TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 13, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
rB's
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
13 FEBRUARY 1974
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
cerried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECUR?TY INi'ORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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13 FEBRUARY 1974
CONTENTS
NUCLEAR STRATEGY
Moscow Scores Schlesinger, Debates Role of Nuclear Weapons
FORCE REDUCTIONS
Moscow Blames West European States for Slowing Mb:R . , . . .
5
Moscow Says European Defense Schemes Incompatible Wi b MBl',R . .
6
ENERGY CRISIS
USSR Predicts Washington Conference Will Fail. . . . . . . . . .
8
INDOCHINA
DRV National Ae??:mbly Sets Guidelines for Economic Recovery . .
12
U.S.-CUBA
Moscow Hints Support for Normalized U.S.-Cuban Relations . . .
16
CHINA
Anti-Confucius Campaign Builds Momentum; Cadres Must Lead . .
17
YUGOSLAVIA
Bili Speech Denounces New "Centralist" Faction. . . . . . .
19
NOTE
Campaign Against Solzhenitsyn . . . . . . . .
21
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . .
i
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NUCLEAR STRATEGY
MOSCOW SCORES SCHLESINGER. DEBATES ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In limited, low-level comment, Moscow has reacted negatively to
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's statements in January
announcing changes in U.S. nuclear missile targeting strategy.
The new U.S. "strategic doctrine," as commentator Sergey
Vishnevskiy called it in a 3 February PRAVDA international
review, has been L,.ca-,ed as a Pentagon effort to step up
the arms race and intimidate the Soviet Union at SALT. Similar
charges have been made in Soviet comment on the proposed increase
in the U.S. military budget. Soviet reaction to these develop-
ments appears against a background of continuing debate within
the Soviet Union over the practical implications of Lenin's
doctrine on the relationship between war and policy.
SCHLESINGER STATEMENTS The most forthright response to the
Secretary's announcement on retargeting
of missiles came in an IZVESTIYA international review by Albert
Grigoryants on 2 February. Citing criticism that had appeared
in the New York TIMES, Grigoryants accused Schlesinger and the
Pentagon of trying to counter the salutary effects of the
U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of nuclear war by "forcing
through the idea that in one form or another nuclear warfare is
still conceivable." Grigoryants went on to quote the TIMES to
the effect that Schlesinger's remarks were intended to provide
a "trump card" at SALT, adding that "these phenomena accord
poorly with the trend toward detente." Other more cryptic
comment has also criticized the announced decision on the grounds
that it could increase the possibility of nuclear war.
In attacking the Secretary's statements on retargeting and the
proposed increases in U.S. military expenditures, Moscow has
carefully avoided broadening the criticism to the Nixon
Administration, zeroing in instead on the Pentagon. In a pattern
typical o past years, Moscow has charged in voluminous comment
that the proposed budgetary increases are inconsistent with the
spirit of detente. But it has gone on this year to emphasize
that the statements and requests issuing from the Pentagon are
even contrary to established U.S. policy. Vladimir Kozyakov
in a Moscow radio broadcast to North America on 8 February said
that "the Administration may have scrapped confrontation for
negotiations, but Pentagon leaders still seem to he thinking in
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the old categories of military preponderance and brinkmanship."
IZVESTIYA's Vladimir Osipov, taking part in the Moscow radio
international affairs roundtable on 10 February, concluded
that Secretary of State Kissinger was addressing U.S. officials
"who insist on increasing military appropriations and who are
dragging out as long as they can the negotiations with the Soviet
Union on a whole range of issues" when he told a meeting in
Washington that "we should not toy with the danger of nuclear
war; we should not turn it into a topic of domestic political
debate."
Brezhnev himself, during his Cuban visit at the end of January,
was uncharacteristically critical of the West, suggesting the
emergence of a more sober appreciation in Moscow of hitches in
the negotiations in Vienna and Geneva on limiting East-West
arms levels. In his 29 January speech in Havana, he spoke of
"some military leaders and civilian politicians who find it
possible to call for intensification of the arms race" and the
joint declaration issued on 4 February acknowledged that
"opponents of detente and advocates of a return to the cold war
are becoming more active in the United States."
But the 3-5 February Gromyko visit to Washington has served as
the centerpiece for assertions that, despite complications,
bilateral consultations are continuing apace and the overall
picture for U.S.-Soviet relations remains promising. According
to Vladimir Kozyakov's 8 February radio commentary, "relations
are getting better between the Soviet Union and the United States
mid the leaders of the two countries are looking fir new agreements
to limit arms and guarantee security in other ways."
THEORETICAL DEBATE In a 7 February RED STAR article, Rear
Admiral V. Shelyag vigorously reaffirmed
the validity of the Leninist doctrine on war and politics in
the face of various criticisms by "bourgeois ideologists." He
rejected the notion that the advent of nuclear weapons had
invalidated Lenin's dictum on war as a continuation of politics
by other means and had rendereil meaningless any distinction
between "just" and "unjust" wars. He charged that critics had
exaggerate, the destructive consequences of nuclear war by
basing their arguments about "the death of civilization" and
"no victors in a nuclear war" on purely "mathematical calculations."
In a rebuttal that avoided the issue of the consequences of
nuclear war, he argued that the presence of "at least half of
the world's nuclear potential . . . in the hands of the Soviet
Union" was a reliable guarantee against nuclear aggression and in
defense of civilization.
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In advancing this line of argument, which could be construed as
an argument against limitations on the Soviet strategic arsenal,
Shelyag went on to endorse the regime's detente policies and
reject the "absurd" notion that the Soviet Union would "pursue
its policy with the aid of war." The existence of a powerful
Soviet strategic arsenal was seen as a guarantee against the
possibility that "reactionary circles" in the West might "gain
the upper hand" over the now ascendant "realistically minded
state leaders" and "succeed in unleashing a war."
The Shelyag article, like another article by three military
writers in the December issue of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES.
No. 24, was ostensibly aimed at positions taken by foreign
scholars at the 15th World Philosophical Congress in Varna,
Bulgaria last September. However, there are abundant indications.
that it is also addressed to domestic critics who have persistently
questioned the Leninist doctrine on the grounds of the unprecedented
destructive power of nuclear weapons and the likelihood that such
destruction would affect all sides.
The Leninist doctrine has been defended on at least five separate
occasions in RED STAR, COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, and
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS since the appearance of an article by
Maj. Gen. A. Milovidov in RED STAR last May. Indeed, during
the course of this debate, the prominent Soviet journalist
Aleksandr Bovin, who reportedly once served on Brezhnev's
personal staff and who has been an IZVESTIYA political commentator
since 1972, was criticized by name for a "noticeable
methodological mistake" in questioning the validity of the
Leninist doctrine. This charge was made in a lengthy defense
of it by Col. Ye. Rybkin in the October 1973 issue of COMMUNIST.
OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 20. The Milovidov article had also.
criticized "some works by Soviet authors" for having committed
the same mistake Shelyag imputed to "bourgeois ideologists."
The substance of the debate was illuminated by two articles.last.
fall, In the November 1973 issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
Lt. Gen. Pavel Zhilin advanced the same line of reasoning as
Shelyag. In explaining the absence of any contradiction between
detente and "the maintenance of our defensive might at a high
level," Zhilin quoted Lenin to the effect that "only after the
proletariat disarms th'! bourgeoisie can it scrap any weapons at
all without changing its world historic mission."
Aleksandr Bovin, the target of Rybkin's criticism, presented
the other side of the debate in an 11 September 1973 IZVESTIYA
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article. He argued that, though achievement of parity in
strategic weapons between the United States and the Soviet
Union had reduced the threat of war, it was not enough to stop
there: It is "organically alien to socialist foreign policy"
to "stabilize the e.ituation at the level of a 'balance of
fear."' To Shelyag's argument that "nuclear weapons in the
hands of Soviet fighting men would be a means of routing the
aggressor," Bovin counterposed a different perspective:
"Any attempt to accelerate the solution of the dispute between
capitalism and socialism by military means would bring
inestimable misfortunes to mankind. The aggressor would be
crushed. But at what cost?"
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FORCE REDUCTIOMS
MOSCOW BLAMES WEST EUROPEAN STATES FOR SLOWING MBFR
As the issue of "national" forces has emerged as a focus rf
East-West disagreement at the MBFR negotiations, Moscow has
shown an increasing tendency to differentiate between the United
States and its NATO allies in assigning blame for lack of progress
in the talks. This was illustrated most recently by Moscow's
treatment of the 5 February plenary session, when chief Soviet
delegate Khlestov reportedly asserted that the United States, but
not its NATO allies, was prepared to reduce forces. In follow-up
reportage on the meeting Moscow radio reported the substance of
Khlestov's remarks, but TASS and PRAVDA ignored them. This suggests
that Moscow is still undecided as to how far to dress this divide-
and-conquer tactic.
SLOW PACE OF M3FR Moscow in recent weeks has gradually intensified
its campaign criticizing the NATO proposal to
leave for some undefined second phase the reduction of "national"
forces, particularly the West German Bundeswehr. and to include only
Soviet and U.S. reductions in the first phase. The comment generally
has stopped short of outright criticism of individual NATO delegations
at Vienna or their governments. However, Moscow radio's main commentator
on MBFR, Vladimir Komlev, attacked the issue directly when he charged
on 26 January that it was "difficult to understand the stubborn
desire of Britain, West Germany, and other West European states not
to agree from the very start to a reduction of their armed forces."
Brezhnev, three days later in his main foreign policy address in
Cuba, put on record Soviet dissatisfaction with developments at
Vienne in the most negative official assessment of the talks to
date. Without naming any individual country, Brezhnev specifically
criticized MBFR progress by charging that "some NATO countries are
obviously trying to replace an equitable and equal agreement with
one that would actually lead to a unilateral lessening of the defense
capabilities of socialist countries." Brezhnev also strongly
denounced the "reservations" and "conditions" which are dragging
out other detente developments, explicitly referring to the CSCE
and alluding to U.S. actions denying most-favored-nation status
to the Soviet Ursion. Brezhnev declared: "All these phenomena
cannot but alert us. It is difficult to square them with the policy
of detente and strengthening of peace proclaimed by the governments
of relevant countries." Moscow Lomment since Brezhnev's speech has
customarily used such general formulations as "some NATO circles" in
criticizing the NATO stand in Vienna.
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5 FEBRUARY MEETING Moscow radio.reported on 5 February that
Soviet delegate?Khlestov that day had
questioned the "desire" of the West European states-to reduce
their forces in central Europe. Khlestov, according to the radio,
said that the socialist states were "prepared" to reduce their
forces and so "apparently" was the United States, but that the
American "partners in NATO had not yet given their consent." The
substance of Khlestov's remarks waa leaked to the Western press.
Moscow's TASS services and the central press failed to carry a
similar report; instead, they publicized the usual terse announce-
ment that another plenary meeting was held on the 5th.
MOSCOW SAYS EUROPEAN DEFENSE SCHEMES INCOMPATIBLE WITH MBFR
While Moscow commentators continue to devote increasingly critical
attention to the Western discussion of European defense cooperation,
they have only rarely suggested that the implementation of any
such plans would run counter to the-profes'sed goals of the MBFR
negotiations. This argument has now been advanced in Moscow's
public discussion of the Warsaw Pact proposals at Vienna,
suggcsting a Soviet intention to use the leverage afforded by
the MBFR talks to dampen-European enthusiasm for defense coopera-
tion.
Moscow's comment in recent months-has strongly denounced the West
European det,rse discussion as a revival of cold war attitudes and
as inconsistent with the-aims of all-European cooperation
embodied in the CSCE. However, the camient has usually avoided
direct references to the force reduction. talks in this context.
A significant exception to this.pattern appeared in a 17 January
IZVESTIYA article by M. Mikhaylov timed to the resumption of both
the CSCE and MBFR negotiations. He stated unequivocally that the
various plans suggested in the West for a "European defense
community" or a "European 'nuclear pool"' are "incompatible with
the Vienna talks."
The significance of this warning becomes apparent when viewed
against the background of Moscow's discussions-of the terms which
it would accept as the framework for an MBFR agreement. These
include what would amount to-a Soviet veto power over any change
in Western defense arrangements that Moscow could interpret as
inconsistent with the original agreement. Thus, in the most
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comprehensive presentation of the Soviet'proposels at Vienna,
an article in the 14 December NEW- TIMES- No,. 50 by K. Borisov,
the author wrote:
It goes without saying that the states party
to an agreement on the reduction of armed forces
and armaments in central-Europe should not make
any international pledges which contradict the
provisions of such an agreement.
He specified that any party to the agreement would have the right,
in the event of any question arising concerning the implementation
of the agreement, to demand "that consultations be held between
all signatory states.," This *,;v'bld obviously provide a broad warrant
for Soviet interventions against changes in the status quo established
by an MBFR agreement.
Somewhat inconsistently, but understandably from the Soviet
point of view, Moscow has been equally adamant in resisting the
notion that there should be any constraints placed on the move-
ment and activities of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.
IZVESTIYA commentator S. Vladimirov charged on 23 December that
"serious complications" for Vienna were being created by
Western proposals "relating not to the reduction but to the
activities of armed forces in central-Europe." He assetted
that NATO leaders would "like to use such measures to place
the activity of Soviet forces in this area under their control."
In a similar vein, Moscow radio's maid commentator on MBFR,
Vladimir Komlev, on 14 January argued that Western proposals
"unconnected" with reduction and "relating to activities" of
armed forces "certainly cannot contribute-to reaching a mutually
acceptable agreement." Komlev-declared that "these proposals
have nothing to do with the talks- in question" and "can only
complicate the course of the talks." These comments are in
keeping with the almost total silence maintained by Moscow and
its East European allies regarding-the words "associated measures,"
which are part of the official title of the Vienna negotiations.
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ENERGY CRISIS
USSR PREDICTS WASHINGTON CONFERENCE WILL FA!L
Moscow has reported negatively, selectively and with little comment
on the 13-nation energy conference that opened in Washington.on
11 February, Soviet media maintain that the U.S.-sponsored
conference will fail to achieve results because of significant
differences among the participants. TASS reportage on U.S.
initiatives at the conference has ignored some key points and
stressed negative reactions to others, while playing up in
favorable terms what it depicts as almost unanimous opposition
by European delegations, particularly France. Moscow's East
European allies generally have echoed the negative Soviet view
of the conference, while Peking so far has completely ignored
it.
U.S. PROPOSALS U.S. efforts to forge "a common front" of
oil-consuming states by avoiding bilateral
agreements a-.,4 creating new bodies to deal with energy problems
have been rebuffed?by some participants, notably France, and
have received a mixed reaction by others, according to TASS.
Moscow has devoted little attention to the details of the
seven-point program advanced by Secretary Kissinger, reporting
only that the proposals envisaged "coordinated steps for saving
energy," "the development of alternative energy sources and
cooperation in scientific research," and "the'idea of.'sharing'
energy stocks in emergency conditions." The key proposal for
establishment of a coordinating group was ignored by Soviet
media. Dealing with President Nixon's 11 February dinner remarks
in only a few words, Moscow emphasized that his views on the.
pitfalls of bilateral oil deals were opposed by several conference
participants, such as France and Japan, who were pursuing such
arrangements "notwithstanding pressure from Washington."
Moscow gave favorable treatment to views opposing the U.S. policies.
It noted that "practically all" participants had indicated before,
the conference that they were against formation of a bloc of
oil-consuming countries, and that the United States had to.modify
many of its positions while the agenda was being drafted. Moscow
reported with evident sympathy the strong anti-U.S. positions
contained in French Foreign Minister Jobert's speech at the
conference on the 11th and the French premier's.statement during.
an interview the next day. Moscow said the impasse. reached on the..
second day of the talks was the result of French unwillingness to
sign a communique supporting common actions and creation of new
international bodies that would usurp the functions of existing
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institutions. Moscow quoted "observers" as being pessimistic
about the conference outcome and noted their belief that
French intransigence reflected an "unwillingness to fortify
the U.S.-dominated Atlantic Alliance."
ARAB COUNTERMOVES Moscow also publicized activities in the
TO CONFERENCE Middle East casting a shadow on the
Washington proceedings. It reported
Libya"s claim that the decision to nationalize completely three
U.S. oil. companies was timed to the opening of the conference.
An effort was made to suggest that the Algiers meeting of the
heads of state of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Algeria was
convoked in response to the U.S. meeting, so that the common
subject of Arab oil deliveries could be discussed "in the
atmosphere of continued attempts of Israel and the imperialist
circles to put pressure on Arab countries."
Soviet energy expert Ruben Andreasyan, in commentaries broadcast
to Arab audiences on 10 and 11 February, took an ambivalent staid
on the idea of broad international conferences relating to energy
and raw material issues. In his first talk Andreasyan refrained
from direct criticism of the Washington conference, instead
pointing out that Arab oil-exporting countries and some capitalist,
countries considered the U.S.-initiated meeting an attempt.to.
establish an economic bloc to defend the interests of American
oil monopolies and of American "imperialists" in general.
Typically, he blamed the energy crisis on the "selfish and greedy"
policies of the oil monopolies, charging that in circumstances.
of a general shortage of oil and the OPEC price increases, the.
monopolies increased prices of their oil products, stockpiled oil
reserves, and disrupted supplies.
On the price issue, Andreasyan in his second talk expressed Soviet
"understanding" of Arab efforts to increase prices to end the
"plunder" of their resources by the monopolies. But in an.unusual
fashion he cautioned his Arab listeners about the effects of high
price policies, in adding that "nevertheless" it should be taken.
into consideration that high oil prices could bring economic.
difficulties "not only in the Western countries but also in the
developing countries."
Andreasyan hedged in offering any Soviet suggestion to solve the
energy problems. Thus, he noted the Algerian and French proposals
for wide international conferences to counter the U.S.-proposed
conference in Washington, but said only that the Soviet Union
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"supports just and equal international economic relations among
all countries," including those supplying raw materials and those
exporting manufactured goods. And he reflected Moscow's wariness
over efforts by Western industrial nations to seek bilateral
agreements with oil-producing states. He remarked that "perhaps"
general economic relations should be built on the basis of
bilateral agreements, "although," he added, the establishment
of constructive relay:ions "requires research and study."
PRECONFERENCE In the past few weeks Moscow has portrayed the
PREDICTIONS Washington conference as a U.S. strategem to
c-eate a common front of Western countries
under U.S. domination that would try to eliminate the Arabs' "oil
weapon" by exerting pressure on oil-producing states to reduce
oil prices, increase deliveries, and lift the embargo against
the United States. This effort will fail, Moscow insisted, .
because Japan and the West European countries would prefer to
conclude bilateral oil agreements, thereby avoiding the risk of
a confrontation with the Arab states.
Moscow has not commented authoritatively on the details of Western
activities related to the energy crisis since President Nixon
proposed the conference a month ago. TASS and the central press
convey a generally critical picture of U.S. actions and intentions,
mainly on the basis of news reports and selective replays of
foreign press comments.
Moscow radio broadcasts in foreign languages have been less
restrained, and many talks were tailored to specific audiences.
Soviet ens":Ry expert Ruben Andreasyan's commew:ary broadcast in
Arabic, on 10th, for example, said that creation of a bloc
of imperialist countries would seek to obstruct "the path.of the
anti-imperialist struggle against the oil monopolies and inter-
national capit.al," which have been weakened, he added, by the
partial or full nationalization of oil resources in some Arab
states and the Arab oil embargo against the United States. A
commentary in German on the 11th contended that a,. the Washington..
conference the United States would try'to "win accomplices for
crimes" against the oil. countries, undermine formal EC associations
with developing nations, and negate East-West development
possibilities. Broadcasts in several languages suggested.that
the oil problem indicated that increased economic cooperation
with the USSR would be more satisfactory than continuing relations
with capitalist states.
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OTHER COMMUNIST COMMENT Peking has not yet mentioned the
Washington conference, but it has
informed UN Secreta!.ry General Waldheim that China supports the
alternative proposal of Algerian President Boumediene for a
UN Gener?.1 Assembly special session on raw materials and
development problems at which the energy crisis would be
disa;ussed. Although there is no available comment from Romania,
they other East European Warsaw Pact allies of ~he USSR have
echoed Mos..ow's negative appraisal of the conference. Albania
and Yugoslavia have also criticized U.S. motives for holding
the meeting, but the most recent Belgrade reporting has suggested
that the United States has adopted a more reasonable position
at the conference than expected.
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I4DOCHINA
DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SETS GUIDELINES FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY
The fourth session of the DRV's Fourth National Assembly held from
4 tr. 9 February provided a platform for elaboration of Hanoi's
domestic policies under peacetime conditions. The session, at
which it was revealed that the 22d plenum of the Vietnam Workers
Party Central Committee had been held recently, heard Vice Premier
Le Thanh Nghi deliver a detailed summation of DRV intentions for
implementing economic recovery.* In the absence of Defense
Minister Vo Nguyen Giap---who last appeared in public in early
October--Maj. Gen. Nguyen Don, vice minister of national defense,
delivered the military report, and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy
Trinh, as he has at past assembly sessions, spoke on diplomatic
activities. Premier Pham Van Dong, the customary keynoter at
National Assembly sessions, evidently played but a minor role at
the current session. Sharing the podium with President Ton Duc
Thang, Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee
Truong Chinh, and lc;r-level provincial officials on the morning
of the closing day, the premier reportedly praised efforts to
rehabilitate the economy and spoke on the need to strengthen
economic and social management.
LE THANH NGHI Hanoi radio broadcast the complete text of
ASSEMBLY SPEECH Le Thanh Nghi's 20,000-word government report
at the assembly in four installments ov'r n
two-day period. Described as being on the "tasks and dir' ,:lions
for economic rehabilitation and development in North Vietnam in
the two years 1974 and 1'75 and on the 1974 state plan," the report
presented the most comprehensive discussion of economic matters
at an assembly sess{on since the report delivered by State Planning
Commission Chairman Nguyen Con in 1965. However, a substantial
portion of Pham Van Dong's government report to the assembly's
L;.Iird session in February 1973 dealt with the national economy and
Nguyen Can delivered a separate economic report to the second
session in March 1972.
* Initial publicity for the National Assembly session is discussed
in the TRENDS of 6 February 1974, page 5.
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In summing up the economic acbievoments for 1973, Nglii said
guardedly that "the direct consequences of the war have been
overcome to a significant degre.e." He crntended that the
"weak and unsatisfactory aspetts of the economy" c.an be explained
on the basis of a backward agriculture, natural calamities, awad,
above all, the ravages of "two wa-d of destruction" conducted by
the United States. In accounting for the. "weaknesses and short-
comings of economic and state management"--a longtime concern of
the DRV--thn vice premier declared that, while party and state
lines are "correct," they are not "satisfactorily reflected, in
concrete actions, planning and programs." And in a candid admission
of the effects of these fnilures, Nghi observed:
Socialist industrialization is the central task of
the period of transition toward socialism, but it
is not yet firmly understood and realized . . . . The
state apparatus and the system of organizing economic
management . . . have not yet satisfactorily implemented
socialist enterprise methods or a unified, concentrated
managerial system.
In expounding the (tuidelines for economic recovery in 1974 and 1975,
Vice Premier Nghi routinely asserted that the "revolutionary struggle
in the South" continues to exert its influence on the North economically,
politically, ideologically, culturally, and in public security. He
briefly noted the need to conduct the "three revolutions--the revolutioti
in production relations, the technological revolr4tion and the ideological
and cultural ferolution, with the technological revolution playing the
key role." Nghx referred to heavy industry in ouch the same way t:at
First Secretary X.e Duan had in a comprehensive article released in
February 1970. Thus Nghi said that the development of heavy industry
must be or, the basis of "developing agriculture and light industry
and building the economy at the central Level . . . ."*
Characterizing the 1974-75 period as an "initial" step in the socialist
industrialization of the DRV and calling for "preparations for future
economic development," Le Thanh Nghi announced a second five-year
plan to take place from 1976 to 1980.** The decision to launch a new
* For a discussi,%)n of the Le Duan article see FBIS SPECIAL REPORT
"North Vietnamese Problems and Policies As Outlined in Le Duan's
February 1970 Article," 7 August 1970.
** Hanoi's first five-year .-Ian ended in 1965 and plans for a second
were dropped in 1966 because of the war.
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five-year plan was noted last year in Pham Van Dong's National
Day address on 2 September, but since then Vietnamese communiut
propaganda has not elaborated on its goals. The need for long-
term planning was also discussed by Le Duan in his February 1970
article--but without specific refererce~to a second five-year plan.
Le Dunn did stress the desirability of "long-range plats--plans
for five or 10 years," and this is- reflected in a later section
of Nghi's report urging the study of a "10- to 15-year developmental
plan?"
In his discussi'on of medical and health work to be accomplished
over the next two years, Le Thanh Nghi warned that the DRV is
confronted with a population problem. "In order to reach a
rational birth rate as concerns the development of~the population,"
Nghi said it was necessary to initiate a birth control movement.
A 10 February NNAN DAN editorial hailing the National Assembly
session further underlined the seriousness of the problem in
economic rerms: "Although the level of productioi; of some products
has reached the plan norms per capita, it remains too low compared
with the actual requirements arising from the soaring birth rate."
Hanoi media in the past have only infrequently called attention to
birth control measures--usually in low-level reports on public
health--although a 30 October 1973 NHAN DAN editorial in bolstering
its call for increased grain production cited "the rapid population
growth in the northern part of nur country."
In his only substantial mention of the 22d plenum, Le Thanh Nghi
listed the "general tasks" that it had set forth "in the new phase"--
beginning with uniting the people and maintaining peace, including
the close coordination of economic development with national defense,
and concluding with a pledge to strive "to fulfill our duties in
the revolutionary struggle to achieve independence and democracy
in the South and proceed to peacefully reunify the fatherland."
In citing objectives for the period 1974 and 1975, Nghi reiterated
the same tasks outlined by Le Duc Tho, special adviser to the Paris
talks, in his 26 January interview and by Nghi himself bcfuce an
awards presentation ceremony in Hanoi on 12 January. This list
began with the task of "completing the healing of the wounds of
war and making strenuous efforts to restore and develop the economy
and develop cu,ture, and concluded with the pledge to "fulfill our
duty to the heroic South."
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MILITARY Vice Defense Minister Nguyen. Don in his report on
REPORT the military situation at the 5 February assembly
session complained that the U.S. mine clearing
obligation has not been "fully" accomplished. Foreign Minister
Trinh, on the other hand, suggested that the United States had
fulfilled its obligation when he said that it "had to destroy and
deactivate the mines in North Vietnam territorial waters." Trinh's
more positive assessment accords with the DRV Foreign Ministry
White Book issued in January to mark the first anniversary of the
Paris agreement. Iri listing those provisions of the agreement
that have been implemented, the White Book declared that the
United States has "neutralized or destroyed the mines that it
dropped along 10 waterways in DRV territorial waters."
CLOSING In reporting the final meeting of the fourth session,
MEETING Hanoi media noted'that it was conducted in the presence
of the diplomatic corps and foreign newsmen, a precedent
set in February 1973 at the third session. Attended by assembly
presidium members Ton Duc Thang, Nguyen Luong Bang, Le Duan,*
Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong, the closing meeting passed the
customary resolutions on its proceedings, elected Hoang Van Hoan,
vice chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, to the
concurrent position of secretary general of the committee--a post
reportedly held by Ton Quang Phiet at the third assembly session,
and announced the creation of a foreign relations commission of
the National Assembly to be headed by Xuan Thuy, fc'rrer head of the
DRV delegation to the Paris peace talks.
According to the re3olution establishing the commission, it will
be tasked with: "Reviewing government reports and draft plans on
foreign relations entrusted to it by the National Assembly or its
Standing Committee; proposing that the National Assembly or its
Standing Committee issue statements with regard to international ques-
tions upon whicl)mit_is deemed necessary to state its attitude; and
carrying out foreign relations tasks entrusted to it by the National
Assembly or its Standing Committee."
* Although some Hanoi domestic broadcasts had omitted Le Duan's
name from the honorary presidium for the assembly, the radio
report on the closing session ceremonies listed him among the
members.
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U, S. - CUBA
MOSCOW HITS 3UPPORT FOR NORMALIZED U,S,-CUBAN RELATIONS
Although the issue of U.S.-Cuban relations did not come up
in elite material on Brezhnev's visit to Cuba, comment since
the visit has implied Moscow's support for normalization of
those relations. Such support was conveyed most directly in a
TASS report in PRAVDA on 8 February and in a Moscow radio
commentary two days later.
The TASS report described a movement in the U.S. Congress for
normalization of relations with Cuba and noted Senator Byrd's
"appeal" to the Administration to "take all necessary steps to
establish contacts with Havana." The report cited Byrd's
remark that the renunciation by the United States of its former
policy toward Cuba was "especially urgent in light of the
current relaxation of international tension." The 10 February
commentary, by Leonid Levchenk.), also cited Byrd's remarks and
added that "discerning voices" can be heard in the United
States "with ever-increasing frequency calling for the normal-
ization of relations between the United States and Cuba."
Levchenko also called for an end to the economic blockade of
Cuba, observing that "no one can now claim to be for peace
and international detente and at the same time enforce anti-
Cuban sanctions."
Discussion in the weekly Moscow radio roundtable on foreign
affairs for 30 February seemed to imply that Foreign Minister
Gromyko's stopover in the United States on the way back to
Moscow from Havana may also have been linked with the issue
of U.S.-Cuban relations. IZVESTIYA political observer Vladimir
Osipov said that "although the discussions in the American
capital were about both Soviet-American bilateral relationo
and general international problems, it is in the order of things
that international public opinion should regard and does regard
this visit in ;lop.e connection with the Cuban visit."
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CHINA
ANTi-CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN BUILDS MOMENTUM: CADRES MUST LEAD
There has been an escalation of revolutionary rhetoric in
some recent articles in Peking's anti-Confucius campaign,
but no specific targets for attack have been singled
out and the campaign continues to stress that there is still
time for erring comrades to come over to correct views. However,
while the campaign has not yet produced any current incitements
to violence, there has been a decided upswing In the number and
intensity of favorable recollections of cultural revolution
turmoil.
The most notable such escalation of inflamatory language came
in an article in the current issue of RED FLAG, written by the
mass criticism group of Peking and Tainghua universities, which
used a strongly worded criticism of Lin Piao's alleged opposi-
tion to cultural revolution violence to warn cadres that "a
revolution is not a dinner party." Elaborating on a theme
presented in one of the group's previous articles, which
appeared in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 24 January, the RED kLAG article
launched a strong defense of cultural revolution violence and
claimed that Lin had attacked the struggle as having "gone to
the extreme" and "has put everything in disorder." The article
recalled that Lin had reacted with counterrevolutionary
violence, and warned that one must "deal with a man as he
deals with you."
While there is not yet any clear target for attack, the potential
for attacks on party leaders appears to exist, as local party
officials are being told in increasingly frank terms that they
will be tested on how well they exercise leadership over the
campaign by "giving free rein to the masses." A Nanning radio
broadcast on 7 February warned local leaders to avoid repeating
the leadership mistakes of the early days of the cultural revo-
lution, when "some comrades did not have a very good understand-
ing of work and were pushed forward by the masses." And a
Yunnan broadcast the same day revealed that some local party
leaders "do not dare to mobilize the masses, because they fear
that the masses will criticize them." Local author,-'ties must
"abandon fear, have courage," and "stand ahead of the struggle
and resolutely lead the masses to advance."
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Judging by a 1 February Canton broadcast, some areas have many
cadres who are out of step with the current campaign. The
broadcast faulted "quite a nun.,er of comrades" for failing to
"catch up with the development of the situation" and for not
"daring to give free rein to the masses." Similarly, Sian
radio on 7 February characterized the problem of whether local
leaders take an active attitude and lead the masses to advance,
or take a passive approach "and be pushed along by the masses,"
as a serious question which must be answered immediately by
the leadership at all levels." Describing the anti-Confucius
campaign as "rolling irresistibly like a prairie fire with the
force of a powerful thunderbolt," Changsha radio on 8 February
called upon local leaders to stand in the front rank of the
struggle and destroy "all interdictions and taboos binding up
the masses' hands and feet."
At this stage of the struggle, however, the ominous-sounding
injunctions for local leaders to either stand at the front of
the masses and properly lead the campaign or run the risk of
being rolled over from behind by them are balanced by clear
signals that contradictions among the people should be resolved
without polarizing one group against another. PEOPLE'S DAILY
on 11 February printed a letter from a model student who
recently received much publicity for "going against the tide"
by criticizing her teacher. The current letter from the
student reminded readers that the teacher had realized his
error and was now "brimful of revolutionary zeal," and it
criticized the revisionist line in education for having "set
teachers and students against each other in the past." By
contrast, the letter noted that -Mao's revolutionary line today
reunites teachers and students, they are fighting shoulder to
shoui.ar.." The paper also carried several accompanying letters,
one o;c which, by a 7 May school teacher, argued that students
criticizing Lin and Confucius must use the party's basic line
as their "guide to action."
The revolutionary edge.of many articles calling for deepening
the campaign is also being dulled by indications of constructive
activities generated by the mass mobilization required to con-
duct a "people's war" against the influence of Lin and Confucius.
Much of this energy is apparently being used to expand factory
production. NCNA on 11 February specifically linked expanded
production at a Shanghai shipyard with the struggle to criticize
Lin and Confucius. Since late January the shipyard workers
reportedly wrote nearly 1,500 articles criticizing Lin and
Confucius and called 1:20 meetings, but still found time to ful-
fill by 5 February half of the monthly quotas for castings and
propellers.
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- 19 -
YUGOSLAVIA
BILIC SPEECH DENOUNCES NEW (/CENTRALIST" FACTION
There are indications that the Yugoslav regime's drive against
liberalism and nationalism, in high gear since Tito's 4isciplin,t y
letter of October 1972, has caused the pendulum to swing too frr
in the opposite direction,. This development was disclosed in a
speech by LCY Executive Bureau member Jure Bilic at a 9 February
meeting of the Zagreb city party committee. Bilic, a leading
proponent of the antiliberal cennpaign, gave the impression of
high-level did,rray- at a time when preparations for the 10th LCY
congress, scheduled for May, are being made.
Bilic charged that "neo-Stalinists" were intent on exploiting the
antiliberal drive for the purpose of establishing a strongly
centralized Yugoslav state. Bilic's charge contrasts sharply
with statements made late last year by Tito's hair apparent,
Stane Dolanc, which held that neo-Stalinism had been overcome
in the Yugoslav party and that strengthening the leading role
of the LCY--heretofore neglected---was the leadership's top priority.
Dolanc's remarks on the party's leading role were reported approvingly
by Moscow.
In his Zagreb speech, summarized by TANJUG and the Belgrade domestic
service, Bilic portrayed the centralist faction as formidable and
well-organized, though "not in the leadership," and as embracing
"unitarists, Rankovicites, and neo-Stalinists" bent on establiahixig
"a strong Yugoslav state based on nationalism and a firm hand." He
dramatized the charge by contrasting the deviant factions of 1971
and 1974, declaring that "the faction of 1971 had a separatist
program," whereas "the faction of 1974 has a bureaucratic-centralistic
program which recognizes neither the rights of the peoples nor the
right of the working class to leadership." Without identifying
the centralists, Bilic said they were promoting their cause through
both "illegal and legal" means and were "exerting special pressure
or1 parts of the veterans organizations."
In a manner suggesting that he was inaugurating a new public
campaign against the centralist faction, Bilic reportedly "stressed
that the party membership must be acquainted as fully as possible
with all these matters, so that it may conduct at the grassroots
level the most zesolute action against these and other anti-self-
management and antisocialist forces." This suggestion is strengthened
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by the fact that Bilic's speech was reported in the central
Belgrade media. A speech by LCY Presidium member Bakaric at a
5 February Croatian party plenum also touched on the activity of
the Croation centralists, but was reported only in the Zagreb
domestic service.
DOLANC In an interview published in the 29 November
STATEMENTS Ljubljana DELO, LCY Executive Bureau Secretary
Dolanc had pointedly downgraded the danger of
centralism. Listing this danger together with the other long-
standing Yugoslav deviations, he declared that centralism, statism,
bu:reaucratism, and neo-Stalinism had been "superseded." And
Dolanc was portrayed, in a 14 December PRAVDA report of his
interview on Ljubljana TV three days earlier, as being concerned
primarily with strengthening the LCY's leading role. Dolanc
reportedly said the situation-in-Yugoslavia prior to 1971 had led
to "nbjective disparagement of the LCY's role" and that the LCY
"still lacks clear and durable ideological-political unity."
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VOTE
CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOLZHENITSYN: The public phase of the Soviet
media's month-long campaign against Solzhenitsyn appeared to be
coming to a close shortly before his arrest on 12 February and
his expulsion from the Soviet Union the next day by decree of
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Apart from a few
sporadic attacks in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in late January and a brief 7 February report in most central
papers that Solzhenitsyn had been praised 'by a West German
neo-Nazi leader, the campaign was carried out mainly by the
literary press. By early February, however, it appeared to be
on-the wane even in the literary papers: the 6 February
LITERARY GAZETTE published only one attack, by Leonid Novichenko
at a 28-29 January conference.of literary critics, and the
8 February issues of LITERARY RUSSIA and SOVIET CULTURE carried
no further criticism of Solzhenitsyn. Among, the republic papers,
the Ukrainian press was especially virulent in its criticism of
Solzhenitsyn throughout the month of January and into February.
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APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 4 - 10 FEBRUARY 1974
Moscow (2735 items)
Peking 1190 items)
Brezhnev Cuban Visit
(15%)
29%
Domestic Issues (60%)
54%
[Brezhnev-Cuban Messages
(--)
5%]
[Criticism of Lit; (9%)
6%]
on 3d Cuban "Revolution"
Piao and Confucius
Committees Conference
Indochina
(9%)
7%
(Joint Declaration
(--)
4%]
[PRC Foreign
(--)
3%]
China
(3%)
6%
Ministry Spokesman
Gromyko in U.S.
(--)
5%
Statement on
Vietnam
(1%)
3%
Paracel Islands
Dispute
Japan-ROK Continental
Shelf Agreement
(--)
4%
Attacks on Antonioni
Film
(5%)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radi'. services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio taut, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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