TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060047-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: November 7, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
7 NOVEMBER 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 45)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 NOVEMBER 1973
CONTENT S
Moscow Evasjve on Immediate Issues, Notes Diplomatic Activity. . . . 1
Soviet Controversy Over Detente-Defense Issue Continues. . . . . . . 6
Moscow Publicity on NATO Rift Avoids Detente Linkage . . . . . . ? 1 7
Moscow Indicates That Washington Should Prove Good Faith . . . . . . 9
Hanoi, PRG Justify Military operations as "Punitive Actions" . . . . 11
DRV Army Journal Examines Conduct of Military Campaigns. . . . . . . 14
Dong Ends Albanian Visit, Returns Home Via Moscow, Peking. . . . . . 15
Cambodian Insurgents Plan Offensive, Reject Compromise . . . . . . . 16
West German CP Calls for World Party Conference. . . . . . . . . . . 19
Chinese Leadership; Sino-Soviet Relations; Le Duan Visit to Laos . . 21
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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ARAB - ISRAELI C ONFLICT
FBIS TRENDS
7 NOVEMBER 1973
MOSCOW EVASIVE ON IMMEDIATE ISSUES, NOTES DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY
In a period of intense diplomatic activity on the Middle East
involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab and
Israeli parties to the conflict, Moscow continues to display
reticence with respect to the immediate issues. The problems
of POW exchange and controversy over the UN Emergency Force
have been touched on obliquely in reportage on developments in
the Middle East and at the Security Council, but these issues
have been largely passed over in limited comment. Panelists
on Moscow radio's weekly observers' roundtable on the 4th
declined to predict the possible course of current and future
negotiations in view of the "complexity and difficulty" of the
talks.
Moscow continues to back up Egyptian insistence on observance of
Security Council Resolutions 339 and 340 calling for the return
of forces to the positions they held at the time of the 22 October
cease-fire. Thus Kirilenko, in his October Revolution anniversary
speech on the 6th, called Israeli withdrawal to the 22 October
positions the "very first and necessary step" toward a political
settlement of the crisis. TASS dismissed Mrs. Meir's counter-
proposal, in a 1 November Washington news conference, for a
"so-called 'mutual alinement"' of the cease-fire. Moscow had
taken no note of what Israel has described as another pressing
problem, the Arab blockade of the Bab el Mandeb strait at the
mouth of the Red Sea, until TASS acknowledged the blockade in a
5 November dispatch from Paris on an Israeli fuel shortage.
TASS said that since the Arab countries had set up a blockade
of Bab el Mandeb no oil tanker had reached Israel from the
Indian Ocean. Seemingly in an effort to obscure the issue of a
Bab el Mandeb blockade, Moscow's domestic service on the 7th
claimed that the arrival of a GDR merchant vessel in the
Jordanian port of Aqaba refuted Israeli charges of an Egyptian
blockade of "the Gulf of Aqaba."
Soviet media have reported, with virtually no comment, the
separate talks held in Washington beginning last week by
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi and Israeli Prime Minister Meir
with President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger and the latter's
meeting with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Ismail "at
American initiative." TASS reported the itinerary for Kissinger's
trip to the Middle and Far East beginning on the 5th, but had no
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comment other ihau to cite "local observers" in Washington
for the view that recent U.S. diplomacy was due to the
American desire to repair relations with the Arab countries
and consolidate its deterioriating Middle East position.
Soviet media also briefly noted Soviet First Deputy Foreigi,
Minister Kuznetsov's meeting with as-Sadat in Cairo on
the 2d and his 3-6 November visit to Damascus, as well as
reporting the current round of inter-Arab contacts and
Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban's arrival in Romania on
the 5th for an official visit.
KIRILENKO SPEECH In his October Revolution anniversary
speech on the 6th Kirilenko went further
than other Soviet leaders have in the present crisis when he
said that the Soviet Union has been rendering and "will
continue to render the necessary aid and support" to the
Arab states. While such statements have been made by Soviet
leaders since the 1967 war,* elite pledges of support since
the October fighting have been confined to expressions of
sympathy with the "victims of aggression" (Brezhnev on
8 October) and of continued strengthening of solidarity with
the Arabs (Kosygin on 15 October).
Kirilenko also made the first Soviet elite reference to direct
Egyptian-Israeli contacts in Egypt in noting that these
countries' representatives were meeting in the presence of UN
representatives to discuss "questions of restoring the
situation that existed on 22 October." Soviet media have
noted these meetings in routine reportage on Mideast develop-
ments. Underlining the importance of an Israeli return to
the 22 October positions, Kirilenko twice called this the first
step toward settlement of the conflict as a whole. In this
context he accused Israel of "gross and treacherous" violations
of Resolution 338 calling for a cease-fire and declared that
for this alone Israel deserved "the most stringent sanctions,
* Kirilenko himself said in April 1970 that the USSR had
rendered and would render the Vietnamese and Arab people "such
aid as is required"; in June 1970 Podgornyy pledged to
continue rendering the "necessary assistance" to the Arab
countries; Ponomarev and Mazurov similarly pledged "comprehensive
assistance" and "all-round aid" in speeches in July and August
that year, and Kosygin promised "all necessary support" in a
February 1971 srcech.
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CONFLDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 NOVEMBER 1973
foreseen in such cases by the UN Charter." In only one other
Instance is a Soviet leader known to have called for Security
Council sanctions against Israel--Shelepin in an October
1969 speech at a WFTU congress in Budapest--although Soviet
delegates have from time to time raised the question during
UN debates on the Middle East.
Kirilenko's remarks on the Middle East were otherwise routine:
He reiterated the standard position that a stable peace in
the Middle East must be based on liberation of "all" Israeli-
occupied territories and on guaranteeing the Palestinians'
"lawful rights." Without mentioning the United States,
Kirilenko went on to say that it should be understood by the
Israeli leaders and "those who support them" that a real
solution to the Mideast problem could only be found in this
way. And like Brezhnev in his 26 October speech, Kirilenko
referred to Soviet contacts with the Arab states in declaring
that the USSR had taken an active part in diplomatic actions
aimed at terminating Lhe war and settling the conflict.
Kirilenko acknowledged the "full complexity" of the Middle
East situation, but concluded on a positive note by stating
that "there are now more favorable conditions" than ever for a
stable and just normalization of the crisis in this region.
UNEF, UN OBSERVERS, Soviet reportage has not spelled out
22 OCTOBER POSITIONS the nature of the difficulties arising
over composition, financing, and
Security Council control over the UN Emergency Force. Moscow
did indicate some of the problems in noting that Secretary
General Waldheim's second report oa the establishment of the
UNEF was submitted without consultation with Security Council
members and that the principle of "just geographical representa-
tion" in the formation of the UNEF had not been duly complied
with. TASS on the 3d reported the 2 November council
consensus--without Fi identifying it--which accepted Poland
to balance Canada, giving the two countries responsibility for
logistic support. There has been no Soviet stress on Polish
participation, :.ASS merely reporting on the 4th the Polish
decision to comply with the Security Council request,
A TASS report in RED STAR on the 4th suggested that the
representation issue had still not been re.olved to Soviet
satisfaction: Soviet UN delegate Malik was reported to have
called the council decision a step forward In that "artificial
restrictions" on the participation of socialist and nonalined
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states in the UNEF had been removed. But Malik added that the
council would have an opportunity in the future to examine
application of the principle of fair geographical distribution
"for the purpose of furtl.ser improving" the composition of
the UNEF.
Moscow has underscored the point that the UNEF has the duty
to obtain the return of forces to the 22 October cease-fire
line. Soviet media have cited Malik as stating that the UN
forces must take "appropriate measures" to insure that
troops participating in the conflict are withdrawn to their
22 October positions. And Moscow has reported statements by
UN spokesmen in New York and Cairo that the United Nations
has had no response from Israel to queries about withdrawal.
TASS, in reporting Mrs. Meir's Washington news conference on
1 November, noted her "cynical refusal" to comply with the
Security Council decisions on a pullback to the 22 October
positions, adding that she "alleged it was 'not known' where
the cease-fire line was on 22 October." Moscow has apparently
not yet reported the Egyptian military spokesman's statements
on the 5th and 6th claiming that the 22 October positions could
be determined by referring to Israeli officials' statements
made on 22 October and an Egyptian military communique issued
on the 24th defining Egyptian positions.
The matter of U>S. and Soviet "observers" in the Middle East
has been broached In only a few instances since Brezhaev
announced in his 26 October speech that the USSR had sent
"representatives" to Cairo in response to as-Sadat's
24 October request for U.S. and Soviet troops and President
Nixon said in his 26 October press conference that the
United States would send observers if this was requested by
the UN secretary general. Since then Moscow has twice
indicated that American as well as Soviet observers have
already been sent to the Middle East--possibly alluding to
the fact, not spelled out, that eight Americans have been
serving with the UN Truce Supervision Organization. Thus a
Mikhaylov article in IZVESTIYA on 30 October asserted that
at as-Sadat's request the USSR, "and, subsequently, the
United States, sent their representatives" to supervise
implementation of the Security Council dec:.lions. And a
panelisc in Mcscow radio's weekly observers' roundtable on
the 4th made the same claim, "reminding" listeners that
"there are UN observers and also Soviet and American
representatives in the former area of hostilities."
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POW ISSUE Moscow has suggested Israeli concern over the
POW problem only by indirection, TASS on the
2d reporting that an emergency session of the Knesset had
been held to discuss the question. However, TASS focused on
an Israeli Communist Party statement calling for an Israeli
withdrawal. to the 22 October positions to speed a solution
to the POW question. Moscow has generally touched on the
problem of the POW's only in the course of media roundups
of various Mideast developments. Egypt and Syria have been
depicted as willing to comply with international conventions
concerning treatment of civilians and prisoners of war, and
Moscow has reported Arab countercharges of Israeli
maltreatment of POW's and civilians under their control.
Thus, Soviet media on the 4th reported Egyptian spokesmen as
stating that Egypt had agreed through the International
Committee of the Red Cross on an exchange of wounded POW's
"G'hich the Egyptian side has started to fulfill," but that
Israel was "sabotaging" this agreement. And TASS on the 1st
reported Syrian readiness to hand over lists of Israeli.
prisoners to the ICRC and "give a possibility" for visits if
Israel also agreed to "follow generally accepted norms."
SITUATION IN Soviet media in the past few days have
EGYPT, SYRIA reported dispatches from their Cairo and
Damaucus correspondents noting continued
tension, with intermittent firing on the cease-fire lines,
but portraying Egypt and Syria as already engaged in plans
for reconstruction. However, Moscow radio correspondents on
the 4th said that in view of Israeli calls for military
preparedness, Egypt was maintaining vigilance and tightening
defenses at industrial establishments. A TABS dispatch on
the 1st noted that along with plans to reopen the Suez Canal
and rehabilitate cities in the canal zone, Egypt also had to
"strengthen the country's defense potential," requiring
considerable efforts from the national economy. That explained,
TASS said, rationing of some foodstuffs and measures to
economize on water, electric power and fuel.
PRAVDA correspondents reported on the 3d and 4th the Syrian
people's determination during the war and -heir current
concern to restore damaged enterprises. While applauding the
solidarity of Syria's population around the Progressive National
? Front, PRAVDA at the same time cautioned against the "internal
enemy" opposing the country's socialist orientation. PRAVDA's
correspondents made Moscow's only known reference to the
evacuation of Soviet citizens from the Middle East in observing
that at the Euphrates hydropower site, about 1,000 "of our
specialists (women and children were evacuated)" and over 12,000
Syrian engineers and workers remained after the beginning of
military operations.
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EAST-WEST RELAT I O14S
FBIS TRENDS
7 NOVEMBER 1973
SOVIET CONTROVERSY OVER DETENTE-DEFENSE ISSUE CONTINUES
The apparently ongoing controversy in the Soviet leadership
over the political uses of military 'trength has again
surfaced in the Soviet central press in the wake of the
Middle Eabt confrontation.* In editorials on the just-concluded
World Peace Congress in Moscow, PRAVDA and RED STAR diverged
sharply over the principal reasons for the general improvement
in East-West relations in recent years. Where PRAVDA
emphasized the decisive role of Soviet diplomatic initiatives
in bringing about the change in the international climate,
RED STAR stressed the growth of Soviet military and economic
might as the principal causal factor. The latter ltne
was also evident in Politburo member Kiri.lenko's 6 November
keynote address on the October Revolution anniversary and
Defense Minister Grechko's traditional Red Square speech the
following day.
The differences between the PRAVDA and RED STAR editorials
were characteristically expressed in esoteric terms, but
they were clearly defined. PRAVDA asserted that the "radical
turn from 'cold war' to detente and collaboration became
possible thanks to the general change in the correlation of
forces in the world in favor of the forces of peace and
progress." The editorial went on to emphasize that "these
positive changes are connected primarily with the principled
and consistent peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet
Union and other socialist states." This was the same view
forcefully expressed by USA Institute director Georgiy
Arbatov in PRAVDA last July. as well as by other Soviet
commentators on foreign affairs.
By contrast, the RED STAR editorial reiterated the hardline
argument advanced in that paper last August by its
propaganda department head Col. I. Sidelnikov. Rephrasing
the first part of the PRAVDA statement, the editorial
* The earlier signs of this dispute were analyzed in the
TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 23 August 1973, "Soviet Debate Over Role
of Military Power During Detente," and in the TRENDS of
26 September 1973, pages 3-4.
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asserted that "the radical turn now occurring from 'cold
war' to detente is primarily the result of the changed
balance of forces in the international arena in favor of
socialism." It then went on to emphasize the role of military
power as an instrument of Soviet detente diplomacy, saying:
"The might ard authority of the Soviet Union and the
entire socialist commonwealth are steadily strengthening
and at the same time their influence on the development
of world events is growing."
A similar hardline position on the role of military power
in international affairs was asserted in Kirilenko's
addrass commemorating the 56th anniversary of the Bolshevik
Revolution. Paraphrasing a formula used by Sidelnikov,
Kiritenko declared: "The stronger and more cohesive
the commonwealth of socialist states, the greater its
economic and defense potential, the more powerful its
influence on the progress of world development, the more
successful the people's liberation struggle, and the
more reliable the great cause of peace for which all
progressive mankind is fighting." Consistent with this
view, Kiri.lenko also called for strengthening the Soviet
armed forces and the maintenance of Soviet defenses "at
the necessary level" as a means of countering Western
"enemies of peace." Not suprisingly, Defense Minister
Grechko likewise urged a "high degree of vigilance" and the
strengthening of Sovic-L economic and military might,
as he had in last yea.-'s Red Square speech.
MOSCOW PUBLICITY ON NATO RIFT AVOIDS DETENTE LINKAGE
Moscow has continued to give moderate publicity to the rift
in NATO ranks exposed by the exchanges of criticism between
the United States and its European allies over the MiddLe
Eastern crisis and the U.S., military alert. Basing its
coverage mainly on West European press criticism cf the
U.S. actions, Moscow has focused on the intra-alliance
implications of the affair, suggesting that relations
between the United States and its NATO partners have been
badly strained. While thus presenting U.S. actions in an
unfavorable light, it has avoided any suggestion that the
overall context of U.S.-Soviet relations has been damaged.
Indeed, it has suggested that the actions of the European
countries in opposing U.S. policy in the crisis testify to
the vitality of the forces favoring a relaxation of inter-
national tensions,
CONFIrENTIAL
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This mixture of criticism and optimism was typified by Moscow
radio's observers' roundtable on 4 November: Criticizing
U.S. media for 4'ra.matizing the crisis and U.S. officials for
making "rather ambiguous statements" about its causes, the
commentators expressed optimism both about U.S. publii
opinion and about the prospects for detente. "We see," said
one of the speakers, "how gradually the policy of peaceful
coexistence, the course toward international collaboration
and detente are gradually gaining the upper hand." An
article in IZVESTIYA on the preceding day struck much the
same tone. Referring favorably to European resistance to
U.S. policy, it said that this showed Europe had become
aware of the benefits of the "transition from confrontation
to cooperation" and would not sacrifice it for the sake of
"so-called Atlantic solidarity."
Moscow has also obviously been concerned not to stress NATO
disarray to the point of suggesting the military threat
from the West is no longer a source of danger. This concern
was stated exilic.ty it the roundtable discussion. "It
would be wrong," said one of the commentators, "to exaggerate
the cracks appearing in the Atlantic bloc," since its
"aggressive essence" and its "aggressive machinery" continue
tc function, The same concern probably accounts for the fact
that RED STAR has been remarkably taciturn about the U.S.-NATO
rift. After reporting President Nixon's press conference
ard giving a brief roundup of European press reactions on
28 October, it has not commented on the issue through its first
three November issues.
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U. S, -SOVIET RELAT I ONS
MOSCOW INDICATES THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD PROVE GOOD FAITH
In the wake of recent U.S. actions in the Middle East crisis
and on bilateral trade, Moscow has assumed a more cautious
stance regarding relations with the United States. Moscow has
continued to express optimism about tLe process of detente as
a whole and restated its desire to continue on a course of
normalizing relations with the United States. But it has in
recent days treated U.S. intentions toward the US:.?;. in a
much more conditional tone, suggesting that it is now up to
the United States to prove its good faith and its intention
to continue pursuing an improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Politburo member Kirilenkc, in his 6 November speech on the
occasion of the October Revolution anniversary, was correct but
distinctly cooler in his assessment of relations with the.
United States than other recent official statements, including
that by Brezhnev on 26 October in his speech to the World
Peace Congress in Moscow. Kirilenko noted that Soviet-U.S.
relations had "begun to develop in the direction of detente."
He reaffirmed Soviet intentions to adhere to recently concluded
U.S.-Soviet agreements, but was cautious in his characterize tion
of U.S. intentions: "We proceed from the ;supposition that the
American side too will act in the same manner in accordance with
the spirit and letter of the agreements concluded." He did
not refer directly or indirectly to the U.S. military alert
ordered in connection with the recent Middle East fighting.
The more conditional assessment of official U.S. attitudes toward
U.S.-Soviet relations was also reflected in Moscow's belated
response to the Administration's decision to delay requesting
most-ravored-nation status for the USSR. Although the media
reported Administration claims that it was maintaining its
commitment to Moscow on the issue, IZVESTIYA's political
observer Vikentiy Matveyev on 3 November implied that Moscow
was reserving judgment on the validity of those reassurances.
"The American press offers various suggestions regarding the
motives behind this decision by official Washington. The
near future will show how things stand in this respect."
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WATERGATE Moscow's handling of the Watergate affair has
also reflected a more cautious assessment of
Washington's Intentions. The linkage of Watergate w'th the U.S.
military alert marks an abrupt change from Moscow's previous
practice of downplaying the affair. The weekly for.ign affairs
journal NEW TIMES in its 2 November issue caLLied a brief,
uuattributed report which for ;:he first time in Soviet media
discussed the issue ?>f impeachment. The NEW TIMES report,
however, contained ' direct criticism of the Presi.dent and,
in pointing to the partisan Democratic party factjr in the
Congressional proceedings, implied, as M. -!cow has consistently,
that the Watergate evelations are heavily influenceu by party
politics and thus not necessarily evidence that the President
is guilty of anything atypical of U.S. political practice.
For this reason, the NEW TIMES report, as yet the only item of
its kind in Soviet media, may have been intended as a pre-
cautionary move alert4.ng the Soviet public to the possibility
of sensational developments in the U.S. domestic political
situation, rather than as a display of pique over the Middle
East.
U.S. ALERT While Moscow has clearly shown distress over recent
U.S. actions, it has continued to airoid any
suggestion that events surrounding the U.S. military alert amounted
to a full-blown crisis. Its linkage of the alert with Watergate
has impl.i-d that the alert was more a domestic than a fcreign
policy dec!si.-)n.
Furthermore, Moscow has continued to convey the imprecision
that the outcome of the Middle East war was a vindication of
detente rather than an indictment. The weekly domestic radio
roundtable on international affairs on 4 November, for example,
told listeners somewhat defensively that "if detente were as
shaky and illusory an affair as Peking continues to por! ay it,
it would hardly have withstood such a test" as the Middle East
war. Radio-TV observer Mikhail Mikhaylov went on to deny
explicitly that there were any grounds for comparing recent events
to previous U.S.-Soviet confrontations, such as the Cuban missile
crisis. Mikhaylov argued that before the onset of detente there
had been "mo:e than one such local crisis in the postwar history
of mankind which quickly grew into a most serious international
crisis threatening world peace . . . . Any local crisis or
military conflict had a tendency to grow almost instantaneously
into a dangerous confrontation between our country and the
Duited States. Peace hung by a thread. This did not happen this
time."
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INDOCHINA
HANOIi PRG JUSTIFY MILITARY OPERAT?,iNS AS "PUNITIVE ACTIONS"
Consistent with the aggressive public posture assumed in mid-
October when the PLAF Command order threatened counterattacks
to Saigon's "acts of war," 'Hanoi and PRG media have made no attempt
to obscure their initiative in recent military ac.Lion. Thus,
they greeted with exultation the PLAF capture of ARVN bases in
western Quang Duc Province on 4 November and their shelling of
Bien Hoa airfield on the 6th.
CAPTURE OF BASES Liberation Radio on 5 November openly lauded
the capture of Saigon positions in Quang Due
Province, According to the radio, the PLAF had "recovered the Bu
Bong ilberated zone" in Quang Duc on 4 November in direct compliance
with an order dated that day from the central Trung Bo PLAF Command
to "recapture the areas illegally occupied by Saigon troops" as
well as with the 1.5 October PLAF Command order. By contrast,
propaganda following the capture of Saigon positions In September
had been much more circumspect in describing the action and only
indirectly alluded to the communist initiative by quoting U.S.
and Saigon charges. For example, when the communists overran
the Le Minh base in western Pleiku on 22 September, propaganda
implied that they had only responded to Saigon encroaching
operations and deprecated U.S. and Saigon charges that North
Vietnamese forces had attacked the ARVN base.
The attack in Quang Duc seemed clearly to have been coordinated
with the central Trung Bo Command order which specifically
declared that since 18 October malty of Saigon's infantry and
armor battalions have "conducted land-grabbing operations" in
western Quang Duc. Although the order from the PLAF's central
command on 15 October was more general than the regional command--
stating, for example, that communist forces should counter "war
acts" in a "fitting manner"--a radio commoatary on that day had
specified that communist forces would not only retaliate in
areas in which they were attacked but "also directly attack"
Saigon's rear bases.
SHELLING OF BIEN HOA Hanoi and PRG comment on the 6 November
artillery attack on Bien Hoa airfield
promptly claimed that the action was punishment for Saigon "acts
of war" during the past nine months, in compliance. with the
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15 October PLA.F Command ordc:. A QUAN DOT NUAN DAN commentary
on the. 7th elaborated on the motivation for the PLAF's "punitive
shelling." Ti,2 paper complained about specific CVN programs,
such as pacification and police operations, and charged that
"SaJgcm has become particularly frenzied since early In October"
and 'that, "under 'I'hleu'H J.nstrucrfon for 'prf-emptJ.ve' measure","
Its air force and artillery have ma(!e "intensified attacks on
areas deep In the liberated zone." in addition, the paper
accused Saigon of "cynically provo'ing reprenentatLvoi of the
PRG In the Joint Mi.11t.ary Commission." .Justifying the Bien Hoa
attack as an act of "legitimate self-defense," QUAN DOI NFIAN DAN
asserted that under this concept the communist4 have the "right"
to "take resolute counter-measures to defenc; the liberated zone
and recuperate whatever part of it has been nibbled away by the
Saigon army."
OFFICIAL PROTESTS A flurry of official communist protests of
alleged U.S. and Saigon violations, issued
it. the first three days of November, may have been calculated to
buttress subsequent justifications for the communist attacks.
Among the official documents publicized were a 1 November
communique by the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman listing "typical"
cease-fire violations Saigon has supposedly committed since last
January; an undated communique by PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman,
broadcast. in the 2d, denouncing U.S. assistance to the Saigon
government; 3 November PRG Foreign Minlat.ry statement cond"inning
recent "acts of war" on the part of SaiGin and the United Slates;
and a 3 November DRV Foreign Ministry statement alleging violations
of the Paris agreement.
The spokesman's communique of the 1st claimed that in the last
nine months, Saigon, "with U.S. assictance and encouragement,
has seriously, comprehensively, and systematically violated all
the principal provisions" of the Paris agreement and 13 June joint
communique. '.t des^r!hc.i as "most serious" Saigon's alleged
"large-scale bulitary operations across South Vietnam." The
undated spokesman's communique broadcast on we 2d by Liberation
radio was directed primarily at the United States for continuing
its "military involvement" in South V1'tnam.
The more authoritative PRG Foreign Ministry statement of the 3d
was ostensibly in reaction to Thieu's naticna] day speech and to
recent comment by the comma;tder of the U.S. Air ':orce in the
Paci.fiL on the possibility o r.:a.:'^ing U.S. bombings in Vietnam.
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TIW Htatement repeated complaints of. U.S. aid to the
Saigon government and of the tatter's mobilization of i.ts armed
forces to conduct "tens of thousands of nibbling operations"
against I'RG-controlled areas. It warned: "All viol.,ittons of
the agreement by the United States and the Saigon ?dminlatration
wilt be duly puni;ihed. If they continue to plunge along the
path of military adventures and sabotage peace and national
rece.)ncilatloo and con,,ord, they will certainly sustain heavy
defenta."
The DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the 3d likewise deplored
"massive U.S. aid" to Saigon and Thieu's "clamouring for war."
The DRV statement did, however, strike one new note in officially
acknowledging the 26 October U.S. State Department note protesting
the Introduction of war materiel and troops into the South :)y
the LJRV. Hanoi's statement echoed earlier, lower-Level comment
In claiming that the "U.S. allegations are clearly aimed at
nothing but misleading public opinion, covering up the violations
of the Paris agreement..., and seeking a pretext for new military
advectures." A 31 October Liberation Radio report and a QUAN
DOI NIIAN DAN newspaper article, as reported by VNA on the 1st,
had charc;cterized the note as resorting to the tactic of "thief
crying stop thief" to cover up U.S. aid being given to the Saigon
government-
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7 NOVEMBER 1973
DRV ARMY JOURNAL EXAMINES COI'UCT OF MILITARY CAMPAIGNS
A series of articleh in the North Vietnamese military
journal, TAP CEII QUAN D0I NFAN DAN, over the past five
months indlcatedi the communists ,ire revie.ding the reeuits
of their 1972 offensive to lay tiic groundwork for improving
their forces and operations.
Following articles early in the ye.r `znerally I.vuding Lhe
1972 achievcsment-;, the journal in June began a coe,uxiihansive
series of articl.Ls under the heading "Studying Se'-.,iral
Matters on the Art of Campaigns" reflecting a mo.e detailed
examination of the past year's experience. This series,
opening with articles discussing offensive, counteroffensive,
and defensive campaigns, has continued at least through the
October issv2. The articles in July and August covered
such subjects as tactical leadership and the role and
organization In an offensive campaign of the rear services,
artillery, political activities, anti.circ.raft forces, tanks
and armor, and signal communications.
The September and October issues of TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
are not yet available, but a Hanoi radio review cf the October
!--sue reported it continued the series with an article on
stiff tasks in an offensive campaign written by Maj Gen Tran
Quy Hai, a vice minister of defense, deputy chief of staff,
and alte::nate memb of the Central Committee. The positions
of r.uthc;rs of the series were nut indicated by the journal,
and most are not well know; however, other authors included
Sen Col Nguyen The Lam, who has written previously on t..:
use of armor, Sen Col Luong Nnan, a deputy chief of the
General Department of Rear Services, and Col Pham Nien, who
has written previously on signal communications.
Maj Gen Tran Quy Hai had indicated the need for a review of
the 1972 experience in an article published in the May
TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN; and the stage was set for the
series by the lead article in the June issue of the journal
written by Trung Dung--a regular ca.'"ributor to the military
jo'irnal and the party journal HOC TAP and a proponent
in early 1971 of the big-unit tactics employed in the 1972
offensive. TYi.ag Dung's June article hailed the 1972
"victory" as proof of the superiority of Vietnamese military
science and arc and, in a broad diFcussion of strategy,
pointed out the importance "skillful campaign organiz.it ion."
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DONG ENDS ALBANIAN VISIT, RETURNS HOME VIA MOSCO1 PEKING
The DRV delegation led by Premier Pham Van Dong concluded its
tour of East European countries with an official visit to
Albania and returned home after stopovers in Moscow and Peking.
During the 28 October-2 November stay in Albania Dong was
received by First Secretary Hoxha and welcomed at the customary
ceremonies by Premier Shehu. Tirana and Hanoi reported that
an agreement was signed on Albania's "gratuitous economic aid"
to the DRV for 1974. In tie joint statement issued at the end
of the visit the Albanian side joined the Vietnamese in "severely
condemning" the United States for its "arrogant encroachments"
on the Paris agreement and in maintaining that the United States
was "heavily responsible" for Saigon's violations. The statement
acknowledged Albania's recognition of the PRG as the "true and
sole representative" of the South Vietnamese people, but did
not include an endorsement of the PRC's 28 June six-point
proposal.
MOSCOW, PEKING During the Moscow stopover Kosygin, Katushev,
and Novikov met on 3 November with Dcng and
Nguyen Duy Trlnh, the other Vietnamese Politburo member in the
delegation. TASS reported that during the :.ieeting, which was
held in a "cordial, friendly atmosp-,ere," the sides discussed
DRV-Soviet relations and exchanged views en "measures aimed at
ensuring a strict implementation" of the Faris agreement. The
Soviets were said to ha/e reaffirmec! theit "all-round assistance"
and support to the DRV for economic reconstruction and the
development of socialism.
Peking gave Dung subdued treatment during his 4-6 November stay
in the Chinese capital. NCNA reported that he was greeted at
the airport by Chou En-lal and feted by Chou that evening at a
dinner, but there was no description of the ati:o-,phere or speeches
at the dinner. Peking's only other report on Dong'o slay was a
straightforward NCNA report that Yeh Chien-ying saw him off.
Last August, when Dong stopped off in Peking on the way home
from visits in the Soviet Union and East Europe, NCNA reported
that Chou attended both the arrival and departure ceremonies at
the airport, feted Dong at a dinner, and later had a "cordial
and friendly" conversation with the DRV premier.
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7 NOVEMBER 1973
CAMBODIAN INSURGENTS PLAN OFFENSIVE, REJECT COMPROMISE
Coincident with the end of the rainy season in Cambodia,
authoritative statements by spokesmen for Sihanouk's Front have
reverted to it hard line, abandoning the insurgents' low posture
daring the previous two month[ Daher some comment had suggested
flexibility regarding a settlement. A birthday greeting to
Sihanouk from his chief minister in the interior--Khieu Samphan--
br.oadcast on 30 October, an RGNU spokesman's statement publicized
the following day, and a 3 November appeal by Khieu Samphan
broadcast on the 5th. have stressed the need for armed struggle
and reaffirmed an uncompromising stance on a political settlement.
Khieu Samphan's message to Sihanouk (dated 26 October, although
not broadcast. until the 30th) said that during the dry season
the insurgents would launch "without retreat or compromise"
"more fierce offensives In all regions" to "dislodge" the
United States and annihilate the Phnom Penh government. Asserting
that the Cambodian btr.uggle is entering "a decisive and irreversible
phase that will inevitably lead soon to total victory," the
message underlined Front determination to fight for achievement of
Silanouk's five points Samphan's appeal on the 3d, which was
carried by the insurgent press agency AKI on the 5th, laid out
plans for wide-ranging attacks during the dry season, claiming
that the Front's preser,t "superior" strength. will allow it to
launch "even more powerful attacks" against Phnom Penh, "all
the main strategic routes," and "provincial areas still under the
enemy's temporary control."
Both of Samphan's pronouncements pointedly condemned efforts to
reach a rompromise settlement. In the birthday greeting he
pledged to "smash the military, political, and diplomatic
maneuvers of the ene,uy, which are aimed at getting t.'f,e FUNK to
meet the Phnom Penl' traitors halfway." The appeal explicitly
warned against the continuing maneuvers by President Nixon
and Secretary Kissinger designed to overcome their "defeat"
in Cambodia, find "a way out," and shore up the Phnom Cenh
government.
The 30 October RGNU spokesman's statement, issued to den)unce
the formation of the new In Tam government in Phnom Penh, was
more categorical in rejecting a compromise settlement. The
statement, transmitted by AKI on the 31st, pointedly derided
Phnom Penh efforts to achieve "reconciliation and national
concord" and asserted bluntly that "by no means, .-nder no
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circumstances, at. no place, and under no pretext will the FUNK
and RGNU agree to make the most minor contact, let alone negotiate,
with the traitorous Phnom Penh clique, its emissaries, or its
accomplices." The spokesman echoed Samphan in declaring that
the war is reaching "its decisive and irreversible stage" and
that the Front is resolved to an "ever uncompromising and
unretreating pursuit of sacred combat," including "simultaneous
and smashing offensives in the course of the new dry season."
These pronouncements and attendant lower-level comment indicate
a return to the hard line that had characterized insurgent comment
prior to the failure of Front offensives around Phnom Penh and
Kompong Cham in late August and early September. Since then
there had been few major pronouncements on the situation in
Cambodia, and the question of an offensive had not been raised.
In fact, authoritative Front statements released during this
period had suggested some flexibility in the Front's position.
Notably, Sihanouk's national day message to PRC leaders in
late September played down the need for uncompromising armed
struggle and did not criticize the leaders of the Phnom Penh
government by name.
Sihanouk, who has been quiescent since late last month, has thus
far not echoed the current hard 14.ne statements. Khieu Samphan's
birthday message to the "head of state," which was markedly
longer than his message last year, hailed his efforts as the
Front's representative abroad and referred favorably to Sihanouk'e
trip to the Cambodian "liberated zone" last spring. In what may
be an effort to acknowledge the importance of the existing divioion
of labor in the Front between Sihanouk's Peking entourage, which
is chiefly responsible for foreign affairs, and the interior
minister , who are responsible fer the conduct of the war,
Samphan noted that "thousands of kilometers" separate the two groups
of Front leaders. In a speech for Sihanouk during his tour in
Camb,-dia last spring, Samphan had similarly stated that Sihanouk
was stationed "far away from us" in the performance of his
"mission abroad."
PEKING While Vietnamese and Soviet media have thus far not
reacted to current hard line Cambodian statements,
Peking has replayed carefully edited versions of the Front
pronouncements and lower-level comment. Though giving ample
coverage to passagea on insurgent resolve to continue the
struggle, NCNA has p'..se ted a less optimistic view than the
Front about prospects for the offensive by pointedly dropping
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Front claims that the coming drive will be "decisive" and will
soon lead to "total victory," ar.4 by softpedaling claims con-
cerning the Front's "superior" strategic position and the
imminent collapse of the Lon No! government. Peking a"o
continued to mute harsh criticism of U.S. leaders by deleting
all references to the repeated attacks against the settlement
"tricks" of President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger.. contained
in Khieu Samphan's 3 November appeal, and it has sidestepped
indications of Chinese support for the Cambodian war, notably
dropping a passage in Samphan's birthday message lauding Peking,
as the insurgents' "reliable rearguard." In this connection an
NCNA replay of a 31 October AKI commentary, condemning President
Nixon's request for supplementary aid to Cambodia and noting that
"captured weapons" represent the bulk of Front armaments, seems
particularly revealing of Peking's current line. The Chinese
version discreetly muffled anti-U.S. charges while it focused
on the CPNLAF's determination to adhere to the "firm. lire" of
"people's war" by using captured weapons as "their main source
of equipment."
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7 NOVEMBER 1973
W
R E L A T
E A C O i . 1 i - 1 U N T . S T IONS
The first public call in Soviet or Fast European media for
a new world conference of communist parties appeared on
3 November in the PRAVDA and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reports of
the keynote address delivered to the West German communist
Party's (DKP) congress by newly elected chairma'i Herbert
Mies.
The Moscow-oriented DKP and its congress are apparently,
being used as a Soviet stalking-horse to launch a public
campaign for convocation of a world party conference. Mies
clearly indicated the Sino-Soviet dispute would be a factor
in such a gathering by juxtaposing a diatribe against the
Chinese leadership and the call for a world conference. Thus,
after claiming the "Maoists" have broken with Marxism-Leninism
and have become "enemies of the world communist movement,"
Mies recalled the previous party conference held in June 1969
and suggested the "time is ripening" for convening another
world conclave. The PRAVDA summary of his report noted
both Mies' attack on the Chinese leaders and his appeal-for
the need to hold a world meeting of communist parties.
The call for a new world conference comes at a time when
the West European communist parties have decided to convene
a regional party conclave of their own. This decision
was made at a consultative meeting in Stockholm on
27 and 28 September attended by 20 WesL European communist
parties, including the French and the strongly independent
Italian party. Moscow did not participate in the Stockholm
meeting, which received only passing notice in Soviet and
East European media.
While Mies mentioned the West European communist conference,
he also called for an all-European meeting of communist
parties as a preparatory step for the world gathering.
PRAVDA did not report these portions of Mies' retrarks.
Moscow has reason for concern over a purely West Europ,~an
comm'inist party conference, whose. discussions might prove
embarrassing to Moscow, given the strongly independent and
liberal views of some of these pa-:ties, particularly the
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WEST GERMAN CP CALLS FOR WORLD PARTY CONFERENCE
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Italian. Tht- West European communists' view of their upcoming
conference, which a 19 October PRAVDA report said would
convene in Brussels 26-28 January 1974 is that it would
deal primarily with West European economic problem. The
Stockholm ivsetiag'r cour-nnique, reported by the Danish party
organ LAND OG FOLK, stated that the agenda also includes
such contentious issues as "national independence" and
"cultural freedom."
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NOTES
CHINESE LEADERSHIP: Since PRC National Day on 1 October there
have been few reported public appearances by usually active CCP
Politburo ^_+embers. The sparsity of leadership appearances
probably signifies that top leaders are presently occupied
with conferences preparatory to convening the 4th National
People's Congress (NPC). The fact that this pattern has
occurred at a time when the drive to criticize "Confucius" has
been intensified, however, raises the possibility that the
target of the anti-Confucius campaign may be a currently active
leader.
Notably absent since National Day are the three remaining
leaders who were members of the old cultural revolution group--
Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, and Chang Chun-ch~ao. Chang was
the only one of the three to be raised to the Politburo
Standing Committee at the party congress. Also absent since
1 October are new Politburo members Chi Teng-kuei and
Wang Tung-hsing; Hua Kuo-feng last appeared on 6 October.
Other active Peking-based Politburo members have made more
frequent appearances, but none showed up from 19-25 October,
the period of Li Hsien-nien's longest absence. Premier
Chou En-lai made only one public appearance between 15 and
26 October, at the interment of Edgar Snow's ashes
on the 19th. Of the new party vice chairmen, Wang Hung-wen
was out of sight between 13 and 25 October, Li Te-sheiig
was absent from 12-25 October, and Yeh Chien-ying did not
pear between 16 October and 6 November. Peking chief
Wu Te made no reported appearances from 13-31 October.
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: Peking's traditional greetings message
to the USSR on t'-?, October Revolution anniversary this year
included for the first time specific reference to the Sino-
Soviet border question, reiterating Peking's call to solve
the issue through peaceful negotiations "under conditions
which exclude ary threats." First carried by Peking's
Russian zervice on 6 November, the message--as usual addressed
impersonally from the NPC Standing Corunittee and State Council
to their Soviet counterparts--reaffirmed Peking's belief in
continuing friendship between the "people" of the two
countries and expressed its desire to normalize relations
despite "e.isputes over questions of principle." Notably
dropped from this year's message were contentious phrases
of previous messages concerning Chinese support for the
Soviet people's "struggle" to safeguard the fruits of the
revolution.
The unprecedented reiteration in such anniversary greetings
of Peking's position on border negotiations follows recent
high-level Soviet complaints about Peking's lack of
responsiveness to Soviet initiatives in the talks and the
continued absence from the talks of the chief Soviet delegate,
Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev. (IJ..I.chev was most recently
reported to be in Moscow on 2 November, welcoming DRV
Premier Pham Van Dong, accordins Lo the 3 November PRAVDA.)
Perhaps reflecting the unusual character of the Chinese
message, NCNA thus far has not reported it, in contrast to
its prompt replay of past anniversary greetings.
LE DUAN VISIT TO LAOS: North Vietnamese communist party leader
Le Duan has paid a unique "friendship" visit to the headq'?arters
of the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) in northeastern Laos 2-6 November.
This is apparently the first time ever that a North Vietnamese
12legation headed by a Political Bureau member has been reported
publicly to have visited Lao territory controlled by the LPF.
Le Duan's trip to Sam Neua was not given advance notice, and
initial reports by the Pathet Lao news agency and Hanoi radio on
7 November mention only the welcoming ceremonies attended by LPF
Chairman Prince Souphanouvong aru most of the top-echelon LPF
members, and the DRV delegation's return to Hanoi; no speeches
were reported. The last announced meeting between Souphanouvong
and North Vietnamese leaders occurred in 1971, when he visited
Hanoi.
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- i -
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PLKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 29 OCTOBER - 4 NOVEMBER 1973
Moscow (2741 items)
Pek-L:ig (1106 items)
World Peace Congress in (31%) 40%
Domestic Issues
(41%)
39%
Moscow, 25-31 Oct.
Middle East
(42%)
21%
[Brezhnev Speech (15%) 9%]
[UNGA, Security Council
(21%)
8%]
Middle East (17%) 6%
`ARV Premier Pham Van (--) 47
Debate
Australian Prime Minister
(--)
18%
Dong Stopover in USSR
Ethiopian Emperor (--) 3%
Whitlam in PRC
Indochina
(5%)
5%
Selassie in USSR
Turkish National Day
(--)
3%
China (5%) 3%
Bulgarian First Secretary (--) 3%
Zhivkov in USSR
Algerian Revolution ( -) 3%
19th Anniversary
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given mayor attention in terms of volumi are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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