TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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In Communist Propaganda
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: '
New Ally for Leader of Soviet Revisionist Historians
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1 MAY 1974
C0dTENTS
DRV Defense Minister Giap Reappears at May Day Celebration. . . .
'DRV Shifts More Government Positions, Promotes Generals .
VIETNAM
ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
Moscow Reticent on Kissinger Trip, Talks With Gromyko
Moscow Hails Portuguese Coup, Cautious About New Government. . . 7
Moscow Disparages Results of EC Foreign Ministers Meeting . . . 8
CONNUNIST RELATIONS
IZVESTIYA Commentator Takes Stock of Yugoslav Politics. . . . 10
USSR
Leaders Praised Selectively in Supreme Soviet Nominations . . . . . . 12
Khrushchev Role in Virgin Lands Cultivation Belittled . . . . . . 15
Tito Visit to Hungary; PRC on Indochinese Summit Anniversary;
PRC May Day . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: New Ally for Leader of Soviet Revisionist
Historians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 1
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics .
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VIETNAM
FBIS TRENDS
1 MAY 1974
DRV DEFENSE MINISTER GIAP REAPPEARS AT MAY DAY CELEBRATION
The conspicuous reappearance of Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap
at Hanoi's May Day ceremonies--a week before the 20th anniversary
of his triumph at Dien Bien Phu--was the highlight of North
Vietnam's otherwise law-key celebration of the holiday. In
contrast with last year's May Day festivities, which featurca an
unprecedented military parade and a rally attended by nearly
100,000 people, DRV media indicated that this year's meeting was
held indoors at the Ba Dinh Conference Hall and did not mention-
a parade. Opening and closing remarks were given by Premier
Pham Van Dong and the main speech by Central Committee member
Hoang Quoc Viet--a division of responsibility that was customary
prior to the 1973 celebration, when Pham Van Dong delivered the
main address and broke a 10-year precedent whereby the main May
Day speaker had been a leader who was not a Politburo member.
During Giap's unexplained absence over the past seven months
Hanoi has continued Lo publicize official messages attributed to
him, and his undiminished offie-ia'l status was confirmed in Hanoi's
report on the May Day meeting which listed him--with his party,
government, and military positions--in his customary position after
Politburo members Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong. Although
Giap last year delivered an unprecedented Order of the Day address
at the May Day rally, it was not surprising that this year, in view
of the reduced scale of the anniversary meeting, he took no active
part in the proceedings. Giap was last reported in Hanoi during a
brief period from 12 September to 6 October 1973, when he appeared
in public on several occasions. Prior to that time he had been
absent from public view since July 1973'.*
Pham Van Dong's brief, routine remarks at the ceremony--broadcast
in full by Hanoi radio--characterized the DRV's situation as
"basically very favorable" following its "great victory" and the
signing of the Paris agreement. According to Dong, the struggle
to implement the Paris agreement against U.S. and Saigon "violations"
has brought "success in the political, military, and diplomatic
spheres." He repeated the cft-made claim that the "balance of
forces is continually developing in favor of the NFLSV and PRG."
* For earlier discussions of Giap's absence, see the TRENDS of
28 December 1973, pages 14-15, and 6 September 1973, pages 11-12.
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Without going into detail, the Premier observed that the North
is now engaged in developing its economy, developing its culture,
and stablizing its people's livelihood. While giving thanks in
general to the "fratelnal socialist countries, countries of the
third world, and other nations" for their support and assistance,
Dong neglected to s{ngle out the Soviet Union and China in this
context as he had at last year's May Day rally when, in his
main address, he devoted greater attention to foreign assistance.
Hanoi radio's excerpts from Hoang Quoc Viet's speech indicated
that he rehashed the key points in the resolution of the 22d
plenum of VWP Central Committee dealing with reconstruction in
the North and routinely discussed the "present situation in the
South." Viet denounced U.S. aerial reconnaissance over the DRV
and accused the United States of "shirking its responsibility"
for contributing to healing the wounds of war in North Vietnam.
DRV SHIFTS MORE GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, PROMOTES GENERALS
New shifts in the North Vietnamese Government and the leading ranks
of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA), coming in the wake of changes
in the government rind in the month, confirm that Hanoi is engaged in a continuing, far,-reaching
transformation of its postwar leadership.* The latest changes
were revealed in a 26 April announcement of appointments and
dismissals by the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee and in
a 27 April report on a military cadres conference which revealed
the first major promotions in the VPA for more than a decade.
MILITARY PROMOTIONS Hanoi radio's 27 April report on a
"recently" held "military cadres conference"
for the first time identified VPA Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung with
the top military rank of senior general and listed the head of the
VPA General Political Department, Song Hao, in the new rank of
colonel general. DRV President Ton Duc Thang, who also attended
the meeting along with First Secretary Le Duan and Politburo member
Le Duc Tho, indicated in remarks to the gathering that other,
* Governmental appointments and dismissals announced in a National
Assembly Standing Committee communique of 2 April were discussed
in a supplementary article in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages
S1-S3.. The election of a new Hanoi municipal party secretary was
discussed in the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 14-16.
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unspecified military promotions had also been conferred: "Our
state has just decided to promote and bestow the general-level
military rank on a number of comrades."
Van Tien Dung's promotion--confirmed in a report on his appearance
at the May Day imcctis.g in Hanoi--makes him the only North
Vietnamese full general other than Giap.* In recent months Dung
has been acting as a stand-in for Giap as top defense ministry
representative at public functions during the latter's prolonged
absence. The only' known colonel general besides Song Hao is
Chu Van Tan.
Both Dung and Song Hao were last previously promoted in September
1959, and Hanoi is not known to have made any change in the ranks
of its generals since 1961. Whereas the current promotions were
revealed by Hanoi only in passing, in 1959 a list of major
promotions was announced at special ceremonies held on the
occasion of DRV National Day. According to the 1959 report on
the ceremony, the' promotions were given in compliance with a
decree issued by the ORV president on the basis of the "law on
the service system for VPA officers" adopted by an April 1958
DRV National Assembly session.
GOVERNMENT CHANGES The most prominent change announced by
the National Assembly Standing Committee
was the removal of Vice Premier Hoang Anh as chairman of the
Central Agricultural Commission. The announcement did not
indicate ?.ahether he would be assuming new duties; however, he
has retlined his post as vice premier and was id-ntifi.ed as
recently as 16 April in his position as a member o:E tie Vietnam
Workers Party (VWP) Secretariat. No new Agricultural Commission
chairman has been announced. One of the two standing vice chairmen
of the commission had already been removed earlier this month in
a list of government shifts, released on 2 April, which announced
the appointment of commission vice chairman: Nguyen Van Loc to
head the State Inspection Commission. The ranking head of the
Agricultural Commission now apparently is *.ts other standlag vice
chairman, Nghiem XuanYem, who has ministerial rank.
* The four VPA general ranks are: major general (thieeus tuwowngs),
lieutenant general (trung tuwowngs), colonel general (thuwowngj
tuwowngs), and senior general (daij tuwowngs)--one, two, three, and
four stars, respectively. Senior general rank had previously been
granted in September 1959 to Nguyen Chi Thanh, a VWP Politburo
member who died in July 1967.
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The Standing Committee also announced the removal of Nguyen
Huu Khieu as minister vE labor and Nguyen Huu Mai as minister
of electricity and coal. Both were said to be assuming other,
unspecified duties. Only the labor ministry position was filled,
with alternate member of the VWP Central Committee Nguyen Tho
Chan taking on the post of minister. Chan headed a department in
the labor ministry in the 1950's. In the early 1960's he was a
deputy secretary of the Hanoi party committee; he was identified
as first secretary of Quang Ninh Province in 1962 and held that
post until 1967, when he was appointed ambassador to the Soviet
Union. After giving up the diplomatic post in December 1971,
Chan was identified in June 1972 as chairman of the State
Reunification Commission--an appointment which is not known to
have been formally announced.* In July 1972 he was identified as
deputy chief of the VWP Reunification Department; he is not known
to have appeared in public after that until showing up at Hanoi's
May Day celebration this year.
This latest series of changes in the government leadership has not
ended Hanoi's reshuffle, since several positions now remain open.
There are no announced chairmen for either the agricultural or
price Curuiu.1.sc,iuu;,, aild LiiL: IuliLioLriC::J
and coal are now both without chiefs.
* The TRENDS of 10 April 1974, on page S 3, incorrectly identified
Nguyen Van Vinh as having been chairman of the National Reunification
Commission prior to the appointment of Dang Thito that position
on 2 April this year. Vinh had been chairman of the commission
since 1960. He is not known to have appeared in public for the past
six years, and it is not known when Nguyen Tho Chan may have
supplanted him.
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1 MAY 1974
ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
MOSCOW RETICENT ON KISSINGER TRIP. TALKS WITH GROMYKO
Moscow has provided only limited reportage on the Geneva talks
between Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko on 27 and 28 April. Moscow's Arabic-language service on
the 29th and.30th noted that these talks concerned both U.S.-
Soviet relations, including the planned visit, to Moscow by
President Nixon, and the Middle East situation, and that both
sides called for resumption "in the near future" of Geneva
Conference meetings to establish peace in the Middle East.
Initial Moscow comment on the Geneva talks was confined to a
single commentary in Arabic for Middle Eastern audiences on
29 April. Apparently concerned to allay any suspicions that
the talks might imply a weakening of Soviet support for Arab
interests, Moscow has assured its audiences that the Soviet
position had been coordinated with "Arab friends" and that the
Soviet-U.S. contacts were taking place in accordance with existing
agreements and were aimed at assisting "in solving the Middle
East crisis on the basis of the well-known Security Council
resolution."
Moscow has also refrained from explaining the purpose of
Kissinger's current Middle East trip, although it noted that
the United States and the USSR had agreed to keep in "close
touch" in their efforts to arrange a peaceful settlement in
the Middle East. As it has for previous Middle East visits
by Secretary Kissinger, Moscow noted only briefly and factually
his arrival in Algiers on the first leg of his tour, adding that
he would also visit Egypt, Syria, Israel and other countries.
In commentaries disseminated on the eve of the Kissinger-Groymko
talks, Moscow reiterated strong support for the Syrian position
on disengagement and previous Soviet warnings that the United
States was trying to impose a solution unacceptable to the Arabs.
PRAVDA commentator Pavel Demchenko wrote on the 27th that the
Syrian Government had declared "quite justifiably" that it would
not agree to any troop disengagement unless it includes withdrawal
of Israeli troops from the territory seized in 1973 and 1967. In
the Moscow radio observers roundtable on the 28th, PRAVDA foreign
news editor KolesnichenKo asserted that disengagement should
represent only "a first preliminary step toward a general settle-
ment." Evincing some displeasure at recent U.S. diplomatic
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successes in the Middle East, Kolesnichenko contended that
continued fighting on tip Israeli-Syrian front contradicted
Western claims that the United States had "to all intents and
purposes managed to settle the Middle East conflict."
Commentaries broadcast in Arabic to the Middle East on the
26th and 27th, using the polemical style typical of such
broadcasts, characterized U.S. policy as being aimed at avoiding
a comprehensive Middle East settlement, at pitting the Arabs
against one another, and at estranging the Arabs from the
Soviet Union.
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EUROPE
MOSCOW HAILS PORTUGUESE COUP, CAUTIOUS ABOUT NEW GOVERNMENT
Moscow showed unusual alacrity in welcoming the 25 April military
coup in Portugal, promptly broadcasting within hours of the event
reports which reflected a favorable assessment of the course of
eventr and of their likely outcome. Just a few hours after the
coup began in the morning hours of the 25th, Moscow started
publicizing factual reports on the developments of that day and
continued this reportage over the weekend. On the 26th PRAVDA
carried a signed commentary which correctly predicted the outcome
u.f the coup. Apparently written while the result was still
unclear, the commentary observed that the transformation of the
army from a "prop" of the regime into its "open enemy" meant
that the Caetano government was "doomed."
Although Moscow's reporting of developments surrounding the coup
has continued to be favorable, it has evinced concern over certain
aspects of the new Spinola government's program. Moscow has been
critical, for example, of the new government's announced intention
to maintain some sort of relationship with the country's overseas
territories. And ` May PRAVDA article by TASS political
commentator A. Krasikov voiced concern over the vestiges of "fascist
organs" of power and cited warnings by the Portuguese Communist
Party (PCP) that the danger of a countercoup had not yet been fully
eliminated. The subject of diplomatic relations between Moscow
and-Lisbon has not yet been broached in Soviet comment, although a
TASS item on 30 April noted favorably that the Portuguese Socialise
Party had called for the establishment of relations with "all"
countries.
PCP REACTION Portugal's clandestine ;ommunist party was
similarly quick and positive in reacting to the
coup. In a broadcast carried by its clandestine Radio Free
Portugal on the 25th., the party greeted the action of the armed
forces movement as a "decisive step" toward ending the "fascist"
regime and proclaimed the beginning of a "new political era" in
Portugal. Echoing similar themes, the PCP Secretariat's 26 April
statement, carried textually on the 26th by Radio Free Portugal
and Moscow radio, specifically asserted that legal~zation of the
PCP would be the "real test" of the establishment of democratic
rights in Portugal.. In a rapid succession of events, the party
announced its reemergence into the Portuguese political arena.
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On the 29th representatives of the PCF participated in a national
meeting of the Portugu%se Democratic Movement (MDP). On the
following day the party's secretary general, Alvaro Cunhal, was
accorded an enthusiastic welcome on his arrival in Lisbon, ending
a 13-year exile, and was granted a meeting with General Spinola.
A Lisbon report on the 30th stated the officia' press organ of
the PCP, AVANTE, would soon resume open publicscion.
MOSCOW DISPARAGES RESULTS OF EC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING
Moscow, in limited comment on the informal meeting of EC foreign
ministers held 20-21 April at Gymnich castle near Bonn, has
presented a picture of continuing disarray in the EC and a failure
of the meeting to achieve results. TASS on 21 April, citing
"local observers," asserted that the British attempt to have
its terms of entry into the EC renegotiated was made in "an
extremely tense atmosphere."* A PRAVDA article by Ye. Grigoryev
on 25 April characterized the meeting generally as an unproductive
attempt to resolve a variety of conflicts evident at the last
previous EC foreign ministers meeting held in Luxembourg on
1-2 April.. Although quoting unspecified observers as :;:iyiae tiW
meeting had "opened up prospects for improving U.S.-EG=consult -
t:ii.on procedures," Grigoryev presented this observation as the sole
positive result of a meeting that was characterized by persistent
problems and "acute contradictions."
This picture is sharply out of line with the assessments provided
by the West European press and by some of the participants them-
selves. The FINANCIAL TIMES reported on 22 April, for instance,
that although no formal decisions had been made, the participants'
remarks afterwards indicated the meeting was a success and could
lead to a breakthrough in the "deadlock over consultations with
the United States." LE MONDE on 23 April, referring to the
"optimism and satisfaction" expressed by most of the ministers--
especially French Foreign Minister Jobert and German Foreign
The TASS report is almost certainly overdrawn. According to the
London FINANCIAL TIMES on 22 April, the issue of renegotiation of
Britain's membership in the EC was not discussed. DPA reported on
21 April that Britain had been asked to submit its proposal on
renegotiation to the EC Council session scheduled for 7 May in
Brussels. PRAVDA on 25 April stated that "according to a number
of newspapers," the ministers preferred not to broach the issue of
Britain's terms of membership.
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progress" on the is*ue of U.S.-EC consultations and as being
satisfied that a pragmatic case-by-case approach would-avoid
"predetermined theory or outline." On 21 April the West
German press agency (DPA) quoted Jcbert as saying that
difficulties in U.S.-EC relations "had earlier been exaggerated."
Moscow has also reiterated its consistent complaint that West
European concerns with specifically West European problems
reflect a parochial outlook inimical to the broader interests
embodied in CSCE. PRAVDA foreign news editor T. Kolesnichenko,
for example, speaking on the weekly Moscow radio observers
roundtable, noted that "many Western papers" have attempi.ed to
play down the importance of CSCE and that certain "fashionable
theories" consider CSCE to play a small role in Europe "because
European security has been superseded by other problems."
Citing only the energy crisis and U.S. relations with West
Europe as examples of these "other problems," Kolesnichenko
concluded: "I think these attempts are calculated to distract
the peoples of Europe from the maim issue."
noticeably closer." It quoted Jobert as seeing "tangible
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Minister Scheel--stated that the meeting had brought EC viewpoints
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COMF1U ('I I ST RELAT I ONS
IZVESTIYA COMMENTATOR TAKES STOCK OF YUGOSLAV POLITICS
IZVESTIYA political commentator Aleksandr Bovin recently returned
from Yugoslavia with an object lesson for Soviet readers about
the dangers of political and economic relaxation. However, the
thrust of Bovin's 13 April IZVESTIYA report on preparations for
the 10th congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)
from 27 to 30 May was to convey general satisfaction that the
Yugoslav leadership is coming to grips with its problems by
strengthening party control over all walks of Yugoslav life,
tightening party discipline and enhancing the role of the working.
class in the party and in society at large. Bovin's confident
outlook clearly suggests a belief that the pendulum of Yugoslav
politics is swinging inexorably in the direction of the Soviet
political model.
The predominantly orthodox cast of Bovin's tour d'horizon,
nonetheless, contained implications about the relevance of;the
Yuc,'oS1zv E` l:. ),1 the
realm of economic planning. While castigating the n ket
mechanism as an ineffective and dangerous regulator of the
economy, Bovin saw some merit in current Yugoslav efforts to treat
planning as a "continuous process and counter-process" involving
state agencies, industrial enterprises and local communities.
Alluding to the adverse consequences of willful planning by the
center--a phenomenon more relevant to Soviet than to Yugoslav
practice--he declared, "It is known from practice that under
certain conditions this process [planning] can succumb to the
force of decisions taken arbitrarily."
ORTHODOX VIEW From a more orthodox position; Bovin identified
decentralization as the root of Yugoslavia's
economic, political and social ills. While conceding that
postwar Yugoslavia, with its system of economic self-management,
had achieved marked success in industrial development and in the
material well-being of the people, he concentrated on the harmful
political consequences. "In the hope for automatic progress of
self-management," he pointed out, the role of the LCY was weakened
and "spontaneous forces hostile to socialism" emerged to fill the
political vacuum. Economic "free play," Bovin said, "nurtured
bourgeois-liberal ideas of the 'free play' of forces in politics,"
which was manifested in regional and ethnic conflict. Eventually
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the Yugoslav leadership was forced to acknowledge tha weakness
of its liberal approach to economics and politics that was
manifested in the 'disastrous" Croatian events of 1971.
Treating Tito's reassertion of orthodoxy more as an accomplished
fact than a policy goal, Bovin noted the measures taken prior to
the congress to restore party discipline and restrict the scope
of public debate. In particular, he looked with favor on Tito's
attempts to "overcome views according'to which the LCY can be
regarded as a debating club where the coexistence of :,orious
ideological views is permitted." On the role of the Yugoslav
party, Bovin quoted a statement by a low-level party official that
"nothing can be done without the LCY," adding his own observation
that "this is how all the communists whom I met think."
In discussing Yugoslavia'r; unique political institutions, Bovin
displayed some reservations about the Yugoslavs' ability to solve
their political and economic problems. For example, he regarded
skeptically Yugoslavia's new legislative system based on elected
delegates from basic organi:tatj,ras and local communities, and
said it required "profound analysis" of its "positive and negative
aspects." Moreover, implementation of centralized economic planning,
in a self-management system representing the "interests and
programs of thousands" of industrial and communal units throughout
the country was likewise viewed as the "central" economic problem
of Yugoslavia.
YUGOSLAV REALITY Bovin's article is perhaps more a reflection of
Soviet hopes than a description of Yugoslav
realities. Attributing a dominant orthodox stance to the LCY
leadership, he portrayed Yugoslav communists as intent on eliminating
the use of the party by liberal elements as a "debating society" in
which the party leaders could be attacked under the guise of "freedom
of opinion." In reality, statements by prominent LCY leaders in
Croatian party meetings earlier this year deplored the emergence of a
"centralist" or "neo-Stalinist" faction in the country and strongly
indicated that the campaign against liberalism and nationalism, in
high gear since Tito's October 1972 disciplinary letter to party
organizations, had gone too far.* These warnings were ignored by
Soviet media, which have instead consistently and selectively
publicized LCY leaders' appeals for strengthening the party's leading
role. Thus, in reporting such an appeal by LCY Executive Bureau
Secretary Dolanc, the 14 December 1973 PRAVPA ignored the proviso by
Dolanc that the LCY must not, however, become "the administrative apex
of the entire Yugoslav system." He added that this would amount to an
"anti-leading role" and a denial of self-management.
* See the TRENDS of 13 February 1974, pages-19-20.
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USSR
LEADERS PRAISED SELECTIVELY IN SUPREM2 SOVIET NOMINATIONS
The Soviet press on 19 April began reporting nominations of
candidates for the June USSR Supreme Soviet elections. While
the relative numerical distribution in nominations of CPSU
Politburo members was similar to the pattern of past elections,
some notable changes in the apportionment of plaudits were
evident. Whereas in the past TASS had limited honorifics
only to the ruling troika--Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin-?
they have now been extended to a b=?oader circle of Politburo
members, with only Mazurov, Shelepin and Pelshe receiving no
praise at all. In another departure from earlier practice,
current nominations singled out the special "contributions" of
individual Politburo members in policy-making, allowing the
senior leaders to share in the credit for foreign policy
achievements.
KOSYGIi SLIGHTED As in the April 1970 USSR Supreme Soviet
nomfnations '`and tlie'Apri I .1971 i'"f SR` S.ji-eme
Soviet nominations, Brezhnev was again clearly set above his
colleagues, he alone being characterized as an "outstanding
figure of the %,i,nunist Party, Soviet state and international
communist and workers movement." On the other hand, Kosygin was
slighted more clearly than in past elections. While Podgornyy
and Suslov received accolades as "prominent figures of the
Communist Party, Soviet state and international communist movement,"
Kosygin received a lesser honorific as "prominent party and state
figure" or "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet
state," along with Kirilenko and junior Politburo members Andropov,
Shcherbitskiy, Kulakov and Kunayev.
IZVESTIYA, however, using an account of Moscow city nominations
written by its own reporters instead of the TASS account, repeated
the TASS honorific for Brezhnev but placed Podgornyy and Kosygin
on equal footing as "prominent political and state figures."
TASS's slighting of Kosygin, compared to Podgornyy and Suslov,
may have been partly offset by crediting him with contributions
both to the domestic economy and to foreign affairs. Still, TASS
again rated Podgornyy as an international leader and Kosygin only
as a domestic leader in the second round of nomina*.i..-s--for
electoral districts. The 26 April TASS report in PRAVDA on the
beginning of district-level nominations repeated the 19 April
characterizations of Brezhnev as an "outstanding" world leader and
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Podgornyy as a "prominent" Soviet and international leader, but
this time Suslov was included as a "prominent figure of the
Communist Party and~Soviet state" along with Kosygin and
Kirilenko.
Kosygin was slighted even more conspicuously in his native
Leningrad. Local nominations reported in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
on 19 and 20 April characterized Brezhnev as an "outstanding
figure" of "historic scale" who has achieved "big successes in
detente," and Podgornyy, Suslov, Kirilenko and Kulakov as
"prominent party and state figures," but they gave no honorifics
to Kosygin and Shelepin. Nevertheless, the TASS account of the
Leningrad meeting that nominated Kosygin added the title
"prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state."
Among other leaders, TASS termed Polyanskiy a "prominent state and
public figure," Grishin a "talented leader and organizer, a figure
of the Leninist type," and Gromyko a "diplomat of the Leninist
school," while Grechko's "huge experience" in leading the armed
forces was praised.
In contrast to the other 13 Politburo members, however, TASS
reported no laudatory epithets or praise for longtime Politburo
members Mazurov, Shelepin and Pelshe, even though Pelshe and
Mazurov did receive them in local accounts of their nominations.
While TASS characterized Pelshe as "one of the oldest figures of
our party," the Latvian paper's account of his nomination in their
republic called him a "prominent figure of the Communist Party
and Soviet state." While TASS reported Mazurov as being nominated
after his Junior, Gromyko, in his native Belorussia and receiving
no praise while Gromyko received considerable tribute, the
Belorussian press listed Mazurov's nomination first and labeled
him a "prominent state figure." Some other republic papers also
deviated from TASS's characterizations in reporting their local
nominations. The Uzbek paper termed Podgornyy an "outstanding
party and state figure" and the Lithuanian press called Suslov
an "outstanding figure of our party and Soviet state."
"CONTRIBUTIONS" CITED A new element was introduced this year
with the recognition of special
"contributions" by individual Politburo members, especially in
the realm of foreign policy usually credited mainly to Brezhnev.
TASS reported recognition of Suslov's "big contribution" to
"uniting peaceloving forces which are fighting imperialist
aggression and to strengthening ties between communist and workers
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parties of various countries," Podgornyy's "contribution to
strengthening peace and riendship between peoples," Kosygin's
"big contribution to improving the administration of industry,
improving planning and the strengthening of economic Incentives
for industrial production" and his "contribution to the cause
of strengthening peace and detente," and Gromyko's "big
contribution to strengthening peace." Gromyko was lauded at
great length for his fo,t 'gn policy activity in the local
account of, his nomination in his native Belorussia.
The relative status of Politburo members as indicated by the
volume of nominations remained about the same as in April 1970
and April 1971, with only junior Politburo member Kulakov
appearing slightly favored. The number of nominations
reported on the pattern-setting initial day was as follows:
19 April 1974 28 April 1971 25 April 1970
Brezhnev 23
Podgornyy 11
Kosygin 1.1
Suslov 4
Kirilenko 4
Kulakov 3
Pelshe 2
Polyanskiy 2
Shelepin 2
Mazurov 2
17 19
15 7
1.5 7
Grishin 2
Shcherbitskiy 2
Andropov 2
Grechko 2
Gromyko 2
Kunayev 1
BACKGROUND In.contrast to the broad distribution of honorifics
this year, the TASS report carried in PRAVDA on the
first day of nomination on 25 April 1970 gave them to Brezhnev
alone--as a "true Leninist" and "outstanding political figure."
However, IZVESTIYA, which did not use the TASS account, reported
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1 MAY 1974
concurrently that Kosygtn had been called a "true Leninist, an
important political and state figure," Podgornyy a "prominent
figure of the Leninist Communist Party and Soviet state," and
Suslov a "prominent party and state figure." The favoritism
toward H':ezhnev shown by TASS may have sparked controversy,
because that glaring disarray was corrected on 30 April when
PRAVDA's TASS account of the second round of nominations added
epithets for Podgornyy--"important party and state figure,
skilled, energetic leader" and Kosygin--"prominent party and
state figure, skilled organizer".*
In the 1971 RSFSR Supreme Soviet nominations, in both the first
round on 28 and 29 April and the second round on 6 May PRWDA
termed Brezhnev an "outstanding figure of the Communist Party, Soviet state and international communist and workers movement,"
while calling Podgornyy r, "prominent political and state figure"
and Kosygin a "prominent party and state figure." As in 1970,
IZ\ESTIYA in 1971 carried its own account instead of relying on
TASS, this time differing by omitting the epithet for Kosygin
reported in PRAVDA's TASS account.**
KHRUSHCHEV ROLE IN VIRGIN LANDS CULTIVATION BELITTLED
The 20th anniversary of cultivation of the virgin lands was
celebrated in March with great fanfare--but predictably with
no credit for the project's initiator, Nikita Khrushchev.
Adding insult to injury, an article on the virgin lands program
in the March issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY belittled
Khrushchev's role in his most famous project while making the
first mention of his name in connection with the anniversary.
The author, V.I. Kulikov, quoted an obscure 1967 scholarly work
by S.L. Kovalskiy, published in Alma-Ata, which complained
that during the Khrushchev years some authors "considered that
the real history of the cultivation of virgin and unused lands
began only in 1954, and the initiative in this big and important
matter was attributed, as a rule, only to N.S. Khrushchev alone."
Further, Kulikov complained that some authors had mistakenly
asserted that the very idea of cultivating the virgin lands had
originated in the 1950's, and as an example he cited a 1960 book
by A.S. Shevchenko, Khrushchev's personal adviser on agriculture.
ii-For details, see the TRENDS of 6 May 1.970, pages 30-31.
** For details, see the TRENDS of 5 May 1971, pages 26-27.
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Kulikov is a conservative historian who defended Stalin's
colle.:tivization policy,against liberal historians in the
June 1968 iss,ie of QUESTIONS OF CPSU U1STORY.* In 1969
Ku]ikov Joined Kovalskiy and several Kazakh scholars to produce
a ong book published in Alma-Ata on the party's campaign to
cultivate the virgin lands; the book avoided any mention of
Khrushchev. During the March 1974 anniversary ceremonies
in Alma-Ata Brezhnev's role in the virgin lands project was
greatly inflated. Some speakers, like Uzbek First Secretary
Rashidov, even called Brezhnev the "organizer and inspirer"
o.f the project.
See the FBIS SURVEY of 18 July 1968, pages 31-35.
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M 0 T E S
TITO VISIT TO HUNGARY: The 27-28 April visit by'Tito to Budapest
served both to demonstrate the good relations between Yugoslavia
and its orthodox Warsaw Pact neighbor in the north and to under-
score Tito's return to full vigor following his indisposition
earlier this year. Thv visit, originally scheduled for February,
had been postponed "for a little while" by mutual agreement.
The rescheduled visit was announced by MTI and TANJUG on 22 April.
The communique, released on the 29th, employed restraint in
terming the atmosphere of the 'Vito-Kadar talks "cordial and
comradely" and generally followed the line of the September 1971
Tito-Brezhnev joint statement in noting that the two countries'
relations were based on respect for "sovereignty, equality,
noninterference," rind the "specific features" of their respective
domestic and foreign policies. The very same formulas had been
duly employed in the 1 October 1973 communique on Kosygin's
visit to Belgrade, but not in the 15 N;,vember document on the
3rezhnev-Tito talks in Kiev. Comment on the current visit included
a, reference in the Budapest weekly MAGYARORSZAG to Tito's 15 April
Sarajevo speech, in which he had insisted that,despite Western
conjectures, Belgrade- had good" relations' with' both" Hungary and the
Soviet Union and had nothing tc fear from Soviet troops stationed in
Hung try.
PRC ON INDOCHINESE SUMMIT ANNIVERSARY: Peking's limited counemoration
of this year's anniversary of the April 1970 Indochinese sammit
conference followed the trend of recent Chineqe practice toward
reducing attention to Indochinese anniversc,....s. This year's comment
on the summit anniversary was restricted to the usual 24 April PRC
leaders' message +,o the leaders of the Indochinese "peoples" and
a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial the same clay, Last year, by contrast,
there had also been a Peking reception attended by Indochinese
representatives and Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders, with a
speech by ranking PRC military leader Yeh Chien-ying criticizing the
United States. As has happened with other Chinese messages on
Indochina in recent weeks, Peking also failed to provide the wide
radio and NCNA publicity previously customary for the anniversary
message--it ha:; been heard only in Peking radio's services in
Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian. This year's PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
criticized U.S. support for Saigon and Phnom Penh, but did not repeat
last year's denunciation of U.S. "military and political schemes"
in Indochina or demand that Washington abide by the peace agreements.
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PRC MAY DAY: All active Peking-based members of the CCP Pulicburo
attended gatherings in Peking parks to celebrate May Day, and CCP
vice chairman Li Te-sheng made his first public appearance in
three months at festivities in Shenyang. Li had not been mentioned
in PRC media for three months and had been the subject of unofficial
poster attacks. Following the pattern established since Lin Piao's
purge, there was no central editorial greeting the holiday. PEOPLE'S
DAILY and other central newspapers carried large pictures of Mao and
reprinted a number of Mao quotations that have recently been used
to guide the campaign against Lin and Confucius, such as the injunc-
tion to "grasp revolution, promote production." Illustrative of
the importance of this theme, much of the 1 May PEOPLE'S DAILY
was devoted to pictures and accounts describing progress on the
industrial front.
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- S I -
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
r
NEW ALLY FOR LEADER OF SOVIET REVISIONIST HISTORIANS
The position of the independently minded director of the Institute
of USSR History, P. V. Volobuyev, promises to be ,strengthened by
the racent naming of a moderate, A. G. Yegorov, to he:,d the Institute
of Marxism-Leninism.* Volobuyev, author of a moderately revisionist
history of the 1917 revolution, since 1972 has been under steady
attack for allegedly distorting Soviet history and for refusing to
admit his mistakes. The most recent attack on Volobuyev's deviations
was made by the first deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism, P. A. Rodionov, in the March issue of that institute's
publication QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY. Rodionov's doctrinaire
attack appeared before Yegorov was appointed as his surarior and
ideological overseer in the realm of party history, ant the attack
was undoubtedly overshadowed by Yegorov's appointment.
The failure to subjugate Volobuyev and the institute he heads
provides a good illustration of the tenuous balance of forces
currently at work in the Soviet political arena. In particular,
it defines the limits on the power of reactionary forcn;~ led by
S. P. Trapeznikov, head of the CPSU Central Committee's science
and higher educational institutions section, and P:. L.; Fedoseyev,
vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and--uatil last -
November--director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Volobuyev,
a specialist on the events of 1917, has in recent years advanced
an approach to the history of the Russian revolution that minimizes
the role of the proletariat in its preparation and stresses the
elements of spontaneity in the Bolshevik rise to power--an approach
in many ways reminiscent of Western historiography on the revolution.
Despite numerous meetings organized by Trapeznikov and Fedoseyev to
condemn Volobuyev, the reactionaries have been unable to engineer
his ouster or to obtain a recantation of his revisionist views.
1972 ATTACKS Volobuyev became director of the Institute of
ON VOLOBUYEV USSR History in 1969, at the relatively young
age of 46, and in 1970 the institute published
two books on the 1917 revolution, one of which he personally
* For background on the Yegorov appointment, see the TRENDS of
24 April, pages 10-13.
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co-authored. The books aroused considerable controversy because
of their avowedly "new appx?oach," and in April 1972 the Presidium
of the Academy of Sciences recalled 73-year old ideologist
P. N. Pospelov from virtual retirement to become acting academic
secretary of the academy's historical division and to aid in the
crackdown on historians. The history division set up a commission
dominated by conservatives to examine the two books published by
Volobuyev's institute.
At a meeting of the commission on 4 July 1972, reported in the
January 1973 issue of HISTORY OF THE USSR, commission chairman
B. G. Gafurov, director of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia,
reported to the history division that the two books contained
ideological errors echoing--intentionally or not--the views of
ideological enemies. At the meeting D. M. Kukin, deputy director
of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, accused Volobuyev of falsely
claiming that Lenin had conceded that the working class had been
unprepared to play the leading role in the October revolution.
Kukin added that the books exaggerated the elements of spontaneity
in the revolution and misquoted passages from the second volume
of the official "History of the CPSU,,," P.,A..Zhilin, director ,
o the I11.^.C'i.t ll e c ~~1.~ It ry ~T1 rt. J.~ t =11.L:0 chal:'LCd t~li. is tac
books distorted Lenin's writings and dohmgraded"the role of the
proletariat in favor of the peasantry; he insisted on Volobuyev's
public recantation. V. I. Bovykin declared that the offensive
works were survivals of the Khrushchev period, when some historians
followed the "very seductive" path of revising supposedly well-
established views on important questions of history.
In reply Volobuyev acknowledged responsibility for the ideological
content of the works under attack and admitted that the foreword
of one had wrongly indicated that the proletariat had acted jointly with
the entire peasantry, including the kulaks. But he defended the
main theses of those works, insisting that the February :evolution
had been spontaneous, that the proletariat had been unprepared to
play the leading role in the October revolution, and that there
were "no ideological-theoretical errors" in the books. Presiding
officer Pospelov closed the debate by rejecting Volobuyev's views,
recalling his earlier errors and proposing a resolution censuring
Volobuyev for refusing to admit his errors and criticizing the
two books for rewriting history and playing into the hands of the
regime's ideological enemies.
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Following the adoption of Pospelov's resolution, new pressures were
brought to bear on Volobuyev. A July 1972 KOPQIUNIST article by
Moscow gorkom ideology secretary V. N. Yagodkin and a November 1972
KO10NNIST article by Professor A. Smirnov criticized the work of
the institutes of world history and of Soviet history under the
Academy of Sciences. Ye. M. Zhukov, director of the Institute
of General History, responded in the May 1973 KOA;r1UNIST, admitting
that the above articles had correctly pointed out the "serious
ideological and theoretical mistakes" in works by his institute.
That Zhukov does not rank among the revisionist historians is
clear from his attack in the February 1969 HERALD OF THE ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES on historians who allegedly try to "undermine principled
Marxist-Leninist positions under the guise of speaking out against
dogmatism" and who call Marxist-Leninist research "outmoded"
because it does not rely on "structure analysis," "mathematical
methods," and the like.*
Volobuyev, on the other hand, did not even reply to these criticisms.
Nevertheless, in reporting Zhukov's reply, the editors of KOMMUNIST
noted that a party meeting at Volobuyev's institute had discussed
the critical articles and had called for "raising the personal
responsibility" of the director and other institute leaders for the
"ideological-theoretical, level of scientific works."
Meanwhile, one of these two books was also attacked in a 13 October
1972 PRAVDA article by A. P. Kosuluikov, chief editor of QUESTIONS
OF CPSU HISTORY, and A. D. Pedosov, head of the faculty of party
history at the CPSU Academy of Social Sciences and, since early
1973, deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. PRAVDA
on 6 January 1973 reported an evasive reply from Volobuyev and the
party secretary of his institute that conceded the correctness of
the criticism and revealed that the criticisms had been registered
in the individual party record of the editors who had prepared
the book's foreword. Apart from these concessions, however,
Volobuyev stuck to the positions he took at the July 1972 meeting
of the historical division, where he had refused to admit any other
errors in the books or to recant personally.
Volobuyev continued to hold out, and on 21-22 March 1973 the CPSU
Central Committee held a conference on history at which Pospelov,
Volobuyev, and Kukin gave the main reports and Trapeznikov,
* For background, see the FBIS SURVEY of 22 May 1969, pages 25-26.
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Fedoseyev, Gafurov, Zhukov and others spoke. As reported in the
May 1973 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, the conference again assailed
the two books, criticize Volobuyev's statement that the proletariat
"was not prepared for the role of leader of the new revolution"
and, without naming him, attacked those still refusing to recant
publicly.
In June 1973 Pospelov, on his 75th birthday., retired without having
obtained Volobuyev's scalp. His position as the academy's historical
overseer was filled by 65-year old archeologist B. A. Rybakov, who
had played only a minimal role in the dispute. In a July 1973
KOMMIJNIST article Trapeznikov assailed the Volobuyev version of
the revolution and any other "new reading" of history. According
to the November 1973 HERALD OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, on 14 June
Moscow secretary Yagodkin had lectured the Institute of General
History on the "ideological struggle in historical science" and
the ideological dangers arising from detente. A samizdat version
of Yagodkin's speech indicates that he assailed any deviation
from orthodoxy in party history and warned strongly against any
slackening of vigilance under detente. Significantly, he was not
invited to deliver a similar address before Volobuyev's Institute
of USSR'Hi.story.
LATEST ATTACKS The most recent attacks on Volobuyev occurred
at an 18 December 1973 joint meeting of leaders
of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Academy of Social Sciences,
and the Higher Party School, dealing with problems of party history.
The meeting, reported in the February QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY,
was keynoted by first deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism P. A. Rodionov and also addressed by Kosulnikov, chief
editor of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, P. A. Zhilin, Pospelov, and
others. Although the brief reports published do not mention
Volobuyev by name, he was clearly the target of Kosulnikov's
complaint that some historians, departing from Marxist-Leninist
methodology, had made serious errors in describing the grouping
of class forces during the revolution. Moreover, Rodionov's
subsequent article in the March issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY
explicitly conveyed the views expressed at the December conference,
and his article contained several unmistakable allusions to
Volobuyev. Rodionov declared that the question of the proletariat's
leading role during the revolution requires special attention, and
that the Institute of Marxism-Leninism was presently helping
Volobuyev's institute begin preparing a monograph on "The Party
of Bolsheviks in the Struggle for the Hegemony of the Proletariat
in the Democratic Revolution." Further, he assailed the "belittling
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of the role of the proletariat" during the revolution in some
works as "serious deviations from Marxist-Leninist methodology"
and as revivals of bong rejected positions.
The March issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU HICI'ORY also reported a
20 November meeting of the journal's chief editor Kosulnikov with
readers in Kiev, at which the readers approved the journal's
articles criticizing "some publications of the Institute of USSR
History which contained serious methodological errors." This
issue was composed at the end of January and signed to the press
on 26 February--well before the appointment of Yegorov as
director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.
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- i -
A P P E N D I X
I
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 22 - 28 APRIL 1974
Moscow (2388 items)
Pekin; (1148 items)
Komsomol Congress
(--)
27%
UNGA Special Session
(32%)
20%
[Brezhnev Speech
(-)
8%]
Cambodia
(3%)
9%
Lenin Birth
(4%)
8%
[Front Leaders in
(--)
6%]
Anniversary
Albania, Yugoslavia
[Ponomarev Speech
(--)
2%]
Japan
(6%)
7%
Warsaw Pact Meeting
(14%)
7%
[PRC-Japan Civil
(4%)
5%]
[Soviet Party-
(--)
2%]
Aviation Agreement
Government
Criticism of Lin Piao
(11%)
6%
"Approval"
Supreme Sov..et
(5%)
5%
and Confucius
Indochinese Peoples'
(--)
4%
Elections
China
(6%)
4%
Summit Conference, 4th
Anniversary
Middle East
(3%)
3%
Middle East
(1%)
3%
Set!ator Kennedy in
(1%)
2%
USSR
(3%)
3%
USSR
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note.. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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