TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060042-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: October 3, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBI'S
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
" OCTOBER 19 3
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CONFIDENTIAL
'I'hi, prupcttantla an,tlt'... s report is based exclusively on material
c;uric41 in lorciLm hroatlcast awI press nu-din. It is puhlishttl
by IRIS wtthoot courtlinatitm with other tI.S. Cuvernnuvnt
cumpuncIts.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized tlisc?los.trc sublet?t to
criminal svtctiuns
CONFIDENTI~I~
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CONLIDENTIAI. FBIS TRENI)S
3 OCTOBER 1973
C0idTEiJTS
National Day Editorial Concentrates on Domestic Themes. 1
Chinese UN Address Assails Soviet Detente Policies. . . . . . . . . . 3
TradLtional DRV Celebrations Mark Chinese National Day. . . . . 6
GVN Military Action, U.S. Ships Off DRV Coast Draw Protests . . . . . 8
MOSCOW Optimistic About Detente Despite Recent Setbacks . . . . . . . 10
CEMA Overture to EEC Receives Mixed East European Reaction. . . . . . 12
U.S. Troop Withdrawal Draws Divergent Communist Responses . . . . . . 14
NOTES
Moscow on PRC National Day: Kosygin's Yugoslav Visit;
USSR, Yugoslavia on U.S. Support for Saigon; Brezhnev Cult;
USSR-Chile Relations; Chinese Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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CON FIDEN`I'1AL FBIS TRENDS
3 OCTOBER L973
C H I Id A
NATIONAL DAY EDITORIAL CONCENTRATES ON DOMESTIC THEMES
Peking's traditional. joint editorial on National Day by PEOPLE's
DAILY, RED FLAG, and LLBIRATION ARMY DAILY reflected a preoccupation
with domestic themes, calling on cadres to study the 10th CCP
Congress documents while preparing for the Fourth National
People's Congress. Foreign affairs were virtually ignored in the
editorial, a sharp contrast to last year when, on the heels of
significant breakthroughs in relations with Japan and the West,
the editorial trumpeted the successes of Chinese foreign policy.
Following practice since the Lin Piao affair in 1971, Peking
skipped the once-traditional review by Mao from the Tienanmen
rostrum in favor of Leadership appearances in the parks of
Peking. Besides Mao and ailing leaders Kang Sheng and Liu
Po-sheng, only Chiang Ching among current Politburo members was
not listed in NC:vA accounts as having made a public appearance
on the anniversary, although JCNA did report her presence at the
foreign ministry reception on 30 September. Chiang's absence is
particularly striking; since the festivities in the parks included
a "rich program" of cultural items, her particular field of
interest, and since she was prominently featured last year, with
Peking television even picking up a finger-wagging exchange between
Chiang and Chou En-.lai. NCNA carefully reported the presence of
all provincial Politburo members and alternates at rallies
throughout China, even taking pains to note that Chen Yung-kuei
appeared in Kansu rather than in his Shansi base.
Focusing on ideological. themes, the joint editorial broke no new
ground in its discussion of political issues and ignored economic
matters entirely. Presumably specific economic and social issues
will be discussed at the forthcoming National People's Congress. The
editorial reiterated the line cf the 10th congress that party policy
since the ninth congress has been basically correct and that
the intervening struggles have been consistent with "Maoist doctrine.
The editorial's calls for continued line study se-.m designed to
stress Chou En-lai's remark to the 10th congress that local
cadres become so involved in daily routine that they sometimes
ignore the general line, a theme picked up recently by many
provincial radios.
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CONFLDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 OC'T'OBER 1973
A new instruction from i-lao released in the editorial seems designed
to meet some of the complaints of those forced to attend cadre
schools while ensuring the assignment of cadres to such schools.
The instruction regularized the mandatory rotational study classes
so that cadres attend a standard three month term of work and
study. Mao's cultural revolution instruction on cadre schools
had not specified the length of study, and cadres so assigned did
not know how Long they would remain or whether they would return
to their posts.
FOREIGN Costing in tine wake of Chou Ln-lai's definitive assessment
POLICY of Chinese foreign policy at the 10th CCP congress,
this year's editorial all but ignored international
affairs, restricting substantive comment to a reaffirmation of
Clrou's congress warning against "surprise attacks" by the Soviet
Union. Consistent with recent practice, there were no speeches
by high-?level Chinese leaders attending the usual receptions for
foreigners sponsored by the Chinese foreign ministry, the Inter-
national Liaison Department of the CCP, and the Chinese friendship
association. NCNA noted the presence of Ambassador Bruce at the
30 September foreign ministry reception, lumping him together with,
though ahead of, the deputy head of the Soviet border talks
delegation, who as usual brought up the rear.
Concurrent Chinese coverage, however, has carefully pointed up
Peking's differentiated approach toward the two superpowers.
In particular, NC VA noted a "friendly" atmosphere at the National
Day reception of the Chinese liaison office in Washington, and
cited growing Sino-U.S. friendship in coverage of celebrations
by friendshLp associations in the United States. A 28 September
broadcast to Taiwan commemorating National Day reported that this
year "Si.no-American relations have taken a further step forward."
in contrast, NCNA's report of the reception at the Chinese embassy
in Moscow did not characterize the atmosphere; the report
noted that the (read of the Soviet delegation to the Peking border
talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Iliclrev, who has been absent from
Peking since mid-July, attended the Moscow reception.
For the first time sLnce 1966, the National Day editorial made nu
reference to Taiwan, though the issue was mentioned at a 29
September PRC State Council reception which, like last year, was
attended by "compatriots" from Taiwan along with visitors from
tiong Kong and Macao, and other Overseas Chinese. Vice Chairman
Yell Chien-ying once again led the Chinese leadership turnout,
but his speech of last year was replaced by a toast, by Vice Premier
'I'eng lisiao-ping, who reaffirmed Peking's conciliatory approach
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CONFIDEN'T'IAL FBIS TRENDS
3 OCTOBER 1973
over the Taiwan issue and routinely urged the Taiwan populace to
contribute to the liberation and reunification of the island with
the mainland. lie sidestepped Pelting's recent call for "peaceful"
unification, though the 28 September broadcast to Taiwan emphasized
that it has become the "common wish of all Chinese people" and
that "now is the time" for Taiwan compatriots to "take the road
of the peaceful unification of the motherland."
PLA ROLE For the second year in a row, the National Day editorial
failed to mention the PLA's civilian role, a legacy of
the cultural revolution. Instead, a 29 September joint PEOPLE'S
DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial stressed restoration of
the rail.ttia's traditional involvement in civil administrative
tasks. The editorial invoked an old Mao instruction+ito buttress
its argument that the militia should play an important role
"in ideological, political and economic spheres" as well as in public
security. Regular PLA commands up to the provincial-level were
instructed to "put their main energy into militia work."
CHINESE UN ADDRESS ASSAILS SOVIET DETENTE POLICIES
PRC chief delegate Chiao Kuan-hua in his 2 October UNGA address
launched a polemical broadside against Soviet detente policies
and voiced the first explicit Chinese criticism of the U.S.-Soviet
agreement ua the prevention of nuclear war. In playing up Peking's
view of .intens:ifLed international rivalry between the two superpowers,
Chiao labeled the nuclear pact "a mni-e scrap of paper" that does
not signify detente, but rather "rivalry for world hegemony."
!ie criticized the United States as well as the Soviet Union over
the agreement, asserting that its scope goes beyond their legitimate
bilateral concerns, and warning, in a passage presumably addressed
to Washington, that Peking "absolutely will not to begging for
nuclear protection from any country." llooTever, Chiao also underlined
Peking's differentiated approach toward the superpowers by praising
the principles of the Sino-U.S. Shanghai communique and by
softpedaling charges about U.S, intentions in reaching the nuclear
pact. In this connection, Chiao cited, without attribution, the
"frank" observation of Dr. Kissinger last June that the U.S.-Soviet
accord is only a general statement of policy, which contains no
enforcement provisions.
While charging that the Soviet Union is attempting "to bind
herself to the United States" in order more effectively to
achieve world domination, Chiao confidently portrayed such a
Soviet course as futile, pointing in particular to continued
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 OCTOBER 1973
Soviet-U.S. contention over nuclear arms development. He also
alluded to alleged Soviet involvement i.i the recent Afghan coup
and alleged U.S. involvement in the turnover in Chile, as proof
of the "increasCngly fierce" superpower rivalry. Chiao reaffirmed
Peking's view that Europe is the current focus of Soviet-U.S.
competition, charging bluntly that the ongoing European security
conference is "nothiri out one of the forms of contention."
While ignoring U.S. intentions, Chiao characterized the demands
of European countries at the conference for an end to military
blocs and withdrawal of foreign troops as a "direct blow" to
"that superpower" which seeks to use the forum to consolidate
its hold on East Europe and to expand toward the West.
Employing sharp sarcasm to castigate Moscow's recent stress on an
Asian collective Acurity plan, Chiao equated the proposal with the
avowed anti-China goals of SEATO in the 1950s. "Has the ghost
of John Foster Dulles gone to the Kremlin?" Chiao asked, adding
facetiously that it would be more forthright for Moscow to attempt
to expand the Warsaw Pact to Asia than to use the cover of its
current security proposal.
On Sino-Soviet relations, Chiao listed a bill of historical
Chinese grievances against the Soviet Union, including the
withdrawal of experts, border clashes, and "subversions," but made
no reference to the current border situation or to Brezhnev's
recent disclosure of a Soviet non-aggression proposal last June
at this Peking border talks. Rebutting Moscow's charge labeling
China as an "opponent of detente," Chiao, echoing Chou En-lai's
remarks at the 10th CCP Congress last month, challenged Moscow
to prove its desire to relax world tension by withdrawing troops
from Czechoslovakia or Mongolia, or by returning the disputed
"Northern Territories" to Japan.
On other issues, Chiao:
+ Routinely criticized U.S. support for the "traitorous Lon Nol
clique," affirmed support for Sihanouk's government, and demanded
the expulsion of the Phnom Penh clique and the reinstatement of Sihanouk's
representative in the United ?rations.
4- Opposed the U.S.-sponsored resolution on Korea, though admitting
it contained "the positive element" concerning the dissolution of
'JNCURK. He duly demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces
from Korea, and supported the DPRK stand that North and South
Korea could only enter the United Nations as one state.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 OCTOBER 1973
4? Maintained a ..irm position on Bangladesh, asserting that it. could
not be admitted into the United Nations until the recent agreements
are carried out in accord with the 1971-72 UN resolutions on the
issue.
+ Dismissed Moscow's proposal for a 10 percent reduction in military
budgets as "Khrushchev's old ware" which "has not deceived many
people," and challenged Moscow instead to cancel its military
debts, particularly with Arab countries, as a "more practical"
method of assisting developing countries. lie affirmed that
disarmament should be first directed at the superpowers and
reiterated that China would support a world disarmament conference
only after the superpowers and other nuclear countries endorse
a no-first use of nuclear weapons agreement and withdraw all
conventional and nuclear forces from abroad.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 OCTOBER 1973
I#1D0CFl I N A
TRADITIONAL DRV CELEBRATIONS MARK CHINESE NATIONAL DAY
Hanoi observed the 24th anniversary of the founding of the
PRC in standard fashion, with a 29 September "grand meeting,"
a message of greetings to Hao, Tung Pi-wu, Chu Te, and
Chou En-lai, and a 1 October Chinese embassy reception.
The "grand meeting" which has been traditional over the
years had been downgraded ~.n 1972 to a "gathering" without
the usual. participation at the Politburo level. As was
customary in past years, the "grand meeting" this year was
sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee,
the Vietnam-China Friendship Association, and the DRV
Commission for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries.
The Politburo was represented at the meeting by Hoang Van
Moan why had returned to Hanoi on 19 September, after a
three-week stay in Peking.'
Consistent with past practice, only lower-level officials
spoke at t:iP meeting. Central Committee member Hoang Quoc
Viet, the president of the DRV-China Friendship Association,
made an opening statement, and the main speeches were
delivered by the Chinese ambassador and Nguyen Van Huyen,
a vice president of the friendship association. Following
a recital of Chinese achievements during the past 24 years,
Huyen asserted that the Vietnamese have always enjoyed
"the most adequate support and assistance" from China.
Recalling the DRV party-government delegation's visit to
Peking last June, Huyen reminded his audience that "the
party, government, and people of China have affirmed their
unshakable determination to continue to fulfil, their
international obligations and resolutely support the
Vietnamese people's just cause until victory."
* Hoang Van Hoan also attended the anniversary meeting in
1971; the Politburo was represented by Le Thanh Nghi in
1970. The purpose of Hoan's recent stay in China was not
announced; he has often made such unexplained visits to
Peking and Moscow--see the TRENDS of 6 September 1973, page 16,
for background.
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CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
3 OCTOBER 1973
The first known mention in Hanoi media of internal Chinese
party wrangling as revealed at the 10th CCP Congress
occurred when Hanoi radio in Vietnamese broadcast the PRC
ambassador's speech at the grand meeting, including his
reference to the review at the Congress of the struggle
"to smash the antiparty group of Lin Piao." The Vietnamese
party Central Committee's message of greetings to the 10th
congress made no mention of the struggle against Lin Piao,
just as their message to the 9th CCP Congress had ignored
its attacks on Liu Shao-chi.
The DRV leaders' congratulatory message on the occasion of
the Chinese anniversary, as well as the holding of the grand
meeting with Hoang Van Ho,.n in attendance, indicated seine
improvement in relations between the two countries since last
October. This year's message revived the conventit:.al
description of the close friendship between the Vietnamese
and Chinese as "a brotherhood based on Plarxism-Leninism and
proletarian internationalism." a description absent from
last year's message. On the other hand, reflecting the
continuing impact of Peking's detente policy, the DRV message
said nothing about Sino-U.S. relations. Over the years, the
annual Message has traditionally hailed Peking's anti-U.S.
stance, an element which was still there, but in brief form,
in 1971 and dropped in 1972 after the President's Peking
visit. Like last year, however, the message credited Peking
with aiding world revolutionary forces and the forces
strugglit:g for peace, natiuaal independence, democracy, and
socialism. And it praised the "brilliant achievements" of
the Chinese people, and offered "sincere and profound thanks
for their valuable support and assistance."
Further conforming with the pattern of previous years, the
formal reception given by the Chinese ambassador was attended
by Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy
Trinh, and Le Thanh Nghi--the same Politburo members who
attended in 1972--as well as Hoang Van Hoan. Brief remarks by
Pham Van Dong at the reception routinely hailed Chinese
successes and expressed gratitude for the "great support and
precious assistance accorded by the CCP and the PRC government
and people" to the Vietnamese "in their struggle against U.S.
aggression previously, in their socialist construction, and
also in the present stage of their revolution." The reception
was said to have proceeded in an atmosphere of "solidarity and
friendship thoroughly impregnated with militancy"--a formulation
similar to the one used last year.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 OCTOBER 1973
Editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHt1N DAN marking the
anniversary both routinely hailed the "success" and "victory"
of the Chinese revolution. NHAN DAN quoted at length from
the joint communique on the DRV visit to China in June,
recalling the PRC pledge of support and assistance. NCNA's
summary of Hanoi's comment and reports on anniversary
activities included NHAN DAN's recollection of the Chinese
offer of assistance.
GVN MILITARY ACTION, U.S. SHIPS OFF DRV COAST DRAI^.' PROTESTS
Extensive Hanoi and PRG comment followed their 26 September
foreign ministry spokesmen's protests denouncing Saigon
military operations in Pleiku and Kontum provinces and GVN
charges that North Vietnamese troops overran the Le Minh
ranger base in Pleiku. In addition, on 1 October the PRG
spokesman issued a further protest and on the 2d the DRV
spokesman assailed alleged U.S. naval activities off the DRV
coast--activities linked in Hanoi press comment to the fighting
in the South.
Saigon charges about the attack on the Le Minh base have been
the subject of several radio and press commentaries, but the
main thrust of the reaction has dealt with ARVN "r.ibbling"
attacks throughout the central highlands. The PRG and DRV
take the position that the U.S. and Saigon are merely using
these charges to divert attention from more widespread
military action they are instigating. A 27 September Liberation
Radio broadcast declared: "While the United States and the
Saigo.l administration were loudly lying that 'North Vietnamese
regular forces have attacked and overrun Le Minh base,' a
sizable Saigon military force supported by aircraft and
art'llery repeatedly launched nibbling operations in
PRGRSV-controlled areas in Gia Lai [Pleiku] and Kontum provinces. . . .
A 29 September demonstration against the Le Minh attack, at the
headquarters of the PRG delegation to the Joint Military
Commission at Tan Son Nhut Airbase, and Thieu's 1 October
speech at Pleiku prompted the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman
statement on the ?st which rejected the "distorted and
slanderous allegations by the U.S. and the Saigor administration"
and denounced their "schemes, provocative acts, and threats."
The alleged .resence of U.S. warships off the coast of North
Vietnam was- the subject of the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman
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CONrIDENTIA L FBIS TRENDS
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statement on 2 October. According to the statement, "On
30 September the U.S. carrier Hancock appeared at a place
approximately 120 miles east of the coast of Nghe An Province
in North Vietnam." The statement further charges that six
U.S. destroyers were also 60 to 80 miles off the same coast
and that "a number of U.S. jet fighters swooped down very low
over DRV fishing boats off the coast of Nghe An Province."
Although the statement itself did not directly link the
presence of the U.S. ships with military operations in the
central highlands, a QUAN DOI NHAN DIN commentary the same
day was quite explicit in this regard. In discussing Saigon's
"nibbling" operations in Kontam and in the "Chu Nghe area"
(the area surrounding the Le Minh base), the commentary
declared: "They have massed hundreds of tanks and armored cars
in this area in preparation for a new military adventure.
Meanwhile, out at sea U.S. warships are lurking, ready to
lend a hand to the Saigon army."
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U.S. - USSR
FBIS 'TRENDS
3 OCTOBER 1973
MOSCOW OPTIMISTIC ABOUT DETENTE DESPITE RECENT SETBACKS
Moscow Is maintaining a bold front on the prospects for
detente, despite signs of concern over the adverse Western
reaction to the Soviet crackdown on dissidents and the
recent actions of Congress on easing trade restrictions
with the Soviet Union, accelerating Trident development
and reducing L.S. forces abroad. In a lengthy and
authoritative review of a new collection of Brezhnev's
works on foreign affiirs, PRAVDA on 30 September gave a
positive assessment of Brezhnev's detente diplomacy and
reaffirmed its basic goals. At '.lie same time, it an
apparent allusion to continuing opposition to de,,ente,
the PRAVDA editorir 1. article pointedly denied thvit Moscow
has ever harbored any "pacifist illusions" about the time
and effort needed to bring about a fundamental change
in relations with the West.
Moscow has by no means swept the potential threats to its
detente policy under the rug. the recent votes in
Congress on t'ie trade bill, on the Trident program, and
on forces overseas have been promptly reported In. Soviet
media. But the coverage of these developments has been
accompanied by commentaries stressing the signific,::ice
of U.S.-Soviet cooperation. The limited comment on the
reopening of SALT TWO, for example, has ignored the Trident
vote and focused instead on the satisfactory implementation
of the earlier SALT agreements and on the optimistic prospects
for the current round. Past warnings that the acceleration
of Trident development contradicts the spirit of SALT ONE,
last expressed by USA Institute member Georgiy Svyatov in
RED STAR on 23 March, have not been renewed. In thi3
connection, Moscow has treated the Administration's role
in the congressional debate in a gingerly fashion. Although
one TASS commentator on the 27th cited U.S. press reports
showing that the Administration had "intensively worked on"
individual senators to back its position on troop reductions,
the comment downplayed White House support for the Trident
program and laid the blame pr_marily on the Pentagon.
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3 OCTOBER 1973
Only on the trade issue has Moscow chosen to counterattack,
most recently in a 29 September IZVESTIYA article by Vikentiy
Matveyev which termed the Jackson amendment a relapse to the
posidior.s of the cold war. Moscow has promptly reported
remarks by Secretary Kissinger and President Nixon that
emphasize the serious consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations
which could ensue from a failure to extend MFN status to
the Soviet Union. Even in the sphere of trade and economic
relations, however, Moscow has continued to evince optimism
that the current difficulties are transient in nature.
Recen_ articles by Soviet specialists on the United States
have Continued to find justification in U.S. developments.
for a policy of long-term rapprochement. USA journal editor-in-
chief V. M. Berezhkov in LITERARY GAZETTE for 29 August and in
a September USA article and USA Institute members Anatoliy
Gromyko and Andrey Kokoshin in the September issue of
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS have all argued that the recent c,ianges
in U.S. foreign policy, from confrontation toward accommodation,
are long-term and basic in nature- Gromyko and Kokoshin, for
example, pointed out that the changes reflect a basic shift
in strategy as well as in means and methods.
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3 OCTOBER .1.973
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
CEMA OVERTURE TO EEC RECEIVES MIXED EAST EUROPEAN REACTION
There has been mixed East European reaction to the proposal for
official talks between CElIA and the European Economic Community
(EEC), a proposal made by CEMA Secretary General Fadeyev when
he met EEC Council of Ministers Chairman Noergaard in Copenhagen
on 27 August. The public response thus far suggests that most
CEMA countrics are concerned to preserve as much freedom of
maneuver as possible in bilateral relations with EEC
and are uncertain as co the nature of the EEC's
Fadeyev overture. Moscow, on its part, has not
proposal and has continued to issue warnings to
highlighting the dangers of developing economic
West on a bilateral basis rather than under the
countries,
response to the
acknowledged the
East Europe
ties with the
aegis of CE1A.
Only Poland, which under Gierek has increasingly acted as Moscow's
spokesman on CEMA affairs, registered unqualified approval of the
Fadeyev overture and urged acceptance by the EEC. Czechoslovakia
and Ea.3t Germany greeted the proposal with caution, underscoring
basic differences between the two economic groupings and the self-
sufficiency of CEMA. Hungary's Kadar, in an interview during a
recent visit to Finland, indicated a preference for bilateral economic
relations with Western countries over formal organizational ties.
Bulgaria and Romania have not commented directly on the Fadeyev
proposal.
POLAND An article it, the 14 September issue of the Polish
gover'iment daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY by the paper's deputy
chief edit)r Wasilkowski was sharply critical of the EEC for having
publicly ignored the latest CEMA overture. Deploring the low
level of trade and economic cooperation between the East and West
European countries, the article viewed the Fadeyev proposal as
another major move toward detente in Europe. It cautioned that
"the two gravitational centers" in Europe might drift apart in the
absence of negotiati'-us and conjectured that it would be "surprising"
if the EEC should reject the proposal outright in view of the
improvement of the political climate in Europe.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Three days later, an article in Prague's party
EAST GERMANY daily RUDE PRAVO played down the Copenhagen
rrecting as merely exulorative and amounting to
"more or less mutual recognition of economic realities." Stressing
fundamental differences between the two organizations, the article
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CON F I )ENT I AI, FB I S T10-:NDS
'1 ut;'PI)iR1:R 1971
charactc'rlZed (:I' IA as a purely cuupc'rat Ive grouping tid the EEC
as pr(nt.trily it "protccllcn[ist" or};uni?Itlun. It pointed out Chia
OIL I'.1;C was not the ;u le repr(';enta1 ivc' of Eurupe..u[ cap i Lai 1.l;t
HLat(.!rt and t'haI CI;t1A was Iniere:;Led fit trade with 11011-I;1;(: members
as we1.1. The Rtil)v; PRAVO .[r1Eele SL,ILrd that Lhc' 270h CEMA yesston
In i'raguc 1.n early Jcu[e Itnd rocugttt.'zed tile "reality" of t:i[e EEC,
Lhu communique on that ::(,ray tun ha(I I n fact noted o n l y i n general.
term:; that the (:r,L'lA yt:.ttes "reaffirm their readiness Lo develop
0-1cufu)It[Ic contact; with other cotu1Lrl.t, ru};.~rdli yy of their r,ochil
and government. r[yiLen[s," un L'Ic hnsly of equality and noninterference.
An East U-1-1 111 rudtu cui t cntary (oil 28 August, I'e day after the
Copenhagen contact, sln[IlarIy played clown the talker, stressing their
"unoffictat" and tentativ4 nature. While conceding the possibility
that. the Intt[a1. Lalks COUId lead to official ncgoLiaLlons, tile
commentary underscored Cl. iA's achtcvements Lideoendent of any
assistance from Lho West.
HUNGARY Although Budapest (lid not comment directly on the
Fadeyev proposal, Hungarian First Secretary Kadar
deprecated the need for organisational ties between CEMA and the
EEC in a Helsinki radio Interview on 28 September, at the end of
his four-day visit to Finland. In the interview, which was carried
to f u I I by P17'1 In English the next day, Kadar approved the
establishment of "a certain amount of contact" between the two
organizations, hut be went on to assert, "In my opinion, there
need not be any formal economic relations as such." Contacts on
the organizational level, he cuntlnucd, must serve the- interests
of promoting tract( through the lowering of customs barriers.
However, the stress should be placed or. bilateral relations
he argued. "for CEPIA and the EEC do not of themselves have an
economic background; this background Is ror:ned by the member
countries."
MOSCOW Al though ;losc, w has not ..cknuwledged the Fadeyev
overture, it has continued to stress tine desirability
of o,.?ganizationaI ties between CL?MA and EEC, as well. as its
readiness to develop economic ties with capitalist countries on
a bilateral basis. At the same time, however, closcow has warned
CLMA member countries of the dangers of such tics. In an obvious
allusion to :,omania, for example, CPSU Secretary Katushev, writing
in the August issue of the communist theoretical journal PROBLEMS
OF PLACt. AND SOCIALISli, declared that "even the socialist countries,
especially toe less developed ones," would be vulnerable to
pressure f_om the capitalist countries "Lf they acted in isolation
in tile world arena." Under the I rotectorate of CLUA, lie argued, even
the small social'.st countries can develop economic ties with
capitalist countries "on a just and mutually advantageous basis."
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(a)NFI DENT I AL III IS '1'111?NUS
3 l)CI'on ' I( 1973
T H A J LAND)
U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL DRAWS DIVERGENT CC+MMUNIST RESPONSES
The [natal stage of U.S. mil[tiry withdrawal from Thailand,
following a U.S.-Thal agreement [n August:, prompted complaints
from Ilanot and the Thal Communist Party about the U.S. Intention
to maintal-- a rrcaldual military force In the arch. By contrast,
limited Peking rcncIIon to the move and sparse Moscow comment
played up the positive aspects of the withdrawal.
HANOI Routine-level Ilanoi comment predictably questioned
U.S. intentions on withdrawal. A 27 August NIIAN DAN
commentary assailed the move as a "cunning trick" designed to
assuati' public pressure for total withdrawal, castigated the
Nixon Administration and the U.S. "aggressive and inter-
ventionist design" against lndocl.ina, and accused the "Thanom
Kittlkhachon reactionary administration" of tailing after the
United States in an effort to make the Nixon Doctrine succeed
in Southeast Asia. To underline Its case against U.S.-Thai
intentions, Hanoi noted that further withdrawals will depend on
developments in Southeast Asia, and criticized Thanom's
observation that the U.S. presence Is designed to deter the
communists in indochina and to safeguard the peace agreements.
Subsequent Ilanoi propaganda has mentioned the U.S. withdrawal
in passing: A 21 September Hanoi broadcast on the action of
U.S. planes in Cambodia, for exampl,,, complained that despite
"propaganda" on the withdrawal, a large U.S. air force contingent
has been "Indefinitely" left there so as to maintain a
capabtl(ty for military intervention throughout Southeast Asia.
THAI CP The That Cl' clandestine station based in China has
released a steady stream of harsh invective,
assailing the withdrawal as :- deception designed to appease
public opinion, to ease U.S. military expenses, and to cover
U.S.-Thai intentions to maintain a permanent U.S. presence.
A 31 August commentary even noted that the United States is
prepared to send additional troops if needed for the security
of the Bangkok goveriment. The reports have consistently
assailed the "traitorous Thanom-Praphat clique" as a "100 percent
U.S. j.ackey," and have let no opportunity pass in order to
play up alleged U.S.-Thai perfidy. Notably, a 22 September
report on the Ser-ite Foreign Relations Committee hearings
on Dr. Kissinger's nomination as Secretary of State noted
his remarks on the U.S. presence in Thailand, as well as those
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CONVI)';rl'I'IA1, III';
'I n(:'''.rltIR I9/3
of Uh'ptrty Del-1114c Sccr(tarry (:Tenn nl.r; during at repent vlr;It
t o Bangkok, an proof IL'at the Vu It 1 :; tatcn wi I I not wtilid raw
hilt 01% continue Ittt poi Icy of "coat rol 1 Ins; Thailand and
the whole of Suulhen;;t Ai Ia ."
I'I KIN( 1't?i(Iny'tt only acInowtetlyment of the redtICtIon of
tt.S. for(-(-!; In Thal kind wa:; a t;t ra fght f orwnrd
25 August NCA'A ncwN rel,ort. whlc'h atppcatred tit reflect (111111)'s
Increasingly relaxed view of U.S. mil Itatr'y Intent long 1n
Asia and Its ongoitti ei fort to Improve relit tons with the
Thai governrrent. The hr Iof report noted that. the U.S.-'T'hud.
announcement i;tat.ed that this was "the I Ii t step" of a
U.S. troop withdrawal, that further U.S. pullouts would be
discussed in latter U.-.-'T'hai talks, and that the current
U.S. strength In 'T'hailand was 42,000 men and 700 aircraft.
It made no mention of Indochina, U.S.-'Thal intentions, or
reports Ih;.t the United States plant; to maintain a permanent
residual nil I itary presence In Thailand.
The Chinese rc.utlon is consistent with Peking's general
rr,tlcenct' on the issue of the U.S. ntilItary presence In
Thailand following; the Vietnam peace agroement in January.
NCNA had duly reported, without comment, the Lransfer of
U.S. air command headquarters Iron; South Vietnam Lo Thailand
last February; but Its only recent reference came In a
15 August NCNA pickup of a Pentagon spokesman's announcement
that U.S. comhatt planes would continue to be stationed '.n
Thailand In the wake. of the halt in U.S. hombIn)', In Cambodia.
MOSCOW While Noscow reed Ia typically g;a"c' more a t t ,'nt ion
than Peking to the reduction (it U.S. forces in
Thailand, Soviet comment also sidestepped sensitive Ist;ucs.
The U.S. move was reported by 'PASS on 25 August, and four
days later a PRAVI)A article by V. Skvortsov lauded the
withdrawal as a "realistic step" in keeping with changes
In Southeast Asia since the end of the Vietnam war. Unlike
TASS, Skvortsov did not acknowledge there would be a residual
U.S. presence in Thailand; he played up the initial withdrawal
as the start of a more extensive U.S. pullout.
Consistent with Moscow's interest in maintaining good relations
with the Thai govcrnmealt, Skvortsov called at tent ion to the
positive rrie played by Bangkok in the withdrawal decision,
asserting that the initiative came ;.argely from Thailand and
that a "realistic viewpoint" In favor of enJ;ng the U.S. presence
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CONE I DENT I Al, I' I' t S TItENI)S
3 OCTOIIi',R 1973
was gaining Influence wi.thi,a the government. In than
connection, ca Moscow radto broadcnMt in 'I'hni on 30 August
went to unusual lengths to obscure the ThnI government's
close in'roivement with Lite U.S. inflitnry presence, nlleging
thnt '1'h;anom had stated that the U.S. bnseec were constructed
by the Pentagon In 'Thailand "without the knowledge and
consent of the Thal, Government."
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c;ONv I DENT I Al, Ffl IS TItI;NDS
3 OCTOBER 1.773
JJUILS
H)SCOW (1N PRC NA I I ONAL DAY: Ta k I r,t; (.110 cut' from Ilre zhnav' s
rcccut: Tat;Itkent t;pcec:h, Moscow's treatment of I'll(: National
Oily combined a glo(ttny ttltlcssml'tlt of Lite prospects for
Improved re1:11, iontl wit Ii alt offer of norntalI.zat[oil on Soviet
Le rmti. The current Impasse watt rt,f te, Led It-, ooth tile
unusually terse Soviet government ma.-,sage of congr1lLUI11LionH
and in ITAVI)A and 17v'E;TIYA at-IIcIea on the occasion, which
reiterated the "Lock themrs of rec milt Soviet comm+.mt on
China. The IZVES'I'IYA artIrLe aH well at; radio broadcasts
repeated 13rc'; 1inev':; renewed offer at Tashkent to accept tin
improvement In relations on Lite basis of peaceful coexistence.
in a departure from previous practice, :IoHCOw has to date
not reported the reception of the PRC Embassy in Moscow.
KOSYGIN'S YUGOSLAV VISIT: The 24 September-1 October visit
of Soviet I'rcrticr Kosygln to Yugoslavia reflected the gradual
normalization of relations between the two countries since
Brezhnev's September 1971 visit to Belgrade. Moscow's
recognition of flelgralc's indepindent position was underscored
In the final communique, which deleted the references to
"socialist internationalism" and joint struggle against
"imperialism" contained in rile 1971 communique. The communique
likewise stressed that relations between the two countries and
parties were based on "sovereignty, equality, and noninterference,"
instead of on "internationalist traditions, friendship, mutual
respect, and equality," as claimed in the communique adopted
after Tito's June 19U Moscow visit. In addition to expressing
general satisfaction over the state of bilateral relations,
the communique endorsee; the "positive changes" it world affairs,
hailed the results of the Algerian conference of nonalined
countries, ^nd denounced the Chilean coup in strong terms
without explicitly mentioning the. U.ited States.
USSR, YUGOSLAVIA ON U.S. SUPPORT FOR SAIGON: In a deaarrure
from Eoscow's nosturr in recent months, the 1 October joint
?i,~