TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070046-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: November 6, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
6 NOVEMBER 1974
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This propaganda :utalysjs report is hascd exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by F13IS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
Notional Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure su5ject to
criminal sanctions
I CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 NOVEMBER 1974
CONTENTS
CYPRUS
Soviet Conference Idea Pushed, Criticism of Turkey Avoided . . . . . .
1
MIDDLE EAST
Belyayev Outspoken on U.S., USSR Policies, Brezhnev Trip, PLO. . . . .
3
U.S.-EAST EUROPE RELATIONS
Romania, Yugoslavia Voice Satisfaction With Kissinger Visits . . . . .
8
USSR-FRG
Brezhnev Sets Adamant Moscow Tone on West Berlin Issue . . . . . . . .
10
CEMA-EC RELATIONS
Brezhnev-Schmidt Statement Endorses "Official" Contacts. . . . . . . .
13
MBFR-CSCE
Warsaw Pact "Compromise" Proposal Labeled "Genuine Concession" . . . .
15
INDOCHINA
Communists Optimistic About Current Strategy in South Vietnam. . . . .
17
North Vietnamese Conference Discusses Local Military Tasks . . . . . .
19
Cambodian Front Economic Delegation Visits Hanoi, Peking . . . . . . .
20
Campaign Focuses on Production, Unity; Hits Factionalism . . . .
23
Peking Asks Cadres to Inspire Production Through Manual Labor. . . . .
24
USSR
Rehabilitation of Molotov Hinted in New Encyclopedia Article . . . . .
26
NOTES
Cuban "Counterrevolutionary"; Pyongyang Stress on
Loyalty, Ideology; PRC Pig Raising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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CYPRUS
SOVIET CONFERENCE IDEA PUSHED, CRITICISM OF TURKEY AVOIDED
Moscow gave minimal attention to the UNGA debate on Cyprus,
welcoming with qualifications the resolution adopted on 1 November.
A TASS dispatch by Romantsov on the 2d noted approvingly that the
resolution urged respect for Cyprus' independence, sovereignty,
territorial integrity and nonalined policy and demanded the
withdrawal of all foreign military forces, but nevertheless
complained that it was not without flaws. It was silent,
Romantsov said, about the factors causing the tragedy and failed
to reflect "some constructive proposals" for solving the
problem--an implicit reference to the proposal. in the 22 August
Soviet Government statement for an internatioral conference
under UN auspices. Again pressing for acceptance of the Soviet
initiative, Romantsov interpreted the UNGA resolution's
"provision for further UN responsibility" as recognition of the
value of "the proposals" for an international conference.
TURKISH RJLE SolTiet media continue to accuse "leading NATO
circles" of attempting to impose a solution
and trying to make the Cypriot people reconcile themselves to
the "fact of partition." Criticism of Turkey's role is still
expressed only indirectly; A commentator on Moscow radio's
international roundtable on 3 November professed to be impressed
by the Greek Cypriot refugees' "surprising maturity" in blaming
the tragedy on the former Greek junta, NATO, the CIA, and Cypriot
EOKA-B terrorists, when "it was easiest for them to acc;ise those
causing their fear and flight--the Turkish army." And a Gerasimov
English-language commentary on the 4th remarked that territory
producing 70 percent of Cyprus' gross national product "continues
to be occupied by foreign troops."
Soviet opposition to geographical federation was reportedly
expresses' by Podgornyy to a Turkish parliamentary delegation which
visited the Soviet Union in mid-October. According to the
30 October Istanbul HURRIYET, Podgornyy told the visitors that
the USSR would like "administration given to the Turkish Cypriots
in local organizations where the Turkish Cypriots were in the
majority," and he insisted that all foreign forces must
immediately leave the island. TASS in reporting Podgornyy's
meeting with the delegation said only that Podgornyy explained the
Soviet stand on the Cyprus issue and stressed the importance of
Moscow's proposal. for a conference under UN auspices. Commenting
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on this meeting, a broadcast by the Turkish-language clandestine
"Our Radio" on 23 October attacked the head of the Turkish
delegation for reportedly saying that Turkey had used "other
means" to settle the Cyprus issue. In one of its strongest
denunciations of Turkey's Cyprus policy, Our Radio accused
Ankara of having "engendered bloodshed, terror, destruction and
the hysteria of ardent chauvinism," occupying more than half of
Cyprus, dividing the island and imposing the "American
imperialist" plan to convert Cyprus into U.S. and NATO base.
A Turkish-language commentary broadcast on the 22d, after the
parliamentary delegation's visit, seemed to suggest that Moscow
would not be averse to exr siting Ankara's problems with Washington
over military aid. TASS had reported without comment the
Congressional struggle to pass a resolution banning military aid
to Turkey over Presidential veto, and the compromise bill signed
on 18 October under which aid would continue until 10 December
provided, 'PASS noted, that "Turkey observe the cease-fire in
Cyprus, not increase its troop contingent in Cyprus, and not
send to Cyprus the 'tools of war' it receives from the United
States." The 22 October broadcast to Turkey, praising in
generalities Moscow'.; "policy of developing good-neighborly
relations" with Ankara, called this policy of particular importance
for Turkey at a time when "Turkey is meeting with certain difficulties
in a series of international problems, including its relations with
its NATO allies."
Moscow for the most part has not brought up the Cyprus problem in
discussing the governmental crisis in Turkey stemming from
Prime Minister Ecevit's resignation on 18 September. But an article
by Shmarov in NEW TIMES (No. 41, 11 October) on the governmental
situation observed that the interparty friction in Ecevit's
coalition government had been intensified by Turkey's acute
economic difficulties. Shmarov remarked that the financial problems
had been aggravated by the "heavy cost" of maintaining Turkish
troops in Cyprus. While the government, Shmarov said, hoped to
cover these expenditures "by means of an 'Operation Peace' government
bond issue," economists believed these hopes to be unfounded.
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MIDDLE EAST
BELYAYEV OUTSPOKEN UN U.S,., USSR POLICIES, BREZHNEV TRIP, PLO
One of the Soviet Union's Lop 1.1_i.ddle E.-:st specialists, Igor P.
Belyayev, has suggested recently that Moscow intends to project
a more active and visible presence in that area, beginning with
Brezhnev's visit to several Arab countries iii January 1975. An
undated interview, which internal evidence i_idi_cates was held
within the past three weeks, was published on 4 November by the
independent Beirut daily AN-NAHAR. Belyayev was remarkably
candid in responding to a series of topical and politically
sensitive questions. He addressed such issues as the political
calculations underlying Brezhnev's forthcoming trip, Soviet policy
on the possible formation of an independent Palestinian state
and/or government-in-exile, the influence of past and present
U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East, and the differences in U.S.
and Soviet approaches to a final peace settlement.
Belyayev--.long with his former PRAVDA colleague Primakov--exercised
similar frankness in the past in forthrightly discussing substantive
Middle East issues and Soviet policies. AN-NAHAR described
Belyayev as PRAVDA's "chief commentator and expert on the Middle
East and Arab-Soviet affairs," noting that as a PRAVDA correspondent
in Cairo from 1957-1963 he had established. a close relationship
with Egyptian President Nasir and since 1963 "has visited the
area once or more every year and held contacts with senior officials."*
BREZHNEV In discussing Soviet motives for Brezhnev's first
VISIT visit to the Middle East since becoming party leader
in late 1964, Belyayev for the most part eschewed
stereotyped praisa for the trip's contribution to peaceful and
cooperative interstate relations. He instead emphasized, in
plainspoken terms, Moscow's intention to assert: its interests
in the Middle East more forcefully than heretofore:
I believe it is time for the Soviet Union to
show that it will have a very active and
* From 1957-1970 Belyayev was associated with PRAVDA and wrote
extensively on Middle East topics. At one time, he was a deputy
foreign editor; at another, the editor of PRAVDA's Asia and Africa
department. Since late 1970 he has been identified as deputy director
of the Africa Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences, but
has occasionally contributed articles to PRAVDA and other journals.
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positive role in the area. It is time for us
to show that we are in the area, we have a
presence in it, and that we are not negativists.
From this stems the importance of Brezhnev's
visit.
In this context Belyayev expressed Moscow's evident resentment
over charges that it has thus far played a "negative," if not
negligible, role :.n the diplomatic efforts to arrange a Middle
East sctlerlent. He recalled that Brezhnev had "once" replied
to "certain journalists" who had raised this criticism.
(Brezhnev in fact had responded testily last March to French
journalists who had remarked on the "impression" that the USSR
had in some measure withd7:awn itself from the Mideast problem.
Calling that impression "superficial," Brezhnev insisted that
"not for a minute did we leave the Middle East outside the sphere
of our attention.") Belyayev stressed that the USSR had in fact
made positive preliminary steps toward arranging a peace settle-
ment, but that "the activity of certain politicians in the region
eclipsed our efforts." Belyayev was distinctly defensive on the
issue, claimiig that "the Soviet Union's role in the Middle East
crisis is being misunderstood" and asserting, as a corrective,
that the USSR was doing everything possible to arrange a just and
lasting peace. He added that, "however, this peace cannot be
contrary to Soviet interests."
USSR-EGYPT Belyayev did not mention the 14-18 October visit to
RELATIONS Moscow of an Egyptian Government delegation, headed
by Foreign Minister Fahmi, during which a joint
Soviet-Egyptian "announcement" on the 15th had first officially
stated that Brezhnev would visit Egypt in January 1975.* But
Belyayev did confirm reports by some Arab media that Brezhnev
would visit unspecified "other Arab countries" in addition to
Egypt--AN-NAHAR speculated they would be Iraq, Algeria and Syria.
The inclusion of additional countries on Brezhnev's itinerary,
presumably to increase the scope and significance of the tour,
would at the same time dilute the political impact of Brezhnev's
first v4.sit to Cairo to try to mend strained Soviet-Egyptian
relations and return as-Sadat's Moscow visits. Belyayev did not
pursue this particular point, but when asked if Brezhnev's trip
would begin a new chapter in Soviet relations with the countries
visited, he drew a distinction between expectations of "strengthening
* For details of the Fahm:i delegation visit, see the TRENDS of
23 October 1974, pages 1-7.
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and improving relations w.Lth Egypt" and "consolidating traditional
relations" with the other countries involved.
Some of Belyayev's additional comments on Brezhnev's trip testified
to persistent strains in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Rather than
presenting a forward-looking view of these relations, for example,
Belyayev highlighted the existence "recently" of a "misunderstanding
between the Egyptian and Soviet leaderships." He also charged
that "certain elements in Egypt, especially =among the rightists
and traditionalists, and several journalists," have wanted
Soviet-Egyptian relations to worsen, playing a "dishonest game"
in asserting that "America will solve the problems of Egypt and
the Arab world."
Asked what tangible results he foresaw from Brezhnev's visit to
Egypt, Belyayev refrained from predicting concrete agreements
that might be announced during the visit itself. He expressed,
rather, a general be.ief that the visit would lead to improved
Soviet-Egyptian couperation in several fields and that the discussions
would cover Soviet military assi,3tance, scientific, technical and
educational matters, and economic questions, including Egypt's
desire for the USSR "to contribute to the five-year development
p Lin." Belyayev added, "As for nuclear cooperation, if this
question is raised seriously by Egypt, then it will be discussed
during the visit."
PALESTINIAN Belyayev's remarks on Soviet policy toward the
ISSUES Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the
complex of issues related to the Palestinian question,
although generally consistent with Soviet comment in recent months,
were more explicit on several key points and suggested that Moscow's
support of the PLO might be expected to increase. Thus, asked
whether Brezhnev during his trip to the Middle East would meet
with PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat, Belyayev responded, "Why not?
Such a meeting is quite logical and conforms with our Palestinian
policy," qualifying his remarks only by adding that such a meeting
would depend on the trip agenda. A question regarding Soviet
policy toward the creation of an independent Palestinian state
evoked the reply that the Palestinians must find a way to establish
such a state and that 'Arafat was told by Soviet officials
during his visit to Moscow last summer that the USSR supported the
idea.* Belyayev expanded, "This means, in practice, that the Soviet
* Neither the AN-NAI-IAR interviewer or Belyayev mentioned the resolution
on the Palestinian question at the 26-29 October Arab summit in Rabat.
For a discussion of 'Arafat's visit to Moscow 30 July-3 August 1974, see
the TRENDS of 7 August 1974, pages 12-14. For details on the Rabat
conference, see the TRENDS of 31 October 1974, pages 4-5.
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Union will ;support this state and help it when it is established.
We are ready to cooperate in all fields." On the related question
of a government-in-exile being formed while the Palestinians await
land for a new national state, Belyayev responded that Moscow
would consider it a "positive step" and "will surely recognize it."
Belyayev also ventured that the United States would in time,
despite statements to the contrary, recogn-;-e the PLO.
U.S. POLICY Belyayev soughtat several points in the interview
to draw a picture of diminishing U.S. influence in
Middle East affairs, while seeking to convey a contrasting
impression of emergent Soviet diplomatic activity. Alleging a
belief by "certain people" in "American miracles that will solve
the Arabs' problems," for instance, Belyayev referred disdainfully
to the miracles' "limited and modest results." He also asserted
that Secretary Kissinger--who arrived in Cairo the day after
AN-NAHAR published Belyayev's interview--"is no longer strong
enough to exert real pressure on Israel," charging in addition
that U.S. policy has not only failed to deliver a promised "era
of happiness, prosperity, and stability" in the Middle East but
has had the opposite effect. Belyayev criticized "unilateral
diplomacy" and, in line with Moscow's comment over the past year,
contrasted the U.S. apprcach with "the more suitable way to a real
solution"--resumption of the Geneva conference.
GENEVA TALKS Although reiterating a standard Soviet call,
Belyayev expressed Moscow's advocacy of a
renewed Geneva conference in forceful language.
We say: Anyone who wants a real solution must
go to Geneva. This is the real keystone. We
do not believe in so-called "quiet and secret
diplomacy." The Soviet Union must participate
in every effort and in every tangible action
to achieve a just peace in the Middle East. We
insist on this. . . . The United States wants
the Geneva conference to be the final stage,
at which what has been agreed upon will be
signed. This is wrong.
Belyayev also expressed concern that the Geneva conference may not
occur "before April or May or even before the coming summer" and
claimed that the date could be advanced if the Arab states took
a unanimous position on the issue.
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Other Soviet comment has also been criticizing "quiet di.plomacy"
and in^isting that the Soviet Union be a party to efforts for a
settlement. Thus a Losev commentary broadcast in English to North
America on 31 October charged "groups in the United States" with
trying to postpone tha Geneva conference and supplant a comprehensive
settlement with partial decisions and separate agreements. Losev
accused the same American "groups" with also attempting to eliminate
the Soviet Union from a Mideast settlement and to "impair Soviet
interests," and he asserted that "there can be no fair peace
settlement in present conditions without the active participation
of the Soviet Union."
Earlier, a Vladimirov article in the October INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
(signed to press 19 September) had been unusually explicit in
outlining Soviet views of Geneva conference procedure. While
comment normally has gone no further than to press for the speediest
resumption of the talks, Vladimirov claimed that an important
benefit of the Geneva machinery lay in the fact that it. made it
possible to examine simultaneously "the whole complex or several
key questions while using the most varied forms of talks and
contacts such as plenary sessions, committees, working groups, and
bilateral and multilateral meetings and contacts of other sorts."
He indicated still another reason why Moscow preferi~d the Geneva
arrangement: It provides the opportunity to overcome such obstacles
as "the absence of diplomatic relations between any particular
participants"--implicitly, Israel and the Soviet Union.
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U. S, - EAST E UROPE RELATIONS
ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA VOICE SATISFACTION WITH KISSINGER VISITS
Bucharest and Belgrade responded to Secretary Kissinger's brief
3-4 November -visits with positive assessments of their relations
with the United States. Both Ceausescu and Tito indicated
satisfaction with their talks and also voiced support for the
Secretary's subsequent visit to the Mideast regarding an Arab-
Israeli settlement. Belgrade media were markedly effusive about
the visit in the wake of the Secretary's favorable comments on
nonalinement in a recent speech in New Delhi.
Bucharest's preoccupation in its relations with the United States--
the. receiving of most-favored-nation status--was exhibited during
the visit. The issue was highlighted by Ceausescu during a
3 November interview with U.S. and other foreign newsmen and
reported by AGERPRES. Noting "satisfaction" with the development
of "relations of friendship and cooperation" between the two
countries, he pointed out that "some problems" do exist but
singled out only MFN as a sorepoint. Ceausescu also made a
point of stating that the Secretary had assured him Romania
would receive MEN status in the near future" and added that
they had thus agreed to initiate negotiations on a trade agree-
ment. Ceausescu's mildly positive assessment of U.S.-Romanian
relations was balanced with his characterization of Soviet-Romanian
relations as "proceeding in good condition" and based or. the
reality that "we are neighbors, socialist countries--and our
relations develop correspondingly." Bucharest media have not
originated additional comment beyond that by Ceausescu.
TALKS IN Belgrade's welcoming remarks preceding the Secretary's
YUGOSLAVIA visit emphasized his New Delhi speech. BORBA on
3 November, for example, described then as "a
completely fresh assessment" of nonalinement acknowledging the
"full sovereignty, equal-ty and independence of the policy of small
countries, a formula paying tribute to the positive role of
nonalined policy in international life." Against such a background,
the media assessed the Secretary's Belgrade visit as one of "excep-
tionally great interest" and as "one of the very important events"
in relations between the two countries. They uniformly predicted
that the Secretary's talks with Tito and other leaders would conclude
"satisfactorily" so long as he recognized that Yugoslavia's nonalined
role necessitated that it sometimes take international positions
in opposition to the United States.
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Comment following the talks suggested that their outcome
furthered the enthusiasm surrounding the visit. Tito himself
characterized his discussions as "very good" and noted "identical
views" on "many things," adding that he and the Secretary had
"agreed that we will continue to further strengthen our relations,
which have thus far not been bad." Outspoken Zagreb radio commen-
tator Milika Sundic, who provided the harshest criticism of
Secretary Kissinger and U.S. foreign policy prior to the talks,
concluded afterward that they "were more cordial, more comprehen-
sive and more useful than could have been expected." And TANJUG's
diplomatic editor Velimir Budimir, noting that "official Yugoslav
quarters" had assessed the talks "very favorably," praised U.S.
acceptance of Yugoslavia's policy of nonalinement, emphasizing
the Secretary's "assurances" of "U.S. interest in keeping
Yugoslavia as she is today." Budimir concluded that U.S. support
for Belgrade's nonalined position "undoubtedly" suggested that
both sides planned to intensify bilateral relations "in all fields,"
pointing out, however, that "no concrete arrangements were
considered in that respect. . . ." (:Monitored Belgrade media
have not commented on a 5 November Washington POST report that
Tito and Secretary Kissinger discussed possible U.S. arms supplies
to Yugoslavia.)
Belgrade's enthusiasm also seemed mixed with a certain pique that
Washington in the past did not give Belgrade proper attention in
view of Yugoslavia's own perception of its nonalined international
position. Comment repeatedly referred to the shortness of the
seven-hour visit and the paucity of high-level contacts between
the two countries and called for more frequent, regular contacts.
This was the Secretary's first official visit to Yugoslavia;
Secretary Rogers visited Belgrade in July 1972 during a tour of
East European capitals.
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USSR-FRG
BREZHNEV SETS ADAMANT MOSCOW TONE ON WEST BERLIN ISSUE
During and since the 28-31 October visit to the USSR by FRG
Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher, Moscow has
been at pains to convey an adamant public stance against any
possible concessions to Bonn on West Berlin. Brezhnev, for
instance, made clear in his 28 October dinner speech that
Moscow was not receptive to reopening "settled" issues involv-
ing West Berlin and that any attempts to do so would be
unproductive. Moscow's public posture is in sharp contrast
with that portrayed by WesL German leaders' public statements
and FRG press reports, which have implied that Moscow privately
did not totally obstruct progress. The West Germans indicated
that progress was made in Moscow on meeting Bonn's interests in
West Berlin, particularly regarding energy supplies to West
Berlin and the participation of West Berlin institutions and
inhabitants with those of the FRG in bilateral agreements with
the Soviet Union.
BREZHNEV REMARKS Brezhnev discussed the West Berlin issue
in unusually strong terms in his 28 October
speech, which on that question reflected the tone of his 6 October
speech at GDR anniversary ceremonies in East Berlin in criticizing
Bonn's policies on West Berlin. Implicitly referring to pre-visit
remarks by Schmidt and Genscher connecting FRG interests in West
Berlin with the signing of any future USSR-FRG bilateral economic
agreements, Brezhnev told his guests that
attempts are made to create obstacles for mutual
understanding in the areas where, it seemed, obstacles
have already been overcome. So it happens with the
West Berlin issue, which was settled when the four-
party agreement was concluded. The agreement, as it
is generally admitted, makes it possible to solve
successfully practical problems related to West Berlin.
Strict observance of the agreement--this is what is
needed so that the West Berlin issue should no longer
cloud the political atmosphere in the center of Europe.
We would like to thin;, that the Federal Government
proceeds from the same view.
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Disagreement over how to acknowledge that the current talks
dealt with various aspects of the September 1971 Quadripartite
Agreement on Berlin was reflected in Brezhnev's remarks and the
joint statement on the current visit. The Schmidt visit joint
statement, released by TLSS on the 30th, ambiguously said that
the two sides had "discussed the range of questions" regarding
implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement "in that portion
of it which bears on their bilateral relations and in this
context confirmed the joint statement of 21 may 1973." Brezhnev's
speech merely used the phrase calling for "strict observance"
of the Quadripartite Agreement, without iclding a call for its
"full implementation," on which the FRG insists. The phrase
"full implementation" reflects the wording of the Big Four
agreement that West Germany's ties with West Berlin should
continue and be strengthened. Both phrases had appeared in the
21 May 1973 FRG-Soviet statement on Brezhnev's visit to the FRG,
which declared that Br.ezhnev and then Chancellor Brandt were
unanimous that "strict o4servance and full implementation" of
the Quadripartite Agreement were essential to firm detente in
Central Europe and to imrrove relations between the states
concerned, particularly the Soviet Union and the FRG.
PRESS, RADIO Ca^MIENT Prior to the Schmidt visit, Soviet
coimnnntators had reiterated Soviet
reluctance to reopen the "settled" West Berlin issue. Nikolay
Polyarov, IZVESTIYA first deputy chief editor and German expert,
noted in the 27 October Moscow radio observers roundtable that
West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and cannot be governed by
it--the passage from the Quadripartite Agreement usually cited
by Moscow and East Berlin in discussing Nest Berlin-FRG relations.
In a similar vein, Moscow Radio's German specialist Gennadiy Siderov
on the 24th ridiculed West German suggestions that Schmidt should
"make West Berlin the hinge" of the Moscow talks and insure that
discussion of West Berlin was "the focus of the exchange of opinions
and the main objective of the visit." In a followup commentary on
1 November, Siderov concluded that "efforts to divert" the Moscow-
Bonn dialog "from the main issue were not crowned with success."
In an apparent attempt to lay the West Berlin issue to rest for now,
TASS director general Leonid Zamyatin observed on Moscow radio on
the 2d that the entire West Berlin question was "settled" in the
1971 agreement, which "created a good basis for the maintenance
of a normal, peaceful situation" for West Berlin. Zamyatin placed
full blame on Bonn for any difficulties arising over West Berlin,
saying: "If the known frictions arise, then the reason for them is
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that on the FRG side frequent attempts are made to, as it wer',
touch up this agreement for their benefit, to evade its pivotal
provision--that West Berlin does not belong to and is not governec
by the FRG." Pointing out that "the problem only arises when
there are violations" of the Quadripartite Agreement, Zamyatin
quoted the full passage from the 1973 joint statement and labeled
as "far-fetched" the raising of the "sc-called West Berlin
problem" by the West German pross.
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?. 13 -
C E 1 . 1 A - E C RE LAT I ONS
BREZHNB -SCHMIDT STATEMENT ENDORSES "OFFICIAL" CONTACTS
A brief endorsement of the establishment of organizational ties
between CEMA and the Common Market, in t!ie 30 October joint
statement issued by Brezhnev and FRG Chancellor Schmidt at the
end of the latter's Moscow visit, was the first such official
Soviet endorsement since Brcrhnev first called for CEhA-EC
Lies in his 21 December 1972 address on the USSR's 50th anni-
versary. The joint statement, carried by TASS, said the two
leaders agreed that "establishment of official contacts between
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the European
Economic Community would help broaden and intensify economic
contacts between the European countries on the basis of respect
for their interests."
Commentaries in support of organizational contacts had appeared
sporadically in the media of Moscow and its CEMA allies in the
wake of Brezhnev's 1972 endorsement. These commentaries have
proliferated in the recent period, a period marked by the
11 October UN General Assembly decision to grant observer status
to both CEMA and the EC. Thus, a K1:arlanov article in PI:AVDA
on 8 October noted that West European newspapers were calling
increasingly for CEMA-EC contacts "between the organizations
themselves," in addition to the existing bilateral trade ties
between member countries of the two bodies. The PRAVDA article
added, in the same vein as Brezhnev's 1972 speech, that such
contacts would be desirable provided the EC did not exert
pressure or '-ose preconditions which could interfere with
bilateral economic relations between the respective member states.
A subsequent Chernyshev article in the 13 OctoLer KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA stressed that East-West detente had, despite t'ie efforts
of its opponents, "created a favorable situation for the further
expansion of international business ties, including those between
the EC and CEMA." Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 16th echoed the
8 October PP.A.VDA article in stressing that Moscow and its allies
favored CEi-IA-EC contacts only if bilateral ties were not disrupted.
The paper noted that the EC foreign ministers meeting which opened
in Luxembourg on the 15th would discuss the question of CEMA-EC
contacts.
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Perhaps to conceal their concern over the status of the bilateral
`rade agreements, the CEMA countries have not reported the EC
countries' dec'-iior. to cancel such agreements as of next January
and to replace them with trade pacts between the EC organization
and individual East European countries, including the GDR.
Western news reports that C04A Secretary General Fadeyev hay:
invited EC Commission President Ortoli to visit Moscow before the
end of the year, presumably to discuss the EC decision, have
likewise not been confirmed by Soviet bloc media.*
Continued Soviet bloc caution was further underscored in the
absence of any mention of CEMA-EC contacts in PRAVDA's report
on the 15-17 October CEMA Executive Committee session in the
Soviet capital. In addition to announcing routine decisions
on intra-CEMA cooperation, the report confined itself to hailing
the UN decision on granting CEIvIA observer status and to a
lengthy commemor?tion of the 10th anniversary of Yugoslav
participation in CEMA.
;ov-et followup comment on Chancellor Schmiit's visit to Moscow
has included only an occasional mention, without elaboration,
of the fact that he and Brezhnev had endorsed the establishment
of CEI4A-EC contacts.
* For discussion of an approach made by Fadeyev to the EC last
year, see the TRENDS of 3 October 1973, pages 12-13.
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!'1BFR-CSCE
WARSAW PACT "COMPROMISE" PROPOSAL LABELED "GENUINE CONCESSION"
Moscow aiLd its East European allies have argued publicly that the
"new" Warsaw Pact proposal formally introduced by Soviet delegate
Oleg Khlestov at the 31 October plenary session of the Vienna
force reduction talks is a "concrete" and "compromise" Pact
initiative demonstrating the socialist states' "good will" and
effort to get the talks moving.* They have labeled the new
proposal a "genuine concession" which, according to TASS on the
31st, takes into account "a number of elements" in the Western
stand, includes steps tl.at are "easy to implement," and allows
for early advancement at Vienna with "practical results already
next year." Comment stressed that "if the Western states show
sufficient realism" in responding, as Prague's RUDE PRAVO put
it on the 1st, to the "flexibility" demonstrated in the. Pact
initiative, the socialist states believe the Vienna talks "could
take a significant step forward."
Soviet and East European media did not go beyond such laudatory
generalities about the Pact proposal until Hungary's NEPSZABADSAG
on 2 November published an article by Peter Vajda. He elaborated
that the new proposal "suggests a reduction of each side's forces
by 20,000 soldiers in 1975, as part of the planned 'first phase,'
in such a manner that first the Soviet Union and the United States
would reduce their zorces and then, in the second half of the year,
the rest of the countries participating in the talks." Vajda
compared the original Pact proposal with the standing NATO proposal
and concludes that the new initiative met Western demands for a
first-phase combined Soviet-U.S. reduction, which would then be
followed by reductions by the other direct participants in the talks
later in the year.
Although available comment on the new move has not mentioned whether
air force units or nuclear-armed weapons were included in the new
negotiating position, an East Berlin radio commentator on the 4th
seemingly alluded to these when lie expressed hope that the Pact's
"readiness for compromise will also give an impulse to the NATO
states to review their positions on other issues that have hindered
rapid progress in Vienna."
* See the TRENDS of 31 October 1974, pages 7-9, for a discussion of
comment leading up to the new proposal.
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Moscow has sought to score propaganda points in comparing the
"constructive" Pact initiative with statements by Secretary
Schlesinger during his 4-5 November official visit to the FRG.
Observing; that "it would be natural to expect" the West now
to take "constructive steps" at Vienna to find mutually
acceptable agreements, TASS observer Eduard Baskakov on the
5th took Schlesinger to task for his remarks that the United
States was going to increase the combat strength of U.S.
forces in Europe, including an increase in the number of
nuclear-armed rockets in West Germany.
GROMYKO ON CSCE Foreign Minister 6_,:myko, in the 6 November
LINK TO MBFR keynote speech marking the 57th anniversary
of the October Revolution, linked progress
at the force reduction talks with a positive outcome of the
Geneva European security conference negotiations (CSCE). The
only precedent for such a linkage was Politburo member
Ponomarev's 10 June election speech. In language almost
identical to Ponomarev's, Gromyko said that "a positive outcome
of the Geneva conference will create a more favorable atmosphere
for the solution of other issues, including the problem of
troop and arms reductions in central Europe." The foreign
minister prefaced these remarks with crit-?cism of "those of the
Western leaders who have not yet realized" that the peoples of
Europe "expect the conference to take major uecisions at summit
level" and who "consider their petty calculations more important
than lofty aims." He reminded these leaders to "think hard over
the responsibility they assume by holding back artificially the
work of the conference." Such criticisms have been made in the
past by other Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev.
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N D 0 C H I N A
COMMUNISTS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT CURRENT STRATEGY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Hanoi comment on alleged GVN military and political weaknesses
appears to anticipate a continuing communist strategy of limited
military pressure on government forces, based on an underlying
assumption that time is working against Saigon. Commentaries
present an opti_aiistic evaluation of the situation from the
communist vantage point, claiming that the "people" are in "an
ascending position" whereas the "enemy is in a declining
position." In 1972 a similar formulation was linked to calls
for main force attacks to take advantage of the situation and
change the balance of forces,* but current comment advocates no
drastic action.
A 6 November NHAN DAN editorial, typically added to its evaluation
of the ascending and declining forces a prediction -hat the
"people" will continue to advance "steadily" and that the enemy
will certainly decline "steadily." The editorial cited reports
on alleged communist rainy season achievements to sustain its
view that "reality on the battlefield reflects a highly encouraging
situation." It maintained that government forces have been unable
to launch large counterattacks as they did before, that they are
becoming "increasingly passive," and that they are spread thin and
lack strategic reserve forces.
Similar points were made in a 31 October QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN
commentary which candidly acknowledged initial communist problems
in the wake of the January 1973 Paris peace agreement. The
commentary noted that initial ARVN military successes after the
Paris agreement had encouraged the United States to believe that
the South Vietnamese army could stand on its own. Contrary to
these calculations, the commentary asserted, the ARVN's
performance and capabilities have steadily declined and the
* Six days prior to the 1972 offensive the North Vietnamese military
commentator "Chien Thang" ,Vi%:tor) pressed this evaluation of forces
and the need for major attacks, and a similar view was reflected in
reports on the 20th party plenum, released after the start of the
offensive. (See the TRENDS of 12 April 1972, pages 13-15.)
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continuing war is "seriously gnawing at the combat strength of
the Saigon armed forces." Among other things, the paper cited
a report in the French press that 1,000 of Saigon's 1,800
aircraft are grounded because of insufficient fuel or poor
maintenance and asserted that Saigon's total volume of
ammunition only equals the amount used monthly in 1972.
The commentary also claimed that Saigon's initial apparent
successes in pacification have proved transitory. Thus, it
noted that after the peace agreement, when there were no major
uprisings in GVN areas, it appeared that pacification had been
successful and that, with a "quiet rearbase," the ARVN could
concentrate its forces on the frontline. Rejecting this picture,
the commentary claimed that Saigon's subsequent relinquishment of
posts in the Mekong Delta indicated the actual instability of
its hold on the people. The paper maintained that the GVN "outer
defense line was broken" in the 1972 offensive and that "the war
is now taking place right in populated areas of the delta." The
growing anti-Thieu movement in urban areas was similarly seen as
undermining optimistic allied expectations.
The commentary also pointed out that U-S. policy after the peace
agreement depended in Art on the role of a continuing U.S.
deterrent force in the area. The paper did not rule out the
possibility that this deterrent force might be used, but, in
effect underlining the success cf the cozanunists' strategy of
limited military pressure, it noted that the deterrent strategy
and policy of "containing the revolution" have "failed to keep
the puppet forces from sustaining repeated counterblows. . . ."
The possibility that the Ford Administration could not get
Congressional approval for the reintroduction of U.S. air or
naval forces into Indochina is raised in some other comment.
Thus, an 18 October NHAN DAN article by the regular commentator
Tran Kien questioned rhetorically whether Congress would accede to
such an Administration request in view of previous Congressional
abrogation of the Tonkin Gulf resolution and reduction of ,^id to
Saigon, the impact of inflation and the energy shortage, the
declining international position of the United States, and
dissatisfaction with President Ford among the "majority" of the
U.S. people.
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NORTH VIETNAMESE CONFERENCE DISCUSSES LOCAL MILITARY TASKS
North Vietnam's local military forces came under high-level review
at a "recent" national conference held by the Vietnam Workers
Party (VWP) Secretariat and the Central Military Party Committee
and addressed by VWP First Secretary Le Duan, DRV Defense Minister
Vo Nguyen Giap, and Colonel General Iloang Van Thai. The brief
Hanoi accounts available thus far provide little information on
the content of the speeches, although a 5 November radio report
on the conference indicated that both Le Duan and Giap broadly
surveyed the military situation as well as local military tasks,
and that the defense minister made a "profound analysis" of past
military "victories."
According to r: 6 November QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, the
conference was held to disseminate a directive of the VWP Central
Committee Secretariat and a resolution of the Central Military
Party Committee on local military tasks. The report on the conference
noted that the participants pledged to implement the directive and
resolution as well as the instructions given them by Le Duan. The
Central Military Party Committee resolution is not known to have
been carried by Hanoi media. However, a 21 October Hanoi radio
summary of the Secretariat directive indicated that it had set forth
several major tasks--r.ar.ging from the education of cadres and people
about national defense to resolving the relationship between the
requirements for building up the local. military forces and the need
to engage in production and socialist construction.
Judging by the radio summary, Le Duan in his speech at the conference
underlined the importance of the struggle for "independence and
freedom" and the achievement of "national liberation and reunifica-
tion," but also pointed out the significance of economic
construction in North Vietnam. The first secretary maintained that
the tasks involved in the democratic national revolution in the
South and the socialist revolution in the Noith are "inseparable,':
and he called for the close coordination of the development of
local armed forces with the implementation of production plans.
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the conference noted that the
situation in South Vietnam "has exerted and will constantly exert
an impact on the North," requiring vigilance and readiness to cope
with "all eventualities." in addition to discussing the local.
forces' responsibilities for defending their areas, the editorial
called upon localities to mobilize material and human resources
to give "reinforcements to the frontline" and to replenish army
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units with "many outstanding cadres and combatants." The editorial
not only noted that local areas should meet the regular recruitment
drive but that local areas must be prepared to meet "requirements
of expanding the army when necessary."
CAMBODIAN FRONT ECONOMIC DELEGATION VISITS HANOI, PEKING
An "economic and financial" delegation from the Cambodian "liberated
zone" has begun an aid-seeking tour of foreign countries, visiting
Hanoi from 28 October to 3 November and traveling on to Peking.
Led by leng Sary, "special advisor" to RGNU Deputy Prime Minister and
chief insurge:,t leader Khieu Samphan, the delegation has been given
high-level receptions in both capitals. leng Sary previously headed
a delegation to Hanoi in 1971, but the last high-level delegation
from the Cambodian interior to tour abroad was one led by Khieu
Samphan that traveled last spring to a number of nonalined and
communist countries, including North Vietnam and China. The only
aid agreement announced during Khieu Samphan's trip was a
26 May 1974 agreement covering Chinese military aid to the insurgents
for 1974.
HANOI Even with the warm reception given the Cambodian delegation
in Hanoi, the narrow economic focus of its mission has
resulted in somewhat less effusive treatment than marked long
Sary's other official visit to the DRV as the head of an RGNU-FUNK
milirary-diplomatic delegation in November 1971. That visit,
unlike the present stay, resulted in a formal communique and
prompted two Hanoi mass meetings and authoritative comment
the leading Hanoi dailies. Just as in 1971, however, the delegation
this time was received by Le Duan and. Pham Van Dong, on 30 and
29 October respectively. These meetings, snd one with Le Duc Tho
on the 31st, were all said to have occurred in an atmosphere full
of "fraternal militant solidarity." DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen
Duy Trinh, who hosted Ieng Sary in 1971. performed similar honors
at the start cf the delegation's visit by speaking at a reception
for the Cambodians on 28 October; but economic expert Vice Premier
Le Thanh Nghi, who returned to Hanoi from China on the 28th, spoke
at a reception on 2 November and saw the delegates off on the 3d.
DRV Vice Premier Dang Viet Chau and Minister Dang Thi attended all
the different meetings with the Cambodians, as well as the two
receptions, and held separate discussions with the visitors over
"economic relations between Vietnam and Cambodia" on 29 October
and 1 November. (Chau is the vice premier in charge of finance,
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trade, and banking matters, while Dang ihi heads the National
Reunification Commission and negotiated the DRV-Lao economic
aid agreements in September.) The content of the economic
discussions was not publicized, but the presence of two Cambodian
officials in charge of regional rubber production committees
suggests that exploitation of ubber plantations in the "liberated
zone" was one of the topics covered. The nationalization of the
plantations had been announced in a 20 July 1974 communique from
the office of Kheiu Sainphan.
In remarks at the Hanoi receptions, Iong Sary ,tressed that the
delegation's visit was "the beginning of a great developmental
step in the economic and financial relations between our two
countries at present as well as in the future." While l.audinr-
recent production drives in the liberated zone and the self-reliant
spirit of the Cambodians, he acknowledge d that the insurgents
were "poor in capital and technology" and "will be very glad to
receive sincere and unconditional aid from friendly countries."
He highlighted the importance of visits to the DRV's "medium- and
small-size factories, dams, and worksites" to learn from the
Vietnamese "valuable experience." Stressing the importance that
development of a prosperous liberated zone had for a possibly
long-term struggle to defeat the United States and Lon Nol, Ieng
Sary asserted that the "production battle ground" would be vital
in the Front liberation drive "no matter how long it nay last."
Consistent with past practice, Hanoi did not issue a formal aid
agreement with the Cambodians, but DRV spokesmen promised to fulfill
their "international. duty" in support of the Front. Foreign
Minister Trinh on 28 October pledged continued "support and
assistance" and backirg for. Sihanouk's five points. Le Thanh Nghi
on 2 November said that the delegation's visit was "a fine success"
and embodied "a new developmental step" in "the cooperation and
mutual trust between our two countries." A 4 November NHAN DAN
commentary said the visit provided the Vietnamese people with
an opportunity "to reaffirm their determination to fulfill their
internationalist obligation toward their Cambodian brothers."
PEKING Arriving in China on 3 November, the Cambodians were
greeted at the airport by Vice Premier. Li I-isien-nien
and prominent RGNU offic-; ils in Peking, hel.' talks that evening
with Politburo Standing Committee Member Chang Chun-chiao and Li,
and were feted at a banquet hosted by Li and attended by Chang.
Li also held talks with the delegates on the 4th and accompanied
Ieng Sary at the Peking airport that day to greet Prince Sihanouk,
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who was returning from a trip to Algeria. Lower-ranking Chinese
economic and trade officials attended both meetings with the
Cambodians, and the meeting on the 3d included PLA Deputy
Chief of Staff Chang Tsai-chien and Political Commissar of the PLA
General Logistic Department Chang Chih-ming.
Speaking at the banquet on the 3d, Li lauded the insurgents'
"correct line of people's war" against the "traitorous Lon Nol
clique," praised the "remarkable achievements" of the Cambodians'
recent "mass production campaign," gave generalized support for
Sihanouk's stance on a Cambodian settlement, and promised that
the Chinese Government and people would "go all out to support"
the Cambodian struggle. While routinely describing the present
difficulties of the Lon Nol government, Li offered Peking's first
authoritative criticism of last July's Lon Nol peace offer,
asserting that "not long ago, the traitorous Phnom Penh clique
under U.S. instigation made a 'peace negotiation' proposal in an
attempt to hoodwink public opinion." Though noting the offer had
been attacked in Cambodia and by world public opinion, Li
discreetly avoided an explicit Chinese condemnation of the move.
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C H I N A
CAMPAIGN FOCUSES ON PRODUCTION, UNITY; HITS FACTIONALISM
An article in the November issue of RED FLAG entitled "Master
the Dialectical Method of One Dividing into Two" has offered an
ideological rationale for shifting the anti-Lin and Confucius
campaign away from mass criticism and making it a force to aid
economic production. Evidently addressing the objections of
those apparently opposed to the recent calls for all groups to
unite behind the nationwide production drive, the article argued
that class struggle is "sometimes tense, sometimes not so tense,"
and chided those who pay "no attention to the different stages"
of class struggle and mistakenly "struggle against everyone and
negate the alliance." The article explained that "Tw2 do not
mean to negate struggle while stressing unity." Struggle should
be continued, it was carefully noted, but only by the method of
"putting facts on the table and reasoning things oust." Stressing
the need to continue criticism of Lin and Confucius and to
strengthen party leadership over production, the article urged
that greater efforts be made to increase production of agricultural
and light industrial goods in order to "provide us with more daily
necessities" and help speed the development of heavy industry.
The RED FLAG article's concern for strengthening unity and
increasing production has been echoed in several recent provincial
broadcasts denouncing factionalism. Two unusually frank broad-
casts from Chengtu, for example, revealed that central calls for
unity apparently are being misinterpreted or ignored by local
groups. A 27 October broadcast of a SZECHWAN NEWSLETTER
commentator's article pointed out that calls for unity should not
be read as a sign for "small. factions to band together." The
broadcast stressed the need to avoid "harming comrades" and
getting sidetracked into settling "old accounts." A 29 October
Chengtu broadcast of another SZECHWAN NEWSLETTER commentator's
article warned errant party members to turn away from "bourgeois
factionalism" and to strengthen their party spirit. The need for
greater "harmony among ourselves" was urged in a HUNAN DAILY
editorial, broadcast by Changsha radio on 23 October, which
stressed closing ranks politically and striking out only at
genuine enemies of the people.
The most specific warning against allowing factionalism to disrupt
the current stage of the campaign ,'is contained in a 31 October
Taiyuan report on a recent provincial meeting held to map out
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fourth quarter production tasks in Shansi. Local officials at
the meeting warned against "settling accounts later or launching
revenge attacks on those . . . who put up big character posters
about us during the movement." The meeting concluded that
errant cadres must be given a chance to correct their mistakes
by carrying out "self-criticism" and the masses must be educated
to look ahead to the future, rather than getting "tangled in
settling old scores."
PEKING ASKS CADRES TO INSPIRE PRODUCTION THROUGH MANUAL LABOR
A 31 October PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary on the example set by Inner
Mongolian leaders who did manual labor at a rail station in Huhehot
has inspired emulation by a number of other PRC provincial leaders,
including party Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng, according to Liaoning
radio on 4 November. The PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary claimed that
rail efficiency had "rapidly increased" as a result of these
cadres' labors and called for the practice to be "widely
popularized" on a permanent basis, especially in units which have
"an important influence on the whole situation." Thus far almost
all cadres reported doing manual labor have worked in either rail
transport or coal production, indicating the importance accorded
production problems that have long infested both fields. A
4 November NCNA roundup of cadre labor activities in seven
provinces claimed that the participation of provincial cadres
in productive labor has "greatly inspired" the workers and that
iower level cadres are also joining the movement.
The attention to cadre labor apparently follows recent central
instructions stressing the need to improve economic production in
key areas. A 31. October Huhehot account of cadre labor in Inner
Mongolia stated that provincial leaders were taking part in manual
labor in order to "swiftly implement the important instruction of
the party Central Committee." Th-e labor movement lends further
emphasis to the attention recently accorded economic production
efforts in the PRC, as preparations apparently advance for a "leap
forward" next year, the final year of the current five-year plan.
Provincial reports stress that the leaders' attention to labor
has already helped resolve rail transport loading problems. The
4 November Shenyang report on cadre labor claimed that on
1 November (Li Te-sheng's first day on the job), one Shenyang
station set a new record in loading and unloading boxcars; it
added that the Liaoning party committee has ordered leading cadres
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at all levels to join in the winter railway transport task.
Ieilungkiang on 4 November broadcast comments by a railroad
worker who, "Inspired" by the example, pledged that all workers
would "work hard with added vigor." A Heilungkiang railroad
official pointed up the seriousness of the rail problem in
noting that the cadres' example had spurred the workers to ship
out coal accumulated at the rail yard for the past 10 days.
Canton radio on 4 November reported that the speed of railway
loading "has been greatly accelerated" and carried remarks by
First Secretary Chao Tzu-yang promising that the rail station
leadership would adopt new measures to further tap productio..
potentials.
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USSR
REHABILITATION OF MOLOTOV HINTED IN NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLE
A.^ article on former Soviet Premier V.M. Molotov, appearing
in the recently available volume 16 of the GRLAT SOVIET
ENCYCLOPEDIA, lends credence to rumors that he has been or
will be restored to party membership. The article on the
84-year old Molotov is the first in an} post-1957 Soviet
encyclopedia to accord favorable treatment to a member of the
disgraced "antiparty group" involved in the unsuccessful 1957
coup attempt against Khrushchev. In completely ignoring
Molotov's role as a ringleader in the coup and his subsequent
public disgrace, the article is in striking contrast to a 1971
encyclopedia entry on former Premier N.A. Bulganin, whose obloquy
as a member of the antiparty group is clearly specified, even
though Bulganin was only a marginal participant and was not
even punished initially.
The Bulganin article, in volume 4 of the encyclopedia, issued
in January 1971, stated d?.rectly that he had been expelled from
the Presidium "for participation in the anti-party group"--the
1957 attempt by Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, L.M. Kaganovich and
Bulganin to remove Khrushchev. It also noted that he had had
the title "Marshal of the Soviet Union" from 1947 to 1958,
indicating for the first time that Bulgan in had been stripped o_
his military rank when he was belatedly denounced and removed
as premier in late 1958.
In contrast, the Molotov article, in a volume signed to press
11 April, simply notes that he had been first deputy premier,
foreign minister and member of the Presidium until 1957, ambassador
to Mongolia until 1960, and then representative at the International
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna until 1962, when he retired on
pension. In addition, unlike Bulganin's article, Molotov's was
accompanied by a photo.
Molotov's treatment is similar to that of former President K.E.
Voroshilov, who though marginally associated with the anti-party
group was never really disgraced, and who in the last years before
his death in February 1969 was again treated as a national hero
and given great publicity. A 1971 volume of the new encyclopedia
carried an article with photo on Voroshilov similar to the 1974
entry on Molotov. Vo,-oshilov's collaboration with the anti-party
group had not been publicly revealed until the early 1960's, and
even after accusations against him at the 1961 22d CPSU Congress he
had remained a member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.
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Further comparisons are not possible since the new edition of
the encyclopedia which carries the Bulganin and Molotov articles
has carried no articles on the other anti-p,irty group leaders
Kaganovich and Malenkov, and other encyclopedias issued since
1957--the SMALL SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA, the UKRAINIAN SOVIET
ENCYCLOPEDIA, and the SOVIET HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA--have
carried no articles on any of the anti-party group members.
BACKGROUND ON EXPULSIONS The question of expelling Molotov and
the others and even bringing therm to
trial for Stalin-era crimee was bitterly contested under Khrushchev.
Although Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich were expelled from the
Presidium and denounced as rriminals by Khrushchev and his followers
after the 1957 coup attempt, efforts to further punish them
were consistently blocked. Only after a deluge of accusations of
murder and other crimes at the 22d Congress in late 1961 were
Molotov and some others finally expelled from the party. Even
at that, the only confirmation of the expulsions came in Suslov's
February 1964 plenum speech, where he harshly assailed Molotov
and the anti-party group and then condemned the Chinese for
expressing sympathy for persons "thrown out of the ranks of our
party." Suslov mentioned only Molotov, Kaganovich and
Malenkov as members of the anti-party group, suggesting that
Bulganin was not regarded as such a serious offender and had
not been expelled from the party. The 1971 encyclopedia entry
on Bulganin may reflect his continued party membership; similarly,
the encyclopedia's recognition of Molotov while ignoring Malenkov
and Kaganovich suggests that Molotov may already have been
readmitted to the party.
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N 0 T E S
CUBAN "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY": Cuban media have publicized a
long interview with a Cuban "counterrevolutionary" who has
returned to the told. Text of the interview with ex-emigre
Carlos Rivero Callado, conducted by Radio Havana, was broadcast
by IIuvana's international service on 3 November. Havana has
said than Rivero returned "recently" but has not said when
the interview took place; the timing of its release may have
been with an ey? to the opening of the OAS meeting in Quito
on 8 November. Rivero Callado, who ].eft Cuba in 1959 and
took part in the Bay of Pigs invasion, described his disillusion-
ment with the "disloyalty, cynicism and perversity" of the
capitalist system and his decision to support the Castro regime.
He gave details of an emigre terrorist campaign whose past
targets, be asserted, included Castro and Salvador Allende and
which currently is aimed at assassinating Secretary Kissinger
and diplomats from Latin American countries voting to lift
the OAS sanctions imposed against Cuba. Charging that the
terrorist organizations had worked with the CIA in the past,
he said that they now received "arms, equipment and money"
from the Pinochet regime in Chile. Rivero also claimed that
"not all the names have been revealed" of Cuban emigres involved
in Watergate activities. Moscow's reaction to the interview,
in TASS and Moscow radio reports, noted Rivero's charges against
the CIA but chiefly singled out his accusations that the Chilean
Government was "trying to unfold criminal activities" in other
countries by using "u].traright reactionary groups and all kind
of riff-raff."
PYONGYANG STRESS ON LOYALTY, IDEOLOGY: A 2 November NODONG SINNUN
editorial marking the fourth anniversary of the Korean Workers Party
Fifth Congress reflects increased DPRK attention to the need for
loyalty to the Pyongyang leadership. The current editorial
interjects elements not raised in last year's anniversary editorial
when it cites--in two different passages--the need to follow the
Central Committee anct repeatedly stresses the need for loyalty
to Kim I1-sung. As in previous years, the editorial concentrates
on the economic goals of the Fifth Congress, but it departs from
earlier practice in pointing out that of the "two fortresses"
(ideological and material) standing in the path of communist
society, the ideological fortress must necessarily be captured
before the material can be achieved. Increased attention to
Kim began to appear in 1PRK media early in 1974, and during the
past few months there have been a number of unusual mentions of
the party Central Committee or "party center."
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PRC PIG RAISING: Greater stress on collective pig raising in
several Chinese provinces indicates dissatisfaction with the
overall progress being made in pig raising. Lack of progress
toward the long-held Maoist goal of "one pig, one person" was
most clearly illustrated by a. 29 October HEILUNGKIANG DAILY
commentary which claimed increases of 10,000 pigs per year for
the past three years. While the commentary did not point out
the extent to which pig production was lagging--the province's
human population probably increased by over 400,000 each year--
it vented displeasure by noting that the ideological struggle
was still acute and warned against "allowing the spontaneous
influences of capitalism to grow arid lead pig raising into
capitalism." The report noted in passing that support must he
given to pig raising by individual commune members, but stressed
that the collective effort had the potential for "large-scale,
rapid development." Recent reports from Tsinghai province and
Hainan Island have also stated that the one pig per capita. goal
can be reached only through collective efforts. Reports of
provincial conferences in Tsinghai on 14 October and Neilungk?.ang
on 1 November called for more party attention to the problem.
Tsinghai called for creating hog-raising committees at provincial.,
county, and commune levels, and both provinces called for personal
attention to the problem by chiefs or designated deputies at
all levels. Collective pig raising has been a sensitive issue
since the Chinese great leap forward, during which millions of
pigs were slaughtered by peasants resisting collectivization
efforts. The current campaign does not appear to pose an
immediate threat to individual ownership of pigs through any
change in the public-private "walk on two legs" policy of recent
years. However, recent provincial calls for a "new leap forward"
next year and criticisms of rural capitalism suggest that the
next five-year plan may call for some increase in the level of
socialism in the countryside.
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- i -
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 28 OCTOBER - 3 NOVEMBER 1974
Moscow (2657 items)
Peking (915 items)
FRG Chancellor Schmidt
(2%)
10%
Criticism of Lin Piao
(8%)
9%
in USSR
[Brezhnei Dinner Speech
(--)
3%]
and Confucius
UNGA Session
(6%)
9
Algerian Revolution 20th
(--)
6,
Arab Summit Conference,
(1%)
6
Anniversary
China
(5%)
5%
Rabat
[Chou Greetings
(] %)
.3?J
Kissinger in USSR
(4%)
4%
Albania
(--)
6%
[Communique
(1%)
3%]
[Chou, Teng
(--)
3%]
Kosygin Speech at Kirghiz
(--)
3%
Congratulations on
SSR 50th Anniversary
Portuguese State Minister
(--)
3%
Leaders' Reappoint-
ments
Cunhal in USSR
Vietnam
(4%)
5%
[DRV/PRC Economic,
(1%)
2%]
Military Aid
Agreement
Economic Crisis in the
(6%)
3
West
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues:
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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