TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070042-2
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Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
34
Document Creation Date:
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 7, 1999
Sequence Number:
42
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 9, 1974
Content Type:
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~TR~ NDS i~n ~ommunist~ Propa:ga~nda
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Confidential
F
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
9 OCTOBER 1974
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TRENDS
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This propiganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
National Security Information.
Unou:eorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 OCTOBER 1974
CONTENTS
ENERGY
Moscow Urges OPEC Unity, "Pressure" on Western Monopolies. . . . . . .
USSR-EGYPT
1
Comment Marking War Anniversary Reflects Continued Rift, . . . . . . .
GDR 25TH ANNIVERSARY
4
Brezhnev, Honecker Speeches Emphasize Bloc Solidarity. . . . . . . . .
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
6
Belgrade Maintains Cool Attitude in Cominformist Affair. . . . , , , ,
INDOCHINA
9
Government Statement Formalizes PRG Call for Thieu's Ouster.
. . . .
11
Statements Underline Khieu Samphan's Role in Cambodian Front .
12
Nguyen Huu Tho Leads NFLSV/PRG Delegation in East Europe, MPR. .
CHINA
14
PRC UJN Speech Hails Third World, Ridicules U.S.-USSR Detente . . . , .
KOREA
17
Pyongyang Emphasizes Support for Struggle in the South . . . . . . . .
ARGENTINA
19
Soviet, Cuban Media Condemn Terrorism, Support Peron Regime. . . . , .
USSR
21
Kosygin's Status in Leadership Boosted, Then Deflated. . . .
23
New Central Committee Decisions on Ideology.
NOTE
24
Hoxha on U.S., Soviet Ties.
APPENDIX
29
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 OCTOBER 1974
E N E R G Y
MOSCOW URGES OPEC UNITY, "PRESSURE" ON WESTERN MONOPOLIES
While Moscow had refrained from any substantial. original comment
on recent criticism of high oil prices by the President and
Secretary Kissinger, it had been quick to replay negative reaction
from spokesmen for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). As late as 5 October, Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace
and Progress in Arabic reminded Middle Eastern listeners of calls
for reduced oil prices by the President and Secretary Kissinger.
But regular Soviet media generally have reverted to doctrinaire
explanations of Western agitation for a reduction of oil prices.
Thus, Moscow Arabic- and Persian-language broadcasts argue that
an "anti-Arab imperialist conspiracy" led by Western oil monopolies
:is behind the current campaign to reduce oil prices, and commentators
urge unity and joint action to "pressure" the monopolies by member-
states of OPEC.
"INTERNATIONAL MONOPOLIES" A Moscow broadcast to Iranian
BEHIND OIL CRISIS listeners on the 3d, arguing that
"imperialist companies" in the West
were trying to place the "heavy burden" of the capitalist world's
oil, inflation, and economic crises on the shoulders of oil-producing
countries, noted that OPEC members expressed their opposition to
the Washington conference of the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund by refusing to attend. The commentary cited the
Teher in paper KAYFIAN--often quoted recently in Soviet comment
for Middle Eastern audiences---to the effect that the OPEC members'
national interests "demand that the price of oil not be decreased."
The commentary concluded that success in the OPEC struggle against
"the common enemy, oil imperialism" or organizations like the
World Bank and the IMF, depended oar OPEC unity and "pressure on the
monopolies through joint efforts."
PRAVDA commentator Peresada on the 4th derided as "untenable"
Western press claims that the capitalist woriI'. economic crisis
and "so-called energy crisis" had beer exacerbated by OPEC oil
price increases and export restrictions. He argued that "international
monopolies" themselves had fomented the crisis in order to preserve
their "superprofits" and monopolize the market and had circulated
the "fairytale" that OPEC had exacerbated the West's economic problems
when they saw the end of cheap hidd].e Eastern oil.
CONFIDENTIAL
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"ECONOMIC WAR" Illustrative of the much more critical and
DECLARED BY U.S. anti-U.S. stance of Moscow's ostensibly
"unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress was a
5 October commentary for Arab listeners. It declared flatly that
"public opinion in the Middle East believes that the pressure and
threats put on the oil-exporting states by the United States
indicates in fact a declaration of economic war." The commentator
concluded with a veiled suggestion that if such "pressure" continues,
the OPEC countries could find themselves "compelled to take what-
ever measures they think appropriate to protect their legitimate
interests. Liberally quoting from Arab newspapers, the commentator
.toted charges that "American colonialism" sought to weaken the
Arab states' position on Middle East issues, undercut the /,ribs'
international support, and split the "united front" of developing
countries and incite them against the Arab states.
By contrast, Moscow's pragmatic approach to detente-related
U.S.-Soviet cooperation on energy matters was illustrated by
Soviet media treatment of the first meeting in Washington
(3-5 October) of the joint U.S.-Soviet commission for cooperation
in the field of energy--a commission set up by the 28 June 1974
agreement signed in Moscow during former President Nixon's visit.
TASS' positive, straightforward reporting on the commission's
first activi.ties completely ignored world and U.S. energy crisis
issues, while quoting the Soviet delegation head as praising
"successful" cooperation and "mutual benefit" to the two countries
through the new bilateral arrangement.
MOSCOW RETICENCE ON Soviet media have re,iained much more reticent
INTERNATIONAL ACTION and noncommittal, however, in regard to
joint international efforts to resolve the
oil price conflict be.cween oil-exporting and oil-importing nations,
efforts that usually have been Western-initiated. PRAVDA's Peresad:_;
vaguely suggested, after referring to "positive trends" at the
present stage of international relations, that such trends "dictate
the need to establish and comprehensively develop equal economic
cooperation among all countries." Current Soviet reportage on the
recent Washington IMF session uniformly disparaged it as a "capitalist"
conclave aimed against OPEC. Moscow also was consistently negative
about the February 1974 Washington energy conference, predicting
its failure in advance and stressing Western disarray and distrust.*
* Soviet advance treatment of the earlier U.S.-sponsored energy
conference is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, pages
9-10.
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Soviet media have never given more than very low-level., perfunctory
publicity to the idea of a broau energy conference with both
communist and noncommunist countries participating.
CONFIDENTIAL
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9 OCTOBER 1974
U S S R - E G Y P T
COM1ENT MARKING WAR ANNIVERSARY REFLECTS CONTINUED RIFT
In limited comment pegged to the first anniversary of the October
1973 Middle ,"ast war, Moscow has conveyed a message of continuing
dissatisfaction with key aspects of Egypt's foreign and domestic
policies under President Sadat. As on past occasions, Moscow's
principal complaints have focused on Egypt's critical attitude
toward Soviet military and economic aid, its increased cooperation
with the West, and Egyptian economic trends away from socialist
policies. Strongly reinforcing this recent expression of Moscow's
displeasure with Cairo was the preponderant theme of Soviet
material on the war ann ive_sary--the vital necessity of Soviet
diplomatic and material support, in the past and the future, for
Arab succes,3 in the conflict with Israel.
Much of the anniversary commentary reflected continued resentment
over Sadat's public criticism, made on several occasions after
the war, disparaging the value of Soviet military aid to the
Arabs. Saclat had referred, for example, to untimely deliveries
and inadequate quantities of military supplies and to th. inef-
fectiveness of Soviet weapons i_ combat. Scviet sensitivity to
such charges was evident in a Moscow radio commentary by A. Timoshkin,
broadcast to Arab listeners on 6 October, which praised the Syrian
military effusively for having "proved that Soviet military
equipment is not inferior to that of the Israeli army," adding
that "it is actually superior to it in many aspects."
A two-part Moscow radio commentary by Yuriy Potomov oiu 4-5 October,
titled "Lessons of the October Mar," also defended the value of
Soviet weapons, using a transparent polemical device to make its
point by selectively quoting Sadat against himself but mentioning
his name only when citing the references approvingly. Thus, noting
that Sadat had recently stated that "the crossing of the canal
and the October war were possible due to Soviet weapons," Potomov
observed further that "even the most uninformed on military matters"
must realize Soviet deliveries of weapons and training in their use
did not begin the day the war started, adding "how insipid to allege,
as some have done," that the USSR did not give the Arabs modern
weapons, that it prevented the Arabs from carrying out certain
military operations, and that it wanted to maintain a state of
"no war, no peace."
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Soviet concern over Egypt's increased diplomatic and economic
ties with the West since the war--as well as a residue of
resentment over the relatively small Soviet role played in
the disengagement negotiations--.was also evident in anniversary
comment. The Potomov radio commentary on 4-5 October, for
example, probably had Secretary Kissinger and his contacts
with President Sadat in mind when it asked rhetorically whether
the "positive changes" of the October war were "all the result
of activity of some statesmen in some countries--men who are
capable of working miracles and changing from the helpers of
the aggressors into the friends of those subjected to the
aggression." Asserting that such a judgment would be "super-
ficial and untrue," Potomov reminded his listeners of other
factors, such as the oil embargo and Arab "solidarity." His
predictable main conclusion, however, was that the "fundamental
preconditions" for the Aral) states' successes in the October
war were their long-time "progressive domestic_ policies,"
combined with foreign policies of close cooperation with the
Soviet Union and other socialist states. The final lesson for
Arab audiences to remember from Potomov's and other Soviet
commentators' analyses was explicitly that future Arab successes
would depend on the same domestic and foreign preconditions.
PEKING Peking conveyed a decidedly anti-Soviet slant in
marking the anniversary, giving only perfunctory
attention to the Arab conflict with Israel and its U.S. backer,
while focusing on the October war as a great victory by Egypt
against Soviet control and interference. Lengthy NCNA articles
on 4 and 6 October dredged up allegations of Soviet perfidy since
the 1967 war and hailed moves by Sadat to check Soviet efforts
to "sabotage" last October's attack. They charged that Brezhnev
had worked closely with former President Nixon to impede the
Arabs' advance in the Sinai and that Kosygin's October 1973
visit to Cairo was part of a heavyhanded Soviet effort to stop
the fighting. Reviewing strains in Egyptian-Soviet relations
over the past year regarding arms supplies, repayment of debts,
bilateral visits and propaganda attacks, the Chinese lauded
Sadat's efforts to diversify Egypt's sources of aid, noting
especially Cairo's closer ties with other Arab nations, the
reestab'jl.islunen*_ of relations with Washington, and the risr_ of
U.S. influence in the area at Soviet expense.
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9 OCTOBEF 1974
- 6 -
GDR 25TH ANNIVERSARY
BREZHNEV, HONECKER SPEECHES EMPHASIZE BLOC SOLIDARITY
The 25th anniversary of the GDR on 7 October was the occasion for
strong reaffirmations by Honacker of East Germany's solidarity
with Moscow--a status newly proclaimed in a revised GDR constitution
which went into effect on that date--and for tributes by the SED
leader to Brezhnev, who was the star of the festivities. Brezhnev
got more lavish praise than at the last comparable ceremonial
occasion in East Berlin, the Eighth SED Congress in June 1971.
Neither Brezhnev nor Honecker mentioned the proposed European and
world communist party conferences in their major friendship rally
speeches on the 6th. Brezhnev's fairly lengthy, tl.ough standard,
discussion of the Chinese was preceded by a briefer, more restrained
allusion to Peking by Honecker in his opening speech.
HONECKER While the new GDR constitution, which eliminates
language reflecting East German dedication to eventual
all-German unification, was not mentioned by either principal, the
GDR's new unq?'alified identity as a socialist state allied with
Moscow was clearly underscored by Honecker. Thus, after declaring
that the GDR's development was inconceivable without its alliance
with the Soviet Union, the SED leader added that, "being an integral
part of the community of socialist states, our GDR now belongs to
the strongest and most influential power in the world, to the power
of socialism which is firmly rooted on the three continents of our
planet." In stating that the GDR is prepared to further develop
relations with capitalist states, including the FRG, on the basis
of sovereignty and equality, Honecker stressed that "the centerpiece"
of East German foreign policy would continue to be the strengthening
of its alliance with the USSR and the other states of the socialist
community. In this connection, he underscored the close connection
between the GDR's industrial successes and CEMA economic integration.
In addition to the expected tributes to Brezhnev in his Karl Marx
Order award speech on the 6th, Honecker also began his rally speech
the same day with a lengthy eulogy of the Soviet leader. Welcoming
Brezhnev as "our good friend and comrade," Honecker praised him as
"the envoy of the Soviet people which . . . through the great peace
program of the 24th CPSU Congress is again thoroughly changing the
world." While thus firmly supporting Moscow's detente policy,
Honecker did not reiterate the principle of "coordination" of foreign
policy by the socialist states--a principle which Moscow and its
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orthodox allies have stressed since the July 1973 Crimea conference
? and which Brezhnev cited in his speech at the East Berlin rally,
Honecker did, however, mention coordination of foreign policy
in his GDR anniversary article published in PRAVDA on the 4th.
Honecker delivered a brief criticism of the PPC for allegedly
aiding the antidetente forces and supporting NATO and the EC.
He had registered a similarly low keyed criticism of Peking in a
Warsaw speech in June. On both that occasion and the present one
he avoided the "Iiaoist" epithet used by both Poland's Gierek and
Brezhnev, respectively.
BREZHNEV As he had done in Poland in July,.Brezhnev answered
the lavish praise accorded him by his host with only
a brief, standard tribute in return. Thus, in his rally speech
the Soviet leader attributed the GDR's economic achievements to
the two-million-strong SED "led by the true son of its people,
steeled antifascist, and prominent figure in the international
communist movement, Erich Honecker." Ile included a more generous
rE.ference to Ulbricht than Honecker had made, listing the late
SED leader with such "hallowed" names as Pieck and Grotewohl who,
he said, had written "glorious pages" in the history of German
socialism and would "forever remain in the memory of their
desce..'lants." Honecker, by contrast, had merely listed Ulbricht
with a large number of "unforgettable" German revolutionaries of
the past.
Brezhnev reminded his hosts that it was "the concerted efforts of
the fraternal socialist countries," embodied in the Warsaw Pact
organization, that had frustrated alleged imperialist attempts
to "crush" the young East German state and paved the way for
official international recognition of the GDR. He went on to
stress the importL ce of the Warsaw Pact countries' "coordination
of political efforts in the international arena" in strengthening
peace and detente.
In contrast to his 21 July speech before the Polish Sejm, Brezhnev
included some critical references to the Chinese leadership in his
remarks. Terming the 1949 revolutionary victory "a great event in
the life of China," the Soviet leader attacked "the Maoist leaders"'
for their current split from the other socialist countries and for
their oppositf.on to detente. He called on "the Chinese people
themselves" to change these policies. As in his 24th congress
speech in 1971, Brezhnev declared that the USSR would "continue
exerting efforts to normalize relations" with the PRC.
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BREZHNEV, HONECKER ON Brezhnev in his major address on the 6th
FRG RELATIONS took the unusual step of discussing at
considerable length Moscow's relations
with Bonn, making it clear that the Soviet leadership wished to
see continued improvement in East-West German relations. Asserting
than the policy of "actively developing relations" between the
FRG and the socialist states "already justifies itself in practice,"
Brezhnev pointed out that agreements with the FRG of recent years
"are being constantly filled with real content" and that "we are
prepared" to continue this policy and "presume the other side" is
also interested. Ile then went on to say that Chancellor Schmidt was
expected soon in Moscow on an official visit and favorably noted
statements by FRG Government lepuers on the "continuity" of Bonn's
foreign policy. At the same time Brezhnev took an indirect swipe
at Bonn over the establishment of the FRG Federal Environmental
Office in West Berlin, deploring the move as an attempt "to
get special advantages counter to the Quadripartite Agreement on
West Berlin," and declaring that all the agreements with the FRG
were too important to be made the object of a "political game."
Honecker, who spoke before Brezhnev on the 6th, referred only
briefly to relations with Bonn, but expressed the optimistic
opinion that there were "possibilities" for achieving "additional
positive results." It was on 27 September that the GDR People's
Chamber adopted the law removing all references in the 1968
constitution to a united German nation or people and to future
reunification of the two German statr,. According to the new
"socialist constitution," which became effective as of the 25th
anniversary, the GDR is now a "socialist state of workers and
peasants," "forever and irrevocably allied with the USSR."
Honecker mar::ged to avoid any reference to "reunification" or
"nation" in his remarks on the constitutional changes on the
27th. In his anniversary address on the 6th, however, he paid
some deference to the East German people's interests in and
feelings for its historical traditions, declaring that the GDR
has preserved "all the good ideas" of German history and that
"we are preserving and treasuring this great heritage."
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- 9 -
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
BELGRADE MAINTAINS COOL ATTITUDE IN COMINFORMIST AFFAIR
Belgrade has given its first indication that it may have received
some assurances from the bloc countries involved in the recent
"Cominformist" conspiracy that such activities would not be
permitted in the future. Meanwhile, at least one Yugoslav
newspaper has criticized Moscow's public handling of the issue,
strongly implying that the latter had .meddled in Yugoslav affairs.
The press spokesman for the foreign affairs secretariat, Milan
Zupan, in a briefing for newsmen on 3 October, acknowledged that
the "party leaderships of certain countries" had been "informed"
by the "LCY leadership" about the trial of the Cominformist group.
As a result of the contacts, he said, Yugoslavia had been given
"assurances" that "no emigre activity against Yugoslavia will
be allowed." Zupan avoided identifying the three countries
allegedly involved--the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
He did, however, go on record to deny Western press reports
that Belgrade had declared persona non grata "three diplomatic
representatives of socialist countries" in connection with the
affair. That the contacts took place at the party level--and
were subsequently announced by a government official--underscored
fito's intention not to allow the affair or Yugoslavia's reaction
Lo endanger state relations with the bloc countries involved.
Indeed, Zupan's remarks seemed designed to portray Belgrade as
approaching the problem with diplomatic equanimity This follows
the pattern in the Yugoslav press since Tito's 12 September
revelation of the arrest and trial of the group, which has
emphasized the need for vigilance against hostile forces but has
avoided inflaming LI,e issue or pointing the finger at Moscow.
An exception has been Ljubljana's DELO, which on 28 September
openly criticized Moscow's first public response to the affair
and in a separate article criticized in a thinly veiled manner
Moscow's general attitude toward Yugoslavia.
THE DELO ARTICLES The first article scored a 27 September
PRAVDA commentary which had concentrated
primarily on discrediting Western press reports about Soviet
military intentions toward Yugoslavia and had mentioned-the
group's arrest and trial only as an aside. DELO pointed out
that PRAVDA, "which undoubtedly expresses the official position
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CONI'IDOT IAL FR1S TRENDS
9 OC'T'OBER 1974
OF the Soviet leadership," was guilty of a'?(,.(i.ng "the very
essence of the problem" because it "clues nk t all mention"
that the .coup involved were "Cominformists" and that they
were "linked with anti-Yugoslav emigrants abroad."
The serond DELO article avoided mentioning the Soviet Union
or any other country by name but was clearly aimed at the
alleged foreign supporters of the group. Using 'I'ito's call for
greater vigilance against hostile forces as a springboard,
DELO criticized those who denigrate Yugoslavia's on brand of
socialism and contend that "it is a verita)le crime not to
copy" the so-called "ideal societies." It particularly criti-
cized "tlic. embassy of a great foreign state" for indirectly
attacking Yugoslavs through the propaganda it distributes.
While the propaganda materials "never contain an ill word
about Yugoslavia," DELO pointed out, they draw attention to
negative phenomena, such as electricity shortages and nationali-
ties problems. '1'lie "message of this polemic," I)ELO concluded,
is clearly to criticize the Yugoslav system, adding that "it is
not a long way from this to extending assistance to those of
our emigrants abroad who want the social system changed."
Whether the DELO articles have been published with the regime's
approval is hard to say. Despite the Federal Government's
efforts to increase control over the provincial press, DELO,
organ of the Slovene Socialist Alliance, has maintained a
degree of independence. Neither of the articles has been
replayed by the media in Belgrade.
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9 OCTOBER 1974
INDOCHINA
GOVERNMENT STATEMENT FORMALIZES PRG CALL FOR THIIEU'S OUSTER
Vietnamese communists have given the offical imprimatur of a PRG
statement to the call--first revived by Hanoi in August--for Thieu's
overthrow and replacement by an administration willing to comply
with the Paris agreement. Giving added impetus to the demand, the
8 October government statement pledged that when Thieu is replaced
the PRG will be ready to engage in "serious negotiations" with a
new administration to arrive at a "speedy settlement" of South
Vietnam's affairs. Since the revival of the issue of Thieu's
ouster in mid-August, for the first time since the Paris accord,
low-level propaganda has continued to lend support to the "people's"
move to oust Thieu, and has occasionally even raised the issue of
negotiations after he is gone.*
Since the Paris agreement, the PRG has generally 11 'mited its
government statements on Vietnam to major policy dem9rches such
as the 22 ilarch 1974 six-point proposal--the last previous government
statement--or linked them to significant events such as the first
anniversary of the signing of the Paris agreement. Why the government
statement was released at this Mme is not cir~.ar, although it may
reflect a communist desire to authoritatively record their position
in anticipation of the upcoming visit to Moscow by Secretary
Kissinger. Prior to former President Nixon's visit to
Moscow in June this year and Secretary Kissinger's trip to Peking
last November, Hanoi and the PRG appeared to be attempting to focus
international attention on their complaints through high-level
official statements and authoritative media comment.
The PRG statement reiterated in standard fashion charges of U.S.-
Saigon "sabotage" of the Paris agreement, U.S. "involvement and
interference" in South Vietnamese affairs, and escalation of the
war through pacification and "nibbling" operations. The statement
took particular note of the "impossible" life of the people ruled
by the Saigon regime, portraying the many political, economic, and
social woes allegedly inflicted on them. by the Thieu administration.
While the media have never been reticent in passing judgement on
what they see as shortcomings of life in the GVN, offi_ciai statements
* For background on the latest call for Thieu's overthrow, see the
TRENDS of 21 August 1974, pages 14-17 and the TRENDS of 28 August
1974, page 13.
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have not ordinarily been the vehicle for such detailed reminders
as provided in the current statement. According to the statement,
the people "can bear this no longer" and this accounts for a
"movement that has erupted violently" in the South to gain redress
for these supp.,sed grievances, for national concord an! reconciliation,
for implementation of the Paris agreement, and for the overthrow of
Thieu. In addition to expressing strong support for this movement,
the statement issued a series of "firm demands" for realizing the
"speedy settlement of the internal affairs of South Vietnam," includ-
ing the demand for the "overthrow of Nguyen Van Thieu and his gang
who constitute the main obstacle to the solution of the political
issues in South Vietnam at present, and the setting up in Saigon
of an administration that wishes peace and national concord and is
willing to implement the Paris agreement."
STATEMENTS UNDERLINE KHIEU SAMPHAN'S ROLE IN CAMBODIAN FRONT
The increasingly prominent position of RGNU Defense Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan in the Cambodian Front leader-
ship was underscored in recent days with the release of a series
of four appeals in his name and an interview with him offering the
first authoritative Front statement on the upcoming UN General
Assembly debate on Cambodia. While Khieu Samphan has issued such
appeals in the past--his last one almost a year ago dealt with the
dry season offensive--a series of directives such as the current
appeals for greater resistance to Lon Nol normally would have been
attributed also to other Front ministers, Iiou Youn and Hu Nim.
Similarly, Khieu Samphan's comments on the UN representation issue
in his 27 September AKI interview impinged upon Prince Sihanouk's
traditional role as the leading Front spokesman on foreign policy
issues. Sihanouk did not issue his first statement on this year's
UN debate until eight days after the Khieu Samphan interview.
The four appeals, dated 27 and 29 September and 1 and 3 October,
were addressed, respectively, to four different audiences--students,
soldiers, monks, and government personnel still under Lon Nol's rule--
and seemed designed to capitalize on recent unease in Phnom Penh
stemming from the decline in U.S. aid and stringent economic reforms
recently undertaken by the Phnom Penh government. Thus, while
praising the present military situation in general terms and reaffirming
Front determination to fight until its five points are achieved,
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Khieu Samphan focused on the newly volatile Phnom Penh political sit-
uation, stating that the people have launched a "general uprising"
against Lon Nol rule and that the present situation in Cambodia has
entered a "new stage." Emphasizing popular dissatisfaction with the
economic measures, which have devalued the currency and led to
tremendous price increases, the appeals said that Lon Nol's lack
of territory and resources and the declir,:: in U.S. aid necessitated
such steps. Asserting repeatedly that an end to U.S, aid would bring
the immediate -ollapse of the regime, the defense minister added
that "the U.S. imperialists themselves face immense economic crises"
and "are in no position to help their puppets." The 27 September appeal
also took note of the recent return to Phnom Penh of Lon Nol's
controversial brother Lon Non, stating that the latter had ""laid bare
his fascist nature" by allegedly ordering the disbanding of the
Cambodian teachers' association last month.
In his interview on the United Nations, Khieu Samphan strove to play
up the Front's stature--reputing claims of territorial control, popular
support, and international backing--and to portray the Lon Nol regime
as a pathetic dependent of the United States. He was c4,tiously
optimistic regarding the outcome of this -rear's debate, though he
warned against the continuing "deceptive maneuvers" of the United States.
Sihanouk's statement on 5 October, as reported by NCNA on the 8th,
buttressed Khieu Samphan's stature in the course of rebutting
the charge that the ';GNU represents a government in exile. He
played up Khieu Samphan's position as a Front leader both within
Cambodia and in foreigr affairs, stating that "the Americans
themselves recognize ti-at 11r. Khieu Samphan, head of our govern-
ment inside Cambodia, is a remarkable figure in Cambodia and in
the international arena."
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NGUYEN HUU THO LEADS NFLSV/PRG DELEGATION IN EAST EUROPE, MPR
Recent visits by NFLSV/PRG leader Nguyen Huu Tho to four East
European states and Mongolia continued a world tour begun a year
ago to express thanks for support received 'during the Vietnam
war. Tho had visited China, the Soviet Union, and the East
European members of the ICCS--Hungary and Poland--during November
and December 1973, and he was in North Korea late this August.*
Following last year's pattern, the Tho delegation has signed
agreements for aid to the PRG in the coming year in each of
the countries visited. Tho has now gone on to visit Syria
and Iraq; he had visited several African countries is well as
Yugoslavia in September 1973.
EAST GERMANY During Nguyen Huu Tho's 5-11 September stay ii:
East Germany, GDR State Council Chairman Willi
Stoph hosted the South Vietnamese at traditional receptions, dinners,
and rallies, represented the GDR in the off4_cial talks, and signed
the joint communique on the visit. An aid agreement with the
Germans, signed on the 9th by PRG Minister Nguyen Van Hieu and
Deputy Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers Gerhard Weiss,
was briefly described in the final communique as providing for
nonrefundable economic aid to the PRG in 1975. Hieu also signed
the aid agreements concluded on the other stops on the trip.
Remarks by Tho and Stoph at a 5 September arrival dinner set forth
basic views which were repeated in the other major addresses
during the visit. The texts of their remarks were published by
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, but the excerpts published by Hanoi and PRG
media focused on criticism of the United States and Saigon and
omitted Stoph's references to detente. Tho stressed that the
present unsatisfactory situation in South Vietnam was due to U.S.
"interference and aggression," denied Washington charges that all
parties to the Paris agreement have violated it, and criticized
President Ford for stating that he would follow the policies of the
former administration. Stoph directed his criticism at Saigon for
violating the agreement "with U.S. support"--a formulation also
used by the German side in the joint communique. While thus stopping
* Nguyen Huu Tho s visit to China is discussed in the TRENDS of
21 November 1973, pages 14-17, and 28 November 1973, pages 14-15;
his visit to Poland in the 12 December 1973 TRENDS, page 15; his
visit to Hungary in the 19 December TRENDS, page 21;, and his visit
to the Soviet Union in the TRENDS of 19 December 1973, pages 15-16,
and 4 January 1974, pages 4-6.
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short of the harsher V._etnamese indictment of the United States,
the Germans went beyond the stand taken by East Europeans during
Tho's visits to Poland and Hungary last year, when they criticized
"imperialist" support for Saigon without mentioning the United
States.
Tho met with SED First Secretary Erich Honecker on the 9th and,
according to a cryptic VNA report, the two sides discussed "a
number of important problems concerning the situation in South
Jietnam and the GDR on which the two sides held identical points
of view." The East Berliv radio account of the meeting gave
more detail on the exchange, reportin; taat Tho paid tribute to
the USSR and other socialist states for warding off aggression
and strengthening the South Vietnamese "liberated areas."
Honecker, according to the radio, praised the contributions to
socialism, peace, and detente by the 24th CPSU Congress and the
socialist community's coordinated foreign policy.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal, acting
for ailing President Svoboda, hosted and held
talks with the South Vietnamese delegation during its 11-16 September
visit to Czechoslovakia. The delegation also met with party chief
Gustav Husak and concluded an agreement on free economic assistance
for the PI:G in 1975. RUDE PRAVO's accounts of toasts at the welcoming
banquet on 11 September indicated that Strougal only indirectly
criticized the United States in a reference to Saigon "and its
allies"; the paper summarized the portion of Tho's remarks on the
situation in South Vietnam, eliminating any direct reference to
the United States. The joint communique on the visit, however,
put Prague on record as condemning the Saigon Administration,
"relying on the support of the United States." The South Vietnamese,
in the communique in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere on the tour,
directed criticism primarily at the United States, rather than
Saigon.
ALBANIA The South Vietnamese delegation was warmly welcomed by
an impressive array of party and state officials when
it arrived in Tirana on 16 September. During the visit, which
concluded on the 20th, the delegation was hosted by Chairman of
the People's Assembly Presidium Ilaxhi Lleshi and received by
party First Secretary Enver Hoxha. As.would be expected, Lleshi
joined Tho in speeches denouncing the U.S. role in Indochina and
went on to single out China for praise and to criticize the "two
imperialist superpowers" and detente. Vietnamese media reports on
the visit predictably quoted extensively from the anti-American
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passages, but omitted Lleshi's references to the PRC and his
allusions to the Soviet Union. In the joint communique at the
conclusion of the visit, the Albanians joined with the PRG in
charging that the United States was the "chief culprit" responsible
for the situation in South Vietnam. As in the earlier stops on
Tho's tour, the communique noted that a nonrefundable aid agreement
for 1975 had been concluded.
BULGARIA The Bulgarians were more restrained than Tho's other
East European allies in backing iRG complaints about
U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Thus, speeches by tht delegation's
host, party First Secretary and State Council President Todor
Zhivkov, critically noted the historical U.S. role in Vietnam before
the Paris peace agreement but referred only to current actions by
"external imperialist forces" without mentioning the United States.
The Lulgarian side in the joint :ommunique similarly only condemned
"imperialist forces" aiding Saigon. Vietnamese accounts of the
communique included the standard statement that an agreement on
nonrefundable economic aid for 1975 had been signed. The text of
the communique published in the 25 September RABOTNICHESKO DELO,
however, did not include the specific qualification on nonrepayment,
referring simply to an agreement on economic assistance. Tho's
official visit in Bulgaria was from 20 through 24 September,
but the delegation vacationed on the Black Sea coast for several
days before leaving for their next stop in Ulaanbaatar.
MONGOLIA Party First Secretary and Chairman of the MPR People's
Great Hural Presidium Tsedenbal hosted the South
Vietnamese delegation during its 30 September-4 October stay in
Mongolia. Speeches by Tho and Tsedenbal followed the pattern set
in most of Eastern Europe, with Tho placing the primary blame for
the "tense" situation in South Vietnam upon the United States
and Tsedenbal criticizing the Saigon administration, which he said
relies on the "support of the U.S. imperialists." The two sides
signed an aid agreement for 1975 and 1976, described in the joint
communique as "gratuitous."
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C H I N A
PRC UN SPEECH HAILS THIRD WORLD, RIDICULES U,S,-USSR DETENTE
China's chief UN delegate-. Chiao Kuan-hua in his 2 October address
to the General Assembly r:t unexpectedly reviewed the inter-
national scene in the framework of "three worlds," hailing the
successes of the Third World against the superpowers of the
"first world."* He asserted that the past year has seen tie
Third World emerge as the "main force" in the revolutionary
struggle against the superpowers.
While Chiao typically was much more critical of the Soviet Union
than the United States, this year's speech differed notably in regard
to superpower relationships from the one lie delivered last year
at the UNGA. Thus, while in 1973 lie displayed concern over
such results of detente as the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the
prevention of nuclear war, this year he pictured people through-
out the world as "seeing through" detente. He remarked that it
was after the "stack of" agreements at the second U.S.-Soviet
summit that the Middle East war broke out and after "more
agreements" at the third summit that the "Cyprus events" occurred.
The Soviet Union was accused of hawking the "quack medicine" of
detente, and criticized for its use of "empty talk" on dizarmament
to cover arms expansion, and for its expansionist ambitions. in
/,rica, the Middle East, Cyprus, the Balkz,ns and South Asia.
In pointing up the Third World victories of the past year,
Chiao devoted special attention to the use of raw materials as
weapons. He claimed that the oil weapon had opened up a new
dimension in the Third World struggle, one which "far exceeds the
scope of the Arab people's anti-imperialist struggle." Showing
some sensitivity to the problems caused non-oil producing Third
World states, Chiao noted that "ways should be sought" to resolve
their difficulties.
Without mentioning the United States, Chiao rejected the recent,
tougher line on oil-pricing. Asserting only that "some people"
say that current economic difficulties are caused by high oil
prices, Chiao attacked this "specious argument" and supported
* A period of increasing Chinese attention to and support for the
Third World countries was climaxed last April by Politburo member
Teng Hsiao-ping's speech to the UNGA special session. See the
TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 1-4.
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9 OCTOBER 1974
efforts by developing nations to control their national resources as
a basic challenge to the old economic n'.der of "exploitation and
plunder." While Peking media have not explicitly mentioned remarks
on oil pricing by the President and Secretary Kissinger, Chiao
apparently was referring to those remarks when he admonished that
"To fly into a rage is futile. To bluff is also futile."
Though duly calling attention to recently heightene'I Chinese
warnings over the "danger of war" stemming from U.S.-Soviet
competition; Chiao carefully refrained from saying that the danger
had become worse over the past year, asserting only that "in our
view, at least one cannot say it is less." He also added a
reference to Mao's dictum that "revolution," not war, represents
the main trend in the world today.
While restating Peking's tough preconditions for the convening of
a world disarmament conference and advocating the development of
"necessary and independent" defense capabilities by non-superpower
states, Chiao expanded on Peking's recently displayed flexibility
regarding nuclear-free zones by explicitly supporting for the
first time separate proposals by Iran and Pakistan for the establish-
ment of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia.
Peking's new openness on nuclear-free zones is obviously designed
to deflect Soviet criticism of Chinese intransigence on general
world disarmament, and Chiao's position on the Pakistani proposal
also serves to put India, with its new nuclear capability, in an
awkward position.
On other issues, Chiao:
4- Offered Peking's most explicit acknowledgment that the Cyprus
crisis derived from Greek-Turkish hostility on the island as well
as from superpower competition, and alleged that the USSR is
trying to use the crisis to expand its control in the Balkans.
4- Reaffirmed Peking's belief in the need for armed struggle for
African liberation, warning specifically that the new Portuguese
government may not abide by its promises of decolonization and
that Soviet neocolonialism is a new danger to the African liberation
movements.
4- Rrstated the PRC's past positions on the Middle East, Sikkim,
Korea, Cambodia, and Vietnam, devoting special attention to withdrawal
of UN troops from Korea, Cambodian insurgent admission to the United
Nations, and to his call for an invitation to the PRG to send an
observer to the General Assembly.
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K0 E A
PYONGYANG EMPHASIZES SUPPORT FOR STRUGGLE IN THE SOUTH
Two recent speeches by Kim Il-song, on 24 September and 1 October,
and a 5 October NODONG SINMUN editorial illustrate revived high-level
North Korean public support for the "revolutionary struggle of
the South Korean people." This extensive public treatment of
the issue--coming when the North-South dialog is at a "virtual
rupture," as Pyongyang has noted several times lately--follows
a hiatus of several years during which references in DPRK media
to North Korean involvement in the South's struggle were mostly
limited to standard, muted formulations. The current references
continue to stress the Southern origin of the struggle and deny
DPRK instigation.
In his 24 September speech to a group of Koreans from Japan, Kim
noted that negotiations with the South would be fruitless if
Seoul continued on the "road of reaction." He called on the people
of the South to "more valiantly come out to the struggle for the
democratization of South Korean society," which he said was
necessary for reunification. Northern support for such a struggle,
he insisted, was neither interference in the internal affa of
South Korea nor "intended to instigate . . , revolution," uut
was ratheL a "nob' national duty" to further reunification. In
discussing the w(,11-springs of the struggle in the South and
Northern support fcr it, Kim denied that the North did--or could--
"export" revolution. One of the tasks given to Chongnyon (the
North Korean support organization in Japan), Kim reminded his
audience, was to "actively support the democratic movement of the
South Korean people," but he cautioned that Pyongyang did not
approve of terrorist acts against individuals, such as the
15 August assassination attempt on ROK President Pak Chong-hui
by a young Korean resident of Japan. What is needed, said Kim,
is not the elimination of a particular person but the change of
an entire social system.
The 5 October NODONG SINMUN editorial stated that it is now important
to strengthen the revolutionary forces in South Korea "to firmly
prepare the internal forces for the reunification of the country."
Echoing Kim's speech on 24 September, the editorial rationalized
DPRK support for the struggle in the South as being not "inter-
ference in the internal affairs" of the South but part of the
solution to an internal question by people of "one and the same
blood." The editorial also noted that Kim's 1 October speech at
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a rally for Syrian President al-Asad had "reclarified" the
North's stand of "actively supporting and encouraging the
democratic movement of the southern Korean people." While
the speech was actually devoted more to the issues of U.S.
troop withdrawal and the convening of a great national
congress, the editorial drew attention to those sections
dealing with Northern support for the struggle in the South,
repeating Kim's pledge that the North would always render
active assistance . . . with might and main" to the struggle
in the South.
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ARGENTINA
SOVIET, CUBAN MEDIA CONDEMN TERRORISM, SUPPORT PERON REGIME
The recent increase in terrorist activity in Argentina has evoked
a flurry of warnings and denunciations by the Argentine Communist
Party (PCA) of rightwing threats against the Peronist Government.
Soviet and Cuban reportage and comment have generally echoed
their warnings. However, while Havana's PRENSA IATINA has openly
referred to rumors that the rightwing terrorist organization,
the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA), alleg'dly has
connections with the Peru regime, Moscow has not done so. Both
Havana and Moscow continue to reflect confidence the Peronists
will survive. And both have for the most part followed the line
of the PCA, including support for the government of Peron's widow,
de..iunciations of terrorism, and warnings against a Chilean-style
coup backed by the U.S. CIA.*
SOVIET Soviet coverage of statements and warnings against
COVERAGE Argentine terrorists carried in the PC', weekly
NUESTRA PALABRA was capped on 4 October by PRAVDA's
publication of a TASS interview with PCA Secretary General
Geronimo Arnedo Alvarez. Arnedo suggested as a major cause of
the "rapid activation of reaction" in Argentina since 1 July
the gestures by the Peronists toward the development of "business-
like" relations with the Soviet U- Lon, Cuba and other socialist
countries. Arnedo claimed that opposition to such steps led to
the current "real conspiracy" against the Peronist regime. The
PCA leader was quoted as saying that "native imperialists" were
being aided by "hundreds of CIA agents" who once worked in. Chile
and that the only defense was a "patriotic front" of Argentine
progressive forces.
The 4 October report echoed earlier Soviet coverage of Argentina.
Even before Peron's death a Konctantin Geneyvandov commentary in
PRAVDA on 17 June had warned that "ultrarightist circles," acting
in unison with the CIA and U.S. monopolies, wanted to create an
atmosphere of chaos that would "prepare the soil" for a change of
regime. In an initial commentary after Peron's death, Moscow's
''unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress on 3 July told Argentines
that "oligarchy and imperialism" now might try to use the "Chilean
* For an examination of the previous change in attitude of the
PCA and the Soviet media toward Peronism, see the TRENDS of
21 March 1973, pages 18-19.
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recipe" to undermine the progress made by Peronism and noted
that the PCA had joined with other "democratic forces" in
declaring "complete support" for the administration of Mrs.
Peron.
As terrorism increased during the next three months, the Soviet
media attacked not only rightwing extremists but also the Peop e's
Revolutioi_.lry Army (ERP), which was labeled "Trotskyite" and
said to be infiltrated by CIA agents-provocateurs. In a Moszow
domestic service commentary on 26 August, Valentin Mashkin
re`erred to NUESTRA 'ALABRA's assertion that the "evil part"
played by the ERP paralleled the earlier role of leftwing
extremists in Chile. However, Malenkin concluded, as has other
Soviet comment, with the confident pr !diction that the Peronist
government would survive and that Argc-itina's fcreign policy
would remain unchanged.
CUBAN The most authoritative Cuban statement on recent
COMMENT events in Argentina was a David Nunez Segura commentary
on the Matanzas domestic service on 5 October. Nunez
Segura stated that the Argentine rightists, who could not "hide the
claws" of the CIA, were embarked upon a "path of jungle terrorism"
resemblying the CIA activities in Chile. The Argentine Anti-
communist Alliance, Nunez alleged, was "recruited, organized and
financed" by "North American imperialists" who were d-atermined to
set back the development of Argentina. He urged Argentines to
organize rapidly to avoid a repeat of the Chilean experience.
Nunez Segura did not criticize the Argentine government, but
recent PRENSA LATINA reports of NUESTRA PALABRA articles seem
to hint at increasing government laxity in suppressing rightist
terrorism. Thus, on 2 October PRENSA LATINA reported that the
communist weekly "doubts the credibility" of Interior Minister
Alberto Rocamora when he denied that "para-police groups" had
been involved in murders; and a 25 September report warned that
there was a plot "to either control or overthrow" the government.
Soviet reports, by contrast, have not mentioned the AAA by nLune
and have refrained from connecting the government with terrorism.
CONFIDENTIAL
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USSR
KOSYGINIS STATUS IN LEADERSHIP BOOSTED: THEN DEFLATED
The public image of the Brezhnev-Kosygin relationship has fluctuated
in recent weeks as each leader has been accorded; or arrogated to
himself, a public role or prestige honor normal.? associated with
the other. Kosygin's status seemed to be boosted by a late
September announcement of the publication of his collected speeches--
an honor thus far accorded only to Brezhnev and Suslov among the
present collettive leaders. Soon after, however, his status
was clearly deflated by Brezhnev's address on economic policy to the
1-2 October session of the Council of Ministers. This is only the
second time since the 1964 separation of party and government
leaderships that Brezhnev has add:cessed the Council of Ministers, and
his domination of the proceedings on this occasion was much more
pronounced than on the earlier occasion in mid-1970.
KOSYGIN SPEECHES PUBLISHED The publication of a collection of
Kosygin speeches and articles covering
the entire period since Kosygin became a national figure in 1939
was announced in the 20 September PRAVDA. Unlike the announcement
of Suslov's collection that appeared on the eve of his 70th birthday
in 1972, the Kosygin announcement is unconnected with any ceremonial
occasion or specific personal achievement. Kosygin's 70th birthday,
on 21 February 1974, had passed with no indication of any intent
to publish his works. The present decisia:, puts Kosygin one up on
Podgornyy, who outraLks him in the hierarchy and whose 70th birthday
in February 1973 had similarly passed with no publication of his
works.
BREZHNEV SPEECH PRAVDA's 3 October ac -aunt of the 1-2 October
c.,uncil session indicated that Brezhnev had
delivered a "long speech" which analyzed fulfillment of the current
five-year plan and defined the tasks for its completion. At the
council meeting reported in the 2 June 1970 ?'RAVDA, Kosygin had
appeared in chargE of the session, ouening t},e meeting with a
"report" on the outlines of the new i:ive-year plan then being prepared.
Brezhnev had followed with a "long speech," but PRAVDA did not
report any of Brezhnev's commouts nor even indicate the subject of
his speech. By contrast, the 3 October 1974 PRAVDA reported tha.
Brezhnev's "long speech" analyzing the five-year plan had opened -he
meeting, carried five paragraphs on what Brezhnev said--which
co.?;tituted the bulk of PRAVDA's report--and only noted at the end
that Kosygin had also delivered a "speech" summing up the discussion,
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9 OCTOBER 1974
dwelling on important economic problems and "es;ecially stressing
the great significance of the tasks set in Comrade L.I. Brezhnev's
speech."
Brezhnev's action--as in 1970--appeared aimed at underscoring his
call for an increased party role in running the economy made at the
preceding December plenum. In his speech Brezhnev pointed out
shortcomings in the work of some of Kosygin's ministries and
made proposals to improve economic efficiency. In line with his
December plenum attribution of equal weight to "mobilizing the
widest masses" and improving economic leadership, he gave great
credit for economic successes to the campaign for socialist
competition--which appears to be one of his own main contributions
to economic policy. In his 13 November 1973 Minsk speech, Kosygin
had credited Brezhnev personally with proposing the 1973 socialist
competition campaign.
KOSYGIN ASSISTANT KILLED During September Kosygin suffered a
personal blow with the death of his
longtime senior aid, A.K. Gcrchakov, in an auto accident. PRAVDA's
obituary on 13 September indicated that onetime textile industry
official Gorchakov had become head of Kosygin's secretariat in
1942 and had continued in this post until his death 32 years later.
NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECISIONS ON IDEOLOGY
Two important decisions in the field of ideology were adopted in late
August: a Central Commit,~ae decree censuring the Belorussian party
organization for neglect of ideological work and the belated naming
of a chief editor for the Central Committee's tofu theoretical
journal KOMMUNIST. Though the meaning and relationship of these
two simultaneous decisions is still unclear, the very fact of their
adoption n-ay mark the resolution of differences and a new departure
in the ideological field. In the matter of appointments, particularly,
the leadership has clearly been deadlocked: the post of chief
editor of KOMMUNIST had remained unfilled for an unprecedented seven
months, while the Central Committee's ?ropaganda Section has had no
identified chief for over four years--nor a first deputy head,
either, until recently.
Although the Central Committee decree on Belorussian ideological work
is being presented as the centerpiece of a national campaign to intensify
ideological work, it will also be read as a censure for Belorussian
First Secretary and Politburo candidate member P.M. Masherov. The
latter aspect of the decree is ironic since Masherov regularly
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outdistances other leaders in harping on ideological work and political
orthodoxy. Belorussia ie~ one of the least likely targets for
accusations of neglecting ideological work, since it has been virtually
free of scandals or public cases of ideological errors. Comments by
Masherov specify that the censure was the work of the Secretariat--thus
suggesting that Brezhnev organized the attack. Although Masherov has
joined in the chorus of praise for Brezhnev in the last couple years,
he has long been outspokenly independent and no Brezhnev protege.
The choice of PRAVDA first deputy chief editor V.G. Afanasyev for chief
editor of KOMMUNIST ends a long deadlock existing since late January
when A.G. Yegorov was removed amidst signs of disfavor and controversy.*
In recent years, Afanasyev, Fresu:'iably enjoying Brezhnev's confidence,
has become one of the rPgi.^.c's most prolific and authoritative
spokesmen on theory. However, his numerous articles do not clearly
identify his stand in the present bitter philosophical and economic
disputes, instead suggesting a c.3utious middle-of-the-road position
reflecting the consensus of the Politburo.
In a possibly related decision, :he vacuum in leadership of the Central
Committee's Propaganda Section r:cently was partially filled. As
revealed in an August ZHURNALIST account of a midyear meeting and
confirmed in the 10 September PRAVDA, longtime Agitprop deputy head
G.L. Smirnov has been promoted ,:o first deputy head. Though Smirnov's
political orientation is not clear, he played a key role in pr, firing
the censure of the BelorusF ian party organization, apparently .! ,:aiding
the commission to investigate Belorussia's ideological problems shortly
before his promotion. He succeeds apparent moderate A.N. Yakoviev,
who had been removed froi,: :his post and exiled to Canada as ambassador
in mid-1973 after authoring a controversial November 1972 LITERARY
GAZETTE article attacking Russophiles. The last identified head of
Agitprop, V.I. Stepakov, had been ousted in mid-1970, and no
successor has ever been publicly identified, although Ideology
Secretary Demichev appears to act as chief in fact if not in title.
DECREE ON BELORUSSIA The Central Committee decree on Belorussian
ideological wor 'a- announced in the
31 August PRAVDA and, following customary practice, cited both
positive and negative work. That the thrust was basically critical,
however, was indicated by its complaints that some Belorussian organs
had neglected ideological work and by its order that Belorussian leaders
improve the choice of ideological cadres and end shortcomings. The
negative interpretation was reinforced by details provided in First
* See the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 22-24.
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Secretary Masherov's long 13 September speech on the decree at a
republic aktiv meeting. Although he went to great lengths to
point out all the positive statements in the decree, he also admitted
that in adopting the decree Moscow had repudiated as inadequate his
own efforts to tighten up and had characterized the shortcomings in
his domain as "serious."
As Masherov noted in this speech, published in the 14 September SOVIET
BELORUSSIA, he had already thoroughly criticized ideological short-
comings at a 29-30 April 1974 Belorussian Central Committee plenum and
had called for ideological tightening up. "Nevertheless," he said,
"we have to admit that the CPSU Central Committee helped us see some
existing shortcomings more sharply" and to see omissions in local work.
Masherov mentioned that a commission had been sent from Moscow to
investigate Belorussian ideological work. The commission apparently
was headed by Agitprop deputy head G.L. Smirnov, who visited
Belorussia about this time and spoke on current ideological problems
at the 30 April republic plenum. After the commission's
investigation, Masherov was called to the Central Committee Secretariat
to report and, as Masherov remarked, the discussion in the Secretariat
was marked by "ve;.;; high party demandingness" and the "secretaries
of the CPSU Central Committee and officials of Central Committee
sections, while as a whole positively evaluating" the Belorussians'
work, also made a number of criticisms. Mzsherov's specifying of
the Secretariat makes Brezhnev's role in the decree clearer, since
Brezhnev, as General Secretary, is in a position, both legally and
politically, to dominate Secretariat decisions. The only other Politburo
members in the Secretariat are Suslov and Brezhnev allies Kirilenko
and Kulakov.
The new decree and Masherov's discussion of it specified few concrete
shortcomings; the decree simply calls on the Belorussians to do everything
better, giving the impression of nitpicking. Masherov mentioned
only one specific charge raised by the Central Committee against the
Belorussians: that labor absenteeism reached 56,000 for the year
1973 and rose to 30,000 for just the first half of 1974. Even Masherov's
long 29 April plenum speech concentrated on ending administrative
inefficiency, raising labor productivity and increasing ideological
aggressiveness and cited few actual ideological mistakes. Indeed,
under the tough ideological policies of Masherov and his predecessor
Mazurov Belorussia has enjoyed a virtually spotless record as far
as ideological shortcomings are. concerned, and.Masherov speeches have
been notable for their consistent stress on intensified ideological
struggle, more aggressive ideological training, suppression of local
nationalism and prevention of economic abuses.
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9 OCT073ER 1974
AFANASYEV APPOINTMENT The appointment of 52-year old philosopher
Afanasyev as chief editor of KOMMUNIST was
revealed in KOMNUNIST, No. 13, signed to press 5 September. He had
not been listed on the board in issue No. 12, signed to press
13 August, thus dating his appointment in late August--at the same
time that the decree on Belorussia was announced. The first issue
of KOMMUNIST under Afanasyev carried the new Central Committee
decree. Other members of the editorial board remain as before.
Afanasyev was specially favored in late 1968, when after several years
as head of the scientific communism department of the Academy of
Social Sciences he was named deputy chief editor of PRAVDA in charge of
theory--a post created specially for him. In 1968-69, reflecting
the leadership's alarm over revisionist trends, he concentrated on
conservative themes, defending central planning, the leading role
of the party and proletariat, and the primacy of the USSR in world
communism. In mid-1970 he was promoted to first deputy chief editor
of PRAVDA.
In recent years he has written numerous articles and books on
subjects such as administration and management, economic reform and
the scientific-technical revolution, but his writings appear to
carefully expound middle-of-the-road positions apparently reflecting
a consensus of the party leadership, rather than breaking any new
ground. A notable November 1971 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article
criticized both "conservatives" who resist cybernetics and also those
who think computers can run the whole economy, and stated that some
decentralization of economic management was necessary. His most
recent notable articles were a January 1974 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY
article which appeared pro-Brezhnev in arguing the need for a strong
leader and only a minimum of collectivity,* and an 11 January 1974
PRAVDA article expounding on themes raised at the December 1973
Central Committee plenum, urging use of modern administrative
methods and increased power for consumers to force improvement of
product quality and assortment. In the PRAVDA article he cited
all Brezhnev's controversial December plenum statements on
asserting a "party style" and "party approach" in leading the
economy, on adopting a "really scientific, party basis" for economic
administration, and on warning. against a "technocratic" approach.
But he balanced all this by recalling Lenin's demand for separation
of the functions of party and state and his warning against
"petty interference" by the party in running the economy. Lenin's
statements, he declared, retain their validity today and cases of
such party interference still occur. Despite his prolific writings,
* See the TRENDS of 20 March 1974, page 19.
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9 OCTOBER 1974
however, his stance in the controversies between liberals and
conservatives in the fields of philosophy and economics is not clear.
Judging by the publication dates given in the journal, the first
issue of KOMMUNIST under Afanasyev was apparently assembled already
last July but signed to press only on c September. Normally issues
are prepared over a span of one to three weeks. and signed to press
only a few days later. Further, the 14-17 July dates would indicate
that issue No. 13 had been prepared before issues No. 11 (prepared
11-19 July and signed to press 29 July) and No. 12 (prepared 1-10
August and signed to press 13 August). Errors in such matters are
possible but extremely rare.
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N 0 T E
HOXHA ON U.S.1SOVIET TIES: In a harshly worded speech, Albanian
party chief Enver Hoxha has rejected any intention of establishing
diplomatic relations with either the United States or the Soviet
Union. His remarks, delivered 3 Octol,er on the eve of Peoples'
Assembly elections, were directed mainly against alleged diplomatic
overtures from Moscow and "traitors" and "agents" who favor
better Moscow-Tirana ties. Hoxha noted that such elements had
been "caught redhanded" and that the "iron broom is sweeping our
ranks clean of them." In the same context he denied rumors that
Albania was "split and gnawed at by the worm of dissension."
These remarks and other indications seem to give substance to
Western press reports that Defense Minister Beqir Balluku has
been ousted for disagreeing with 1-loxha's hardline stance toward
Moscow. Balluku's activities have not been reported since 18 June,
and his name was dropped from the list of Peoples' Assembly candidates.
Hoxha also had particularly harsh words for Bulgaria's Todor
Zhivkov, but he pointedly expressed interest in improved relations
with neighbors Yugoslavia and Greece.
CONFIDENTIAL
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9 OCTOBER 1974
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 30 SEPTEMBER - 6 OCTOBER 1974
Moscow (2864 items)
Peking (769 items
GDR 25th Anniversary
(1%)
11%
PRC National Day
t1%)
27%
[Brezhnev Speeches
(--)
4%]
[Joint Editorial
(--)
6%]
in GDR
UNGA Session
(7%)
14%
Hungarian Party Leader-
(11%)
8%
[Chiao Kuan-hua
(--)
9%]
Kadar in USSR
Speech
[Brezhnev Interv.ew with (--)
4%] Gabon President Bongo
(--)
9%
Hungarian Journali
PRC National Day
sts
(-- )
7%
in PRC
PRC-Japan Air Service
(2%)
7%
Brezhnev Council of
(-- )
5%
Inauguration
Ministers Speech
Criticism of Lin Piao
(3%)
4%
Gromyko in Poland
(--)
3%
and Confucius
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms o volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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