TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: October 31, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

se 19~/.$$~B~;~fA-12DP85;{OQ$76R000~U007f1d~15=9
Tren~!'s in .~~ar~m~uni~s~# Propaganda ~~` ~ 3~1 ,pct ~4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
Confidential
FDIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
31 OCTOBER 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 44)
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONU'I1)H'N'I'IA1,
This propaganda analysis rrport is hast?d cs lusivrly oil material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
b? FBIS without coordination with other U.S. t:ovcnmu+nt
components.
STATSPEC
I
National Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure subject lo
criminal sanctions
Approved For Release 199 %09/ 51~ CI)~-RD P85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
CONTENTS
Moscow Sees Kissinger Visit Confirming Detente Course. .
1
Peking Sees Intensified Arms Race Behind Moscow Talks. . , . . . . . .
AR B-ISRAELI ISSUE
2
Moscow Welcomes Arab Summit Decision on Palestine Question . . . . . .
CSCE-'MFR
4
Moscow's Deadline for CSCE Implied at Warsaw CP Conclave .
6
Elements of Optimism Appear in Comment on 1st MBFR Anniversary . . . .
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
7
PRAVDA Article Hails Results of Warsaw Consultative Meeting. . . . . .
VIETNAM
10
DRV Party Journal Attacks "Hostile" Elements Opposing Regime . . . , .
12
DRV-PRC Agreement on Economic, Military Aid Signed in Peking . . . . .
KOREA
15
Peking Marks CPV Anniversary, Strasses U.S. Troop Removal. . . . . . .
BHUTTO VISIT TO MOSCOW
18
Soviet Propaganda Welcomes Changes in Pakistani Policies . . . . . . .
USSR
20
Conservative Named Chief Editor of NOVY MIR. . . . . . . .
22
Furtseva Death Amidst Scandals Closes Stormy Career. . . . . . . . . .
PRC-India; PRC-USSR-Mideast; Moscow, Peking on U.S.-Japan Ties;
Chinese Education; Chinese Retail Outlets; Albanian Defense
23
Minictar
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: New First Deputy Editor Strengthens
25
Hardline Trend at PRAVDA
Sl
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
U,S. - SOVIET R ELATIONS
MOSCOW SEES KISSINGER VISIT CONFIRMING DETENTE COURSE
Secretary Kissinger's visit to Hoscow from 23 to 27 October
has been presented in the Soviet media as a "useful" but not
particularly dramatic event, the main significance of which
lies in the testimony it gives that U.S.-Soviet relations are
still moving in the "right direction." This positive assessment
has been conveyed less by what Moscow has said about the talks
themselves--on which little information has been made public--
than by surrounding comment on the general subject of U.S.-Soviet
relations and by reports of the ceremonial speeches. Both the
comment and the speeches have stressed the continuity of the
present course in U.S.-Soviet relations, pointing up the linkage
of the present meeting with past ones, as well as with the forth-
coming meeting between Brezhnev and the President in Vladivostok.
The image of the United States and of the attitude of the U.S.
Administration presented in this material has been uniformly
favorable. On the eve of the talks, IZVRSTIYA carried a dispatch
from New York by correspondent V. Kobysh which said that "detente"
had become a commonly accepted word in the American idiom,
reflecting bread acceptance of the concept by U.S. public opinion.
At the conclusion of the visit, a Moscow Radio observers roundtable
on 27 October stressed the linkage of the Kissinger visit with the
visit of Secreta-y Simon the week before, as well as with other
recent contacts )etween U.S. and Soviet officials. "All this is
testimony," said commentator Natveyev, that U.S.-Soviet agreements
are not just "paper pacts" but are being successfully implemented.
The commitment of the Ford Administration to continue the policies
of its predecessor has been singled out for particular notice.
Gromyko drew attention to it in his speech at the luncheon he
gave for Secretary Kissinger on the first day of the talks. He
noted that Brezhnev at the opening session had "expressed satis-
faction" with President Ford's statements indicating his intention
to continue "the course that has been adopted." A number of
commentaries, including the Moscow Radio observers roundtable,
also drew attention to the point.
The commitment of the Soviet leadership to the detente course
has also been stressed, with no less emphasis on the personal nature
of the commitment.' The most striking expression of the commitment
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
came in Gromyko's speech at the luncheon which Secretary
Kissinger hosted at the U.S. Embassy on 26 October. Referring
to the readiness of the Soviet Union to continue the search
for solutions with the United States, Gromyko said that the
genuineness of commitment was attested by Brezhnev's personal
participation in the talks with Secretary Kissinger. This
is a fact which speaks for itself, he said, "and quite
eloquently at that." He went on to assert that "our party's
Central Committee, the Soviet Go^?ernment, and L. I. Brezhnev
personally" are fully resolved to pursue the course of improving
U.S.-Soviet relations.
PEKING SEES INTENSIFIED ARMS RACE BEHIND MOSCOW TALKS
Peking reacted with unusual speed to Secretary Kissinger's Moscow visit
and talks with Brezhnev, with separate NCNA reports on 25 and 27 October
presenting the two sides' professions of detente as a cover for their
intensified arms rivalry. Peking had portrayed Kissinger's last
visit to "'IDSCOW last March at the head of a U.S. delegation in
the same light, but on that occasion it had waited until the Secretary
returned home before offering its assessment.
Consistent with its recent propaganda stress on the "reality" of a
superpower arms race lurking behind the "smokescreen" of detente,
Peking linked the sessions in ifoscow with recent reported advances
in U.S.-Soviet arms programs, offering its most comprehensive assess-
ment in'recent months of U.S.-Soviet arms development. Thus, the
25 October report cited Western press observations that recent Soviet
"launchings of rocket carriers" in the Western Pacific were timed
to coincide with Kissinger's airival In order to "strengthen its
posture for the forthcoming talks." It went on to note reports that
Moscow had recently tested "improved" MIRV's, its "latest longrange
rockets," had developed a "mobile launching system" for ICBMs, and
had built "151 new silos for emplaced ICBPI's"--developments which
NCNA said "raises diplomatic and military problems for the United
States" and could have "far-reaching effects on the nuclear balance"
between the superpowers. NCNA on the 27th added the claim that
Moscow had also recently developed "a new mobile antiballistic
guided missiles system," which "many U.S. officials" regarded as an
open violation of the 1972 agreement on ABM's.
Peking has portrayed the United States as equally determined to sustain
its position against Soviet advances, with the NCNA report on the 27th
giving special attention to the 25 October Pentagon announcement of a
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
successful laun:~aing from an aircraft of a Minuteman ICBM. Ci'iing the
Western press, NCN,, said that "Kissinger and the Department of Defense
have cons-lstently pushed this (airborne ICBM) test program in order to
give the Soviet Union a deep impression that the United States is
fully prepared to match them in developing mobile ICBM's," and that
"U.S. leaders regard the new weapons system" "^s an important bargaining
chip in the strategic arms limitation talks."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
- 4 -
ARAB - ISRAELI I SSUE
MOSCOW WELCOMES ARAB SUMMIT DECISION ON PALESTINE QUESTION
Moscow typically has paid the usual lip service in welcoming the
results of the seventh Arab summit conference, held in Rabat 26-29
October, as a demonstration of "anti-imperialist" Arab unity.
While it has hailed the summit decision on the Palestine question,
it has alsn typically failed to come to grips with the effect
this decision will haiie on future Arab-Israeli negotiations for
a Mideast settlement. The resolution on Palestine, adopted on
the 28th, confirmed the c,.aims of the Palestine Liberation
Organizati.on (PLO) as sole legitimate representative of all
Palestinian Arabs and endorsed the PLO's right to establish an
independent national authority on liberated Palestinian territory.
Tale resolution raises questions about Jordan'.an and PLO representa-
tion in any negotiations and even about the fate of future talks
given Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO. Moscow has
depicted the Israeli reaction of one of anger and disappointment,
citing Tel Aviv's refusal to sit at the niegotiating table with
the PLO, but drawing no conclusions as to how this might affect.
efforts for a sLi:tlement.
Nor has Moscow addresser'. itself to the question of possible
establishment cf a Pa.lesrinian goverment in p::ile now that
the summit supported the establishment: of an "independent
Palestirti: n authority." Moscow reported, almost in passing,
that Egyptian President as-So''at sairi a Palestinian government
in exile would b- fo-_:med soon, but has taken no tote of
speculation in Arab media on this subject. And scarcely a month
before the summit conference, an article in the October issue
of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS had reiterated previous Soviet criticism
of Palestinian disarray and again advised the Palestinians to
draw up a "sober, democratic program" aimed at a just Mideast
settlement.
GENEVA TALKS Soviet comment pegged to the summit has blandly
continued to call for resumption of the Geneva
talks, appearing to brush off the practical implications of the
Palestine resolution for the course of future negotiations. TASS
on the 28th put the PLO-Jordanian dispute in the context of the
Geneva conference, remarking that the Palestinian question had
become the focal point of the summit due to opposing PLO and
Jordanian views on "representation" of the Palestinians,
particularly those in the West Bank. The issue at stake, TASS
CONFIDE T A
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : I - tDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
said, was "most closely connected with the representation of
both sides" at Geneva. Subsequent treatment of the Geneva
representation issue suggests that Moscow may share the general
uncertainty over conflicting reports of possible Jordanian
and/or PLO representation at the conference. Thus a Moscow
radio commentary broadcast in English to Africa on the 29th
asserted that the summit had agreed that "the PLO will send
its representatives to the next session of the Geneva conference
on the Middle East as members of the Jordanian delegation."
But TASS on the 30th, reporting Moroccan King I-Iassan's press
conference that day, cited him as saying that the decision on
"Arab countries' participation" in the Geneva talks rested
with the "states immediately confronting the Israeli aggression."
While TASS accounts of President Ford's 29 October press con.-
ference made no mention of his remark about the need for movement
toward settlement of Israeli-Egyptian problems, Israeli-Syrian
problems, and problems "between Israel and Jordan or the PLO,"
Moscow broadcasts in Arabic on the 30th misrepresented his comment.
Thus a Timoshkin commentary, in the course of extolling the
"very great success" of the Rabat conference, cited the President
as "calling on Israel not to obstruct the participation of the
legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people" in the
work of the Geneva conference. And a brief news item claimed
that the President had stated that the "Israeli Government should
change its stand toward the PLO and not hinder the participation
of its representatives in the Geneva peace conference."
Moscow has occasionally linked its comment on Arab political
unity with warnings against: following the negotiating approach
advocated by the United States. IZVESTIYA political observer
V. Matveyev, for instance, speaking on the Moscow radio observers'
roundtable on 27 October,, praised the results of united Arab
action in the past but warned that Arab states "have not always
managed to achieve this unity," due in large part to Western
attempts to foster Arab differences. Matveyev charged that these
attempts presently included convincing certain Arab governments
they should arrange for "separate agreements of a limited
character--thus by-passing the Geneva conference." A 31 October
PRAVDA article by B. Kotov, reported by TASS, interpreted the
Rabat conference as a rejection by the Arab states of "plans for
'partial,' 'stage-by-stage,' or 'separate' solutions in the Middle
East." At the same time, Kotov noted that the United State._ and the
USSR, as guarantors of the UN Security Council resolutions, would
have to be consulted by those Arab governments that reaffirmed their
readiness at Rabat to participate in the Geneva conference, "after-
they coordinate their views with the PLO as well as with the two
great powers."
Approved For Release 1999/bW~e~'fALRDP85TOO875ROO0300070045-9
 Approved For Release I
999/0?Y29ID tDP85T008 0NII00070045-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
C S C E - M B F R
MOSCOW'S DEADLINE FOR CSCE IMPLIED AT WARSAW CP CONCLAVE
Moscow has seemingly indicated a desire to bring the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to a conclusion
before mid-1975. The final communique of the 16-18 October
Warsaw "consultative" meeting of 28 European communist parties
stated that the participants decided to prepare to hold a
conference of European communist parties in East Berlin "no
later than mid-1375."* In speeches at the Warsaw meeting, CPSU
Politburo member and secretary Ponomarev and many of the East
European spokesmen declared that the East Berlin mid-year
conference should follow the successful c nclusion of the CSCE.
Moscow would appear to be signaling its ope for a conclusion
to CSCE at the latest by next spring, possibly with the idea
of marking the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II by
holding the CP conference in East Berlin.
Ponomarev, according to the 18 October PRAVDA account of his
speech, told the Warsaw meeting on the 16th "it is to be assumed"
the CSCE would end with positive results which can be viewed as
a great success. "Our delegation," he added, "proceeds from the
assumption that the communist conference would be held after the
end of the all-European conference of states." Polish CP
Politburo member Babiuch was slightly more specific in his speech
on the 17th, saying "we hope" that the CSCE will be "concluded
early next year."
The call for a CSCE conclusion this year has all but discnpeared
from even routine Soviet comment on CSCE; more authoritative
comment and official statements continue to call for an end of the
conference "as soon as possible," "in the nearest future," "soon,"
or use similar vague formulations. For example, Brezhnev, in his
speech at the 28 October Kremlin dinner for visiting FRG Chancellor
Schmidt, called for "speediest conclusion" of the conference while
again arguing in effect that CSCE negotiators should only attempt
to resolve those questions now ripe for solution and not those which
lie "beyond the limits of reality."
* For an analysis of the Warsaw "consultative" meeting, see the
TRENDS of 23 October 1974, pages 8-11.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 CIA RDP85T00875R000300070045-9 FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
ELEMENTS OF OPTIMISM APPEAR IN COMMENT ON 1ST MBFR ANNIVERSARY
Scattered elements of new optimism have appeared in Soviet and
East European comment on the Vienna negotiations on force reductions
since they resumed on 24 September and with the passing of the first
anniversary of there negotiations on 30 October. The thrust of
much comment continues to stress the differences and incompatability
of the two sides' draft proposals, although previous appeals for a
first "symbolic" step to get the talks moving and to increase mutual
trust have reappeared with some frequency of late. At least two
East European press articles have offered one new element, implying
that there is a certain commonality in the approach of the two sides,
while the idea that compromise is needed on both sides also has been
introduced. Moscow has again apparently resorted to a press leak
in Vienna to convey the impression the MBFR talks are not totally
stalemated, in order to counter pessimism voiced in the Western
mess.
A call for compromises and mutual concessions came in a signed
article in the 24 September. Polish daily GLOS PRACY, which argued
that now it is necessary "to search for compromise solutions" and
that it is not unusual that "final success" at international
conferences "depends on mutual concessions." The notion of common
elements in the two sides' proposals appeared in an article in the
Polish weekly POLITYKA of 28 September by Warsaw's main commentator
on MBFR, A. Rayzacher. He pointed out that despite all the
substantial differences, "propositions from both sides have a
common methodological point"--there is talk about the first step
in reduction which could be used both for building confidence and
to accumulate empirical experience for making further reductions.
A similar assertion was made in a Sandor Pirityi article in the
Budapest weekly MAGYARORSZAG of 6 October.
RAYZACHER ARTICLE Rayzacher in his article sounded a note of
optimism in recalling that both Pact and
NATO spokesmen had previously made statements to the effect that
"the first understandings can be expected at the turn of 1974 and
1975, and the implementation of the first step in the coming year."
Rayzacher wau optimistic with regard to progress at Vienna.
Alluding to Brezhnev's "tasting of the wine" speech in May 1971,
in which he called on NATO to start negotiations on force reductions
to see what the Pact had to offer, Rayzacher asked rhetorically
whether the "Viennese bottle" was half full or half empty. Noting
statements by spokesmen for the two sides, he concluded that "the
optimists are therefore surely right."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release I 999/O 125[P&CI X DP85T0O8, RQO O7OO45-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
In a rare departure for an East European or Soviet commentator,
Rayzacher also indirectly broached one of the fundamen'.al issues
dividing the two sides in Vienna--the Warsaw Pact demand that any
negotiated ceiling on force levels must apply to the national
armed forces of the individual states instead of alliance-wide
force levels. In a nonpolemical tone, Rayzacher sought to
counter West European arguments that the Pact sought international
control and limitations on the entire structure of the West
European armed forces and the sovereignty of the West European
states to manage their defenses )n their own national territory, or
to prevent the political integration of West Europe and its
military autonomy within NATO. While noting Pact disapproval of
such moves toward West European integration, Rayzacher seemed to
hint there was room for compromise on this issue, observing that
the East Europeans "also recognize the objective character- of the
processes of integration in the capitalist part of Europe."
GLOS PRACY's call for mutual concessions and Rayzacher's restrained
approach to a sensitive issue have not been echoed in Soviet
comment, but they are of more than routine interest since East
European cominencators in the past have seldom ventured far beyond
the positions of their Soviet counterparts on MBFR.
SOVIET STATEMENTS Moscow's recent authoritative comment has
included a mixture of positive statements on
the MBFR talks and critical assessments of the NATO bargaining
position. The PRAVDA editorial article on 13 October--marking
the 10th anniversary of Khrushchev's ouster----included an almost
verbatim reiteration of one of Brezhnev's most optimistic statements
on MBFR, first made in his 14 June Supreme Soviet election yerch
in Moscow. PRAVDA observed: "The USSR is ready initially P_c agree
even to partial measures. The Soviet side sees a possibility in the
near future of achieving specific results at the talks on the
reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe if, of
course, good will is displayed by all participants." Brezhnev's
more recent remarks--at a 28 October Kremlin dinner for FRG Chancel'-or
Schmidt--were in the critical tone more common to Soviet leadership
statements on this issue: He pointed out that "considerable differences
in the principles of the sides . . . are manifested at the talks" and
charged that "some participants in the talks manifest the. striving to
obtain unilateral advantages." (Soviet comment routinely implies that
the NATO powers do not have a joint proposal at the Vienna MBFR talks.)
Brezhnev concluded by lecturing his West German visitors: "If there
is a wish to reach an agreement, it would be better to give up such
strivings. It can hardly be regarded as realistic to seek to build
one's security to the detriment of the security of otlie.i5."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300070045-9
 Approved For Release I999!09!25 oN9 - RPL85T00875F 9P949P750045-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
PRESS LEAK ON The most recent Vienna press leak on MBFR
PACT PROPOSAL developments, obviously based on Warsaw Pact
sources, came in an Austrian Press Agency (APA)
report published in the Viennese press on the 25th and picked
up by TASS five days later.* The APA report cited "informed
quarters in Vienna that the Warsaw Pact states have submitted
a new compromise proposal." The report noted that the new
proposal would make it possible for force reductions "to begin
before the end of 1975" and added that the Pact was "convinced
that this new initiative opens a genuine opportunity for concrete
progress." The timing of the rumor, coinciding with Secretary
Kissinger's visit to Moscow, seemed designed to suggest that
Washington and Moscow might be able to move the talks off dead
center--a tactic Moscow has used before at times of high-level
U.S.-Soviet talks. The announcement on Kissinger's 23-27 October
visit to Moscow said that the two sides "also feel that progress
is possible" in the Vienna talks.
Moscow acknowledged the rumor of a compromise proposal in an
unsigned TASS dispatch from Vienna on 30 October which took note
of Western press articles "about a 'breakthrough' in the talks."
Without mentioning the source of the reports, TASS went on to say
that the Vienna press articles reported that the "initiative comes
from 'the Warsaw treaty countries. "' TASS also cited the press
articles' discussion of the possibility of "concrete progress
already during 1975" in the context of the Pact's proposals to
implement "initial cutbacks in 1975 which would mark a practical
step towards reaching the general goal of the talks."
* See the TRENDS of 27 March 1974, pages 8-9, for a discussion of
previous Soviet comment on "press leaks" on MBFR.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 199Pd919/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
IDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
C0111UN I ST RELATIONS
PRAVDA ARTICLE HAILS RESULTS OF WARSAW CONSULTATIVE MEETING
Moscow waited 12 days after the windup of the 16-18 October Warsaw
"consultative" meeting of European communist parties before issuing
its first authoritative comment--a 30 October PRAVDA editoria"
ai-tlele which praised the gathering nFt a contribution to European
security and communist unity and predicted that the European CP
conference plani.-d next year would be "a major international event."
Like the communique issued at the close of the Warsaw meeting, the
PRAVDA editorial article did not mention a world communist confer-
ence, thus apparently confirming the Soviet bloc's inclination to
put that project aside for the time being while concentrating on
the sizable task of preparing the European conference. Moscow's
orthodox East European allies have likewise avoided the subject
of a world conference both at Warsaw and in followup comment,
whereas earlier the East Europeans had clearly linked a European
party meeting to a subsequent world party conference. Moscow
itself has not called for a new world party conference since
the idea was broached in November 1973.
The PRAVDA article generally follows the main lines of Soviet
delegate Ponomarev's speech to the Warsaw meeting, a speech
;;eyed to the theme of unity in diversity. Like Ponomarev, the
article asserts that the planned European CP conference must
hammer out a "common" line based on a free exchange of views.
The conference documents must, PRAVDA said, express "the coordi-
nated opinion of all the parties- attending" as well as "the right
of each party to take the floor at the conference and raise any
problems that it may deem necessary."
While this approach seems calculated to reassure the more inde-
pendent members of the movement--Romania, Yugoslavia, and the
Italian CP--that their views will be heard at the conference, it
also clearly provides a formula that would leave an opening for
raising the controversial China issue at the conference. However,
the three independents have consistently served notice, both
before and at the Warsaw meeting, that their participation in
the 1975 European CP conference and its preparations was contin-
gent on scrupulous avoidance of any criticism of "absent" parties
during the proceedings. There was apparently no direct mention
of the China issue in speeches during the Warsaw meeting.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/I~,CIA-RP85T00875R000300070045-9
S TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
While the PRAVDA editorial article did not mention the Chinese
directly, other Soviet comment in the wake of the Warsaw meeting
was less restrained. Thus, a Sibiryakov commentary broadcast
by Moscow radio on the 24th charged that "imperialist propaganda"
prior to the Warsaw gathering had "tried to persuade everybody
that the meeting was intended to keep out China," adding that
"all kinds of renegades, opportunists, and Maoists" had adopted
the same viewpoint. The absence of any mention of the Warsaw
meeting by Peking media was denounced in a Ifulin commentary
broadcast in Ifandarin on the 28th: Tiie talk voiced a Lelief that
"the Chinese communists would have been interested in the Warsaw
meeting had they known about its aim" of promoting detente, but
"the Maoist leaders would not even let them know" about the
gathering.
NEPSZABADZAG In contrast to the conciliatory tone of the
COMMENT PRAVDA editorial, the Hungarian party daily
NEPSZABADZAG on 20 October issued a stern
prediction that next year's European CP conference would reflect
the views of Moscow and its orthodox allies, whether the
independent participants like it or not. Thus, the article, by
Berecz, head of the MSZMP Central Committee's foreign department,
noted that "one party or another sometimes overemphasized the
significance of the principle of unanimity"--a principle which
the article said was desirable but should not be made into "a
dogma." The principle of unanimity or consensus, it declared,
must not "hamper the voluntarily assumed joint action . . . of
the decisive majority of the sister parties." The outspoken
Hungarians reiterated this point in a Vajda article in MAGYAR
HIRLAP on the 23d, which similarly stressed that the communist
parties "rule out considering the principle of unanimity as
absolute." The article also raised the prospect of a conference
final document not wholly acceptable to the independents, in
noting that the participating parties can "decide for themselves
whether they accept the jointly elaborated proposals and documents."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
V I ETNAf
DRV PARTY JOURNAL ATTACKS If HOSTILE. ELEMENTS OPPOSING REGIME
A highly unusual editorial in the September issue of the Vietnam
Workers Party (VWP) theoretical journal 11OC TAP presents a
striking picture of political and social disruption in North
Vietnam and suggests strong party contention over policies.
The editorial's content and tone go far beyond any earlier
propaganda on postwar problems, even warning of the existence
of "hostile tendencies and thoughts" opposed to basic party
policies, including opposition to such aims as completing the
revolution in South Vietnam.
HOC TAP editorials are (often used to explain and reinforce new
party lines, but the fact that thus far there has been no endorse-
ment of the current editorial in other media suggests that it
reflects the viewpoint of a discontented, militant faction within
the leadership. The very appearance of an editorial in the party
journal which departs so sharply from the usual propaganda line
suggests that there may be a serious confrontation within the
North Vietnamese party, with significant forces pressing for
policy changes. The editorial's militant position on the war in
South Vietnam and its criticism of "opportunist" elements in the
North could be r-ad, not only as an indictment of laxity, indifference,
and softness among the Vietnamese population in general, but also
as an attack on prusent party policies and their sponsors.
POLICIES TOWARD The editorial's discuss.Lon cf the "party line"
SOUTH VIETNAM on South Vietnam is more militant than the
usual Hanoi statements, suggesting that its
author may not merely be defending an agreed position but, in fact,
be advocating more aggressive action. Seeming to attack elements
which would be reticent to endorse military action to take over
South Vietnam, the editorial caustically assails opportunists who
prefer a "selfish, individualistic life" to "national independence
and freedom." And, in an argument at odds with propaganda in the
wake of the January 1973 Paris agreement calling for a political
solution in the South, it decries those who would deny the
"necessity to resort to revolutionary violence and revolutionary
warfare to liberate the nation." Although the editorial begins by
surveying the situation in the past year and a half, it makes no
mention of the peace agreement itself.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
The editorial goes beyond the usual North Vietnamese line both
in he precedence it gives to the struggle in the South, as
opposed to construction in the North, and in its evaluation of
the military balance of forces. In describing, the nation's two
"strategic tasks," the editorial first lists the "national
democratic revolution 1_n the South" and then the task of building
socialism in the North--a reversal of the order of priorities
established at the VWP's 3d party congress in September 1960
and reaff iimed in the description if tasks contained in the party
Central Committee's 22d plenum resolution early this year. The
editorial's appraisal of the balance of forces in Vietnam is less
cautious than the usual communist claim--voiced, for example by
Premier Pham Van Dong in his national day speech published in tae
same issue of HOC TAP--that the balance of forces is moving "more
and more" in favor of the revolution. By contrast, the editorial
claims a decisive edge, with "our people's revolutionary forces
throughout the country... certainly stronger than the forces of the
counterrevolutionary henchmen of the U.S. imperialists."
The editorial's claim of military superiority is unusual, but it
has been made in the past by some representatives of the DRV
military. Thus, DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap similarly
claimed in a 7 May speech that the forces of the revolution were
"much stronger" than Saigon's "as far as the entire country is
concerned." The military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor)
strongly advocated this view in articles in August 1973 which may
have been intended to supply justification for increased communist
attacks in the following months. The usual DRV appraisal of the
balance of forces states that it is moving in favor of the communists,
without claiming they have achieved superiority.
SOCIALIST REFORM In the area of domestic policies, the HOC TAP
IN NORTH VIETNAM editorial comes down hard on those who allegedly
oppose socialist reform and "compulsory and
dictatorial" measures to protect socialist property, stop illegal
transactions, and maintain public order and security. Concern
with the prevalence of such "negative phenomena" in North Vietnam
is nothing new; however, the editorial goes beyond other Hanoi
propaganda in portraying a sinister opposition to measures of
reform.
Similar problems were addressed, for example, by Vice Premier
Tran Huu Duc in an article in the March HOC TAP which complained
at length about illegal activities, even involving state employees,
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
and demanded "very firm ana urgent measures" to check them.
Due also anticipated the curr-int editorial's concern that some
cadres did not show proper ze0_ in combatting such manifestations,
However, Due merely accused these cadres of misunderstanding the
content of the struggle and misjudging the "serious impact" of
illegal economic activities, while the editorial, by contrast,
appears to be attacking wi3.lfu_. opponents of reform policies.
It repeatedly scores unnamed persons who allegedly have used
the "pretext of respecting 'democracy' and 'freedom' in order
to oppose the state's close control and managerial measures
against those wh, have stolen socialist property and transacted
illegal business, , and against speculators and conspirators...."
The harsh tone of the editorial strikes a markedly different chord
than the seemingly pragmatic line that has prevailed in North
Vietnam in recent years. In particular, it seems at odds with
the views of VWP First Secretary Le Duan expounded in his major
February 1970 article and touched upon again in a March 1973
article on cadre problems. Li Duan stressed that the "essential
nature" of the proletarian dictatorship was not "violence
or oppression" but rather construction and organization, and
he warned against preoccupation with the suppression of
opponents of the proletariat. In his 1973 article he also
maintained that with a correct political line there is only
a minor risk of cadre deviations and "bad tendenci,is" can be
"easily eliminated."
The HOC TAP editorial states that "a number" of cadres and party
members a- among those "entertaining an incorrect outlook" ant
that these views have been publicly disseminated. Thus, it warns
that thei_ incorrect outlook has encouraged hostile tendencies
to develop into a "'current of evil thoughts"' which i,s being
"conveyed from mouth to mouth" and has "appeared even in the
press and in the literature and arts." Elsewhere it specifies
that those who are "ideologically opposed" to the ragime "have
publicly propagated their hostile thoughts for sinister purposes."
Hanoi media during the war occasionally complained of decadent,
counterrevolutionary views being clandestinely disseminated,
particularly among urban youths; however, the current editorial
seems to be deploring a more serious situation in which
authoritative organs have b,:~en used to propagandize an "evil"
or "poisonous" line.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :CpjAt RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
DENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOi ER 1074
The editorial calls for a "mass movement to struggle against
negative phenomena" to be carried out along with the emulation
mover,?ent for labor productivity which has been the key campaign
in all areas of North Vietnamese society during the past year.
It recommends that those who have erroneous points of view
should be educated, but harshly demands punishment for elements
"who are really opposed to our regime."
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF In another example of unusual candor, the
"FAMINE" IN NORTH editorial, listing DRV achievements, claims
that North Vietnam was successful in
"overcoming the famine which occured in the preharvest period
early this year as the result of natural calamities." At no time
in recent years have Hanoi media been known to acknowledge the
existence of "famine." Propaganda earlier this year did, however,
take note of the delay in harvesting the fifth-month and spring
rice crops. And a 19 June NIHAN DAN editorial, for example, discussed
the problems of state distribution of grain "in times of difficulty"
and assistance to the peasants "in the recent period between the
two crops."
DRV-PRC AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC, MILITARY AID SIGNED IN PEKING
An agreement on Chinese economic and military aid to North Vietnam
in 1975 was signed in Peking on 26 October by PRC Vice Premier
Li Hsien-nien and DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, capping negoti-
ations that apparently began more than two months ago. Chinese
aid for 1975 had been discussed, according to Hanoi media, during
a Nghi visit to Peking in the first week of August. The usual
DRV aid negotiator, Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban, has
apparently been in Peking since that time.* In addition to the
annual aid agreement, DRV and PRC foreign trade and military
officials on the 26th signed a trade agreement and protocols
on the supply of military equipment and materials and civilian
goods. The last annual PRC-DRV aid agreement was signed in
June 1973, during a visit to Peking by Vietnam Workers Party
First Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong, and comparable
protocols and a trade agreement were concluded in October 1973.
* Ly Ban is not known to have returned to North Vietnam following
Le Thanh Nghi's 1-8 August visit to China, and he appeared at
celebrations in Peking marking the 2 September DRV National Day
anniversary. The DRV delegation's August visit is discussed in
the TRENDS of 14 August 1974, pages 18-19. Last year's aid agree-
ment is discussed in the TRENDS of 13 June 1973, pages 3-4.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release I
99 g,%i }LA-RDP85TP$ 7~ 9300070045-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
Hanoi media, as usual, specified that the annual agreement provided
for "nonrefundable" aid and reported that Li Hsien-nien, at his
banquet for the delegation, also referred to nonrefundable aid
for 1975. Peking media had similarly characterizedtthe aid agree-
ments for the past two years, but this year returned to the previous
PRC practice of omitting any description of the annual aid agreement
even ignoring Li Hsien-nien's reported remark Peking did report,
however, that the military protocols provided for "Lratuitous"
supply of material.
Although a cryptic statement by Le Thanh Nghi at the 26 October
banquet suggested that Chinese aid may have increased, Peking reports
on the banquet appeared to reflect a deliberate Chinese policy of
avoiding attention to Chinese assistance for Vietnam. The NCNA
account of the banquet speeches by Li Hsien-nien and Le Thanh Nghi
left out several references to Chinese backing for Vietnam which
were included in Hanoi reports. Thus, NCNA's summary of Li Hsien-nien`s
speech, in addition to dropping his mention of the agreement on
"nonrefundable economic and military aid," omitted his references
to the two nations' talks on economic cooperation proceeding "on
the basis of proletarian internationalism" and to their longstand-
ing mutual "support and aid." NCNA retained no specific reference
to assistance, only quoting Li as promising continuing "support"
for Vietnam's "just struggle and socialist construction." The
NCNA account also predictably omitted the statement by Nghi suggest-
ing that Chinese aid had been stepped up: According to Hanoi
radio, Nghi cited the current situation in Vietnam and the "schemes"
of the United States and Thieu and asserted that in the face of
such a situation, "an increase" in Chinese "support and assistance"
is of "great significance and-ffect." In addition, NCNA left
out a lengthy passage praising Sino-Vietnamese friendship, "on
the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism,"
and Nghi's assertion that the Chinese people consider "support and
assistance" to Vietnam to be an "international obligation."
NCNA did report that Li Hsien-nien had recalled the PRG and DRV
government statements of 8 and 11 October, respectively, and
offered the "resolute support" of the "Chinese people" for them.
Li's cautious endorsement, failing to menti:un the two statements'
criticism of the United States and demand for Thieu's ouster,
was not included in Hanoi's account of his remarks. Chinese backing
for the statements had been offered earlier in a 15 October PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article.*
* The commentator article is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 October
1974, page 10.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
During Le Thanh Nghi's 25-28 stay in Peking, in addition to holding
talks with Li Hsien-nien, he met with Chou En-lai in the hospital
for a "cordial and friendly conversation" and had separate meetings
with Prince Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth. Le Thanh
Nghi returned to Hanoi on the 28th, and there has been no indication
whether he will visit other countries to sign annual aid agreements,
as he has in past years. Other aid agreements for 1975 that are
known to have been concluded by Hanoi are a pact with Albania, signed
in the DRV with an Albenian delegation on 7 October, and an agreement
with Bulgaria, signed in Sofia on 14 September by the head of the
DRV delegation to Bulgarian National Day celebrations.*
* The Bulgarian- DRV aid agreement is discussed in the TRENDS of
18 september 1974, page 19.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31. OCTOBER 1974
KOREA
PEKING MARKS CPV ANNIVERSARY, STRESSES U1S, TROOP REMOVAL
Chinese comment pegged to the 24th anniversary of the entry of
Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) into the Korean War reflects
both increasing Chinese attention to continued U.S. military
involvement in South Korea as well as Peking's efforts to
deemphasize its past military ties with Pyongyang. The anniversary
was marked by the usual banquets in the two capitals and by
traditional wreathlaying ceremonies in 11orth Korea in honor of
CPV dead, including one at the grave of Mao Tse-tung's son. As
in previous years, the anniversary failed to trigger any editorial
comment in the Chinese press, but drew the customary NODONG
SINMUN editorial.
Chinese banquet speeches this year were harsher than those at last
year's anniversary functions on the issue of withdrawal of U.S.
troops from South Korea, containing the firmest language. thus far
in Peking's gradually hardening line on the presence of U.S.
troops in Korea.* Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, speaking at the
Peking banquet,argued that there was still no solution on Korean
reunification because South Korea was "still under ':he occupation
of U.S. troops flaunting the UN flag." It was and-_r i;he "aegis"
of the United States, Chen asserted, that the Pak government was
disrupting the North-South and suppressing the South
Korean people. Chen demanded that the United States "immediately"
stop interfering in Korea's internal affairs and specifically
called for "U.S. troops flying the UN flag" to "pull out of South
Korea without delay."
Speaking at the Pyongyang banquet on 25 October, Chinese ambassador
Li Yun-chuan portrayed U.S. troops as a "grave obstacle" to Korean
reunification and demanded that the "U.S. imperialist aggressor
troops must be completely withdrawn from South Korea." The Chinese
speaker at the Peking banquet last year, Ni Chih-fu, had not
pointad to the United States in mentioning "outside interference"
in Korea, nor had he mentioned any time frame un U.S. troop
withdrawal. And Li, speaking last year in Pyongyang, merely
* For discussions of Chinese comment on U.S. troops in South
Korea on recent anniversaries, see the TRENDS of 26 June 1974,
pages 19-20; 10 July 1974, pages 8-9; and 17 July 1974, pages 16-17.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : Qd&W~P 5T00875R000300070045-9
N IAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOpc;R 3 974
called for the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea, characterizing
them neither as imperialist aggressors nor as a stumbling block to
Korean reunification.
NCNA's report on Chen's speech did not characterize the atmospherics
ai: the banquet and fa led to report any banquet toasts. Last year's
report on the Peking banquet had described it as "pert...eated with an
atmosphere o~ militant friendship and unity" and had reported toasts
to t'le "blood-sealed great friendship" between Peking and Pyongyang.
This year Ambassador Li noted that the. Chinese treasure their "great
friendship and unity" with the Koreans, but did not repeat the claim
he made In 1973 that Pyongyang's "victory" 9.n the Korean War had
safeguarded China's security.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/0913Pr -R DP85T00875R000300070045-9
7 IA FbIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
- 20 -
BHUTTO VISIT TO MOSCOW
'OVIET PROPAGANDA WELCOMES CHANGES IN PAKISTANI POLICIES
Soviet propaganda accompanying Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar
1.1i Bhuttr s 24-26 October visit to Moscow refl.ected the improve-
aeat in Soviet-Pakistani relations since Bhutto's last official
visit to Moscow in March 1972.* Prior to Bh; ;'s arrival, TASS
and Moscow radio broadcasts to South Asia carried a 23 October
PRAVDA article favorably reviewing the "internal democratisation"
in Pakistan since Bhutto's accession to power, and linked internal
Pakistani developments to the "positive realistic tendencies" in
'ihutto's foreign policy. The article particularly cited Pakistan's
withdrawal from SEATO, establishment of diplomatic relations with
the GDR, DR'J, and. DPRK, and "constructive contribution" to the
"normalization" of the situation on the South Asian subcontinent.
Soviet comment prior to Bhutto's 1972 trip had focused on the
"serious crisis inherited by the country" from the recently deposed
Yahya Khan regime, and the need for Bhutto to implement his
announced program of socioeconomic reforms.
The agenda of Bhutto's visit and Soviet media characterization of
the tone of Soviet-Pakistani consultations closely r=_sembled those
in 1972. Kosygin and Bhutto held two days of talks marked by an
"identity or similarity of views," and party Secretary Brezhnev
a,id Bhutto held a "friendly" meeting on 25 October in which
"tops -al problems" were discussed. Kosygin's remarks at a 24 October
dinner, reported in full in the 25 October PRAVDA, were general
and optimistic in nature, expressing the hope that South Asia
would be turned into an "area of durable peace," a seeming
reference to Moscow's proposal for an Asian collective security
system that Pakistan has consistently refused to endorse. Bhutto's
remark,, at the dinner, excerpted in PRAVDA, countered with a
refer ?=-ce to Pakistan's proposal that South Asia he declared a
"nuclear-free zone." A ".Ioscow radio commentary, broadcast to
South Asia on the 24th, went further than Kosygin when it explicitly
stressed the need for an Asian collective security system and
quoted Brezhnev's Kishinev speech on Soviet determination to work
for peace in Asia .
Soviet reports of the 25 October Bhutto-Brezhnev meeting said
nothing about the Asian collective security issue, but TASS quoted
Brezhnev as reiterating Kosygin's earlier formulation that South
* Bhutto's 1972 Moscow visit is discussed in the TRENDL of
22 March 1972, pages 36-38.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: GM4RDFJ&T00875R0QQ4Q0#,7~{#5-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
Asia should be turned into an "area of durable peace." The
joint communique issued prior to Bhutto's departure on the
26th utilized the same formulation as in the 1972 communique,
with both sides agreeing that "world peace and security in
Asia" were dependent on scrupulous observation of the
"principles of the UN charter."
On other issues the communique noted ~Mt an "identity or
proximity" of posi`ions was reached between tl.-A two sides,
and Moscow agreed to begin negotiating a new trade agreement
with the Pakistanis. (Accccding to Karachi Domestic Service,
the agreement will involve an additional 228 million ruble
credit for the accelerated completion of the Soviet-built
Karachi steel mill.) Bhutto "renewed" his invitation to
Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to visit Pakistan, an offer
which first appeared in the 1972 communique.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
USSR
A conservative has now been appointed as chief editor of the
prestigious literary journal NOVY MIR, long the rallying point
for Soviet liberals and the target of relentless attacks by the
ideological hardliners. TASS on 29 October revealed that
55-year old Sergey Narovchatov, chief of the Moscow branch of
the writers union, has been named to the post most recently held
by 64-year old liberal Valeriy Kosolapov. Kosolapov had become
chief editor in early 1970, when outspoken liberal Aleksandr
Tvardovskiy was forced out. Although Kosolapov ran the journal
much more cautiously than his predecessor, he appears to have
fallen into disfavor late this summer; in September he was
demoted from chief editor to ordinary member of the editorial
board.
Rumors of Narovchatov's impending appointment were reported in
the 15 October FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, and the 29 October TASS
account referred to him as the "newly appointed" chief editor.
The September issue of NOVY MIR, which was signed to press on
11 September, listed the deputy chief editor and responsible
secretary but no chief editor, carrying Kosolapov's name only as
a member of the board. The August issue, signed to press
5 August, had identified Kosolapov as chief editor. No other
board members were affected as of September.
Although there has been no recent public criticism of NOVY TIR
which would account for the change, the FRANKFURTER ALLGEIIEINE
account claimed that the July issue of the journal had originally
been slated to carry a war novel on the Crimean Tartars, whom
Stalin had ce.ported during the war and whose fate has remained
a sensitive issue for the regime since. A similar lapse in
political caution had apparently caused Kosolapov's earlier
ouster from the LITERARY GAZETTE chief editorship in the December
1962 crackdown. Reports at the time indicated that he was being
punished for having published Yevtushenko's controversial poem
"Babiy Yar" and for refusing to print an article attacking
abstract art.
Whereas Kosoi.apov's replacement of Tvardovskiy in 1970 represented
no basic shift in the liberal orientation of PTOVY MIR, the present
change replaces a. liberal with a writers union apparatchik who is
known as an assailant of dissenters. Narovcha tov has risen quickly
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: Cd?j90875R009017?-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
in the conservativ(s writers union hierarchy, having been elected
a secretary of the Moscow branch in January 1965, of the RSFSR
union in March 1970 and of the USSR union in November 1970, and
having succeeded literary hatchetman Sergey Mikhalkov as 'oscow
first secretary in May 1970. Although not as strident as Mikhalkov,
Narovchatov has repeatedly criticized dissenting and erring writers.
Most recently, at a 27 February 1974 Moscow writers plenum reported
in the 8 March LITERARY RUSSIA, he assailed poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko
for defending Solzhenitsyn and called on him to finally grow up and
act his age. Narovchatov, himself a poet, has long shown a special
animus against Yevtushenko. Among other indications, he bitterly
assailed him at the March 1965 RSFSR Writers Union congress.
FURTSEVA DEATH AMIDST SCANDALS CLOSES STORMY CAREER
Radio Moscow on 25 October announced the death of Culture Minister
Yekaterina Furtseva, of a heart attack at age 63. Furtseva's
death came at a low pint in her career, in which scandals affecting
both her personal reputation and the performance of her ministry
had raised the question of her removal; her death conveniently
solves this question for the leaaership. Her recent troubles
recall an earlier phase in her st',r,.?y career when, after the
22d CPSU Congress, she was dropped from the Presidium and
disappeared for several weeks amidst rumors of severe illness and
attempted suicide.
Furtseva's recent troubles began last spring, when it was revealed
that she had misused her position to build herself an expensive
dacha. In May stories reached Western reporters that she had
been rebuked and would not be reelected to the Supreme Soviet
because of the scandal. The New York TIDIES followed up this
initial 25 May account with a 13 June report that she had not been
assigned a Supreme Soviet election district when registration
closed on 12 May, but that she had appealed to Brezhnev, who had
promised to help. The TIMES al.so quoted a government source close
to the Supreme Soviet Presidium as telling foreigners that she
had subsequently been assigned a district and the paper added that
at a 31 May news conference she had hinted to reporters that
she would be a candidate after all. Yet when the newly elected
deputies were listed on 19 June, she we not included, a fact which
gave rise to speculation that she would not be reappointed culture
minister when the new government was announced in July.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1988f$2?dTiOA-RDP85TiQ9?77?R 0300070045-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
However, if such was the intention, the leadership vacillated,
perhaps not wanting to aggravate the scandal by removing her
in the midst of the publicity over the dacha+.. Moreover, in
an apparent effort to dispel Western speculation, she played
a prominent public role during Nixon's late June visit, attend-
ing the opera with Nixon, Brezhnev, Podgornyy, Kosygin, Gromyko
and Ambassador Dobrynin on 28 June and being present at the
29 June signing of an economic-technica' cooperation agreement.
Stories of her impending disgrace were further put in doubt by
her reappointment as minister at the 26 July Supreme Soviet
session..
Her posi,-ion may have further deteriorated in September, however.
when the authorities brutally broke up an unauthorized abstract
art show in a Moscow suburban district, an act resulting in such
bad publicity abroad that the leadership fired the local district
party leader and permitted the restaging of the show.* While
there was no public evidence that Furtseva was personally involved
in either the original suppression of the 15 September art show or
in the subsequent backdown, her ministry must'have taken a st;:nd
in the dispute over handling the show.
This issue has still not died down, as evidenced by an attack on
the second art show in the 23 October issue of the 'Zoscow city
paper VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA. The article contended that the show
proved the artistic poverty of the painters and justified the
contention of Moscow officials at the 28 September press confer-
ence that the whole affair was being exaggerated.
Furtseva'u past reported attempt at suicide had occurred during
her biggest political setback, when she lost her position in the
top leadership in late 1961. At the close of the 22d CPSU Congress,
when she w4s dropped from the Central Committee Presidium, she
disappeared for several weeks amidst rumors of bitter clashes,
serious illness and attempted suicide. Since that drastic fall,
she has managed to retain only the relatively powerless position
of culture minister, a post she seemed on the verge of losing
when her death occurred.
* See the TRENDS of 23 October 1974, pages 19-21.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
N 0 T E S
PRC-INDIA: Peking has not yet explicitly aci,nowledged Secretary
Kissinger's 27-30 October visit to New Delhi, but it offered an
unusually harsh indictment of Indian expansionist policies and
Soviet support for New Delhi in a lengthy NCNA commentary issued
on the very day Kissinger arrived in India. The commentary
warned against Indian designs, "emboldened by Soviet social
imperialist backing," for military, political and economic
dominance in South Asia and denounced a series of recent Indian
moves against every one of its neighbors except Burma and
Ceylon. Calling special attention to New Delhi's expanded
military budget and nuclear development program, the commentary
asserted that India sought to use its new power to intimidate and
gradually bring its smaller neighbors under direct New Delhi
control. Pointing to the behind-the-scenes role played by the
USSR, it warned that Moscow has its own motives for supporting
Indian expansion, claiming that it desires to enhance Soviet
leverage in South Asia at the expense of "the other superpower."
PRC-USSR-MIDEAST: Peking has responded for the first time to the
"change" in Soviet Middle East policy concerning the Palestinian
question with a lengthy 27 October NCNA commentary. NCNA's argument
that the Soviet "shift" was prompted by the recent change in the
superpower balance of forces in the Middle East was pegged to an
11 October speech in Kishinev in which Brezhnev had expressed support
for a Palestinian national home as well as for Palestinian participa-
tion at the Geneva peace conference. NCNA pointedly noted that
previously Moscow had criticized the Palestinian liberation struggle
and had even treated their plight as a "refugee issue." Pointing to
Secretary Kissinger's successful diplomatic efforts in the Middle
East since early this year, NCNA asserted that the United States
"has gone over to the offensive" while "the Soviet revisionists have
been forced on the defensive and their influence has decreased."
Peking claimed that Brezhnev's recent endorsement merely signals a
new Soviet effort "to stage a comeback in the Middle East" by
exploiting enhanced support fur the Palestinians and especially for
the latter's participation at the Geneva talks "as a counter in
their bargaining with U.S. imperialism." Peking has thus far
totally ignored the 14-18 October Moscow visit by Egyptian Foreign
Minister Fahmi during which the endorsement of a Palestinian national
home was reiterated. Peking has similarly remained silent on
Brezhnev's planned January visit to Egypt.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
MOSCOW, PEKING ON U.S.-JAPAN TIES: Contrasting Moscow and Peking
exploitation of the current controversy in Japan over the presence
of U.S. nuclear weapons reflects their varying approaches to the
question of U.S.-Japan security ties and the U.S. military
presence in Japan. While Peking reported developments briefly
and selectively with its usual circumspection toward the United
States, Moscow not only reported the controversy but also
originated comment pointing up the alleged dangers of Japan's
security ties with the United States. A 9 October signed
IZV:LSTIYA article, for exai,iple, argued that Japanese observers
were questioning the reliability of Washington's promise of
prior consultations before bringing nuclear weapons into Japan.
The article also asserted that the "so-called Japanese-American
security treaty" was now under serious review in Japan. While
Moscow media have portrayed the United States as the main villain
in the current controversy, a 22 October PRAVDA article chided
Japanese Government representatives for attempting to "protect
the Pentagon" and "whitewash" U.S.-Japanese military cooperation.
In contrast to Moscow, Peking's treatment has been very low key,
limited thus far to a pair of NCNA pickups of Japanese news agency
reports. A 22 October replay of a TOHO news agency report on the
21 October Anti-war Day demonstrations in Japan did, however, include
a rare call for abrogation of the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty,
a theme not seen in PRC media since last April. NCNA reportage on
rally speeches excluded denunciations of President Ford's planned
November visit to Japan; in fact, monitored Chinese media have not
yet been heard to acknowledge the announced visit.
CHINESE EDUCATION: Shanghai, a model province whose example is often
followed throughout China, appears engaged in a drive to improve the
level of instruction in local primary and secondary schools.
Shanghai's WEN HUI PAO on 23 October frontpaged a letter from local
teachers and students entitled "Let Students Learn More Skills in
School" w1iich came down unusually hard on the "expert" side of the
"red and expert" formulation. The letter complained frankly that
recent middle school graduates "still show weaknesses in certain
fields." Placing responsibility for the poor quality of vocational
education on the shoulders of 1c.al educational authorities, a
separate WEN HUI PAO editor's note asked "our comrades on the
educational front" why students could not "learn more skills in
school." Shanghai's efforts to improve the quality of education
had been reflected in an 8 October Shanghai broadcast which hinted
that sorr.e college applicants may now be admitted primarily on the
basis of their academic considerations. The report noted that special
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
attention was paid to enrolling "some of those who had truly
performed well," and it revealed that Shanghai enrollment officials
were careful to "insure the Iuality of the admitted students."
Shanghai's lead in raising educational standards apparently has
been followed in Kiangsu. A 20 October Nanking broadcast on local
student enrollment work also noted that rpecial attention was paid
to enrolling those applicants who "had truly performed well."
CHINESE RETAIL OUTLETS: Peking's current push to increase light
industrial output significantly in the fourth quarter of 1974
appears linked to an innovative Anhwei campaign to expand urban
markets by setting up a series of "marketing agent stores"
supplementing the network of state commercial centers. Judging
by a 26 October ANHWEI DAILY editorial, a number of safeguards
govern the new--and apparently controversial--retail organs in
order to prevent any resurgence of small-scale capitalism.
Existing state stores provide all operating funds and commodities
for the new outlets and will set all prices. Accumulated funds
must be turned over to state commerce departments, and all business
activities of the new stores are to be developed according to party
and state economic plans. Nevertheless, the very existence of such
stores, providing a buffer between the shopper and the state,
represents a step back from the purer forms of communism. The
editorial frankly admitted that the new stores were being set up
over the objections of some "dubious" commercial leaders who faared
that the new outlets would prove "difficult to control or manage."
Control responsibilities for the retail outlets rest with local
party leaders, who were instructed to take the necessary steps to
support the growth of this "new thing."
ALBANIAN DEFENSE MINISTER: Premier Shehu announced on 29 October
that he would assume the position of defense minister, thus confirming
rumors that Begir Balluku, minister since 1953, had been ousted.
Shehu's announcement came in a speech to the People's Assembly in
which he also named a new deputy premier (a post which Balluku had
held concurrently) as well as new finance and communications ministers.
Judging from a lengthy summary of the speech broadcast by Tirana radio,
Shehu did not mention Balluku, whose activities had not been reported
since last June. However, Shehu's remark that "the government will
take all necessary measures to insure that our army will always remain
ideologically pure, loyal to the party line . . . ," seemed to give
substance to :peculation that Balluku was being dismissed for
advocating a less hostile position toward Moscow. The premier's
speech reiterated the main lines of Hoxha's remarks on foreign
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
policy earlier this month: continued intransigence toward
the Soviet Union and. its East European allies, and a warming
of attitude toward Albania's Balkan neighbors. Shehu urged
a "normal development of state relations" with Belgrade and
also called for the "further development" of existing relations
with Romania.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :cGWRD T00875R0QQjV(q?W45-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
- S 1 -
SUPPLEMLNTARY ARTICLE
NEW FIRST DEPUTY EDITOR STRENGTHENS HARDLINE TREND AT PRAVDA
The appointment of hardliner R.I. Kosolapov as PRAVDA's new
first deputy chief editor gives the CPSU organ its most
conservative leadership since the 1950's. Kosolapov, formerly
Agitprop deputy head, replaced V.G. Afanasyev, who simultaneously
was named new chief editor of KOMMUNIST. The two appointments--
announced in the October issue of the journal ZHURNALIST, signed
to press 17 September--suggest a trade-off, the promotion of the
anti-intellectual hardliner Kosolapov, balanced by that of the
more moderate Afanasyev. Whether or not such a trade-off was
actually made, the Kosolapov appointment clearly strengthens the
reactionary wing, since he becomes chief PRAVDA spokesman for
theory and ideology at a time when the conservative Zimyanin is
chief editor.
Kosolapov was last publicly identified as deputy head of Agitprop
in the 16 July MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. Afanasyev was listed as
KOMMUNIST chief editor in its issue signed to press 5 September
but not in the previous issue signed to press 13 August. Other
ideological decisions--such as the adoption of the Central
Committee decree on Belorussian ideological work--also appear to
have occurred in this same period.*
BACKGROUND Kosolapov, a 44-year old philosopher, has been
ON KOSOLAPOV identified as a lecturer or consultant in the
Central Committee's propaganda section since the
mid-1960's, but he was promoted to deputy head of the section
only relatively recently, first being identified in this post in
the 2 February 1974 PRAVDA. His articles in the 25 May 1968
PRAVDA and Mny 1971 CUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY--attacking the idea
of regarding intellectuals as some sort of "elite" or "technocratic"
class and insisting on their subordination Lo the proletariat--
identify him as one of the more conservative figures in the
ideological field, an impression reinforced by his 1974 articles
on international affairs and detente. In a long 21 January 1974 PRAVDA
article he stressed that peaceful coexistence "in no way means
an end to the class struggle between socialism and capitalism
in all its forms" but simply the "rejection of direct military
confrontation and use of force and threats of force," a result
which the West had been forced to accept by the strengthening
* See the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 24-28.
CO Approved For Release 1999/09/2: l-`Qbb5T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 19 OSAMiACIA-RDP851T9A87,90300070045-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
of world socialism. In a May 1974 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY
article Kosolapov tackled the problem of squaring peaceful
coexistence and cooperation with capitalist governments with
the need to aid revolutionary forces in overthrowing these
governments. He stressed the "sharp, implacably hostile"
ideological war and the dangers of "ideological penetration"
and warned against "slipping into positions of right opportunism
and unprincipled compromises with class enemies." He condemned
a long list of errors, including "pseudorevolutionary adventurism,
preaching export of revolution, inciting useless conflicts which
can. bring only losses, and playing with fire." in his new job at
PRAVDA he will take over Afanasyev's role as enunciator of theory
and presumably will supervise PRAVDA's department for propaganda
of Marxist-Leninist theory.
PRAVDA TREND TOWARDS Kosolapov's appointment clearly strengthens
CONSERVATIVISM the conservative faction in PRAVDA and
highlights how far PRAVDA has regressed
in the last ten years from its liberal orientation under chief
editor A.M. Rumyantsev and deputy chief editor N.N. Inozemtsev in
1965. Most of the liberal influence that developed under Khrushchev
and in the immediate aftermath of Khrushchev's fall was eliminated
during tha late 1965-66 purge of PRAVDA. Liberal chief editor
Rumyantsev was removed in September 1965, followed by responsible
secretary S.B. Sutotskiy around the turn of the year, and liberal
deputy chief editor Inozemtsev in May 1966. Rumyantsev became
academic secretary of the Academy of Sciences' economics division,
Sutotskiy went on pension, and Inozemtsev became director of the
Institute o` World Economics and International Relations.
During this period most of the top pos.-.s at PRAVDA were taken over
by persons brought in from the outside. Conservative Deputy Foreign
Minister M.V. Zimyanin became chief editor; SOVIET RUSSIA chief
editor K.I. Zarodov became first deputy chief editor; RSFSR
Publishing Committee Chairman B.I. Stukalin became deputy chief
editor; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA chief editor Yu. P. Voronov became
responsible secretary of the editorial board; SOVIET RUSSIA
responsible secretary S.V. Tsukasov became first deputy responsible
secretary; deputy head of the Central Committee's culture section
G.I. Kunitsyn became editor of the literature and art department;
and the head of the party life department of the journal PROBLEMS
OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, S.M. Kovalev, became editor for the
department for propaganda of Marxist-Leninist theory.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: 0XRD afiT00875R00 0@78 5-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
Kunitsyn's late 1966 appointment was especially revealing, since
he had joined in the att?icks on Rumyarr;`sev at the time of the
latter's ouster in late 1965. Kunitsyn, author of a book on
"party spirit" in literature, in a November 1965 KOMMUNIST article
had attacked the liberal interpretation of Lenin's attitude
toward art propounded by NOVY MIR and Rumyantsev and reasserted
the right to expel writers from the writers union for ideological
deviations.* With Kunitsyn's arrival at PRAVDA., literature and
art editor N.A. Abalkin was demoted to an observer in that
department, and Rumyantsev's line on culture was reversed. As.
new literature and art editor; Kunitsyn helped prepare the 1968
ideological crackdown. This was done in a 16 February 1968
LITERARY RUSSIA article which argued that Lenin was willing to
tolerate artistically deficient literature as long as it was
politically useful, and a 29 February 1968 PRAVDA article which
attacked the "legend" that Lenin had been tolerant toward hostile
trends in art--a view promoted by Rumyantsev in his 9 September 1965
PRAVDA article.
New theory editor Kovalev also played a key role in this conservative
trend, authoring a notorious 26 September 1968 PRAVDA article
introducing the "Brezhnev doctrine" of the right to intervene in
other socialist countries. By no means all of the 1965-1966
additions were as conservative as Zimyanin, Kunitsyn and Kovalev,
however. Voronov, icr example, had bravely--even recklessly--
crus-ded against Lysenko both before such attacks were officially
sanctioned and after they had ceased elsewhere, and his transfer
from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was presumably intended to end the
unwanted criticisms in this regard.
Moreover, some out-and-out liberals remained among the survivors
at PRAVDA. Political observer F.M. Burlatskiy and collegium
member L.V. Karpinskiy, clearly rank in this category. They
created a furor by publishing an article in the 30 June 1967
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA attacking censorship. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
was forced to run an editorial on 8 July attacking the article as
a "gross ideological error," and Burlatskiy and Karpinskiy left
PRAVDA's staff. Earlier, Burlatskiy had apparently stepped out
of line by interpreting Kosygin's remarks at a London press conference
on 9 February 1967, as implying a more favorable Soviet attitude
toward the idea of limiting ABM's than the facts apparently warranted.
Reports leaked to Western newsmen after the event indicated the
article was in error.
* Seethe FBIS SURVEY of 14 March 1968, pages 22-23.
CONFID;N
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RD R*00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/0pd351b irDP85TOO875R000300070045-9
FBIS TRENDS
31 OCTOBER 1974
Another shakeup hit PRAVDA in the late summer and fall of 1968,
in connection with the Czech events and the ideological turmoil
of that year. First deputy editor Zarodov was packed off to
Prague as chief editor of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM about
the time of the invasion and Voronov was replaced as responsible
secretary. Deputy chief editor Stukalin was promoted to first
deputy chief editor, Afanasyev came from the Academy of Social
Sciences to become deputy chief editor for ques::iorrs of theory,
PRAVDA's editor for the socialist countries department A.I. Lukovets
advanced to deputy chief editor, and first deputy responsible
secretary Tsukasov moved up to responsible secretary.
Kunitsyn left PRAVDA in early 1969 and Kovalev in late 1971, but
other conservatives have come to PRAVDA, including such radical
types as anti-Semitic propagandist V.V. Bolshakov, who became deputy
responsible secretary in charge of PRAVDA's international departments
in 1970. Bolshakov wrote articles going beyond official anti-Israeli
policy and even implicitly criticizing official positions as too
soft on Israel and the Jews.* His personal crusade against the Jews
appears to have ended only recently. The September 1974 ZHURNALIST
announced that Bolshakov had been transferred abroad as a PRAVDA
correspondent, stationed in far off Australia, New Zealand and
Oceania.
* See the TRENDS of 31 October 1973, pages 30-31.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T0087?R0Q~M70045-9
31 OCTOBER 1974
- i -
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 21 - 27 OCTOBER 1974
Moscow (2660 items)
Peking (935 items)
Pakist,..ni Prime Minister
6%
Danish Prime Minister
(8%)
9%*
Bhutto in USSR
China
(5%)
5%
Hartling in PRC
[Maritime Transport
(--)
3%]
Arab Summit Conference,
(--)
4%
Agreement
Rabat
Indochina
(8%)
9%
[Soviet Leaders'
(--)
3%]
[Vietnam
(5%)
4%]
Greetings
[PRC-Lao Communi-
(--)
3%]
Kissinger in USSR (--)
4%
cations Agreement
1973 World Peace Congress (--)
3%
Criticism of Lin Piao
(10%)
8%
Anniversary
European CP Meeting,
(3%)
2%
and Confucius
Economic Crisis iul. the
(1%)
6%
Warsaw
FRG Chancellor Schmidt
(--)
2%
West
UNGA Session
(7%)
6%
in USSR
24th Anniversary of
(--)
3%
Chinese "Volunteers"'
Entry into Korean War
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or edito iy., govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted .:s commentaries,
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the precet'ing week.
Topics and events given major attention in terns of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may i:Zve been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with
Hartling.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070045-9