TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070034-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: August 14, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
F'BIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
HIGHLIGHTS:
First Communist Reaction to Ford Presidency - page 1
USSR Concerned Over Cyprus Troops, Partition - page 10
Confidential
14 AUGUST 1974
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CONFIDENTIAL
nil propaipnde analysis report is bared exclusively on material
carried in foreign brmdcut and press media. It to publlrhed
by FB[S without coordination with other U.S. ('.ovemment
componen-^r.
STATSPEC
I v~.w l1sWn M
rAJW eMMIMI w~efbm
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14 AUGUST 1974
CONTENTS
Moscow Puts Best Face on Leadership Change, Hails Continuity. . . . . 1,
East Europeans See Ford Continuing Detente Impetus. . . . . . . . . . 3
DRV, FRG Media Negative on Ford's Following Nixon Doctrine. . . . . . 4
Chinese, Other Asian Communists Briefly Note Ford Presidency. . . . . 6
Cuban Media Restrained on Ford, Abusive of Nixon. . . . . . . . . . . 8
CYPRUS
USSR Concealed Over Troop Occupation, Threat of Partition . . . . . . 10
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Advises Arab Unity, Political Use of Oil in EC Talks . . . . . 14
INDOCHINA
Vietnamese ..oomunists Charge .VN Airstrikes, U.S. Overflights . . . . 17
Le Tn nh Nghi Delegation Visits China, Discusses Aid. . . . . . . . . 18
THAILAND
Thai CP Lauds Political Struggle, Calla for People's War. . . . , . . 20
PRC-MONCOLIA
Sharpenrid Polemics Show Worsening of Sino4Mongolian Relations . . . . 22
KOREA
Pyongyang Highlights Reunification on Kim Speech Anniversary. . . . . 24
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Conten*ion Over Party Role in Leading
Soviet Economy . . . . . . . . . . as as . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sl
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . i
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U, S, PRESIDENCY
Preliminary communist reactlons to the resignation of President
Nixon and President Ford's euecaesion range from the cautious
optimism of Moscow and its East European allies and a limited
reportorial response by Peking to the doctrinaire reactions
of the Vietnamese communist and North Korean media. Soviet
media have put the best possible appearance or. the change and
expressed satisfaction with President Ford's aesvrr,nces of
continuity in U.S. foreign policy. Moscow's East European
allies have followed a similar tack, with perhaps greater ex-
pressions of concern over the sudden change. Peking's very
restrained and cautious handling of the change stands in
sharp contrast to the Vietnamese communist media, which have
combined highly vituperative personal attacks on President Nixon
with open skepticism that President Ford is likely to change
U.S. policy toward Indochina in any manner favorable to peace.
North Korean media reported the Nixon resignation in abusive
terms, but--alone among communist countries--has not yet
acknowledged President Ford's succession. Cuban media have
thus far treated President Ford in restrained, unemotional
reportage that contrasts sharply with venomous personal attacks
on the resigning President.
MOSCG4 PUTS BEST FACE ON LEADERSHIP CHANGE. HAILS CONTINUITY
Moscow has endeavored to put the best possible face on the change
in the U.S. presidency. Attributing the Nixon resignation
exclusively to internal phenomena, Moscow has expressed complete
satisfaction with President Ford's avowals of his desire to
follow the previous Admiuistration's policy in U.S.-Soviet
relations, and it has emphasized other i:igns of continuity in
U.S. policy. Moscow has ignored the President's stress in his
initial public statements on the need for a strong defense
posture, while noting instead his past statements of support
for the SALT negotiations.
These themes were capsulized in Podgornyy's 10 August congrat-
ulatory telegram to President Ford, which expressed satisfaction
with the President's initial foreign policy statements and
confidence that U.S.-Soviet relations would continue to improve.
A PRAVDA editorial article on the 11th, which presented the
most authoritative assessment to date of the circumstances
surrounding the change in Administration, reaffirmed the "great
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significartula" that Moscow attnches to the U.S.-Soviet relation-
ship and noted such signs of continuity as the new President's
expressed desire that Kissinger remain as Secretary of State.
Like other commentary, the editorial article pointed out that
the changes in Washington were a result of Internal develop-
ments in the political and economic arena and emphasized that
objective, long-term factors--independent of individual lead-
ers--lay at the basis of the new U.S.-Soviet relationship.
Moscow has long stre38ed this' point in countering concern that
the new relationship with Washington was too dependent on the
whims of the U.S. domestic political scene.
Assessments of President Ford's political history have singled
out positive elements, such as his past statements in support
of detente and the President's visits to the Soviet Union.
Reports of his speeches upon being sworn in on 9 August and
before Congress on the 12th also singled out his remarks on the
need for continuing the Nixon Administration's policy toward
the Soviet Union.
Moscow's posture on the strategic aspects of the relationship
has followed the same Fattern. In reports of the Pres'ident's
remarks and elsewhere r'oscow has ignored Presidcnt Ford's emphasis
on the need for a strong defense posture to support detente.
Public assessments have instead publicized his comments' in support
of SALT. The PRAVDA editorial article cited a 1 August Christian
Science MONITOR interview in which he expressed "support for the
Soviet-U.S. SALT accords and hope that an agreement will be
reached as a result of the second stage of talks on this problem."
In a 10 August discussion of the changes on Soviet TV, TASS
director Leonid Zamyat in-- spokesman for Brezhnev at recent
summits--cited similar feelings expressed to him by Ford during
Zamyatin's visit here last May with a Supreme Soviet delegation.
De%:;ite the pervasive confidence in the continuity of U.S. policy,
there have been hints that Moscow anticipates a greater focus
on domestic problems at the expense of foreign policy initiatives
in the new Administration. A 10 August assessment of the U.S.
changes by IZVESTIYA political observer Vikentiy Matveyev noted
that the U.S. change came in the wake of a rash of governmental
changes in other Western countries, such as France, Britain and
the FRG. While noting that the new leaders in all. cases had
confirmed their interest in continuing detente, he acknowledged
as well their intention to "give priority to domestic problems."
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Reports from Moscow carried in the Yugoslav media--a suurae whi:h
has frequently provided reliable insights intu Mcseow's thinking
on sensitive issues it has been reluctant to discuss openly--tend
to confirm this note of ;-ration in the Soviet assessment of the
changes in Washington. According to a 9 August TANJUC news
agency report, "political observers" in Moscow feel that under
the new President relations could be expected to develop at a
slower pace, though probably along the recently established lines.
The same observers were reported ad expressing particular concern
about the President's history of strong support fat military
programa.
EAST EUROP.ANS SEE FORD CONTINUING DETENTE IMPETUS
Moscow's East guropean fillies. though indicating concern over
President Nixon's resignation, have generally expressed cautious
optimism that President Ford would continue the detente-oriented
policies of the last ndminiAtration. Among the signs of
continuity highlighted by the media have, been the PresidefY's
assurances that he would pursue the Nixon Administration's
policies in foreign affairb and the President's retention of
Set.tatary Kiecinger. Explanations of the Nixon resignation
itself have been inconaietent, pointing out on the one hand
that domestic affairs, not foreign affairs, brought about his
downf.:ll, and on the other that the Watergate issue had boen
exploited by "forces" who "mistakenly" believed they could
undermine detente by toppling the President. Yugoslav re-
action--though more critical of American foreign policy--was
markedly similar to that o' the orthodox Warsaw Pact countries,
while Pact maverick Romania was ro,atrained in its commen' and
eschewed any details of domestic U.S. events. Albania,
characteristically, expressed pleasure over President Nixon's
humiliation, but foresaw nothing good coming out of the curre.at
U.S. ;nlitical system.
A common theme in the comment of the East European countries on
the prospects for detente under the new Administration hap been
the argument that detente depends not on individual leaders but
on objective factors. While Nixon is credited for hia "r 11sm"
in recognizing the objective changes in the world balance of
forces, it is implied that the present U.S. Administration will
make much the same assessment and adjust it@ policies accord-
ingly.
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At thA vamc time, some, reservations have been voiced concerning
the ; cesibility that the new Adailnietration may neglect foreign
af.fai,% in favor of c new concautration on domestic problems.
BudapRSt radio an the 10th, for example, expressed concern that
the new President may become "praoccuuiud" with domestic problems,
espc+eial]y since he is more familiar with them.
Biographical data on President Ford has been sketcny but generally
favorable. Doecribed consistently as either "conservative" or
"moderate conservative," Ford has nevertheless been portrayed as
a supporter of detente. The Bulgarian press on the 10th, for
exr'mple, depi.ted him s "calm and moderate," and as "a serious
and intense leader, a realist in his actions and intentirns>"
One paper, TRUD, though also generally complimentary, cited
reports that the new President lacked a brilliant intellect and
imagination and that he "has not produced any original ideas in
politics."
While the East European media frequently reported that President
Ford had supported an "aggressive" foreign policy during the cold
war years, it was also pointed out that he steadfastly supported
the Nixon Administration's foreign policy. The President's lack
of exposure on the fcreign scene has alan been noted. Whereas
East Berlin's Voice of the GDR on the 10th referred to his "great
experience as a politicietu and statesman," Budapest Radio of the
same day noted that he was picked as Vice President because he
was "suitably undistinguished." The Bulgarian party daily
RABOTNICHESKO DELO, also on the 10th, pointed out that before
Ford had joined the Administration, he had not been "known for
any particularly active participation" in foreign affairs.
The President's 12 August speech to a joint session of Congres.3
was summari.ned by every East European capital--all of them
emphasizing his pledge to continue his predecessor's foreign
policy, particularly the improvement of relations with the Soviet
Union. Budapest, Prague, Sofia and Tirana media singled out his
call for a continued strong national defense policy to insure
peace. Although comment on the speech was sparse, favorable
fate 'as taken of the President's remarks on U.S.-Soviet relations.
DRV. PRG M A NEGATIVE ON FORDS FOLLOWING NIXON DOCTRINE
Hanoi and Liberation radios reacted quickly to President
Nixon's resignation, blaming his demise on the "total crisis and
deadlock of all internal and foreign policies" of the United States,
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of which Watergate was only a "manifestation." Initially sparse
and essentially factual references to President Ford by Va.etnamass
communist media have now given way to critical comment, whereas
the relatively restrained treatment accorded Nixon in their first
response has since developed into an unbroken barrage of invective,
reviling him for alleged "crimes."
Hanoi radio's first, lengthy commentary on President Nixon's
resignation, broadcast on 9 August less than four hours after
the event and before Ford's swearing-in, even then observed that
President Ford would be "very limited" in his ability to make
changes because the "capitalist ruling clique formulates U.S.
policy." The same commentary noted in its lead paragraph that
Kissinger would continue as Secretary of State, and the.. U.S.
policy remains bipartisan irrespective of who is Pres!dent.
Describing the shortcomings of the present U.S. international
position, Hanoi noted that Nixon had been "wearing a false
peace mask and upholding the label of detente" in foreign
affairs. It characterized the Vietnam war as a U.S. "fnilu:e"
that weakened the United States "militarily, politically, and
economically."
A briefer, more sharply worded Liberation Radio commentary aired
an hour later took the same tack, stressing that the President's
"warmongering and cruel policy" against Vietnam was one of the
"root" causes of his downfall. While claiming that the President's
"collapse" was a strong blow to the Nixon Doctrine and that it
"clearly exposes the weakness of the U.S. imperialists," the
Liberation Radio commentary characterized Thieu as "bitter and
bewildered" by Nixon's end and predicted that Thieu cannot "avoid
being seriously affected'by Nixon's resignation.
Hanoi's first substantial appraisal of President Ford came in a
broadcast late on 9 August presenting biographic data on him.
Citing "foreign news agencies," the report said he was a "represen-
tative of the Republican conservative faction" and that he has
agreed "85 to 95 percent" of the time with Senator Goldwater--"a
most reactionary and conservative politician." The biography
noted that Ford actively supported the U.S. "policy of aggression"
in Vietnam. Reaction to President Ford's inaugural address was
confined to brief Hanoi radio reports citing U.S. press agencies.
A Hanoi broadcast of the 10th noted that, according to AP,
the State Department had affirmed that the Nixon Doctrine would
continue to serve as a guideline for U.S. policy in Southeast
Asia under the Ford Administration. An interview given by PRG
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Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, aired on the 11th, by Liberation
Radio, observed that Gerald Ford's policy toward South Vietnam would
"remain unchanged " in view of the recent support for the Thieu
administration expressed by the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.
A Hanoi radio broadcast in Mandarin on the 11th reflected mild
antagonism in noting what it considered President Ford's first
acts affecting Vietnam. These ware listed as the continuation
of the Nixon Doctrine under Secretary Kissinger, the assurances
given Thieu by the U.S. Embaeny in Saigon, and the alleged over-
flights of DRV territory by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft on the
afternoon of the 9th--after Ford bad already bean sworn in--as
evidence that Nixon's policies were being continued.
A Hanoi radio broadcast of the 13th contained the first monitored
reaction to Ford's speech before a joint sesoion of Congress on
the 12th. In an otherwise straightforward account of the address,
the broadcast took predictable exception to his remarks on Indochina,
saying that his "ballyhoo" about wanting the cease-fire observed
was belied by "grave sabotage" of it by the United States and Thieu.
PERSONAL ABUSE The venomous barbs that Vietnamese communist media
AGAINST NIXON have aimed at the outgoing President appear intend-
ed not only to arouse revulsion for his policies
but for the man as well. A 10 August NHAN DAN commentary, analyzing
the "bankruptcy of the Nixon Doctrine and the crisis of U.S. imperial-
ism," charged Nixon with being "the most bellicose, most reactionary,
and most malicious" U.S. President in history and described his
resignation speech as that of a "born liar, a quack, an abuser
of powc:i, and mastermind of many political scandals and swindles."
Similarly, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of the same date portrayed
him as an "ambitious tyrant" whose "golden dream" of presiding
over the U.S. bicentennial had been "shattered." Liberation Radio,
in a broadcast of the 11th, declared in equally abusive language
that Nixon would be remembered as a "criminal who has squandered
hundreds of billions of dollars in taxes on war" and declared
that his name would continue to "nauseate the world for thousands
of years."
CHINESE., OTHER ASIAN CQ IWISTS BRIEFLY NOTE FORD PRESIDENCY
Peking has been circumspect in treating President; Ford, avoiding
all comment while reporting briefly on his 12 August address to
Congress and noting the President's 9 August meeting with P'RC
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Liaison Office Chiof Huang Chen following his swearing-in that day.
The 13 August NCNA account of the President's address, transmitted
to both domestic and foreign audiences, cited his statement that
bringing inflation under control was his Administration's "first
priority" and noted his determination to continue the foreign
policy of President Nixon. Though Ignoring the President's
remarks addressed to other foreign nations, NCNA replayed in full
his pledge to continue the now relationship with the PRC based on
the principles of the Shangh&i communique. Peking also reported
President Ford's determination to stand by past foreign policy
commitments and his opposition to unwarranted cuts in U.S. defense
spending, quoting his affirmation that a strong defense provides
the surest way to peace, while weakness invites war.
China's sole report on President Nixon's resignation was a brief,
straightforward NCNA report on 9 August, also broadcast on the
national radio, based on President Nixon's 0 August television
address. The report cited the President's exrlanation that loss
of Congressional support due to "the Wateargate matter" prompted
his resignation, but it did not amplify on the meaning of Water-
gate, a subject Chinese media had never previously mentioned.
NCNA ignored other aspects of the Nixon address except his
reference to having "unlocked the doors thp: for a quarter of a
century stood between the United States and the PRC?"
NORTH KCREAN, Pyongyang has not yet mentioned that Gerald
MONGOLIAN REACTION Ford has become President, but a single
Pyongyang radio broadcast late on 9 August
briefly noted President Nixon's "falling out" of the presidency
ou that date. The broadcast described him as the "wicked boss"
of the U.S. imperialists and a "notorious anticommunist villain
and master of the traitorous Pak Chong-hui puppet clique," a
rather typical Pyongyang appellation for President Nixon. The
item was otherwise devoted to an attack on ROK President Pak.
According to a 10 August Ulan Bator MONTSAME report, the Mongolian
press that day informed its readers about the resignation of
President Nixon and the swearing-in statement of President Ford.
No details are yet available.
COMMUNIST CLANDESTINE The Pathet Lan clandestine radio on
RADIOS, FRONTS 10 August characterized President Ford's
accession to the presidency as portending
little change in U.S. "reactionary" foreign and d'iestic policies.
Initial reports soon after President Nixon's 8 August resignation
speech were brief and factual, but a 10 August commentary stressed
his interventionist policy in Indochina and the "crimes" of Watergate.
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The Cambodian Front news agency warmed President Ford in com-
mentaries on 11 and 13 August that if he followed "Nixon's
beaten path" of interference in Indochina, he would most a
fate similar to his predecessor and "be hanged by the American
people and the peoples of the world." The Thai CP radio has
not commented on President Ford's policies, but it seized upon
U.S. Ambassador Kintner's assurances regarding U.S. policy in
the wake of the Nixon resignation to warn that "the United
States will not change its policy of aggression and control over
Thailand."
CUFAN MEDIA RESTRAINED ON FORD. ALUSIVE OF NIXON
Havana media have combiLied harsh, abusive criticism of outgoing
President Nixon with restrained, unemotional reportage on new
President Ford, as well as some tentative leadership remarks
suggesting Cuban caution and reiterating willingness to negotiate
with the United States if the blockade of Cuba was lifted. The
new President was described in a Havana TV biography, quoting a
U.S. news agency, as "c conservative in financial matters, a
moderate in domestic matters, and a liberal in foreign policy."
Aside from one 8 August Havana TV reference to President Ford as
"one of the strangest figures in the entire Watergate scandal," a
Havana allusion to Ford's changing position on supporting President
Nixon in previous months, Cuban media have refrained from further
evaluations.
Cuban officials, in line with recent Castro remarks, have intimated
some receptiveness to the idea of a U.S.-Cuban dialog, but re-
iterated the position that a lifting of the blockade must come
first. Thus, First Vice Prime Minister Raul Castro, responding to
a newsman's question about the possibility of relations with the
United States now that Ford had become President, was reported by
PRENSA LATIhA on 9 August as replying that "we are willing to sit
down for talks" with the United States but only "after they have
unconditionally lifted the blockade." Foreign Minister Roa, in
a press conference in Sweden reported by Havana's international
service on the 10th, assailed Nixon in vituperative terms but did
not directly comment on the new U.S. Administration, although he
did rdmark that the U.S. blockade had "fallen apart, and logically
it is to be expected that the situation will change." And a
9 August Havana domestic service commentary noted that some U.S.
Senators opposed "the cruel isolation ordered against Cuba by the
Nixon Administration."
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Havana's longstanding hostility toward President Nixon was summed
up on 9 August by the Cuban Communist Party organ GRANMA, which
said that the Watergate "vultures" reared by President Nixon
ended up "devouring the insides of one of the most mediocre
political hacks who ever passed through the Presidency of the
United States."
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CYPRUS
USSR CONCERNED OVER TROOP OCCUPATION, THREAT OF PARTITION
Soviet reaction thus far to the renewed Turkish attacks in Cyprus
on 14 August, following the breakdown of the Geneva negotiations,
has been confined to brief TAPS reports noting the resumption of
"military actions," Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military
structure, and UN Security Council adoption of a resolution calling
for an immediate and to hostilities and resumption of peace talks.
In the pant wack, coincident with the opening of the second phase
of the tripartite Cyprus talks in Geneva, major articles in
IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA criticized the 30 July Geneva Doclaration by
Britain, Greece and Turkey and argued that the Security Council,
not the NATO guarantor states, should bear the responsibility for
de.:ing with the Cyprus problem. These articles and other Soviet
comment conveyed a tone of increasing concern over the presence
of foreign troops on the islend, charging that this "effective
occupation" of large areas of Cyprus world lead to division of the
country, threatening Cyprus' existence as an independent state.
Moscow, having previously softpedaled Turkey's military involvement
in Cyprus and evaded attributing federation proposals to Ankara,
has now edged toward reluctant acknowledgment that at least some
of the difficulties stem from the Turkish attitude.
Soviet eoumnent in general has continued to avoid any suggestion of a
possible Soviet initiative in the Cyprus problem. However, A NEW
TIMES article reviewed by TASS on the 8th did inject a Soviet offer
of Help into the usual Moscow formula on the Cypriots' right to
decide their future themselves. It said that the USSR "is willing
to help the Cypriot people, both Greek and Turkish," to secure for
themselves the right to decide their own problems and the destiny
of their common motherland.
CURRENT SITUATION Soviet reportage on the renewed Turkish military
operations in Cyprus has been confined, as of
this waiting, to a single TASS English item datelined London noting
that "military actions have been resumed" following.the breakdown
of the Geneva talks. TASS reported that Turkish planes had bombed
military installations near Nicosia and in the airport area, Turkish
tanks had been observed ot: the road between Kyrenia and Famagusta,
and fighting had broken out along the Green Line in Nicosia. TASS
promptly picked up Greek Foreign Minister Mavros' statement in Geneva
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that Greece no longer considered itself a NATO member, as well
as the subsequent Athens announcement that Greece was withdrawing
its armed forces from NATO while remaining a "political member"
of the alliance. TASS cited a Greek Government spokesman as saying
the decision was due to NATO's inability "to prevent a conflict"
between Craaco and Turkey; the Athens announcement in fact
referred to NATO's inability "to restrain Turkey from creating a
situation of conflict."
Thus for. Moscow's only account of the emergency Security Council
session has been a two-sentence TASS report noting that the council
unanimously demanded an immediate end to military operations in
Cyprus and resumption of the peace talks, and that the session
had been hold at the request of Britain, Greece and Cyprus after
the failure of the Genova talks and "a now outbreak of hostilities"
in the island.
TURKISH PROPOSALS As the Geneva talks broke up over Turkish
FOR FEDERATION demands for a federal structure for Cyprus,
finally abandoned its efforts toavOid
acknowledging Turkish authorship of proposals for autonomous
administration and geographical separation. Up to this time, Soviet
comment had warned vaguely of "Wescern" plans for changes in the
islant i internal structure which would open the door to dismember-
ment of the island. As Moscow in the past week voiced increasing
alarm over threats of partition, a Moscow domestic service commentary
;t the 8th, in what was apparently the first.mention of the Turkish
demands, cited "acting" Cypriot President Kliridhis as saying that
Ankara's proposal for a geographic partition of the two communities
was unacceptable. On the 13th, after a Turkish ultimatum for
acceptance of its proposals at the Geneva conference, TASS finally
acknowledged that a Turkish plan was the focus of attention at Geneva.
While "the particulars are not yet finally clear," TASS said, the
proposal envisaged establishing "autonomous regions (cantons) with
Greek and Turkish population which are to be united in a federal
state."
TASS, in a dispatch from Ankara on the 13th,. subsequently cited "news
agency" reports that the Turkish proposals provided for two
independent administrations and "completely autonomous federative
states" enjoying equal rights "in the formation.of.a.federal
government." TASS noted that Turkey.proposed.that the "Cypriot
Turks' state" occup 33 percent of Cyprus territory and consist
of five cantons and that it also called for."radical changes" in
the Cyprus constitution. A Moscow domestic service newscast early
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on the 14th, without mantit:,ing the fighting -in Cyprus, reported
that the Geneva talks had been broken off of tar Turkey insisted
on "unconditional accaptanto" of its plan for establishing two
autonomous administrations in Cyprus. The report noted that
after Kliridhis rejected the plan as unaccoptabin and proposed
postponing consideration of it for the time being, Turkish Foreign
Minister Gunas said that if the Turkish proposals were rejected
the talks would be terminated, and "this is exactly what happened."
CC*1ENT ON Setting the stage for the reopening of what he
STATUS OF CYPRUS called the "narrow secret talks in,Goneva,"
an 8 August PRAVDA commentary by Svetlov in
effect indicated opposition to.Turkish federation proposals by
complaining that conditions in Cyprus were such that the legitimate
government could not exercise authority "throughout the country."
Objecting to the provisions of the Geneva. Declaration , Svotiov
noted that there wac no hint in that document as to when and haai
foreign military interference would be ended and.the Cyprus
Government would be guaranteed the opportunity of "exercising its
own authority to the full" in the country. Svetlov noted that the
Geneva participants had no objection to a review of Cyprus' status
and its constitution, and IZVPSTIYA political observer Matveyev,
in his article the same day, charged that talk about possible
formulas for the internal structure of. Cyprus .failed to take account
of the opinions of the Cypriots themselves.
Matvay*v observed that while Greek. Cypriot, and. Turkish Cypriot
representatives were to be.invited to the Geneva.talk,. the three
guarantor states were "circumventing" the question of ,-qual
participation by "representatives of .the Government ,i Cyprus,"
TASS director general Zamyatin, in a Moscow domestic service "answers
to listeners" program on the 10th, enlar1,ed on.Matveyev's complaint,
remarking that representatives of the Gre.. Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot communities had been invited to the.second phase of the
Geneva conference, but that "neither of the. communities can represent
the government as a whole, which means that here toop from the
beginning a course is being steered toward division of the island."
Zamyatin sidestepped a question as to why Makarios had not yet
returned to Cyprus, responding that Makarios himself bad iaid that
so far it was not possible to "implement authority" on the island,
and that in the current conditions his return as "lawful president"
would be dangerous. Matveyev's.IZVESTIYA.article .did call for
restoration of the "constitutional government led.by President
Makarios," declaring that there "can be no other way" of protecting
Cyprus' sovereign rights.
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TROOP ISSUE The Matveyev I`!VESTIYA article, #ocusin3 on the
need for withdrawal of foreign troops from Cvpt,us,
offnrad the first Sovfdt interpretation of the relevant paragraph
in Sacurlty Council resolution 353, assorting that it calls for
immediate withdrawal "of all foreign military personnel there
wxcopt the UN troops." (The resolution in feet calls for
withdrawal of "foreign military personnel present otherwise
than under the authority of International agreements, including
those whose withdrawal was requested" by President Makarios on
7 July.) Matveyov declared that the scale of "foreign
inrarfere.tce had constantly been increasing, that large areas
of thu islitd were "effectively In a state -f occupation," .*nd
that the number of foreign troops was rising rather than
di,,ressing. Criticizing the Geneva Declaration, Matveyev Sall it
wap extremely ambiguous in that it mentionni troop withdrawal in the
"moot indefinite and diffuse form." It went no further, he said, than
"the formula that 'the territories under the control of the armed
forces of the parties to the dispute . . . must not be extended,"
and he charged that even this "half-hbnrted commitment" was not
being observed.
In asserting that the major sources of tension in Cyprus were the
foreign troops moved there "in defiance of Standards of inter-
national law," ttatveyev made no mention of the guarantor states'
right t: act under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. But NEW TINE"
commentator Sharov, in an article broadcast by Moscow domestic
service on the 9th, noted that Britain retained the right to
keep forces on Cyprus "as a so-called guarantee" of the state's
independence, and the "other 'guarantors,"' Britsis'? NATO
allies Greece and Turkey, also stationed military contingents
on Cyprus. Sharov asserted that the Cypriot people were well
aware of the threat to them represented by "these NATO-drilled
contingents."
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW ADVISES ARAB UN I . Yj POLITICAL USE OF OIL IN EC TALK,".
In limited comment on t'.'l first round of talks hold 31 July in
Faris to initi.te therocg-awaited formal dialog between the
European Community and Arab tats on mutual economic cooperation,
Moscow has profemsed a favorable svaluacZcn of the development,
noting briefly the prospective oronomie advantages for both sides
while focusing primarily on potcmtial political benefits for the
Arab side, The Soviet reaction has been generally in line with
Moscow media treatment of EC-Arab relations in past months,
although lacking the previously pronounced emphasis on the theme
of disarray in U.S.-European relation@ add European refusal to
fall into line with U.S. proposals fir unifl.ed policies by the
maj,.L' tl-consuming nations to meet the variour problems related
r,c the one ly crisis.
BAC!.CROUNDs Init& tion of a formal EC-A:ab dialog has been long
in preparation, and over the past months Moscow media have followed
the highlights of its gradual realisation. Soviet reporting on the
EC Copenhiger conference in mid-December 1973, for example, noted
that theme had been discussion of direct cooperation between the
European and Arab countries as a means of resolving the energy crisis.
Moscow media also noted French Foreign Minister Jobert's proposals
fcr such cooperation in January 1974 and the EC formal decision at
Brussels in March 1974 to enter into direct talks with the Arab
states. In commenting on those developments, Moscow has generally
presented them as evidence of U.S.-European disunity and of a desire
by Europe to avr1d depund.nce ot; the United States, often adding
that the developments represent a victory for Arab unity and offer
the Arab states ?.. omic and political advantages.
ECONOMIC BENEFIT.. Moscow has almost certainly been displeased
by the prospects of expanded, long-term
economic cocierition between the Arab states and Europe, but in its
public comment has nevertheless Avoided criticism of thn development,
seeking instead to emphasise its positive aspects for Arab int`eests.
In reporting the recunt initiation of the EC-Arab dialog, Moscow
has characterised the sides' interosts,in it as "understandable" and
explained itts emergence primarily in terms of the anticipated mutual
ecotwi is benefits. Thus, the Europeans are said to seek to ensure a
continuous Fupply of Arab oil, the source of almost 75% of Europe's
fuel coodsa and to sea in direct talks with .:he Arab states a way,
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as well, to avoid the "costly middlemanship" of U.S. oil companies.
for their part, the Arab countries seek, In largo part, to obtain
Western equipment and advanced technology.
POLITICAL. ASPECTS Moscow has emphasised at the same time, however,
that the Arab states are motivated not only by
economic concerns but ale, by national political interests in the
achievement of a desirable Middle East settlement. Recently, Moscow
has on occasion advocated that the Arab states shou)d exploit their
new dialog with Europe by pursuing a unifi.ad policy on oil supplies
designed to force appropriate changes in European foreign policies.
A particularly explicit c.xaaple, an unattributed commentary broad-
cast in Arabic on S August on the "unofficial" Radio Peace and
Progress, stated as a general proposition that the Arabs viewed
their dialog with Europe as a moans to help create "the proper
intetiational atmosphere" for a final Middle it settlement. Warming
to the subject, the commentary apsertsd that "no serious cooperation"
was pcsaible between the two sides wit'iotrt "precise commitments" by
the Europeans to take the Arab side against Israel. The commentary
added that "there is no harm in recalling that the very possibility
of conducting a Euro-Arab dialog appeared after the Western states
were forced to charge their pro-Israel Middle East policy under the
influences tef the Arab oil embargo."
Somewhat less explicitly, PRAVDA commentator Yu. Kharlanov in an
article on 23 Ju17' asked rhetorically, "who is creatirg thft obstacles"
to establishment of direct relations bswten the Arab states and
Europe. He predictably located the culpritA to major U.S. oil
interests which fear a lots of monopoly positrons in the fuel market.
Echoing some of the points he And other Soviet comsntaiors had made
in their analyses of the energy crisis and Arab oil embargo in late
'973 and early 1774, Kharlanov urged the oi1?produ0.ng developing
countries to maintain a "unified front." He concluded with the
reminder that only a unified policy "independent of presours from the
Douopoliss can lead to results that meet the true interests of Third
World nations."
TOLKJNDV ARTICLE A major IZVESTIYA article on 1 August, third an.14
last in a series on the Middle East by chief
edicoz Lev Tolkuonv, was addressed in large part to the issues of
Arab unity and use of oil as a political weapon. Opening his article
vith the observation that "it would be incorrect to represent the
Arab world as united and harsonious,` Tolkunov readily acknowledged
that the numa:oua "inter-Arab-contradictions"--linguistic, religious,
ethnic, sc-cial, and others--wars goo deeply sutablished to be
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eradicated short of "changing the vary class structure of the
Arab world, a lengthy and complicated process." Against the
background of these "existing realities," Tolkunov nevertheless
found ctrtain "unifying factors," chief among which were Arab
cooperation with the USSR and the Arib countries' own
joint struggle on the oil front, which is
linked to an increase of Arab world proff.te
and the striving to exert pressure on the
Western states ?o that they pursue a policy
advantageous to the Arab states, particularly
on the questions of the liberation of the
lands occupied by the aggressor.
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INDOCHINA
VIETNAMESE CCt4IJNISTS CHARGE GVN AIRSTRIKES, U,S1 OVERFLIGHTS
Alleged GVN airstrikes against targets in the PRG "liberated tons"
of South Vietnam on 6 and 7 August have drawn numerous protests
from Vietnamese communist sources, including PRG and DRV
foreign-ministry level statements. The ^RG's reaction to the
bombings has again raised the specter of the 15 October 19'3
PLAF Command order.--heretofore noted only occasionally since
the period shortly after its issuance--which threatens communist
counterattacks in retaliation for alleged Saigon violations of
the Paris peace agreement.* At the same time, a DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman's stat,iment of the 9th has charged the United
States with conducting aerial reconnaissauce over North Vietnam
with SR-71 aircraft. This routine protest was issued at the
usual level cf authority and couched in standard terms.
The authoritative PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements on 7 and
8 August, respectively, claimed that Saigon aircraft--including
"many F-SE's"--bombed and strafed Loc Ninh and Bu Dop in Binh Long
Province on 6 August. The PRG statement described the attacks
as hitting "densely populated" areas with "demolition, fragmenta-
tion, and napalm bombs" which "killed dozens" and caused "extensive
damage." The later, somewhat more strident DRV statement upped
the death toll, accusing Saigon of conducting "wanton genocidal
bombings and etrafings" that resulted in "hundreds of dead." Both
statements asserted U.S. complicity in the bombings, with the PRG
statement declaring that the United States "must be held responsibl,
for Saigon's "violation" of the Paris agreement.
A 9 August PRG Fora:Qn Ministry spokesman's statement charging
continued GVN bombings on the 7th, while issued at a lower level
of authority, ominously referred to implementation of the 15 October
PLAF Command order to punish "acts of war." While the threat of
PL AF counterattacks are occasionally brandished in the media, the
15 October order has rarely been evoked since its issuance. The
only known recent tafarence was in a Liberation Radio commentary
of the 8th on the capture of Thuong Duc by communist forces,
which declared that the "southern armed forces and people are
* For a discussion of the-PLAF Command order, see the TRENDS of
17 Oc? bar 1973, pages 7-9.
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determined to execute" the order as long as Saigon continues its
"acts of war." A 9 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the
capture of Thuong Duc, while not directly cuing the PLAF Command
order, used terminology reflecting its intent by describing the
ection as "appropriate punishment . . . right at the bass which
serves as a departure point" for ARVN operations. A mildly
worded DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 9th--
likewise protesting the alleged bombings on the 7th--avoided
mention of the FLAP order or the possibility of retaliation.
The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on overflights of
the North, transmitted in English by VNA on 9 August and in
Mandarin by Hanoi radio on the lOt%, described u.d. "encroachments"
of the DRV by SR-71's on two occasions on the 9th over Hanoi,
Haiphong, and "many other parts" of North Vietnam. This statement
has apparently been disseminated thus far only on Hanoi's inter-
national transmissions, which would he a departure from past
practice. Customarily, statements charging overflights have been
broadcast by Hanoi's Vietnamese domestic service, as was the last
such protest, a virtually identically worded DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement issued on 15 July charging a similar SR-71
overflight. The only known attendant publicity for the latest
protest has been limited to passing references in Hanoi Mandarin
broadcasts.
LE T ANH NGHI DELEGATION VISITS CHINA, DISCUSSES AID
The North Vietnamese economic delegation led by Vice Premier
Le Thanh Nghi capped its recent tour of the USSR and East Europe
with a 1-8 August stay in Peking and Kwangsi Province before
returning to Hanoi on the 8th. _During his stay in Peking, Nghi
held talks with PRC economic and aid experts headed by Vice
Premier Li Haien-nien, who &lso-attanded airport arrival and
departure ceremonies for the DRY leader and feted him at a
banquet on 2 August. Li had also been Nghi's host when the
latter'stopped off in Peking on 5-7 July, on the first lag of his
foreign tour. During his August Peking visit Nghi held separate
talks with Prince Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth
on the 4th. VNA reported that the DRV Vice Premier and his
entourage were welcomed home in Hanoi on the 8th by officials
headed by Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh.
The delegation aecompaaying Nghi to China included Vice Chairman
of the DRV State Planning Commission Le Khan, who had been with
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Nghi during earlier talks in Moscow rend East Europe.* Joining
the delegation in Peking was DRV Vito Foreign Trade Minister
Ly Ban, who in the past has played a crucial role in the annual
negotiation of Sino-VisC:i::.4se aid agreements. While NCNA
merely stated that the DRV delegation was on an "official
visit" to China, VNA disclosed on 6 August that the two sides
hold talks on "China`s aid to Vietnam in 1975" and on the
"development of economic, scientific and technical cooperation
between the two countries." No agreements were noted during
the visit.
Though Peking gave full honors to the visitors and described
effusively the "very cordial and friendly" atmosphere .hat
prevailed in the bilateral talks, evidence of persisting Sino-
Vietnamese differences was reflected throughout the visit. Thus,
at the 2 August banquet, Li Hsien-nien failed to echo Nghi'e
sharp assessment of the "grave situation" in South Vietnam
caused by continuing .a, intervention designed to establish
"neocolonialism." Li stressed instead Chinese approval of
Vietnamese postwar reconstruction and support for their
implementation of the Paris agreement. He mildly criticized
peace agreement violations by Saigon "with the support of
the U.S. Government."
Peking spokesmen duly testified to the "proletarian inter-
nationalist" basis of Sino-DRV relations, but they discreetly
muffled statements committing Chinece aid to Vietnamese
endeavors. NCNA even dropped references to Chinese aid that
appeared 1.n VNA accounts of Nghi's speeches, not reporting the
DRV leader's stress at the 2 August banquet that Chinese support
and assistance zontributod to the "great victory of the
Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. strug;le for national salvation."
NCNA also failed to carry Ngri'a prediction that as a result
of the talks in Peking, "the great and precious assistance of
China will be strengthened and developed."
? * For s discussion of the delegation's-earlier stops, see the
TRENDS of 17 July 1974, pages 12-13, and of 31 July 19746 pages 14-16.
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THAILAND
THAI CP LAUDS POLITICAL STRUGGLE, CALLS FOR PEOPLE'S WAR
The China-based clandestine radio of the Thai Communist Party,
the Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), marked the anniversary
of the 7 August 1965 start of communist-led armed insurrection
in Thailand with an editorial reiterating traditional calls for
people's war while giving favorable new stress to recent polit?cal
struggle. This year's editorial, in contrast to last year's, which
preceded the demonstrationp in October that, brought down the
Thanom administration, noted that Thai political struggle had
achieved an "unpreeedentaf ly large-scale and violent upsurC4."
It lauded the October demonstrations as evidence that the mass
movements had developed to a "high tide," it characterized civil
strife leading to the 21 May resignation of the first Sanya
cabinet as a reflection of the "upsurge in the people's struggle,"
and it claimed that "unprecedentedly large-scale struggles" are
being waged against. the present Sanya cabinet.
The editorial reaffirmed longstanding Thai CP reliance on people's
war by linking the political struggles in the cities with the need
for armed insurrection. It stated that the people's experience
in anti-government demonstrations and strikes over the past year
had shown that "democracy and Justice cannot be obtained through
begging, nor can they be handed out by anyone." The editorial added
that "no peaceful means" can solve the conflict between the people
and the rulers, and stressed that the seizure of political power by
armed force "is the only correct way to solve the problems of the
country and the people."
Reelecting the gradually reduced U.S. role in Thailand and the
winding down of Indochina conflicts, the editorial this year muffled
criticism of the United Stites and made no reference to Indochina--
subjects previously commanding high priority in the anniversary
editorial. The editorial also struck a more optimistic note on the
insurgents' prospects, highlighting the present "excellent" situation
and the enemy's "very difficult position," in contrast to past years
when the insurgents' future "tortuous" road full of "difficulties"
was emphasized.
FOREIGN REACTION In contrast to its silence on the date last
year, Peking marked the anniversary with
selective 10 August NCNA replays of the VOPT editorial and of a
VOPT report reviewing the insurgents' battle successes over the
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past six months. The change conforms with Peking's increased
attention to Thai insurgent battle reports and to demonstrations
against the Thai government since the change of administration in
B-ugkok 'nst October. It seems to reflect an appreciation that
the weak and vascillating Sanya administration is lose likely
than the previous, anticommunist Thanom government to allow such
low-level NCNA reports to impede the normalization of Sino-Thai
relations sought by Peking. NCNA'e replay of the VOPT anniversary
editorial focused on its praise for armed struggle while ignoring
its discussion of political struggle against Bangkok. It dropped
all references Co the United Sr tea and criticism of the Sanya
administration. NCNA's replay of the VOPT battle review did
contain a passing reference to the "Sanya administration."
Vietnamese communist media marked the date with lrt:-ievel commentary
that praised the Thai armea struggle and highlighted the U.S. role
in Thailand. A QUAN DOI NRAN DAN commentary replayed by VNA on ? August
did not criticize the Sanya government by name, but LPA on the sam,~
data scornfully equated the current government with the previous
military regime.
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SHARPENED POLEMICS SHOW WORSENING OF SINO-MONGOLIAN RELATIONS
Against the backdrop of recent Soviet-fostered moves to convene an
international communist conference, presumably to castigate the
Maoist leaders, Sino-Mongolian relations have recently taken a turn
for the worse. Ulan Bator media have slavishly followeC Moscow's
lead in broad-ranging anti-China attacks, while Poking has responded
with bitter charges against Soviet exploitation of the MPR. Peking's
relations with Mongolia have long been among the poorest of China's
traditionally cool relationanips with close Soviet allies--a fact
vividly underlined by the official termination of bilateral aid
relations following talks held in Ulan Bator eariy last,year.* But
the present sharp pitch in mutual polemics--surpassing the propa-
ganda exchanges of other Soviet bloc states with tha PRC--points
up a hardening in relations over crucial bilateral disputes and
more general questions concerning the Sino-Soviet split.
Ulan Bator has acted as the chief foreign sounding board for Soviet-
inspired charges geared to China's "anti-socialist" policies in
Asia, sharply condemning Peking's opposition to the "Asian Collective
Security system," calling attention to alleged PRC territorial
claims and expansionism in Asia, and charging Maoist pursuit of
"Great Han chauvinism" against Mongolian and other minority peoples
in China. The Mongolians have issued long treatises documenting
the history of Maoist "deviation" as well as searing attacks in the
dgily press. Typically, MONTSAME on 6 August replayed an MPR
j)urnal'e historical discussion of PRC policies toward ethnic
Mongolians in China, scathingly equating Mao's approach with the
"chauvinism" practiced by previous dictators in China. It criti-
cally juxtaposed Peking's promises of autonomy for national minori-
ties with its alleged policies of discrimination and importation of
Han Chinese into minority areas. The article even delved into past
alleged Chinese leadership disputes over the issues, charging that
Ulanfu, an ethnic Mongolian and former alternate PRC Politburo member,
was purged because he opposed these policies. It added that subsequent
massive influxes of Red Guards into Inner Mongolia during the Cultural
Revolution had resulted in the confiscation of Mongolian weRlth and
the arrest of older Mongolian males who still retained ethnic identity.
* NCNA reported on 27 March 1973 that a PRC Government delegation had
returned to Peking, after talks in the MPR which resulted in formal
transfer to Mongolia of incomplete PRC-aided projects stemming from past
PRC economic and technical assistance agreements with the MPR.
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Though Peking has not responded with equal harshness and has
avoided direct attacks against tlL,ta MPR leadership, Chinese
comment has recently gone to greater lengths to discredit the
MPR's close ties with Moscow. Characterizing Mongolia as the
paradigm of Soviet exploitation abroad, the Chinese have charged
that Moscow not only dominates Mongolia militarily and politically
but also completely controls major aspects of MPR economic life
through such means as joint stock companies and technical cooper-
ation agreements. Recent commentaries have e,-en alleged that
Moscow directly appoints Soviet representativ.os to key Mongolian
government ministries, in order to manage closely MPR economic
development.
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KOREA
PYONGYANG HIGHLIGHTS REUNIFICATION ON KIM SPEECH ANNIVERSARY
in cormamcorating the annt',ersary of a 6 August 1971 Kl,m I1-song
spoe.h, during a visit by Cambodian Prince Sihanouk,'?yongyang
has highlighted Kim's statement that "we are ready to come !n
touch at any tie.e with all political parties, including the
Democratic Republican Party," the South's dominant party.
Comparatively little attention was given to the major theme
of the original address, which postulated that U.S. rapprochement
with China actually evidenced a decisive shift in the world
against the imperialist camp.
While past aLnivorsarica of this speech have received little
media attention, this year's was greeted by a NODONG SINMUN
editorial, a speech by Political Committee member Yang Hyang-sop,
and a meeting of the central committee of the North's unification
front. The front followed through on numerous anniversary calls
for wide ranging North-South negotiations with an appeal for
convening a "great national congress" this year. Such a congress
had been proposed by Kic on 23 June 1973, and appeals for its
convocation have been made frequently ninca, but never with such
a specific time frame. Moreover, the apkaal wont beyond Kim's
original proposal in urging attendance rot only by representatives
from people of various strata in both North and South but also
from "overseas compatriot organizations."
Yang's 5 August speech included the standard litany of Py ntgyang
charges against Seoul's perfidy while taking cars to emphasize
the North's conciliatory attitude and positives moves for peaceful
reunification. Yang characterized Kim's proposal in the 6 August
1971 speech for contacts with the South as a chance for "many
peopit" to atone "at least so;aewhit" for past crimes against the
nation. He stated that the North could negotiate with the Soutb
Korea authorities, "at any place to be agreed on with them,"
if they would "repent for their wrongdoings in the past" and
"return to the position of independence."
Blaming the current deadlock in North-South negotiations on the
ROK, Yang downgraded the importance of the Red Cross talks, call-
ing them the "least" of Pyongyang's many proposals, and stated
bluntly that overall the North-South dialog "has made no progress
to speak of." He noted, however, that it has been quite success-
ful in reveailing the Pak government as "splittist, bellicose and
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fascist," in isolating it internationally oven from important
segments of U.S. and Japanese public opinion, and in adding to
Pak's domestic difficulties. As he did in July on the second
anniversary of the North-South joint stateeant, Yang called on
South Koreans to "smash the Pak Chong-hui fascist military
dictatorship," and he also pointedly cited events in Thailand,
Portugal, and Greece to back his claim that the world no longer
tolerates such dictatorships.
PEKING, MOSCOW A 10 August Peking domestic broadcast noted
the DPAK proposal for a national congress.
but no original Chinese comment or, the initiative has yet been
monitored. Moscow, however, has been quick to hail the plan
in selected media. An 8 August Moscow broadcast in Hungarian
lauded the rroposal and went on to n.ce the presence of foreign
troops in South Korea, stating that the existence of "almost 200"
Pentagon m.litary bases formed a "potential hotbed for military
eoi U ets." A commentary in Korean on the 9th repeated tt;kt
leinguage and contrasted the general "affirmative political
detente in the Asian continent" with the "cold war" division
of Korea.
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-51-
SUPPLE1ENTARY ARTICLE
CONTENTION OVER PARTY ROLE IN LEADING SOVIET ECONOMY
Breshnev's `power at the noeember 1973 CPSU plenum appears to
have aggravated the long-standing conflict over the party's rote
in the economy, both by its proposals for changes in the economic
system and by its blatant call for a more direct party role in
management of the economy. The contentiousness of Broihnov's
remarks is evidenced by the fact that when a published version
of his speech appealed in February, all his specific economic
proposals were om'?ted and his call to place economic leadership
on a "party basin'- w,-is deleted from a senttanco. This censored
clause, as well as hia warnings at the plenum against a "tech-
nocratic" approach, have recently bean revived in a June KO UNIST
article and a Jul!- RADYANSKA UKRAINA editorial that defacd the
party's right for intervene in the economy, suggesting that the
issue in still under debate so efforts continue to draft now
economic measures based on the plenum.
Although Breshnev himself described his proposals at the ple.tm
as very important, representing a sweeping reform of the sysL.sm
of economic administration and planning, it is unlikely that they
include many proposals to grant economic organisations mcra
freedom to operate on the basis of economic levers, in view of
Breshnev's past coolness toward economic reform and hib plenum
remarks calling for more party control. His plenum attack on
"narrow-economic" or "technocratic" approaches to economic
management presumably referred precisely to those who want more
independence for government and economic organisations, and also
amounted to an indirect swipe at Kosygin, who has promoted measures
to facilitito wider use of economic levers. This has not prevented
Kosygin from winning approval of the April decree allowing light
industry associations and enterprises more freedom to adjust
their own production. Nor has Breshnev received public support
from other Politburo members, who have ignored his plenum statements.
BREZH EV STATEMENTS According to the 12-page abbreviated
version of Brezu..ev's December 1973 plenum
speech published in a collection of his &gricultur&l speeches signed
to press on 14 February, Breshnev called for a "persistent" struggle
for a "party approach in all spheres of economic activity" and 2eclared
? that "era cannot approach leadership of the economy, questions of
improving this lsad.rship, from narrow economic, such less technocratic
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positions," since this is "a party matter, a political matter."
He also stated:
"Both today and in the future the party as and
will have two pillars in economic construction.
One of them is the improvement of the leader-
ship of the economy. imd the other is the
mobilisation of t.te widest masses of the workers,
arousing of their creative activity and initiative
in the struggle for e^ar,cmic progress."
In fact, Brashnev's definition of "two pillars" when publicised
earlier had included an additional clauia implying an increased
party role tunderlinod below). PRAVDA editorials on 27 January
and 14 Hareh quoted Breshnev directly as having said:
"Both today and in the future the party has and
.ail have two pillars in economic construction.
One of them is the improvement of the leader-
ship of the economy, placing it on a really
scien0iM.. really party basis. And the other
is the ilization of the wide masses of
workers, arousing of their creative activity
and initiative in the struggle for economic
progress."
The siitnificance of the excision is underscored by the fact that
although 11 paragraphs of his elaboration on the second pillar,
mobilisation of the masses, were published in the Februa.y
collection of speochss. no elaboration was included on measurer
to improve the administration of the economy. This was all the
more striking because his introductory remarks on this subject.
which were not cut, had stressed the impo?tance of his proposals,
which he termed "a whole system of importan#. measures for
improving administration and planning and for improving the
whole scotomic mechanism."
The sensitivity of the clause is further suggested by the fact
that it was cut out of the middle of a paragraph when published
in the book. Moreover. It was omitted--along ??ith the rest of
the "two pillars" statement--from the initial PRAVIIA editorial
on the ilanum published on 16 December, which had included
Breshnev's attack on a technocratic approach. This editorial
did refer to a part of the omitted clause* but the omission of the
reference to "party" had the affect of changing Breshnev's
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waaning. It said that he had pointed to the need for "further
improvement of the 1,,adership of the economy on a Acientif?.c
hosts." Alth-ugh 'cbe full "two pillars" statement wan quoted
in the 27 January and 14 March PRAVDA editorials, it was omitted
from editorials on 28 December, 17 January, 25 February, 11 March,
and 13 May, which cited his statement on taking a party approach
in all spheres, and also emitted in the editorials on 11 and 15
February and 24 May which cited his condemnation of a technocratic
approach.
In contrast to PMVDA, IZVESTIYA has largely ignored all those
Brpahnev statements on these issues. Its long 16 December
editorial on the plenum totally ignored all of Brezhnev's comments
on the party's role in the economy--although 1ZVESTIYA, like other
papers, reprinted PRAVDA's 16 December editorial in its next issue.
In the months since the plenum, IZVESTIYA editorials have only
once mentioned Brezhnev's "two pillars" statement (9 February)
and his - atement that managing the economy wan a party and
political matter (7 Marc:i).
The Politburo members in their statements on the plenum have
virtually ignored all these statements also, although Mazurov
did repeat one formulation in twisted form in his 7 June election
speech. Whereas Brezhnev had declared it necessary "to persistently
fight for assertion of a truly party style of work, a party approach
in all spheres of economic activity," Mazurov declared that the
Central Committee coi,siders it necessary "to persistently fight
for assertion of a truly party style of work, a scientific approach
In all spheres of economic activity." One 'f the few officials
to pick up Brezhnev's statements was conservative Moscow gorkom
ideology Secretary V.N. Yagodkin, who used Breriinev'm condemnation
of a technocratic approach and his insist,'nce on a party approach
to leading the economy to launch attacks on liberals in February
articles in the journals QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS and KOMMUNIST.
RECENT REFERENCES Two recent references to Brezhnev's "two
TO "TWO PILLARS, pillars" formula suggest that this Issue
remains very much alive. In a June KOMMUNIST
article entitled "The Party Approach to Economic Construction,"
Latvian First Secretary Voss, a p:apaganda specialist, cited the
"two pilla-s" statement in well as Brezhnev's warning against a
techrocratic approach an,1 criticized the Theory that the party
should "separate 4tself from leadership of the economy and wholly
and fully leave this to econotic organs." A 19 July editorial
under the identical title in the Ukrainian Central Committee organ
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RADYAHSKA UKRAINA stressed that "party leadership of the economy
to an objective necessity" and also repaate. Breshnev's warning
against a technocratic approach, quoting the full version of
brezhnev's "two pillars" statement.
An opposing point of view, in the meantime, has been posed by
Central Committee official F.F. Petrenko.* In a 19 October 1973
PRAVDA article he had argued that government and economic
organizations now had such skilled cadres that it was no longer
necessary for party organs to intervene in their work, and the
party could therefore concentrate on its leading political role.
In an April 1974 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY articl4i he argued
that a fast-growing economy had made changes necessary in the
system of economic administration and even in some features of
the political system. In addition, In an April 1971 POLITICAL
SELF-EDUCATION review Pstranko had written that Len:n had
strictly distinguished between the role of the party as
"political leader and organizer of the people" and t-tie functions
of state organs and had insisted that the party should not load
society directly but through governmen? and public organizations.
Petrenko noted that people sometimes ask whither the party
organizations "should so thoroughly 'push their way' into economic
problems and whether state and economic organs could not themselves
handle economic matters and decide them."
BACKGROUND While Kosygin has not publicly addressed the issue
of the party role, he clearly supports at least
some extension of independence for economic enterprises and
organizations, a position which would imply some r.ttenuation of
central planning red ministerial control as ball as of party
control. In addition to his association with the original 1965
economic reform, Kosygin won adoption of a March 1973 decree
ordering ministries to switch to a structure of production
associations and an April 1974 decree allowing light industry
associations and enterprises to set their output on the basis
of consumer demands.** Both decrees increase the opportunity
for economic units to make decisions on a strictly economic
basis.
The associations operate on principles of economic self-sufficiency
(cost accounting) and can utilize rights granted to enterprises by
See the TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 23-29.
'''* See the TRENDS of 17 July 1974, pages 21-23, and 24 July 1974,
page 35.
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the 1965 reform which, in practice, the plants themselves have
often been unable to implement. As economist !.. Slyakhman wrote
in the April NBVA, "economic independence, the s+bility to fully
pay for themselves and all other attributes of full cost acco 't-
ing are conceivable and possible only" fur ascaciationr,. not
individual enterprises. Further, the spread of associations
may strengthen the case for granting more decision-making to
economic units, even in such iwnsitive areas no price setting.
QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS chief editor T.S. Khachaturov, urging more
flexibility in the price formation system in a May QUESTIONS OF
ECONOMICS article, rejected the idaA of allowing enterprises to
Wablieh prices for their products, but in a Juno PLANNED ECONOMY
article did acknowledge that the "overly rigid and centralized"
price formation system alight he improved by granting more rights
to associations to set prices for certain types of products, as
long as the "general line of state price policy" is observed.
The system of "direct ties" between light industry units and
retail cutlets permitted by the April 1974 decree, limited though
it is, does permit enterprises and associations new rights to
adjust output, slightly loosening the central plan's control.
When the 1965 economic reform extended more righte to economic
enterprises, party spokesman soon asserted the need for a greater
party role to insure adc.ption of the correct economic decisions.
A March 1968 PARTY LIFE editorial declartd that "now, in connection
with the economic reform and a significant widening of rights of
economic leaders," party checking oa economic organizations "must
be especially deep and cffective," that pv.rty checking is "an
effective form of party leadership of the economy,? and that if
a party secretary sees that an economic leader "is adopting
incorrect decisions," he must resolutely oppose this. Gorkiy
Obkom Secretary V. Tikhcmirov wrote in an April 1968 ECONOMIC
GAZETTE that "the economic reform grants more rights and more
independence to 1'iRders of enterprises" and local party o!ficials
therefore feel that "party checking on economic activity must be
strengthened," since "there still are economic officials who are
not ashamed of deceiving the scat,-."
The stage was set for increased interference by the December 1969
CPSU plenum, after which the Central Committee adopted a decree
on the party organization of the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry,
laying down the principle that party organizations of all ministries
must intervene more actively in running their ministry and must
ii?fvrm the Central Committee of shcrtcomi;ige in the work of the
ministry and any of its officials. As Mazurov acknowledged in a
4 June 1970 Minsk speech, "de'tper penetration of party organizations
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into the essence of all processes taking place in the economy
is characteristic for the present stage." Against this back-
ground, the recent calls by Patrenko to reduce party interference
in economic organs may be read as an effort to r4varss the trend
begun in the late 1960's. As Petranko argued in the 19 October
1973 PRAVDA article, the weaknesses in state and economic organs
which necessitated past intervention by the party apparst have
been largely corrected and the party could return to its political
work.
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14 AUGUST 1974
APPENDIX
MOSCCJ, PCF:ING BROADCAtT STATISTICS 5 - 11 AUGUST 1974
Moscow (2453 items)
Peking (820 items)
China
(7%)
')X
Law of the Sea Conference
(8%)
13%
U.S. Presidential
Change
(--)
CX
Criticism of Lin Piao and
Confucius
(9%)
7%
[Podgurnyy Greetings
to Ford
(--)
4%]
Romanian Foreign Minister
Macov escu in PRC
(--)
5%
Cyprus Crisis
(6%)
7%
Cyprus Crisis
(7X)
5%
Chile
(3%)
3%
Indochina
(5X)
5%
[Vietnam
(3%)
3%)
USSR/Japan Northern Terri-
tories Dispute
(--)
3X
These statistics are based on the volcecast commerV-ry output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and Inter, atlonal radio services. T* a term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy Item- .radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or dlylomattc note? Items of extensive reportage are
counted as crmmentarlea.
Figures in pakenthesec indica ' volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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