TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060024-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: June 13, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FDIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
13 JUNE 1973
T00875R000G`0006002 4-3J0. 24)
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 JUNE 1973
CONTENTS
Le Duan Visit to PRC a "Complete Success," Yields New Aid . . .
1
PRG President Phat Addresses Biannual Council Meeting . . .
8
U.S.-DRV Talks Ignored, PRG Proposals for Settlement Repeated .
10
Sihanouk Cites DRV-PRC Support; Moscow Reports Prince's Tour. .
USSR-JAPAN
11
Moscow Postpones Tanaka Visit, Toughens Line on Japan . . . . .
USSR-LIlYA
13
LITERARY GAZETTE Assails al-Qadhdhafi for Anticommunism . . . .
EUROPE
16
Warsaw Army Paper Urges French Attendance at Vienna Talks . . .
USSR
18
Political Economists Resist Pressures for Reform. . . . . . . .
20
Economists Resume Debate over Future of Kolkhoz System. . . . .
21
RED STAR's New Theoretical Series Takes Ideological Turn. . . .
22
College Enrollment Underway, Schools Tighten Standards. . , . .
24
PRC Media Note Agricultural Problems, Urge Greater Efforts. . .
NOTES: Prague CEMA Session; Schlesinger Speech; Radio
25
Free Europe Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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INDOCHINA
The 4-11 June visit of Le Duan and Pham Van Dong to China was
"a complete success," according to the joint communique. The
Chinese may have particular reason to be pleased by the timing
and results of the visit shortly before Brezhnev's trip to the
United States. Notable among the results was the signing of
a new aid agreement and of a communique citing both sides'
misgivings about Soviet-U.S. detente. The Chinese used the
occasion to raise their commitment to the PRG as the "sole
authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese people.
After maintaining almost total silence on the Kissinger-Le Duc
Tho Paris talks, Hanoi media or. 13 June carried the announcement
that agreement had been reached on communiques to be signed by
the United States and the DRV and by the four parties to the
Vietnamese agreements, respectively.
Standard Vietnamese communist rhetoric regarding the peace
agreement and long-range goals were reaffirmed by PRG President
Huynh Tan Phat in his report to a recent Council of Ministers
meeting. The Liberation Radio announcement on the 8th that
Phat had chaired the Council meeting on 6-7 June in an
unidentified "liberated area" supplied the first explanation of
Phat's absence from ceremonies in Quang Tri on the 6 June PRG
anniversary. Phat's report to the Council of Ministers called
the PRG the sole authentic representative of South Vietnam.
This description is consistent with the stress on the PRG's
international prestige during the anniversary ceremonies in
Quang Tri, marked by the attendance of newly named ambassadors
to the PRG.
LE DUAN VISIT TO PRC A "COMPLETE SUCCESS," YIELDS NEW AID
Stealing a march on Brezhnev's visit to the United States later
in the month, the Chinese hosted Hanoi's Le Duan and Pham Van
Dong to a week-long summit visit beginning on the 4th that
produced a new aid agreement and a communique which reflected a
common attitude vis-a-vis the superpowers. With the two sides
taking divergent approaches to the Vietnam question, the
Chinese made a point of defining their new aid commitments in
terms that made clear their interest in encouraging a peaceful
situation. The DRV leaders returned hume on the 11th after a
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few days in the northwest rounding out what was recorded in
the Joint communique as an "official friendly visit" crowned
with "complete success."*
The visitors were accorded :he standard treatment for high-level
friends, including a meeting with Mae on thy, second day for
what NCNA called "an extremely cordial and friendly conversation."
In addition to the usual ')anquets, tfere was a rally on the 7th
carried live over radio i~,ad televisicn, Though Le Duan and Dong
were given joint billing as leaders of the delegation, the party
chief delivered all of the principal &peer_hes. As the main host,
Chou En-lai spoke at the welcoming and reciprocal banquets in
Peking, but it was left to top military leader Yeh Chien-ying,
who addressed the rally, to deliver the most comprehensive state-
ment of Chinese policy. All of the active Peking-based Politburo
members attended the rally, including Chiang Ching and the
recently rehabili.tatcd Teng Hsiao-ping.
SINO-VIETNAMESE According to the communique released on the
SOLIDARITY 12th, the two sides held talks on "the
further strengthening" of their friendly
relations and cooperation, "the new situation" in Vietnam, and
other questions of common interest. A similar formulation in
the communique on Dong's November 1971 visit, without the
reference to a. "new" situation, had included a reference to
"U.S. imperialist aggression." The two sides lavished the
expected praise on each other, with the communique saying the
talks "fully manifested the ever-deepening great friendship and
militant unity" and affirming that thee:, relations, based on
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, "will not be
destroyed by any force on earth." The communique calls the new
aid agreement "a mcs.. vivid expression of the militant unity" of
the two sides, and Peking pledges its "unshakable determination
to continue to perform its internationalise u_'tv" in aiding the
Vietnamese in their struggle to safeguard peace, build socialism
in the North, achieve independence and democracy in the South,
and proceed toward peaceful reunification,
* A 5 June meeting between the DRV ambassador in Moscow and
Soviet Deputy Premier V.N. Novikov, who handles aid mattei3,
raises the possibility that Soviet-DRV talks on aid may be in the
offing. Minimal Soviet coverage of the Sino-Vietnamese summit
included a TASS report on the delegation's return to Hanoi that
singled Tut Le Duan's expression of gratitude for Soviet aid and
his call for cohesion within the communist camp in his Peking
speeches.
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The communique's assessment of the international situation
reflects Peking's success in finding common ground with their
allies concerning Moscow's detente policy. In passages
clearly reflecting Chinese draftsmanship, the current document
replaces a section in the November 1971 communique assailing
"U.S. imperialism" with one calling for resistance by "small
and medium-sized countries" and members of the Third World
against the hegemony of unspecified "imperialists." In
offsetting an acknowledgment of "some easing" of international
tensions with a warning that the imperialists are resorting
to "more cunning and deceptive means" toward their expansionist
goals, the communique associates the North Vietnamese with
Peking's characteristic expressions of concern over the effects
of Soviet-Western detente. Yeh Chien-ying had forcefully
pressed this line in his rally speech, but the more blatantly
anti-Soviet overtones were muted in the joint communique.
AID ACCORD Both NCNA and VNA reported that an agreement
on the PRC's "gratuitous economic and military
assistance" to Vietnam in 1974 was signed on 8 June. NCNA's
repor'- of last year's signing of the annual agreement, on
26 November, had noted as usual that a specific protocol on
the supply of "military equipment and materials" had been
signed in addition to the aid pact, but none was mentioned
this year. By signing the annual agreement now the two sides
were able to produce a concrete result of the summit as well
as to take into account the new situation in Vietnam after
U.S. withdrawal.
VNA did not specify the purpose of the aid; but NCNA said
that the purpose of the agreement "is, after the end of the war
in Vietnam, to heal the wounds of war Lhe.re, rehabilitate and
develop its national economy and strengthen its national defense
capability, and to further strengthen the militant friendship
and unity" between the Chinese and Vietnamese. Prior to the
Sino-U.S. rapprochement in April 1971, Peking had said that the
aid was for the purpose of defeating the United States. But
Peking did not indicate the purpose of the annual or supplementary
aid grants in 1971 and 1972.
A 12 June NHAN DAN editorial hailing the "brilliant success" of
the visit linked the aid agreement with the standard set of
Vietnamese goals in the north and south, including "advancing
toward peaceful national unification." A day earlier VNA released
a message from the departing delegation to the Chinese noting "with
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great satisfactian the resolve" of tha PRC "to continue your
support and assistance" in the new stage of the struggle
until "our complete victory."
1NDO::HINA SITUATION The two sides used the Joint communique
to put on record their positions on
various aspects of an Indochina settlement, a task made
difficult by the divergent approaches reflected in their
speeches during the course of the visit. As in the November
1971 communique on Dong's visit, each side stated its views on
the current Vietnam situation, with the Vietnamese charging
the United States and Saigon with having "incessantly,
systematically, and grossly" violated the Paris accord while
the Chinese avoided accusing any party of wrongdoing. Where
the November 1971 communique included a lengthy passage
registering the two sides' "unanimous" views on a Vietnam
settlement, the current document has them merely demanding that
Saigon and the United States "thoroughly respect and strictly
implement" all the provisions of the Paris accord. In naming
Saigon first, the communique used the language preferred by
Peking. On he other hand, DRV statements during the visit
placed the main onus on the United Stares, consistently listing
it first.
The Chinese did, however, make one notable move toward their
Vietnamese allies' position by recognizing the PRG as "the
only authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese people.
This represents a concession to the Vietnamese communists that
the Chinese had persistently avoided in the past and serves
to enhance Peking's political support for the PRG at a time when
the latter is seeking to embellish its trappings as a legitimate
government.* Peking also expressed support in the communique
for the PRG's 25 April six-point proposal for a settlement in
South Vietnam.
* It is noteworthy that Peking's comment marking the 6 June
anniversary of the PRG's founding--including the usual leaders'
message, PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, and high-level speech at a
PRG reception--failed to echo Vietnamese references to the PRG
as the only authentic representative of South Vietnam. The
12 June NI-IAN DAN editorial or. the DRV delegation's visit made
a point of citing the new Chinese formulation appearing in the
communique.
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On Laos, the communique hails the Vientiane agreement,
supports the "correct stand" of the Lao Patriotic Front,
and expresses "the hope that progress will soon be achieved"
in the ongoing consultations among the Lao parties. The
two sides also hail "the huge victories" won by Sihanouk's
front and acclaim his visit to Cambodia as "an event of
great historic significance." Declaring that "the wanton
bombing" of Cambodia by the United States cannot preserve
"the traitorous Lon Nol clique," the communique expresses
support for Sihanouk's five-point declaration and for the
"just stand" takr.n by his front on a Cambodian settlement.
Without elaboration, it calls for the Cambodian question to
be settled by the Cambodian people themselves "free from
foreign interference." During the delegation's visit Sihanouk's
prime minister, Penn Nouth, had been prominently reported as
present at various ceremonies, and he met with Le Duan and
Dong on the 5th and feted them on the 6th.
SINO-VIETNAMESE The cracks in the show of solidarity staged
DIVERGENCES by the two sides were clearly evident in
the course of the visit., reflecting their
divergent interests and priorities. As to be expected, these
differences derived essentially from Peking's moves in the
big-power arena and the consequent strains in. the Peking-Hanoi.
relationship.
4 United States: The repeated anti-U.S. attacks that punctuated
the November 1971 communique are largely absent from the new
joint document, but during the visit the Vietnamese indulged in
outbursts against U.S. policy that contrasted with Peking's
treatment of the United States. Thus, Le Duan in his rally speech
on the 7th cast.gatc:d the "extremely atrocious war of aggression
waged by U.S. imperialism, the international gendarme," over the
past decade and warned that Washington was attempting not only to
impose neocolonialism in Vietnam but to oppose "the national
liberation revolution and the socialist revolution."
Apart from Chou's brief reference to U.S. bombing in Cambodia in
his banquet speech on the 4th, Chinese spokesmen avoided critical
comment or, current U.S. policy. In his wide-ranging rally
speech elaborating Peking's line on global upheaval and conflict,
Yeh Chien-ying justified Peking's diplomatic moves, implicitly
including the developing relationship with Washington, by
advocating the development of friendly relations with various
countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.
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During the visit the Vietnamese offered several reminders of
the Taiwan issue, but the Chinese avoided rising to the bait.
As in November 1971, the Vietamese side expressed support in
the communique for liberation of Taiwan,- but the Chinese this
time, unlike the previous occasion, failed to acknowledge
that support.
+ Indochina: Having impugned Washington's current motives in
Vietnam in his opening speech on the 4th, Lr2 Duan sharpened
his point even further in his rally address by tracing "the
deep root and the immediate cause" of violations of the Paris
agreement to a U.S. "policy of neocolonialism it South Vietnam
and of permanent partition of Vietnam." He harshly denounced
Saigon as a "militarist and fascist clique," and for good
measure he added a charge that the United States is "supporting
the Lao rightists and conniving with them" in violating the
Vientiane accord.
Reflecting Peking's more rela:ced posture on implementation of
the Vietnam agreement, the Chinese speakers failed to challenge
U.S. intentions and were less harsh than their guests in
criticizing Saigon. Citing the endorsement of the Vietnam
agreement by the Pari' international conference, Yeh stressed
that thorough implementation is "a very serious matter," but
he also observed that "historical experience ar.d the facts
after the ending of the war in Vietnam have shown that it is
no easy task to turn an agreement into reality." In contrast
to Peking's more detached view, Le Duan on the 4th insisted
that Hanoi's goals, including reunification, are "closely
interrelated objectives of paramount importance to be achieved
at all costs, even through a hard and complex struggle."
The Chinese used their strongest language to warn against
unspecified outside involvement in Indochina, with Chou asserting
on the 4th that "no interference in Indochina under whatever
pretext and in whatever form will be tolerated." Chou's warning,
with overtones as least as much anti-Soviet as anti-U.S., was
underscored by a remark by Mao to the guests, later repeated by
Chou: "Vietnam belongs to the Vietnamese people, not to the
reactionaries in Viet.?.am and still leis to imperialism."
+ Communist Unity: Yeh's discourse on "imperialism and
hegemonism" in his rally speech represented the most forceful
statement of Peking's anti-Soviet line during the visit. Though
the substance of his warning against Moscow's detente policy
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Was reproduced in diluted form in the joint communique, Hanoi's
concern not to offend the Soviets was reflected in VNA's
censorship of Yeh's speech. While carrying the text of all
the other major speeches during the visit, VNA reduced Yeh's
discussion of the international situation to an innocuous brief
paraphrase.
For their part, the North Vietnamese took the occasion of the
visit to renew their appeals for international communist unity.
In his opening bpeech on the 4th Le Duan offered a toast to
"the tightening of the solidarity" among the communist countries,
and he amplified this call in his rally speech. In a passage
acknowledging aid not only from China but also from the Soviet
Union and other countries, he pledged that the Vietnamese "will
endeavor to do everything in our power to contribute in a worthy
manner to the stre.igthening of the solidarity" among the
fraternal countries.
The North Vietnamese have used these summit meetings to pursue
their role as brokers for communist unity. This was particularly
evident in the fall of 1969, after the opening of the Sino-Soviet
border talks, when Dong's visits to Peking and Moscow were
marked by invocations of the appeal in Ho's testament for
restoration of communist unity. Le Duan had made a similar
pitch during Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi in October 1971, as had
Dong during his trip to Peking the following month.
In his rally speech Le Duan made a wistful historical reference
that reflected Hanoi's concern over unity. He recalled that
after the Chinese revolution Vietnam was linked with the PRC
"and thereby with the whole socialist camp, thus adding new
strength to us in our patriotic war." As a result, he said,
"we won the great victory of the battle of Dien Bien Phu which
is of historical significance." The historical implication
might be that lack of unity in the communist camp makes a
decisive new Dien Bien Phu less likely.
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PRG PRESIDENT PHAT ADDRESSES BIANNUAL COUNCIL MEETING
The timing of the PRG Council of Ministers meeting to coincide
with the 6 June anniversary of the founding of the government
follows the pattern set last year when, for the first time,
sessions were held biannually in January and June.* There was
no commemorative gathering held expressly to mark the PRG
anniversary in 1972; the June Council meeting was said to have
been held on the occasion of the anniversary, as is also the
case this year despite the holding of the separate anniversary
celebrations.
The locus of the Council meeting was, as usual, described only
as being in a "liberated area." But it can be assumed that
this area was not in Quang Tri, since Phat and other officials
did not participate in the anniversary celebrations in that
northernmost province of South Vietnam. Quang Tri has obvious
geographic advantages as the site of anniversary ceremonies ii
view of the presence of envoys from the USSR, China, and other
foreign countries. It is not clear why the Council meeting was
not postponed until after the anniversary to allow President Phat
to join other leaders in Quang Tri anniversary ceremonies and in
welcoming arriving diplomats. However, the inability of other
PRG officials to travel to the Quang Tri. celebrations may have
made the holding of another meeting at PRG administrative: head-
quarters at the time of the anniversary unavoidable. Vietnamese
communist media have not raised the question of a PRG capital,
but the fact that lower-level foreign diplomatic officers as
well as ambassadors were in Quang Tri suggests that facilities
for a permanent diplomatic presence will be established somewhere
in the South.
POLITICAL REPORT Unlike the five previous Council of
Ministers meetings, the 6 June session did
not release a communique. As usual, Phat delivered the major
political report; following the precedent set last January, it
and the military report were made. public, while the substance of
other reports was not revealed. Covering predictable ground,
Phat's report lauded the history of the Vietnamese struggle and
the "victory" of the Paris agreement and expounded on the "role,
prestige, and authority" of the PRG as "the sole genuine
representative" of the South Vietnamese people.
* PRG Council of Ministers meeting since the government was
established in 1969 are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 January
1973, 14 June and 2 February 1972, 24 February 1971, and
4 February 1970.
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Phat's major points were generally identical to those made by
Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho in his 5 June speech at the PRG
anniversary meeting in Quang Tri. Ater calling the United
States the "main cause" of continuing problems in South
Vietnam and Indochina and reaffirming long-standing goal3,
Phat issued the cryptic warning that "our patience has its
limits." He added that Saigon military operations would be
"punished" and that "no brutal force, no preasure, no
perfidious maneuvers can makes the South Vietnamese people
depart from their just path of struggle and their lofty goals."
While professing the usL.al determination and optimism regarding
eventual complete victory, Phat also voiced the standard word
of caution about difficulties to be overcome. Stressing the
importance of unity with other elements in South Vietnam, he
reaffirmed the view stressed at the January Council meeting
that "national concord is the fundamental and foremost policy"
of the NFLSV and PRG.
Both Phat and Tho appealed for foreign assistance--communist
as well as noncommunist- -for the South Vietnamese people and
the PRG to heal the wounds of war and rebuild the country.
The question of postwar reconstruction aid has rarely f-een
raised in PRG media, a'.though Tho, in an interview carried by
LPA on 3 Juno, noted that the NFLSV and PRG "encourage
Vietnamese overseas to invest their capital in order to rebuild
the country, and foreigners to invest capital and techniques to
contribute to the restoration and building of the economy in
South Vietnam . . . ." The question of U.S. aid to South
Vietnam was touched on in a 12 April Liberation Radio report oa
a meeting two days earlier between U.S. Senator Brooke and Hoang
Anh Tuan--then deputy head of the PRG delegation to the JMC.
Tuan expressed the view that the question of U.S. aid must be
brought up with the government formed after general elections
and that "in the absence of such a government, U.S. contributions
must be channeled through the two present administrations in
the South--the PRG and the Saigon administration."
MILITARY REP RT The report to the Council on military
matters claimed that the PRG has exercised
self-restraint and set forth reasonable proposals for a
cease-fire and the achievement of rational concord, and it
added--echoing the warnings by Tho and Phat--that "this good
will is also limited." The report was given by Lt. Gen. Tran
Van Tra, who was said to represent the PLAF Command and to be
authorized by the PRG Defense Ministry.
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This is the first time Tra has assumed the role of spokesman
on the South Vietnamese military situation; he has not been
identified in a new position since he was replaced on 12 May,
by Hoang Anh Tuan, as head of the PRG delegation to the Joint
Military Commission (JMC). At the January Council meeting
the military report was similarly read by a representative of
the PLAF Command and Defense Ministry, one Le Chan, rather
than by the more logical spokesman--Defense Minister Tran Nam
Trung.
U.S.-DRV TALKS IGNORED, PRG PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT REPEATED
Alt: ',ugh Hanoi media had announced the 6 June resumption of the
talks in Paris between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho which had begun
in May, they failed to mention the talks a,;sin recessed on
9 June and resumed on the 12th. Consi::aent with this silence,
Vietnamese communist reports of PRG Fot.:Ign Minister Nguyen Thi
Binh's 6 June press conference in Quang Tri ignored her remarks
on the Paris meetings. The French CP organ L'HUMANITE reported
on the 9th that Binh had "emphasized" that the talks took place
at Kissinger's request. She also reportedly expressed approval
of the meetings but warned that the struggle to implement the
Paris agreement will require "much patience and energy" even if
world opinion and "domestic difficulties such as the Watergate
affair" cause the United States to reaffirm the validity of the
agreement and accept its own and Saigon's responsibility for
implementing it.*
Issues that were presumably on t' a agenda of the U.S.-DRV talks
in Paris, however, have been given publicity in Vietnamese
communist media in the course of their efforts to press the PRG's
six-point proposal advanced on 25 April. Nguyen Huu Tho in
his 5 June PRG anniversary speech, for example, reaffirmed the
PRG's adherence to the six points and specifically demanded an
end to the fighting, the release of all civilian prisoners, a
guarantee of democratic liberties, and the establishment of the
k -Hanoi media have continued to carry accounts of Western press
reports on Watergate developments but have generally avoided
comment. For example, the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN from
15 through 30 May carried a 15-part series on Watergate from
Western news reports, with only the final installment offering
the, independent comment that President Nixon is supported by
"powerful capitalists" who will not let him be "overthrown."
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National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. His
omission of the final two points--on general elections and
the reduction of armed forces--reflected the communists'
cousis;:ent position that these questions can only be settled
after full implementation of the first four points.*
A 13 June NHAN DAN article, which repeated the standard clairr
that the Thieu regime is seeking a military victory rather
than a settlement under the Pariq agreement, denounced Saigon
allegations that communist forces are preparing to launch a
new military offensive designated "operation elephant tail
and mouse head." Judging from the brief VNA summary, however,
NHAN DAN did not acknowledge reports that such an operation
might begin if the communists fail to achieve their aims in
the Paris talks.
SI' IANOUK CITES DR's . PRC SUPPORT; MiOSCOW REPORTS PRINCES TOUR
Prince Sihanouk and his front seem to have assumed a more relaxed
posture after earlier having given vent to strident outbursts
against a "Munich-style conference" in which outside powers would
exert pressure for a compromise settlement in Cambodia. The
stream of attacks on a cease-fife agreement issued by Sihanouk
on his foreign tour and by the resistance leaders have trickled
to an infrequent statement on the settlement issue. This change
coincides with the Sino-Vietnamese summit in Peking and may
reflect assurances to the FUNK that its allies are not seeking a
deal at the expense of its objectives of overthrowing the Lon Nol
regime.
In a speech in Tirana on 8 June, Sihanouk derided Washington for
declaring that the United States and the DRV "will sooner..' the
armed resistance of the Khmer people" and enable the Phnom Penh
"treacherous clique" to survive indefinitely. Asserting that
this "shameless political maneuver" has been exposed by the DRV
leaders themselves, he disclosed that Le Dunn and Pham Van Dong
had assured his prime minister, Penn Nouth, in Peking on the 5th
that the DRV would never discuss the Cambodian question in place
of the FUNK and that the United States should talk directly with
Sihanouk's government. Later in the speech Sihanouk quoted Chou
En-lai's 4 June warning that no outside interference in Indochina
will be tolerated as well as Chou's endorsement of Sihanouk's
five-point declaration.
* The six-point proposal is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 May
1573, pages 11-13.
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13 JUNE 1973
reporting the DRV leaders' meeti:-g with Penn Nouth, Hanoi
mcola supplied no substance of the conversation. But a
9 June NHAN DAN article repeated earlier denials that a
Cambodian settlement was being negotiated between the DRV
and the United States.
MOSCOW The Soviets have further complicated the murky
Cambodian story by beginning to report for the first
time on Sihanouk's foreign tour. Soviet references to Sihanouk
since his overthrow and exile in Peking have been rare, and
he had not been mentioned in monitored Soviet media since before
the signing of the Vietnam agreement. However, brief TASS reports
on the 8th and 10th noted his stays in Algeria and Yugoslavia.
The reports maintained Moscow's avoidance of references to
Sihanouk's government, but TASS quoted him as saying to Tito
that Cambodia needs the support of other countries sad recognition
of the FUNK. As to be expected, Moscow did not report his visit
to Albania, where he pointedly thanked "our beloved Albanian
brothers" for their support "while some allegedly anti-imperialist
countries, and indeed not unimportant, feign not to understand us."
Moscow's decision to report on Sihanouk's travels and his appeal
for support suggests that the Soviets may find it opportune to
cultivate the FUNK at this time. A Soviet commentary on the
7th raised the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Cambodia
in observing that "there are objective conditions for restoring
peace and settling the military conflict by political means,"
which would conform with "the basic national interests of the
Cambodians." The commentary noted vaguely that there are
unspecified "healthy forces" in Cambodia "capable of carrying
out the will of the people and of keeping agreements on the
basis of respect for their legitimate rights and aspirations."
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1.3 JUNE 1973
USSR-JAPAN
MOSCOW POSTPONES TANAKA VISIT, TOUGHENS LINE ON JAPAN
An unusually candid article on Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation
published in LITERARY GAZETTE on 6 June--the same day the Soviet
Union informed Foreign Minister Ohira that Prime Minister Tanaka's
projected visit to Moscow in August* would be "inconven!_ent" at
that time--sugges:,s that Moscow is using the summit as a lever to
pry out better terms for Soviet-Japanese economic and technical
cooperation as well as to increase its bargaining position on the
sensitive territorial question which still inhibits Soviet-Japanese
relations. The article reveals that some hardening on the terms
for trade and closer economic ties with Japan may be in he
offing in the wake of Brezhnev's recent meeting with Chancellor
Brandt in Bonn which opened the prospect of USSR-FRG agreements
on economic and technical exchanges and as Moscow reevaluates
Japanese-Chinese relations.
FOCUS ON CREDITS Departing from the tone of previous Soviet
comment on joint economic cooperation with
Japan, the lengthy article, jointly written by D. Petrov and
V. Syrkomskiy, played down the specter of Japan as an industrial
giant by placing heavy stress on Japan's reliance on raw materials
for its survival. After noting that "there are almost no minerals
in Japan," the article argued that "the tremendous interest which
Japan is displaying in the possibility of acquiring raw materials
from the boundless resources of Siberia is understandable."
Sharpening the image of the USSR as a pote-itial economic partner
in meeting Japan's "acute" need for raw materials, the article
became unusually specific in outlining the terms of future Soviet-
Japan economic cooperation:
Our position is perfectly clear. We say: You need raw
material? By all means, we are ready to accelerate the
development of the appropriate deposits to satisfy your
requirements. Give us credits and we will buy equipment
and mechanisms from you and pay for them in raw materials.
* The Soviet Ambassador to Japan asked on the 6th that Tanaka's
trip be postponed to some time between mid-September and mid-
October. KYOPO on 9 June reported Tanaka's announcement that he
would visit the USSR after 20 September. At this writing, Mcscow
media have not yet confirmed a September meeting.
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13 JUNE 1,973
After highlighting statements by several Japanese '-'isinessmen
favoring government support for "large bank credits" to the
Soviet Union as a means of overcoming Jaran's "energy crisis,"
the article linked future economic coopet.tion between Moscow
and Tokyo to still unresolved political problems. "It would
be wrong to turn a blind eye," the article cautioned, "to the
fact that there are also forces in present-day Japan which are
trying to put obstacles in the path of the development of
good-neighborly relations. Ultraright elements, for example;
are still dragging out the so-called territorial question."
In keeping with the shift in Moscow's line on the status of
the four northern islands which dates back to Brezhnev's letter
to Tanaka last March, the article avoided claiming that the
territorial issue was "settled," It did, nevertheless, firmly
argue that "the highway leading to the establishment of relations
of true good-neighborliness and friendship consists not of
creating artificial barriers under false pretexts but of seeking
mutually acceptable resolutions."
THE CHINESE DIMENSION Bringing in the Chinese factor, Petrov
and Syrkomskiy then pointed to the
recently concluded month-long visit to Japan of a Chinese
delegation led by Liao Cheng-chih, head of the China-Japan
Friendship Association, as evidence that "the Maoist leadership
is trying to use Chinese-Japanese contacts to hinder the
development of good--urighborly relations between Japan and the
Soviet Union." Liao's delegation was specifically charged with
having made "slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union" in trying
to "persuade Japanese business circles not to embark on broad
economic cooperation with "ur country, threatening to regard
it as an 'unfriendly act' against China." Displaying an unusual
degree of confidence regarding the still budding relationship
between Peking and Tokyo, however, the article introduced a
new theme in Moscow's line on the Sino-Japanese rapprochement.
It argued that "the initial boom linked to the establishment of
diplomatic relations last fall has clearly slumped." Developing
this argument, the article claimed that "the representatives
of business circles and political leaders who put all their
money on China are proving to be in an increasingly embarassing
position." As illustration, the article cited recent Japanese
press reports that Chinese toy pandas--a "fashionable symbol"
of the establishment of relations with China several months ago--
are now "piled up on the toy counters" in Japanese stores looking
"sadly at the indifferent passersby as though they knew that the
man who invested all his capital in the manufacture of pandas,
committed suicide when the dust began to settle on thousands of
the toys in storehouses."
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Linking this specter of public disenchantment with Peking Lo Tanaka's
forthcoming visit to Moscow, Petrov and Syrkomskiy pointed to an
unidentified article in the JAPAN TIMES as having contained "a
warning for tlose who have not lost hope of using relations
hetween the USSR and the PRC as the subjects of a shady diplomatic
game" and for having pointed out that one of the tasks of Prime
Minister Tanaka's trip to Moscow must be the "liquidation of any
suspicion whatever regarding Japan's intention to make a deal with
Peking against the intetests of the Soviet Union." The JAPAN TIMES
article was also said to have called for a statement that Japan
not only "has not the slightest desire to be dragged into disputes
between the USSR and China," but that it is also "not in any way
interested in us.Lag in any form contradictions between them. PAZ it;
own interests."
As If to underscore the significance of Brezhnev's recent trip to
Eon: and the possible emergence of West Germany as an economic
riv.31 of Japan in trade with Moscow, Petrov and Syrkomskiy reported
that the JAPAN TIMES had noted that this "unprecedented meeting"
signals "colossal progress" in z-il,.!11ons between the two cou':.ies
as we,.1 as "the start of a new e-.a" in Europe. Turning to "Tanaka's
decision to visit Moscow this year," Petrov and Syrkomskiy advised
the prime minister that keeping abreast of the "swiCi.?v developing
process of the relaxation of international tension io increasingly
determining the position of the leading politicians in Japan."
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USSR - LIBYA
LITERARY GAZETTE ASSAILS AL-QADMDHAFI FOR ANTICOMMUNISM
Moscow's irritation wiLn Libyan President al-Qadhdhafi has been
displayed most recently Is a LITERARY GAZETTE article of 6 June
which to.-)k issue with his "wild assertions" about communism.
Soviet-Libyan press friction erupted over a year ago when PRAVDA
in Mich 1972 objected to an "overtly provocative article" in
the Libyan army paper which coincided with the official visit
to Moscow of a Libyan Government delegation headed by then
Economy Minister Jallud. Since then Moscow has periodically
responded to Libyan positions: NFW TIMES last September "regretted"
al-Qadhdhaf is Maoist,-oriented phraseology and found Libya
"in particular need of accurate orientation"; LITERA.'.Y GAZETTE
in October deplored a Libyans press article "blaspheming"
an-Nasir and in November assailed a Libyan paper for its
"dubious role as 'exposer of communism."' And this January
LITERARY GAZETTE dismissed as "'Fanciful imagination" assertions
by al--Qadhdhafi that the USSR had twice requt,P~ted 0;-L and naval
bases in Libya.
Now Borisov, in the 6 June LITERARY GAZETTE, further demonstrated
Soviet sensitivity to al-Qadhdhafi's "accusations against
communism" as rejecting nationalism, advocating atheism, and
other "absurd ideas." In his ar?ti.cle--broadcast in installments
In Moscow's Arabic service--Borisov derided the Libyan leader's
"third theory" concept of an alternative to capitalism and
communism and scoffed at his new ideology of "true socialism"
based on justice and Islam. While he made no mention of the
Egyptian-Lib;'an merger scheduled for Se!i)tember, Borisov
pointedly contrasted al-Qadhdhafi's "anticommunism and anti-Sovietism"
with the Egyptian "official" position and quoted an-Nasir and
as-Sadat on the merits of Soviet-Arab friendship.
Borisov also ignored al-Qadhdhafi's "popular revolution," launched
in a 15 April speech and brushed off by Moscow in a domestic
servi,:e broadcast five days later which had tersely noted that
the first steps included "mass arrests of ;.ibyan Communist Party
members." A week later, NEW TIMES had observed that while reports
were confusing, "the aim appears to be 'revolutionization' of
Libya" on the basis of Islam.*
* The Czechoslovak CTK in a Tripoli-datelined report on 11 June
remarked that Libya's cultural revolution was aimed not against
:-reign oil companies but against "progressiv_ forces in the
country under dogmatic slogans" of Islam and nationalism, and
added that Egypt "is not expected to approve such a policy after
the planned merger."
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13 JUNE 1973
Taking another swipe at al-Qadlidhafi's "anticommunism," a Moscow
br^adcast in Arabic on 11 June pegged to the anniversary of the
evacuation of Wheelus base lectured on the importance of the
USSR's great support and aid to the Arab countries and recalled
that the Soviet stand was "appropriately appreciated" in the
joint communique on Jallud's March 1972 visit to Moscow.
Against this background, the commentary found it "extremely
odd, to say the least," that voices were being raised in Libya
trying to cast doubts on Soviet policy.
In a further display of pique, Moscow all but ignored al-Qadhdhafi's
anniversary speech on the 11th: In two one-sentence dispatches
from Tri.poli, TASS that day attributed to the Libyan Revolution
Command Council the decisions to recognize the GDR and to
nationalize the American oil company Bunker Hunt. Reporting
the former decision, TASS noted that it had been announced by
al-Qe.dhc;hafi, "who spoke here." TASS did add the next day that
in his anniversary speech ai-Qadhdhafi explained the decision
on Bunker Hunt as motivated by the United States' "all-out support."
for Israel.
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EUROPE
WARSAW ARMY PAPER URGES FRENCH ATTENDANCE AT VIENNA TAUCS
Broaching a subject rarely discussed in Soviet bloc media, the
Polish army daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on 5 June provided a
generally favorable review of French positions on MBFR,
suggesting that eventual French participation could be
anticipated on the basis of France's expressed interests.
Picking and choosing among French statements to support this
interpretation, the Polish paper highlighted arguments that
seemed to suggest a parallel between French and Soviet bloc
positions. In this context it revealed some insights into
Soviet bloc attitudes, mainly a strong Polish interest in
seeing France join the talks. It also aired an idea on force
reductions that has not previously been advanced in Soviet bloc
media--the idea of substituting offsetting for parallel force
reductions, which would have the effect of maintaining a balance
between the offensive and defensive forces of the opposing sides
while overall force levels were being reduced.
The argument advanced by ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI is consistent both
with the general Soviet position that the talks should be open
to "other European states" and with Soviet statements on France
in particular. Moscow media discussed the possibility of a
French role in MBFR in mid-January following the Ponp.Ldou-hrezhnev
talks in Minsk. Writing about the talks in SOVIET RUSSIA on the
18th, TASS Director General Zamyatin took approving note of
evidence suggesting that Pompidou was receptive to Brezhnev's
"appeal" for French participation. MoE.:ow has been reticent,
however, about discussing Fresh positions in detail and about
offering advice to the French as to what their policy toward
the talks should be.
ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI showed no such reticence. It went into
considerable detail in discussing French argume.rics against
MBFR, suggesting that Poland shared French attitudes to some
extent. It made this particularly clear with respect to the
impact of force reductions on the military baalance in West
Europe. Noting with approval French cuncerni, on this score,
it observed that only West Germany was in a position to profit
from the withdrawal of American troops from the continent.
Obviously expressi.Lg its own concerns as well as sympathy for
the French position, it asserted that "a ftnher increase in the
Bundeswehr potential . . . would not be t,) the liking of France
or any other European member of NATO."
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It went on to suggest, however, that France should not allow
itself to be dissuaded by these considerations from contributing
it-9 share to the cause of European oecurity and disarmament.
It broadly implied that French objections to participation were
based in part on a false premise--that the conditions governing
force reductions would be those heretofore set forth in NATO
documents. The future conference, it asserted, "will have little
in common" with this concept, and its results "will not harm the
security interests of any side."
OFFSETTING Go{.ng on to discuss the military reasons
FORCE REDUCTIONS for France's participation in the talks,
ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI noted France's objections
to the "asymmetrical" force reduction schemes advanced by NATO.
Praising the French attitude, the paper referred to studies
being undertaken in France regarding alternative methods for
bringing about force cuts. It drew particular attention to a
model that would focus on "offensive-defensive types of weapons,"
saying the Quai d'Orsay regarded this model as among the "most
logical." Apparently implying its own interest in the idea, it
went on to explain how the model would work: Warsaw Pact tanks,
it said, could be balanced off against NATO antitank weapons,
and proportional reductions could be arranged accordingly.
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11 JUNE 1973
USSR
POLITICAL ECONOMISTS RESIST PRESSURES FOR REFORM
Despite a December 1971 Central. Committee decree criticizing
the Institute of Economics for concentrating on abstract
doctrinal matters rather than on practical economic concerns,
the predominantly conservative school of political economists
has continued to resist pressure to reform its ways. Since the
adoption of the decree, the conservatives have opposed attempts
to revise the training of political economists to include
modern economic concepts and methods. At the same time, a
recent PRAVDA article, apparently reflecting official impatience,
attacked several political economists by name for obstructing
the application of modern methods in the Soviet economy.
The recalcitrant attitude toward innovation prevailing among
political econ-imi,_;ts was displayed at a recent Moscow State
University conference on training instructors in this field,
reported in KOMSONOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 27 May. According to the
report, by liberal economist Gennadiy Lisichkin., proposals were
made at the conference to broaden the educatiorrl curriculum to
include instruction in computers, mathematics, and production
technology in addition to the traditional doctrinal courses.
However, Leningrad State University dean V.A. Peshekhonov
objected to the proposals on grounds that they would distract:
students from study of "Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the
regularities of economic development." In a similar earlier
attempt to alter the dogmatic orientation of training, reported
by Yugoslav reporter Risto Bajalski in the 10 April Yugoslav
paper POLITIKA, a prominent textbook on political economy was
attacked for containing ultraconservative formulations contrary
to the regime's ;onomic reform. The text's author, Nikolay
Tsagolov, head of Moscow State University's political economy
department, responded by attacking its critics as symp.Athetic t:,
"market socialism" and by refusing to alter his book.
The continued sniping by conservatives at modern economic methods
prompt?d a 4 June PRAVDA article by I. Solovyev. Citing Brezhnev's
endorsement of mathematical-economic models, systems analysis,
and other modern methods, Solovyev assailed articles by Yuriy
Belik for opposing new methods of planning, by Yakov Kronrod for
endeavoring to .discredit modern methods of systems analysis, and
by Adolf Kats for attacking the works of leading Soviet mathematical
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economists. Although the PRAVDA article fell short of offering
a blanket endorsement of the ui.verEe contributions of the new
economics, it served as a warning to political economists that
the methods of ideological abuse and character assassination
employed in past disputes were no longer suited to the times.
ECONOMISTS RESUME DEBATE OVER FUTURE OF KOLK'IOZ SYSTEM
Although the idea of converting kolkhozes into sovkhozes was
vigorously repudiated after Khrushchev's fall, the initiation
of work on a long-range plan for 1.976-1990 has reopened the
dispute over the future of the kolkhoz system. The controversy
erupted last December at one of a series of meetings conducted
by the Institute of Economics as part of its contribution to
the long-range plan. The debate at the December meeting arose
over an article prepared for publication in QUESTIONS OF
ECONOMICS by Yakov Kronrod, head of the institute's sector for
general problems of the political economy of socialism. The
article, which later appeared in the February issue of the
journal, argued that kolkhozes were incompatible with socialism
and would be taken over by the state even before the advent of
communism.
Although the deputy director of the institute, Viktor Cherkovets,
agreed with Kronrod, the head of its economic history sector,
Ivan Gladkov, took strong exception to Kronrod's assertion that
the kolkhozes are "not an obligatory element of the socialist
system" and should be tf.rminated. Gladkov continued the debate
in the April QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, upholding the socialist
credentials of kolkhozes and complaining that Kronrod's thesis
simply amounted to "turning kolkhozes into sovkhozes." "The
task for the future," he argued, "is to strengthen the kolkhoz
system in every way."
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RED STAR'S NEW THEORETICAL SERIES TAKES IDEOLOGICAL TURN
The second installment of RED STAR's new series on military
theoretical questions has brought into sharper focus the issue
rf party-military relations tentatively raised by Lt. Gen.
I. Zavyalov in the first article on 17 April.* Without
directly contesting the claim advanced by Zavyalov, that the
military's co-authorship of military doctrine gives it a
strong influence in the formulation of military policy, the
second article conveys a sharply different impression of
the dynamics of the party-military relationship in this
sphere. It implies that the party, through its correct
interpretation and application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy,
informs and guides all creative intellectual activities in
the Soviet Union, including military thought. Published on
17 May, the article is authored by Maj. Gen. A. Milovidov, a
long-time faculty member of the Lenin Military-Political Academy.
The issue at the heart of Milovidov'.sarticle is the question
of the autonomy of military thought. The Soviet military has
consistently claimed extensive rights in this regard, apparently
acting on the belief that a certain independence from party
interference is a necessary condition both for the effective
performance of its institutional functions and for the
succesuful assertion of its interests in the policymaking
process. Accordingly, it has cultivated the notion that
military affairs fall under a special. discipline of thought,
military science, and that the findings of this science are
a necessary ingredient in the formulation of military policy.
Soviet military spokesmen have advanced this view repeatedly.
Perhaps the best known exposition of the viewpoint was the
late Marshal Zakharov's 4 February 1965 article iu RED STAR
attacking Khrushchev for his "subjectivism" and "hare-brained"
scheming. Zakharov reserved his strongest indignation for
Khrushchev's practice of rejecting the advice of military
professionals--a practice which disregarded the fact, the
marshal emphasized, that this advice was "based on a profound
study of military affairs and the laws. of armed conflict."
* Zavyalov's article is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 May 1973,
pages 2-3.
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While Milovidov's article avoids any direct challenge of this
military viewpoint and specifically disavows any intention of
raising one, it does so indirectly by attacking historical
views easily identifiable with traditional military biases.
Purporting to see in the history of Soviet military thought
recurrent instances of an overly narrow, technical approach
to the analysis of war, Milovidov contrasts this approach
with the one assertedly upheld by the party--a broad
philosophical approach, in which war is viewed not simply
as the art of armed conflict but as a social and political
phenomenon. He implies that it was only due to timely
interventions by the party that Soviet military thought was
saved from serious methodological errors.
i
Milovidov refers in this connection to an unidentified
"discussion," clearly the 1965-66 debate involving Talenskiy,
Rybkin, and Grudinin over the question of whether the
destructiveness of nuclear weapons repealed the Leninist
axiom that war is an extension of policy.* Criticizing
the affirmative position that had been taken on this issue--
by Rybkin, among others--Milovidov asserts that it stemmed
from a tendency to "absolutize" the technical aspects of war.
He goes on to suggest that this was the same tendency that
had led Trotskiy and his adherents to define the military
profession as the "trade of war."
By placing his argument in the context of these historical
errors, Milovidov clearly raises a signal of polemical intent.
Yet he refrains from extending his criticisms beyond the
historical incidents mentioned, in keeping with his disavowal
of any intention of challenging the military position on the
autonomy of military thought. Indeed, he goes so far as to
acknowledge that "military s-ience has its own inner logic."
A final assessment of Milovidov's intent can only be given
by his colleagues, and subsequent articles in the series may
shed some light on their verdict. In the meantime, it can be
said that Milovidov has redressed the military bias introduced
into the new RED STAR series by Zavyalov by balancing it with
a strong assertion of the party's guiding role in military
thought.
*For an analysis of this debate, see the FBIS SURVEY for
4 August 1966, pages 33-36.
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C H I N A
COLLEGE ENROLLMENT UNDERWAY. SCHOCLS TIGHTEN STANDARDS
college enrollment for the autumn term finally seems well underway
with Fukien, Liaoning, and Ki ngsi joining Hunan and Kwangsi in
announcing that the enrollment program is in progress. cost
qualifications for students are similar to those adopted lust year,
when Kwangsi, for example, noted that 70 percent of those admitted
met senior middle school graduate standards and that policies had
been adopted to enroll a certain number of women, minority groups,
and children of nonworking people. The broadcasts this year all
specify that students to be enrolled must have at least the equiv-
alent of a junior middle school cultural level, be about 20 years
old, be unmarried and in good health, and have at least two year,
of practical experience. These students will obviously be drawn
from recent graduates with good school and political records.
The Kiangsi announcement on 10 June, however, differentiated these
students from the workers, peasants, and revolu':ionary cadres to be
admitted, detailing how the schools may meet pt.ublems caused by
bringing in students with low cultural levels. :.ike some schemes
aired in previous years, the Kiangsi plan calls for segregating
unqualified worker-students into special "preparatory" classes
instead of mixing them in with the educated youths. Thus the Maoist
ideal of open education is squared with the need for better substan-
tive college training. The workers will not be required to meet
standards required of regular students. Admissions will be "as
flexible as possible," though workers must have at least eight
years of practical experience. A "small number" of workers will
be admitted to general courses, but for them there is an age limit
of 30 and their college study must be arranged se that they can
"apply what they have studied after graduation."
Unlike in previous stages of educational reform, the Kiangsi plan
explicitly provides authority for removing unsuccessful students
"if within three months after admission a student is found to be
lacking proper qualifications or to have violated the enrollment
procedures." The plan also offer; considerable discretion to the
schools. Each student admitted must pass a written admissions
examination given by the school even though he must have already
been examined and approved by party committees at the regional and
municipal levels.
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The Kiangsi enrollment plan takes note of the problems produced
by the need to allow for admission of a representative numuer of
students sent down to the ccuntryside. While each county is to
be considered a unit for testing and selection, with applicants
selected in general according to county quotas, the broadcast
specifies that "more students should be selected from the areas
where large numbers of e:ucated young people are concentrated."
.he current guidelines, especially the detailed account offered
by Kiangsi, indicate that, PRC educational authorities are making
serious efforts to deal %rith complaints over policies devised
during the cultural revolution. All cultural revolution effects
have not been removed, however; approval of the masses, two years
of labor, and a good political record are still prerequisites
for any student seeking admission. The only consolatiizn offered
thooe who do n'at meet riaquirementn are that they "happily remain
at their own posts" where cney -;at; also make contributions.
PRC MEDIA NOTE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS. URGE GREATER EFFORTS
Recent broadcasts have expressed concern about harvest prospects
in view of a second straight year of poor weather, but there are
no signs that a change in China's current moderate agricultural
policies is contemplated. All economic sectors have been advioed
to give first priority to rapid development of agriculture. A
Canton broadcast of a 10 June SOUTHERN DAILY editorial warned that
funds must not be diverted from agriculture and that industry
must concentrate on thi_gs which produce "rapid results" in agricul-
ture this year when "the weather in Kwangtung is abnormal and the
flood season arrived early." Industry was told to nave on electricity
in order to insure power for draining land, and factories were told
to organize emergency teams of mechanics for the crash repair of
farm machinery. While broadcasts earlier this spring suggested that
some small fertilizer plants might be closed because of their
excessive use of coal, the editorial stated that "coal, electricity,
and material" for the plants nust be assured. In stressing
agriculture the editorial made the rare admission that "for a
certain time less material and finance might be available for
developing heavy industry," though in the long run its development
will be "more rapid."
There is evidence of sensitivity about publicizing the adverse
natural conditions endangering this ;ear's harvest. NCNA on 30
May went so far as to halt publication of a report it had disseminated
which called the drought in Hopei "even more serious than the one
last year," replacing it with an article cn 1 June removing that
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13 J1141' ",77
,Judgment while stressing the hard work bni:ig done to overcome
natural disasters. An Anhwei broitdcatit on 10 ,;une tried to put
nn optimistic gloss in the situation, stating Lunt "in various
localities" output of rapeseed and summer grain is greater than
last yenr. In general the provincial med&n have warned against over
optimism while encouraging Lite peasants with exhortations that
hard work can overcome natural disasters. A Chekiang broadcast
on 7 June linked a forecast of "excessive rains in June" with it
call Lo increase efforts on "the dangerously threatened projects"
so that: they will withstand the flooding enfely. A HUNAN DALLY
editorial on 9 June stated that early crops are "growing comparatively
well," but warned that rain and floods in some areas coupled with
pests and plant diseat,es hav. Introduced "certain unfavorable
factors." The editorial, like a few others earlier, warned also
against "sabotage by the class enemies."
While flooding seems to be i problem in southern China and drought
serious in the north, a turn in the weather ot'ld still result in
a relatively good crop. Last year's crop shortfall and the gloomy
prospects this year have not convinced the Chinese leadership
that any radical change in agricultural policy is needed. Most
cadres are probably quite conscious of the difference btttween the
relatively mild difficulties r-sulting from the current period
of bad weather during a period of economic moderation and the
anguish of the Great Leap when weather problems were exacerbate,]
by radical agricultural experimentation. A 9 June Hupeh broadcast
even suggested that more retreats from the old commune ideal will
be allowed those production teams that desire them. The broadcast
praised a production team which as part of its policy of awarding
remuneration according to labor had split up the labor force into
six work ",roups. Individual work points are assessed not by the
larger team but by the small work groups according to the quality
and quantity of work done, thus bringing individual initiative
even more in line with wages paid.
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13 JUNE 1973
iJUTES
0
PRAGUE CEMA SESSION: The final communique on the 27th CEMA
aensfon in Prague, held 5-8 June, stopped short of a dl.rert
call for organizational ties between (;:MA and the Common
Markel, issuing instead u general appeal. for expanded economic
relatJ.ons cunonA Europeans countries on the basis of "the Leninist
principles of peaceful c,)existence." Brezhnev had been explicit
on the desirability of cooperation between the two economic
group!ngs in b1s major speeches of 20 tLarch and 21 December 1972.
The Prague gathering ratifieu the 16 May 1973 cooperation
agreement between CEMA and Finland as 2 prototy,.e for economic
cooperation between states with differing social systems,
based on "equality and noninterference." As at the 26th CEMA
meeting in Moscow last July, the mall preoccupation at Prague
was with implementation of the long-range CEMA integration
program 7dupted two years ago in Bucharest.
The Soviet and East European representation at the Prague
gathering, as at last year's Moscow meeting, was at the heads-
of-government level ~cxciept for the GDR's First Deputy Premier
Sindermann; Premier Stoph wAs absent for reasons of health,
according to TAN.IUG. Cuba, accepted to CEMA membership last
July, was represusnced by Deputy Premier Rodriguez; Yugoslavia,
reprtsenteu in July by Premier Bijedic, sent only a deputy
prem_er thl9 time. The DRV and DPRK ambassadors to the CSSR
both attended the session as observers, where only the Drlth
sent an observer to last year's meeting.
SC.HLESINGER SPEECH: Available comment f',u Moscow and its
East European allies 0.1 r'efense S1( c.?etary-designate Schlesinger's
7 June speech in Brussels all but ignored its estimative content
--the remarks which, according to Western pr2as accounts,
sharply downgraded NATO estimates of the threat currently posed
by the Warsaw Pact. The thrust of the sparse, routine commentary
has been that the speech revealed "contradictions" between the
European countti,!!s' interests and U.S. demands for greater West
European sharing of the burden on the U.S. balance of payments.
A Prague radio commentary on the 10th declared that Schlesinger
"quite brutally" demanded that West European member states
increase their contributions toward the maintenance of U.S.
troops in Europe.
Moscow ignored the speech entirely iii most of its initial radio ar,d
press reports on ''.he NATO meeting, and the sole Moscow comment
or Schlesinger's remarks appeared in a radio "military-political
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FBIS TRENDS
13 JIIN1, 1973
comtncitnry," broadcast In German on the lath. Concentrating on
the issue of burden-sharing, thin commentary also referred
to a st111-unfinished Defense Department study on NATO and
Warsaw Peet capabtlttlen described In detnil by Michael Getler
In the Washington POST on the 7th. Without specifically
mentioning Get.ler's nrticLe, the commenti.tor said the study
questioned the "reast..,ableness" of many U.S. military concepts
and doctrines regarding deterrence policy. In a possible
allusion to tho uubstar.ce of Schlesinger's remarks, It
added that tho rer;ulta of the Pentngr-i study challenged the
"official line of the West European hierarchy of NATO" on
defense policy. A similnr observation appeared in a Budapest
radio commentary on the 10th which said U.S. and West European
views on European security clashed at Brussels, with the former
believing. "on the basis of secret and not so iecret data and
reports," that the forces of both East and West can be reduced
in central Europe.
RADIO FREE EUROPE FUNDING: There has been limited East European
reaction--but no monitored Soviet reference--to the 7 May
Presidential statement endorsing the recommendations of the
Presidential Study Commission on international Radio Broadcasting
(the Eisenhower commission), which concluded that U.S. funding
of Radio F'rie Europe and Radio Liberty should continue.
C:,echoslovak and Bulgarian media have strongly c.ritici.zed the
Administration's decision to ask Congress for additional
funding to extend the life of the two "ldeologicsl" radios.
While noting that the commission's recommendations allow for a
possible termination of the radios' ac;.ivities if future
political conditions are suitable, Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO
on 9 May asserted that the "clear" issue was one of continued
'ttdeological subversion" efforts against the USSR and the other
socialist states. Bratislava's PRAVDA on 11 May described
the output of the radio as interference in the domestic affairs
of the socialist countries. Echoing a theme of past East
European comment on RFE and Radio Liberty, Prague radio on
25 May urged the FRG to remove from its territory the radio
stations. which "propagate opinions alien to the strivings of the
West German Government." The comment observed that Congress will
not necessarily approve the Administration's recommendations.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Fills TRE1,I)s
13 .111NE 1973
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATI5'. LCS 4 - 10 JUNE 1973
Moscow (285i items)
Peking (1363 items)
CEMA Meetings in Prague
(--)
7%
Vietnam
(5%)
47'1
China
(9%)
7%
[DRV Leaders in I'RC
(3%)
2'
PRG 4th Anniversary
(--)
6%
[PRG 4th Anniversary
(-._)
12%J
Middle East
(2%)
5%
Domestic Issues
(48%)
297
Soviet Local Elections,
(4%)
4%
Cambodia
(1.1.%)
6%
17 June
(Sihanouk Tour of
(4%)
4%]
Brezhnev Visits to West (12%)
TU-144 Crash at Paris (--)
7%
3%
Africa, Europe
PRC Foreign Minister in UK
(--)
47
Air Show
These statistics are based on the voicecast comme'-.tary output of the Moscow arid
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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