TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 16, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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16onTiaential
FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
16 MAY 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 20)
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 Approved For Release 1999/(,Y&I,PL85T00875R000300060020-7
This propaganda analysis report is based exclUSively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is publishe(I
by II HIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
I NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
16 MAY 19;3
C 0 N TEN TS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Le Duc Tho Statement, White Book Set Stage for U.:-.;.-DRV Talks . .
1
U.S. Accused of Repeated Air Attacks in South Vietnam . . . . . .
5
DRV, PRG Comment on Problems of Peace-keeping in the South. . . .
7
Peking Gives Muted Responses to Allies' Calls for Support . . . .
9
Sihanouk, Insurgent Leaders Stress Hard Line on Settlement. . ?
11
LPF Issues Communique on Status of Vientiane Negotiations . . . .
U.S. - USSR
12
Moscow Optiminntic But Cautious on Brezhnev Visit. . . . . . . . .
EUROPE FORCE CUTS
15
Soviet Bloc Implies Hungary's Exclusion. Permanent . . . . . . . .
MIDDLE EAST
17
Moscow Sustains Cautious Coverage of Events in Lebanon. . . . . .
YUGOSLAVIA
20
Dolanc Report at LCY Conference Scores Nationalism. . . . . . . .
USSR - CHINA
21
Rival Efforts to Influence National Minorities Continue . . . . .
CHINA
23
Educational Authorities Encouraged to Enhance Quality . . . . . .
25
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FOR OFFICIAL U.S. ONLY FBIS TRENDS
16 MAY 1973
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN
MAJOR ATTENTION 7 - 13 MAY 1973
Moscow (270a items)-
Peking (1208 items
May Day, CPSU Plenum
(39%)
11%
Domestic Issues
(30%)
49%
VE Pay
ll%)
11%
Cambodia
(9%)
13%
Brezhnev in Poland
--)
9%
[Sihanouk Tour
(--)
9%]
Lenin Peace Prizes
(11%)
9%
of Africa,
GDR Liberation
(--)
5%
Europe
Anniversary
Meetings of i1N Bodies (--)
7%
Czechoslovak Liberation
(--)
5%
Norwegian Foreign (--)
3%
Anniversary
Brezhnev in GDR
(--)
4%
Minister in PRC
PRC Friendship
(3%)
3%
China
(3%)
2%
Delegation in
Indochina
(2%)
2%
Japan
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Mos ^ow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior Issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
16 MAY 1973
INDOCHINA
A threatening and intransigent statement by Hanoi's negotiator
Le Duc Tho upon his arrival in Paris on 14 May seemed to set
forth the basic communist position in the talks with Presidential
adviser Kissinger scheduled to begin on the 17th. In line with
earlier propaganda, Tho claimed that the DRV has "good will and a
serious attitude" regarding measures to irsure the implementation
of the Paris agreement, but he gave no indication that improve-
ment of the situation required any change in the communist stance.
Instead Tho assailed alleged allied violations of the accord,
including U.S. boml,ing of South Vietnam--a charge first raised on
11 May, the day the PariG consultations were announced--and
warned that any further attacks would make the meeting with
Kissinger impossible.
Hanoi's 1.5 May release of Tno's statement followed a barrage of
charges of allied violations. Ap-arently in preparation for the
Paris talks, Hanoi media on 10 May issued a DRV White Book
documenting the view that the United States and Saigon are the
sole violators of the accord; this is the first such document to
be issued since 1965.
Le Duc Tho made his customary stopovers in Peking and Moscow,
arriving in the PRC capital on the 11th and going on to Moscow the
next day before continuing his Journey to Paris on. the l.4th. As
usual, his Chinese host was Chang Chun-chiao, and he met with
Chou En-lai for the standard "very cordial and friendly
conversation" whose substance was not disclosed. Peking has given
only the barest publicity to Hanoi's announcement that the
Kissinger-Tho talks would concern complete implementation of the
Vietnam agreement.
In Moscow Tho saw Kirilenko and Katushev, the officials who most
frequently meet with him on these stopovers. Reporting that the
two sides exchanged views on the Vietnamese situation and on how
the agreement is being implemented, TASS added that Tho "gave
information about violations of the Paris agreement by the American
side, quoting numerous facts of the agreement being violated by the
Saigon administration."
LE DUC THO STATEMENT, WHITE BOOK SET STAGE FOR U,S.-DRV TALKS
Hanoi did n',t comment at once on the official U.S.-DRV announcement,
which it publicized on 11 May, that Kissinger and Le Duc Thu would
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16 MAY 1973
meet in Paris on the 1.7th to review implementation of the
peace agreement and seek measures t- bring about its strict
observance. Prior to VNA's 15 May release of Le Duc Thu's
statement at the Paris airport, Hanoi on the 14th publicized
a NHAN DAN article which paralleled his remarks in affirming
the DRV's good will while maintaining that the U.S.-DRV
review should "stress" that the "primary responsibility" for
the present situation rests with "none other than the United
States." The article asserted that there would be "favorable"
conditions for progress in the talks only if the United States
stopped reconnaissance over the DRV, resumed mine removal,
discharged its "obligations and responsibilities stipulated"
in the agreement, and resumed the work of the U.S.-DRV
economic commission.
VNA underlined the significance of Tho's airport statement by
calling it "important." Tho went beyond other attacks on the
alleged U.S. air strikes in South Vietnam when he warned that
the talks would not take place or would be halted if there was
a repetition of the strikes. Suggesting that the alleged
incidents may have heightened Hanoi's suspicions about U.S.
intentions, Tho charged that the United States had carried out
attacks Just before the meeting in order to "pressure" the DRV.
He also claimed that the Unites States had "resorted to such a
tr{ck" in past negotiations and asserted that "this is a vain
effort." A Hanoi radio broadcast on the 16th, read literally,
went beyond Tho in suggesting that for the talks to go forward
it is necessary not only for the United States to refrain from
bombing in the South but to meet Hanoi's other demands:
If the Nixon Administration wants to display
good will in seriously implemen'Ling the Paris
agreement, first of all it should stop sending
reconnaissance aircraft over North Vietnam,
carry on mine removal, resume the work of the
DRV--U.S. joint economic commission, and
immediately suspend all air reconnaissance,
strikes, and bombing against the PRG-controlled
areas. Only under such circumstances can the
17 May meeting b(:tween the two parties in Paris
take place.
Routinely protesting numerous U.S. and GVN actions since the
peace accord, Tho echoed other Hanoi comment in recent weeks
which has charged the United States and Saigon with committing
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CONFIDENTIAL F'3IS TRENDS
16 MAY 1973
"extremely serious and systematic acts of violation" which have
"posed a diror"t: menace to peace in South Vietnam and rendered
the situation in Indochina increasingly tense." Tho maintained
that international opinion is protesting these violations and
will. not be "deceived" by allied efforts to place the blame on
the DRV. According to Tho, a durable peace in Vietnam and
Indochina and the normalization of DRV-U.S. relations can be
achieved only through a U.S. undertaking to scrupulously
implement the Paris accord as well as the act of the inter-
national conference on Vietnam. He went on to warn: "Should
the United States continue violating the Paris agreement and
still scheme to impose its neocolonialism on South Vietnam,
the Vietnamese people would resolutely struggle against it,
and the United States would certainly not escape another defeat."
WATERGATE It is noteworthy that on the eve of the ocheduled
DEVELOPMENTS Kissinger-Tho meeting Hanoi's continuing publicity
for developments in the Watergate case has
included references to its possible effect on the Presidential
adviser. Thus, a 16 May Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese, citing
numerous Western press reports on Watergate, quoted REUTER as
speculating that Kissinger's position might be undermined. A
1 May Hanoi broadcast had mentioned BBC speculation that Kissinger
was affected by the Watergate affair because it would have an
impact on U.S. foreign as well as domestic policies. On 28 April
Liberation Radio, on the other hand, cited an AFP report which set
Kissinger apart from the Watergate case since those involved were
not members of Kissinger's "group."
WHITE BOOK The text of the DRV White Book on alleged U.S. and
Saigon violations of the Paris agreement, transmitted
by VNA on 10 May, was said to have been issued three days earlier by
the DRV Foreign Ministry's Press and Information Department. The
only previous DRV White Book issued during the war, on 10 July 1965,
purported to document "20 years of U.S. intervention and aggression"
in Vietnam; since 1965, however, the DRV Foreign Ministry has
periodically released "memoranda" indicting the United States in a
similar fashion.* It seems likely that the current White Book is
* The last such memorandum, issued 27 July 1972, is discussed in
the TRENDS of 2 August 1972, pages 5-6. Pre'.rious memoranda were
issued to mark the 20 July anniversary of the Geneva agreement in
1966, 1968, and 1969.
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16 MAY 1973
aimed at influencing world public opinion as well as at
bolstering the rommunists' position in the Paris discussions.*
The White Book placed particular stress on U.S. responsibility
for alleged Saigon violations of the Paris agreement, basing
this stand in broad terms on President Nixon's statement in his
23 January speech, announcing the peace accord, that the United
States will continue to recognize the GVN as the sole legitimate
government of South Vietnam. "By this cynical distortion of
the agreement," the White Book charged, "the White House has
given the green light to the Saigon administration to use all
ways and means to oppose the implementation of the agreement in
a bid to maintain the Thieu regime."
The White Book attributed more specific responsibility to the
United States for the problem of Vietnamese civilian prisoners.
While the Paris agreement left this issue to be settled by the
PRG and GVN, the communists have previously hinted that the
United States had privately agreed to take some responsibility.
The White Book claimed that Washington "has formally undertaken
to ensure the return of all captured and detained Vietnamese
civilian personnel within the 90-day time limit." This claim
was previously broached in the 14 April PRG memorandum, sent to
participants in the 12-power international conference, which
said that the United States had made a commitment that the
majority of Vietnamese civilian personnel would be returned within
60 days of the signing of the accord and all of them returned
within 90 days.** The White Book underlined its contention with
the argument that "it is not proper that the United States tries
only to bring back the captured personnel of the U.S. side without
fulfilling its obligation to urge the Saigon administration to
immediately return all captured and detained Vietnamese military
and civilian personnel."
* It is noteworthy in this regard that Hanoi's VNA office
transmitted similar documentary material on alleged allied
violations of the peace accord to its Paris branch on 24 April,
three days before the opening of the meetings in Paris between U.S.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan and DRV Vice Foreign
Minister Nguyen Co Thanh--meetings which were to lay the groundwork
for the Kissinger-Tho talks. These earlier materials apparently
were not publicized by Hanoi media, nd it is not known if they
were ever made public or otherwise used by DRV representatives.
** For background, see the TRENDS of 18 April 1972, page 3.
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16 MAY 1973
The White Book's many-faceted indictment of he GVN included
the charge that Saigon has deliberately created obstacles for
the GVN-PRG consultative conference which has been meeting
outside Paris since 19 March. It reiterated the six-point
PRG program presented at the 25 April session of the consulta-
tive talks and scored the GVN proposal made on the same
occasion. The White Book particularly criticized the Saigon
plan for calling for the withdrawal of non-southern Vietnamese
troops, charging that the question was not included in the
Paris agreement. By making this a prerequisite, the White
Book contended, the GVN has put its plan "beyjnd the framework
of the Paris agreement on Vietnam, thereby making its 'proposals'
null, and void from the legal as well as the practical point of
view."
The White Book's conclusion again focused attention on the
alleged responsibility of the United States in Vietnam, contending
that the serious situation in Vietnam and Indochina lie in U.S.
unwillingness to give up past policies, strictly end its military
involvement and intervention in South Vietnam, and give up its
"design of carrying out U.S. neocolonialism in Indochina." It
called up;n fraternal socialist countries and others to "expose
and condemn in time" the alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of
the accord and to "put up a resolute struggle to compel the
United States to give up its neocolonialist policy" arLd implement
the agreement.
U.S. ACCUSED OF REPEATED AIR ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The first Vietnamese communist claim that U.S. planes had attacked
PRG-controlled territory in South Vietnam came in broadcasts on
the 11th which cited alleged attacks in Tay Ninh and Binh Long
provinces from 2 to 9 May. A 12 May PRG Foreign Ministry statement
singled out raids on th,,a 9th as the most serious, describing
in detail bombing and steafing by four successive waves of U.S.
F-4's against the PRG-controlled areas in Loc Ninh, Binh Long
Province. Characterizing the alleges strikes as "direct military
acts by the U.S. Government," the statement called them
"extremely gross violatioi,.s" of Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Paris
accord and Articles 1 and 2 of the protocol on the cease-fire and
the JMC. It demanded an end to U.S. and Saigon reconnaissance
flights as well as the U.S. "bombing and spellings" of PRG areas.
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The PRG's concern over the alleged attacks was also expressed on the
12th by the spokesman for the PRG delegation to the JMC at a press
conference. According to Liberation Radio on the 13th, the
spokesman specified that U.S. and Saigon aircraft had carried out
reconnaissance over and bombed or strafed PRG-controlled areas
from Loc Ninh to Xa Mat, Tay Ninh Province, on 2 May and daily
from the 5th through the 9th. He also charged that B-52's had
"intruded into the airspace" of these areas in April, bombing
the "South Vietnam-Camuodia border area anti inflicting heavy
losses in lives and property on the Vietnamese and Khmer people
in the border area." The radio indicated that in response to
newsmen's questions the spokesman supported his contention of
U.S. involvement by nointelly noting that "only the United States
uses B-52's, F-4's, and F-105's."
FuLther alleged U.S. air strikes, on 12 May, were denounced in
broadcasts on the 13th, including accounts of a protest attributed
to the NFLSV and PRG committees of "Binh Phuoc Province"--the
communist designation for the GVN provinces of Binh Long and Phuoc
Long. The communists charged that on the 12th the United States
carried out reconnaissance and then sent two F-4 jets to strafe
Loc Tan--a village on Highway 13, about five kilometers northwest
of Loc Ninh district capital.
The alleged attack of the 12th was protested in a PRG Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statement on the 14th. Also on the 14th,
the PRG announced that its delegation to the JMC had sent notes
to he ICCS cn 12 and 13 May scoring alleged U.S. and Saigon air
intrusions and attacks on PRG areas in Tay Ninh and Binh Long
since the beginning of April and demanding that the ICCS investigate
the U.S. "violations." The 14 May spokesman's statement rejected
as a "cover-up" the denials of communist charges by the U.S.
embassy in Saigon. It charged that the United States "has not
truly made up its mind to end its war of aggression, since it is
itself directly violating the cease-fire and continuing its
military involvement in Vietnam." The statement added.: "This
certainly will lead to the danger of involving the U.S. again in
Le --onflict in Vietnam and Indochina as before 27 January 1973."
The U.S. embassy's denial was also strongly rejected in a 13 May
NHAN DAN article which asserted that "the bombing was no mistake."
It claimed, to buttress this view, that the air attacks had been
on many days and in many planes which had long been under the
control of the PRG, in particular at Xa Mat which was chosen as
a PRG point of entry. The article warned that the United States
should not attempt to convey a threat with such bombings and
reaffirmed that no intimidation can shake Vietnamese determination.
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16 MAY 1973
An article in the 13 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claimed that the
alleged attacks, along with such actions as a reported U.S.
reconnaissance flight over North Vietnam on the 10th,*
undercut White House statements that the Kissinger-Tho talks
are aimed at shoring up the peace agreement. A 15 May DRV
Foreign Ministry statement, endorsing the PRG protests of
the 12th and 14th, also noted that the alleged attacks had
occurred just before the n;eeting between the U.S. and DRV
representatives.
DRV, PRG COMMENT ON PROBLEMS OF PEACE-KEEPING IN THE SOUTH
NHAN DAN ON ICCS A 9 May article in NHAN DAN, under the
signature Lam Dong, for the first time
attacked Washington and Saigon for "criticizing" and "pressuring"
Hungary and Poland over their actions as members of the ICCS.
As evidence the article cited a U.S. "note" in late April
accusing Poland and Hungary of failing to perform their duties
adequately and the U.S. cancellation of a Polish visit to the
United States. The article maintained that U.S. and Saigon
"slanders and pressure" against Hungary and Poland in fact
"prove that the delegates of these two countries to the ICCS
have performed their duties in a correct and serious manner."
Consistent with past Hanoi criticism of the Canadian ICCS
contingent, NHAN DAN article also scored the GVN for remarks
by a spokesman on 7 May complimenting the chief Canadian
representative, Gauvin. Gauvin has been periodically criticized
in Hanoi and PRG media since he censured the communists at a
13 April session of the ICCS and implied that an ICCS helicopter
downed on 7 April might have been fired on by North Vietnamese
troops.** Some commentaries have suggested that Canada's role
on the ICCS is undermined by its attitude. A 2 May Hanoi radio
commentary, for example, cited an instance where a Canadian
representative had refused to go along with a report signed by
the other ICCS members and commented that if such acts recur
"the Canadian side will have lost its status as an objective
party in charge of supervising and controlling the implementation
of the Paris agreement."
* The alleged 10 May overflight prompted a protest statemen* by
the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 12th. Unlike protests
of air intrusions on 19 and 24 Aptil which claimed flights over a
wide area of the DRV heartland, the 12 May statement only charged
an ini:rusion over the southernmost province of Quang Binh.
** See the "TRENDS of 18 April 1972, pages 4-5.
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DOWNING OF In an unusual admission of a cease-fire violation,
JMC COPTER the PRG on 12 May acknowledged that fire from its
troops had forced two "Saigon" helicopters to
land south of An Loc, Binh Long Province. Judging by the
Liberation Radio account, the acknowledgment--at a press conference
given by the PRG delegation to the JMC--did not go so far as to
note that one of the helicopters was hit by the fire. The press
conference spokesman reported that PRG officers were on board
the helicopters, although he did not specify that they were JMC
helicopters. Fe declared that the incident was "regrettable"
and that the local administration was conducting an investigation
into its cause. Implicitly offering a justification for the
shooting, Liberation Radio's report on the spokesman's remarks
concluded by charging that during the first days of May the
United States and Saigon had carried out reconnaissance and
air strikes in the area where the incident occurred.
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16 RAY 1973
PEKING GIVES MUTED RESPONSE TO ALLIES' CALLS FOR SUPPORT
Against the background if recent authoritative Vietnamese
communist calls for international support at a time when the
Vietnam settlement is shaky and new consultations in Paris
are in the offing, Peking has maintained a discreetly low
posture and has demonstrated a reluctance to underwrite its
allies' claims. While duly resorting the series of Vietnamese
notes and statements on violations of the Paris agreement,
including the 14 and 16 April PRG and DRV notes to the inter-
national conference participants, Peking has been sparing in
its authoritative comment on Indochina, and even this comment
has been occasioned by anniversaries for which Chinese pronounce-
ments have been virtually mandatory. The last authoritcive
Chinese commentary pegged to a current development was the
20 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article protesting U.S.
air str.kes in Cambodia and Laos. In what may be a move by Hanoi
to conduct close consultations with Peking, North Vietnamese
Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan arrived on the 11th on the same
plane as Le Duc Tho but not as a member of the Tho delegation.
Peking has taken a markedly more relaxed view of current
Indochinese developments than that of its Vietnamese allies,
softpedaling charges against the United States and expressing
only minimal support for the Indochinese communists. In the
most recent authoritative comment, ranking Chinese military
leader Yeh Chien-ying, addressing a Peking re?:eption on 25 April
marking the Indochinese summit anniversary, acknowledged that
the Indochinese are faced with "arduous fighting tasks" and
that the Vietnam and Laos agreements have been beset with
"continual obstruction" by the United States and Saigon. But
he failed to echo the Vietnamese speakers' denunciation of
"perfidious schemes" and "insolent threats" by the United
States designed to thwart the Indochinese struggle. A Chinese
leaders' message on the occasion pledged that the Chinese will
"resolutely support and assist" the Indochinese struggle, but
it stopped well short of the previous yaar's strong avowals of
backing--at a time of major military at.tivity--when the
Chinese called it their "bounden internationalist duty" to assist
the Indochinese and said China provided a "reliable rear area"
for the struggle.
Chinese pickups of Vietnamese comment have also reflected the
divergence in approach between Peking and the Vietnamese.
NCNA's account of a 25 April NHAN DAN editorial on the Indochina
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summit anniversary carefully avoided portraying American
actions aq endangering the Indochinese accords by omitting
passages chu:?.,iug that U.S. /ielations were threatening the
peace tlgreemnnts rnd accusing Washington of attempting to
intimidate the. L`T V. Similarly, in ci!porting the substance of
the current 1,RV 1Thite Book on allegei3 U.S. and Saigon violations
of Lite peace accord, Peking omitted the document's assertion
that these v,:olations were threatening the peace in Indochina.
Peking also deleted all criticism of the Nixon Administration
by name, skirted charges focusing on U.S. intentit'ns and alleging
the use of "inpudent threats" in V;etnam, and deleted all
references to the 24 April U.S. note on implementation of the
Paris agreement.
SINO-':'IETNAMESE In keeping with its low posture, ?'eking gave
RELATIONS only bare-bones treatment to Le Duc Tho's
11-12 May stopover. PeL ng took note of the
purpose of his return to Paris only by citing TFnoi's announcement.
Unlike Peking's cov:rage of many of his previous stopovers, NCNA
did not report any of the remarks at Tho's meeting with Chou
En-lai or at the banquet given by Chang Chun-chiao, and the only
characterization of the atmosphere at either occasion was the
standard formula that "a very cordial and friendly conversath n"
took place at the meeting. As has frequently been the case, NCNA
reported that Tho met with a ranking Cambodian leader in Peking,
in this instance Penn Nouth, but for the first time there was no
characterization of the atmosphere.
The arrival of Hoang Van Hoan, who has long figured in inter-
national communist relations and was Hanoi's ambassador in Peking
in thk 1950's, suggests a need felt by Hanoi to have a Politburo-
level officiai in Peking for consultations and perhaps hard
bargaining ov'sr support for the North Vietnamese. .:CNA's
announcements on Tho's arrival and departure made clear that
Iloan was not ;i part of the DRV delegation going to Paris but
had only arrived on the same plane. Hoan had also been present
in Peking in mid-November at a time when Tho made another stopover
and when a DRV aid delegation arrived. He subsequently was in the
Soviet Union for several weeks, arriving in Moscow on 18 December
as a member of Truong Chinii's delegation to the USSR's 50th
anniversary celebrations and staying until 26 January, well after
Truong Chinh had returned home.
There have been signs that the North ''ietnamese have been grasping
for signs of Chinese support which Peking has been reluctant to
put on record. Where NCNA's account of Yeh Chien-ying's speech at
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.16 MAY 1.973
the Indochina summit observance cited a bland Chinese pledge
to "firmly support" the Indochinese, VNA quoted him further
as reaffirming the PRC's "close militant friendship and great
solidarity" with the Indochinese and as promising assistance
for their struggles. More notc.bly, VNA on 5 May reportted that
Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan, speaking at an undated rec ption
for n South Vietnamese trade union delegation, "warmly praised
the great victory of the V etnamese people in the anti-U.S.
resistance," condemned the United States and Saigon for
violating the Paris agreement, and pledged continuing Chinese
support until the VietnamEse have "won complete victory." In
Peking's only reference to a meeting between Yso and this
delegation, an NCNA account of various May Day celebrations in
Peking :Involving Chinese leaders and foreign visitors noted that
Yao and others met the Vietnamese along with Albanian and
Somali groups. NCNA did not indicate what was said at any of
.he celebrations.
SIHANOUK, INSURGENT LEADERS STRESS HARD LINE ON SETTLEMENT
In moves presumably timed for the Kissinger-Tho talks in Faris,
Prince Sihanouk and the Cambodian in-country insurgent leaders
have in recent days strongly reaffirmed their opposition to a
compromise involving an accommodation with the Phnom Penh
govetnment. According to NCNA reportri of Sihanouk's current
foreign tour? the prince took the occasion of his stops in
Senegal and Guinea to affirm his government's "sacred mission
of riddin4 the U.S. neocolonialist system established in Phnom
Penh since March 1970 and of liberating the entire national
territory of Cambodia," adding that he "will never agree to
negotiate or become reconciled with the Phnom Penh traitors today
or tomorrow, nex.. year, or at a more distant date." Similarly,
the "three ministers in the interior" have since 4 May issued a
series of five appeals calling on Cambodians under P!,nom Penh's
rule to revolt against Lon Nol and reiterating the rigid line
on a settlement that marked their last series of appeals during
February. The current FUNK appeals harshly denounce the "sham
peace and cease-fire tricks" of the United States and the
Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam clique* and categorically
affirm the insurgents' determination to use armed force to destroy
the Phnom Penh regime.
* Recent comment in FUNK media on the new hnom Penh ruling
political council. has duly noted Cheng Heng's presence among the
four-man council. His absence from the rogues' gallery denounced in
the series of appeals, and the absence Lrom these appeals of any
reference to the new council, suggest that they were composed prior
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Recent Chinese and VietnameHe comment has avoided the settle-
ment question. Hanoi has concentrated on condemning American
military actions In Cambodia and noting Congressional
opposition to Nixon Administrntiai policies, while Peking has
focused on signs of weakness and discord in the Phnom Penh
leadership. Though mo_,e gingerly than Hanoi, the Chinese
have also called attention to American domestic opposition
to U.S. actions in Cambodia. An 11 May NCNA report on Secretary
Richardson's Congressional testimony on U.S. bombing in Cambodia
noted that American "public opinion" is "very much concerned"
about U.S. involvement and that there is "ever stronger"
Congressional opposition. The report noted in passing that
the House had passed an amendment prohibiting the use of funds
for military operations in Cambodia.
Soviet coverage remains limited to low-level reports on the
fighting between the "patriotic" and regime forces as well as
reports on the U.S. bombing. PRAVDA on the 12th carried a
dispatch highlighting Senator Mansfield's opposition to the
bombing as representing a widely shared sentiment in Congress.
The Soviets have avoided raising the question of a settlement
and have given no publicity to Sihanouk's current tour, as they
bad ignored his March trip into Cambodia. (TASS sent a point-to-
point dispatch from Dakar reporting Sihanouk's arrival there, but
the report was not disseminated in the media.)
LPF ISSUES COMMUNIQUE ON STATUS OF VIENTIANE NEGOTIATIONS
For three weeks after the return to Vientiane in late April by
Phoumi Vongvichit, secretary general of the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF),
Pathet Lao media had carried no authoritative evaluation of the
status of the prolonged talks with the Royal Lao Government (RLG)
on implementing the 21 February cease-fire accord.* This silence
was broken on 12 May when the LPF delegation issued a communique
at a press conference in Vientiane asserting that Phoumi had
presented a draft protocol "containing reasonable proposals for
the concrete settlement of the military and political questions"
but that the RLG, "under the pressure of the U.S. imperialists
and the ultrareactionaries," had raised "unreasonable and
tendentious" counterproposals in an effort to obstruct the talks
* Phoumi's return to Vientiane and a 23 April LP;' Central
Committee statement on the talks are discussed in the TRENDS of
7S April 1973, pages 7-8.
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16 MAY 1973
and "sabotage" the agreement.* Although the head of the LPF
delegation, Phoun Sipraseuth, reported at the press conference
that "generally speaking, the negotiations achieved some
progress," the communique gave nn indication that significant
resolution of differences hat! been accomplished during Phoumi's
four meetings with RLG Premier Souvanna Phouma and seven
meetings with RLG chief negotiator Pheng Phongsavan.
The LPF's issuing of the communique seems to reflect an
estimate that the talks will be prolonged and that it is in the
LPF's interest to publicize its position from time to time.
The communique complained that the RLG has been boycotting the
plenary sessions that had been held regularly every Tuesday
until 27 March; these meetings had presented an occasion for
both sides to issue statements and meet with the press. The
communique announced that pending the resumption of these meetings
the LPF delegation had the "obligation to regularly inform the
press about the progress of the talks in order to correctly
inform the broad public opinion which is following the Vientiane
talks with interest."
The communique also focused sharply on the possibility that
the apr_ement would be submitted for approval by the RLG to
the "ac-called" National Assembly, which began its 1973 session
in Vientiane on 11 May. This niuvc: wan viewed as an attempt to
obstruct national reunification and the restoration of peace in
Laos through the device of a body that "has nothing to do with
this agreement and has no right to check its implementation."
Several commentaries broadcast by Path::c Lao radio have pointed
out that the National Assembly is domtnated by the "ultra-
reactionary" Phouei Sananikone, the president of the assembly.
Pathet Lao media publicized a few of the remarks made by LPF
delegation head Phoun Sipraseuth at the press conference but they
ignored his statement that the existence of a formal Indochina
front comprising Lao, Vietnamese and Cambodian "patriotic forces"
* A draft of the communique was transmitted to Vientiane and
Hanoi on 9 May over a Pathet Lao service radioteletype circuit
emanating from northeast Laos. Although the delegation in
Vientiane was instructed to modify the draft if deemed necessary
and "to send the full text of your version to us by teletype for
broadcast In a timely manner," there were only minor differences
between the draft and the text which was made public on 12 May.
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16 MAY 1973
was a fabrication of "imperialist propagandists," an assertion
reported in Moscow radio broadcasts in Lao. Phoun was quoted
by Moscow as saying "that the Lao patriotic forces are
Implementing an independent policy and are not attached to the
so-called Indochina front." The Pathet Lao radio, however,
did attribute to him a remark accusing the RLG of trying to
avoid a stipulation in the agreement allotting an equal
number of ministerial posts to both sides in the projected
provisional government, a charge not made previously.
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1.6 MAY 1973
U. S, - USSR
MOSCOW OPTIMISTIC BUT CAUTIOUS ON BREZHNEV VISIT
The 12 May announcement of Brezhnev's for.thcc.ai.ng visit to the
United States has been given moderate attentt.on thus far in
Soviet press and radio commentary. While it is too soon to
say what Moscow's eventual public attitude toward the visit will
be, the commentary thus far available reflects a bland of
optimism and caution.
The more optimistic side of the picture was stressed by IZVESTIYA's
political observer Matveyev in the Moscow radio roundtable discus-
sion on the 13th. Taking up the visit after a review of Moscow's
achievemeuts in bringing about a detente atmosphere in Europe,
Matveyev presented a decidedly buoyant assessment of its
significance. He placed particular stress on distinguishing
the present period in international relations from the "cold
war" period that preceded it, suggesting that the changes
introduced by the Mo.=-w summit meeting last year had initiated
a new historical era. While noting obstacles being placed in
the way of Soviet-Americaa relations by "Zionist" circles opposed
to granting most-favv~-ed-nation status to the Soviet Union--an
indispensable cond'.cion, he said, for Soviet-American trade--he
concluded th;L th,ise who are "for commonsense, for realism in
foreign policy" will prevail.
A similarly optimistic but more cautious note was struck by Yuriy
Zhukov in a PRAVDA article, summarized for radio listeners in
North America on the 14th. While reiterating some of the points
made by Matveyev, Zhukov dwelt more on the developments in
Soviet policy leading up to the visit, as though setting forth
a justification for Brezhnev's visit. He stressed in particular
the "historic importance" of the document on basic principles
signed by the principals at last year's summit meeting, noting
that it has been evaluated by the Central Committee, the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Soviet Government as
creating "the prerequisites in international law" for the
development of ties and cooperation between the Soviet Union
and the United States on a long-term basis. He stressed in
this connection and elsewhere itt the article that a normaliza-
tion of Soviet-U.& relations would not be prejudicial to the
interests of third countries. Also apparently reflecting a
concern to forestall criticisms from Moscow's more militant
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16 MAY 1973
allies, Zhukov sprinkled his text with appropriately militant
phraseology; he specifically condemned U.S. bombing in Cambodia
and violations the agreements to end the war in South Vietnam
and Laos as among the "thorns" barring the path to better
relations.
Moscow media have also carried reports on U.S. events related
to the visit, such as Presidential adviser Kissinger's 13 May
press conference on his negLtiations in Moscow. This reporting
has been generally straightforward, conveying the impression
that a forward momentum is under way in Soviet-American relations
and that it is likely to lead to positive results.
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- 17 -
EUROPE FORCE CUTS
FBIS TRENDS
16 MAY 1973
SOVIET BLOC IMPLIES HUNGARY'S EXCLUSION PERMANENT
Moscow and its allies have taken a strong public position on the
"compromise" agreement regarding procedures and participa;
reached at the Vienna preparatory talks on European force
reductions (MBFR), maintaining that the agreement is binding
not only for the current talks but also for the subsequent formal
negotiations. The compromise, which categorized Hungary among
the eight "special" participants rather than among the 11 full
participants, made it possible for the 19 NATO and Warsaw Pact
representatives on 14 May to hold their first plenary session
since the talks began on 31 January. Repeatedly referring to
the agreement as a "compromise" between the NATO and Pact sta~ed,
Moscow and those of its allies which have commented directly o,1
the agreement--Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw--have avoided saying
outright that the decision on Hungary's "special" designation in
the talks represented an acceptance of their position but have
clearly implied that they regard it that way.
TASS ON FIRST SESSION Moscow made its stand clear in a care-
fully worded TASS report issued on the
15th. Summarizing "proposals submitted" by USSR delegation leader
Oleg Khlestov at the opening plenum, and making no reference to
explanatory statements by representatives of the West, TASS
conveyed the impression that all the Soviet interpretations on
contentious issue. had been unanimously approved. Without
directly referring to the disputed ise%ie of Hungarian and Italian
participation, TASS maintained that the NATO countries had tried
unsuccessfully "to secure a decision which would give them
unilateral military advantages."
Outlining the details of the Soviet "proposals," TASS said
11 states would be parties "to agreements concerning the area of
central Europe where the military confrontation is of a
particularly dangerous nature." Although the question of "how"
a force reduction was to be carried out would be discussed in
the future negotiations, TASS said, it was assumed that a
reduction "should cover both the national troops of the countries;
of the area of central Europe (the FRG, Benelux, the GDR, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia) and foreign troops stationed in the area
(U.S., British, Canadian, and Sovier)." TASS added that decisions
would be made on a consensus basis.
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As for the "other participants" in the consultations--here
TASS followed the agreed procedure in listing Hungary along
with Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Romania, and
Turkey--the TASS report said they "will not be covered by
future agreements." But the report went on to assert--in
apparent defiance of the West's position that the question of
participation in future substantive negotiations remains open--that
the "submitted proposals also define the procedures for both the
preparatory consultations and the future talks."
The only acknowledgment in the TAGS report that there were any
issues left undecided was a reference to the "understanding" that
"the question of inviting other European states" (read: France)
as observers for participation in the talks may be considered.
TASS concluded that the plenary session "unanimously approved
the submitted proposals."
BUDAPEST, WARSAW REPORTS Moscow's allies, particularly Budapest
and Warsaw, have been even more direct
in suggesting that the present "compromise" agreement would be
binding for the official negotiations as well as for the preparatory
talks. Hungary's NEPSZABADSZAG on the 13th said the "compromise is
consistent with the principle of equal security," a principle on
which "the socialist states will insist at the substantive talks as
well." The head of the Hungarian MBFR delegation, Endre Ustor,
was reported by MTI as saying at a press conference on the 14th
that Hungary would be able to consider participating in any possible
decisions only if "satisfactory conditions" were fulfilled; Vienna's
DIE PRESSE on the 15th quoted Ustor as saying Hungary would
participate as a full member "only if Italy participates as well;
this is the main condition." MTI cited Ustor as also stressing
that there is no difference between Hungary and the other seven
states with "special" status. Interpreting these remarks on a
Budapest television program on the 15th, a reporter asserted: "We
are prepared to take part in the negotiations with full status only
if Italy also takes part in the decisions."
Expressing much the same view for the Polish side, Warsaw's PAP
commentator Andrzej Rayzacher stated on the 14th that "a very
essential element [in the agreementl is the fact that the under-
standings concerning participation and procedures will be binding
both in the course of the current consultation: and during the
negotiations which are being prepared."
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16 MAY 1973
THE CONCEPTUAL ISSUE The clearest exposition on record of the
rationale behind these Soviet bloc views
was presented by Hungarian military specialist Istvan Kormendy in
the 6 May issue of the Budapest weekly MAGYARORSZAG. Declaring
that "central Europe must be viewed from a strategic rather than
a geographic" point of view, Kormendy went on to explain how the
qu.ation of Hungary's participation impinged on this conceptual
issue:
The reduction zone outlined after two or three, years
of internal NATO debate is unacceptable to the.
Warsaw Pact members. Zones consisting of the FRG
and the Benelux countries and one of the GDR-Po].and-
Czechoslovakia-Hungary would mean, for one thing,
that all Soviet forces stationed abroad would come
under limitation while the .Americans would station
troops in numerous other countries of Western Europe,
including Italy. If for no other reason than this,
it would make sense for Italy and Hungary to have the
same status at the talks: both'or neither should
belong in the reduction zone.
Only under such conditions, Kormendy concluded, could a reduction
of forces in harmony with the principle of equal security--that
is, "a proper and mutually acceptable 'state of equilibrium"'--
be achie..led .
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16 MAY 1973
iIIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW SUSTAINS CAUTIOUS COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN LEBANON
Moscow's continued cautious treatment of developments stemming
from the army-fedayeen clashes in Lebanon suggests its concern
to see the conflict resolved. Maintaining an essentially even-
handed approach toward the Lebanese and the Palestinians,
Moscow has cited both sides' reassurances concerning their
peaceful intentions and their efforts to eliminate the
unspecified "causes" of the conflict. But implicit admonitions
to potential troublemakers were apparent in PRAVDA's criticism
of the actions of Palestinian "extremists" and in treatment of
Syria's role in the crisis.
An initial PRAVDA account of the clashes noted that they
developed following incidents involving "Palestinian partisans,"
and PRAVDA on the 12th remonstrated against the actions of
extremist elements within the resistance movement. Such a
rebuke was issued in the wake of Israel's 9-10 April raid
in Beirut, and in both instances PRAVDA's criticism was
broadcast to Arab audiences. Apprehension over possible
Syrian intervention was reflected in an Arabic-language
commentary on the 14th which pointedly omitted Syria in
naming some Arab states which contributed to easing the
Lebanese crisis. PRAVDA on the 10th had repcrted without
comment that Syria had condemned Lebanese actions against
the Palestinian resistance movement., and the following day
cited Israeli Defense Minister Dayan as warning of Israeli
actions in the event of further conflict in Lebanon and "on
the Lebanese-Syrian border."
Mcscow has predictably accused Israel of aggravating the
situation through military maneuvers and threatening
statements. It has made no mention of the United States
in connection with the conflict, ignoring rrports in U.S.
and Arab media that Washington was considering Rending small
arms ammunition to Lebanon. The propaganda has gone no
further than charges that imperialist-directed "subversive
elements" were at least partially responsible for the clashes.
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16 MAY 1973
YUGOSLAVIA
DOLANC REPORT AT LCY CONFERENCE SCORES NATIONALISM
In a lengthy report to the Fourth Conference of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) on 10 May, LCY Secretary Stane
Dolanc claimed successes in the purge of dissident elements
initiated by Tito's disciplinary letter to the party last
October. At the same time, the second-ranking Yugoslav party
leader stressed that the struggle against rationalism--"the
mustering point of all class enemies"--would continue. Dolanc's
report, released by TANJUG on the 9th, was based on a lengthier
report by the LCY Presidium, sections of which had been released
in the form of summaries prior to the conference.
The LCY conference, the third to be held since the start of last
year, was not attended by Tito, whose absence was explained by
Dolanc at a press conference reported by TANJUG on the 11th.
Tito, he said, "is resting on the advice of his doctor because
of exhaustion." Insisting that the Yugoslav leader's health
was "excellent," Dolanc denied rumors that Tito would give up
any of his party or state posts but conceded that "chan-.es" of a
ceremonial nature would be made so as "not to burden thci
president with unnecessary protocol duties." Tito addressed the
two previous LCY conferences last year, in January and December.
Dolanc pointed to progress in c^.nbatting factions--"combinations"--
in the party allegedly guilty of "technocrat ism, liberalism,
nationalism, and bourgeois bureaucratism" and abetted by liberal
sympathizers abroad. Such "ill-intentioned" sympathizers, he
charged, portrayed the purge as "a struggle for power" and tried
to "create some kind of fighters for democracy, humanism, and
progress out of the people who had to leave--I repeat, had to
leave--the LCY."
Dolanc stressed that "the open and public character" of the
purge had enabled the Yugoslav public "to come out firmly in favor"
of the LCY's policy of self-management at home and nonalinement
abroad. But he went on to warn that the struggle against
nationalism and its causes must remain "a lasting everyday task" for
the Yugoslav party.
The LCY Secretary wa: more emphatic than Tito had been in his
February interview wj.th VJESNIK in denying that the purge represented
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a departure from the main lines of Yugoslav domestic and
foreign policy. He ttributed this view to "dogruatist,
etatist-centralist, . id neo-Stalinist forces" in the country
who considered the purge "a modification of our policy and a
correction and repairing of the mistakes made by the LCY in
the past." He underscored the point by recalling the party's
fight against "anti-self-management tendencies" in the past,
beginning "in 1948 at the time of our struggle against
Stalinism."
On foreign affairs, Dolanc reiterated Yugoslavia's nonalinement
policy in general terms without elaboration. However, the
international section of the LCY Presidium's report, which
TANJUG had summarized on the 7th, included praise for Tito's
Tune 1972 visit to the USSR, calling his talks with Brezhnev
"a new success" in developing cooperation between the two
states and parties. The report also stressed the LCY's
adherence to. "independence, equality, mutual respect," and
"noninterference" in relations with "other parties and move-
ments." Regarding European security, the report reiterated the
traditional Yugoslav principle of nonalinement and opposition
to blocs.
A Belgrade-datelined TASS dispatch published in PRAVDA on the
12th predictably highlighted those passages in the LCY
Presidium's report on the purge of liberal and nationalist
elements and on Tito's June.1972 visit to the USSR. While
duly noting the LCY's positions on interparty relations, the
dispatch characteristically ignored the references to
nonalinement.
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16 MAY 1.973
USSR-CHINA
RIVAL EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE NATIONAL MINORITIES CONTINUE
Long a factor in border tension and an index of Sino-Soviet
hostility, rival efforts to manipulate and control the national
minorities in the Central. Asian borderlands have persisted in
the climate of unabated Sino-Soviet antagonism. Soviet broad-
c -s to the border regions in Uighur, Kazakh, and Mongolian
pl.,:y up resentments among the Turkic and Mongolian minorities
in tlia PRC over what the broadcasts describe as forcible
assim'.lation and colonization of the minorities by the Chinese,
destruction of the minorities' national cultures, and the
contrast between the oppression found in the PRC and the
flourishing life of the minorities on the Soviet side of the
border. A favorite device for drawing this contrast is to quote
statements by refugees from the PRC, as in a recent broadcast in
Uighur quoting a refugee from Sinkiang as expressing satisfa-tion
over the opportunities afforded Uighurs in the USSR and saying he
had been accused by the Chinese of advocating "pan-Tt,rkism."
Some of the more inflammatory Soviet propaganda revives memories
of past revolts and separatist movements against the Chinese, as
in broadcasts from Tashkent in Uighur recalling the establishment
of an independent "East Turkestan" republic in Sinkiang in the
1940's. Another sensitive subject is the charge of Chinese
gerrymandering of regions inhabited by minorities and the
resettling of Han Chinese into these regions as a means of
maintaining control. Relating this charge to a development
growing out of the border confronts!ion, broadcasts beamed to
Inner Mongolia over Radio Peace and Progress have pointed out
that this area was recarved into newly drawn military regions
for strategic reasons at the height of border tension in 1969.
The:,e broadcasts have also noted that Chinese troops have been
ent to the border regions and urban youth assigned to the
paramilitary production and construction corps in response to
a "fabricated" Soviet threat.
On the:! part, the Chinese cite border defense as one of the
aims in the a.celerated program for rustication of urban youth.
An NCNA report on 5 May invoked Chou En-tai's authority behind
the campaign to send urban youth to join the Sinkiang production
and construction corps as "an important force in building up and
defending China's northwest frontiers." This report was
subsequently carried as the lead item in broadcasts by Radio
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Peking to the USiR. PRC reglon'il broadcasts seek to foster a
sense of unity by playing up the role of both Nan Chinese you'. h
and minority youth in developing and guarding "the front lint
of antirevisionism."
ILICHEV RETURNS Though there have been no signs of progress
TO PEKING toward resolving the border dispute, the
situation appears to have remained stabilized
since the two sides agreed to open negotiations in October 1969
and to defuse the explosive situation that had developed that
year. One sign of a stabilized situation is Moscow's maintenance
in Peking of a negotiating team h=aded by a deputy foreign
minister. In keeping with recent practice, TASS announced on
15 May that Soviet chief negotiator Ilichev -Fong with Ambassador
Tolstikov returned to Peking that day, having presurt:ably gone to
Moscow for the recent CPSU plenum. There was no ment,-)n of
Chinese officials meeting them at the airport and no Chinese
announcement on their return.
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CON FLDEN'I'IAL l BIS ;'WP;NDS
' ', MAY 1973
C H I N A
EDUCATIONAL AUTHORITIES ENCOURAGED TO ENHANCE QUALITY
As part of Its atL'1mpL to control the Impact of the 1,in PLac:
affair and to cunbat tendencies toward both rcrrlntinations on
lo.'er levels i%nd imldity on Lhe part of bewLidered local
cadres, the regime has sought to make IL clear that efforts
to rebut ld a quality educational system are not to be clef leered
by concern over who ther a shift of. l fnc ntig;ht find educational.
authorlLles caught moving in the wrong direction. WhiIc
narrowing the target of attack on Lin and his cohorts for
:heir "uitrarlghtisL" role in the power struggle rat the top,
the regime has also continued to attack various .leftist
policies aHsociatcd with the "swindlers," including their
approach to the sensitlve issue of educational policy.
Liaoning, the provincial bailiwick of Politburo member Chen
Hsi-lien, has been the most forthcoming in calling for
intellectuals to adopt a more enthusiastic attitude toward
selected cultural revolution "achievements" in educational
reform,* but a Shenyang broadcast on 21 Al.ril indicated that
in striking the proper balance between "re,l and expert" the
trend will continue to be toward expertise. The broadcast
gave an unusually candid ar.count of how a party
committee In a lical research institute had correctly guided
scientific and technical personnel to abandon their "tendency
to want to deal with Ideological transformation first and to
tackle technical work later." Departing sharply from the
cultural revolution's panacea for treating ideological.
shortcomings among intellectuals, the party committee led the
institute's scientific and technical personnel to "overcome
the inclination to take part in manual labor purely for its
own sake." The research personnel heeded the advice of local
workers who reminded them that "it is good for you to take
part in labor work and to strive hard to remold your world
outlook" but that "you must not forget that you are also
scientific and technical personnel trained by the party and
the people. You must put your knowledge to work." Without
expressing concern over any elitism in this system--an extremely
* See the TRENDS of 18 April 1973, pages 15-1
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c;ONFII)ENI'IAt, FilLS TRENDS
16 MAY 1973
Ht.nrrltlvc' Huhject. dur flip, the. culturral revolution--the broadcast
went on Lc note that. several "Out nLand ing" sc lent I f lc rt:ru
technical persontt(I In the plant have been admitted to the CCP
+uid that ma- of them have "become' the backbone of the Institute
bath politically and professionally and made gratifying
,rr:hI ?vementH In nclentIllc research."
The canter has -iddresHed I t.s+e I f specifically to the problem of
hesItsutt cadres glving less than full support for raising the
duality of educ:Itlcnurl work out of "fear of being held responsible
if such acts{ should backfire in the future." PEOPLE'S DAILY on
1 April encouraged teachers to revise and eapplement teaching
materials written during, the cultural revolution by the "masses."
After noting that even though the new teaching materials were
written "under the guldanLe of Chairman Mao's educational
revolution Line," PEOPLE'S DAILY admitted: "It must be said
that these new teaching materials still leave much room for
improvement." The article praised teachers who have "courageously
revised and supplemented their current teaching materials" and
argued that "it should be permissible" for teachers "to revise
and supplement them according to the party educational -,olicy
and on the basis of their revolutionary sense of responsibility
and their sincere desire to seek truth from facts in order to
raise our pedagogical standards to )-igher levels.`
School audiurities giving; "little or no support to the teachers
in this type of work" weir:' instructed to change this "wrong
attitude:" and to encourage teachers to "perfect teaching
mit~,rial.s and raise teaching standards?." Teachers should be
permitted, PEOPLE'S DAILY declared, to rearrange the contents
of their teaching materials according to the learning capacity
of the students, to provide additional lessons to maintain
coherence In study, and to insert examples of grammatical and
idiomatic usage into language-teaching materials where such
examples are needed to improve the student's writing ability.
The type of educational r::form now being pushed by Chinese
leaders differs greatly from the politically charged ones
undertaken by student rebels during the cultural revolution.
Peking's KWANGMING DAILY on 9 May, for example, announced
that it was restoring its special edition on the reform of
Chinese characters--a longstanding objective which languished
as Red Guards assaulted the educational system. Indicating
firm resolve to work for Chinese language reform at this time,
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7
CONPII)I,N'I'IAL PHIS TRENDS
16 MAY 1.973
KWANGMINC I)AII,Y will um., the altoclal edition to disC1188 tile
Imp ill Icat Ion an (I reurg: nIzn,t ion of Chinertt. cI) nrile tere.
popularization of Lite common npuken 1.:tnYunge, teaching the
phoncti ., rendition of Lite ClrineH9.1 lany,ua~;e, and tile use of
the Ch!!tewe phrenetic alphabet. It wil.I oven "introduce the
progrer.ei made by foreign count.rl&H [n reforming the written
language: and Htandard[zing both the written and Hpoken
of
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7