TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060050-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: November 28, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively (HI
in foreign broadilist and press ii icdia. It is published
I))' 113IS without coordination with other U.S. Cmernment
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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28 NOVEMBER 1973
C ONTENTS
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
USSR Welcomes Arab Summit, Marks Time on Developments 1
SOVIET BLOC ENERGY
Moscow, Allies Acknowledge Fuel and Power Liffirtulties 6
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Replies to PRC Greeting, Restates its Border Position . . . . 10
INDOCHINA
Foreign Ministries Charge ('.VN Bombing, U.S. Overflights 12
PRC-PRG Communique Shows Mutual Accomodation 14
CHINA
Provinces Stress Need to Follow Party's Rural Policies 16
NOTES
DRV Organization Congresses; Soviet Ambassador to India 18
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
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ARAB-ISRAEL1 CONFLICT
USSR WELCOMES ARAB SUMMIT, MARKS TIME ON DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow continues its reportage on developments connected with the
cease-fire agreement and convocation of an Arab-Israeli peace
conference, but there has been little comment of substance. The
Soviet posture was typified in a message from Podgornyy and
Kosygin welcoming the Arab summit conference, convened in Algiers
on 26 November. The message stressed the need for further Arab
coordination as the Middle East conflict enters "a stage of
practical steps," and it again called for Israeli withdrawal
from "all" Arab territories.
While continuing to complain of Israeli tactics of "sabotage and
procrastination," Moscow has briefly noted Israel's 25 November
agreement in principle to take part in a peace conference with
the "stipulation" that the Israeli Government cannot make any
important decision before the parliamentary elections at the end
of December. And Soviet media reported without comment Secretary
Kissinger's assessment, in his 21 November news conference, of
sufficient progress in the Egyptian-Israeli situation so that a
negotiating process could begin in December.
KISSINGER NEWS CONFERENCE Short reports of Secretary Kissinger's
21 November news conference by TASS,
Moscow radio and PRAVDA, while varying somewhat, all focused on his
opening statement on the Middle East and paraphrased some of his
remarks on detente.
-I- U.S. objectives, peace conference: Kissinger was cited as
explaining the U.S. objective in the Middle East as solidifying
the cease-fire "so that we could move forward together with other
interested parties" toward peace negotiations. TASS and PRAVDA
noted his belief that sufficient progress had been made in the
"complex situation" on the Egyptian-Israeli front so that "we can
look forward with scme confidence" to the beginning of peace
negoaations. Kissinger was also reported as saying that "our
effort will be to create the appropriate auspices called for in
Resolution 338 and under the auspices of the United Nations" to
begin a negotiating process hopefully during December. The
Soviet reports did not mention Kissinger's remark that thk peace
conference should be under the auspices of Moscow and Washington
with UN "blessing," and Moscow has never defined the
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"appropriate auspices," going no further than observations by
PRAVDA's Zhukov that the negotiations should be held under
"suitable aegis," involving the assistance and participation
"of the United Nations or that of various states." Thus Soviet
media have ignored Cairo and Amman reports on the 27th that the
U.S. and Soviet envoys had been jointly received by Egyptian
Vice President Fawzi and King Husayn respectively; Amman radio
explained that the ambassadors had extended an invitation to
Jordan to attend the peace conference to be held in Geneva on
18 December.
-I- Detente: The Soviet accounts of Kissinger's press conference
all cited the Secretary as noting the "great significance" of
detente in Soviet-American relations for the settlement of the
Middle East conflict. According to PRAVDA and Moscow's domestic
service, Kissinger said that from time to time "existing
differences cause tension" in U.S.-Soviet relations and it was
important at such moments to have sufficient trust between
them to relax this tension. (Kissinger in fact said that, as
happened during the Middle East crisis, "long-standing commit-
ments--ideological pressures--produce actions that bring these two
sides into confrontation." At that point, he added, "it is
important that enough confidence exist so that the confrontation
is mitigated.")
-I- Guarantees: Moscow's reports of the news conference did not
mention Kissinger's observation that the final accord would have
to include "an element of security arrangements" between the
Arabs and Israelis and "may have to have an element of outside
guarantees." But TASS on the 24th did note his remark on outside
guarantees in promptly reporting Israeli Defense Minister Dayan
as turning down "the American proposal for guarantees of Israel's
borders and security." TASS cited Dayan as declaring that "the
Americans 'tell us that we can and must rely on security guarantees.
But why do we need such guarantees in view of the fact that
Israeli borders will then be worth nothing?'" TASS assessed
Dayan's statement as demonstrating that Israel's real concern
was not the security of its borders nor even the establishment of
peace, but rather a continued policy of territorial expansion.
The same point was expressed in a Mayevskiy article in PRAVDA on
the 23d which scoffed that the Israeli "theory of the 'need for
reliable borders" was simply a justification for the seizure of
Arab land. Similarly, Kudryavtsev in an IZVESTIYA article on
10 October had dismissed Israel's insistence on secure frontiers
as being only a cover for its "expansionist" policy. Kudryavtsev
had reiterated hiF.I thesis that Israel's frontiers would become
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genuinely secure only when it maintained "good-neighborly
relations" with the Arab states.. And in a 23 November IZVESTIZA
article Kudryavtsev declared that genuine security for Israel
could be insured only by guaranteeing the security of all
countries and peoples of the region.
4- Energy crisis: The Moscow radio and ITAVDA versions said the
Secretary noted the seriousness of the energy crisis in the United
States as a result of the Arab oil embargo and stated that economic
pressure would not change U.S. policy in the Middle East. But
Moscow did not pick up his remark that if "pressures" continued
unreasonably and indefinitely, the United States would have to
consider what countermeasures it might have to take. TAS S on
the 24th acknowledged this remark by indirection in reporting
from Dacca on indignation in Bangladesh over "Kissinger's
announcement of U.S. intentions" to resort to "repressive economic
measures" against Arab states which were seeking to liberate their
lands. TASS also noted that a Congressional committee had
conceded that a retaliatory U.S. embargo on grain and food exports
would be ineffective. An Arabic-language broadcast the same day,
citing Algerian and Lebanese press comment, said Arab public
opinion condemned the "U.S. threat" to ban the export of grain.
and goods to Arab countries as a countermeasure against the
reduction of oil exports. A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article by
Agaryshev on 24 November, discussing the U.S. oil supply situation,
claimed that this "partly explains" American diplomatic activity
in the Middle East.
ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE Moscow comment in Arabic un the Algiers
summit conference has cited the
consolidation of Arab solidarity in political, military and
economic cooperation as the focus of the discussions, which would
deal among other things with future oil policy and the "Palestinian
question." A Moscow domestic service broadcast on the 26th
additionally noted two other agenda issues, a Middle East peace
conference and the status of Jerusalem. As in the case rC the
last Arab summit conference, in Rabat in December 1969, Podgornyy
and Kosygin sent a greetings message to the pnrticipants.*
Along the lines of Kirilenko's October Revolution anniversary
* The Podgornyy-Kosygin message and Soviet treatment of the 1969
sv:ilmit are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 December 1969, pages
17-20, and of 31 December 1969, pages 19-20.
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speech, the message pledged that the USSR would continue giving
"comprehensive assistance and support" to the Arab countries,
and again expressed Soviet readiness to contribute to the
creation of conditions for the establishment of peace. Kosygin
and Podgornyy repeated the standard Soviet tall for Israeli
withd.zawal from "all" Arab territories and adhered to the usual
formulation in supporting the Palestinians' "legitimate rights."
In reporting the opening of the conference, TASS on the 26th
mentioned without comment that Iraq and Libya had not sent
delegations. Libya's absence was dismissed as of no consequence
by former PRAVDA Middle East expert Belyayev in the weekly
Moscow radio observers' roundtable on the 25th. He remarked
that there was nothing new in al-Qadhdhafi's stand, since he
had disapproved of Egyptian and Syrian strategy and tactics in
connection with the October fighting and "remained, as it were,
outside the framework of Arab unity" since then.
The panelists' failure to mention Iraq undoubtedly stems from
Soviet annoyance over Iraq's rejection of the Security Council
cease-fire resolutions. Thus the Iraqi foreign minister, asked
in an interview reported by Baghdad radio on 17 November about
Soviet efforts to persuade Iraq to accept the cease-fire, replied
that "the Soviets have-their viewpoint and we have ours on war
and peace." He added chat "we regard them as friends who give
every possible means of support," but do not consider them "as
an alternative to the Arabs with regard to Arab issues."
Perhaps not coincidentally, Moscow and Baghdad on the 27th
announced the arrival in Iraq of a Soviet party-government
delegation led by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev.*
The visit would seem to be connected both with Iraq's stance
on a cease-fire and with Iraqi internal dissensions. Baghdad
radio reported that at the delegation's first talks, with
Bafth Party Deputy Secretary Saddam Husayn, the sides discussed,
"in an atmosphere of frankness and amity," bilateral relations
and the situation in the Middle East on which they "exchanged
views." On the internal front, the visit may deal with recent
reported clashes between the Iraqi Communist Party and the
Lurdish Democratic Party; both ICP and KDP delegations have had
talks,in Moscow this month with Ponomarev, the communists having
* At the same time, Cairo and Moscow announced the arrival in
Egypt on the 27th of a CPSU delegation headed by CPSU Central
Committee candidate member Kirichenko.
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also been received by Brezhnev. A TASS report on the talks with
the Kurds indicated that the USSR was still pressing for Kurdish
participation in the Iraqi national front established by the
ruling Balth Party and the communists in July.
PALESTINIAN ISSUES Moscow continues its reticence in matters
pertaining to the Palestinians. The
visit of a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) delegation
to Moscow was not acknowledged until the release by TASS of a
"communique for the press" on 26 November, two days after the
visit ended. The communique indicated that the talks were
again held under the umbrella of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee although, as in the case of PLO Chairman 'Arafat's
August visit this year, talks were also held with "other USSR
public organizations." The communique referred to the
Palestinians' legitimate "national" rights, as did the Soviet-
Yugoslav communique on Tito's recent talks with Brezhnev in
Kiev, but Moscow comment otherwise has generally avoided
including the word "national."
Moscow followed up the visit on the 27th by broadcasting in
Arabic an interview with delegation leader 'Arafat, a practice
also observed in at least his last two visits. 'Arafat called
the talks positive and constructive and praised Soviet support
for the Arabs whether by "passing along its experience or
giving arms," and he particularly expressed gratitude to
Brezhnev for "insisting on mentioning" the Palestinians'
"legitimate rights" in the Soviet-U.S. communique on Brezhnev's
June visit to the United States.
Moscow has again conveyed in typical fashion its disapproval
of the latest Palestinian hijacking. A broadcast to Great
Britain on the 26th called attention to a PLO disclaimer of
involvement in the hijacking of a KLM Boeing 747 out of Beirut
on the 25th.
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SOVIET BLOC ENERGY
MOSCON, ALLIES ACKNOWLEDGE FUEL AND POWER DIFFICULTIES
As the energy shortage grips the developed economies of the West,
Moscow and its East European allies have coupled routine ex-
pressions of support for the Arab boycott with increasing attention
to the status of their own energy resources. While the comment
continues to emphasize the adequacy of oil stocks, in comparison
with the situation in the West, there has been general acknow-
ledgement of the need for conservation measures, as well as
announcements of energy rationing in Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria.
Only Hungary has explicitly acknowledged dependence on Arab oil
deliveries.
MOSCOW Radio Moscow gratuitously reported on the 24th that
deliveries of Soviet petroleum to Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, and the GDR via the Druzhba pipeline were running
24 hours ahead of schedule, and that the volume of such deliveries
to these countries had increased 12 percent over last year. On
the 17th Moscow radio had reported completion of installations
for the second segment of the Druzhba line, which would ircrease
annual Soviet oil deliveries to Hungary from the present 4.5
up to 10 million tons. The report included a reminder of Budapest's
dependence on such deliveries in stating that "Hungary produces
only 2 million tons a year of its own oil."
While maintaining outward calm, Moscow hastened to convene a series
of CEMA meetings on energy problems. On the 23d Radio Moscow
carried reports of meetings in the Soviet capital of the CEMA
standing commissions for electric power and for peaceful use of
atomic energy, and TASS on the 26th reported a meeting of the
CEMA standing commission for power engineering. The reports
included glowing accouurs of past achievements and of long-
range projects to step up fuel and power supplies to the member
countries over the next two decades.
The overall Soviet portrayal of a favorable domestic energy
situation was marred only by a 13 November MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
report of a Moscow gorkom conference convened to discuss the
city's power situation for the ct.ming winter. The lengthy report
referred repeatedly to difficulties in delivering heating gas
to Moscow homes and enterprises and stressed the "extreme"
importance of economical use of power resources. It appeared to
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rAse some possibility of future gasoline rationing in pointing
out that 16 million liters of gasoline had already been saved
since the start of the current five?year plan in 1971. In contrant to
the generally somber tone of the MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA article, TASS
on the 22d reported the Soviet English?language weekly MOSCOW
NEWS as claiming that there were plentiful stocks of natural gas
to heat Moscow apartments this winter.
POLAND, Warsaw's uniquely rather restrained support of the
BULGARIA Arab cause in the recent hostilities has been followed
by official acknowledgement of a serious energy
shortage. On the 24th, two da:s after TRYBUNA LUDU had publicized
a government decision to switch to coal as the future power
base, the Polish Council of Ministers announced a series of
restrictions on the use of liquid fuels in motor transportation,
effective 1 December. Although the fuel rationing order was
restricted to "official" motor vehicles, according to the Warsaw
radio, it was "closely linked with the situation which has arisen
lately in the world fuel market."
The government order specified a one?third raduction in fuel
consumption by official passenger cars, comfared with average
monthly consumption during the first quarter of this year; a
ban on driving on Sundays and other religious holidays; and a
speed limit of 70 kilometers per hour for trucks and 80 for
passenger vehicles. The order, as reported by Warsaw radio,
called for voluntary cooperation by private passenger car
operators, in contrast to "many countries" which have banned
all Sunday driving. In justifying the decision, the government
daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 25th stressed that Poland imports
all its liquid fuels and that the restrictions were designed
to "avoid a tense situation which could affect our economy."
Bulgaria's rationing order, announced on 21 November by the
Ministry of Power Supply, restricted the use of electric power
in the public sector and urged voluntary cooperation in limiting
power consumption in private homes. The official announcement
indicated that the order was necessitated by, among other things,
"a shortage in some liquid fuels." On the 25th the party daily
RABOTNICHESKO DELO reported that as a followup to the rationing
order a five?day work week and a reduction in total working
hours would be introduced on 1 December.
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HUNGARY, An article in the 17 November issue of the
CZECHOSLOVAKIA Budapest trade union daily NEPSZAVA, reported
by both MTI and the Budapest domestic service,
noted that Hungary has "sufficient reserves" of gas and fuel oil
and thdt its crude oil stocks are "about double" that of a year
ago. The article pointed out that two-thirds of Hungary's crude
oil comes from the Soviet Union and one-fourth from domestic
production, with the remainder coming from Iraq Ey rail from
Yugoslav harbors and by river from Romanian ports. The article
said that deliveries of Iraqi oil from Syrian ports had been
temporarily interrupted for "understandable reasons" but have
now been resumed.
Prague has issued a number of public denials of a general energy
shortage. On the 24th Czechoslovak Finance Minister Rohlicek
was quoted by CTK to the effect that there was "no danger of an
energy crisis." A radio commentary by the Prague domestic service
on the 22d, in ridiculing "rumors" of a sharp rise in the price
of gasoline, noted that the price of crude had "tripled" in the
West and that "no wonder our motorists are asking if similar trends
will not come to our country as well." Both items were accompanied
by doctrinaire assurances that economic cooperation with the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries ruled out the danger
of tuel price increases or shortages. News of the discovery of
a new crude oil sourcc..) was reported by RUDE PRAVO on the 21st.
The new deposit, in the Zdanice forest area of Moravia, was
reportedly expected to produce 15 tons of petroleum per day.
At the same time, an "especially pressing" electric power short-
age was acknowledged in a Prague domestic service commentary on
the 14th which reported a joint meeting of the committees for
indAstry, transport, and trade of both chambers of the Federal
Assembly to deal with the problem. The shortage was attributed
to shortfalls by hydroelectric plants resulting from this
year's drought. Articles on the power shortage in the Bratislava
PRAVDA on the 10th and in the Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE on the
13th combined demands to conserve power with assurances that
help was forthcoming from the CEMA power grid.
ROMANIA Bucharest's decision on fuel rationing, adopted by
the party E.'ecutive Committee on the 13th and sub-
sequenily spelled out in decrees by the State Council and the
Council of Ministers, was more drastic than Poland's. It re-
stricted both public and privately owned automobiles to 40 1.:ters
of gasoline per month from 1 November through 31 March 1974 and
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to 60 liters per month thereafter. Lower vehicle speed limits
and reduced quotas for natural gas consumption in home heating
were also imposed, and electric power consumption for public
buildings and public lighting was cut by 50 percent.
Romanian comment has gone no further in explaining the fuel
shortage than to indicate that its economy is dependent on fuel
imports which are not available in sufficient quantities. Thus,
a commentary carried by AGERFRES on the 9th, four days prior to
the announcement of the rationing decision, stressed that the
country's growing electric power and industrial requirements
demand "bigger quantitie.; of oil products, natural gases, and
other fuel" and that "imported fuel" was a necessity. The
large-scale drive for fuel conservation, it added, was occasioned
by the fact that "Romania's reserves are not limitless."
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW REPLIES TO PRC GREETING, RESTATES ITS BORDER POSITION
In an unusual step, Moscow publicized its message of thanks to
the Chinese for their greetings on the occasion of the October
Revolution anniversary earlier in the month. The message was
carrIed by TASS on 24 November and appeared in the central
press on the 25th. Moscow normally sends individual messages
of thanks directly to the parties concerned but publicizes
only a generalized message to all well-wishers. This year's
general message was Carried by TAS on 17 November.
The Soviet message was in response to a somewhat Conciliatory
Chinese greeting which had dropped certain provocative phrases
used in previous years to suggest ideological backtracking on
the part of Mo:mow.* The Chinese message had also for the
first time referred to the border questicn, reiterating Peking's
call to solve the issue through negotiations "under conditions
which exclude any threat." The message echoed Chou En-lai's
remarks on the border issue at the 10th CCP Congress in August,
where he had also reiterated Peking's proposal that relations
between the two countries be normalized on the basis of peaceful
coexistence.
While the Soviet reply is not po17mical, it breaks no new ground
in the dispute. It reflects the posture taken in recent leadership
statements and in earlier responses to Chou's remarks at the
10th Congress by ,:epeating past Soviet proposals, reminding Peking
that "concrete deeds are of decisive importance for normalizing
relations," and implying that the next move is up to the
Chinese. The Soviet message lists two specific proposals at
the border talks already rejected or ignored by the Chinese--the January
1971 nonuse of force proposal and the nonaggression treaty proposed
in June of this year. The same day that TASS transmitted the
Soviet message of reply, NCNA reported remarks by a Chinese
representative at the UN which accused Moscow of "hypocritically
proposing the nonuse of force against each other."
The publication of the message is apparently a further attempt
by Moscow to place its positam in the dispute in ecle best light
possible while indicating to the Chinese that it dues not
intend to relax its own demands for a settlement. The message
thus conveys, in a more subtle fashion, the same assessment
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of Sino-Soviet relations provided by Kosygin a few days earlier
in Minsk. As reported in SOVIET BELORUSSIA on 15 November,
Kosygin lamented the lack of progress in the border talks and
obseroed pointedly that Chou's remarks at the 10th CCP Congress
had no been backed by "real actions." He went on to call
for suc'l action in the for of "businesslike discussion" of
"the constructive proposals submitted by the USSR."
* For an analysis of the Chinese message, see the TRENDS of 7
November 1973, p. 22.
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INDOCHINA
FOREIGN MINISTRIES CHARGE GVN BOMBING, U.S. OVERFLIGHTS
Alleged Saigon bombing raids on 23 November in the Katum area,
Tay Ninh Province, prompted protests from the DRV and PRG at the
foreign-ministry level which also reviewed alleged air attacks
since the beginning of October. While in the past two months
the spokesmen for thc foreign ministries have issued frequent
protests over bombings, the current statements are the first
at foreign-ministry level since early October, when the GVN
carried out large-scale raids over PRG-controlled areas of Tay
Ninh in retaliation for the communist capture of the Le Minh
base in Pieiku Province.
Issued on the 26th, three days after the air strikes were
supposed to have taken place, the PRG statement termed them
"the largest-scale bombing of the Tay Ninh liberated zone since
28 January" and claimed that the Saigon air force killed and
wounded "dozens of civilians, most of them women and children"
and destroyed large amounts of civilian property. The statement
warned that the PRG will "resolutely counter" all violations of
the cease-fire agreement by Saigon. This was milder language than
in the 15 October PLAF Command order, which promised to "resolutely
counterattack" GVN forces "anywhere in appropriate form and
with appropriate forces" for violations of the cease-fire agreement.
The DRV statement issued on the 27th similarly described
civilian deaths and destruction allegedly caused by Saigon's
air attacks and characteri2ed them as "another very barbarous
crime" and an "extremely grave Vtolation" of the Paris agreement
and the 13 June joint communique. The DRV statement gave more
attention than had the PRG to the alleged U.S. role as the inptigator
of the raids. The DRV statement declared that Saigon was
"encouraged and assisted by the United States" in carrying out
the air attacks, and it additionally asserted that this was
part of the "U.S.-Saigon Administration clique's sinister schme
to systematically sabotage the ceace-fire." The PRG statement,
while not neglecting charges of U.S. complicity, accused the
United States only parenthetically, in its concluding paragraphs,
of "abetting and encouraging" Saigon to violate the cease-fire.
Aerial reconnaissance of PRG-controlled areas in Quang Tri
Province on 21 and 24 November and of the DRV's coastal Nghe An
Province on the 28th, reportedly conducted by SR-71 and "unmanned"
aircraft dispatched by the United States, drew routine-level
foreign ministry spokesmen protests from the PRO on the 24th and
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t7th and from the DRV on the 28th. The three latest statements
are virtually identical in wording and tenor to protests
by the DRV and PRG on 19 and 21 November for alleged overflights
at that time.*
PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman statements on the 24th and 27th,
like the statement of the 21s1., charged that U.S. overflights
of PRG territory consitituted a violation of Article 4 of the
Paris agreement, "denounced and condemned" such action, a',d
"demanded" it be discontinued. The protest of aerial reconnaissance
by unmanned aircraft reported in the statement of the 27th
is the first time since 2 May that unmanned a1rcr7I]t have been
mentioned in this regard. While the May spokesman's protest
did not specify the type of aircraft involved, media commentary
then described the overflight as being carried out by
"pilotless reconnaissance aircraft."
Tinlike earlier DRV protests of SR-71 intrusions, which clearly
charged that North Vietnam's interior had been penetrated,
the latest statement only asserts that U.S. aircraft "encroached
upon . . . many areas of Nghe An." The statement repeated the standard
charge in overflight protests that the alleged intrusion was
in violation of Article 2 of the Paris agreement and the
first point of the 13 June joInt communique.
* The DRV protest statement of the 19th and the FRG protest
statement of the 21st are discussed in the TRENDS of 21 November
1973, page 17.
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PRC-PRG COMMUNIQUE SHOWS MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION
The 21 November joint communique marking the "complete ouccess"
of the 18-23 November Mina visit by the PRG delegation led
by Advi:zory Council Chairman Nguyen Huu ThO reflected
bilateral efforts to reconcile Sino-Vietnamese differences
evident in leaders' speenhes and other authoritative pronouncements
during the visit.* Most notably, the two sides reaffirmed
common stands on crucial issues such as alleged U.S,-Saigon
violations of the Paris agreement, while implicitly acknowledging
continued Sino-Vietnamese differences by failing to mention whether
"identical views" had been reached. This omission was a departure
from tha last PRC-PRG communique of 1 January 1973 marking
Foreign Minister Binh's visit to Peking.
In contrast to Peking's silenc.e in speeches during the visit on
the subject of alleged U.S. obstruction of the Paris agreement,
in the communique the Chinese compensated by pointedly condemning
Saigon violations ?with the support and connivance of the United
States" and by demanding that Washington shoulder its "unshirkable
responsibility for implementation of the Paris agreement." This
was a stronger Chinese position than Peking's generalized
express:.on of support for the Vietnamese charges in the 12 June
1973 joint communique marking DRV party leader Le Duan's visit
to China. In that communique Peking had blandly admonished the
United States to respect and implement the peace accord. Peking
enhanced its accommodation of PRG interests by offering in the
communique its first authoritative endorsement. of recent PRG
warnings that it would take countermeasures agaiut:t the Saigon
viulations. Specif:!cally, the Chinese joined with the PRG
in affirming that the South Vietnamese people are entitled to
take "all resolute measures" to check Saigon violations, defend
the liberated areas, and uphold the Paris agreement.
Some PRG accommodation to the Chinese positions was evident in
the communique's playing down of the seriousness of U.S.-Saigon
violations. Thus, although Tho had stressed in his Peking speech
on the 18th that the United States and Saigon had "ever more
crudely and systematically violated many most important provisions
of the Paris agreewmt," in the communique the PRG merely pointed
* The major Sino-Vietnamese pronouncements during the visit, apart
from the communique which was released following the PRG visitors'
departure on the 23d, are treated in the 21 November TRENDS, pp. 14-17.
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28 NOVEMBER 1973
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to "violation 1 of some vital provisions" by Washington and
Saigon. This formula was even milder than that used by the DRV
in the 12 June communique, which stated that Washington and
Saigon had "incessantly, systematically and grossly violated
important provisions of the agreement." Furthermore, the PRG
side inserted in the communique more effusive praise for Chinese
support than the DRV had in the 12 June communique, noting in
particular that it has "always received enormous and effective
support ond assistance" from the PRC.
Peking pointed out "emphatically" its firm support for the South
Vietnamese struggle for national rights, but this time avolded
any reference to pledges of continued Chinese assistance to
the Vietnamese struggle, pledges mentioned in both the 12 June
and i Januar: communiques. The Chinese duly reaffirmed support
for the PRG as the "sole authentic representative" of the
South Vietnamese and for the PRG six-point proposal.
Both sides' treatment of Cambodia and Laos echoed thAr
complementing statements earlier in the visit, addi4g a demand
that ,he United States halt its support for Lon Nol and
interference in Cambodian internal affairs. The 12 June
communique had sidestepped any specific demand in mentioning
the futility of the U.S. bombing and military intervention in
Cambodia.
After short stays in Tientsin and Canton the PRG visitors
departed for Hanoi on the 23d. While in Canton, Tho and Binh
reportedly had a "friendly" meeting on the 22d with Cambodian
Princs Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth, and also
met with Sihanouk's ailing mother. Penn Nouth attended a
Canton banquet for the delegates on the evening of the 22d,
but Sihanuuk's only ocher publicized appearance dnring the
PRG visit was on the 23d, when he received Tho's Chinese host,
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, who came to pay respects to the
prince's mother. Upon arrival in Hanoi on the 23d, the PRG
delegetes were received by the same high-ranking DRV officials
who greeted them during their 18 November stopover on the way
to Peking.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 NOVEMBER 1973
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CHINA
PROVINCES STRESS NEED TO FOLLOW PARTY'S RURAL POLICIES
With the ead of the harvest season, PRC media are following
time-honored tradition in again stressing ideological and
capital construction tasks in rural areas for the winter. The
uroadcasts suggest no change in current policies dealing with
production relationships, but there seems to be increase over
recent years in the attention devoted to Lleological struggle.
Kirin radio on 23 November carried a CHANGCHUN DAILY commentator's
article that criticized certain cadres for mistakes in harvest
distribution policies which would weaken the economy and dampen
the peasants' enthusiasm. Such criticism indicates the errors
were "leftist" in their opposition to current PRC distribution
policies, which stress the legi:imacy of the peasants' needs
for gradual increases in income as production increases. The
article noted that "efficient distribution arouses people's
socialist enthusiasm, which in turn promotes production."
Current production relationships were also reaffirmed by Kweichow
in a 25 November broadcast summing up results of a provincial
conference on afforestation. The broadcast stressed the rights
of lower-level production teams when their resources are used 17,y
brigades and communes, stating that when teams contribute labor
and investment, they must receive "compensation in proportion."
The status of production teams was also treated by Shensi radio
or the 23d, in an attack on "erroneous tides" by rural cadres.
The radio defended the current size of production teams in re-
calling that during the 1962 rightist surge supported by Liu
Shac-chi, "upper levels" had requested that a brigade reduce the
size of its teams and that the brigade had "disobeyed the persons
sent by the upper level" in a spirit of going against the tide.
But the article pointed out that the correct tide may sometimes
be hidden, noting that Lin Piao in 1969, using as a pretext
criticism of Liu's incorrect line, had interfered with the
party's rural policies from the "ultraleft," attempting to
"cut off the tail of private ownership."
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WNvivILNTiAL FBIS TRENDS
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As usual, middle level cadres are left most exposed in the
current stress on ':ural line struggle. The Shansi provincial
radio on the 23d carried a pointed warning to aueh cadres in
reporting a speech by Tachai model Chen Yung-kuei, now a member
of the Politburo, to a symposium on learning from Tachai held
earlier this month. Chen attributed Tachai's success to its
adherence to the party line and stated that "the failure in
some localities to impelement policies is a great obstacle
to 1:11e current campaign to learn from Tachai. . . . If
polices are not implemented we cannot blame the lower level;
the responsibility lies with the leadership." Chen demanded
that "the county CCP committees in particular" get rid of their
apprehensions and "implement correctly all party policies."
Cadre apprehensions appear natural since past swings of the
pendulum have brought severe attacks on those who implemented
moderate policies.
PEASANT CONGRESSES Following Hunan's 18 November announcement
of the convening cf its provincial peasant
congress, the nation's first since the cultural revolution, Hofe:;.?
on 26 November announced Its peasant congress had convened
on the 25r.h. Anhwei leader and party Vice Chairman Ti Te-sheng
sent a greetings message to the meeting, but he remenrA in
Peking. Provincial secretary Kuo Hung-chieh reported to the
congress that grain, cotton, and pig production had all risen
"by a fairly big wargin" over last year. Shantung, Shensi, and
Kiangsu have all announced peasant congress preparations, and most
provinces will probably try to hold their congresses during the
current slack farming period.
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CONFIDENTIAL FIS TRENDS
28 NOVEMBER 1973
-18-
NOTES
DRV ORGANIZATION CONGRESSES: The announcement by a third DRV
mass organization, the trade unions, that their first congress
in more than 12 years will be held in early 1974 is further
evidence of a return to normal organizational activity after
the long war effort. If vh,-; pattern of 13 years ago is followed,
the calling of three conEreszes by mass organizations suggests
more strongly that another Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) congress
may be in the offing. The Vietnam General Federation of Trade
Unions will hold its third congress In mid-February, according
to a Hanoi radio 22 November report. Earlier announcements of
congresses included a 9 August newspaper report that the Ho
Chi Minh Working Youth Union would hold its fourth congress in
1974, and a 16 October directive of the VWP Central Committee
Secretariat broadcast by Hanoi on 20 October stating that the
Vietnam Women's Union would hold its fourth congress in 1974.
All three of these mass organizations held their last congresses
in Febrrary and Marh 1961, several months after the VWP's
third and most receut congress in September 1960.
SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO INDIA: Although Moscow has not announced
the long-awaited appointment of a new ambassador to India, Soviet
media reports that "USSR Ambassador" V.F. Maltsev is a member
of Soviet party chief Brezhnev's delegation visiLirg India
suggest that Maltsev's appointment co this post is Lriminent.
Moscow has been searching for a suitaLle candidate since April,
when Ambassador to India Nikolay Pegov was appc,tnted deputy
foreign minister. Since Pegov was one of the few Soviet
ambassadors in noncommunist countries who was a member of the
CPSU Central Committee, Moscow and Delhi obviously wanted to
maintain this symbolic manifestation of their close relations.
After the long delay the two countries may have settled on
Maltsev, a candidate member of the Central Committee who is
presently Soviet ambassador to Finland. The tentative nature of
this move, however, is reflected in the failure of Moscow to
acknowledge formally that Maltsev is absent from his post in
Helsinki.
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FBIS TRENDS
28 NOVEMBER 1973
- 1 -
APPENIJIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 19 ,- 2.5 NOVEMBER 1973
Moscow (2528 items)
Brezhnev in India
China
Middle East
Guinea-Bissau Leader
Cabral in USSR
Brezhnev Meeting With
Vrench CP Secvetary
General Marchais
Peking,. (1138 items)
Domestic Issues
Indochina
[PRG Leader
Huu Tho in
Korea UN Debate
Middle East
(41%) 33%
(9%) 31%
Nguyen (5%) 25%]
PRC
(5%) 8%
(6%) 2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international rata() services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment Jr party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some MaY have been covered in prior issuc:
in other cases the propaganda content may he routine or of minor significance.
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