TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 27, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
27 MARCH 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. i.) /
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CONFIDE NTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is b;tsotl exclusively on material
c;n?ritvl in foreign broadcast anti press media. It is published
by F11IS without coordination with other U.S. Covcrnmcnt
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SI':CURPrY INFORMATION
Unauthorised disclosure sul,ic-ct to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FB'ES TRENDS
27 MARCH 1974
C0NTEi'TS
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Looks for New Impetus to Detente in Kissinger Visit.
Moscow Continues to Plug for Stronger I Mideast Role. . . . . . . . . . 3
Soviet Bloc Media Hint Progress Possible in Unofficial Talks. . . . . 8
PRG Offers "New" 6-Point Proposal for Settlement in Soath . . . . . . 11
Hanoi Media Deny DRV Might Accept U.S. Conditions for Aid . . . . 14
Sihanouk's Front Observes Fourth Anniversary in Somber Mood . . . 16
Lao Clandestine CP Letter Marks 19th Anniversary . . . . . . . . 18
Moscow Reports Pham Van Dons Stopover En Route to Cuba. . . . . . . . 20
KOREA
DPRK Proposes Direct Peace Talks With United States . . . . . . . . . 21
Provincial :?edia Link Lin Piao to "Imper-J.aiist Atrocities'" . . . . . . 23
NOTES
PRC and :.evolution; Ceausescu on World Party Ccnference;
Soviet Arms in Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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-1-
U. S, -SOVIET R E L A T IONS
MOSCOW LOOKS FOR NEW IMPETUS TO DETENTE IN KISSINGER VISIT
Secretary of State Kissinger's arrival in Moscow on 24 March
provided Moscow an opportunity to demonstrate anew its persist-
ently bullish posture on relations with the United States and
to call for new measures to restore momentum to the process of
improving relations. Kissinger's visit provided a focus for
revival of some of the more glowing language about U.S.-Soviet
cooperation as the basis for world peace that was so prominent
in Moscow in the wake of the Washington summit last June.
Typical of such treatment was a widely broadcast 23 March
Yevgeniy Makarov commentary that spoke of the "new atmosphere"
in U.S.-Soviet relations as a result of a turn to "realism"
in U.S. policy. Makarov cited Brezhnev's remark last summer
that the two countries' economic and military might and
international influence "burden them with special responsibility
for the fate of universal peace and for prevention of war."
As has become typical for Kissinger's visits, Soviet media have
been positive but brief in their coverage, in contrast to the
extensive coverage given to visits by the two countries' top
leaders. Moscow's reporting of the 25 March luncheon remarks
by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Kissinger and of other aspects
of the visit underlined the businesslike and optimistic attitude
with which both sides were entering the talks.
Moscow's reaction to recent setbacks to U.S.-Soviet detente and
adverse developments within the United States in regard to some
of its economic and strategic goals has been to underline the
need to restore momentum to the process of improving relations.
As Podgornyy put it in early March, in welcoming new U.S.
Ambassador Stoessel to Moscow, "the important thing now is not
to relax efforts to further promote Soviet-American relations."
In the context of the Kissinger visit, Makarov made the same
point in his 23 March commentary: "Further progress in relations
between the Soviet Union and the United States is even more
important today, because the opponents of detente are stepping
up th,-.ir efforts."
The same posture has been evident in the strategic relationship.,
Moscow, after briefly registering its concern about statements
by Defense Secretary Schlesinger on missile targeting since
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Januavy, has resumed its customary public reticence on the
strategic aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, with the
exception of its traditional expressions of concern about the
size of the U.S. military budget. TASS and Moscow radio
reports of Kissinger's 21 March press conference in Washington
ignored the more cautious aspects of his remarks on SALT, as
reported in the Weste:?n press, while stressing his indications
of progress. As Mof;cow reported in a 22 March broadcast to
Great Britain, the Secretary "said that an agreement was
within sight."
That Moscow would find evidence of progress in East-West arms
limitation negotiations particularly timely now was implied
by Valentin Zakharov, who observed in a 26 March commentary:
"Every new barrier which can be raised against these anti-peace
forces as a result of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations and the
Vienna negotiations on the reduction of troops and arms would
be a plus for the cause of consolidating peace."
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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
MOSCOW CONTINUES TO PLUG FOR STRONGER MIDEAST ROLE
On the eve of Secretary Kissinger's arrival in Moscow on the 24th,
Soviet comment has placed renewed emphasis on the shared interests
of the Soviet Union and the United States in detente. But
minimal comment on the Arab-Israeli situation has continued to
stress that Moscow expects to take a more prominent part in
further Mideast peace moves. Thus TASS on the 21st, reporting
Kissinger?;:'s press conference that day, noted his remark that
the Unit,,.. States proceeded on the assumption that a Mideast
settlement would be impossible without the agreement of the
Soviet T:n,.on, and that the United States would strive to
cooperate with the USSR "wherever possible." A Losev commentary
broadcast to North America the following day seemed to
underscore the Secretary's remark, saying that "everyone now
recognizes" that a Middle East settlement "cannot be
attained'without the Soviet Union, much less against its
interests."
As if to underscore its role as an active participant in
Middle East affairs, Moscow announced on the 26th, as
Kissinger continued his talks in the Soviet Union, that
Syrian President al-Asad would pay an official visit to the
USSR in the first part of April--presumably to consult on the
forthcoming negotiations over disengagement on the Golan
front. And Soviet Defense Minister Grechko was reported as
winding up a "cordial official" three-day visit to Iraq
on the 26th. Soviet visitors to the Middle East were also
reported as cultivating contacts with various Palestinian
groups.
In the meantime, Moscow has continued to show concern over
indications of Western leanings in Egypt's economic and foreign
policies. Comment warning of imperialist and reactionary
influences in Egypt has moved up the scale of authority from
Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts to Moscow radio broadcasts
in Arabic and now to PRAVDA. On the 25th PRAVDA published a
TASS dispatch from Beirut reporting an appeal to the Egyptian
president from Lebanese public figures demanding an end to
Cairo press attacks against Nasir and his policies.
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SYRIA Setting the stage for President al-Asad's forthcoming
visit to Moscow, Soviet media continue to reiterate
that an agreement on disengagement can only be acc^.pted if
it is regarded as a first step toward total withdrawal. The
comment points to Israeli "military provocations" and "threats"
to Damascus as evidence that Tel Aviv has no intention of
accepting an overall settlement. A commentary in Arabic on
the 26th, stressing the importance of al-Asad's visit, urged
the Arabs and their friends to be wary in the light of Israel's
reluctance to return any captured Syrian territory.
A less one-sided view was presented in the Losev commentary
broadcast to North America on the 22d. Professing some optimism
about prospects for a settlement, it pointed to difficulties
likely to arise concerning the Golan Heights. Judging from
Israeli press reports, Losev said, Israel would resist any
demand for return of the town of al-Qunaytirah in the first
stage of disengagement--the first Soviet intimation that this
is one of Syria's negotiating demands. Losev indicated that
U.S. policy would be likely to decide the issue. Israel's
future course, he said, "will naturally depend in large measure"
on what Washington does. He noted that the Arabs still retained
some leverage to affect U.S. policy through their planned
reexamination of the oil embargo issue in June.
IRAQ Other than the communique released on the 26th, neither
'ioscow nor Baghdad has revealed any details of Defense
iinistar Grechko's 23-26 'larch visit to Iraq.* The communique
noted that a "comprehensive discussion" on cooperation in
military and other fields was held anti that the sides expressed
satisfaction with their military cooperation. The two parties
were also reported as satisfied with the development of their
"friendly" relations in line with the Soviet-Iraqi treaty.
The passage on the `fiddle East: identical with that contained
in the communique issued after Saddam ciusayn's 25-27 February
talks in Moscow, merely affirmed that peace in the region
could be established only through the liberation of all occupied
Arab territories and the securing of the national rights of
the Palestinians. (After Saddam Eusayn's Moscow visit, the
Baghdad paper ATH-THAWRAH on 1 March praised Soviet-Iraqi
relations 'despite disagreement or inconsistency in viewpoints
on certain matters,..")
Grecnko last visited Iraq 14-?17 December 1971.
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The communique obliquely indicated that Grechko's talks also
dealt with proble;ns arising out of the Iraqi Government's
11 arch announcement of autonoiay for Kurdistan as well as
with Iraqi-Iranian relations. During the visit, it said,
Greclrko was apprised of the "progressive social, political
and economic achievements taking place in Iraq in a manner
that serves the people's interest, the strengthening of
national unity, and the safeguarding of the country's
territorial security and sovereignty." This passage
appeared in Baghdad radio's "text" of the communique but
was absent front the available t(oscow versions.
Baghdad radio announced on the 25th that Soviet Internal
Affairs Minister Shhc.relolov would head a delegat,'.on to
Iraq on the 23th for a four-day official visit at the invitation
of his Iraqi counterpart. Soviet media have not as yet
reported the visit.
CONTACTS WITH 'Ioscow has continued to furbish its image
PALESTINIANS as a friend of the Palestinians since
Gromylco'u talks with Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir 'Arafat in Cairo and Damascus
early in March. While no date has been announced for 'Arafat's
"off iclal" visit to the .JSSP., said by Arab media to have
been proposed by Gromyko, several contacts between Soviet
middle-level officials and Palestinian representatives have
been publicized by "Ioscow.
IZVESTIYA on the 21st, for example, carried a dispatch fron,
correspondent :oryavin in Beirut reporting his meeting with
eight Pa.lastinians deported from the vilest Bank last Deccmber.*
The dispatch reported that the ei;::t represented a new
"patriotic political organization," the Palestine .National
Front, establish--a ii,. January in response to Israeli policies
in the occupied territories. IZVESTIYA described the front
as uniting the "broadest circles of the population" in the
occupied territories. It said the front regarded the PLO as
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians and
denied that the Palestinians in the occupied territories
* Apart from TROD and PRAVi.)A analyses late last spring of the
Lebanese-Palestinian clashes, the last major central press
articles on the Palestinians appeared in PRAVDA in August 1972
and in SOVIET RUSSIA in October that year. The c?-eekly NEW
TIRES :Zas also occasionally carried articles on the Palestinian
movement.
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followed a "different path" from those outside the West Bank
and Gaza. A generally consistent picture of the front had
been given by Cairo's AL-AHRAP[ in January. The Lebanese
Communist Party daily AN-NIDA' on 8 ;larch had also described
a similar organization, formed with communist participation,
but had dated its founding as last August.
Another meeting reported in the central press concerned the
visit of a USSR Supreme SoviQt delegation to Kuwait in late
February. According to an interview with the delegation leader
published in IZVESTIYA on 19 :[arch, the group had a talk
with members of the PLO office in Kuwait and leaders of
unions of Palestinian journalists, engineers, and lawyers.
Meetings between Soviet ambassadors in Mideast countries
and Palestinian representives have also been reported.
IZVESTIYA chief editor Tolkunov, visiting Beirut in mid-March
as part of a Mideast tour, was reported by the Lebanese CP
organ AN-NIDA' on 15 24arch as having reviewed "Pliddle East
and Palestinian issues" with Fatah central committee members
in a Soviet embassy meeting attended by Soviet .Ambassador
Azimov. Such meetings involving Azimov have been reported
before in Arab media, but seldom by ;[oscow.
The Soviet ambassador to Jordan was also reported to be
active. The Syrian news agency on 6 '.[arch reported him as
having outlined the USSR's concept of Palestinian "rights"
in an Anunan lecture the day before. While the ambassador's
lecture was not sported at the time by Soviet riedi.a, a
Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 23d?--apparently referring
to the same lecture--quoted him as saying the USSR considered
that "the first phase" in obtaining Palestinian rights should
be liberation of the Arab lands occupied in 1967, "so as to
give the Palestinians the opportunity to return to their lands,
to get compensation and self-determination." T1u. broadcast
also cited the ambassador as saying that Israel should
off.'cially recognize the Palestinians' national rights. The
Syrian news agency, but not the ![oscow broadcast, additionally
reported that the ambassador had declared that a just solution,
fro:a the Soviet point of view, "does not begin with the
destruction of Israel but in finding basic points to be
agreed on."
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Apart from reporting the ambassador's remarks, the Moscow
com?aentary on the 23d was at pains to build up the PLO's
image of respectability and legitimacy. It pointed out that
"patriotic forces" of the Palestinian movement deplored
terrorism, and it cited 'Arafat as saying that 103 countries
had recognized the PLO as the legitimate sole representative
of the Palestinian people. While asserting that the Soviet
union and other socialist countries supported the PLO, it
stopped short of indicating that the Soviet Union regarded
the PLO as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian
people.
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FORCE REDUCTIONS
SOVIET BLOC MEDIA HINT PROGRESS POSSIBLE IN UNOFFICIAL TALKS
De-spite the publicly avowed adherence to the rule of secrecy to
which both sides have agreed in the MBFR talks, the Soviets and
East Europeans have occasionally resorted to press leaks and
other manipulative tactics to influence public understanding
of the course of the talks and of Soviet positions on the issues.
The most notable example was the disclosure of the three-phase
Soviet proposal in November, which was made known to the press
in Vienna wiLhin days of its formal presentation. Two additional
cases have occurred in recent weeks: one a planted story
suggesting that good progress was being made in the "unofficial"
talks that have recently been organized to facilitate the formal
negotiations; the other an apparently indiscreet remark by a
Soviet commentator suggesting that the United States and the
Soviet Union could resolve their differences on a "bilateral
basis."? both seem calculated to raise public expectations concerning
the possibility of progress in the talks; they may have been timed
to take advantage of Secretary Kissinger's anticipated visit to
the USSR, the.i j?ist three weeks away.
INFORMAL NEGOTIATIONS The first item was an unsigned article,
obviously based on a Warsaw Pact leak,
which appeared in the 1 March Vienna paper WIENER ZEITUNG. Citing
a "well-informed source," the article noted that the NATO and Warsaw
Pact negotiators had agreed tr conduct informal explorations
outside the plenary MBFR meetings. The article pointed out that
there was a "good and businesslike" atmosphere at the talks, and that
a "new phase" of progress was promised by the inauguration of the
unofficial multilateral meetings. Mare importantl;v, it implied that
NATO had agreed to discuss the basic points of the Soviet November
proposal., which called for an across-the-board reduction of nuclear
armed forces, air forces, and national as well as foreign forces.
Moscow has refrained from commenting directly on the substance of
the WIENER ZEITUNG article, limiting its publicity to a singular
verbatim citation of almost the entire article in an 8 March
PRAVDA commentary by I. Melnikov. The East Europeans have been
less reticent. Since the beginning of the informal meetings in
February, Czech, East German, and Polish commentators have
strongly implied that the West is now ready to discuss the
contentious issues of the Soviet proposal, albeit in the unofficial
talks. The most direct assertion of this line appeared in the
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Polish army daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on 14 March. Reporting from
Vienna, PAP correspondent A. Rayzacher wrote that the informal
meetings were being "used also to discuss the reduction of
natic,nal armed forces and. armaments, air forces, and nuclear forces."
The East Europeans have not gone so far, however, as to suggest
that NATO has acquiesced in a formal discussion of the Soviet
demands.
Meanwhile, the maverick Romanians have gone public to demonstrate
their dissatisfaction with the unofficial meetings, which in
Bucharest's view would restrict its ability to participate fully
in Vienna. According to AGERPRES, the Romanian delegate at the
21 March plenary meeting charged that efforts to "elude the official
framework of the conference" and to discuss "basic issues" in
'unofficial forums" do not "contribute" to the smooth functioning of
the conference. Ceausescu personally aired this view in a 23 March
Vienna DIE PESSE interview, asserting that it is now "difficult" for
the public to evaluate the progress at Vienna because of. "certain
conditions . . . and trends in the framework of these talks."
U.S.-USSR "BILATERAL" The second item was a Moscow commentary on
WITHDRAWALS 1 March which broached for the first time
the possibility of a "bilateral" reduction
of forces in Europe by Washington and Moscow. The remark came in a
Moscow radio broadcast of the regular German-language feature
"military-political commentary" by Valentin Zakharov. Posing the
rhetorical question of why the West European governments even
bothered to send their delegations to Vienna if they were not
interested in reducing their forces, Zakharov remarked:
After all, a mutual reduction of troops of the
United States and of the Soviet Union stationed
in central Europe can certainly be decided on a
bilateral basis, as evidenced by the development
of the Soviet-American relationship.
This unprecedented statement by a Soviet commentator seems unlikely
to have been made without careful calculation. That it appears to
give substance to West European concerns about a Soviet-American
condominium--concerns which Moscow has been at pains to dispel in
other contexts--only tends to reinforce this conclusion. The
likeliest explanation is that it was intended to stimulate
suspicions in the Western camp concerning the purposes of Secretary
Kissinger's then projected visit to the USSR.
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U.S. ADMINISTRATION Moscow hay all but ignored the recent
STATEMENTS statements on the maintenance of U.S. forces
itt Europe made by President Nixon in Chicago
autd Houston on the 15th and 19th respectively, by Secretary Kissinger
at his press conference on the 21st, and by Vice President: Ford in
his exclusive REUT'ER interview of the 22d.* Thus Moscow has avoided
speculating on the possibility of a unilateral U.S. withdrawal of
forces from Europe if the United States and the West European
states cannot compose their various differences. Moscow has also
avoided self-initiated comment on the Nest European reaction to the
President.'; reuiarks, reaction which has included speculation on
the possibility of a Washington-Moscow bilateral move to reduce forces
ouLsidc the context of the MBF negotiations.
* For a review of Moscow comment on the President's recent statements
see the TRENDS for 20 March 1974, pages 7-8.
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INDOCHINA
PRG OFFERS "NEW" SIX-POINT PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH
The content and presentation of a "new" six-point plan for implementation
of the Paris agreement, set forth in r 22 March PRG statement, suggest
that the proposal constitutes a new propaganda platform, rather than
a genuine effort to end the fighting in Vietnam and the deadlock in
the PRG-GVN negotiations. The proposal contains much harsher criticism
of the Saigon government than did two similar PRG plans--promulgated
on 25 April and 28 June 1973--and it wary released in the form of a
government statement, rather than in a report on its presentation at
the bilateral consultations with the GVN in Paris as in the case of
the earlier proposals.*
While extolled in accompanying propaganda as a "great overture" and
a "very important contribution" toward achieving a settlement, the
latest prbposal for the most part recapitulates the programs contained
in the two earlier six-point PRG proposals. It omits some of the
concrete suggestions for implementation made last June, but adds a
new element with the suggestion of a specific interval in which
elections in South Vietnam should take place.
The PRG appeared to give renewed attention to the negotiations with
the GVN by announcing on the 23d that its chief delegate to the talks,
Nguyen Van II{,u, recently had left Vietnam to return to Paris. (Hieu
left Paris on 10 January, and is said to have been reporting to the
Pi:G ;end its Advisory Council on the status of negotiations.)
4- The 22 March proposal's first point, calling for an immediate
ceasefire, advocates that both sides issue government appeals and
military orders calling for a cease-fire, that these appeals and
orders be disseminated by the media of both sides, that the ICCS be
informed of the cease-fire agreement and be given assistance to super-
vise it, and that the participants in the international conference on
Vietnam also be informed. The earlier PRG six-point plans had not
included such a scenario, instead urging the implementation of the
cease-fires already called for in the Paris agreement and the 13 June
joint communique.
* Tiese earlier PRG six-point proposals are discussed in the TRENDS
of 2 May 1973, pages 11-13, and 5 July 1973, pages 7-11.
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The current 1'RG statement (loco not raise several specific pro-
posals for Implementing the cease-fire tiuut were contained in
the April and June 1973 six-point L11itt:!LLvec3. Thus, it does not
call for the pullback of military forceH to positions held before
the 28 January 1973 sign Lug of the peace agreement, urge Lc.u rapid
delineation of respective zones of control., or specify that commanders
of opposing units should meet to reach agreement on measures to (avert
further conflict. It is not clear why these demands were dropped;
they had been voiced officially as r.ucctttl,y as 1.7 January, In a
stafcrncr.;: by the I'RG Foreign Ministry spokesman commenting on it GVN
cease-fire proposal.
? The second of the current I'IG points, deal lug with the disposition
of civilian and military prisoners, adds some new (laments to pre-
vious I'RG proposals. Whereas the April. and June proposals dealt
only with civilian prisoners held since before the peace agreement
was signed, the current six points cover military as well as civilian
prisoners,and Include those "captured and detained since 28 January
1973." All there prisoners, it maintains, should be returned "within
three months, by 30 June at the latest."
In line with the generally harsher tone of the current proposal.,
the second point does not simply reiterate calls for humane treatment
of prisoners pc,tding their return but instead demands that Saigon
"immediately stop inhumanely torturing, killing, or mistreating the
detainees" and that it "Improve its extrcmel.y cruel prison system."
It repeats earlier proposals that national Red Cross societies
Inspect the prisons.
The April and June six-point plans had made, no reference to the
number of prisoners allegedly held by Saigon. However, the current
PRG statement charges that the GVN Is detaining more than 200,000
civiian and 15,000 military personnel captured before 28 January
1973, The figure of 200,000 civilians has been used rel.eatedly by
the communists, but the claim that Saigon has kept 13,000 military
prisoners has rarely been made until recent months. The figure of
15,000 military prisoners was used in an LPA commentary last August
and appeared this year, for example, in the TRG Foreign ;linistry
"document" on the implementation of the peace agreement, issued on
22 January, and in a 14 March PRG Foreign Ministry statement on
the prisoner question.
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4 The third point of the new proposal briefly rUftertites tile
det7nnds in the nix points of June and April for guarantees of
"democratic liberties." However, the fourth poi.tlt--ori the National
Council for National, ltcconcliinti.o?t and Cr+ncor.d--dcprtrt:ti considerably
from the content of List Juno's I'M; init tat Lye. The. June rroposal
had stipulated in detail the iortuttton, structure, and functions
of the National Council, nuggcnting th..tt It be given virtually the
powers of it coalition government, with author+.ty over till contending
rarticu. The current plan merely notca that the third fcrcc must
be given it proper poellt?an in the Council and citoe the Council's
tasks as specified in .r.ticle l2 (li) of the Paris agreement. It
proposed that the Council hi, formed within three months after a
cease-fire; last June the P1W urged that the Council be formed
within it month,
While the i.'RG's retreat; from its more specific demands on the
Council's functioning could be viewed as it conciliatory move, the
less precise content of the current proposal may simply reflect the
PRG's cst.imatc that there Is no likelihood of detailed negotintiont:
in the near future on the formation of the Council.
+ In the fifth point, addressed to the question of general elections,
the PRG for the first time suggests that elections be held within
one year aftcr formation of the National Council. Earlier, vaguer
proposals had simply called for holding elections as soon as possible
after implementation of the cease-fire and guaranteeing of liberties,
and the PRG has resisted Saigon efforts to fix a date for elections.
The 1'RG statement reiterateu the communist position, stated in the
previous six-point proposals, that the elections would choose a
constitutcnt aKsembly that would draft a constitution and set up an
official government.
+ The i'Rc: statement's sixth point deals with the question of dis-
position of the Vietnamese armed forces in much the same manner
as did earlier PRG plans. This point repeats the content of Article
13 of the peace agreement, which stipulated that the two sides
should settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in the South
and that their discussions would include such questions as measures
to reduce military effectives and demobilize the troops being reduced.
Consistent with communist opposition to Saigon efforts to accelerate
implementation of this article--which is intended to resolve the
problem of the North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam--the PRG
statement suggests no deadline for completing the military reduction.
CQ;
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27 MARCII 1974
REACTION 10 Hanoi rutiponded to the r'R!l statement with a 23
PRG STATEMENT March DRV Government statement nssertLng that
the new proposal would open the wily for prugrdss
tit the PRG-GVN 1alh-n and Insure thr scrupulous Implementation of
the Paris ug;-cetncnr.. The DRV st;ttemctrt demanded flint. Saigon respond
seriously to Or-, "very convt:r.uctlve'' propcitraI curd that the r'nited
States end leer involvement in Vietnam and "I,c runponttible ;:s_;' making
the Saigon administ?raLion scrup,ulouttly implement all provisions
the Paris agreement." Other North Vietnamese commune included a.
NIIAN DAN editorial, on the 23c1 which claimed that the P1W proposal
contained "many new r,nd practical. points based on the developments
that have taken place in South Vietnam over the past year and in
response to the pressing demands of the people of various strata."
PEKING, MOSCOW Reflecting Its usual restraint on Vietnam deve.lop-
RESPONSLS ments, Pekin,; backed the 1'RG and DRV government
statements with ;a bland 26 March PI.011LE'S DAILY
Commentator article--the lowest level of authoritative PRC comment.
While voicing support for tbu t'RG's six points, the article focused
its mild crLi1cism on the Saigon reglmc and gave only tangential
treatment to the United States. Pekin}; notably failed to repeat its
usual specific demand that Washington adhere to the Paris
agreement, employing this time a vague formula specifying merely
that the agreement's provision,-; must be thoroughly implemented.
NCNA earlier replayed versions of thv PPP nnd DRV statements that
omitted harsh critici:.w of the N!xnn Administra:lon.
Moscow promptly sumrnarized the PRC's six-point proposal in a TASS
report on the 22d. A 24 Maid; ThSS review of the Soviet central
press noted that "much scope" was gtve:t the 1'RG's "new Initiative"
rind that PRAVDA had commented Lhat the prc'posa 1 paved the way for
"genuine peace." The six points; were alt;(.) endorsed tri a 25 March
TASS commentary assailing alleged Saigon violations of the Paris
accord.
HANOI MEDIA DENY DRV MIGHT ACCEPT U.S. CONDITIONS FOR AID
Hanoi has responded angrily and with apparent sensitivity to news
reports suggesting that North Vietnam has been conslderirg accepting
WashLngcon'8 conditions for U.S. postwat aid to the North. The issue
was raised first in a 24 March Hanoi radio commentary in Vietnamese,
reacting to a 10-day-old news item, and subsequently discussed along
similar lines in a commentary published in NHAN DAN on 27 March.
Such attacks on reports suggesting a DRV-U.S. deal on the aid question
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have appeared only occasionally In Ilun.,i media during the past
year, although propaganda regularly complains of U.S. failure to
abide by Its "oblignLlon" to aid the North. Ilanoi, last indicted
U.S. aid policies in detail In a DRV Foreign Ministry "document"
cleased in January which reviewed the work of the U.S.-DRV Joint
LconomLc Commission, claiming that it had decided In June on the
details of an aid pro,grnm but that tIi United States impotued
''political conditions" to avoid signing or ngreement.?a'
The 24 March radio commentary was pegged to a 14 March report
from a REUTER Paris correspondent which, according to Itanoi,
cited U.S. officials as stating that "North Vietnam had manifested
its desire; to receive $1 billion in aid from the United States in
exchange for it promise not to initiate or support major military
offenbives in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos." The radio also
quoted REUTER ne stating that the U.S. officials maintained that
"this is why" liunoi recently rci:urned the remains of 23 U.S. pilots
and has referred to the possibility of normalizing relations with
the United Stares.
Denouncing the U.S. officials' statements as it "fabricated story,"
Lite radio accused Lite United States of trying to deceive the pua ,lic,
cover up "the fact that the United States an:' the Saigon administration
are seriously violating the Paris agreement," and a-,-tide "the 1t.8.-Thieu
clique's responsibility for causing the present tense situation in
South Vietnam and Indochina." The commentary maintained that the
Jniteu States has an "obligation" to contribute to "healing the
wounds of war" in North Vietnam, and clamed that Washington had
"'pledged that this contribution will be unconditional.." The radio
also assailed Lite United States for setting "one condition after
another" for resumption of meetings by the joint U.S.-DRV economic
commisr.iion.
The 27 March NNAN DAN article similarly outlined U.S. responsibilities
and pledges. It commenter' with regard to the news report that "the
Nixon Administration has sht:.m its very bad intent in releasing odious
fabrications against the DRV" through U.S.. officials.
BACKGROUND Late last summer Hanoi responded officia 1) to U.S.
statements on conditions for U.S. aid. Thus, for
example, an 11 September 1973 DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement denounced "U.S. authorities" foe declaring that the United
* The DRV document," first publicized on 17 January, is discussed
in the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, pages 16-18.
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Stater; would not fulfill, it.y obl..i.gation to aid ;:hc DRV so long
an Han ii did not properly Ltplolnrant: Article 8 (13) of the Paris
agreement, which calls for cooperestion in obtaining ;information
and returning than remains of personnel. Listed as missing in action.
On 6 August ; I,)RV Fur.el.g,n Ministry spokesman Hcored remarks by a
U.S. State 0epartmwant. spokesman three days earlier that the United
Staters would provide no roconHtructton assistance to Lite DRV until
Hanoi fu.lly observed Lite cease-fi.re in Indochina and Congress
appropriated the money. Responding even more explicitly, a 5 August
NIUAN DAN commentary had denounced Lite United States for linking
tile stalemate In the joint economic talks with the situation to
Cambodia and declared th;;;t Washington "may not pose preconditions"
for aycsistance or link it. to "Lite situation elsewhere."
SIH44NOUK'S FRONT OBSERVES FOURTH ANNIVERSARY IN SOMBER MOOD
Faced with Lite current Cambodian military stalemate, Prince Sihanouk's
Front tl;t:; year marked the fourth annLvcrs;cry of Lite. Front and its
insurgent army In it markedly more somber atmosphere possibly reflect-
ing a realization that their utruggle may be protracted. The in-
surgents' main backers; in Hanoi and Peking have further reduced
their public support in treating this year's anniversary, while
Moscow media gave it inrrrased attention compared with 1973. The
Front's :sober propaganda for this year's atinivcr:tary contrasts with
Lite optimLsm of late 1973 that the current dry season offensive
would ga'?n a decisive victory, suggesting that Front policies may
be under review in Lite light of Lite military stalemate. Possibly
related to tills was Lite 24 March announcement that RGNU Defense
Minister Khieu Samphan would make his first publicized vis:,;;
outside Cambodia since Lite Front was formed to 1970, Khieu S;imphan
will pay an off I;ial visit to the DRV "in Lite near future," accord-
ing to a DRV Foreign Ministry communique broadcast by Hanoi on
the 24th.
11osting a 23 March anniversary banquet in Cantor attended by PRC
provincial lcadct-;, Sihanour. struck a sober note in assessing the
present situation, according co NCNA's report of Lite conclave.
Observing that the Front is struggling not only against Lon Nol
but also the Un;,ted States--"the biggest imperialism in the world".-
the princa' warned that there may be "protracted" struggle that "will
continue for several more years." NCNA's brief rfndition of Sihanouk's
remarks also disclo!~ecd that he remained firm on the settlement question,
promising Front resolve to persevere in fighting without compromise or
retreat until complete liberation.
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kGNU Prlmct Minister Penn Nouth'9 23 March appeal. e,n the anniversary
similarly blamed U.S. support to Phnom Penh in explaining the Front's
failure to topple Lon Nol. llc took special note of the "largo
amount" and "various types" of U.S. assistance, which he said allowed
Lite "clique of traitors" "Lo Hurvive this e1gon.Tzing situation for
Lite time being." The appeal.'t, rationale had been employed three
clays earlier by an RG";U Propaganda and Information Ministry statement
which focuHud on alleged intensified U.S. aid to Phnom Penh "since
Lite beginning of the current dry season."
Penn Noutit also harshly denounced alleged U.S. maneuvers urging
unspecified third countries to pressure tite Front to reconcile w! :,h
Lon Nol. Sustaining it firm settlement stance, Nouth affirmed that
"we resolutely oppose all nrrang=:.Ints and reconciliation with the
traitorous clique" and assailed "the U.S.-style peace, which is n
fake peace," lie affirmed that it settlement must conform to the
Front's five: points.
PEKING, NANOI Peking's coverage of the anniversary generally
SUPPORT confort-iicd with its low key commemoration last
year, whcr. Sihanouk wns also absent from the
capital. However, this year for the first time the usual PRC
leaders' message: was not carried by NCNA. The message, addressed
by Tung Pl-wu and Chou En-lea to Sihanot' and Penn Nouth, has thus
far been monitored only in Peking radio s French service to South-
east Asia and Peking's Cambodian service--both obviously focused on
the Indochin'se audience. Tung and Chou duly hailed the Front's
"people's war" under the ieadersi:ip of "head o: state" Sihanouk
and promised to be the Front's "powerful support" and to "strongly
back" the struggle until total victory. The message mentioned the
insurgents' striving for achievement of t1-e five prints, but avoided
any direct PRC endorsement of the Front settlement position.
Reflecting Peking's altered assessment of the ('ambodinn situation
and the U.S. role there, in the wake of last Aub'cst's U.S. bombing
halt, the companion PECPLE'S DAILY editorial, unlike last year's
anniversary editorial, did not focus on "U.S. intervention and
aggression" as the "key" element to the persisting Cambodian problem.
A 23 March Peking reception attended by the RGNU foreign minister
p.oc1u ed a Chines" leadership turnout at : level similar tc last
year, but it was sidressed by the RGNU ambassador and a Chinese
vice foreign minister, in contrast to 1973, when the PRC and RGNU
foreign minis;Etrs spoke.
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North Vietnamese coverage of the anniversary, publicizing
the uaual l.w aura' message, 1411AN DAN editorial, and RCNU ambassador's
reception in Hanoi, was noticeably more low key than last year.
The lenders' message ii d bri.cf reports on remarks by Le Thnnh Nghi
dL the ambassador's reception were much less effusive than last
year, omitting promised to stand in the "same trench" with the
Front against the United States, references to the Front's
'unprecedented victories of strategic significance," and the promise
Lo "assl8L" the insurgents. Only the NIIAN DAN editorial specifically
reaffirmed Hanoi's promise of assintance while offering a
gLncralized pledge of support.
Hanoi duly backed thy, five points and hailed Sihanouk as "head of
state," but IL failed Lo repeat last year's characterization of
the prince a:3 the "representative of the legaliky, legitimacy, and
the continuity of the Cambodian state." however, Hanoi comment did
routinely identify the RGNU as the "sole, legal and genuine government
of they Cambodian people," and attack the chief Phnom Penh leaders by
name.
MOSCOW TREATMENT Reflecting its movement toward closer relations
with Sihanouk's government over the past year,
!loscow gave -Increased attention to the anniversary. In contrast to
1973, when the anniversary drew only a PRAVDA article, this year
Moscow publiciz,d a 1'odgornyy message to Sihanouk, a signed article
in IZVESTIYA on the "ch, a 22 March TASS commentary, and a 22 March
report of a Koscow public meeting in support o` the Front. Podgornyy's
message noted that the Soviet pe-.ple have invariably sided with the
Cambodian "patriots" and expressed confidence that relations between
the two peoples "will continue to dev'lop." IZVESTIYA pledged that
the Soviet people "have always supported and continue to support the
Khmer patriots' struggle for freedom and independenc:," while the
TASS commentary duly noted Front achievements under the leadership of
"head of state" Sihanouk.
LAO CLANDESTINE CC.M'IUNIST PARTY LETTER MARKS 19TH ANNIVERSARY
For at least the last three years a Pathet Lao point-to-point radio-
teletype circuit has carried a letter from the secretary general of
the clandestine Lao communist party, the Lao People's Party (LPP), mark-
ing the anniversary of the party's founding. Each year the trans-
mitision carried instructions that the letter be broadcast on the
Pa'chet Lao radio's dictation-speed prL,gram. This year's letter :aas
monitored from the point-to-point radioteletype circuit on 21 March
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CONVI1)EN'rIAL FIiiS 'T'RENDS
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and from the cllctnIion-spend Voicccast In two l.nstal.1.ment8 on the
22d and 23c.I. The Pathet Lao radlu did, not repeat the letter on its
ot:l-tr programs, however, and in fact there Is no previous monitored
reference to the 1,1111 or. Its members In 1'athet Lao media meant for
general d.Issenrination.* The secretary gerrhral of the LPP is Kayson
I'homvI.han but when ho is mention?,!d In the media he in Identified in
his role of v.-.ce chairman of the Lao Patriotic Front rather than in
hill party post.** As In the last two years, the anniversary letter
was signed by LPN Sec re Lary General "Vlengsny"--n pseudonym Knyson
t'Irourv than .in known to use.
SUBSTANCE OF The letter endorrred the political settlement In
LETTER Laos over the past year, expressing support for
the creation of n provisional coalition government.
At the sane time iL used more militant rhetoric than LPF statements,
and called arttcItrcion to continuing revolutionary tasks. Thus, it
held that past victorlas would provide "a firm base for the expansion
of our revolution In peacetime" and described the "liberated zone"
as a "strong fortress for the revolution" and an "independenL state."
Elsewhere'.t advocated encouraging "the people's struggle moven.,?nts"
in areas under the control of the Royal Lao Government as one action
necessary to preserve peace and achieve t`:e national democratic
revolution. In addition to routinely denouncing "the U.S.
Imperialists," the letter went beyond the usual Pnthct Lao line to
yarn that there remains a "possibility of the resumption of the war
In our country by the U.S. Imperialists and their hirelings."
While d,r1y praising the "hei},l;tened" prestige of the LPF, the letter
echoed earlier anniversary messages in hailing the LPP as the
organizer and guide of "every achievement of the Lao revolution."
It claimed that the Lao party has "excellent relations" with other
communist parties and expressed thinks for the assistance of "all
fraternal parties, the Vietnam Workers Party in particular."
* Presumably, the 1'!tter was aired on the dictation speed radio
program the past two years, but FRIS did not cover those programs.
however, the TRENDS of 28 March 1973, pages 12-13, presents a dis-
cussion of the anniversary letter and background information on the
Lao communist party.
** For example, reports of Kayson Phomvihan meetings during the
past year with North V-Ietnam party chief and fast European communist
leaders visiting Sam Neua identified him as Lao Patriotic Front vice
chairman.
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27 MARCH 1974
MOSCOW REPORTS PHAM VAN DONG STOPOVER EN ROUTE TO CUBA
The three-day stopover in Moscc;d of a DRV delegation led by Premier
Pham Van Dong provided an occasion for the Soviet leadership to
reaffirm its solidarity with the DRV-rRG stand on the "full and
precise realization" of the Paris accords. Moscow media generally
have given low-key attention to the situation in Vietnam since the
last high-level Vietnamese visit, when PRG leader Nguyen Huu The
led a delegation to the USSR last December.* In the intervening
period the anniversary of the signing of the Paris agreement, on
27 January, and a DRV note on the anniversary of the act of the
lnteraatloual conference on Vietnam, in early March, have prompted
commentaries in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA routinely condemning alleged
violations of the peace accord. More recently, a RED STAR article
on 20 March denounced alleged Saigon violations and U.S. military
aid to the GVN, specifically citing reports on the U.S. delivery
of F-5E Jets.
During their 19-21 March stay in Moscow, Pham Van Dong and DUV
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh held "friendly and cordial"
talks with Soviet Premier Kosygin and reportedly examined questions
of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. PRAVDA's report on the 20 March
talks quotes Kosygin as declaring Soviet support to the DRV-PRG
efforts for implementation of the Paris accords cn "a just settle-
ment of the internal political problems" of South Vietnam--suggesting
the talks, coming two days before the release of the latesi: six-point
PRG proposal, dealt in part with the search (or a settlement in
South Vietnam. According to PRAVDA, Dong also informed the Soviet
premier about the decisions adopted by the VWP Central Committee's
22d plenum and the work of the fourth session of the DRV National
Assembly with regard to DRV economic rehabilitation.
The PRAVDA report on the talks appeared to deliberately obscure
whether the Soviet side went on record with even a mild condemnation
of U.S. attitudes. After quoting remarks by Dong--and before citing
Kosygin's views--the paper observed that "it was etnphas:.zed" that
an abnormal situation with serious cbmplications persists in South
Vietnam as a result of Saigon actions "bccked by imperialist circles
in the United States." A 23 March Moscow domestic service broadcast
identified both Kosygin and Dong with this allusion to "circles" in
the United States; however, VNA's report on the talks only quoted
Dong as criticizing the United States.
* Soviet statements at the time of the Nguyen Huu Tho visit are
discussed in the TRENDS of 4 January 1974, pages 4-6, and 19 December
1973, pages 15-16.
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KOREA
DPRK PROPOSES DIRECT PEACE TALKS WITH UNITED STATES
A North Korean announcement on 25 March that Pyongyang was ready
to enter direct talks with the United States on a peace agreement
to replace the "outdated" 1953 Korean armistice agreement appears
to stem in part from DPRK dissatisfaction with its sporadic
negotiations with Seoul. The proposal also seems to he a
tactical maneuver aimed at regaining the propaganda initiative
seized by Seoul on 18 January, when it called for a North-South
nonaggression pact. The proposal for U.S.-DPRK negotiations was
announced by Foreign Minister Ho Tam at a 25 March session of the
Supreme People's Assembly.
The substance of the Pyongyang proposals suggests they were made
largely for propaganda advantage: the DPRK offer is predicated
on the elimination of U.S. military and political influence in
South Korea, demanding a virtual capitulation of U.S. positions
in the ROK as a precondition for a North Korean "pledge"--with no
provisions for enforcement--that it would not attack the United
States nor expand its military capabilities. Under Pyongyang's
proposal, the United States would be committed to withdraw all
U.S. troops from South Korea "at the earliest possible date along
with all their weapons" and to agree not to interfere "in any
form" in the internal affairs of Korea. The proposal recommends
the appointment of delegates at "a rank higher than those of the
Korean Military Armistice Commission" to attend talks at
Panmunjom or in a third country.
Pyongyang has made no secret of its dissatisfaction with the
North-South Korea talks over the past year, but there is no
indication in the new proposal that these stalemated talks would
be interrupted in favor of U.S.-DPRK negotiations. The fifth
session of the current series of North-South meetings of the
Coordination Committee's vice chairmen was held on 27 March and
another is scheduled for 24 April. Ho Tam's reference to the
talks sounded a pessimistic note regarding the level of antagonism
between the two sides, warning that "the dialog between the North
and South has come to the verge of rupture and the situation is
moving to division, not reunification, and to war, not peace."
Thus far there has been little communist comment on the DPRK
proposal, though NCNA has transmitted extensive excerpts of the
SPA letter and pertinent excerpts from Ho Tam's report. TASS has
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- 22 -
carried three brief dispatches on the letter, and a 'PASS review
of IZVESTIYA for 27 March noted that a Yuriy Shtykanov article
hailed the "new, major initiative" as being in the interest of
peace. A PAP report of a DZIENNIK LUDOWY commentary expressed
hope that U.S. officials would examine the SPA document "without
emotions or prejudices."
BACKGRYUND For the past 17 years offic4.1 North Korean efforts
to prompt a U.S. withdrawal have centered on the
conclusion of P peace agreement with South Korea. In September
1957 North Korean president and party leader Kim Il-song proposed
that an agreement be signed and the armed forces of the twc sides
"be reduced drastically after all foreign troops are withdrawn
from our country." in a more specific offer, the North Korean
Government announced in June 1970 that after a U.S. withdrawal the
two sides could conclude an agreement and reduce the size of their
armed forces to 100,000 or less. Two years later Pyongyang
modified its position, asserting that an agreement could precede
withdrawal. In a report to the SPA session in April 1973,
Premier kim I1 proposed the conclusion of a peace agreement that
would guarantee among other things the eventual withdrawal of
U.S, forces. As a further inducement, a letter sent to all
foreign governments and parliaments by the SPA at the same time
announced that "if the U.S. forces pull out of South Korea, we are
willing to reduce our army strength to 200,000 or less of our owr
accord."
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CHIi1A
PROVINCIAL MEDIA LINK LIN PIAO TO "IMPERIALIST ATROCITIES"
During the past month several PRC provincial radios have broadcast
lurid accounts of past imperialist atrocities commited in China,
in each case using a local atrocity stor; to point out that Lin
Piao was colluding with Soviet social-imperialism to drag China
back to an era when such :.ncidents were possible. The broadcasts
appear to be aimed at, boJ.;atering enthusiasm for the anti--Lin and
Confucius campaign by suggesting the horrors that would have be-
fallen the Chinese people had Lin and his followers not been ousted.
The stories evidently are based on local legends or events, and
thus the Japanese--who were probably most guilty of atrocities--have
been most frequently mentioned in local accounts. However, the
examples do not appear aimed at harming Peking's relations with
Japan or western nations formerly active in China. The silence of
Peking central media on the subject, at a time when provincial
radios are responding on a fairly wide scale, suggests that while
Peking approves the campaign, it recognizes the sensitivity of the
issue and wishs'r, to limit the campaign to less authoritative media.
Alleged U.S. involvement in atrocities has 'thus far been limited to
tangential references in two provincial broadcasts--Kweirhow on
2 March and Szechwan r)n 12 March--which denounced local concentration
camps run during the war years by "U.S.-Chiang special agents." The
Yunnan provincial radio on 22 March carried the most inflamatory
atrocity account, which concerned a camp where Chinese children
vere used in medical experiments, tortured, boiled in oil and even
eaten, but the broadcast did not try to identify a particular villain,
instead blaming "imperialists" in general. The brcaL;rtast credited
"our savior Chairman Mao and the communist party" with changing
these conditions and giving the survivors "a second life."
Jap.ai:ese war atrocities were featured in several recent broadcasts
reviving memories of past imperial transgressions in China. Typically,
a 21 March Foochow report recalled Japanese war crimes to illustrate
that Lin Piao was a "traitor" and a "deadly enemy" who wanted to
return to the conditions of "old China" and let imperialists "fire
their guns at us once again." The broadcast only referred to "Japanese
militarism" in a historical context and avoided forecasting a. revival
of militarism in present-day Japan, as had been done routinely before
Peking-Tokyo relations were normalized in 1972.
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Judging by a recent PEOPLE'S DAILY article, broadcast by Radio
Peking on 23 March, the provincial accounts of :iapanese atrocity
stories are not meant to signal any change in the status of Sino-
Japanese relations today. The article attacked "Seirankai," a
rightist group within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, for
openly clamoring fora revival of Japanese militarism," but it
was careful to reflect Peking's continuing regard for its special
relationship with Japan. After noting that the war launched by
Japanese militarists in 1937 "ib still -learly remembered by the
Chinese people," the article characterized Prime Minister Tanaka's
1972 Peking visit normalizing relations as part of the general
trend toward friendship between the Chinese and Japanese people,
a trend "nobody can hold back."
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NOTES
PRC AND, REVOLUTION: Chou En-tai's renewed pledge of PRC support
for world revolutionary struggics--[n n 24 March speech at n
Peking banquet for Tanzanian President Nyercre--was the first:
such reaffirmation since CLou's report to the 10th CCP Congress,
in which he pledged that Peking would uphold "proletarian
Internationalism" and strengthen unity with the "proletariat
and the oppressed people and nations of the whole world." Such
broad vows of Peking support have become rare since Peking began
strengthening tics with the West, but have appeared from time to
time as the occasion warranted. Most notably, only one rn nth
after President N:xon's February 1972 visit to China, Chou
declared in no unc-rtaln terms at a banquet for Cambodian Prince
Sihanouk that China would continue to support the struggles of
the Indochinese, Aruhs, 'third World and "all the oppressed
nations and peoples." Chou cited the authority of Mao's teachings
to affirm that "the Chinese people have always regarded it as
their bounden internationalist duty to support the revolutionary
struggle of the people of all countries," and added that Peking
will stand forever with oppressed peoples and nations throughout
the world and "together with them wage a joint aLruggle."
CEAUSESCU ON WORLD PARTY GONFERENU:: Against the b;fZkg;' )und of
recent public endorsements by the leaders of Moscow'n f:'.ve
orthodox East European allies: favoring preparations tai a new
Moscow-sponsored world conference of communist parties, Romania's
Ceausescu has now gone on record as favoring international
conferences "in principle." fie hedged his endorsement: with so
many caveats, however, that it amounts to not ..och more than
damning the idea with faint praise. In an interview published in
the Vienna DIE PRESSE on 23 March anal summarized by AGERPRES,
Ceausescu asserted that an international meeting must be in the
interests of each party and must "in no way impair the autonomy
and independence" of any party. fle added that any conference must
allow "a free exchange of opinions" which would "in no way" lead
to a discussion of another party's policies. Alluding to some of
the difficulties at the 1969 Moscow conference, Ceausescu declared
that if any conference adopted .t joint document, "it must be prepared
with the consent of everyone; under no circumstances, however, can
it become obligatory for anyone." His remarks follow the recent
article by RCP Secretary Burtica in the first March issue of the
party's theoretical journal, ERA SOCIALISTA, which set forth in
unequivocal terms Buchare.L's independent views on how multilateral
party conferences should he conducted.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENT IAL FillH TRENDS
27 MARCH 1974
soyIL "C AI4F1SIN PEW) : 'Clle rust ictwwn Moscow acknowledgement
that Soviet mil.l.triry equipment has been supplied to Peru
appeared in a ttoscow cotrdnenUiry, hrondcntat in Portuguese
and Spnnicth to Latin America on 22 and 23 March. Denying
foreign prCHH c.laimtt that Soviet military hales were being
cotabliHhed in Peru, the commentary went nn to note that
Peruvian Prez hLcnt Vclasco Alvarndo lend conceded under
questioning at a 13 March pre_t.ts conference that the Soviet
Union had supplied Peru with arms. It quoted the president
an saying that "tile Peruvian Government had no intention
or conceding its purchases of Soviet arms," and that Peru
had been "forced to take this step because of the arms race
started by neighbors." The commentary added that this was
a defensive measure prompted by Chile's purchase of arms
from the United States, !Jest Europe, and Israel. Although
:loscow .is generally reluctant to publicize Soviet arms
deliveries to other countries, the current departure is
apparently aimed at reinforcing the image of Moscow's
support for the Peruvian military government. The
cornnentaiy Indicated that the current campaign against
Peru is be.tnl waged by "forces" seeking to discredit Peru's
"progressive regime" and halt the socio-economic changers which
have occurred In that country.
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VI) IS' TRENDS
21 MARCH 1914
A P P E N D I X
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST S'T'ATISTICS 18 - 24 MARCH 1.974
Moscow (2F32(, i.tctttrr
Indochina (1%)
[ Thorn Van 1)ony, 1n (--)
USSR
(4th Anniversary of (--)
Cambodian Front
Chinn (5%)
Chile (2%)
Brezhnev Alma-Ata Spcec%t (7Y,)
Norwegian Premier (--)
13ratelli in USSR
Arab-Israeli issue (3%)
RAPS() Meeting, Baghdad (--)
1'cktiig (I(U)5 Iterrtr,'
97. Crimbodln (1%) 13%
47.J ISlluinoulc in Litor~ (l ) 5%]
and URV
3%J [4th Anniversary (--) 4%]
of Cambodian Front
6% Criticism of Lin Vino (12%) 8%
5% and Confucius
4% PRC/Cuinca-Nissan (--) 7%
4% Diplomatic Relations
USSR (2%) 3%
3% [PItC Foreign (--) 2%)
3% Ministry Note
Protesting I1e1i-
copter Intrusion
These statistics are bused on the voicecast cununentary output of the Moscow and
Poking domestic. and International radio services, The term "conmmentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries,
r igures hi parentheses Indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topic:; and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior issues:
in other cases the {.ropaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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