TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 24, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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STATSPEC
Coufidentia
In Communist Propaganda
HIGHLIGHT:
New Leader of Key Soviet Institute - page 10
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STATSPEC
Confidentia9
24 APRIL 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 17)
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
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CONTENTS
ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE.,
USSR Praises Ties With Syria, Shows Concern Over Cairo Shift
WARSAW PACT MEETING
Communique Reveals Little New Substance on Security Issues
Bucharest Continues to Desist Moscow on Communist Unity . . . .
CPSU SLOGANS
May Day Slogans Reflect Concern Over World Trouble Spots . . . .
USSR
Moderates Gain Leadership of Key Soviet Ideological Institute . . 10
CYPRUS
Moscow Sees Turkey's Federation Proposal as NATO Plot 14
CHINA
Kirin Leadership Criticized, Trade Unions Assume Major Role . . 17
INDOCHINA
Cambodian Front Leader Extends Tour, Reaffirms Front Unity . . . 19
PRG, DRV Statements Denounce GVN Retaliation for Fall of Base . . 20
Report on DRV Army Campaign Mentions "Party Military Congress" . 21
Chinese Leadership; Peking on PRC-Japan Aviation Accord; . .
PRC on French Elections; Moscow on Inter-American Meetings . 22
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . ... . . . . . . .
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 APRIL 1974
ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
USSR PRAISES TIES WITH SYRIA. SHOWS CONCERN OVER CAIRO SHIFT
For want of more effective props to support its diplomatic posture
in the Middle East, Moscow has continued to make the most of
Syrian President al-Asad's recent visit to the USSR, presenting it
as a symbol of Soviet-Arab friendship'and a token of Moscow's claim
to play a role in a Middle Eastern peace settlemer:. At the same
time, Moscow has shown concern over the shift in Cairo's sympathies
from a pro-Soviet to a pro-United States position. While it has
rejected charges that its support for Syria is serving to perpetuate
the fighting on the Golan Heights, it has warned the Arabs against
turning to the West for military and diplomatic support, and assured
them that the USSR offers "comprehensive support, including arms."
SYRIAN-ISRAELI Routine comment on the Syrian-Israel issue has
DISENGAGEMENT kept up the criticism of "partial agreements"
voiced by Brezhnev on the 11th in his speech at
a dinner for al-Asada Thus ZA RUBEZHOM, in an article reported by
TASS on the 19th, cautioned against attempts being made, "under the
guise of a search for a solution, to perpetuate the injustices
engendered by Israel's aggressive policy." Moscow brushed off
Western press assertions that the Soviet-Syrian talks constituted
an obstacle to Secretary Kissinger's peace efforts. A broadcast
to North America on the 19th insisted that the Soviet Union is not
obstructing Syrian-Israeli disengagement, but that it does support
Syria's position that troop separation must be part of an overall
settlement.
Ponomarev, touching briefly on the Arab-Israeli problem in his
Lenin anniversary speech on the 22d, pledged that the USSR would do
everything necessary to defend the Arab countries' legitimate in-
terests, to make its contribution .to the liquidation of the crisis,
and "not to permit a 'settlement"' that would encourage the "aggressors."
A Middle East statement issued by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative
Committee on the 19th* declared that disengagement, a "first pre-
liminary step" toward a general settlement,"must be followed without
fail" by other steps aimed at implementation of Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338. The statement noted the "significance"
* The last such Warsaw Pact PCC statement on the Middle. East was
issued on 3 December 1970; see the FBIS TRENDS of 9 December 1970,
pages 19-20.
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of the Geneva conference and said it should lead to solution of
the "key problems"--complete Israeli withdrawal, insuring the
Palestinians' rights, and guarantee of the security, integrity
and sovereignty of all states of the area.
ARMS ISSUE Moscow has not acknowledged Egyptian President
as-Sadat's recent series of public complaints of
Soviet unresponsiveness to his requests for arms, or his state-
ments that Egypt intends to end its arms dependence on' the USSR
and seek other sources of supply. But Soviet broadcasts in Arabic
have been quick to warn the Arabs against relying on the West--
particularly the United States--for military equipment and to
reassure them that the USSR renders "comprehensive support, in-
cluding arms," to the Arabs. Arab audiences have been reminded
that Washington remains the main arms exporter to Israel, and
Moscow expressed "regret" over the placid reaction of "some Arabs"
to the U.S. policy of continuing to arm and finance Israel and
thus encourage its "aggressive, expansionist" policy.
At the same tLuie, NorthAmeifcn listeners w. .: Lail, ire,,a.:brcad-
Cal bn"' the 19th, that`''~alIegaticns by''some `A eracans" that the
USSR was encouraging the arms race in the Middle East were "absurd."
A broadcast. in Arabic on the 18th, moreover, dismissed as a
"hysterical reaction" an "allegation" by the British GUARDIAN
that, judging from reconnaissance data reaching Washington, the
Kremlin was actively encouraging the fighting on the Golan Heights.
The true issue, the broadcast asserted, was the attempt by some
U.S. journalists to turn the Arabs away from friendship with the
USSR by convincing them that the U.S. attitude had changed and
that Washington was even sending arms to the Arabs.
An Arabic-language commentary on the 23d.denounced the BBC for
attempting to undermine Egyptian-Soviet relations by talk about
Egyptian purchase of Western weapons, particularly from the United
States, despite the fact that the U.S.. State Department "turned its
back on this question."
RELATIONS WITH Moscow has shown increasing concern that the
U.S., EGYPT warming of relations between the United States
and Egypt may encourage Cairo to adopt an in-
creasingly hostile stance toward the USSR. The broadcast to North
America on the 19th cited columnist Joseph Alsop as writing that
"influential U.S. quarters" would Me to induce Egypt to break
off its "remaining ties" with the Soviet Union. This certainly
would not bring a Middle East settlement any nearer, the commentary
said, and "it is diametrically opposed to the interest of peace as
well as to the spirit and letter of the Soviet-American agreements."
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Broadcasts in Arabic have complained that "certain persons" were
taking a neutral attitude toward both the Soviet Union and the
United States. A boadcast on the 23d referred cryptically to
"certain diplomatic activities," in addition to "subversive pro-
paganda," aimed at disrupting Soviet-Egyptian relations. The
commentary took the position that these relations had weathered
difficult tests and subversive actions before and would withstand
them again, and pointedly, recalled how Egypt in the past had re-
jected British and American conditions attached to offers of help
in building the Aswan data.
Indications of diplomatic efforts to heal the Moscow-Cairo breach
have recently been reported by Middle Eastern sources. The MIDDLE
EAST NEWS AGENCY said on the 23d that the Soviet charge, at his
request, had been received by Foreign Minister Fahmi and had handed
him a letter from Brezhnev "on the Middle East problem." According
to an IRAQI NEWS AGENCY report, the Cairo AL-AHRAM said on the 24th
that Brezhnev's message included a reply to as-Sadat's expression
of readiness "to meet with the Soviet leaders."
SADAT STATEMENTS Soviet media have virtually ignored as-Sadat's
series of public statements outlining his troubles
with Moscow. A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 29 March summed up in
two paragraphs the Egyptian president's interview with the Beirut
AL-ANWAR, published that day. The Moscow account merely noted that
as-Sadat called for complete Israeli withdrawal, described Israeli
demands for secure borders as an effort to retain some occupied
territory, and asserted that Egypt and Syria held identical views
on Syrian-Israeli disengagement. In the Cairo version of the
interview, as-Sadat had also complained that the Soviets had tried
to mislead him during the October war by falsely reporting that the
Syrians were asking for a cease-fire.
In a speech in Alexandria on 3 April, as-Sadat discussed at length
his difficulties with the Soviet Union in obtaining arms, and in
hl.s 18 April speech to the ASU and the People's Assembly he mentioned
several aspects of the "misunderstandings" with the Soviet Union--over
arms, Egypt's "abandonment of socialism," and its improvement of
relations with the United States. The latter speech was reported
by Soviet media in one-line items: TASS noted that as-Sadat submitted
a working document on Egyptian domestic and foreign policy, and Moscow's
domestic and Arabic services said he declared that without Syrian-
Israeli disengagement there would be no progress in implementing
Resolution 242.
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FBIS TRENDS
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Moscow may have chosen to reply to as-Sadat's charge that it had
falsely reported Syrian intentions during the war by way of cir-
culating the Soviet side of the argument in the Beirut press. A
document described as a statement by Ambassador Vinogradov to
Egyptian "official and political personalities" was published in
the Beirut AS-SAFIR on 16 April. It would appear to have been
given a stamp of authenticity by its-republication the following
day in the Lebanese Communist Party organ AN-NIDA'. In the state-
ment Vinogradov, who was the Soviet ambassador to Cairo during
the war, maintained that in his "daily" meetings with as-Sadat
from 4 to 29 October last year there were no acrimonious debates
or differences of any kind, and no criticism of the Soviet stand.
The ambassador gave his version of the Syrian cease-fire request,
suggested that there were some Soviet-Egyptian differences on
military strategy in the Sinai campaign, and recounted the events
of 20 October when he said as-Sadat urgently asked Soviet inter-
vention to obtain a cease-fire. According to the story attributed
.to Vinogradov, the Soviet leaders on receipt of this request ,.
"immediately issued, a decision for 'a partial alert of the' Soviet
forces and mobi: t a.a ' ven Soviet.miliLary,,,divisions" and, in fact,
"an advance'group `arrived` ` Caro.
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WARSAW PACT MEETING
FBIS TRENDS
24 APRIL 1974
COMMUNIQUE REVEALS LITTLE NEW SUBSTANCE ON SECURITY ISSUES
The communique on the 17-18 April meeting of the Warsaw Pact's
Political Consultative Committee (PCC) revealed little that was
new, either in substance or form, in the formulations on
European security and force reductions. It made the appropriate
bow to the goal of easing international tensions and briefly
noted that the treaties and agreements reached with the FRG
have contributed to "normalizing the situation" in Europe.
This reflects the view of Moscow and its allies that the "German
question" is now a matter of history and that the CSCE should
signal an acceptance by all European states of the postwar
status quo. As usual, the communique reaffirmed the readiness
of the Warsaw Pact to disband itself simultaneously with NATO,
or as a first step, to liquidate their military organizations.
The communique did not, however, reaffirm the unity of the
Warsaw Pact, an omission which clearly reflects Romania's
independent stance.
SECURITY CONFERENCE The-lengthy section of-the-communique. dealing with the CSCE repeated the call,
long stressed in Soviet bloc comment and official statements,
for a summit-level concluding session to be held at the "earliest"
possible date. Although Moscow has usually not been specific
about the timing of the third stage summit meeting, tc has carried
several recent reports which indicate that it may be miming for a
mid-summer 1974 windup. Moscow radio on 4 April cited a U.S.
delegate to Geneva as saying that he thought the second stage
would be "completed in June." On 5 and 22 April TASS publicized
statements by Finnish government leaders pointing out that
Helsinki is ready to hold the third stage in July, or when
necessary.
The present communique pointed out that the conference's third
stage should not be regarded as an end in itself but as a
starting ioint for "the historic work of building new relations
between all the states of the European continent." It went on
to call again for the creation of a permanent organ to oversee
the implementation of the security treaty once the conference
was over,
Although the communique denounced what it called "attempts to,create
obstacles, to drag out the work" of the conference, and to detour
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it from "solving crucial tasks," it avoided the harsher language
commonly used in the denunciations of Western "obstructionism"
on the CSCE's third "basket" of humanitarian and personal contacts
issues. The section of the communique dealing with these issues
contained no reference to alleged Western attempts to interfere
in the domestic affairs of the socialist states, nor any
insistence on the need for respecting the sovereignty and laws
and customs of states. By contrast, the last previous joint
summit statement by Soviet bloc leaders, the 31 July 1973
communique on the third annual Crimea meeting,-declared:
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The socialist countries proceed from the view that
this cooperation must develop in the framework of
strict respect for sovereignty of every state and
noninterference in its internal affairs, while
observing the laws and taking into account the
customs and traditions of every country.
The mellowing of the language on personal contacts and the exchange
,,,of ideas reflects, the generally optimistic attitude that the Soviet
and East ru.rope ii routn 4Ao teas a ui~ sccci during, x1Lte CSLL Easter
recess,'5_22"'April. Tf is 'is clearly'related to the successful
conclusion of the draft agreement on the principle of inviolability
of borders on 5 April, which Moscow has described a3 the removal
of a major stumbling bloc.;: to agreement. Chief Soviet delegate to
CSCE Kovalev, in a recor:L-i statement broadcast by Moscow radio
on the 6th, said that by adopting the agreed text on borders the
second stage of the conference has overcome "a steep political
obstacle in its work." Warsaw PAP's special correspondent in
Geneva, Mysae, asserted on 19 April that "now the wording of the
principle of the inviolability of borders is such that the
socialist states will be able to sign it without objection." The
full text of the agreement has not yet been published in Soviet
or East European media.
FORCE REDUCTIONS The communique's one paragraph on the Vienna
force reductions negotiations was routine and
uninformative. It stated that the Pact leaders again affirmed the
position taken by the January 1972 PCC meeting, namely, that
recognition of the principle of "undiminished security for all the
parties to the talks, with due consideration for the security of
all the European states," makes it possible to reach a "constructive"
agreement. Possibly with a nod to the Romanians, who have
repeatedly stated publicly that talks on reductions of forces and
armaments should also be extended to the Balkans, the communique
declared that the success of the current negotiations would "create
favorable conditions" for holding such talks in the future concern-
ing "other areas of Europe."
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East European media in recent weeks have openly acknowledged
difficulties between Romania, on the one hand, and Moscow and its
five orthodox allies,, on the other, concerning MBFR. One bone
of contention has been Bucharest's dissatisfaction with the
unofficial meetings which have taken place in Vienna outside
the framework of the formal conference. AGERPRES publicized the
Romanian delegate's remarks at the 21 March plenary session
which criticized the unofficial contacts. And Ceausescu
personally, in an interview with a Vienna paper on the 23d,
voiced his concern over the "framework" in which the talks were
taking place.
These signs of irritation by the Romanians were then followed by
an item in the Hungarian press which implied that Romania in fact
does not support the agreed Warsaw Pact position at Vienna.
Writing in the Hungarian government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on
31 March, Imre Tatar said that the proposal of the four direct
socialist participants--the USSR,. GDR, CSSR, and Poland--is
"fully supported by Hungary and Bulgaria, countries attending
the Vienna talks with consultative rights." The only other
socialist special participant, Romania, was not mentioned.
BUCHAREST CONTINUES TO RESIST MOSCOW ON COMMUNIST UNITY
Romanian obstructionism at the Warsaw Pact meeting was pointed up
by the notable failure of the final communique to include any
reference to unity, limiting itself merely to calls for strength-
ening "friendship" and "cooperation." By contrast, the communique
issued at the end of the January 1972 meeting of Pact leaders in
Prague had recorded the participants' determination to increase
"the stability of the socialist countries' unity." As was the-case
in the communiques of the two Pact summit meetings that preceded
the June 1969 Moscow international conference of communist parties,
the 19 April communique failed to endorse current moves for a new
world conference.
Where the 1972 communique had called for "repulsing imperialist
aggression," the current document merely noted, in connection with
the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact in 1975, that cooperation
between the Pact member states "strengthens the defense capability"
of the alliance. The communique added routinely that, as long as
NATO exists "and effective disarmament measures have not been
implemented," the Pact members consider it necessary "to strengthen
their defenses."
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BILATERAL MEETINGS The continued tension between Moscow and
Bucharest was reflected in the characteriza-
tion by Soviet and Romanian sources of the 18 April talks between
Brezhnev and Ceausescu as merely "comradely:" By contrast,
Brezhnev's bilateral talks with Zhivkov, Husak, Kadar, and Gierek,
respectively, during the Pact session, were described as "friendly,"
and his meeting with Honecker was depicted as "fraternal and
cordial." At the same time, the blunt "comradely" designation
was not uniformly used in reports of meetings involving the-
Romanian leaders: TASS reported on the 18th that Kosygin had a
"friendly" conversation with new Romanian Premier Manea Manescu,
and the Bucharest radio the same day reported a "friendly" meeting
between Ceausescu and Gierek.
FOLLOWUP COMMENT Perhaps because of the absence-of the unity
clause in the communique, both Moscow and its
orthodox allies have heavily stressed this themeS in. their followup
comment. Thus the 21 April PRAVDA editorial viewed the results of
the meeting as "vivid evidence of the growing unity and cohesion
of the fraternal states, and the inteneifiatsion of.coordination of
their foreign policy-activities." Ceausescu, presumably under
.. heavy pressure, had` joined the other participants in subscribing to
coordination of foreign policy in the communique on the 31-July
1973 Crimea meeting of Soviet bloc leaders, but was apparently
successful in opposing its inclusion in the 19 April Pact communique.
The only direct reference to Romanian obstructionism in the media
of a participating country appeared in a Prague domestic service
commentary on the 19th on the results of the Warsaw Pact meeting.
In an allusion to the traditional Romanian posture of independence,
the Prague commentator charged that Western analysts "exaggerated
and blew up certain unimportant nuances in the Romanian attitude
at certain international talks and expected, like the Peking Maoists,
that a rift or at least a serious. difference of opinion would take
place at Warsaw." Contrary to such hopes, the commentary maintained,
the Warsaw Pact countries' "highest" representatives approved "with
complete unanimity all decisions" on their further mutual cooperation
and on key world issues.
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CPSU SLOGANS
MAY DAY SLOGANS REFLECT CONCERN OVER WORLD TROUBLE SPOTS
The CPSU Central Committee slogans for this May Day continue the
recent practice of deemphasizing contentious issues in inter-
national relations and communist affairs while focusing specifically
on major world trouble spots. Slogans calling for measures to make
detente trends "irreversible" and proclaiming the "historic victory"
of the Vietnamese over imperialism remain unchanged.
4- Reflecting Moscow's impatience with the pace of negotiations at
the European security conference, the slogan on Europe adds a call
to "strive for the successful completion of the conference on
questions of European security.
+ The disarmament slogan adds a plea for "termination of the arms
race" to previous calls for general and complete disarmament and
the implementation of Moscow's 1972 nonuse of force proposal at the
United Nations.
+ . An expression of concern about developments :in?,Chile?,- inserted...
for the first time last October, has now been broadened to include
a specific call for freeing Chilean Communist Party Secretary-
General Luis Corvalan and "all prisoners of the fascist junta."
+ Reflecting the evolving situation in the Middle East, the slogans
replace a demand for an end to "Israeli aggression" with a call
for "a reliable and stable peace for all states and peoples" and a
routine call for elimination of the "consequences" of Israeli
aggression.
+ The most notable change in the domestic slogans reflects priorities
set out in Brezhnev's speech to the December 1973 CPSU plenum in
calling on agricultural workers to "develop specialization on 'the basis
of the concentration of agricultural production and interfarm
cooperation."
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2! APRIL 1974
MODERATES GAIN LEADERSHIP OF KEY SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE
The six-month deadlock over leadership of one of the Soviet Union's
top ideological institutions, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism,
was finally broken in mid-April with the identification of former
KOMMUNIST chief editor A.G. Yegorov are new director of the institute.
The post had been vacant since early November 1973, and the naming
of an official with Yegorov's moderate credentials to head a key
institution for interpreting Soviet doctrine appears to represent
a victory for the forces of moderation in the leadership.* Yegorov
had authored a highly controversial article in the November 1973
issue of the literary journal ZNAMYA, an article that expounded
unusually moderate positions on a wide range of intellectual issues.
By contrast, his predecessor as director, P.N. Fedoseyev, has been
one of the prime movers of the recent ideological crackdown on
the social sciences.
Yegorov'had been abruptly removed in January as chief editor of
KOMMUNIST'in circumstances suggesting he was in disfavor because
of his ZNAMYA article. Since then the top post in KOMMUNIST has
remained vacant, and the journal has become a forum for sharply
divergent viewpoints. At a belated ceremony in Moscow on 17 April
commemorating the 50th anniversary of KOMMUNIST, the journal was
represented by deputy chief editor Ye. I. Bugayev. The continued
vacancy in the regime's principal theoretical journal indicates
that the issues in dispute remain unresolved.
The 66-year old Fedoseyev apparently surrendered the post of institute
director in late October or early November, his last identification
in this position being in the 24 October MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. Since
13 November he has been identified in the central press only as vice
president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a post he had held
.concurrently since 1971. Apparently because of this vacancy,
important conferences in the institute on 18 December and 18 January
were supervised by first deputy director P.A. Rodionov, with neither
Fedoseyev nor Yegorov in attendance.
Yegorov was identified as institute director in PRAVDA on 16 April--
the same day the leade7ship sent a belated message of congratulations
and an Order of Lenin t:o KOMMUNIST on its anniversary. The 54-year
* For background on Yegorov's views, see the TRENDS of 17 April 1974,
pages 22-24.
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old Yegorov had not been mentioned for three months following his
removal as editor of KOMMUNIST and the appearance of his ZNAMYA
article. In his new0post Yegorov will have overall responsibility,
under the provisions of the 14 August 1967 CPSU Central Committee
decree on the social sciences, for work in the field of party
history--a field of study serving mainly to rationalize and
authenticate current Soviet policies.
FEDOSEYEV'S ROLE In contrast to the moderate views expressed
by Yegorov, Fedoseyev has in recent years
been stressing the threat of ideological subversion. After he
became director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in May 1967,
Fedoseyev allied himself with Brezhnev's Stalinist protege,
S.P. Trapeznikov, head of the CPSU Central Committee section for
science and higher educational institutions, against the forces of
moderation led by A.M. Rumyantsev. The latter had succeeded
Fedoseyev as Academy of Sciences vice president in May 1967.
Attempts by moderates to legitimize sociology in the Soviet Union
succeeded in 1968 in having established the Institute for Concrete
Social Research, with Rumyantsev as its director. The new
institute became one of the most innovative institutions in the
Soviet social sciences as well as a prime target for criticism by
advocates of orthodoxy led by Trapeznikov??and Fedoseyev.
The reactionary campa:i.6n to discredit Rumyantsev succeeded in
obtaining his ouster both as Academy of Sciences vice president in
May 1971 and as director of the sociological institute several
months later. Fedoseyev then resumed the post of academy vice
president, and M.N. Rutkevich, who in 1969 had echoed Fedoseyev's
criticism of innovative, empirically-oriented sociology, became
director of Rumyantsev's institute.*
In December 1971 Fedoseyev assailed sociologists for copying Western
methods. In 1972 the Presidium of the Academy of-Sciences-censured
the institute's former leadership for ideological shortcomings and
ordered the institute to reorganize its work "on the basis of
dialectical and historical materialism." The institute was renamed
the Institute of Sociological Research, dropping the word "concrete"
from its title as smacking of empiricism. In his role as social
science supervisor Fedoseyev also keynoted the December 1971 founding
congress of the new Philosophy Society, calling for intensification
of ideological influences in the social sciences.
* For background on the purge of Rumyantsev and his institute, see
the TRENDS of 24 May 1972, pages 38-40, and 15 November 1972, pages
22-23.
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CURRENT CRACKDOWN In the spring of 1973 Trapeznikov began a
renewed campaign against the dangers of
ideological penetration from abroad in an era of emerging detente.
At a May 1973 Central Committee conference of the Academy of
Sciences division on philosophy and law, Trapeznikov, Rutkevich
and others denounced ideological errors in philosophy, sociology
and law. On 28-30 November Trapezni.kov convened a similar
conference of economists to reassert ideological orthodoxy in
this field. He was. joined by Fedosayev and others in- accusing
the nation's leading economist, N., P. Fedorenko, of deviating
from Marxist-Leninist ideology and.importing alien ideas--the
same charges used to discredit Rumyantaev and the unorthodox
sociologists in 1971.
Fedorenko, director of the Central. -Economic .Mathematlcs .Institute,
had become academic_secretary.of.the.economic diuision.of the
Academy of Sciences at the same May 1971..academy.session which
elected Fedoseyev as vice preside.nc. in place of Rumyantsev. .
Although the work of Fedorenko's institute has been, under constant
attack during the past.decade, it a.ppe.a.red< to r?ecc itc high level
support in %a. 4 Juno 1973 PIiVDA article, However, the .attacks
by conservative economists and Gosplan officials continued during
the summer and fall,.and. Fedorenko ..defended the.work .of his
institute and assailed .its critics in an article in the October
1973 issue of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY.* Although under.fire
from his superiors.at the November.conference, Fedorenko avoided
polemics and, judging.fromthe version of his.confereace speech
published in QUESTIONS.OF.ECONOMICS, merely acknowledged the
role of ideology in Soviet economics.
COUNTERATTACK Soon after . the. November conferenc.e;..however,
there were indica.ticns.of.stubborn_resistance
to the ideological. crackdown, QUESTIONS OF PHILOSPHY, which
had carried Fedorenko's defense in- October, published a.bold
editorial in its January issue-.defending .the right to.i:ree inquiry
by scholars and assailing-"cavalry raids"-against the latter.**
* For the attacks on Fedorenko, see the TRENDS of 31 October 1973,
pages 27-30. 41
** For details, see the-TRENDS Supplementary. Article -of.3 Apia
1974, "Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Jciences."
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- 13
Although the editorial appeared to be a thinly disguised ply
to Trapeznikov's hardline speech at the May 1973 confer'nce on
philosophy, sociology and law, its broad applicability to all
of the social sciences was clearly evident. Whereas Trapeznikov
had complained that persons "calling themselves innovators"
were "vulgarizing" Marxism-Leninism and that detente increased
the need for tightening up controls against ideological
subversion, the editorial emphasized the need to seek truth
"no matter how bitter and mercilessly. critical it is" and
the importance of objective research under conditions of
increased contacts with the West.
This remarkable editorial, as well as the prolonged stalemate
over the choice of new leaders for the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism and the journal KOMMUNIST, suggests the absence of
a stable consensus in the top Soviet leadership. The deadlock
over the new chief editor for KOMMUNIST was apparently respon-
sible for the postponement of the scheduled 5 April celebration
of KOMMUNIST's 50th anniversary. Even so, when the ceremony was
finally held, the journal remained without a new chief editor.
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CYPRUS
MOSCOW SEES TURKEYS FEDERATION PROPOSAL AS NATO PLOT
Moscow, in sustaining its low-keyed but persistent comment
supporting an independent Cyprus, has recently moved toward
open disapproval of a Turkish-advocated "federal." solution which
it suggests would amount to partitioning the island between
Greece and Turkey, Mindful of its relations with the various
concerned states, Moscow itself has not directly attributed t,)
Ankara the federation proposal, set forth in the program of
Prime Minister Ecevit's government in January.* Instead, it
ha3 described the idea as a disguised ploy for partition in the
interests of "NATO circles" which allegedly wish 1:o convert the.
island into a military base. At the same time Moscow has continued
to accuse the Greek regime of collaboration with the Greek Cypriot
EOKA underground movement of the late General Grivas in furtherance
of enosis, or union with Greece.
Some years ago Moscow mentioned the idea of federation as a
possible solution for the Cyprus problem, but only within the
framework of a single state. Following a Podgornyy visit to
Turkey in January 1965, Gromyko in an IZVESTIYA interview later
that same month had remarked that Cypriots might choose a federal
structure, but that such a system presupposed the existence of
a single central government, single defense organization, and
centralized administrative and judicial system. Since that
interview the question of federation has not been broached in
elite comment and only rarely in routine propaganda.
In keeping with the USSR's contention that Cyprus' communal
differences must be settled by the two communities without outside
interference, Soviet propaganda has supported the inter-Cypriot
talks since they began in 1968. The talks have been suspended
since early April over the issue of Turkey's espousal of a federal
solution, which according to the Makarios government altera the
basis of the talks, which are premised on a unitary state.
* The Turkish-language communist clandestine "Our Radio" in a
16 April broadcast did rebuke Ecevit for advocating a federal system
for Cyprus, claiming this had annoyed "progressive public opinion"
in Cyprus just as Greek support for enosis had done, and observing
that Ecevit's suggestion "has been characterized as intervention."
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COMMENT ON PRAVDA on 21 March foreshadowed the current impasse
FEDERATION on the inter-Cypriot talks when it critized EOKA
demanQts for enosis as well as demi%nds for par~:ition
"irrespective of their origin." Encouragement of thesm demands,
PRAVDA declared, could only be regarded Rs Interference in the
internal affairs of the sovereign Cypriot state.
A Moscow broadcast in Greek to Cyprus on 4 April, two days after
the talks were broken off, pointed t:+ "foreign press" debate on
the question of establishing a federation on the island ;=:nd charged
that "leading NATO circles" were a couraging such discussions in an
effort to thwart the talks. The broadcast cited President Makarios
as declaring that creation of a federal state was impossible because
"in Cyprus there are no prerequisites for a federation," which
would be unacceptable to a great majority of the population? And
a Greek-language commentary broadcast to Cyprus on 18 April asserted
that the Cyprus Government was "absolutely justified" in rejecting
any change in the basis of the talks. The new difficulties in the
talks had arisen, it explained, when the press of "certain NATO
member countries" began propagandizing the idea of solving the Cyprus
problem on the basis of federation.
Moscow presented the same argument to the other side in a Turkish-
language commentary broadcast. to Cyprus on the 19th. After first
routinely denouncing enosis, the commentary offered various arguments
against the notion of a federal state being bruited about by "some
authoritative NATO politicians." For one thing, it said, Turkish
Cypriots were scattered geographically, and separation would be
"practically impossible," not to say unnecessary since Greeks and
Turks could and did work and live together. Capping its argument,
the commentary added that "NATO's plans to partition Cyprus are
hidden behind words of federation."
PRAVDA took up the issue again on the 21st in an article exploiting
Cypriot press agitation over the arrival at British bases of U.S.
military personnel and equipment in connection with the assemblage
of helicopters for use in mine-sweeping operations in the Suez Canal.
The PRAVDA article, as reported by TASS, warned that this development
was at variance with the relaxation of tension in the eastern
Mediterranean and spoke darkly of "hostile intrigues of the NATO
military and their agents" on the island. PRAVDA pointedly went on
to caution against plans for a division of the island or for "such
a reform of its state system" as would lead not to stronger cohesion
but to isolating Greek and Turkish Cypriots from each other.
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SOVIET DEMARCHES Soviet media did not publicize Moscow's
demarches in mid-March to the governments
of Greece, Turkey, the United States and Britain oiler alleged
foreign interference in Cyprus' internal affairs. But the Cyprus
communist party (AKEL) crgan Y.HARAVYI, which has in the past
publicized Soviet diplomatic activity about which Moscow has kept
silent,* said in a 27 March article that the USSR had again
"decisively intervened" to prevent the overthrow of President
Makaxios and the imposition of a "NATO partitionist solution and
a fascist regime" in Cyprus. According to KHARAVYI, the Soviet
Govexn.ner.?C hart sent a "strongly worded" note to Greece warning
it would not remain indifferent if the legal Cyprus Government
were overthrown, and had also "delivered a note" to Turkey and
notified the U.S. and British governments and the UN secretary
general.
* Previous Soviet representations to Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, and
Britain were reported by KHARAVYI in March 1970, for instance;
see the TRENDS of 26 March 1970, pages 4-5.
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CHINA
KIRIN LEADERSHIP CRITICIZED, TRADE UNIONS ASSUME MAJOR ROLE
An 18 April Kirin radio report of 'a provincial trade union rally
stated that the provincial party committee must be "held re.f,porisible"
for errors committed during the previous stage of the campaign
against Lin and Confucius and emphasized that workers must be the
"major force" in implementing the current campaign. The broadcast
thus seems to be a response to a 2 February PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial, which warned cadres that the issue of criticizing
Lin and Confucius would be "a test for every leading comrade" and
that the .fitter would not be allowed to assume a passive role.
The Kirin meeting report stated that some cadres "were afraid to
mobilize the masses" and some even "suppressed the masses" out y,
of fear of criticism.
The Kirin trade union meeting carefully stressed the need for
unified party leadership at every stage of this campaign. It
also firmly reiterated guidelines contained in several recent
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials emphasizing the need for carrying
out the campaign. without manifestations of factionalism and
affirming the overriding importance of stimulating production,
with revolution relegated to "spare time."
The trade union rally also added two more moderating injunctions
to the list previously noted in central media. It specifically
prohibited "experience-exchanging" among various units and areas,
which was responsible for much of the spread of the disorder
connected with the cultural revolution, and it stated categorically
that "mass organizations must not be formed within the armed forces."
With the Shenyang military region, of which Kirin is a part,
presumably in some disarray following the apparent purge of Li
Te-sheng, the order may reflect actual, ongoing problems within
PLA units in Kirin.
While Kirin is the first province in which the provincial'. party
committee has been criticized openly, other provinces have.called
on mass organizations, especially the trade unions, to take-a more
active role in the anti-Lin/Confucius campagin and have noted
leadership problems at higher levels. For example, a 12 April
Honan broadcast noted that some leaders in Hopi municipality had
doubted the ability of workers to serve as the main-force.in
criticizing Lin, but that the party committee had attached great
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importance to the role of "mass organizations, particularly that
of trade unions," had provided them with relevant central
committee documents and had invited their participation.
The first province to indict a provincial-level leadership
organ for mistakes was Shansi, where the provincial cultural
bureau was criticized last month for having encouraged the
production of the opera "Three Trips to Taofeng." While the
provincial party committee was not attacked, Western press
agencies have reported poster attacks on the Shansi first party
secretary and one of 1;1s supporters. The apparent victor in
the provincial struggle' was Politburo member Chen Yung-kuei,
who is also concurrently secretary of the provincial party
committee and the Hsiyartg county committee and founder of the
model Tachai production brigade. A 19 April Shansi broadcast
describing leadership activities in Hsiyang presumably reflects
the recent victory in stating that county cadres no longer
blindly follow instructions from upper levels but instead "ask
'why?' about each instruction and see whether it conforris with
reality and whether it is rational."
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- 19 -
INDOCHINA
CAMBODIAN FRONT LEADER EXTENDS TOUR., REAFFIRMS FRONT UNITY
Following its return to Peking from Pyongyang on 8 April, the
Cambodian Front delegation led by insurgent armed forces chief
Khieu Samphan spent two weeks visiting Peking and touring Chinese
provinces before embarking on 19 April bn what appears likely to
be a prolonged trip to several European and African countries.*
Samphan's stay in China coincided with Prince Sihanouk's annual
pl.lgrimage to North Korea on 11-23 April, to honor Kim II-song
on his birthday. Remarks by Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan during
their i:avels have stressed the Front's unity in the face of
alleged U.S. efforts to divide it, and have reiterated standard
conditions for a peace settlement and denunciations of U.S.
involvement in Cambodia.
Following Samphan's return from Pyongyang and his welcome by PRC
Politburo members Yeh Chien-ying and Wu Te, Peking was strangely
silent about the Cambodian delegation's activities from 8 to 14 April.
The sole reference to the, group.,was. NCNA!s. 12, April., report, that,
on the previous day Samphan and his "special advisor" Ieng Sary
had been present, along with Chou En-lai, to see Sihanouk off to
the DPRK. NCNA gave full coverage to the delegation's tour of PRC
provinces. The group left Peking for Szechwan, accompanied by
Yeh Chien-ying, on the 14th, returned to Peking on the 17th, and
was seen off for Albania by Yeh and Wu Te on the 19th, NCNA reported
that diplomats from Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, Algeria, Mauritania,
and Cameroon were at the airport--a good indication of the delegation's
probable lengthy itinerary.
The likelihood that Samphan's visit to Peking had provided an
opportunity for high-level Front consultations was underlined by
the appearance at the airport on the 19th of.the chief Front
spokesman in Paris, Chau Seng. The date of Chau Seng's arrival
in China is unknown; he had not been reported to have been in
Peking for several months.
* The delegation's earlier visits to Hanoi, Peking, and Pyongyang
are discussed in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974, pages 9-11, and 10 April
1974, pages 11-15.
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24 APRIL 1974
FRONT UNITY
Portraying an image to the in a 20 AprI of Front unit
insurgents+ Speech in Tirana Y' Khiet Samphan
Sihanouk had underlined "Immense 11 bloc of national ' called attention
speech in P his s?lidarit with union. Similarly,
internationaingyang in which he hailed the Samphan in a 12
authentic debut on his current armed forces Apsril
representative tour and labeled him "the #
responsible for Of our
word of their armed people and the number
authoritative co struggl..it Unit one figure
of Queen Sisowath Koss mment marking was also the watch
word birthday
r
cast b Minister Penn Nouth, and this
the Cambod s ian n commemoration
Y Peking in Combo ?uth' in a message queen new Year.
national tour and c dlan on the ge to the
broad-
Introducing oncluded his 10th, lauded Samt
qu Samphan to birthday gr'eetin Phan a e
message from Sam the queen, The g with a statement
ever offered. Pephan to the broadcast then
also nn Nouth+ queen--the first carried tea
schemesaimed Samphan's vis9tsusual New Year's mess greeting he has
designed to abroad as a on 12 April
Of our Front, g~ "undermine and courier to to the it
divide rhe, iron- dark..
like unity
FRGS DRV STATEMENTS DENOUNCE PRG GVN RETALIATION FOR FALL OF BASE
RG and DRV issued
April respectively foreign war and the "indef' Protesting the GVN statements on 1g and 19
ati?ns inite" suspension of intensification"
between the t
the al wo South La Ce of the
leged co h Vietnamese Parties 11e-Saint-Cloud
statements mmunist seizure of in reta
neti
other demande Tonle Cham
liation for-
retali d a resumption base on 12 April Both
air strikes y the'South Vietnamese and denounced
and immunities" against Loc Minh Govern
and the of the PRG dele the suspension of ment--12-?.5 Njah.
cancellation of weekl gation to "Privileges
Loc the Y liaison flights 'bent Military Commission between Saigon According to the PRG gon and
aimed not on. if statement, the ' n
~iitar only at sabotaging" ne GVN S fuss" ?ver Tonle
adventures Cham is
Y " gotiations and 11
aid," Both statements but also at "obi
actions accuse the obtaining an excuse to b for new
s but the DRV statement United States to beg for
U.S. arms deliveries goeS further of supporting Saigon
a5 to
Vietnam and the Admi
ca.ly criticize
nist
An earlier ration s request
TRENDS discussion of th
of e 17 April 1974, pages 12 13e Cham incident is cont
ained in the
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24 APRIL 1974
to Congress for more military aid to the GVN. Secretary of State
Kissinger is the target of criticism in both statements: The DRV
protest, for example, reiterates the charge--leveled at Kissinger
in-connection with his 25 March letter to Senator Kennedy.-that
he has distorted the spirit and letter of the Paris agreement to
justify increased U.S. military involvement and interference in
South Vietnam.
REPORT ON DRV ARMY CAMPAIGN MENTIONS "PARTY MILITARY CONGRESS"
Hanoi has begun a widespread "emulation drive" in the North Vietnamese
armed forces, with the dissemination on 14 April of an instruction
from the Standing Committee of the Central Military Party Committee
and reports in the following days of meetings to launch the drive
organized by military commands throughout the country, Such campaigns
are a regular feature of DRV military activities. However, a surprising
new element was introduced when Hanoi's report on one of the meetings
raised the possibility of the convocation of an unprecedented nation-
wide meeting of the army's political cadres: A 16 April report on a
meeting by the air defense and air force service quoted an unnamed
"colonel political commissar-" as urging. emulation not. only., to. mark
the May anniversaries of Ho Chi Minh'sbirth and Dien Bien Phu, but
also to "greet the 2d party military congress." There have been no
other known references in Hanoi media to such a congress, either in
the past or in the future.
The instruction of the Central Military Party Standing Committee
labeled the new campaign "the determined-to-win emulation drive"
and cited as its objectives the education and encouragement of
cadres and combatants, the development of the strength of the
armed forces, and the motivation of the armed forces to participate
in building the North and maintaining domestic order and security.
To meet these objectives, the instruction advocated emulation in
increasing combat strength, practicing self-discipline, developing
the regular army, and stimulating"" production and practfcittg-' thirift:
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i10TES
CHINESE LEADERSHIP: CCP vice chairman Li Te-sheng has failed
to join other party vice chairmen in sending a wreath to the
funeral of a prominent PRC leader for the second time in succession.
The 23 April NCNA account of the funeral of Fu Tso-i listed all
other vice chairmen as having sent wreaths, as did the 27 March
account of the funeral of Chen Yu. Following Li's transfer to
head the Shenyang military region at the end of last year, he was
listed with other vice chairmen as sending wreaths to two funerals
in January. Thus his failure to send a wreath to the recent
funerals is not explicable merely on the basis of his being the
only vice chairman not resident in Peking. His inclusion on the
list for the second January funeral, on. the 30th, marked his last
mention in PRC media. Li has recently been the target of a wide-
spread poster campaign.
PEKINAON PRC. JAPAN AVIATION ACCORD: Direct Chinese comment on
the recently concluded' civil air agreement with Japan, a break
through.on the most important issue facing the two countries since
relations were normalized in 1972, has thus far been confined to
brief welcoming remarks by Liao Cheng-chih, president of the China-
Japan Friendship Association. Liao predicted on 23 April, three
days after the agreement was signed in Peking, that "no reactionary
force on earth" can halt the historical trend for China-Japan friend-
ship. Peking's. strong interest in expediting the signing of other
business agreements, as well as in a treaty of peace and amity with
Japan, has, however, been revealed in several. NCNA reports publicizing
carefully selected statements by various Japanese spokesmen on the
accord. An NCNA report on 23 April quoted a Japanese trade official
as stating that Japanese businessmen are especially determined to
support Diet ratification of the air agreement. On 21 April-, two
separate NCNA reports carried statements by several Japanese political
leaders calling for the conclusion of a treaty officially ending
World War II hostilities between the two countries. Reflecting its
sensitivity to the relationship now emerging between China and Japan,
Moscow has not yet commented on the air agreement.
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PRC ON FRENCH ELECTIONS: Peking's only report to date on the
French presidential elections, a 19 April NCNA Paris dispatch,
manages to suggest, by selective quotations, that each of the
three main candidateO supports policies which Peking endorses--
the development of European defense cooperation plus a continu-
ing independent French foreign policy. NCNA ignored French
CP support for Francois Mitterand, noting only that he was
"Jointly nominated by the opposition parties, including the
Socialist Party." NCNA applied similar disdainful. treatment
to the French communists in reporting the Match 1973 parlia-
mentary elections. French communist leader Marchais had
sharply criticized the Chinese leadership at the 26-28 January
Brussels conference of West European communist parties, label-
ling alleged PRC support for a West European political and
military alliance as "an eloquent illustration of their
desertion of the principles of proletarian internationalism."
MOSCOW ON INTER-AMERICAN MEETINGS: Moscow gave routine coverage
to the 17-20 April Washington and Atlanta sessions of American
foreign ministers attended by Secretary of State Kissinger, strtss
ing that "sharp contradictions" emerged between the United States
and other countries on major issues affecting inter-American
relations. Moscow described Kissinger as "sharply out. Oftune"
with Latin American delegates-because he maintained silence on
economic and trade policy and the status of Cuba and the Panama
canal zone. In a Spanish broadcast on the 18th by Soviet commentator
Levchenko, Kissin.ger's.proposal for creation of a "new Western
hemisphere community" was criticized as an attempt to "merely
renew the facade" of.inter, -Amer ica.n.relations without instituting
basic changes. On the issue of Cuba, Moscow noted that the foreign
ministers of Peru and Argentina called for an end to the blockade,
and claimed that they and ethers opposed the embargo on the grounds
that it contradicted present realities in Latin America as well as
international detente. 'TASS prcmptl.y reported on the 19th the U.S.
decision to authorize tha sale of automobiles to Cuba by Argentine
subsidiaries.
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APPEND I X
MOSCOW, PEKINe BROADCAST STATISTICS 3.5 - 21 APRIL 1974
Moscow (2599 items)
Peking (811 items)
Warsaw Pact Meeting
(1%)
14%
Ur;GA Special Session
(35%)
32%
[Communique
(--)
3%]
[Teng Hsiao-ping
(11%)
5%J
China
(5%)
6%
Speech, 10 April
Syrian President
al-Asad in USSR
(9%)
6ro
Criticism of Lin Piao
and Confucius
(8%)
11%
[Joint Statement
(--)
2%]
Japan
(1%)
6%
Supreme Soviet
Elections
(--)
5%
[)'RC-Japan Civil
Aviation Agreement
(_..)
4%]
Lenin Birth Anniversary
(--)
4%
Cambodia
(7%)
3%
May Day Slogens
(2%)
3%
USSR
(1%)
3%
UNGA Special Session
(8%)
3%
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.