TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060053-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: December 19, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

DEC
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F
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
19 DECEMBER 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 51)
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TRENDS
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is 'onsed exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FiIS without coordination with other U.S. Covernmcnt
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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19 DECEMBER 1973
CONTENTS
NOTE: Because of the shortened work week during the holidays,
the next two issues of the TRENDS will be delayed. Both
'ai].l be prepared on Fridays--28 December and 4 January--and
distributed on Wednesday, 2 January and Monday, 7 January
respectively.
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
USSR Maintains Woncommittal Stance on Peace Conference Issues . . . .
FORCE REDUCTIONS
Moscow Insists Reductions Must Include National Forces. . . . 5
SAT:T
Moscow Breaks Long Silence on U.S. MIRV's, Shows Concern. . . . . . 8
Moscow Says Latest Meetings Reveal U.S.-NATO "Contradictions" . . . . 10
Peking Sees Growing U.S.-European Unity Against Moscow. . . . . . . 10
DRV Says Outcome of Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Talks Depends on U.S. . . . 13
USSR Scores U.S. Support for Saigon, Expresses Hope for Talks . . . . 15
PRC Press Reiterates Support for Vietnam; Le Duc Tho Feted. . . . . . 17
PRG, DRV Stress "Illegality" of Helicopter Ambush Claims. . . . . . . 19
PRG Hungarian Visit Concluded; UN Status for PRG Discussed. . . . . 21
Shcherbitskiy's Purge of Ukrainian Oblast Leaders Continues. . . . . . 22
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C 0 N T E N T S (Continued)
PRC Broadcast Endorses "Peaceful Settlement" of Taiwan Issue. . . . .
25
NOTES
FRG-Czechoslovak Treaty; PRC Revolutionary Committees;
China's Harvest; Korean Coastal Dispute` . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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ARAB- ISRAELI C ONFLICT
USSR MAINTAINS NONCOMMITTAL STANCE ON PEACE CONFERENCE ISSUES
In a period of intensive diplomatic activity in preparation for
the Geneva peace conference, Moscow, not surprisingly, has
avoided substantive comment on the issues. While it has
described the forthcoming conference as an event of great
significance, it has commented only in passing on the problems
involved in convening the conference. Thus PRAVDA in its
international review on the 16th remarked without elaboration
that "tense efforts" had been made during the past week to
prepare for the conference. Soviet media briefly traced
Secretary Kissinger's 13-17 December Middle East tour,
noting that both Kissinger and Egypt's as-Sadat described their
talks as "useful," but also noting that foreign newsmen had
reported that the Secretary "met with great difficulties"
during his negotiations in Cairo and "especially in Damascus."
Comment tailored for North American audiences underlined
Soviet-U.S. cooperation in arranging the conference, but a
commentary broadcast to Arab listeners remarked sourly that
the United States was trying to take major credit for
"positive changes" in the Middle Eaqt.
In the only current remarks on the situation by a Soviet
leader, Podgornyy, speaking at a dinner for the PRG delegation
on the 18th, expressed hope that the Geneva conference would
serve the attainment of a lasting and just peace in the
Middle East. He pledged that the Soviet Union would "assist
in every way a reliable settlement" of the conflict, specifying
Moscow's standard terms for such a settlement--Israeli
withdrawal from all occupied territories and assurance of
the legitimete rights of all states and peoples of the area,
including the Palestinians.
UN ROLE TASS on the 18th reported that identical letters
had been handed to UN Secretary General Waldheim
by the U.S. and Soviet UN delegates expressing the hope that
Waldheim would agree to serve as the official host of the
conference at:.: preside in the opening phase. The TASS summary
noted that the conference would be under the co-chairmanship
of the Soviet Union and the United States, and that the
"question of other participants" would be discussed during the
first stage of the conference. TASS' account did not mention
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that thn letters expressed the hope that the secretary general
could make available a representative "who would keep you
informed" as the conference proceeded, or the suggestion that
the Security Council president should consult informally
with council members with a view to securing their concurrence.
TASS had briefly reported the Security Council resolution on the
15th, noting that it expressed confidence that the UN secretary
general would play a "full and effective role" at the peace
conference and would preside over the meetings "if the parties
so desire." The TASS dispatch reported that the resolution
passed by 10 votes with the Big Four abstaining and China not
voting.
While Moscow generally had not publicized its co-sponsorship
of the Geneva conference, a Losev commentary broadcast to
North America on the 14th had reminded listeners that "the
Soviet Union and the United States are working together to
arrange the conference," and recalled that Kissinger in his
recent Washington news conference had mentioned the USSR's
"constructive contribution" toward organizing the talks and
working out such matters as agenda, participants and procedures.
U.S. AID In a slightly more critical tone than Moscow
TO ISRAEL has customarily shown toward Kissinger, TASS in
reporting the Secretary's address to the Pilgrims
in London on the 12th noted that he "admitted" that the United
States had not done everything in its power prior to the
October fighting to contribute to a lasting Middle East settle-
ment. TASS skipped over his remark that the United States had
demonstrated great restraint once the October war began "until
the Soviet effort reached the point of massive intervention."
But in noting his explanation of the U.S. arms resupply to
Israel, it claimed that he "tried to justify" U.S. policy in
the area, particularly the arms supplies which "encourage
Israel's stubborn refusal" to withdraw it troops from occupied
Arab territories. Moscow has publicized Senator Fulbright's
objections to appropriations for military aid to Israel, and
the Losev commentary on the 14th remarked in passing that "no
flood of American weapons" could promote a settlement.
The matter of American military aid was also raised in an
Arabic-language commentary on the 18th whicl. revived, for the
first time since the October fighting began, a complaint
which the Soviet Union had previously made at times of U.S.
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initiatives in the Middle East, namely, that the United States
was trying to "persuade the world that the key to solving the
Middle East yuestioa is In Washington's hands." The commentary,
a routine-level, unattributed talk, echoed past arguments
that "this key" remained in the hands of the Arab countries
"on whose side stands the Soviet Union." In the first public
display of Soviet pique over U.S. diplomatic initiatives the
commentary charged that "efforts of. American diplomacy at
present are concentrated on suggesting that the greatest
credit is due to Washington for the positive changes" in the
Middle East. As a case in point, the broadcast cited Deputy
Secretary of State Rush as saying that peace in the Middle
East could only be achieved with American help. Noting that
Rush was testifying before Congress in support of military
aid to Israel, the commentary wondered whether military aid
to the aggressors" could be related to efforts to restore
peace in the Middle East.
SYRIAN POSITION Moscow has not commented on the Syrian
decision not to attend the conference,
TASS merely reporting on the 18th that Damascus said the
decision, announced that day, was adopted after a series of
contacts with Egyptian and U.S. officials and in light of
facts pointing to "maneuvers" aimed at serving Israel's
interests. On the 19th TASS reported an Egyptian Government
spokesman as saying that progress at the Geneva talks would open
the door to participation by Syria and other Arab countries.
Earlier, Moscow had indicated Syrian readiness to attend, with
an Arabic-language broadcast on the 15th citing President al-Asad
to that effect. Soviet media had pointed out that Israel had
agreed to participate in a conference with Egypt and Jordan
but not with Syria because Damascus refused to provide a list
of Israeli prisoners of war. Moscow objected that settlement
of the crisis was impossible without Syrian participation as
"one of the victims of Israeli aggression." TASS on the 18th
said that Arab papers, commenting on Israel's "provocative
hullabaloo" about the POW issue, recalled that while there was
a POW exchange between Israel and Egypt Tel Aviv did not meet
its commitment on withdrawal of troops to the 22 October
positions.
PALESTINIAN ISSUES TASS on 14 December reported that the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
had decided to convene a session of the Palestine National
Council in January to discuss the questions of "the future of
the West Bank and Gaza" and of Palestinian representation at
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the peace talks. Palestinian representation at the peace
conference was also broached by Middle East specialist
Belyayev in a 12 December LITERARY GAZETTE article. Belyayev
pointed out that the recent Arab summit conference in Algiers
had confirmed the PLO as the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinians. Thus when the "interested sides" begin
to discuss possible variants of a Palestinian solution during
the "forthcoming political settlement,"Belyayev said, they
will have to deal with the PLO. Suggesting some Soviet
impatience with the Palestinians' indecision, Belyayev
admonished the PLO on the need to "formulate clearly its
attitude" toward "those specific proposals . . which may
be worked out in the process of a settlement."
The 17 December Palestinian attack on a PanAm. aircraft'at Rome
airport and the hijacking of a Lufthansa plane brought not
only the customary Soviet publicity for PLO denials of
involvement but also criticism from PRAVDA. TASS on the 19th
reported PRAVDA commentator Orestov as saying that world
public opinion viewed with alarm the "political aspect" of
these "crimes" committed by "people who call themselves
Palestinians." Orestov found it suspicious that the incidents
coincided with preparations for the Geneva conference which,
among other questions, must discuss ways of achieving a just
settlement of the Palestinian problem. In this context,
Orestov declared, attempts to set public opinion against the
legitimate demands of "Palestinian patriots" were "provocative."
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FORCE REDUCTIONS
MOSCOW INSISTS REDUCTIONS MUST INCLUDE NATIONAL FORCES
With the Vienna negotiations on force reductions now in recess
until 15 January, Moscow and its East, European allies have been
assessing the progress of the talks. Summing up points made
in routine comment over the past few weeks, PRAVDA's.Vienna
correspondent Igor Melnikov on 17 December concluded that after
six weeks of negotiations there is "reason to assume" that
all the participants possess sufficient realism and good will
to insure the "successful completion" of the talks. At the same
time, he and other commentators have made it clear that Moscow
continues to regard Western positions on the timing of "national"
force reductions--that is, the West and East European forces
other than the U.S. and Soviet--and on asymmetrical reductions
as major stumbling blocks to agreement.
NATIONAL FORCES Moscow has been increasingly critical of
the Western two-phase approach to force
reductions, which calls for initial reductions to be applied
to U.S. and Soviet troops exclusively and postpone for a
subsequent stage the problem of reducing West and East European
national forces. Apparently concerned about the well-equipped
and well-trained Bundeswehr, Moscow has argued that this
approach fails to provide firm guarantees regarding the nature
and scope of the reductions to be applied to national forces.
A TASS-attributed report in PRAVDA on 2 December, for example,
which included the first reference in the central press to
the details of the Soviet plan presented at Vienna, observed
that the Western plan's first stage called for the reduction
of U.S. and Soviet ground troops only, but that "the content
of the second stage has not been revealed. Admittedly,"
PRAVDA continued, without directly mentioning the FRG, "the
possibility of a reduction in the forces of other countries
in central Europe is mentioned, but what categories will be
cut back and when is not clear from the proposal." It is
noteworthy that this PRAVDA commentary and other Moscow
discussions have not rejected the two-stage NATO proposal
outright, but have indicated that NATO should be more
explicit regarding the second stage details, thus seemingly
leaving open the possibility for future negotiation in this
sphere.
IZVESTIYA's Vienna correspondent K. Perevoshchikov on the 4th
? strongly criticized the NATO plan, saying that "the essential
character of the second stage has scarcely been revealed,"
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and adding that the "diffuse formulas on the possibility
of also reducing the forces of other countries in central
Europe" postpone a resolution of this issue "for an
indeterminate period." Asserting that it is impossible "to
ignore the West's inclination to leave national forces untouched,"
Perevoshchikov said that the Bundeswehr alone numbers just
under 500,000 men. Although Perevoshchikov and other Moscow
commentators refer to the armies of the United Kingdom,
Belgium and others in this connection, it is clear that Moscow's
concern is focused on the West Germans.
ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS Since the details of the Soviet
force reduction proposal became
public knowledge in mid-November, Moscow's treatment of the
proposal has gone from initial silence to acknowledgment.of'
the details, and then into specific comparisons of the Soviet
plan with the NATO proposal offered on 22 November. Moscow
radio's main commentator on force reductions, Vladimir Komlev,
on the 29th acknowledged the details of the Eastern bloc's
draft plan for the first time, pointing out that it called
for a reduction in 1975 of 22,000 men on each side along with
the corresponding arms and corbat equipment, a further
reduction in 1976 of five percent on both sides, and a final
10 percent cut in 1977. Komlev asserted that implementation
of this plan "would preserve the existing proportion of NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces in the area, but with a lower level.
of forces and arms"--the longstanding definition of Moscow's
criterion of successful force reductions.
In follow-up comments, Moscow has criticized the Western plan
for not including air and nuclear-armed forces, and for
excluding the national forces or leaving them for some
undefined, ambiguous second stage. It has also continued
to denounce the NATO proposal for asymmetrical reductions and
NATO's singling out of those elements of the force equations
in which the Warsaw Pact enjoys an advantage over NATO, such
as armored forces. Moscow has charged that NATO is attempting
through its demands for asymmetrical reductions to upset
the present equilibrium of forces in central Europe--an
equilibrium which, it says, has maintained peace on the
continLat for a full generation.
EAST EUROPEAN CONCERNS While the comment of Moscow's allies
has generally taken its cue from
Moscow, th',re have been occasional indications of the independent
concerns that the East European countries have in the force
reduction talks. Two recent items in the Warsaw government
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daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY, for example, suggesta less :clamant
position than Moscow has indicated on the issue of
asymmetrical reductions and a particular Warsaw interest,
for economic reasons, in seeing a successful outcome of
the talks.
In a 27'November article criticizing NATO's call for asymmetrical
,.reductions, the author, J. Golebiowski; argued that the discussion
of asymmetrical reductions "could easily lead the Vienna negotiations
up the blind alley of endless polemics." But he also stated
that "we should not, of course, refuse to discuss this problem."
This is the only known case in which a Warsaw Pact spokesman has
indicated a willingness to discuss NATO's asymmetrical approach
to force reductions.
On 9 December, the same authcr.pointed out that the "economic
consequen- s" of force reductions should be a "crucial"
factor affecting the decisions of both sides. He said that
"Poland is most interested in this." He went on to point
out that a failure of the talks might lead to a new arms
race and, hence, preclude the opportunity for shifting
resources to more productive purposes-which a successful
outcome of the talks might provide.
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SALT
MOSCOW BREAKS LONG SILENCE ON U,S, MIRV'S, SHOWS CONCERN
After Moscow media's avoidance of the issue for almost two years,
articles discussing U.S. MXRV's have appeared in the December
issue of the journal USA, signed to the press on 19 November,
and in the 9 December RED STAR. The last extensive discussion
of MIRV's appeared before the SALT ONE agreements in a March
1972 RED STAR article. Although the two articles focused on
different aspects of the U.S. program, they could be interpreted
as expressions of growing concern in Moscow over the destabilizing
effects of MIRV on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. Neither
article broached Soviet developments in this area, although the
change in posture came on the heels of the announcement by Secretary
of Defense Schlesinger last August that Moscow had begun to test
its own version of missiles with multiple, independently targetable
warheads.
Writing in USA, military specialists M. A. Milshteyn and L. S. Semeyko
maintained that the second round of SALT was being conducted under
more favorable conditions than the first round, and they were
generally optimistic about the outcome. But echoing arguments
made in the West, and in fact drawing extensively on the observations
of U.S. specialists, they showed considerable concern about the
destabilizing effects of qualitative weapons improvements upon
the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance. They emphasized the urgency of
placing qualitative limits on strategic weapons in a permanent
SALT accord. The authors built. their case for such limitations
by quoting U.S. spokesmen who maintain that the particular
qualitative development embodied in MIRV's is destabilizing, since
the acquisition of MIRV's makes sense only,in terms of a search
for a first-strike capability. They warned that an unrestricted
U.S. MIRV program presents "a potential danger of breakdown in
the process of easing military tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations."
Milshteyn and Semeyko defined the basic asymmetries in the U.S.
and Soviet strategic force structures as "qualitative-quantitative,"
on the one hand, and geographic, on the other. Arguing that these
asymmetries are unlikely to be eliminated but must be balanced by
a formula that ensures "equa? security" for both sides, they went
on to reiterate Moscow's longstanding opposition to an accord
that would simply establish equal numerical ceilings for basic
strategic systems. This line of argument suggests that the authors
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may favor some form of limitation on MIRV's which would grant
the United States an advantage in that area in exchange for
compensation in other areas.
ARMS REDUCTIONS The Milshteyn and Semeyko article is also
notable for the considerable interest it
showed in progress toward strategic arms reduction at SALT TWO.
Although Brezhnev last December had first characterized arms
reductions as a bp;ic goal for SALT, this is the first public
indication that i is considered a goal of some urgency. The
two authors stressed that arms reduction had been advanced as
the "ultimate task" of SALT at the Moscow summit and aff;.rmcd as
a goal of the second stage at the Washington summit. And they
went on to observe that "the importance of bilateral steps in
this sphere--even if they are only partial steps--is diff_.ult
to overestimate." Although they noted the economic benefits of
such measures, they seemed more interested. in the international
and domestic political impact of reductions.
The 9 December RED STAR article focused exclusively on difficulties
in the U.S. testing program for Poseidon missiles, thus raising
the possibility that some military quarters in Moscow are skeptical
about the advisability of a full-scale Soviet MIRV program. The
author of the article, Eng. Lt. Col. L. Nechayuk, was perhaps
scoring points in an internal debate on force structure as he drew
on reports in the Western press to describe test failures,
"particularly during the separation of the multiple warheads and
their guidance, onto the targets." He concluded that the reliability
of a system "which only yesterday was being refc:red to as
powerful and efficient" has "proven to be much lower than wqs
calculated."
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E U R 0 P E
MOSCOW SAYS LATEST MEETINGS REVEAL U,S,-NATO "CONTRADICTIONS"
In reporting Lhe recent NATO defense and foreign ministers
meetings and the EEC's Copenhagen summit, Moscow has played up
the "contradict tons" between Washington and its NATO allies
and the differences among the West Europeans themselves.
While reporting Secretary Kissinger's remarks at the 10 December
NATO Council meeting that the Alliance remains the-cornerstone
of U.S. foreign policy, Moscow has stressed his acknowledgment
that differences have arisen between Washington and its allies
in recent mon*'.s, particularly over the Middle East war.
Similarly, in reporting Kissinger's 12 December London speech
to the Pilgrims, Moscow has alleged that there was no agreement
among the EEC leaders at their Copenhagen summit for a West
European response to his call for an Energy Action Group; it
has noted that only London has publicly endorsed the secretary's
suggestion, and that the others West Europeans are allegedly
striving to resolve the energy crisis by direct cooperation
with they Arab states.
As fcr NATO, Moscow has accused Washington of trying to ride
roughshod over its allies on everything from burden sharing and
offset payments to West European strategic interests during the
Middle East war. While it has been particularly harsh in its
treatment of NATO Secretary General Luns, :k scow has also observed
that "even" NATO could not ignore the present development
of detente in Europe, as indicated by its endotaement of the
CSCE and force reduction negotiations. Continuing a theme
that began to emerge in Moscow comment well before the recent
NATO and EEC meetings, Moscow has harshly criticized the public
discussion in West Europe of the popaibi.lity of developing a
West European defense system., possibly separate from NATO.
PEKING SEES GROWING U,S,-EUROPEAN UNITY AGAINST MOSCOW
Peking has professed to see signs of Western unity-rather than
disunity in recent developments affecting,U.S.-European.relations.
This line has been pressed in a series of NCNA reports addressed
to the recent NATO ministers'meetings, the EC summit, and the CSCE
and force reduction talks. In a striking-example of selective
reporting, Peking has presented these events as-testifying to a
growing unity between the United'States and its West European
allies based on a common determination to resist Soviet military
pressure.
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NATO, EC MEETINGS The meetings in-Brussels of NATO defense
and foreign ministers--on 7-and 10-11 December
respectively--prompted NCNA reports suggesting that the'.meetings
had helped in developing a solid Western defense against increasing
Soviet military power in Europe. Hailing the evidence of
Western determination,at the NATO meetings to maintain a
strong NATO posture in both conventional and nuclear armaments,
NCNA on 8 December drew attention particularly to European-acknow-
ledgments of the continued importance-of the U.S.'commitment
to Europe's defense. The report noted the European defense
ministers' welcome of the announced U.S. determination to
maintain forces in Europe, as well as their recognition that
"a common effort ors the part of the-allies" was required to
offset U.S. financial difficulties arising from the maintenance
of troops in Europe. Similarly, a 12-Dece,nber report noted
French Foreign Minister Jobert's'observation that at present
"there is no alternative to the role played by'the U.S. nuclear
force and its military presence in Europe."
Chinase coverage of the NATO sessions and of-v.he subsequent EC
summit meeting of 14-15 December drew -attention- to what was
described as the emergence in Europe of growi:Z ,-opposition to
"superpower" domination. Muffling the fact that the United States
also qualifies for "superpower" status, Peking interpreted
this opposition as being directed-mainly against the'Soviet
Union. Thus, NCNA could report-"European-unity" and "U.S.-European
unity" as complimentary rather than contradicting phenomena.
For example, in a 12 December report on Secretary-Kissinge:'s
comments at the NATO foreign ministers' conference NCNA highlighted
both his avowal of continued U.S.-backing-for an "independent
European entity" and also his assertion tha5; U.S.-West*European
differences wire minor in comparison wiry-, ? the broader unity
they shared. More pointedly, a 14 J?2cember NCNA report on
the EC summit ci',refully quoted from the-group's document on
"European Ident:lry" the passages noting that U.S.-EC ties are
mutually benef. -;,cial and should be preserved, and that ' "these
ties do not conflict with the determination-of the nine to
establish themselves as a distinct and original-entity."
CSCE,MBFR Peking has highlighted the lack of progress a
the recent CSCE and MBFR sessions-as-evidence
of Western determination to protect'and pursue-their interests
despite the blandishments of detente:" A-15 December NCNA
commentary noting the holiday recess-of-the-European security talks
in Geneva said that Moscow's efforts to-achieve a-summit meeting
on European security by the end of the year had been-dashed
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because of serious differences with the West. Reporting issues
dividing the two sides, NCNA noted that the West favored
keeping the door open for the possibility of peaceful changes
of European frontiers, whereas Moscow was determined to maintain
and solidify the status quo. Pelting poi?ttedly replayed in
this connection a West Garman spokesman's assertion that
provision should be made for the eventual peaceful reunification
of Germany? NCNA also stressed Moscow's rei?isal tr? agree to priot
notification regarding movements of ..ts military forces, charging
that this revealed its Intention tc commit future interventions
in Europe sinilar to the o'Ze it had undertaken in Czechoslovakia.
An NCNA article on the 13th, marking the holiday recess of the
MBFR sessions in Vienna, ridiculed the talks as "six weeks of
wrangle." It said that the meetings had witneacred a clash
between Mos(;,W'n determination to "maintain and strengthen
the superiority in conventional forces it now has in Central
Europe" and Washington's counter determination to whittle
down the advantage of the Warsaw Pact forces. After castigating
Moscow's continued military buildup in central Europe during
the course of the sessions, Peking predicted a protracted
debate in Vienna, noting sarcastically that many delegates
have rented apartments with "longterm leases" and plan to stay
in Vienna "til they retire."
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19 DECEMBER 1973
I N D 0 C H I N A
DPW SAYS OUTCOME OF KISSINGER-LE DUC THO TALKS DEPENDS ON U1S1
The 13 December U.S.-DRV nnnounccment that Secretary kissinger
and Lo Duc Tiro would meet In Pavia in a wank prompted articles
in Hanoi's two leading papers on the 14th which insisted that
the United 3i:ates bears the "entire" responsibility for the
situation in Vietnam and the outcome oi' tl>e talks. Le Duc Tho's
statement on his arrival at the Paris airport on the 17th
similc.rly placed the blame for the breakdown of thc. peace
agreement on the United States. Professing that he, had come
to Paris with "good will and a serious attitude"--the very wo--de
used to describe the DRV positi.-.n prior to the Paris talks last
May--Tho made cl. it that he felt the progress of the meeting
would depend on t:,_ "correct attitude" of the United States.
Hanoi's stress upon U.S. responsibility is in line with a series
of high-level official DRV.and PRG statements beginning in
mid-October which seemed aimed at placing the blame on the
United States for the deteriorating Vietnam situation and at
pressing it to help put an end to the intensified military
action. Hanoi's concern in this regard was demonstrated most
recently in an 8 December NtIAN DAN Commentator article* which
took Secretary Kissinnz;r to task for viewing the Vietnam conflict
ah a civil, war which the Vietnamese: Lhcnuoclves must and.
The articles in !.he DRV party paper NIAN DAN and the army paper
QUAN DOI NHAN MN ~n the 14th said that the scheduled 20 December
meeting was proposed by the United States and explained that DRV
agreement to the talks "is a diplomatic move" to force U.S. and
Saigon implementation of the peace agreement. Tho underscored
Hanoi's apparent sensitivity about the origin of the proposal by
leading off his Paris statement with a denial of an "untrue
report," allen,edly spread by U.S. and Saigon officials in Paris,
that the DRV called for the meeting.
Tho went on in his statement with a routine indictment of the
United States, charging continued U.S. military involvement: in
South Vietnam, the introduction of U.S. military advisors into
the South disguised as civilians, massive U.S. military aid to
Saigon, and U.S. railure to contribute to North Vietnam's
postwar reconstruction. Unlike the press articles he made no
* The article is discussed in the TRENDS of 12 December 1973,
page 9.
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19 DECEMBER 1973
rofarence to the spcte of U.S. reconnaissance overflights of
DRV territory that have recently been protested in rtataments
issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesmen. In a further
recital of oft-repeated charges, lie ci.aimed tceaW Saigon,
"encouraged find assts"ed by the U.S.," has engaged in
land-grubbing operations, terrorized the populace, refused to
return political pris-'nere,, and created obstacles preventing
the proper functioning (if the Paris consultative conference
ant the Joint Hilitcry Ci-mmission in Saigon.
Affirming th good intentions of the DRV ti*_:d PRG in implementing
:h. Paris agreement and the 13 June joi-?t communique, Tho
dGclc:red that the ')RV and PRG could not ''sit with folded arms"
and %,atch Saigon continue its "grave violations" of the
agreement. He added that the DRV supports the stand o16' the
PRG to use "a'.1 energetic means to duly punish all acts of
war" by Sa:tbon.
In making the standard accusations of U.S. and Saigon peace
agreement vioi.a0ons, the NHAN DAM and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
articles on the 14th both incliad.i charges of U.S. "encroachment"
of DRV territory with re(-:)nnaissainee aircraft and warships.
The most recent alleged overflights were on the 17th--the same
day Tho spoke in Paris--and were protested in a standard DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman etatement on the following day.
Outright violation of DRV territorial waters has not been charged
in protests involving U.S. warships. For example, a 2 October
foreign ministry spokesman statement alleged that the U.S.S.
Hancock was present 120 miles off the coast of Nghe An Province
and that six U.S. destroyers were 60 to 90 miles off the same
coy )t on 30 September, and the presence of the U.S.S. Midway
"close" to the coast of North Vietnam off Quang Binh Province on
6 December was protested in a spokesman statement on the 7th.
In neither case was there any mention of encroachment of
territorial waters. (A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman statement
issued in September 1964 indi_ated the extent of Hanoi's
territorial claime when it took issue with the United States for
not recognizing a 12-mile limit to DRV territorial waters Pnd
claimed this was an attempt to justify repeated intrusions by
U.S. war vessels.)
NORMALIZATION OF In setting forth rewards that could accrue
U.S.-DRV RELATIONS if the United Statee "strictly respects
and scrupulously implements" the Paris
Agreement and the joint communique, both the NHAN DAN and QUAN
DOI :THAN DAN articles offered the possibility of "normalizing
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19 DECEMBER 197, 3
U.S.-DRV relations"--a goal Hanoi has ignored Rince the period
immediately after the signing of the 13 Jur joint communique.
Le Due Tho did not raise the question of nnrmnlization of
relations in :iis 17 Decembnr statement, nithn!igh he had in his
statement on his arrival in Paris last.. May for the talks which
led to the joint communique.
USSR SCORES UPS1 SUPPORT FOR SAIGON. EXPRESSES HOPE FOR TALKS
Two days before the snheduled Kissinger-Le Due Tho meeting, Soviet
President Podgornyy expressed Moscow's hope for the success of
peace-seeking efforts and focused responsibility on the United
States with unusual directness by accusing Washington of supporting
Saigon violations of the Paris peace agreement. Podgornyy's
critical remarks, in a speech welcoming a visiting PRG
delegation, were consistent with Moscow press and radio comment
in the past month, but went beyond previous speeches by Soviet
leaders. Kosygin had atypically castigated U.S. support for
Saigon, however, in a 1 October joint communique on his visit
to Yugoslavia.
Speaking at an 18 December dinner for PRG Advisory Council
Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, Podgornyy accused the United States of
supporting systematic Saigon sabotage of the Paris agreement,
and warned that attacks on communist territory had brought about
"a dangerous exacerbation of the situation in South Vietnam."
Maintaining that the establishment of peace requires full
implementation of the Paris agreement, Podgornyy added: "We
hope that the efforts that are being undertaken at the present
stage with the aim of lessening tensions in Vietnam will
produce positive results, and that the interested sides will
find the appropriate ways for the realization of the agreements
reached in Paris." He went on to affirm Soviet support for
the Vietnamese struggle and willingness to "do everything
depending on it to facilitiate" the establishment of lasting
peace and implementation of the "lawful rights and aspirations"
of. the Vietnamese.
BACKGROUNri Following the signing of the January Paris
agreement, Moscow was very circumspect in its
treatment of the U.S. ro'e in Vietnam. While there was some
criticism of U.S. actious In propaganda prior to the 13 June
Joint communique, Soviet leaders did not voice such censure,
and even low-level press and radio attacks were dru,.,red during
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 DECEMBER 1973
the first three monti,s of ter the joint communiqu-. (Luring
the period of this low-key approach--from mid-June to
mid-September--Moscow failed to mention even alleged Saigon
violations in the communique on DRV First Secretary Le Duan's
~'aly visit. The issue of Saigon violations had been raised
In a Podgornyy speech and the communique on a visit of PRG
Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh .,l March and early April,
and such official criticism of Saigon was revived again
beginning with the 21 September communique on Brezhnev's
visit to Bulgaria.)
In the weeks after direct criticism of U.S. support for Saigon
was voiced in the 1 October Joint USSR-Yugoslav communique on
Kosygin's visit to Belgrade, the issue of the U.S. role was
broached only indirectly by Soviet loaders: Brezhnev, in a
27 November speech in India, warns,!, against "for,:ign interference"
in Indochina, and Suslov, in a speech on the folluv,i!tg day,
claimed Saigon was encouraged in its violations by "imperialist
circles." Low-level Soviet reports in October and Nr)vemb'r did
begin to cite alleged examples of illegitimate U.S. activities
in Vietnam, and since mid-November U.S. actions have drawn
comment in the central press. Thus, RED STAR on 18 November,
IZVESTIYA on 24 November, and NEW TIMES on 7 December condemned
the United States for allegedly supporting Saigon violations
of the peace agreement. More recently this charge was raised
in a 15 December PRAVDA article, timed to coincide with Le Duc
Tho's arrival in Moscow an route to Paris.
LE DUC THO During his stopover in Moscow, DRV envoy
SrOPOVER Le Duc Tho on 16 December had talks, in a
"friendly and heartfelt" atmosphere, with Soviet
Central Committee Secretary Ka tushev. On previous stopovers
Tho usually had met with Politburo member Kirilenlto as well as
Katushev. A TASS report on the Tho meeting with Katushev did
not include any Soviet criticism of the United States; but
noted that Tho had demanded the United States and Saigon to
strictly observe the Paris agreement ant.! had claimed that the
PRG "reserves the right to take necessary measures" to protect
PRG-controlled areas from any "hostile encroachments." The
Soviec side, according to TASS, reaffirmed its support for the
DRV-PRG stand on the fulfillment of the Paris agreements "by
all sides" and "strongly condemned" Saigon's continuing
violations.
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19 DECEMBER 1973
PRC PRESS REITERATES SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM; LE DUC THO FETED
Increased Peking backing for the position of ite Vietnamese
allies, first reflected during PRG leader Nguyen Huu Tho's
visit to the PRC last month, was again apparent in a 1 December
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article endorsing recent DRV and
PRG foreign ministry statements. The article is the first
such authoritative Chinese endorsement of Vietnamese protests
of U.S.-Saigon peace violations since last summer, although
in the months following the January Paris agreement Peking
had regularly seconded high-level Vietnamese statement's on
de'elopments in Vietnam. Thus, DRV and PRG government statements
of 30 March and 1 April had prompted a 3 April PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial, while PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements at the
end of July were endorsed in a 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article. By contrast, the outpouring of harsh,
high-level Vietnameso protests beginning in October and
including PRG and DRV government statement9 of 9 and 10 November,
had heretofore elicited no seconding Chinese comment.
Unlike the Peking comment earlier this par endorsing Vietnamese
statements, the 8 December Commentator article did not refer to
specific statements, instead seconding the denunciations
issued in unspecified DRV and PRG foreign ministry protests
against recent U.S. at,d,Saigon violations. Reflecting the
heightened intensity of Vietnamese criticism of the Uriced States
in their statements, Commentator castigated the United States
in stronger terms than those used in Peking"s earlier endorsing
comment. The article accused Washington of having uttered
"truculent military threats" and of "brazen provocations" against
the Vietnamese people; however, it did not in its own name go
beyond demanding that Washington "scrupulously implement" the
Paris agreement.
It is possible that the revived Chinese willingness in the
Commentator article to second Vietnamese official protests may
be related to Sino-Vietnamese discussions during the 18-23
November PRG delegation's visit to China. Dur!,ng the visit,
Peking at first seemed characteristically reluctant to
associate itself with its allies' comprehensive condemnation
of U.S.-Saigon violations, but the Chinese ultimately agreed
to a joint Sino-Vietnamese d"v