TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060023-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: June 6, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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eontuciential
rB'S
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
6 JUNE 1973
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This propawlwala analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press navdig. It is published
by IBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 JUNE 1973
CONTENTS
Le Duan Stay in Peking: Divergencies Show Behind Solidarity . . . 1
PRG Marks Anniversary, Welcvaes Ambassadors to South Vietnam. . . 4
PRG, DRV Score Two-Party ICCS Probe of DRV Troops in South. . . . 7
Pathet Lao Stand Elaborated in Central Committee Memorandum . . . 7
USSR-CHINA-U.S.
Soviets Denounce Western Reports That They Threaten China . . . . 10
FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Prague and Its Allies Hail FRG Czechos.loavk Accord. . . . . . . . 14
G:)R-FRG-USSR
Honecker Reviews FRG Relations Following Brezhnev Visit . . . . . 16
USSR
Decree Clamps Down on Controversial Farm Subsidiaries . . . . . . 18
Armenian Leadership Hits Nationalism, Mismanagement . . . . . . . 19
NOTE: Tr of imenko on SALT TWO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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IND0CHI1JA
In the opening clays of the Peking sojourn of the DRV delegation
headed by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong beginning on the 4th, the
two sides have effusively praised one another's role and
proclaimed their fraternal solidarity, but their divergent
interests have also been evident. Th'. Chinese have made a point
of warning against outside involvement. The North Vietnamese
for their part have stressed that their goals, including
reunification, are "closely interrelated objectives of paramount
importance" that are to be achieved "aL all costs."
Propaganda on the 6 June anniversary of the founding of the
Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam
reflects a major communist effort to project the PRG into new
prominence in the international arena and to buttress its claim
to be the genuine representative of the southern people and an
equal rival to the Saigon regime. A dramatic fillip to the PRG's
international stature came with the announcement that several
countries, including the Soviet Union and China, had sent
ambassadors to South Vietnam to present their ' -edentials. And
comment on the anniversary called attention to the PRG's increasing
emergence as an official government in the international arena.
The unexplained absence of PRG President Huynh Tan Phat from the
anniversary celebrations raises the possibility that he is out of
the country on a mission to further press the claim to legitimacy.
Vietnamese communist media have ignored the U.S.-DhV talks which
resumed this week in Paris, while continuing routinely to
complain about alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the peace
accord. Canada's announcement that it was withdrawing from the
ICCS was given little attention, but the Canadian ICCS delegation
was sharply criticized in PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements
charging it with going beyond the limits of the peace agreement
in its investigation of the presence of North Vietnamese troops in
South Vietnam.
LE DUAN STAY IN PEKING: DIVERGENCIES SHOW BEHIND SOLIDARITY
The Peking visit of the DRV party-government delegation led by
Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, now in its third day, has been shaping
up along expected lines as a high-level display of solidarity
and fraternity. The Chinese have warmly hailed the Vietnamese
for their ",great victory" in war against the United States, and
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the guests have reciprocated with effusive expressions of
gratitude for Chinese aid. Judging from the composition of the
DRV delegation, the terms of this aid in the new circumstances
are a major subject on the agenda. On the second day of the
visit the Vietnamese were received by Mao for what NCNA called
"an extremely cordial and friendly conversation."
Behind the show of solidarity, however, there have been signs
of persisting divergencies in the two sides' assessment of the
situation. As Chou En-lrii made clear in his speech at the
welcoming banquet on the 4th, "a completely new situation" has
appeared in Vietnam as a result of the peace settlement, and
the principal tack now is to shore up this settlement. While
routinely demanding that Saigon and the United States observe
the Paris agreement and end militrnry intervention in Cambodia,
Chou reserved hi.; strongest language to warn against unspecified
outside involvement, declaring that "no interference in Indochina,
under whatever pretext end in whatever form, will be tolerated."
Chou's warning was also underscored by a remark by Mao quoted
in NCNA's account of his conversation with the visitors: "Vietnam
belongs to the Vietnamese people, not to the reactionaries in
Vietnam, grill less to imperialism." As in Mao's remark to
Romania's Ceausescu in June 1971, when he called for unity against
"imperialism; and all reactionaries," the Chinese mean the Soviet
Union at least as much as the United States in referring to
imperialism in such an open-ended context.
Apart from an extended expression o' gratitude for Chinese aid,
Le Duan's reply speech on the 4th took a significantly different
direction. Taking a markedly less benign view of the U.S. role,
Le I)-,.;an observed that his peoples had defeated "the most
atrocious colonial war that has ever been conducted" but that
the "U.S. imperialists," using "perfidious maneuvers and
insolent threats," are continuing to impose "U.S. neocolonialism"
on South Vietnam and to aE:rpetuate the partition of Victnam.
Chou had avoided impugning U.S. motives.
Most notably, Le Duan came down hard on the importance the.
Vietnamese attach to their goals, including "peaceful reunification"
of Vietnam. In language strikingly reminiscent of that used by
Pham Van Dong when the DRV premier headed a delegation to Peking
in November 1971, Le Duan stressed that these goals are "closely
interrelated objectives of paramount importance to be achieved
at all costs, even through a hard and complex struggle." On
20 November 1971, a few days after the suspension of the round of
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secret Kissinger-Tho talks that had been taking place, Dong
had emphasized, in reference to the two basic military and
political demands in the communists' seven-point plan,, that
these two points "of very essential significance" were "closely
interrelated." Considering the subsequent pressure from Hanoi's
big allies to loosen the link between the military and political
issues, Le Duan's current formulation may have been intended
as much for the instruction of Hanoi's allies* as for its
adversaries.
At one point Le Duan made the customary acknowledgment of the
support provided by the Soviets and others as well as by the
Chinese. Also, in one of his toasts he called for "the
tightening of the solidarity" among the communist countries on
the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
Ile did not, however, echo Chou's assertion that Sino-Vietnamese
friendship is based on M-irxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism. Since the July 1971 announcement of Peking's
invitation to President Nixon, the North Vietnamese have on
several occasions seemed to have expressed their pique by failing
to acknowledge these as the existing basis--as opposed to a
desired goal--of relations between Peking and Hanoi.
* Hanoi's objectives had figured in an unusual development
involving Sino-Vietnamese relations several weeks ago. NCNA
belatedly reported on 4 April that on 30 March Chou had received
the DRV and PRG envoys for an account of the implementation of
the Paris agreement over the first 60 days. Chou was quoted as
expressing his belief that the Vietnamese would sucreed in
achieving "peace, independence, demccracy, and national concord"--
a formulation omitting the usual reference to reunification.
Hanoi's accounts of Chou's remarks omitted this formulation
altogether.
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PRG MARKS ANNIVERSARY, WELCOMES AMBASSADORS TO SOUTH VIETNAM
The highlight of the PRG's celebrations on its fourth anniversary
was a "grand meeting" of more than 7,000 peop1r. held at dawn in
an aria under PRG control ?.n Quang Tri Province.* Assuming the
trappings of a conventional national day celebration, the meeting
wan atte;tded for the first. time by delegations from the DRV as
well its foreign delegations from Cambodia, Laos, and Cuba and
the newly appointed ambassadors from the USSR, PRC, DPRK, GDR,
Poland, Hungary, Algeria, and Mauritania. Wi,:h the usual speaker,
PRG President Huynh Tan Pha., notably absent, "an it.iportant
speech" was delivered to the meeting by Nguyen Iluu Tho, Chairman
of the NFLSV and of the PRG's Advisory Council. The speech is
not yet available in translation, but according to Liberation
Radio's account of the meeting it dealt with the situation and
tasks of the southern people and with the PRG's stand on the
settlement of internal affairs in South Vietnam.
In addition to Tho, the South Vietnamese officials at the meeting
included Vietnam Alliaice chief Trinh Dinh Thao and PRG Foreign
Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, who was reported by Hanoi media on
.' May to be on her way back to South Vietnam after a stopover in
the DRV. The North Vietnamese representatives included a govern-
m,nt delegation led by Vice Premier Nguyen Con, a member of the VWP
S.cretariat, and a National Assembly delegation led by Nguyen Xien,
a ;'ice chairman of the Assembly Standing Committee.
FORiTIGN ENVOYS The first announcement that a number of countries
had sent ambassadors to South Vietnam came in
a Liieration Radio :,eport on 5 June which said that over a period
of days ambassadors from the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and
Algeria had presented their credentials to the PRG "in the
liberated area of South Vietnam." Although the PRG has sent
ambasstdors to many of the 33 countries which have recognized it,**
Thi;, is the first time that the locus of the celebration has
been spe.cifiad. In previous years the ceremonies were described
as being held in "a liberated area."
Liberation Radio on 3 June broadcast a list of countries,
including the DRV, which it said had officially recognized and
establish.d relations with the PRG. The list included 29 nations
as having made this move prior to the peace agreement and added
that since then Uganda, Dahomey, Burundi, and the Republic of
Guinea had joined their ranks.
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only Cuba had previously appointed an amb'ssador to the PRG.
The announcement of the dispatch of ambassadors comes some two
weeks after Hanoi and the PRG had belatedly criticized France
for establishing ambassadorial relations with the GVN without
making a similar move toward the PRG.* It seems possible that
the Vietnamese waited to criticize the French until after they
had assurance that other countries would send ambassadors to
the PRG.
The first indication of the new move was a -+ June TASS repr'rt
that the Soviet ambassador to Burma, Aleksey Yelizavetiri, had
also been appointed ambassador to the PRC. I4CNA the next day
noted that Ambassador Wang Jo-chieh, w'no had left his post in North
Yemen last December, left Peking on 28 May and presented his
credentials to the PRG on 3 dune. PRG reports on the activities
of various ambassadors in some cases additionally noted the
appearance of embassy secretaries and attaches, thus further
suggesting the intention to establish a permanent presence in
South Vietnam. The Cuban ambassador is now referred to as "dean
of the diplomatic corps." He presented his credentials to FRG
Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh in Paris in June 1969 and later
reportedly traveled to South Vietnam but did not remain there.
His return to South Vi.attiam was first noted in a 5 June Liberation
Rddio report that he had been received by Mime. Binh "recently,
in a PRG-controlled area."
HANOI COMMENT Hanoi greeted the PIZG anniversary with more than
usual fanfare, marking the event with a "grand
meeting" on 4 June attended by Politburo members Truong Chinh and
Nguyen Duy Trinh. No meeting was held last year, although Truong
Chinh did pa:, an anniversary call on the PRG representation in
Hanoi, and the anniversaries in 1970 and 1971 were marked with
recept~.ons given by the PRG and attended by DRV Politburo members.
As usual, North Vietnam's government leaders sent a message to
Nguyen Iuu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat and, as has been the case in
most years, the anniversary was hailed editorially in the Hanoi
press.
The Hanoi meeting was sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front and
the Hanoi Administrative Committee and was addressed by Foreign
Minister Trinh and Nguyen Van Tien, head of the PRG's special
* Vietnamese communist comment on the French action is discussed
in the TRENDS of 31 May 1973, pages 9-10.
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representation in the DRV; in addition, Truong Chinh offered brief
opening and closing remarks. Both of the main speakers sought
to demonstrate the PRG's increased stature: Trinh, for example,
cited the recognition of the PRG by foreign governments and its
participation as a member in the July 1972 nonalined conference,
and claimed that the peace agreement and the act of the
international Vietnam conference "confirmed the decisive role"
of the PRG in the settlement of internal affairs in South
Vietnam and its "prestige and important position in the inter-
national arena." Trinh's routine allegations of U.S. and
Saigon violations of the accord included the claim that Washington
and Saigon were "gning so far as to refuse to recognize and then
to eliminate the PRG." Charging that "neocolonialism" continues
in the South despite the peace accord, Trinh promised that the
North must therefore continue to "perform its duty" to the South
"until neocolonialism is completely wiped out of the southern
part of our country and until our fatherland is reunified and
the South and North are reunited."
Both Trinh and PRG representative Tien referred to the PRG as the
only representative of the South Vietnamese people--a characterization
that ""as been pressed since the peace ?ccord. And Tien added that
the PRG is the "supreme authoritativ- organ reflecting the will
and deep aspirations of all strata" In the South. At another
point, Tien also asserted that the "victories" in the past four years
had "consoli-lnted the role and great power and simultaneously
reflect the stability and strength" of the PRG as "a government that
is really of the people, by the people, and for the people and that
the entire people strive to defend and build."
The 6 June NHAN DAN editorial reviewed the progress of the struggle
in the South in past years and claimed that the Paris agreement
had fulfilled the most important objectives mentioned in the NFLSV
platform and the PRG's 12-point program of action. This "great
victory" of the "national democratic revolution," according to the
paper, has caused a great change in the balance of forces and
"created conditions for advancing toward the achievement of other
objectives." Echoing themes brought up in Trinh's speech, the
editorial also lauded the PRG's international position and promised
DRV backing until reunification is achieved.
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PRG, DRV SCORE TWO-PARTY ICCS PROBE OF DRV TROOPS IN SOUTH
Foreign ministry statements fiim the PRG and DRV, on 1 and 3 June,
respectively, assailed both the Caradian and Indonesian ICCS
delegations for their investigations -regarding the resence cf
North Vietnamese soldiers in the South. The statement pointedly
noted that the Paris accord makes no mention of North Vietnamese
troops and accused the Canadian delegation of misusing the ICCS
to carry out activities that far exceed the limitations of the
agreement. The statements did not go Into detail about the
activities of the Canadian and Indonesian delegates, instead
cryptically referring to investigations and reports in the Da
Nang area on the "so-called case of 'North Vietnamese prisoners
of war."' They held that the investigation violated Article 18 F
of the agreement and Article 9 A of the protocol on the ICCS
which stipulate that the commission sh:~ll operate in accordance
with the principle of consultations and unanimity.
The Canadian delegation has been criticized by the communists
since mid-April when Ilanoi scored remarks by its chief, Gauvin,
taking part..cular umbrage at a statement he made alluding to
the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South.* The
Indonesian delegation has not previously come under attack, and
the current statements carefully disassociated the action of the
Indonesian ICCS team in Da Nang from the policy of the Jo.karta
government, citing a report that the Indonesian Foreign Ministry
said its ICCS teams were not instructed to join the efforts of
the Canadian delegation on this question.
Hanoi duly reported Canada's announcement on 31 May of its
intention to withdraw from the ICCS. The only other allusion to
the announcement came in a 1 June article in the army paper
QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN which criticized the British Foreign Office for
a statement that DRV and PRG refusal to cooperate with the ICCS
compelled Canada to withdraw.
PATHET LAO STAND ELABORATED IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM
The Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) Central Committee marked the passing
of 100 days since the signing of the cease-fire agreement by
issuing a lengthy, 31 P`ay memorandum on the status of the LPF-RLG
* See the TRENDS of 18 April 1973, pages 4-5.
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negotiations. The memorandum differs from an LPF Central
Committee statement of 23 April--60 days after the cease-fire
agreement--in its detail regarding LPF proposals during the
prulonged talks with the RLG. Substantial detail regarding
the LPF positions was first supplied in a series of four
Pathet Lao radio commentaries from 17 through 20 May, and
the memorandum now elaborates on those broadcasts.
The memorandum, which was released at press conferences in
Vientiane, Sam Neua, and Hanoi on 1 June and disseminated by
LPF media on the same day, was notable for its explicit
criticism of Premier Souvanna Phouma. While propaganda in
the past has referred critically to "rea,:tionaries," the
memorandum now said that Souvanna Phouma and other RLG
negotiators have tried to avoid discussion of "essential
questions" and have "shown no sincere desire for a settlement."
They were accused of changing their minds "too often," modifying
proposals "again and again," and advancing "very absurd claims.''
The memorandum also castigated the United States and the RLG for
violating the cease-fire provisions of the February agreement and
attacked the United States for instigating the RLG to procrastinate
in the negotiations. The document accused the United States of
engaging in "perfidious maneuvers" to ostensibly transfer Air
America and the Lao "Special Forces" to RLG control in an attempt
to circumvent stipulations in the agreement for their disbandment.
It also revealed that on 7 May a U.S. serviceman had been
captured by LPF forces while engaged in a mission to direct
groups of commandos introduced into the zone under the control
of the "patriotic forces" to conduct acts of sabotage. Pathet
Lao media have not yet identified the serviceman but Hanoi and
East German media have quoted an LPF official in Hanoi as saying
that he is a major attached to "the U.S. Special Forces in Laos."
LPF POSITIONS In addition to repeating, the negotiating
positions outlined in the May series of Pathet
Lao radio broadcasts,* the memorandum offered new information
which can be summarized as follows:
+ The International Commission for Supervision and Control should
not be granted powers not assigned to it under the 1962 Geneva
* The TRENDS of 23 May 1973, pages 7-9, discusses four Pathet Lao
radio commentaries from 17 through 20 May which revealed LPF positions
on the possible creation of a deputy premier post, the distribution of
ministerial portfolios, the functions of the proposed "National
Political Coalition Council," and the neutralization of Luang PraL:ng
and Vientiane.
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agreement. The RLG wants an enlarged commission to assume
additional duties, which would be "incompatible with the
sovereignty of Laos."
1- Territorial areas in contention between the two sides should
be delimited "to avoid further conflict on the basis of respect
for the regions controlled and administered by each side." The
RLG "wants to take advantage of the absence of boundaries and
cease-fire lines to avoid the recognition of the existence in
Laos of two zones controlled by two sides."
+ The RLG should allow "hundreds of thousands" of civilians
held in "so-called refugee camps" to return to homes they left
as a result of U.B. bombing and RLG military operations. By
refusing to grant approval for their return, the RLG is denying
their "economic and political" rights and "democratic liberties."
(With the future elections in mind, the LPF obviously wants to
bolster its vote-getting position by enlarging the electorate in
areas it controls with released refugees.)
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USSR-CHINA-U, S.
SOVIETS DENOUNCE WESTERN REPORTS THAT THEY THREATEN CHINA
With Brezhnev's visit to the United states in the offing, Moscow
has again expressed acute sensitivity to having its China problem
put in a triangular context that could limit its leverage
in big-power relations. A statement issued by the Soviet embassy
in Washington and supported by press comment denounced Western
press reports concerning a Soviet threat to China. Concurrently.
Moscow his chose;^ this time to present a wide-ranging critique
of '::inese foreign policy, including a warning that Peking's
raising of territorial questions could trigger chain reaction
which would undermine the international uv?tem that has emerged
since World War II. Earlier, a Soviet broa..:ast to China
offered a notably gloomy assessment of Sino-Soviet relations,
flatly asserting that no progress has-been achieved in the
border talks.
The Soviet embassy statement,* released on 1 June, denied what
is said were recent reports in the American press that "diplomatic
intervention by the United States has averted an inevitable
nuclear attack" by the Soviets on China. In an allusion to
ongoing East-West negotiations, the statement closed by observing
that such "provocative" reports "have nothing in common with the
interests of international detente and peace." It also noted
that these reports are similar to remr ks made recently by an
unnamed Chinese leader to American journalists. The Soviets may
have been prompted to issue this denial by reports on the book
by John Newhouse on the SALT negotiations that is being serialized
in the NEW YORKER. These reports have highlighted the book's
assertion that the Soviet Union had approached the United States
concerning joint steps to forestall any military actions by the
Chinese.
The embassy statement has been followed by press comment similarly
directed at rebutting the portrayal of a Soviet threat to China.
On 3 June PRAVDA carried a commentary by N. Sablin taking exception
* Several statements and protests have been issued by the embassy
in Washington in recent years, most of them dealing with Jewish
activities directed against the Soviets in the United States.
A statement issued on 6 June denied reports that the Pentagon
papers had been handed over to the embassy.
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to n UI'I report from London linking the Soviet troop buildup
along the Chinese border with the Soviet diplomatic offensive
in the West. PRAVDA quoted the report as saying Moscow's
"c!+plomatir offensive in Europe and the United States" is
prompted by the Kremlin's desire to gain freedom of action
against China. Sablin observed darkly that "there are no
f w leaders" in the West who would like to put the Soviet Union
and the PRC on a collision course and "to wa':m their hands on
this."
APALIN ARTICLE The wide-ranging critique of Chinese foreign
IN IZVESTIYA policy, by C. Apalin in the 2 June ;morning
issue) of IZVESTIYA, follows the familiar
script used by the Soviets in recent years in their effort to
discredit Chinese policy now that it has hec)me more formidably
flexible and effective. Thus Apalin argues that the Chinese
h2 c sought to adapt to circumstances by "complex tactical
maneuverinb" while keeping their "strategic course unchanged."
A-cording to Apalin's analysis, the Chinese are trying to
destroy the existing system of international relations in their
pursuit of great-power hegemonistic goals.
All of this is familiar enough in Soviet anti-Chinese polemics,
including charges that Peking is seeking allies from among
even the most imperialist forces in order to isolate the Soviet
Union as the number one enemy. The Apalin article is notable,
however, for its use of the border question in elaborating the
line that the Chinese are enemies of detente. \ccording to
Apalin, the Chinese have recently been "feeding certain circles
in certain countries with inflammatory material for stirring up
nationalist pass~?_,