TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070021-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 22, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
F B I S
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
22 MAY 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 21)
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CONFID]NTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign bro,Ldcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
National S.curity information
Unauthoriad diselosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 MAY 1974
CONTENTS
U.S.-SOVIET ?tELATIONS
Observers Defend Summit, See Relations at Critical SO.-age.
EUROPE
Moscow Sees Continuity in Bonn, GDR Extends Olive Branch. . . . . . .
4
Moscow Satisfied With Giccard, Eastern Europe More Skeptical. . . . .
6
USSR Blames Israeli "Perfidy" for Deaths in Ma'alot Incident. . . . .
8
USSR Uses Jallud Visit to Bolster Image as Arab Supporter . . . . . .
10
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Presents Case on Bilateral Relations, Border Talks . . . . . .
14
INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST
"Peaceful Intentions" Noted by Moscow, Ignored by Peking. . . . . . .
:1.7
INDOCHINA
Communist Attacks in South Vietnam Portrayed as "Punishment". . . . .
19
North Vietnamese Editorials Mark I;o Chi Minh's Birthday . . . . . . .
20
Hanoi Attacks Thai Policies, Sets Terms for Improved Relations. . . .
21
Peking Shows Measured Concern Over Vietnam Developments . . . . . . .
22
PRC FOREIGN POLICY
PRC Ignores U.S. Asian Role on Anniversary of Mac Statement . . . . .
24
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Husak Regime Seeks Accommodation With Political Oeteasts. . . . . .
25
NOTES
Chou En-lai Status; PRC on Disarmament. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 MAY 1974
U,S, -SOVIET R E L A T IONS
OBSERVERS DEFEND SUNWIIT, SEE RELATIONS AT CRITICAL STAGE
A PRAVDA article has presented a strong argument for moving ahead
with the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations despite U.S.
domestic uncertainties. In making a case for the forthcoming
Moscow summit, the 18 May article, by R. Vasilyev and V. Slavin,
painted a more optimistic picture of recent U.S. developments
than have other recent discussions. At the same time articles
by USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov and others in the most
recent issues of USA and INTERNATIONTAL AFFAIRS have warned that
U.S.-Soviet relations are at a decisive stage and that movement
forward is the only alternative to increased tensions.
Vasilyev and Slavin depicted a growing bipartisan support among
diverse segments of the American public for detente with the
Soviet Union. The existence of a "broad political base," in
their opinion, overshadows "all the complexity and contradictions
of the domestic political situation existing in the country and
enables the American leading circles to follow the course set as
a result of the Soviet-American summit meetings in Moscow and
Washington." .3rezhnev had alluded to the "complex and contradictory"
nature of contemporary world affairs in his last major speech, in
Alma Ata on 15 March.
Though the PRAVDA article did not mention Watergate specifically,
it is clear that it was the major domestic "complexity" at issue.
Since reporting the President's 29 April speech announcing that
he w.s turning over transcripts to the House Judiciary Committee,
Moscow has not reported ensuing developments, adhering to its
normal policy of reporting major Presidential moves while ignoring
other developments in the case. A hint of possible impending
developments, however, was contained in a TASS report, carried in
the central press on. 3.7 May, of an interview in the Washington
,':)TAP.-NEWS in which the President was quoted as saying that "if
the house of Representatives decides to bring charges against me
and discuss-ion begins in the SEuate, I am prepared to pursue the
process to the end . "
The PRAVDA authors' cautiously optimistic outlook on the prospects
for further m.ovet-gent on the ride issue is noteworthy. Where in
other recent coaater.tary the Congress, as the major stumbling block
to most-favored-nation status and credits for Moscow, has come in
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22 MAY 1974
for some pointed criticism,Vasilyev and Slavin stressed the
support of American business for expanded trade and concluded
that "on the whole understanding is growing on Capitol Hill
that the course taken by those legislators who are enemies of
detente is in conflict with the national interests of the
American people."
In expressing support for a third Brezhnev-Nixon meeting-the
PRAVDA article rejected arguments that the U.S. internal political
situation dictates against it. Though the article did not
characterize the prospects for such a meeting or discuss a
specific agenda, the authors twice quoted American senators on the
need for further arms limitation measures.
An article by M.O. Kolosov in the May issue of USA, signed to press
16 April, was devotee,. more specifically to the forthcoming summit.
Perhaps reflecting the views of those Americanologists at the
institute with a personal stake in improved U.S.-Soviet relations,
Kolosov emphasized the need for specific measures and "substantial
practical results" at the summit. His discussion of SALT
reflected Moscow's recently more cautious public posture on timing,
however. Where earlier in the year there were frequent references
to the goal of reaching a permanent agreement in 1974, Kolosov
said only that the "extremely complex" nature of the subject left
"no room for premature decisions."
CRITICAL STAGE Kolosov's concern about the erratic progress of
U.S.-Soviet relations was expressed even more
dramatically by Arbatov in the same issue of USA. Arbatov argued,
as he had in the wake of the Middle East crisis last October, that
if the two countries miss the opportunities that now exist for
further improving relations, "it may be too late tomorrow." Citing
the analogy cf a traveler with one leg raised to cross an obstacle,
Arbatov noted that "he cannot remain in this position indo;f initely:
he must either cross the obstacle or turn back." Arbatov applied
this analogy specifically to SALT. "If other steps do not follow
in the near future," he affirmed, "the arms race will continue and
even grow" with the attendant "serious political repercussions."
In the same vein the lead article in the May issue of INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS by V. Nikitin, signed to the press on 19 April, warned that
Soviet-U.S. relations were now at an "exceptionally important stage"
and that "under these conditions it is particularly important that
U.S. leaders consistently adhere to the general policy line sealed
in the Soviet-U.S. agreements." Nikitin took issue in this respect
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with U.S. policy on SALT and with last October's military alert,
which was "objectively aimed at exacerbating the overall
situation in the world and creating tension in Soviet-U,S.
relations."
SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION Vasilyev and Slavi.n in their PRAVDA
article cited the visit by the USSR
Supreme Soviet delegation which began on 20 May as an example of
the "profound constructive changes which are taking place in tha
mental attitude of Americans." Moscow has given prominent
coverage to that visit, highlighting remarks by delegation head
and CPSU Central Committee secretary Boris Ponomarev. TASS
reported that IZVESTIYA of the 22d had devoted "almost an entire
page" to reports on the visit, Moscow's reporting has not focused
on substantive issues, though TASS quoted Ponomarev as telling both
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Congress as a whole
that he did not consider this a "protocol" visit but planned to
discuss specific bilateral and international issues. He has been
frequently quoted as stressing the progress that has already been
made in improving U.S.-Soviet relations but also as urging further
progress at SALT. According to TASS on 21 May, he told a group
of senators that such progress was necessary since "given the
present nature of armaments and the balance of armed forces, attempts
at settling disputes by military means are fraught with the gravest
consequences."
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CONFIDENTIAL, FBF.S TRENDS
22 MAY 1974
MOSCOW SEES CONTINUITY IN BONN, GDR EXTENDS OLIVE BRANCH
Moscow has shown evident relief over the evolution of events in
Bonn since the sudden 6 May resignation of Willy Brandt. Follow-
ing some breath holding in the immediate aftermath of the crisis,
prominent Moscow commentators both in the central press and on
Moscow radio have begun to discuss at length the statements of
the new government leaders and the implications of the change in
government for future FRG-USSR relations. The thrust of this
comment has been that the continuity of the SPD-FDP coalition,
as well as the declarations of Schmidt and other leaders, indicates
that the new Bonn government intends to continue the Brandt-Scheel
policy toward the East. The GDR, in the meantime, with perhaps
some arm twitting from Moscow, has responded positively to suggest-
ions from the floor of the Bundestag that the process of improving
FRG-GDR relations should be carried forward.
CONTINUATION OF The most thorough evaluation of the events
OSTPOLITIK since 6 May and their effect on Soviet-FRG
relations was provided by IZVESTIYA's first
deputy chief editor and German expert Nikolay Polyanov in Moscow
radio's international observers discussion program on the 19th.
Repeatedly citing the 17 May government statement by Schmidt,
Polyanov asserted that "we now know that the policy of this
cabinet will be the same as the policy of the preceding cabinet."
Claiming that an "analysis" of Sc'nmidt's policy statement "merely
confirms" what observers;: had said since Brandt resigned, Polyanov
concluded that the new Bonn government "will as much as possible
embody continuity. . . ." Similarly, in the first commentary in
the central press by a Moscow-based commentator, IZVESTIYA's A.
Grigoryants on the 16th cited statem;a.ts by Born leaders reassuring
Moscow that the new leadership would not alter the "basic directions"
of West German foreign policy.
Moscow, in the meantime, has apparently been able to persuade the
East Germans to come forward with a conciliatory move toward Bonn.
The occasion was provided by the "short, friendly visit" by GDR
Council of Ministers Chairman Sindermann on 12-1 May. The reports
on the visit, and on separate meetings with Kosygin and Brezhnev
on the 13th, revealed that the talks ostensibly were focused
on joint economic coordination; but the report on the Brezhnev
meeting also noted that the leaders discussed "certain inter-
national questions" and "the strengthening of detente both in
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FBIS TRENDS
22 MAY 1974
Europe and throughout the world." Both meetings were said to
have been held in an atmosphere of "complete unity of views."
'.lthough no mention was made of German affairs, Brerhnev and
ether Soviet leaders almost certainly used the occasion to re-
view the Brandt resignation and its repercussions. And with
East Berlin on the 21st offering to hold discussions with the
new Bonu leaders on Issues including Berlin, it can be assiuned
that Moscow was successful in persuading East Berlin to make a
gesture of reasonableness toward Bonn.
GDR RESPONSE '0 ADN reported on the 21st that an East Berlin
BONN LEADERS foreign ministry spokesman, speaking for SED
leader Honecker, stated. that the GDR was
"prepared to examine" proposals affecting FRG-GDR relations made
by SPD deputy cha{.rman and parliamentary floor leader Wenner on
the 20th in the Bundestag debate on the new government's policy
statement. The spokesman noted that "the GDR party and state
leadership" shared Schmidt's view that "despite difficulties"--an
obvious allusion to the Chancellor's reference to the "espionage
case"--relations between the FRG and CUR "can. be actively and
further developed," The spokesman asserted that the GDR was
"prepared to react positively" to the proposals of the Bonn leaders.
Specifically, the spokesman said that the GDR was ready to examine
proposals made by Wehner related to economic cooperation, the
issue of conversion of money by West German visitors to the GDR,
and the coordinating of energy supplies to include West Berlin.
The GDR spokesman ignored the double-edged statement by Wenner
which seemed to include a suggestion that if East Berlin does not
now move forward on issues of importance to Bonn in the FRG-GDR
relationship, this could affect the development of economic
relations between the two countries. Also, Wehner declared that
all the treaties and agreements between Bonn and all the Warsaw
Pact countries made up a whole, all parts of which must be followed
both in spirit and letter. The implication seemed to be that
Soviet-FRG as well as GDR-FRG economic relations would be affected.
TASS carried textually the ADN report on the foreign ministry
spokesman's statement. And GDR media on the 22d were quick to cite
the very favorable reaction by Bonn leaders to the GDR spokesman's
statement.
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22 MAY 1974
MOSCOW SATISFIED WITH GISCARD. EASTERN EUROPE MORE SKEPTICAL
Moscow is accenting the positive in its initial comment on the
victory of center-rightist candidate Giscard d'Estaing over the
leftist coalition candidate Mitterrand in the 19 May run-off election
elections for the French presidency. Focusing primarily on the
foreign policy implications of the election, Moscow has indicated
that it foresees a continuation of French policy and good re-
lations with France along the general lines developed under de
Gaulle and Pompidou. East European media, on the other hand, have
stressed the narrow margin by which Mitterand was defeated (50.8%
to 49.2%), and have predicted a continuing important role for the
leftist forces on the French domestic political scene.
DETENTE AND COOPERATION Moscow radio's French service, in a
commentary on 20 May by V. Grigoryev,
praised Giscard as an "energetic promoter" of Pompidou'a "independent"
foreign policy, which Grigoryev said included a policy of "detente,
harmony, and cooperation" toward the USSR. Grigoryev mentioned
twice in the same broadcast that Giscard has been chairman on the
French side of the Soviet-French Grand Commission and that in this
capacity he had visited the USSR and developed good relations with
Soviet leaders. Citing Paris newspapers to the effect that Giscard
"'ias always recognized the irreversible nature" of pie Gaulle's
policy toward t::_- USSR, Grigoryev quoted Gi.scard as saying that
future French policy wiil be sirilarly directed toward "detente
and cooperation" with the USSR, as well as accompanied by expanded
scientific, economic, and cultural relations.
LEFTIST STRENGTH Moscow's restraint toward Mitterrand's electoral
achievement and its pragmatic, positive approach
toward Giscard's victory--at least as reflected in limited, initial
comment--stands in sharp contrast to the highly partisan attitude
that most East European countries have shown toward the French left
alliance. Virtually all East European comment has emphasized at
length that the election results testify to.the "enormous" and
"unprecedented" strength of leftist political forces in France
and presage increasing influence for the left alliance. Typical
was a commentary on 21 May by T. Varkonyi, Paris correspondent for
the Hungarian daily MAGYAR NFM.ZET, which said that the left had
never come so close to governing France and that it would win
victory in the 1978 elections.
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ELECTION POST-MORTEM Moscow and its East European allies have
as yet made little attempt to delve publicly
into the specific factors that led to Mitterrand's narrow defeat.
Their analysis, for the most part, has been confined to suggesting
that the vote was split along class lines, with an "arithmetic
majority" going to Giscard while the majority of workers, youth,
and intelligentsia supported Mitterrand. The most specific commentary
to date from Soviet and East European sources which has sought to
analyze Giscard's victory in terms of specific strengths and weak-
nesses of the candidates and their campaigns was provided by V.
Kostov, Paris correspondent for Sofia radio, in a 20 May commentary
over Sofia's domestic service. Citing the last four days of the
campaign as "decisive"--probably because French polling results
published on 15 May showed both candidates receiving equal percent-
ages--Kostov referred to four major strengths exhibited by Giscard,
coupled with two main weaknesses in Mitterrand's campaign. First,
not only did all "bourgeois" parties support Giscard, but the
"extreme leftwing forces" assisted him as well since "in appealing
to their supporters to vote for Mitterrand, they stated at the same
time that they did not entirely trust him." Second, whereas Gis-
card conducted a "lively" campaign, Mitterrand "for a long time
stood on rather vague political positions trying to win votes
from petit bourgeois circles." Third, Giscard had "solid" fi-
nancial support, although Kostov refrained from repeating Mitterrand's
lament in his concession stateml:nt that "the forces of money" had
barely defeated "the people's movement." Finally, "anticommunism"
was said to play a considerable role in drawing votes to Giscard.
Kostov's last point, although not further explained, is at variance
with most other Soviet and East European comment, which has stressed
to the contrary that one conclusion to be drawn from the election
is that use of the "Red threat" and anticommunist themes are no
longer effective in France. Although the basis for the latter and
more prevalent assessment has been stated as the size of Mitterrand's
vote, the difference in analysis may reflect uncertainty concerning
the future of the leftist coalition, an uneasy alliance since its
formation in 1972 and one whose fate is now in question after its
failures in the 1973 parliamentary elections and on 19 May.
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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
FBIS TRENDS
22 MAY 19 74
USSR BLAMES ISRAELI "PERFIDY" FOR DEATHS IN MA'ALOT INCIDENT
In its reportage and comment on the 15 May Palestinian fedayeen
operation in the Israeli town of Ma'alot, Moscow has contrived
both to blame the Israelis for the tragic outcome of the affair
and to reaffirm its standing condemnation of international terror-
ism in general. Delaying its first report until the 16th, when
th_z Israelis launched retaliatory raids on Palestinian targets
in Lebanon, Moscow was able to offsp:: its reports of the Ma'alot
incident with complementary report., of the Israeli attacks.
Portraying worldwide indignation at Israeli "savagery," Moscow
rejected the "pretext" that the attacks in Lebanon were in
reprisal for the Ma'alot incident.' While Moscow held "Israeli
perfidy" responsible for the loss of lives at Ma'alot, some comment
also expressed disapproval of terrorism in general and specifically,
in one instance, of the Palestinian seizure of children as hostages.
MA'ALOT INCIDENT The 16 May TASS account of the "tragic events"
in Ma'alot, and a report by corresporL.dent
Orekhov in PRAVDA on the 17th, provided some details: Orekhov
said the fedayeen demanded the release of 23 guerrillas in Israeli
prisons in return for the release of 9C schoolchildren held
hostage. He said the Israeli Government "allegedly" agreed to
the demands but that half an 'hour before the Palestinian ultimatum
expired, army detachments--" led" by Dayan--attacked the school,
resulting in the death of the three Palestinians and the killing
or wounding of many of the students.
The TASS and PRAVDA accounts set the theme for subsequent comment
in charging that the "perfidious actions" of the Israeli military
caused the tragedy, and that the inhabitants of Ma'alot themselves
denounced the "treachery" of Tel Aviv and called Dayan a murderer.
TASS commentator Kulik took up the condemnation of Dayau on the
20th, comparing him with Eichma*in and accusing him of killing
Israelis and then blaming others to provide an Israeli pretext for
prolonging occupation of Arab lands.
* From 1967 through 1970 Moscow from time to time issued TASS
statements condemning Israeli "armed provocations" against neighbor-
ing Arab states. The last retaliatory action to draw a formal Soviet
response--the Israeli incursion into Lebanon following the incident
at the Munich Olympics in September 1972--was denounced in a Soviet
Government statement.
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INTERNATIONAL While the Palestinian operation at Ma'alot could
TERRORISM be construed as falling within the category of
terrorist acts which Moscow has approved--internal
as opposed to international acts, such as airplane hijackings--Moscow
has not chosen to stress the distinction. Yermakov's international
review in PRAVDA on the 19th placed equal blame on both Israelis
and Palestinians, declaring that "perfidious attacks" of Israeli
shock detachments on a school and "the seizure of children as
hostages by the Palestinians" had brought condemnation by inter-
national public opinion. And Kolesnichenko's weekly review of
events broadcast to North American listeners on the 20th also
denounced terrorism in such a way as to apply to both parties.
Referring to Israel's "revenge against Palestinian guerrillas,"
it went on to assert that the Soviet Union condemns terrorism,
believing it can solve no political problems.
Moscow abstained from any criticism of the 11 April fedayeen
operation in Qiryat Shemona, but seemed to convey its disapproval
by indirection. Two days after that incident, a Moscow broadcast
in Arabic carried an article by a Jordanian communist deploring
"harmful and adventurous trends" in the policy of the Palestine
Liberation Organization and remarking approvingly that the PLO
planned to give up adventurous actions which greatly harmed its
reputation and upset world public opinion. Comment at the time
stressed a statement made earlier by PLO chairman 'Arafat to the
effect that the feda:,teen had suspended operations from territories
of Arab countries adjacent to Israel and were conducting their
activities "deep in Israel." Although Moscow has said nothing
about this claim in the present instance, Lebanese and Palestinian
spokesmen again indicated that the Ma'alot fedayeen did not come
from Lebanon but were "sons of the occupied territory."
Soviet media failed to report the.involvement of France and Romania
in the Ma'alot affair as intermediaries at the request of the
fedayeen. In reporting foreign reaction, TASS noted that the
French foreign ministry declared that the Ma'alot incident could
not justify attacks on Lebanon. But Moscow ignored AGERPRES'
18 May explanation of Romanian invol-rement and the agency's
authorized statement expressing the disapproval of "the Romanian
people" regarding both individual terrorist actions and Israeli
reprisals.
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22 MAY 1974
USSR USES JALL.UD VISIT TO BOLSTER IMAGE AS ARAB SUPPORTER
Against the background of its deteriorating relations with Cairo
and its efforts to assert a role in the diplomatic action in the
Middle East., Moscow has played up the importance of Libyan Prime
Minister Jallud's 14-20 May official visit to the Soviet Union.
Ntthough not announcer by Moscow until 10 May, the visit had been
rumored for some time, and Libyan Chairman al-Qadhdhaf_i had. c'.is-
closed the data, as well is raising the possibility of a So,;,iet-
Libyan "summit," in an interview with the Beirut AS-SAFIR on
28 April. The Jallud visit follows .'y three months his February
tour of several European countries, including Poland, Czechoslovakia
and Hungary, and has been presented by Libyan media as a continuation
of that earlier round. Moscow Arabic-language comment on the visit
included sharp digs at Egyptian policies, and Cairo newspapers
responded in kind with sarcastic references to a marriage of con-
venience and to "political adolescents" trying to exploit Soviet-
Egyptian differences.
PROGRAM OF VISIT The length of Jallud's stay in the USSR was
not announced in advance, although the Libyan
news agency said on his departure for Moscow that the visit would
last several days. According to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY on the
20th, he extended his visit a few more days, having been scheduled
to leave Moscow for Leningrad on the 17th. The only reported
speec:_as during the visit were made by Kosygin and Jallud at the
welcoming dinner on the 14th; no remarks were reported at the
luncheon which Jallud gave on the 16th. Moscow extended Jallud
the same courtesy it had extended Syrian President al-Asad, a
television interview, broadcast on the 21st, according to TASS.
On his previous visit to the USSR on 23 February to 4 March 1972,
Jallud had gotten the more normal treatment for Arab visitors,
a radio interview broadcast on the Arabic-language service.*
Jallud held a succession of "friendly" official discussions with
Kosygin, as well as separate meetings with Brezhnev and Podgornyy
on the 16th. Tripoli--but not Moscow--media indicated that Jallud
had another meeting with Brezhnev on the 17th and also met with
Defense Minister Grechko for two hours on the 19th. According to
Libyan repor..s the talks were lengthy--with Brezhnev, five and a
half hours, with Podgornyy over two hours, and with Kosygin the
final day over four hours. His talks on his 1972 visit were also
lengthy, according to Libyan reports.
* The 1972 visit is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of. 24 February
1972, pages 37-38, and 8 March 1972, pages 29-32.
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Jallud last met with a Soviet Leader when he was received by
Podgornyy in Paris at the time of the de Gaulle runeral.
According to PRAVDA on 8 April, they "exchanged views on certain
questions of mutual interest." Presumably, Moscow was interested
in sorting ouc the implications of al-Qadhdhafi's just-announced
withdrawal from political and administrative functions to devote
his time to "organizational and ideological" activities.
There was no mention of al-Qadhdhafi in Moscow's coverage of the
Jallud visit. Kosygin in his dinner speech did acknowledge that
Soviet-Libyan differences were "evidently chiefly in the field
of ideology." Moscow media in. the past have taken al-Qadhdhafi
to task for his attacks on communism and his claims of a "true
socialism" based on Islam. The communique papered over these
differences. Thus it said that Jallud explained to his hosts
the economic, social, cultural and other changes in Libya, white
similar passages in the communiques on his East European -,isits
noted that he also described "ideological" changes and Libyan
efforts to preserve the country's "spiritual sanctities."
TRADE AND AID The communique characterized Jallud's official
talks with Kosygin as taking place in a friendly
atmosphere "in a spirit of frankness and mutual understanding,"
the same description applied to his 1972 talks. A Tripoli radio
commentary on 14 May described Jallud's visit as a continuation
of the East Enropean visits. The announced agreements followed
much the same pattern. In Moscow, a trade agreement was signed
and agreement was reached on establishing an intergovernmental
commission on economic and scientific-technical cooperation.
Similarly, Jallud had concluded trade and scientific-technical
cooperation agreements in all three East European capitals and
additionally an agreement on an economic commission in Budapest.
Soviet coverage of the visit contained hints but no firm con-?
firmation that the discussions also included military cooperation,
which would seem to have been indicated by Jallud's meeting with
Grechko. Jallud was reported in a Moscow Arabic-language broad-
cast on the 14th as telling a TASS interviewer that there were
wide prospects for development of Soviet-Libyan relations in
political, economic, military and other fields. And a commentary
broadcast in Arabic on the 13th remarked that the USSR and Libya
were developing ecc!"omic and technical cooperation and "cooperation
in the field of defense."
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Jallud again invited Brezhaav, Podgornyy and Kosygin to visit
Libya; in the 1.972 communique, the invitation was extended on
behalf of the Revolution Command Council, but this time by
Jallud himself. Similar invitations were extended to the East
European leaders by Jaliud in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but
on behalf of al-Qadhdhafi in Poland.
ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE Not surprisingly, in view of Libya's
antipathy to any negotiated solution of
the Arab-Israeli dispute, there was no mention in the communique
of the problem of disengagement. Kosygin, however, broached the
subject in his dinner speech with an attack on "half measures."
The communique condemned Israel, Zionism, and "imperialist forces
supporting them" along the lines of the 1972 communique, which
had also denounced U.S. support for Israel. The current document
routinel;* insisted, reflecting the consistent Soviet line, that a
"radical and all-embracing settlement" in the area is impossible
without Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and
insurance of the Palestinians' legitimate rights.
The communique pledged to continue "every assistance" to the
Palestinian resistance movement. While this pledge is not a
customary feature of Soviet-Arab communiques, TASS' report on
the November 1973 visit of a Palestinian delegation to the USSR
noted Soviet determination to continue assistance and support
to the Palestinians' struggle for their legitimate national
rights. During his East European tour Jallud obtained an express-
ion of support for Palestinian self-determination from Poland,
while Czechoslovakia and Hungary additionally supported the
Palestinians' right to "return to their homeland."
Undertones of criticism of Cairo's domestic "liberalization"
and emerging friendship with the United States appeared in a
routine passage i Arab unity which, in contrast to the 1.972
communique, this time called for unity of action on the basis
of "social progress and democracy." And also unlike the 1972
communique, it called for struggle not only against the usual
targets of imperialism and Zionism but against "reaction" as
well. The USSR expressed determination to continue "every
support" for Arab piLioples "fighting for stronger national
independence and for economic and r3ocial progress" and the
communique stressed the importance of strengthening Arab-Soviet
friendship "in all f ielde&" as an important factor in the anti-
imperialist struggle.
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Comment on the visit broadcast in Moscow's Arabic-language service
and Radio Peace and Progress in. Arabic also seemed aimed at dis-
approved tendencies in Cairo. A Radio Peace and Progress broad-
cast on the 15th, for example, accused Arab reaction of collaborating
with imperialism and Zionism by substituting partial measures for
a comprehensive Middle East settlement. It claimed that these
rea,,tionary groups, whether they "are now in office or not," were
try.Lng to convince the Arab masses that American imperialism had
suddenly changed from an Arab enemy to a friend. A.zother Radio
Peace and Progress broadcast on the 1.8th complained that imperialism
and Arab reaction were trying to upset Arab cooperation with the
socialist countries 1v' "introducing polemics and controversies
which favor national interests." And a Moscow commentary in Arabic
on the 13th seemingly cautioned Cairo on deviating from its "progress-
ive" economic and social measures when it declared that the Soviet
Union assisted the Arabs in consolidating their economic independence
on the basis of establishing supervision over the activity of foreign
capital and introducing social changes."
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- 14 -
SINO - SOVIET R ELATIONS
MOSCOW PRESENTS CASE ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, BORDER TALKS
IZVESTIYA on 16 May published a comprehensive analysis of the state
of Sino-Soviet relations which reiterates the Soviet view that the
next move to improve relations must come from Peking but also argues
that in the interim the best policy is one of restraint, seeking an
improvement in relations as the best means of encouraging healthy
forces in Peking. The article was widely broadcast by Moscow
radio over a four-day period. Authored by Oleg Borisov,* the
article also broke with Moscow's usual reticence on the border
talkr3 in Peking to offer the lengthiest defense of Moscow's
position there since chief Soviet negotiator Leonid Ilichev last
returned from Peking in July 1973.
Borisov accused Peking of "blocking" the talks by its "ultimatum--
style demands" and its refusal to deal with narrower issues and
specific sectors of the 4150-mile common border. He laid the blame
for the "impasse" at the border talks and across the board in
bilateral relations at the door of Peking. In evoking an image of
Soviet reasonableness on bilateral issues and arguing that the next
move is up to Peking, Borisov reiterated a Soviet posture
spelled out late last year in official policy statements in the
wake of the July 1973 Crimea summit of bloc leaders and the 10th
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in August. The reason for
the appearance of the Borisov article at this time is unclear.
It makes only a cryptic reference to the March incident involving
the Chinese capture and detention of a Soviet helicopter and crew,
as well as to the expulsion of Soviet diplomats in January, and
thus seems related to longer-term difficulties in bilateral relations.
Borisov reiterated the line taken by both Brezhnev and Kosygin last
fall in claiming that Moscow had acted responsibly, doing all it
could to move relations off dead center, and that the next move was
up to Peking. As part of the public rationale at that time for the
* Borisov has written since at least the late 1960's on Sino-Soviet
relations and international communist relations. Though his articles
have as a rule not appeared to be particularly significant, they
ir,Mclude a contribution to KOMMUNIST in the wake of the first 1969
border clash and one to PRAVDA on the second day of President Nixon's
visit to the PRC in February 1972. See the TRENDS of 24 February
1972, page 13, for an analysis of the PRAVDA article.
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Soviet position, Moscow began discussing more openly the various
proposals it had made to Peking in and outside: the border talks.
Borisov revealed that in J;:Pii,c last year Moscow had again proposed
a Sino-Soviet summit as well as the non-aggression pact disclosed
by :rezhnev last September in Tashkent.
Criticizing Peking for setting forth ultimatums and "absurd,
unacceptable conditions" at the border talks, Borisov made a rare
reference to the Soviet approach at the negotiations, noting that
10the Maoists are in no way interested in solving questions connected
with defining more precisely individual sectors of the Soviet-
Chinese border?" He also accused Peking of "flouting" an agreement
that the substance of the talks should remain confidential.
THE ANTI-CONFUCRUS CAMPAIGN Touching briefly upon the internal
situation in China, Borisov asserted
that "many people in the Peking leadership do not believe the
farfetched fabrication of the 'Soviet threat"' and disagree with
the prevailing "anti-Soviet course," and he noted that former
Politburo member and Defense Minister Lin Piao had "probably" been
among them. That assessment appeared to assign to the anti-Confucius
campaign in China more immediate relevance for Sino-Soviet relations
than have other commentaries which have emphasized leadership
factionalism but have typically played down its significance for
policy toward the Soviet Union. Recent Soviet analysis, ,
example, has not sought to dit?erentiate among the current Chinese
leadership. And comwactaries in connection with Vice Premier
Teng Hsiao-ping's recent trip to New York for the U1IGA special
session suggested that Moscow expected no change as a result of his
political ascendance, labeling him a "veteran" anti-Soviet figure.
Moderate Soviet spokesmen such as Aleksandr Bovin, in a Sunday
supplement to IZVESTIYA in April, have from time to time expressed
optimism that eventually a change in leaders in Peking would bring
a change in policy as well. But this has ncvwally been seen only
as a long-term development. The more typical Soviet assessment of
the short-term effects of PRC infighting was presented in the 19 May
international affairs roundtable on Moscow domestic radio. In an
unusual move, the roundtable invited Vladimir Krivtsov, deputy
director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Far East Institute, to
answer listener's letters on the internal situation in China.
Krivtsov discounted the impact of the Confucius campaign on basic
policy, claiming that whatever the "vacillations" in China's foreign
policy course resulting from the internal political struggle, "it
will remain a great power chauvinist course."
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Borisov's depiction of a leadership seriously divided over
policy toward the Soviet Union could be seen as a counsel of
restraint on is part. That attitude seemed visible elsewhere
as well, in his acknowledgment of the "socialist gains" in China,
and his closing assertion that "any improvement in Soviet-Chinese
relations undermines the positions within the country of Mao
Tse-tung and his group."
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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IND I AIN NUCLEAR TEST
FBIS TRENDS
22 MAY 1974
`PEACEFUL INTENTIONS" NOTED BY MOSCOW, IGNORED BY PEKING
Moscow promptly reported on 18 May the Indian Atomic Energy
Commission's announcement of Tndia's first successful explosion
of a nuclear device. The TASS report noted India's efforts to
advance the technology of peaceful explosions and cited the
Commission's assertion that India has no intention of producing
nuclear weapons. A second report on the 19th cited the Indian
defense minister's statement that India would never use its
nuclear capability for military purposes. Moscow has otherwise
been silent on the test, failing thus far to comment or report
other world reaction. In urging wider adherence by near-nuclear
states to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the past,
Moscow has gone on public record to the effect that there is
no distinction between nuclear weapons and devices intended
for peaceful purposes and hence a state carrying out peaceful
nuclear explosions must be viewed as possessing nuclear weapouc4.
Moscow's allies in East Europe have also maL:tained a low
profile on the Indian test, reporting factually and including
India's protestations of no military intent. Yugoslavia has
predictably reported more extensively on the details of the
test and world reaction, but available commentary has sh..an
reticence in criticizing India, a fellow stalwart of the
nonalined movement.
Peking responded initially with. a straightforward 19 May NCNA
report citing the Indian press regarding the size, location and
underground nature of the nuclear explosion experiment. It made
no reference to India's intentions. NCNA the following day
reported Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto's press conference
remarks on the 19th that Pakistan would not succumb to nuclear
blackmail by India nor compromise positions for Kashmir-i self-
determination and against Indian domination on the subcont:" ent.
While noting the prime minister's call for greater. Pakistani
unity at this time, NCNA ignored Bhutto's announcement that he
is sending his foreign minister to China and other countries to
discuss the implications of the Indian test.
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An Albanian radio commentary on the 19th criticized the blast
and the "aggressive designs of the reactionary Indian clique,"
going on to assert that the test is "also the result of the
extensive military assistance" provided by Moscow.
North Korea has not been heard to mention the test, while a
brief report on Hanoi radio on 21 May r^ported the test of a
"nuclear bomb" without including India's claims that it did
not intend to produce military devices.
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22 MAY 1974
INDOCHINA
COMMUNIST ATTACKS TN SOUTH VIETNAM PORTRAYED AS It PUNISHMENT'
A flurry of Vietnan.cae communist comment promptly hailed the
16 May communist "destruction" of the ARVN base at Dak ?ek,
Kontum Province, as justified "punishment" for Saigon's "war
acts." Other communist attacks in recent days have drawn less
attention from communist media, but news reports on the
15 May attacks in Binh Duong Province and on the 20 May
explosion at the Nha Be fuel depot also portrayed these actions
as retaliatory in nature.
A 17 May Liberation Radio commentary attempted to justify the
attack on Dak Pek by accusing Saigon of launching ground,
artillery, and air attacks from the base against PRG territory.
Charging that Sa.i;on wants to erase the "liberated area," the
commentary prais?:d "fierce counterblows" in the central highlands
this month, especially the Dak Pek attack, and added: "This is
a necessary and appropriate measure aimed at checking the Thieu
clique's intensification of the war." Such counterattacks were
also endorsed by Hanoi in articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN on 18 May. NHAN DAN dwelt upon U.S. responsibility in the
current situation, charging that GVN attacks are "directed and
abetted" by Washington.
Vietnamese communist comment does not recall the 15 October 1973
PLAF command order which set forth the policy of counterattacks
and which has been cited in connection with communist offensive
actions in the past.* However, a Liberation Radio commentary,
broadcast on the 18th and 19th, recalled that a 4 July 1973 order
from the regional Kontum PLAF command had advocated counterblows
against GVN military operations and attacks on the bases from
which they originated.
Communist comment on the Dak Pek attack made no effort to obscure
the fact that the base had long been controlled by the GVN.
Thus, for example, the 17 May Liberation Radio commentary noted
that "before and after the advent of the agreement, the Dak Pek
base has served as a blocking position situated deep in the
PRG-controlled area."
* For a discussion of the 15 October PLAF order, see the TRENDS
of 27 March 1974, pages 11-14.
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In recent months, the communists have come closer to acknowledging
that they have attempted to expand their areas of control since
the peace agreement was signed in January 1973. Notably, in this
connection, the latest six-pcint PRG proposal for a political
settlement, issued on 22 March, did not repeat the call in similar
proposals in April and June 1973 for a return of forces to
positions occupied when the agreement was signed.* Subsequently,
a 26 March Liberation Radio commentary on fighting in Kontum
suggested that th::'ommunists actually controlled more territory
in that province than they did in January 1973, and a 29 March
NHAN DA.N editora.al and other comment from Hanoi have claimed that
"most areas" le3t to the ARVN since the peace agreement had been
retaken and that: "In many areas the strength and position of the
revolution are better than prior to 28 January 1973."
NORTH VIETNAMESE EDITORIALS MARK HO CHI MINHIS BIRTHDAY
North Vietnam marked Ho Chi Minh's 19 May birthday, as it did last
year, with editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. While
NHAN DAN recalled that Ho's testament had urged that the party and
government draft effective economic and cultural plans and care for
the people's livelihood, the army paper stressed the need to
struggle for "final victory."
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on Ho's birthday could be read as an
argument for a new efforts to achieve advances in the South through
military means. It maintained that the Vietnamese revclution "is a
process of struggle to achieve one success after another" and that
after a victory it is necessary to "consolidate our battleground"
and strengthen forces to advance to "even greater victories." Noting
that "as soon as one stage of the revolution ends, a new stage will
start," the army paper added: "The current situation as regards the
revolution in our country, as well as in the world, has given us new
advantages to continue to develop our offensive strategy and advance
to score new victories." T';ze editorial in another passage called
for preventing and overcoming negativeness, a lackadaisical attitude,
and "pacificism"-?-a rarely mentioned error. Balancing its stress
on the need to pursue victory, the editorial also noted, after citing
the role of "collective interests," that "only by devoting all their
strength and ability to building socialism can our cadres and party
members progress toward a bright future."
The six-point PRG proposal is discussed in the TRENDS Of 27 March
1;174, pages 11-14.
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HANOI ATTACKS 'i1-IAI POLICIES, SETS TERMS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS
Abandoning the attitude of restraint which marked its propaganda
on Thailand followin?? the installation of the civilian government
in Bangkok last October, Hanoi. in recent weeks has directed
increased criticism against Bangkok policies related to sensitive
issues in DRV-Thai relations. In particular, a 12 May NHAN DAN
article, attributed to "Observer," charged that Bangkok's actions
do not match its professions of goodwill toward the DRV and took
the unusual step of listing Hanoi's conditions for improved
relations. The Observer article was followed on the 18th by
two DRV Foreign Ministry spokesmen's statements--one criticizing
as deceptive the recent announcement of zdditional U.S. military
withdrawals from Thailand and the other charging Bangkok with
terrorizing Vietnamese residents in Thailand.
The 12 May Observer article castigated the Thai Government for
asserting that its policy of goodwill toward Hanoi has not been
reciprocated and listed a long bill of historical Vietnamese
grievances against Thailand. The article acknowledged that the
Sanya regime* had issued positive statements regarding policy
toward Hanoi and the rest of Southeast Asia, but said that it had
failed to follow through with its announced intentions. Observer
focused particularly on continued U.S. military presence in
Thailand, Thai officials' allegations regarding North Vietnamese
intentions against Thai national security, and Bangkok's policies
toward Vietnamese nationals living in Thailand.
In specifying conditions for establishing "friendly relations"
with Thailand, the article notably avoided a direct call for the
total withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country. It more
generally asserted that Bangi' k must "stop its collusion" with
Washington agairi3t the Vietnamese, cease its alleged slanders
against Hanoi's intentions toward Thailand, and release Vietnamese
residents in Thailand who have been "illegally detained."
However, a demand for U.S. withdrawal from Thailand was voiced
in the 18 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the
question which maintained that the United States must "immediately
and completely withdraw" its military forces and installatior,
and that the Thai Government "must not put the Thai territory at
the United States' disposal."
* The abrupt resignation of the Sanya cabinet on 21 May was noted
on the same day in a Hanoi radio broadcast which cited Western press
comment that there had been growing pressure in Thailand for a
cabinet reshuffle and the removal of several ministers.
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BACKGROUND Hanoi's recent outburst caps the second major
cycle in DRV propaganda treatment of Thpiland
ever the past year and a half. In the immediate wake of the
January 1973 Paris agreeme>t, Hanoi had reduced its previously
harsh invective against thi conduct of the Thanom-Praphat
regime and for three months avoided sharp criticism of Bangkok's
association with U.S. military efforts in Indochina.* Thailand's
persisting association with Washington, especially in connection
c.Tith U.S. bombing raids in Cambodia last spring and summer,
prompted a revival of harsh anti-Thanom denunciations by late
spring 1973.
Following the overthrow of Thanom and installation of the Sanya
regime in October 1973, Hanoi once again reverted to a low
posture. A 10 December QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary had labeled
the new government as a case of "new wine in old bottles," but
harsh invective was not revived until last month when a 16 April
NHAN DAN commentary denounced the "vile, slanderous" remarks
made earlier by Sanya regarding North Vietnamese military intentions
toward Laos and Thailand.
PEKING SHOWS MEASURED CONCERN OVER VIETNAM DEVELON.w..NTS
At a time of increased Vietnamese fighting and the suspension of
talks between Saigov..nd the PRG, Peking has departed from its
low posture on Vietnamese affairs of recent months and endorsed
PRG -nd DR.V foreign ministry protests--cf 15 and 17 May--in a
21 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. Since last December
Peking had sidestepped author~:`atide endorsement for its
Vietnamese allies' statements at the. foreign ministry level or
below. The Chinese this year have only once responded
authoritatively to Vietnamesa statements--a 26 March PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article seconded PRG and DRV Government
statements announcing the communists' revised six-point plan.
The last authoritative Peking endorsement of Vietnamese protests
at the foreign ministry level cane in an 8 December 1.973 PLOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator arL!.cle just prior to the Kissinger:-Le Duc Tho
talks that month.
The present article as usual focused the brunt of invective
,Against Saigon violations, but also castigated the United States
for leaving behind disguised military personnel, replenishing
* The change is discussed in the TRENDS of 25 July 1973, pages 7-8.
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22 MAY 1974
military and economic aid to Saigon, and threatening the
Vietnamese. This represented harsher treatment than the
26 March 1974 article, but was somewhat milder than the
8 December 1973 article which had accused Washington of "brazen
provocations" against the Vietnamese. In contrast to the
article last December, there was this time no direct Chine3e
demand that Washington halt its violations and scrupulously
implemer t the WYaris accord. NCNA's r;:olay of the PRG and DRV
statements predictably dropped references to the Nixon
Administration and Nixon Doctrine and the accusation that
Washington is the "mastermind" behind Saigon's "sabotage" of
the Paris accord.
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PRC FOREIGN POLICY
FBIS TRENDS
22 MAY 1974
PRC IGNORES U,SP ASIAN ROLE ON ANNIVERSARY OF MAO STATEMENT
Peking's recent sanguine posture regarding the U.S. presence in
Asia is strikingly apparent in comment marking the fourth
anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's 20 May 1970 anti-U.S. united front
statement, issued in response to the U.S. moves against 'Vietnamese
communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. Thus, a PEOPLE'S DAILY
article on the anniversary made no direct mention of a U.S. role
in Indochina or elsehwere in Asia. Chinese speeches during the
early April visit in Peking of a Cambodian Front delegation led
by insurgent armed forces chief Khieu Samphan* recalled the
1970 Mao statement to underline Chinese unity with the Cambodian
and other revolutionary struggles; however, Peking was careful to
avoid stressing the anti-U.S. features of the Mao statement.
The total avoidance by the PEOPLE'S DAILY article of any mention
of the U.S. role is the more notable since it appeared on the
very day that Khieu Samphan returned to Peking from a lengthy tour
abroad.
While excerpts from the 20 May statement are freque,ltly quoted in
PRC media, especially the remark that "revolution is the main
trend in the world today," with the movement toward improved
Sino-U.S. relations the anniversary has not recr.:.ved. high-level
attention. For the past three years the date has ':,aen i.ti:.int:'
only by PEOPLE'S DAILY articles attributed to a woiker. The
current article reiterated the foreign policy thesis articulated
in Chou En-lai's report to the CCP Congress last August that
-.-irld disorder stemming from U.S.-Soviet rivalry and tir.ird world
%.?position to the superpowers is the salient feature o the
present age and is advantageous to China and oppressed peoples
throughout the world. While acknc:wiedging that Washington and
Moscow may reach agreement on some detente-related issues, it
reaffirmed that their strategic rivalry is "absolute and
irreconcilable," demonstrating that Peking continues to see ample
opportunity for advantageous Chinese maneuvering in the triangular
relationship. The article also underscored Peking's continuing
differentiated view of the superpowers, singling out Moscow's
"inordinate ambition" for special criticism while offering a
routine critique of the United States. It reaffirmed Peking's
stance that while China is vigilant against war caused by the
superpowers, it is particularly on guard against any "surprise
attack" launched by the USSR.
* The speeches are discussed in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974,
pages 11-15.
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22 MAY 1974
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUSAI( REGIME SEEKS ACCQ4VO ATION WITH POLITICAL OUTCASTS
The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) appears to be seeking
an accommodation with scientists and technically trained personnel
alienated by the 1968 events as well as those expelled from the
party. Although the terms of the accommodation remain unclear,
a conciliatory offer was issued at the 14-15 May Central Committee
plenum which considered problems of scientific-technological
development in the economy. The offer appearing in the official
resolution of the plenum represented a setback for hardline
elements favoring removal of "revisionists" from scientific and
other intellectual work.
The CPCZ plenum resolution, published in the 17 May RUDE PR.AVO,
stressed the. "irreplaceable role" of the scientific intelligentsia
in society and declared that the party "highly appreciates" its
past contributions. The resolution thus implicitly acknowledged
that the economy cannot function without highly skilled personnel.
As an inducement for improved social collaboration the resolution
went on to state that in the future, practical accomplishments
rather than past political views will be the test by which
intellectuals are to be judged: "Thin also goes," the resolution
stated, "for those with wham the party parted company in the past
but who now realize their m:stakes and through their positive
efforts demonstrate their attitude to our Abcxi`t~-` gd hel to
develop it."
The conciliatory approach embodied in the plenum resolution was
also evident in the CPCZ Presidium report delivered by Presidium
member Josef Kempny. Kempny noted that the party will seek to
increase the participation "of all honest scientific and techno-
logical workers" in the economy and that ?iis requires "an
atmosphere supporting scientific inquiry. . . ." However, he
warned, as did the plenum resolution, that "all scientific work
should be systematically based on the ideological fcundation of
Marxism-Laninism. "
Hardline concerns about the dangers of adopting a more tolerant
attitude toward the scientific intelligentsia were for the most
part ::~nspicuously muted at the plenum. Two traditionally
hardline Presidium members who might have been expected to raise
such fears, ideological commission chairman Vasil Bilak and trade
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22 MAY 1974
uniou leader Karel Hoffmann. both of ':hom - chaired Ihssiono of
the Presidium, reportedly did not epe:ak. Another, Prague
party chief Antonin Kapek, restricted his remarks to technical
matters.
The only fully hardline speech was delivered by Jr:n Fojtik, a
Central Committee ecretary and Ideological commie +sion member,
who attacked the tolerant approach to the scientific intelli-
gentsia by which "parsons who have no future, for either political
or technical reasons. . . , are allowed to keep their position."
Recalling the "extremely benevolent attitude" that led to the
Prague Spring, Fojtik warned that revisionists "will undoubtedly
do everything possible to make a comeback and start a new onsloughtt
as soon as the first opportunity arises."
The paucity of comment from hardliners contrasts sharply with the
plenum discussions on ideological tasks of October 1972. At that
time Bilak delivered the Presidium report and warned that "it
would be an unforgivable mistake if we were to ouccumb to self-
satisfaction, if we were to let up on our work. . . ." The
following month at a Slovak party plenum Bilak revealed that
within the party hierarchy there were some lice himself who
favored a "tough course" and others--an allusion to moderates
led by-General Secretary Rusak--who took a "blue sky" approach,
being satisfied with a more conciliatory attitude toward the
scientific intelligentsia and other social groups. The next
step in the process of accommodation will probably have to
await the outcome of the struggle for the succession activated
by the imminent death of President Svoboda.
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FBIS ".ENDS
22 MAY 1974
CHOU EN-LAI STATUS: Premier Chou's public appearances during the
17-21 May visit to Peking by Archbishop Makarios followed the
pattern set during Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto's visit earlier
this month. Chou was aboent from airport ceremonies, banquets
and some discussions with Makarios, but did greet him at the
guesthouse, participate in the first round of bilateral talks,
and attend Makarios' audience with Mao on the 18th. Vice Premier
Teng Hsiao-ping acted as host during most of the talks and
ceremonies and was again careful to note, in his 18 May banquet
speech, that he had been "entrusted" by Chou to host the
gathering. Official photographs of Mao's meetings with Bhutto
and Makarios showed Teng sitting in Chou's traditional seat
to Mao's right. It is not clear whether the seating change
symbolizes an increase in real status for Teng personally, or
merely indicates that he was acting as chief host. During
the visit of Senegal President Senghor, Chou, and Vice Premier
Li Hsien-nien were both present and Chou retained his traditional
seat. This meeting was prior to Chou's apparent indisposition,
however, which occurred two days later, after which Li sirbstituted
for Chou at functions for Senghor and then accompanied Senghor
on a tour around China. Li is also maintaining a full schedule
as a Chou substitute, and NCNA's 18 May listing of those who
sent wreaths to the funeral of an NPC member showed Li still
in his usual rank order just ahead of Teng.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 MAY 1974
PRC ON DISARMAMENT: Peking has never acknowledged the Soviet call,
on 16 April, for the participation of "all nuclear powers" in the
25-state disarmament negotiations in Geneva. However, the PRC
position was made clear in a 16 May PEOPLE'S DAILY article by
Hsj.ing Ming which ridiculed "so--called disarmament meetings,"
especially the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)
in Geneva. In reporting the CCD session of 16 April, NCNA had
ignored Soviet representative Roshchin's call for "enlisting in
the negotiations on disarmament all militarily powerful countries,
including all nuclear powers, and first and foremost, the Chinese
People's Republic whose negative stand provides one of the major
obstacles to the implementation of disarmament programs." The
PEOPLE'S DAILY vow characterizes the talks as "forlorn" and "on
the verge of death," adding that they serve little purpose other
than to allow Moscow to play its "title role" as the "world's
top-ranking trumpeter" of fraudulent disarmament. The article also
typically differentiated between the two superpowers. It not
only castigated Moscow's "hypocrisy" in pleading detente while
expanding arms but went so far as to cite Defense Secretary
Schlesinger to bolster its charge: It quoted the Secretary as
saying that Washington's arms buildup is needed because Moscow
"sees no inconsistency between detente and increasing military
capabilities."
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FBIS TRENDS
22 MAY 1974
- i. -
APPEND iX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 13 - 19 MAY 1974
Moscow (2996 items)
Supreme Soviet Elections (7%)
China (8%)
GDR Premier Sindermann (--)
in USSR
Libyan Premier Jallud (--)
in USSR
Chile (1%)
[Upcoming Trial of (--)
"Patriots"
Portuguese Coup Aftermath (1%)
Arab-Israeli Issue (9%)
FRG Elections (--)
Soviet Leaders' Greetings (--)
on Yugczl .v Leaders'
Reelection
Peking (933 items)
10% Pakistan Prime Minister (5%) 16%
6% Bhutto in PRC
5% [Joint Communique (--) 4%]
Cypriot President (--) 8%*
4% Makarios in PRC
Criticism of Lin Piao (4%) 5%
37. and Confucius
2%] Indochina (10%) 5%
PRC-Japan Air Agreement (--) 4%
3% Senegal President (12%) 3%
3% Senghor in PRC and
3% DPRK
3% USSR
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary %.utput of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with
Makarios.
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