TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070038-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: September 11, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
TRENDS
I n Communist Propaganda
Confidential
11 SEPTEMBER 1974
(VOL. XXV NO 37)
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coorc:;nation with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
National Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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CONTENTS
CYPRUS
Moscow Implicitly Critical of Turkey, Pessimistic Over Future. .
1
MIDDLE EAST
Podgornyy Favorably Cites Palestiniaus' Right to "Statehood" . . . . .
3
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Silent on Major Issues, Pushes Routine Themes . . . . . . . .
5
GERMANY
East Berlin Welcomes Establishment of U,S.-GDR Relations . . . . . . .
6
USSR Repeats Stand on Berlin in Agreement Anniversary Comment. . . . .
7
PRC-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Says U,S. Faces "Profound" Economic Crisis. . . . . . . . . .
9
PRC-INDIA
PRC Foreign Ministry Voices Support for Sikkim Resistance. . . . . . .
10
COMMUNIST FELATIONS
Zh~vkov Scores Chinese, Podgornyy Restrained at Sofia Meeting. . . . .
12
INDOCHINA
Hanoi Condemns Thai Legislation on U.S. Military Presence. . .
3.5
CHINA
Peking Lays New Stress on Unity, Narrows Anti-Lin Campaign . .
16
DFRK-JAPAN
Pyongyang Softens Line on Japanese Following Seoul-Tokyo Rift. . . . .
18
NOTE
Moscow on DRV Anniversary.
20
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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CYPRUS
MOSCOW IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF TURKEY, PESSIMISTIC OVER FUTURE
Moscow has shown signs of a sli3htly more critical stance toward
Turkey on the Cyprus q>estion combined with pessimism aver the
political future of the island republic. Although President Podgornyy
in his 8 September speech in Sofia continued the practice of refraining
from direct criticism of Ankara, some comment has implicitly conv3yed
Moscow's irritation. Both Turkey's military pressure on the Greek
Cypriots to accept a settlement on Ankara's terms and its rejection
of the Soviet proposal to solve the problem within the UN
framework have received more pointed attention. But comment has stopped
short of criticizing Turkey by name.
The strongest indication of Moscow's frustration over the Turkish
position appeared in PRAVDA on 1 September i.i Oleg Orestov's
international review. Although in the past PRAVDA has softpedaled
Turkish rejection of the Soviet proposal, this time it underlined
the unreasonableness of Ankara by noting that "despite the complete
bankruptcy" of the Geneva talks, both "Turkey and the United States
have advocated their resumption." Citing Greek Foreign Minister
Mavros' refusal to negotiate under pressure, PRAVDA identified this
pressure as "the pronouncements of certain figures on Cyprus itself
and outside Cyprus . . . statements to the effect that foreign
troops will not be withdrawn from Cyprus and also the demand for the
withdrawal of UN troops"--thinly veiled references to remarks by
Turkish Cypriot and Turkish leaders. PRAVDA went on to label the
statements "irresponsible" and sounding "like threats," which are
worsening "an already grim situation."
This note of pessimism was reemphasized in Moscow radio broadcasts to
East European listeners. Yuriy Shalygin in a Polish-language commentary
on the 5th saw not "even the slightest indication of hope" for a peaceful
settlement of the crisis, and Vladimir Silantsev in a Romanian-language
commentary on the 7th foresaw "the danger of the liquidation of this
state and its partition . . . ."
Podgornyy was not so gloomy in his remarks on the 8th, although he
did say that the situation "continues to be complex and tense" and
blamed the "present crisis" on "the continued intervention in the internal
affairs of Cyprus by certain NATO circles." In his speech, delivered
at Bulgaria's 30th liberation anniversary ceremonies and carried live by
Sofia radio, Podgornyy again put forth the Soviet proposal, omitting,
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however, any reference to the proposal's provision for "appropriate
effective guarantees" by the permanent member-states of the
Security Council.
Moscow typicai.ly has not publicized its most recent diplomatic
activity, and Athens and Ankara apparently have not confirmed
Western news reports that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minicater Ilichev
was visiting Turkey and due to visit Greece. But Nicosia radio on
the 10th announced that Ilichev was expected to arrive in Nicosia
"within the new few da,r-" to exchange views on the Cyprus problem
between the government of (,yprus and the Soviet Union.
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? MIDDLE EAST
PODGORNYY FAVORABLY CITES PX.ESTINIANS` RIGHT TO "STATEHOOD"
President Podgornyy, in his 8 September speech in Sofia, put the
Soviet Union on r'2cord as endorsing the Palestirian Arabs'
"sovereign right to establish their orm statehood [gosudarstvennost]
in one form or another." In the past, Moscow has been reluctant
to discuss the idea of a new Palestinian state and has generally
stressed the need to insure undefined "legitimate national rights"
of the Palestinians as an indispensable part of an overall Middle
East peace settlement.* Podgornyy's reference to some form of
Palestinian "statehood," not further spelled out, would allow for
considerable flexibility in interpretation.
Podgornvy's reference may be related to the Soviet position at
the upcoming session of the 28th TJN General Assembly, scheduled
to begin on 17 September. His speech occurred only days after
the A_ab League Council had agreed to place the Palestine issue
on the UNGA agenda as a separate item. In noting the Arab League
Council decision on 2 September, the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY
stated that it had been made in response to a request by the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), adding that the PLO
rejected UN Security Council Resolution 242 and saw the
Palestinian issue as "one of existence, not border lines." On
3 September the Cairo newspaper AL-AKHBAR, according to the
IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, reported that the Soviet Union not only welcomed
the Arab League Colincil decision but also intended itse1 to adopt
and defend the Palestine question during the UN session. The
source of AL-AKHBAR's information was not provided, however, and
reaction from Moscow media has been limited; TASS on 2 September
promptly reported the fact of the council decision, and it was
noted in a TASS roundup on the 4th of the council session. A
Moscow Arabic-language commentary on the 3d, observing that the
council decided to convene an Arab summit conference in Rabat on
26 October, added that "another important decision" provided for
raising the Palestine problem at the UN General Assembly. Calling
the Palestinian issue the "core" of the Middle East crisis, the
broadcast said it was "necessary to tackle it" during the next
UNGA session.
* For a discussion of Moscow's increased public support recently
for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in connection with
PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Moscow on 30 July-3 August
1974, see the TRENDS of 7 August 1974, pages 12-14.
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Fodgornyy's favo.:ablo reference to the Palestinians' right to
some form of statehood '!roaches at an authoritative level a
subject that has long 'Lean sensitive for Soviet media. In the
past, Soviet references to the concept of a Palestinian state
have been exceedingly rare. For several years after the June
1967 war, when such references occurred they were virtually
always critical of the concept as an Israeli-sponsored scheme to
establish a buffer state on the occupied West Bank territories,
ostensibly governed by Arabs but in reality a "puppet" subject
to Israeli control.* The only known favorable Soviet reference
to a new Palestinian state at that time occurred on 14 August
1969 in a Yiddish-language broadcast to Israel over the
"unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress, which asserted that "an
Arab state in Palestine would be a real step toward a political
solution on the Middle East problem." Although Soviet comment
in more recent years has occasionally referred to the Palestinians'
right to "self-determination," Moscow has been very reluctant to
express a view on the desirability or possible forms of a new
Palestinian state.
Moscow's reluctance has probably been due in large part to disunity
among the Palestinians themselves on this issue and to a desire not
to become committed to a policy position too soon on such a
contentious question. A possible indication of Moscow's current
thinking on the form of a Palestinian state was provided in a
30 July 1974 IZVESTIYA article by the editor-in-chief, Lev
Tolkunov. Tracing the "severe fate" suffered by the Palestinians
for almost three decades, Tolkunov seemed optimistic that "realistic
trends" were now prevailing in the Palestinian resistance movement
with regard to the future of the occupied Palestinian lands. By
way of explanation, Tolkunov stated that many Palestinian leaders
"believe that if Israel liberates the West Bank of the Jordan River
and the Gaza strip, a Palestinian state [g osudarstvo] may be formed
on this territory." Urging the PLO groups to unite behind a common
political program, Tolkunov warned that "some people in the Near
East" plan to seize control of*a new Palestinian state, "if it emerges
in the Gaza strip and on the Wect Bank of the Jordan," and also plan
to implement "so-called Palestinian autonomy within the framework of
the Kingdom of Jordan." Tolkunov also warned that some circles seek
to eliminate the PLO as a political force and "to place at the head
of the future state, when it is Treated," a bourgeoisie aligned with
"Arab reaction and imperialism."
* See the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 15 October 1970,. pages 1-2, for a
discussion of Soviet treatment of the idea of a Palestinian state
during this pericd.
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U.S, -SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW SILENT ON MAJOR ISSUES, PUSHES ROUTINE THEMES
After the flurry of attention prompted by the change in the U.S.
presidency, Soviet media have fallen uncharacteristically silent
on U.S. developments, apparently reflecting Moscow's concern
lest premature comment adversely affect the deve'_opment of
relations with the new Administration.
Brezhnev failed to even mention the United States--although he
did mention detente--in his major speech at Novorossiysk on
7 September. Even such major developments as the prospective
breakthrough on most-favored-nation status was barely mentioned
by the Soviet media, although the Soviet reluctance to acknowledge
the reciprocal concession on increased Jewish emigration is
understandable. In the meantime, Moscow has fallen. back on stock
propaganda themes to keep alive the notion that U.S.-Soviet
relations are continuing on track and that the prospects for
detente remain bright.
Although the Moscow domestic radio carried a brief report on
17 August that a meeting between President Ford and Senators Jackson,
Ribicoff, and Javits had reportedly opened the way for Senate
approval of most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union, this
was apparently the only Soviet reference to what was subsequently
described in the U.S. press as a deal involving an exchange of MFN
status for a Soviet commi::ment to permit increased Jewish
emigration. In the meantime, the Soviet media have carried a
spate of items reporting interviews with Western businessmen who
were said to have expressed highly optimistic assessments of the
prospects for U.S.-Soviet trade.
Space cooperation and the prospects for disarmament were other
themes played up by Soviet media over the past week. PRAVDA
reported an interview with the head of the Soviet cosmonaut
delegation on its departure from Moscow for Houston. The arrival
of the cosmonauts in the United States, and the visit of NASA head
Fletcher to Soviet Academy of Sciences President Keldysh were other
items which attracted attention, Although--except for a Trofimenko
article in the latest issue of USA that is not yet available in
translation--the Soviet media have remained silent on SALT, arms
control themes have continued to be promoted. A Berezhkov commentary
on 9 September, for example, praised Secretary Kissinger's Miami
speech, describing as particularly "interesting" his assertion that
the accumulation of strategic weapons would not raise the level of
security but rather the level of risk.
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GERMANY
EAST BERLIN WELCOMES ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S.-GDR RELATIONS
Soviet as well as East German comment has hailed the 4 September
establishment of U.S.-GDR diplomatic relations as the final step
in the international recogni':ion of the postwar status quo of two
German states. East German observers have in effect gloated over
the fact that Washington, as an. East Berlin radio commentator
said on the 9th, finally had "t:) adapt itself to reality in Europe,
that is, to the existence of the two German states." While
comment has triumphantly underlined the success of the GDR's
entire postwar policy of striving for international recognition as
an independent, sovereign state and nation--including the long
battle against such West German policies as Willy Brandt's thesis
of "two German states within one German nation"--treatment of the
Washington signing ceremonies was low-keyed and moderate, reflecting
East German satisfaction.
GDR comment has highlighted the remarks by the head of the GDR
delegation at the 4 September signing ceremony, Ambassador Herbert
Suess, who noted that the signing was a "good beginning" for the
future development of GDR-U.S. relations. Both the official
remarks and comment made clear that East Berlin hopes to expand
its economic and trade relations with the United States as soon
as possible, with comment expressing some concern over "discrimi-
natory" trade provisions such as the "refusal to grant the GDR the
most-favored-nation clause, as well as marketing restrictions, the
still existing embargo list, and other things." A radio commentator
on the 9th noted that GDR leader Honecker in an AP interview in
early June had listed these restrictions in commenting on future
U.S.-GDR relations.
NEGOTIATIONS ON CLAIMS, East Berlin media have, not surprisingly,
ISRAELI QUESTION ignored the details of the agreement with
Washington to hold negotiations in the near
future "on the settlement of cla;.ms and other financial questions
which are pending between them"--language from the joint communique
issued it. Washington to cover future talks on claims by American citizens
against the GDR Government and claims for possible compensation by
Jewish and other victims who suffered under Nazism. East Berlin
reported that thesa negotiations would be held and NEUES DEUTSCHI.AND
frontpaged the text of the communique, but without any elaboration.
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The view that the GDR is one of the two successor states of Hitlers
Third Reich--the basis for the U.S. position on claims against the
GDR for victims of Nazism--has, with only one knoim exception, never
been acknowledged by official East German spokesmu.n, The exception
came in the speech by GDR Foreign Minister Winzer at the 3.July 1973
foreign ministers' meeting in Helsinki at the conclusion of the first
stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperrtion Europe. In
discussing the postwar period and the issue of recognition of the
postwar European borders, Winzer stated unequivocally--and his speech
was published textually in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND--that "being a successor
state of the former German Reich" the GDR must see that the European
borders must never again be violated from "German territory."
In an obvious effort to stem Arab speculation about reparations to
Israel and to head off demands for compensation, a statement issued
by the GDR Embassy in Cairo, reported by TASS and Arab media on the
10th, refuted a Cairo AL-AHRAM report that the GDR had agreed to
commence talks on payment of compensation to Jewish victims of
Nazi Germany. An IRAQI NEWS AGENCY report said the embassy statement
declared that the GDR "categorically refused" to compensate Israel
or any other Jewish or Zionist organization for the ",o-called Nazi
atrocities" because "the GDR is not the successor of the Third Reich--
Hitler's regime." According to the TASS report, the embassy statement
concluded that all questions related to payment of compensation were
settled in the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, and that the U.S.-
GDR agreement on establishment of diplomatic relations "does not have
a single word about any compensation to Israel" by the GDR.
USSR REPEATS STAND ON BERLIN IN AGREEMENT ANNIVERSARY COMMENT
Marking the third anniversary of the 3 September 1971 signing of the
Qaudripartite Agreement on Berlin, Moscow commentators have reiterated
the conventional Soviet interpretation as concerning only "West"
Berlin rather than governing Big Four relations in the entire city.
At the same time, Moscow has used the occasion to seemingly wind up
the recent controversy over the establishment of the FRG Federal
Environmental Agency in West Berlin and the resultant transit diffi-
culties, while warning that the USSR and the GDR would respond
similarly in the future to any "illegal" acts by Bonn considered
contrary to the Quadripartite Agrement. Since the Big Three and
Moscow exchanged formal demarcheF on the FEA question early in
August, Moscow has gradually diminished its attention to the issue,
perhaps to set the stage for the upcoming 15-16 September Cromvko visit
to Bonn to prepare for a possible visit-to the Soviet Union by
Chancellor Schmidt this fall.
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Highlighting Moscow comment on thhs.:-aiauivetsary, articles in PRAVDA
and IZVESTIYA on the 3d and 4th, respectively, maintained the standard
Soviet position on the agreement.. Thus PRAVDA's West Berlin correspon-
dent Yuriy Voronov in his article on the 3ti cited the passage stating
that "the western sectors of Berlin are not an integral part of the
FRG and would continue not to be administered by it." Voronov charged
that "opponents of the four-power agreement," particularly leaders
of the CDU/CSU opposition, have propounded the view that "West Berlin
is FRG land and are persistently fighting for the expansion of the
'Federal presence"' in West Berlin. Repeating criticism expressed in
IZVESTIYA last July, Voronov agreed with "thooe observers who note
the inconsistent and contradictory position . . . adopted by some
politicians from the coalition of FRG ruling parties."
Voronov rejected the view that establishment: of the FEA fell within
the limitations outlined in the Quadripartite Agreement to the effect
that it does not deny West Berlin's ties with the FRG. Everybody knows,
Voronov said, that "there are ties and then there are ties." He
added: "With regard to West Berlin, they are permissible only so
long as they do not contradict the pivotal provision of the agreement
to the effect that the city doer; not belong to the FRG." ;iidiculing
the idea that the USSR and the GDR would have "to make concessions in
West Berlin" in order to continue the further relaxation of tensions,
Voronov warned that Moscow was prepared to take similar action in
the future in defending what it sees as its interests in the Quadri-
partite Agreement:
Any unlawful or unilateral actions contradicting the spirit
and letter of the Quadripartite Agreement are bound to have
and will have consequences.
The 4 September IZVESTIYA article by T. Sergeyev, whil making many of
the same points as Voronov, omitted any threatening reference to
"consequences," observing only that "a desire to evade the provisions"
of the four-power agreement "or to interpret them unilaterally can lead
only to an unnecessary aggravation of relations in the center of the
continent."
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PRC-U, S, RELATI ONS
PEKING SAYS U.S. FACES "PROFOUND" ECONOMIC CRISIS
Peking propaganda recently has given stepped-up attention to U.S.
economic problems--a departure from its general silence on the
Ford Administration policies in other areas. This was capped by
an atypical, albeit brief remark by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
on 5 September that "the superpower known as the 'dollar
empire' is now facing a profound crisis of acute inflation
coupled with a decline in production." Li's remark came in a
speech at a banquet welcoming visiting Nigerian head of government
General Gowon.
Since former President Nixon's February 1972 Peking visit, Chinese
leaders have been reluctant to comment specifically on U.S. economic
and other internal problems, and they have not gone beyond the
generalized formula used by Chou En-lai at the 10th CCP Congress
in August 1973--that the United States, as well as the USSR, is
"beset with troubles internally and externally" and is finding the
going "tougher and tougher." Peking media have lung provided
routine, low-key reportage on U.S. problems, and they have given
unusually full coverage to gloomy Ford Administration assessments
and new policy moves designed to cope with the negative performance
of the economy. Reporting on the President's 12 August address to
Congress, NCNA had highlighted his remark that inflation represented
his Administration's first priority, while a recent NCNA report on
the 5 September White House economic conference quoted the Presidert_'s
statement that "there is no quick fix for what ails our economy."
NCNA went on to note gloomy remarks by others at the conference that
there was little likelihood of an economic upturn next year an'.
reported Senator Mansfield's 4 September remarks to the preps that
he felt the United States was now in a recession and that current
economic indicators were similar to those of the 1930s,
Peking's portrayal of U.S. economic problems has thus far not been
accompanied by a change in Chinese treatment of U.S. foreign policy
in general or of Sino-U.S. relations in particular. Li Hsien-nien's
speech on the 9th duly underlined the basic Chinese belief that
irreconciliable U.S. rivalry with the USSR r-imains the salient
feature of the current international. scene, while NCNA's report on
President Ford's 12 August address carefully noted his determination
to maintain a strong U.S. military posture and to stand by Washington's
commitments abroad. Peking demonstrated its continued interest in
improved Sino-U.S. relations by replaying in full the President's
12 August promise to continue the new U.S, relationship with China,
by giving its usual correct treatment to the latest U.S. Congressional
delegation to visit China, and by sustaining Chinese discretion on
Watergate, avoiding mention of President Ford's pardon for former
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PRC-INDIA
PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY VOICES SUPPORT FOR SIKKIM RESISTANCE
Peking has capped its heavy outpouring of criticism over India's
"annexation" of Sikkim with a strongly worded 11 September PRC
Foreign Ministry statement that for the first time offers explicit
Chinese support for Sikkimese resistance to Indian rule. The
statement represents the most authoritative Chinese denunciation
of New Delhi since the Indian-Pakistani war of 1971.
Similar to Peking's earlier attack in a 3 September PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article,* the foreign ministry statement denounced the
Gandhi government by name and linked its incorporation of Sikkim
with past Indian dismemberment of Pakistan and alleged Indian
designs to use the recent successful atomic test to "do whatever
it pleased with its neighbors." The statement also echoed past
Peking criticism in pointing to Moscow's supportive role for New
Delhi's "colonialist" moves; it claimed that the USSR's role as
the sole defender of Indian action shows that Moscow is "the boss
behind the scenes as well as the abettor of Indian expansion."
The statement added the voice of the Chinese "government" to the
previous denunciation of India by the Chinese "people" in the
3 September Commentator article.
Though the Commentator article had avoided reference to possible
Sikkimese resistance and had predicted only vaguely that India
would be "sternly punished by history," the present statement hailed
recent resistaac,--t by the Sikkim ruler and people and predicted that
India's act "is bound to arouse the Sikkimese people and the people
of the whole world, including the Indian people, to even stronger
resistance." It affirmed that China "absolutely does not recognize
India's illegal annexation" and pledged that Peking "firmly supports"
the "just struggle for national independence and sovereignty and
against Indian expansionism."
Peking in the past week had led tip to the foreign ministry statement
with the greatest outpouring of critical Chinese comment on a South
Asian issue in more than two years. An 8 September PEOPLE'S DAILY
article by Yuan Ku-ping had hinted at possible Chinese support for
Sikkim resistance in noting that Sikkimese efforts to rebuff Indian
* The Commentator article is discussed in TRENDS of 5 September 1974,
pages 13-14.
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dictate were "winning sympathy and support from the peoples of
their neighboring countries." The article made a highly unusual
reference to resistance to Indian oppression by the Naga and Mizo
peoples, minority groups in India that until recent years had
received ample propaganda and some material support from Peking.
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COMMUNIST RELATIONS
ZHIVKOV SCORES CHINESE. PODGORNYY RESTRAINED AT SOFIA MEETING
Mutual avowals of Soviet-Bulgarian solidarity and differ.-'ng public
stances on the issues of China and a new world communist conference
marked the speeches by Zhivkov and Podgornyy at the 8 September
celebration in Sofia of Bulgaria's 30th liberation anniversary.
Zhivkov roundly assailed the Peking leaders and called for both a
European and a world conference of communist parties. Podgornyy
preserved the low profile that the Soviet Union has assumed on
these issues during the current round of East European anniversary
celebrnr.ions by avoiding direct statements on either. The Soviet
Union's discretion on these issues in East European forums stands
in contrast to the intensified anti-Peking campaign which the
Soviet media have mounted in connection with the 25th anniversary
of the PRC.
Both speakers had refrained from polemics at the 1969 Bulgarian
anniversary, which came in the wake of the Czechoslovak events
and the June 1969 Moscow party conference. In 1964, Brezhnev, who
headed the Soviet delegation, joined Zhivkov in attacking the
Chinese. This year the Soviet Union has been represented by top
leaders at each of the East European anniversary celebrations:
Brezhnev attended Poland's in July, and Kosygin Romania's in
August.
ZHIVKOV Zhivkov's blistering anti-Peking attack seemed calculated
SPEECH in part, at least, - draw unfavorable attention to the
relative restraint recently shown by other East European
leaders on this score:
Our position is clear: We do not hide our conviction
that the adventurous, revisionist and nationalist course
of the clique of Mao Tse-Tung threatens the socialist
conquests of the Chinese people. We resolutely reject
and condemn the anti-Soviet and anticommunist slanders
of Peking, its ferocious struggle against the unity
and cohesion of the world socialist community, the
international communist movement, the national liberation
movements, and its reactionary pro-imperialist positions
and actions on the world stage.
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11 SEPTEMBER 1974
Zhivkov's attack came in the context of a review of Bulgaria.'s
relations with other socialist countries, in whic:. ten coun-
tries--including Romania--were listed as having ties of "strong
militant friendship" with Sofia. He then singled out Yugoslavia,
Albania, and China for special comment. With regard to Albania,
he merely noted that Bulgaria would like to improve relations.
With Ligard to Yugoslavia, he observed that "our country makes
constant efforts to improve relations," and that "we have achieved
new successes in this field." (Belgrade, however, sent only a
Yugoslav Preside:.cy member, Doronjski, to the Sofia festivities
after sending a more prestigious figure, Vice President Stambolic,
to the T3ucharest anniversary observance.) Zhivkov buttressed his
portrayal of improving Sofia-Belgrade relations by recalling
elsewhere in his speech that after liberation in 1944 the Bulgarian
People's Army had fought "shoulder to shoulder" both with the
Soviet Army and the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army.
In regard to Romania, the Bulgarian leader's indication of normal
Sofia-Bucharest ties was qualified by a remark elsewhere in his
speech that could be construed as critical of Ceausescu's course:
"There are still people in this world who call themselves revolu-
tionaries but who are so afraid for their independence vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union" that they show a willingness to renounce the
true revolutionary path. The Bulgarians, he added, "gratefully
use" the Soviet experience and example.
Zhivkov followed up his attack on the Chinese with a vow to help
strengthen "the united front of the communists of the world,"
declaring that "th.e conditions for convoking a European and later
a world conference of the communist and workers parties are ripe."
He added that his party was prepared to participate in and contribute
to the success of these conferences. The directness of Zhivkov's
appeal contrasted with the low-keyed endorsements of international
party "conferences" registered by Gierek and Brezhnev in Warsaw in July.
Brezhnev at that time directly endorsed only a European CP meeting.
PODGORNYY Following Zhivkov, Pcdgornyy delivered a largely
SPEECH routine speech replete with praise for Bulgaria's
post-liberation achievements and its contribution
to the socialist camp. He praised Zhivkov's leadership as well as
Brezhnev's. Underscoring the Bulgarians' exemplary socialist
credentials, the Soviet president declared that the new generation
of Bulgarian people in the past 30 years has been "educated in the
spirit of boundless fidelity to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism"
and are "genuine patriots-internationalists." In a veiled a"lusion
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11 SEPTEMBER 1974
to the Chinese, he went on to stress that "we know the Bulgarian
Communist Party as an integral part of the world communist and
workers movement, as a party which wages a merciless struggle
against the enemies of the working class, against those who are
trying to split its ranks." In underscoring the solidarity of
the Soviet and 'Bulgarian parties, Podgornyy singled out Zhivkov
in a fairly standard tribute as "the well'-known figua,e of the
international communist and workers movement and faithful Friend
of the Soviet Union." The tribute was comparable to Zhivkov's
preceding praise of ?odgornyy as "the great son of the Soviet
Union and one of the most important officials of the! CPSU and
the international communist movement." Zhivkov had followed up
this tribute with more fulsome praise for Brezhnev as, among
other things, a tireless fighter for world peace.
Podgornyy recalled Brezhnev's remarks at the Polish liberation
anniversary on "how much has been done in recent years" to lessen
the cold war atmosphere in favor of cooperation on the basis of
peaceful coexistence, citing the relaxation of tensions in Europe
as largely responsible for the governmental changes in Portugal
and Greece. Referring to the opponents of detente in this context,
Podgornyy registered a further vo1.led criticism of Peking on the
score of its stand on PoLtugal's African territories, citing
"those politicians who mask themselves under revolutionary
phraseology and speak as supporters of peace and defenders of
the interests of the people, but in fact cause harm to the
liberation movements, trying to brake the genuine and positive
shifts in the international arena."
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11 SEPTEMBER 1974
INDOCHINA
HANOI CONDEMNS THAI LEGISLATION ON U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
Hanoi's continuing concern over the presence of U.S. military
forces in Thailand has been reflected in its criticism of legislation,
sponsored by former foreign minister and now assemblyman Thanat
Khoman, that would give the Thai National Legislative Assembly
greater control in regulating foreign troops stationed in Thailand.
A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 7 September claimed
that the bill would "legalize" the presence of the troops, rather
than restrict their activities, and a Hanoi radio commentary on
the 6th assailed Thanat Khoman by name and identified him as Prime
Minister Sanya's foreign affairs adviser. Hanoi's sharp reaction
is consistent with the critical attitude it has shown toward the
Bangkok government since mid-May when it abandoned the circumspec-
tion it had initially adopted following the installation of the
Sanya government in October 1973.* Thus far, there has been no
criticism of the bill on foreign military forces from the Thai
Communist Party'!3 c.landest_.ne station, Voice of the People of
Thailand, or by Peking and Moscow.
Ignoring Thanat Khoman's position that his bill will provide
greater Thai control over U.S. forces, the DRV spokesman's state-
ment denounced the proposal as "just another move to legalize the
presence of the U.S. armed forces in Thailand" and "the conversion
of that country into a military base of U.S. imperialism for use
against the peoples of Southeast Asia." It accused unnamed "Thai
authorities" of "selling" Thailand's independence and sovereignty
to the United States "at a cheap price," adding that they are also
acting against the national rights of the Indochinese countries and
are blatantly violating the 1962 Geneva agreement on Lios.
The statement voiced the DRV Government's stern condemnt.iou of
Thailand's "continuing collusion" in supporting U.S. designs of
aggression and intervention in Indochina and supported the Thai
people's struggle for complete U.S. withdrawal. It reiterated the
DRV stance that an end to Thai Government involvement in U.S. moves
against Indochina remains "a basic condition" for the establishment
of friendly Thai-Vietnamese relations.
* For background, see the TRENDS of 5 June 1974, pages 14-15, and
22 May 1974, pages 21-22.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
11 SEPTEMBER 1974
C H I N A
PEKING LAYS NEW STRESS ON UNITY, NARROWS ANTI-LIN CAMPAIGN
While Peking continues to pay pro forma attentio.a to the campaign
to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, a new and recent insistence
on unity seems to signal an effective pause in the campaign until
China's leadership quandry arising from Chou Ea-lai's illness is
resolved. The new insistence on unity was most graphically
demonstrated by Peking's 7 September television coverage of the
4 September meeting between Mao and Togo President Eyadema, in
which Eyadema was escorted by Teng Hsiao-ping. Mao shook hands
not only with the Togo delegation but also with Teng, a move that
seems designed to underline that past opponents can be united.
Teng. the former CCP Secretary Ge..neral, was purged with Liu Shao-chi
in 1966. Monitoring of Chinese television coverage of such meetings
since 1971 has not produced any earlier instance in which Mao was
observed shaking hands with another PRC leader.
The need for unity was also stressed by a September RED FLAG
article which called for the nation to close its ranks politicc_lly
and to set aside certain "controversial issues" in the campaign
to criticize Lin and Confucius. In unusua__ly frank terms, the
article stressed the need for greater unity under party control
to help guard against class enemies who try to "instigate the
masses to fight one another." In dealing with "certain matters"
on which "no agreement can be reached in a short time," cadres
are to keep the "public interest" in mind and seek common areas of
agreement while "reserving minor differences." Attempting to
achieve greater unity by narrowing the scone of attack, the article
warned that it is necessary to "prevent jurse:.ves from becoming
endlessly entangled in certain problems" which might serve to turn
the masses away from criticism of Lin and Confucius.
Peking has continued to deal with protocol meetings and greetings
formerly handled by Chou through temporary expedients. Two of
Chou's vice premiers--Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Hsien-nien--continue
to stand in for the ailing premier and share hosting duties for
visiting delegations, and during August Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen
filled in for Chou in his party.-government role during airport
departure and return ceremonies for Li Hsien-nien's delegation to
Romania. Wang is the only party vice chairman to have made a public
appearance since the Arm; Jay reception on 31 July, and even he has
since dropped from sight, not making his customary appearance during
recent Mao meetings with visiting African leaders. Wang's absence
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
11 SEPTEMBER 1974
from the !eeetings with Togo's Eyadema and Nigeria's Gowon on
10 September may signal that he has assumed other duties foru?erly
carried out by Chou or other currently inactive vice chairmen.
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D P R K - J A P A N
PYONGYANG SOFTENS LINE ON JAPAI'?.:SE FOLLOWING SEOUL-TOKYO PFF7
Pyongyang media have moderated their usual harsh treatment of the
Japanese in the wake of friction between Seoul and Tokyo over the
investigation of the 15 August assa.sination attempt on ROK President
Pak Chong-hui--friction exacerbated by Pak's demand that Japan taka
action against Chongnyon, the pro-DPRK overseas Korean organization
in Japan. While initially the DPRK press had treated events follow-
ing the assassination incident as a sign of Japan-ROK collaboration
to suppress Chongnyon, a 4 September DPRK Foreign Ministry statement
signaled a new approach, dropping the charge of collusion and
blaming Pak "personally" for requesting that the Japanese government
oppress Chongnyon. The statement expressed the DPRK's belief that
the Japanese would not comply, since the request was "unreasonable
and beyond the bounds of common sense." A 5 September NODONG
SINMUN signed commentary went beyond the ministry statement,
charging that South Korea had "insolently demanded" that the
Japanese restrict Chongnyon an,' that it was "natural" for Japan
to refuse such a demand. The commentary went on in a highly unusual
display of praise to credit Japan with "past instances of protecting
progressive-minded men of Asia after the Meiji restoration."
A diminution of anti-Japan rhetoric was clearly evident in the
9 September DPRK National Day speech by Pak Song-chol. In contrast
to past such speeches and other recent major anniversary addresses,
Pak Song-chol did not accuse Japan either of obstructing Korean
reunification or of being a U.S. lacKey, and he referred only in
passing to Japan's alleged plans to "reinvade" South Korea. At
the same time, he reflected Pyongyang's newest interpretation of
ROK-Japanese relations in noting that the South Koreans are
"entreating" the "Japanese government" to oppress Chongnyon.
In line with this more positive treatment of Japan, Pyongyang has
given unusually high level treatment to a visiting delegation of
the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) headed by its chairman. Kim Il-song
attended a 6 September banquet for the JSP delegation, an honor he
had previously reserved this year for heads of state or of ruling
parties. He also held a private meeting with the delegation.
BACKGROUND The current brouhaha between Seoul and Tokyo is
Pyongyang's second experience in a year, following
the Kim Tae-chung kidnaping, of serious tension erupting between
two governments it usually depicts as reactionary conspirators.
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11 SEPTEMBER 1974
In the Kim case, North Korean media initially presented Tokyo as
an active partner in the incident, but eventually noted the split
caused between the two countries over the kidnaping and stopped
describing Japan as an active participant.
Pyongyang's original interpretation of events after the 15 August
shooting in which Mrs. Pak was killed suggested that Seoul was using
the incident to work "hand in g,ove" with the "Japanese reactionaries"
against Chongnyon. Prime Minister Tanaka's 19 August trip to Seoul
for Mrs. Pak's funeral prompted a harsh 22 August NODONG SINMUN
commentary which contained some of the strongest language against
Tanaka DPRK media have ever used, reminiscent of their barrages at
former Prime Minister Sato.* The commentary accused Tanaka of
promising cooperation with KOK schemes to link Chongnyon and North
Korea with the assassination attempt in order to advance Japan's
"reinvasion" of South Korea. Less severe and more typical media
comment accused Japan of plotting with the ROK, but noted that
Japanese investigating authorities differed with South Korean claims
about the assassination plot.
* Since 1972, when Sato resigned, the North Koreans have maintained
a hard line toward Japanese activity in. South Korea but reduced the
level of abusive hostility towards the Japanese government, and have
indicated publicly on several occassions that they hoped Tanaka would
not follow Sato's police toward the DPRK.
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T.Rt4.BER 1974
N0TE.
MOSCOW ON DRV ANNIVERSARY: Moscow marked the 2 September. 29th anni-
versary of the DRV's founding with the traditional message of gre-tings
from Soviet party and state officials to their DRV counterparts, rallies
to celebrate Soviet-Vietnamese friendship, and a DRV ambassador's
reception which prompted the usual level of Soviet representation--
Politburo member Polyanskiy and Secretariat member Dolgikh. Reelecting
Moscow's less sanguine view of the Vietnam situation since last year's
anniversary, the leaders' message, unlike the 1973 greeting, directly
acknowledged problems in implementing the Paris peace agreement
and did not dwell upon the advantages for peaceful development
accruing to Hanoi from the peace accord. Consistent with Moscow's
public statements at the time, last year's message had endorsed
efforts to implement the Paris agreement in the interests of
consolidating international peace and security but had not acknow-
ledged Hanoi's complaints about violations of the accord. This
year the message directly accused the Saigon government of
attempting to "prevent" implementation of the peace agreement and to
frustrate a political settlement," and it promised "all-sided assis-
tance and effective support" for the Vietnamese "Just struggle." The
message made no allusion to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, although
the Soviet leaders' greeting to the PRG on its 5 June founding anniver-
sary had criticized "foreign forces" patronizing Saigon. More recently
Podgornyy charged, in an 8 September speech in Sofia, that Saigon had
the "practical support of the imperialist state" in its "sabotage" of
the peace agreement.
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 FBIS TRENDS
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- i -
A P P E N D I X
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 2 - 8 SEPTEMBER 1974
Moscow 2661 items)
Peking (1108 items)
China
(7%)
7%
Seventh Asian Games,
(15%)
25%
Novorossiysk Award
(--)
6%
Teheran
Ceremony
Togolese President
(--)
8%*
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
4%]
Eyadema: in PRC
Cyprus Crisis
(9%)
6%
Criticism of Lin Piao
(7%)
7%
Chilean Solidarity Week
(--)
5%
and Confucius
Bulgarian Revolution
30th Anniversary
(--)
5%
Indian "Annexation"
of Sikkim
(--)
6%
[Podgornyy Speech
in Sofia
(--)
2%]
Guinea Bissau Indepen-
dence
(1%)
6%
DRV National Day
(2%)
5%
DRV National Day
(--)
5%
Law of the Sea Confer-
ence
(11%)
3%
Nigerian President Gowon
in Pi.C
(--)
3%
UN World Population Con-
(6%)
3%
ference, Bucharest
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "Commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses Indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with
Evadema.
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