TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060025-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 20, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
20 JUNE 1973
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FnIS without coordination wit t other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
I NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disOosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONTENTS
Moscow Emphasizes Long-Term Aspects of Nixon-Brezhnev Meeting . . .
1
East European Media Say Summit Proves Success of USSR Policy. . .
3
CHINA
Foreign Minister Decries "Illusory" Detente on Tour Abroad. . . . .
5
INDOCHINA
DRV, PRG Cell Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Communique a "New Victory" . .
8
DRV Createuu New Building Ministry, Shifts Several Officials . . .
17
Economists Challenge Official Doctrine on Economic Priorities . . .
18
Grechko in KOMMUNIST Stresses Peace Through Strength Theme. . . . .
19
NOTES: Chiang Ching With Americans; China Agriculture; European
Security Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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- 1 -
U,S,-SOVIET SUMMIT
FBIS TRENDS
20 JUNE 1973
MOSCOW EMPHASIZES LONG-TERM ASPECTS OF NIXON-BREZHNEV MEETING
Stressing the "working nature" of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks at
the Washington summit, Soviet commentary has suggested that a
good beginning has been made but has refrained from extensive
substantive discussion of the issues. Soviet media have this
far into the summit focused instead on the atmospherics of the
event and the broader historical context. Ample coverage of
the ceremonial aspects of the summit included live radio and
television coverage of the official welcoming ceremony on
18 June. TASS carried the full texts of the Nixon and Brezhnev
speeches on that occasion as well as those at the White House
dinner that evening.
TASS described the first session of the talks on 18 June a!3
"businesslike " and reported that the two leaders had positively
assessed the progress in bilateral relations since the May 1972
Moscow summit and had discussed steps for further cooperation.
IZVESTIYA's correspondents reported Brezhnev's remark that a
"good beginning" had been made. TASS and Moscow Radio promptly
reported the first series of agreements on 19 and 20 June.
Moscow Radio's Zorin concluded that the signing of the agreements
was important since in addition to their inherent value they
deepen the cooperation of the two great states."
While awaiting the development of more substantive news, PRAVDA
and IZVESTIYA representatives in Washington--including PRAVDA's
Yuriy Zhukov and IZVESTIYA's deputy chief editor. N. Polyanov--
have concentrated on the historical-context of the summit and
on what they describe as the overwhelmingly positive attitude
of Americans to U.S.-Soviet cooperation. They as well as other
Soviet correspondents have gone to great lengths to emphasize
the historical momentum behind the changes that are now occurring
in U.S.-Soviet relations. While echoing Brezhnev's remark that
an elimination of the consequences of the cold war will not be
an easy matter, they have expressed optimism about the eventual
outcome of the process. The historical legitimacy of U.S.-Soviet
cooperation has been illustrated by references to antecedents
from Lenin's and Roosevelt's days. In this perspective the
cold war is seen as an aberration from the norm that should
prevail in Soviet-U.S. relations. PRAVDA's Boris Strelnikov
on the 14th went so far as to point out that Tsarist Russia had
resisted attempts by West European imperialist powers to involve
it in actions hostile to the young American nation. Throughout
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this commentary, the operative adjectives have been "large-
scale" and "long-term."
Moscow has reassured the Soviet domestic audience about the
favorable circumstances for Brezhnev's visit, portraying broad
bipartisan support for President Nixon's foreign policy, even
among those who disagree on internal issues, and emphasizing
the isolation of his opponents. Interviews by Soviet
correspondents with U.S. businessmen and political figures
have portrayed a serious U.S. interest in expanded trade and
cooperation with the USSR.
Moscow has also taken pains to reassure its allies--and preempt
Chinese and third world charges of superpower- collusion--by
portraying the coordination of foreign policy within the
socialist community and by emphasizing the linkage between
U.S.-Soviet detente and the prospects for world peace. Reports
of a 14 June meeting of Brezhnev with communist ambassadors
accredited to Moscow were carried prominently in the central
press on the 15th. While not mentioning the Brezhnev U.S. visit
explicitly, these reports stressed the "coordinated action of
socialist countries on the international scene." Moscow has
also been careful about West European sensitivities, as under-
scored by a TASS announcement on the 17th that Brezhnev would
visit Paris on the way back to Moscow. While Moscow has continued
to criticize Chinese attempts to frustrate Soviet detente
initiatives, it has not made any special attempt to take
advantage of the visit to derogate Chinese policy.
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EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA SAY SUMMIT PROVES SUCCESS OF USSR POLICY
Moscow's allies in Eastern Europe have echoed the themes that
the Brezhnev visit registers another triumph for the Soviet
peace program, demonstrates the "realistic" stance of the Nixon
Administration, and is overwhelmingly favored by the U.S. public.
The leading dailies of the orthodox allies gave front-page
coverage to Brezhnev's arrival and his init,ai talks with the
President. The Bratislava TV announcer for the 55-minute live
relay, via Eurovision, of Brezhnev's arrival !~a1d that "all"
the socialist countries were receiving the telecast. The
Bucharest radio and the party daily SCINTEIA carried only brief
reports on Brezhnev's departure from Moscow and arrival in the
United States.
Where Hungarian and Czechoslovak commentaries had speculated in
May on the possible impact of Watergate on the summit, only
the Yugoslavs and Albanians explicitly mentioned the affair at
the start of the visit. The Albanians charged on the 19th that
"revisionist propaganda" was "protecting" President Nixon by
treating Watergate as a plct by "reactionary" elements bent on
sabotaging Soviet-U.S. detente. The Yugoslav press agency
TANJUG on the 18th observed that the visit enjoyed overwhelming
public support but that the main argument of those favoring
canceling or postponing the visit was the "internal disturbance"
in the United States provoked by Watergate. On the 17th, TANJUG
had characterized the dominant public mood in the United
States with the observation that "at the time of the Watergate
affair, the opinion prevails" that Brezhnev should have been
invited and that the internal American developments should not
exert a "negative influence" on the results of the summit.
A moderate volume of comment In Polish, East German, Czechoslovak,
Bulgarian and Hungarian media has uniformly stressed the favorable
long-term prospects for the Washington summit, based on the
positive results of the 1972 Moscow talks, and the harmonious
atmosphere surrounding the initial White House discussions. Polish
party leader Gierek hailed Breznnev's trip at an East Berlin dinner
on the first day of his "official friendship" visit to the GDR.
According to TASS on the 18th, Gierek called the visit "eloquent
proof of the successes" of Soviet policy, adding that the visit
"would certainly make a big contribution to the consolidation of
peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems."
The East German party daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 20th similarly
stressed that the visit exemplified peaceful coexistence in action,
noting as well "the great personal contribution of Leonid Brezhnev"
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in this ruga::d. On the 18th, a talk carried by the East Berlin
domestic service i.ndt aterl that Brezhnev's trip was "no longer
of a sensati%nal nature" but war, in line with the incipient
"normalizaticn" said to be taking place In Soviet-U.S. relations.
This process, it added, was a prerequisite for achieving lasting
peace "for many generations to come."
Both Czechoslovak pa;:ty leader Husak and MPRP leader Tsedenbal
praised Brezhnev's visit in their speeches at a friendship
rally in Ulan Bator on the 18th., The Prague party daily
RUDE PRAVO on the 20th commented that "the first day of the
Soviet-U.S. summit talks was a good day" and that "the official
statements of both sides give rise to confidence in the success
of the talks, as well as in the willingness and will to cooperate."
The paper had adopted a. sterner line in a commentary on the 16th
which observed that the President's readiness to -negotiate with
Brezhnev was not due to any change in U.S. foreio_ policy aims
but was instead "a reflection of objective reality" in which the
West has been forced to abandca its "unrealistic" policy of
"pushing communism back." The paper warned at the same time of
the need for vigilance against "some circles" in the United States,
such as "the military-industrial complex," allegedly opposed to
the Soviet poiicy of peaceful coexistence. The same approach was
taken in a commentary carried b' the Bulgarian news agency BTA
on the 19th. Recognition of realities, it observed, "has
induced the governments of the most powerful nations in the West
to embark on a course of realpolitik in international relations,"
concluding that, "despite the misgivings of the ill-wishers,
there are very strong reasons for optimism" regarding the results
of the current summit.
The comment trom Budapest, underscoring the "realistic" aspect
of Brezhnev's visit, was unique in leveling barbs at the Chinese;*
Thus, the U.S. co.-respondent of the party daily NEPSZABADSAG
was quoted by MTI on the: 16th as pointing out that Senator
Jackson, who "opposed Bre zhnev's visit," also maintains "close
relations with the diplomatic bureau in Washington of the People's
Republic of China." The "Chinese orientation" allegedly favored
by the Senator, the report added, "would be a dangerous policy
from the point of view of America's interests." The Hungarian
Government daily MACYAR HIRLAP on the 17th, insisting that
Soviet-U.S. cooperation was not aimed against "any third country,"
declared that "those who are spreading slanderous rumors about
'a conspiracy between the two superpowers' are simply refusing to
take note of today's realities."
* Czechoslovakia is the only other Ease European country to have
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C H I N A
FOREIGN MINISTER DECRIES "ILLUSORY" DETENTE ON TOUR ABROAD
Against the background of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit and ongoing
movement toward East-West detente, Chinese Foreign Minister Chi
Peng-fei took the opportunity of his 6-19 June tour of Britain,
France, Iran, and Pakistan to carry Peking's message of warning
against "illusory detente" and of vigilance toward Soviet
intentions. Though Chi in his criticism throughout the tour
of "certain big powers" for their "expansive designs" did not
mention either the Soviet Union or the United States by name,
the context of his remarks and concurrent Chinese comment made
clear that he was voicing Chinese concern over any expansion of
Soviet influence in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Souti, Asia.
The Chinese foreign minister received high-level treatme.1t
throughout his visit, meeting with Prime Minister Heath,
President Pompidou, the Shah of Iran, and President Bhutto.
He took the opportunity to highlight bilateral Chinese relations
with each state, noting in particular the planned visits to
China of Heath and Pompidou, expressed support for Iran's defense
posture in the Persian Gulf, and reaffirmed Chinese support for
Bhutto's position on a settlement in the subcontinent.
EUROPE Striking the note of vigilance that was to mark his
pronouncements on every stop during his tour, Chi
responded to British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home's
balanced assessment of European detente in a banquet speech on
7 June with a sharp warning against the cortinuing danger of
big-power hegemonism. Where the British speaker had noted "a
healthy trend in the world today" in which East-West differences
are being settled through negotiations, Chi rejoined with Pe:king'8
line that "the wort is still in turmoil and unrest," that
"hegemonism and lower pL1itics Lre still menacing the independence
and security of nations, and this is the rcct cause of inter-
national tension." The anti-Soviet implications of his remarks
showed thro,..)i in Chi's warning to the British not to be misled
by a detente on paper: "If one to ks vclubly about detente but
in practice actively prepares for expansion, his detente is
nothing but a fraud." Taking up the same theme in an address at
a reception given by the French Foreign Minister on the 13th, Chi
stressed that only strict observlnce of the principles of peaceful
coexistence and the elimination of hegemonism would allow for real-
international detente. He warned that these prerequisites have not
yet been achieved and that "the specter of hegemony still haunts
the world."
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A 9 June NCNA report on the conclusion of the preparatory talks
on a European security conference ran parallel to Chi's analysis
and set forth a somber Chinese view of the talks as a forum for
the participants to pursue their narrow interests. NCNA took
note of Washington's "new Atlantic c:hacteL" proposal as
designed to adjust the U.S,. relationship with West Europe and
to enable the United States along with West Europe to contend
with the Soviet Union over Last Europe? It also portrayed
anxiety among the West Eurnneans over Soviet-U.S. "behind-the-
scenes bilateral contuct,o," and played up efforts by "small
and medium-sized countries" like Romania to resist big-power
domination. However, the sharpest thrust o'c NCNA's account
was focused on Soviet policy: Moscow was depicted as
fostering "a false sense" of detente while expanding its
military power to pave the way to "Infiltration and expansion"
into West Europe, and its plan for a European collective
security system was interpreted as an effort to consolidate
Soviet hegemony In East Europe while trying to "squeeze out
U.S.. influence" in the West., NCNA also referred to the
Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty of East European
countries as the target of Western insistence on inclusion
of the principle of self-determination on the agenda. NCNA
concluded by quoting a French paper's observation on the
"massive" Soviet military buildup: "So long as this formidable
and mute Soviet military hegemony lasts, people do not see how
the problem of European security can advance one step."
A 15 June NCNA account of the NATO foreign ministers' session
on 14-15 June more for ce.fully expressed Peking's anti-Soviet
line through selective replays of remarks by Western spokesmen.
NCNA noted NATO Secretary General Luns' observation that NATO
cannot yet afford to relax vigilance in the face of still
expanding Soviet power. It cited warnings from Secretary
Rogers and others against being misled by "euphoria over the
possibility of detente," and noted particular NATO concern over
the importance of maintaining U.S. troop strength in Europe
and over Soviet naval power in the Medit-:rranean, The report
duly cited Rogers' assurance that the U..S,-Soviet summit would
not prejudice NATO interests, but it also noted European
uneasiness over U.S.-Soviet "backroom bazgainu.ng:" NCNA
subsequently replayed remarks by FRG Defense Minister Leber on
17 June which bluntly warned against the "powerful military
potentiality of the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw
Pact" in noting that "Western Europe, being the neighbor of
a world power which is by nature expansionist, needs the close
support of the United States,"
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IRAN, PAKISTAN In an address in Teheran on 14 Tune, Chi
focused his warnings on the situation in
the Persian Gulf, noting that- "intensified expansion,
infiltration, and rivalry by certain big powers" are gravely
menacing security there. Telling the Iranians that "you
have every reason to feel uneasy at this situation," Chi
expressed support for Iran's defense measures and for the
position that the region's affairs should be settled only
by the Persian GuiC countries. In. this connection he quoted
the Shah as having once said "the situation both east and
west of Iran" provides a strong warning to the country--an
apparent allusion to Moscow's treaty ties with India and
Iraq. Later, speaking in Pakistan on the 18th, Chi alluded
to the Soviet role in attributing the "still unsettled"
situation in South Asia to infiltration and subv;rsion by
"certain expansionist forces."
Peking reinforced its anti-Soviet message with a 13 June NCNA
account of the 10-11 June CENTO ministerial conference that
represented a notable departure from the critical line on
this alliance taken by the Chinese in the past. NCNA noted
that Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Britain attended the
conference and that the United States was represented by an
observer, but it failed to identify Secretary Rogers as that
observer or to note the accommodating line he set forth on
East-West relations. NCNA chose rather to highlight the
strong warnings regarding Soviet motives voiced by the other
participants. It took favorable note of the members' resolution
to maintain their guard in the face of the "large-scale increase
in Soviet armaments," and depicted CENTO apprehension over
Moscow's expansion in the area as a result of the August 1971
treaty with India and its April 1972 treaty with Iraq. Peking's
decision to break its silence on the Soviet-Iraqi treaty,
taken together with the show of support for Iran's defense
measures, suggests that the Chinese are willing to cultivate
anti-Soviet sentiments even at the expense of Arab sensitivities.
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INDOCHINA
The 14-point joint communique on a Vietnam settlement, signed in
Paris on 13 June at the conclusion of the Kissinger-Le Due Tho
negotiations, has been described as reaffirming the peace accord
and called a "new legal" basis for continuing the struggle. As
in the period following the signing of the accord in Jaiuary,
comment has indicated that while Hanoi and Washington have been
able to reach agreement on many points, serious differences remain
between the FRG and Saigon, Hanoi treats the United States
circumspectly for the most part, limiting sharp criticism to
U.S. intentions to continue bombing in Cambodia. The PRG, on
the other hand, has repeated charges that the United States is
continuing a "neocolonialist" policy in South Vietnam.
Peking used a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 17th to endorse the
joint communique as "a new victory" of the Vietnamese people's
struggle for thorough implementation of the Paris agreement and
as "entirely necessary" in view of the "still unstable" situation.
The editorial noted that the communique proceeded "once again from
the reality" of two administrations and zones of control in
stipulating measures for guaranteeing the cease-fire, adding that
this is of "positive significance" in contributing to a settlement
in South Vietnam. The editorial also called on the United States
to "scrupulously honor" its commitments to the DRV specified in
the joint communique. In keeping with Peking's mild treatment of
the United States, Chinese accounts of Vietnammese comment have
delete-' attacks on U,S. intentions.
Moscow lauded the communique in a 16 June PRAVDA article by
A. Serbin, which held that it was a "new and important step"
toward real peace in Vietnam and praised it for recogr.izing the
"reality of the political situation" in South Vietnam in which
there are two admin!strations, two armies, two zones of control,
and three political forces. Le Due Tho, stopping over in Moscow
on his way home from Paris, was assured in a meeting with Kirilenko
and Karushev on the 18th that the Soviet Union will continue to
give help and support to Vietnam to ensure "peace and stability."
DRV, PRG CALL KISSINGER-LE DUG THO COMMUNIQUE A "NEW VICTORY"
Beginning or. 14 June, Hanoi and Liberation Radio for several days
broadcast the text of the Paris communique along with a PLAF Command
cease-fire order issued on the 14th Both the DRV and the PRG on the
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14th issued foreign ministry statements lauding the communique
as a new "victory" in their efforts to insure implementation of
the January peace accorr'..
In the foreign ministry statements as well as subsequent comment,
Hanoi has been much more restrained than the PRG regarding the
United States, avoiding direct criticism of the Nixon Administration
and even failing to mention Kissinger by name when assailing his
remarks that U.S. bombing in Cambodia would continue.
The DRV Foreig-1 Ministry statement cited the obligations undertaken
by the signatories of the communique but did not single out the
Uni;:ed States, or Saigon,in urging implementation of the Paris
agreement as reaffirmed in the communique. By contrast, the PRG
Forei;n Ministry statement scored past U.S. and Saigon actions,
specifically demanded that the United States halt "aggression"
in Cambodia and "intervention" in Laos, and called for resolute
struggle against "plots and acts of the U.S. Government and the
Saigon administration violating the Paris agreement."
Similar differences were reflected in 15 June DR'! and PRG notes
to participants in the February international conference on Vietnam.
The DRV Foreign Ministry note merely urged the recipients to
contribute to the implementation of the Pars agreement; but the
PRG note specified that the recipients should demand the U.S.
Government and Saigon administration strictly implement all the
provisions they have agreed upon and signed.
Hanoi's restraint toward the United States, as compared with PRG
comment, was even more striking in follow-up comment. A NHAN DAN
editorial on the 15th in complaining about delays and possible
future plots to sabotage the communique explicitly cited the Saigon
administration but avoided mentioning the Nixon Administration;
NHAN DAN referred only v:?;uely to "bellicose" forces in the United
States. Similarly, a NHAN DAN article on the 17th focused on alleged
Saigon statements and actions contrary to the provisions of the
communique and did not mention the United States in charging that
"the Saigon administration has no intention of seriously respecting
its signature and is still unwilling to satisfy the people's urgent
demands." By contrast an editorial issued on 16 June by the PRG's
news agency LPA dredged up the stock charge that the United States
"has not yet given up its design to impose neocolonialism in South
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Vietnam and to prolong the partition of Vietnam." While this
charge way routine in Hanoi propaganda prior to the signing of
the communique, it has not appeared in comment on the communique.
The most critical Hanoi comment on the United States since the
signing of the communique has been in connection with statements
by Administration officials--K:lssi.nger's 13 June press conference
statement that the communique did not bar bombing in Cambodia and
a similar remark by Defense Secretary-designate Schlesinger. The
editorials is NHAN DAN and QUAN Dot NHAN DAN on 15 June failed to
mention Kissinger then they deplored the remark by the U.S.
"representative." The editorials went on to call on the United
States to respect Article 20 of the Paris agreement--reaf:.rmed
in Point 13 of the communique--whicr pledges an end to foreign
miii.i_ary activities in Cambodia and Laos. The army per said
that the U.S. "distortion" should be "sternly denounced and
condemned" and charged that "this proves that the United States
still maintains its erroneous attitude, speaking about one thing
while doing another, and still pursues its dark schemes."
A 20 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article in assailing Schlesinger's
remarks before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 18th
acknowle-aged both his reaffirmation that bombing in Cambodia
would continue and his remark that resumed bombing of the DRV
could not be totally ruled out. Departing somewhat from Hanoi's
restraint, the army paper viewed his remarks as ev{dence of the
"evil design" of the Nixon Administration. The article observed
that his statements came "just after the signature of the Paris
joint communique and against the background of the continued U.S.
bombing in Cambodia and the sword-rattling by Nguyen Van Thieu in
Saigon."
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DRV-U.S. ISSUES So..ie llanoi comment on the communique has
drawn particular attention to the future
course: of U S.-DRV relations. Both the DRV Foreign Ministry
statement and Le Duc Tho, in a 14 June press conference, declared
that i'-ie strict implementation of the peace agreement is a
cordlti)n ror the normalization of relations between the United
Stags and North Vietnam. A month earlier, when Le Duc Tho first
arrived in Paris for the talks which led to the communique, he
had similarly stated the terms for normal relations with the
United States, thus suggesting tl-at this point was to be raised
in his meetings with Kissinger.
The 13 June communique not only pledges the United States to give
up moves taken last April to pressure Hanoi, but also clarifies
U.S. obligations under the Paris agreement:
? Point 1 of the communique requires that the United States
cease "i.nmeliately, completely, and indefinitely" aerial
reconnaissance over the DRV, "in conformity with Article 2" of
the Paris agreement. The communique thus codifies Hanoi's
long-standing contention that reconnaissance over the North is
among the military activities which the United States pledged to
eschew last January. Despite the fact that Article 2 of the
agreement made no mention of reconnaissance, a 1;' March Hanoi
radio commentary--following the first alleged U.S. air intrusions
on 12 and 13 March--flatly stated that the pledge to end military
action included reconnaissance. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
protest, the day after the first acknowledged U.S. overfl.icc"t on
19 April, for the first time suggested that there was a private
understanding on this point when it referred to an unspecified
U.S. commitment; and a 20 May protest on alleged overflights
during the time of the Kissinger-Tho meetings in Paris explicitly
claimed that there had been a U.S. commitment to halt reconnaissance
flighi:s over the DRV.
? Point 2 of the communique comm'ts the United States to resume
the mine-clearing operations in North Vietnamese waters which were
halted on 17 April as one of the U.S. moves to induce communist
compliance with the peace accord. It specifies, among other things,
that the United States shall supply the DR% with "means which are
agreed to be adequate and sufficient for sweeping mines in rivers."
This provision is in line with Article 5 of the protocol on mine
clearing which gave the United States responsibility for clearance
of inland waterways, but stated that the DRV would actively
participate, with the means of surveying, removal, and destruction
and technical advice supplied.by the United States. Hanoi had
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charged, nrt curly its mid-February, that the United Staten wrath
attempting to evade responsibility for removing mines in DRV
waterways, ,inc{ it DRV spoketiman at. it I Varc.h press conference in
ll:.tn,,i h:ul cotttpl,ttned specifically that the United States had
failed to supply adequate manna to tht' DRV to remove the mines.
Hanoi media on i9 June reported that the United States had
proposed to return its minesweepers to rer.,utnz mine.-clearing
operations and that on 18 June .t U.S, m.l.nesweeping delegation
arrived In Haiphong.
4- The final, 14th, point of the communique stipulates that the
U.S.-DRV joint economic commission will resume its meetings
within four clays and complete the firs( phase of its work
within 15 dnvs thereafter. No deadline for the cowmissian's
effcrt.i was publicly announced when it began its meetings on
15 March; however, a DRV press communique on the 19 April U.S.
suspension of the talks claimed for the first time that the
commission, "by common agreement," was tj complete its work on
30 ApciJ--"60 days after the commission was set up." Hanoi mcc*,1n
have reported the return to Paris of their de.egation to the
economic talks and the resumption of the talks on 18 June.
CEASE-FII'E PDint 3 of the Paris communique, calling for both
Sotth Vietnamese sides to issue new cease-fire
orders, was promptLy i;,,plemented by the communists, with Hanoi
as well as Liberation Radio on the 14th broadcasting :i cease-fire
order from the PLAF Command. At the same time, the DRV vnd PRG
have complai:i,d that Saigon has not disseminated a cease-fire
order. Thus, for example, Le Duc Tho, in his 16 June statement
upon his departure from Paris, charged that "--eports" reveal
that the Saigon administration "still refuses to widely publish
the cease-fire order and continues its military operations,
including air attacks agains' many places." Ocher comment has
cited Western press reports _n complaining that Saigon his not
broadcast 1;:s cease-fire order and that some ARVN officers have
not heard of it.*
The DRV and the PRG have accused the ARVN LIE numerous cease-fire
violations and have denounced Saigon charges that the communists
* While Saigon radio has been heard to refer to a cease-fire
order, no text of such an order has been monitored. This is at
variance with the period immediately following the peace accord:
Saigon radio broadcast the original cease-fire
as well as a 17 February cease-fire appeal issued by the four-
party JMC.
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have vic, Tared the cease-fire 1s "slanders" and "fabrications."
A 20 June Libe,"alion Radio broadcast revealed that on the
previous day th,2 P1tG delegation r.o the JMC `,ad received the
ConndLan de:egntion to the IL'.S and spec if [call y denied reports
that I'RG forces had IIred on 1":S aircraft flying between Saigon
and An hoc on the 17th.
+ Point 4 of the communique repeats Articles 2 and 3 of the
January c. ca se-fire probocol which indicated what act iona were
prohibited ar'l what allowed. Among other things, Article 3 forbade
re ntri.c'lon s on "civi!.[an supply, freedom of movement, freedom
to work, freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian
communication ar'; transportat[on between and among all areas in
South Vietna,." The stipulation on trade almost immediately
became a point of contention with a statement In a broadcast
interview with GVN Lt. General Pham Quoc Thuan, head of the GVN
delegation to the JMC, explaining that "no trading activities
or contacts will be allowed."
+ Point 5 reiterates the stipulation of Article 3 B of the peace
agreement that the two-party JMC should determine areas controlled
by the two parties, adding that ehe commission should also discuss
movements neccasary to accomplish the return of the armed forces
of the two parties to the positions they occupied at the time of
the 28 January cease-fire. References in points 4 and 5 to the
areas of' the two side;; would appear to be among the provisions of
the communique alluded to by Hanoi and PRG comment on the
document which has contended that it recognizes that in South
Vietnam there are "two administrations, two armies, two areas of
control, and three political forces." The contradiction between
this view and Saigon's position--that the communis'' zone is not
political but merely a troop stationing area--was pointed up in a
17 June Hanoi broadcast which scored GVN spokesmen for
"deliberately and erroneously" explaining that "the determination
of the areas controlled by each of the two parties involves only
military zones of control."
+ point 5 repeats the stipulation of Article 4 of the cease-fire
protocol that the commanders of opposing forces at places where
they ,re in direct contact shall meet, following the cease-fire,
to roach agreement on measures to avert conflict and insure supply
and medical care for the forces. The communique does not resolve
the opposing contentions of the two South Vietnamese sides on this
question--the communists holding that such meetings should take
place at all levels, and Saigon maintaining that meetings should
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be reHtrlcted to higher IeveIH. These d.lvergcnt vlewr; were
pointed ill) In n 15 June LIberatton Radio commentary which
c:r I t tc lzed GVN Foreign II In l.stc r Tran Van t,am's remarks at a
pr.ean conference on the t4th; t:Ire radl.) charged flint Dual
"stul,burnty cont.1nuod to dc?mnnci that the moetingn between the
CCnrunanders of the, c-ppoHtng armed forces . . , be hold only at
Lire (livisional. level or at the rc,g[ment.rl .1eveJ.."
+ Point 7 dea1H with the reatrictlons on the introduction of
mititary personnel and equipment which were ccntnined in Article 7
of the Par in agreement. Among cther things, it adds that military
equipment may transit the demilitarized zone only if introduced
into South Vietnam as replacements pursuant to Article 7 and
through a designated point of entry.
PRISONERS Paint 8 of' the communique calls for the return,
without delay, of any remaining military prisoners,
and asks the two South Vietnamese parties to do their utmost to
return till detained civilians covered by the agreement within
45 days. Borh sites clam that all military prisonerq have not
been returned to them. Ilnnot repeated its views on this issue in
the 15 June NIIAN DAN editorial which held that n "major part" of
the communist military personnel had been returned and that
"the adversary received all its military personnel."
The provision in civilian prisoners in thy, communique goes no
further than that in the Paris agreement which also suggested a
deadline--in that case 90 days--for their exchange. Although
the January agreement, like the communique, placed responsibility
for this provision with the South Vletnnmc se, the communists have
claimed--for example, in a 14 April PRG mcmurandum--that the
United States had made a commitment to the effe:t that the
majority of the civilian personnel would be returned in 60 days
and the rest within 90 days The c,)nununique does not broach the
issue of the number of civilians actually detained by either
side. The 15 June NTIAN DAN editorial and other comment has
reiterated the communist contention that Saigon is illegally
detaining "hundreds of thousands" of civilians.
Point 8 also repeats the agreement's call for Red Cross inspection
of detention sites within 15 days. And it reiterates Article 8 B
of the agreement on cooperation in gaining information on missing
in action and the location of graves, adding that "for this
purpose, frequent and regular liaison flights shall be made between
Saigon and Hanoi."
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POLITICAL SETTLEMENT Points 9 and .10 of the communique deal.
with the search for a political. settlement
in South VI tnam. Point 9 quotes Article 1.1 of the Paris agreement
on achieving nntionnl concord and insuring democratic liberties.
It offers no resolution of communist and Saigon differences on
the timing of the 1mpiementrtlon of these provisions and these
differences were pointed up in n 17 June Hanoi broadcast which
scored a Saigon spokesman for "brazenly" stating that the GVN
"reserves to itself the right to maintain restrictions on democratic
freedoms."
Other aspects of Chapter 4 of the Paris Agreement--dealing With
South Vietnamese sell-determination--were summarized In Point 10
of Jhc communique which covers the formation of the Notional
Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and the holding of
general elections. The communique calls upon the two South
Vietnamese parties to attempt to sign an agreement on the internal
affairs of South Vietkiam as soon as possible--if they can, within
45 days. The Paris agreement had called for 'fforts to sign such
an agreement within 00 days. Regular consultative meetings between
representatives of Saigon and the PRG to reach s;.:.11 an agreement
opened outside Paris on 19 March and were highligi?ted by the
presentation of concrete proposals by both sides at a 25 April
session--two days bei.)re the expiration of the 9`-day deadline.
The meetings, which had been held weekly, have not continued during
the month of June--presumably delayed until the conclusion of the
Kissinger-Tho talks. The chief PRG rel,,resentativc at the meetings,
Nguyen "an Hicu, complained in a 14 June press conference that on
the previous day Saigon had rejected his proposal that the meetings
resume the following week to attempt to meet the 45-day deadline.
According to I1t , Sa!gon's representative suggested that the next
meeting be held in two weeks,
The final paragraph in Point 1.0 reiterates Article 13 of the Paris
agreement calling for the South Vietnamese parties to settle the
question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam, The
six-point PRG proposal at the 25 April consultative meeting had
repeated this provision, specifically relegating It to the last
In its list of problems to be Solved. By contrast, Saigon has
Indicated i:hat it wants the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops--
matched with a demobilization of Saigon forces--prior to the holding
of the general elections.
JE?1C, ICCS Point 11 addressed problems in the functioning of the
J;1C and Point 12 pledged assistance and cooperation
with the ICCS. The provisions on the JMC include th,: stipulation
that Arti-rles 16 and 17 of the cease-fire proeocol dealing with the
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positLon and privileges of JMC representatives shall immediately
be :.m?lemented, along with the II-point statement of privileges
and lnmunittas agreed upon by the (.our-party JMC. Since the
first meeting of the two-party JMC on 29 March, the communists
have been complaining about Saigon's failure to recognize the
points on privileges and Immunities of the JMC delegates
previously agreed upon by the four-party JMC. In line with
the provision in Article 17 of the Paris agreement on separate
logistics for each JMC delegation, the communique also notes
that "frequent and regular liaison flights" shall be Trade
between Saigon and the headquarters of regional conmiibsiona
and other places in South Vietnam, and between Saigon and
Loc Ninh.
Another persistent communist complaint was met with the provision
that the headquarters of the two-party JMC will be located in
Saigon proper or at tin agreed-upon location in an area dividtng
territory controlled by either side. Point 11 also calls upon
the two-party JMC to agree within 15 days on the locations
of the headquarters of the reg:i,nal two-party commissions.
Liberation Radio reports on 15 and 18 June JMC meetings have
charged that Saigon has persistently demanded that the PRG agree
to locate regional JMC headquarters in military bases and has
balked at discussing the selection of regional sites In accorda'-ce
with the procedures defined in the 13 June communique.
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DRV CREATES NEW BUILDING MINISTRY. SHIFTS SEVERAL OFFICIALS
The DRV National Assembly Standing Committee on .14 June nnnouncc:l
the formation of a new Ministry of Building and revenlud several
shifts among ministerial-level personnel. These are the first
such shifts since the signing of the pence accord and presumably
reflect the changing priorities of the reconstruction period.
Ministry realignments were previously announced in December 1969,
when the Ministry of Heavy Industry was subdtvlded and a Ministry
of Food and Focdstuf#s was established, and in April 1971, when
the Agriculture Commission was formed by the merger of several
organs.
The Ministry of Building, formed by a merger of the former
Ministry of Construction and the Commission for. Capital Construction,
will be headed by Do Muoi, deputy premier and former chief of the
Commission for Capital. Construction. Do Muoi's appointment may
be aimed at supplying some new push to the reconstruction effort.
Bui Quang Tao, :,onstruction Minister since 1958, will be given
unspecified "new tasks." In an article broadcast by Hanoi on
29 March, Tao had noted the new "great tasks" of peacetime
construction and had called on the construction branch to "rapidly
remedy Cie shortcomings in production."
In other personnel actions, the National Assembly Standing Committee
announced that Deputy Premier Nguyen Con has been moved from his
post as director of the State Planning Commission to work in the
Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers. He will be
replaced as planning commission director by Nguyen Lam, a vice
chairman of the planning commission since 1969. Some dissatisfaction
with the progress being made in water resources seems indicated by
the reassignment of Ha Ke Tan from the Ministry of Water Conservancy
to become minister in charge of the Da River dam construction.
Taking over the Ministry of Water Conservancy Is Nguyen Thanh Binh,
director of the State Inspection Commission.
On 17 June Hanoi ',roadcast an article by Binh which stated that an
investigation in May by the State Inspection Commission had found
that in the area of dike preservation "a number of localities have
some weaknessess." Binh noted that the imi.lementation of the
regulations on the protection of dikes has progressed slowly, and
revealed some impatience in pointing out that "this problem has
been reiterated many times since 1969." And a NHAN DAN article on
8 May had laid major blame on inefficiency at the center for major
failures in water conservancy projects, failures which meant "that
30 to 40 percent of their capacity has been wasted."
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USSR
ECONOMISTS CHALLENGE OFFICIAL. DOCTRINE ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES
Two SuvIcL econuml.rits spec.talizlrg In cap1.Lu.llsm have openly
chall.eng;ed uffI IaI clcnctrine on economic priorities and advocated
that the Soviet. Union, as :a full-fledged Industrial power, should
emulate western economic practice In granting priority to
consumpt:lon aver Invc13tme1lt. Writing in the April Issue of
QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, A.I. Shapl.ro, head of the sector of future
economic development of capitalism at the Institute of World
Economy and Int.ernat.innal Relations, and V.M. Kudrov, a specialist
In the U.S. economy at the same institute, claimed that the
Marxist doctrine on the preferent1a.1. growth of the means of
production applies only to the early stages of industrialization
and not to the prevent stage when the Soviet Union possesses an
abundance of capital goods. Charging ;hit allegations about the
universall.Ly and immutability of this doctrine are "mistaken,"
the economists declared that "in all lnduntri.ally developed
countries, after reaching a certain industrial. maturity, the
non-production sphere of the economy begins to grow significantly
faster than the sphere of material production."
The economists' line of argument is clearly open to attack,
since It not only challenges one of the basic shibboleths of the
Soviet system but does so on the basis of capitalist experience.
Despite the fanfare in r rent years on improving welfare, party
leaders and professional, ecoromist.4 have continued to uphold the
validity of the doctrine that production of "the means of production"
must always grow faster than production of "the means of consumption"
and to assert that this doctrine has been strictly observed in
the current five-year plan.* The doctrine, which historically
* Since the announcement of the plan, Soviet spokesmen have
consistently maintained that it preserves the traditional relationship
between capital goods production (subdivision I) and consumer goods
production (subdivision II), while at the same time providing a
slightly faster growth rate for light industry (group B) than for
heavy industry (group A). Actually, despite the five-year plan,
the growth rate of group A exceeded chat of group B last year, and
the 1973 plan scheduled a continuati~: of the traditional relationship
between the two sectors of industry.
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has been used as justification for forced Indust r.ialization and
economiz austerity, has in more recent times been defended as a
means of promoting scientific an(, technoLogicaL progress, as well
as ensuring steady improvement of public welfare.
Although the doctrine on economic prlorltLes has often been challenged
in the past, sack challenges have usually been couched in esoteric
terms, only to be exposed and condemned vociferously by party or
economic spokesmen. The forthrightness and timing of the present
challenge suggest that it is intended as a trial balloon connected
with deliberations now under way on the long-range economic plan
for. 1976-1990.
GRECHKO IN KC IUNIST STRESSES PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH THEME
')efense Minister. Grechko's first major statement since becoming a
Politburo member clearly reflects his departmental interests rather
than his broader responsibilities in the lec.dership. Writing in
celebration of the 28th anniversary of victory in World War II,
in KOMMUNIST, No. 7, Gre,:hko provided what amounts to a defense
lobbyist's tract on the practical lessons to be derived from the
experience of tht war. While making pro forma bows to the regime's
current peace initiatives, he laid greater stress on the theme that
the bedrock foundation of party policy should be a strong defense
posture.
Asserting that the study 3f World War II provides an important means
for implementing the 24th CPSU Congress' injunction to raise the
defense might of the country, Grechko ticked off the practical
lessons: that the party outlines and implements all the necessary
measures for consolidating the state's defense might, that
strengthening the Soviet state means also strengthening its "armed
forces," (Grechko's emphasis), that a "well developed military-
economic base" is a firm guarantee of security, and that military
cooperation among the socialist states is an objective necessity
at the present stage "since there is a real danger of imperialist
aggression." The list could be extended, but in quantitative terms
alone; Grechko's collection of militant propositions probably
constitutes a record of sorts for Politburo-level statements,
at least since the "peace program" has become the focal point of
public discussion.
Grechko's military bias was cast into sharper relief by the minimal
attention he gave to the regime's peace program. While referring
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to the April plenum and .,Acknowledging that the regime's "enterprising
international policy" is contributing to "positive changes in the
world situation," lie avoided elaborating on these themes with the
now customary optimistic rhetoric. Indeed, he made a point of
balancing such references with reminders that a strong defense
posture is an essential ingredient of success in foreign policy.
Another unusual feature of Grechko's article was its extensive
discussion of military doctrine -- a subject rarely discussed in
leadership articles. The subject is currently under debate in
RED STAR, with the focus on the respective roles of the army and
the party it formulating Soviet military doctrine.* Grechko's
article was perhaps deliberately ambiguous on this score, stating
than. the doctrine "proceeds" from the party's policy, "accords"
with Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, and "embodies"
progressive military-technical thinking.
* For a discussion of the RED STAR articles, see the TRENDS for
2 May 1973, pages 2-3, and for 13 June 1973, pages 22-23.
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NOTES
CHIANG CHING WITH AMERICANS: Against the background of Brezhnev's
visit to the United States, Chinese Politburo members Chiang
Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, reputedly the most radical and
anti-American Peking leaders, on 19 June attended the opening
matches played by the American men and women basketball teams now
touring the PRC. The presence of Mao's wife and Yao was marked
by unusual publicity, with Peking radio and television carrying
the event live and NCNA issuing two separate reports noting that
the Chinese and their guests had a "friendly" conversation.
According to NCNA, the games took place "in an atmosphere of
friendship between the people and sportsmen of China and the
United States." NCNA also noted the presence of David Bruce,
the chief of the U.S. liaison mission.
In addition to the reassuring gesture to the United States,
Peking's treatment of the event also served to aline Chiang and
Yao with :he policy of Sino-American detente. Chiang, whose
appearances in recent months had been rare, may have been under
a cloud. On 8 March Chou En-lai, in her presence, called on
Chinese women to "thoroughly eliminate big-power chauvinism" and
"actively expand friendly contacts" with foreign countries. Four
days later Chiang was listed after Yeh Chien-ying, but she has
since been given her normal position ahead of Chou's close
associate Yeh.
CHINA AGRICULTURE: Persisting drought in North China was acknowledged
in a 19 June NCNA account of the visit of Sihanouk's Prime Minister
Penn Nouth to the China-Cambodia Friendship People's Commune on the
Peking outskirts. The chairman of the commune's revolutionary
committee was quoted as having told Penn Nouth that there is "a
more serious drought this year than last." A similar assertion
in a 30 May NCNA article about drought in Hopei Province (which
surrounds Peking) seemed to have been the cause for NCNA's
withdrawing it from publication and replacing it with a more
optimistic report.
The need to concentrate efforts on agriculture in the face of bad
weather was strongly emphasized by a 17 June Foochow broadcast
praisir :, a commune which reorganized enterprises serving
agriculture in order to release manpower for the fields, and which
closed down "enterprises not serving agricultural production."
While the closure of such enterprises has been advocated since the
cultural revolution's fervor for self-sufficiency was spent, there
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EUROPEAN SECURITY TALKS: Moscow and its East European allies
have all but ignored the issue of a time linkage between the
scheduled 3 July Helsinki convening of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCF) and the setting of a firm
autumn date for the formal start of the Vienna negotiations on
European force reductions (MBFR). Since the 3 July date was
announced at the final plenary session of the fourth round of
the Helsinki preparatory talks on 8 June, Soviet bloc comment
has adopted a relatively low-key posture on the conference;
however, the commentary has resorted at times to the usual
hyperbole about the onset of an entirely new "historical era''
of European cooperation, The most direct reference to a linkage
was made in the 20 May East Berlin daily DER MORGAN, which
observed that any "basic 'recisions" to come from the future
Vienna negotiations "can be made only when the results" of the
CSCE "are on the table." This remark is consistent with the
longstanding public Soviet bloc position that any force
reduction talks can take place only after the proper atmosphere of
trust has been determined by the CSCE. A unique remark by a
member of the GDR Helsinki delegation, Bock, may reflect Moscow
thinking on the duration of the CSCE. In a 14 June NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND interview, Bock said that the socialist bloc "will.
endeavor to conclude the security conference before the end of
this year."
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- i -
A P P E N D I X
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 13. - 17 JUNE 1973
Moscow (2911 items)
Peking (1203 items
Brezhnev Visit to U.S.
(3%)
17%
Domestic Issues
(29%)
41%
Soviet Local Elections,
(4%)
7%
Vietnam
(47%)
19%
17 June
[DRV Leaders in PRC
(27%)
11%]
China
(7%)
5%
[Kissinger-Tho Joint
(--)
6%]
European Security
(2%)
5%
Communique
Brezhnev Meeting With
(--)
4%
Cambodia
(6%)
7%
Communist Ambassadors
[Sihanouk Tour of
(4%)
4?0]
CEMA Meetings in
(7%)
4%
Africa, Europa
Prague
PRC Foreign Minister in
(4%)
7%
Vietnam
(8%)
3%
Europe, Iran
Middle East
(5%)
3%
European Security
(--)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio s,:rvices. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio alk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment 'r party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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