TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060014-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 4, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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F B I S
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
4 APRIL 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 14)
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This propaganda analysis report is bawd exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FB S without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 APRIL 1973
CUNTEi'JTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
DRV, PRG statements flail U.S. Withdrawal; Nixon Talk Scored . . .
1
U.S. Charged with Violating Accord; POW Complaints Denied . . . .
5
Comment Marks End of Four-Party Joint Military Commission . . . .
6
Peking Offers Restrained Support for Allies' Pronouncements . . .
8
PRG Foreign Minister Binh Pays Official Visit to USSR . . . . . .
1.0
USSR - UN
Moscow Calls for Security Council Action on Nonuse of Force . . .
12
USSR - GERMANY
Moscow Begins Preparation for Brezhnev Visit to FRG . . . . . . .
13
USSR - UK
Moscow Again Signals for improved Relations with London . . . . .
15
CHINA
PRC Promotes "National Independence Movement" in Third World. . .
17
CUBA
Havana Endorses "Ideological Pluralism" in Latin America. . . . .
21
USSR
New C.mpaign Launched Against Ukrainian Nationalism . . . . . . .
23
All-Army Conference Shuns Doctrinal Issues, Boosts Brezhnev . . .
26
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
4 APRIL 1973
- i -
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 26 MARCH -- 1 APRIL 1973
Moscow (2659 items)
Vietnam (6%)
[Madame Binh in (--)
USSR
2d Anniversary of 24th (--)
CPSU Congress
China (6%)
Conference of USSR (--)
Military Party
Secretaries
Peking (1270 items)
11% Domestic Issues (48%) 43%
3%] Cameroon President (2%) 18%
in PRC
9% Vietnam (5%) 10%
Cambodia (16%) 7%
6% [FUNK 3d (13%) 4%]
5% Anniversary
UN Seabed Meetings, (7%) 3%
Superpower "Maritime
Hegemony"
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during 'the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 APRIL 1973
INDOCHINA
Hanoi and the PRG marked the completion of the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Vietnam with government statements and a flurry of
editorial comment reiterating the standard line that the withdrawal
is an historic victory. The DRV statement reaffirmed communist
intent to abide by the peace accord while warning that peace in
Vietnam and the future of U.S.-DRV relations depend upon scrupulous
U.S. implementation of the agreement and abandonment of U.S.
policies which led to war.
President Nixon's 29 March TV speech prompted a NH.AN DAN article on
the 31st which acknowledged the substance of his remarks on Vietnam
in unusual detail and rebutted his contention that the United States
is strictly implementing the peace accord. The article warned that
despite U.S. troop withdrawal, "important forces" in Washington are
intent on continuing a "neocolonialist" policy in South Vietnam.
And a NHAN DAN editorial on 3 April viewed President Thieu's current
visit to the United States as another step in U.S. efforts to
interfere in Vietnam's internal affairs.
Peking's first substantive commentary on Vietnam since early last
month came in a 3 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial supporting the DRV
and PRG government statements. NCNA duly carried the texts of
those statements, but in its own comment Peking took a more sanguine
view of the situation and softpedaled alleged violations of the
agreement.
The Soviets gave PRG Foreign Minister Binh a correct but not
effusive reception during her official visit to Moscow from
26 March to 2 April. While Podgornyy awarded her the Order of the
Friendship of the Peoples and lauded the PRG, Moscow's welcome fell
far short of the one she was given in Peking last December when,
among other things, she was received by Mao. Soviet media have
continued to report Vietnamese communist allegations about allied
violations of the peace accord but have initiated no authoritative
comment. Moscow's low posture on Vietnam developments was
illustrated in PRAVDA's report on the President's remarks on
Vietnam in his 29 March speech: The report noted his pledge to abide
by the peace agreement but said nothing about his warning to the
Vietnamese communists regarding their violations of the agreement.
DRV, PRG STATEMENTS HAIL U.S. WITHDRAWAL; NIXON TALK SCORED
In acclaiming the "victory" represented by the final U.S. withdrawal,
the DRV and PRG government statements--issued 30 March and 1 April,
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respectively--observed that for the first time in more than a
hundred years there are no "invading troops" on Vietnamese soil.
At the same time, both statements charged that the United
States is still unwilling to end its military involvement and
intervention in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, and both
called violations of the cease-fire in the past two months a
Threat to peace. While assailing alleged violations of the
peace accord by both Saigon and Washington, the DRV statement
placed major responsibility on the United States, demanding that
it not only end its own military involvement and intervention
in South Vietnam but also "honor its responsibility to prod the
Saigon administration to strictly respect and scrupulously
implement all the provisions of the Paris agreement."
Consistently over the past two months, Hanoi has pointed to U.S.
responsibility regarding Saigon's adherence to the peace accord.
For example, a 31 January NHAN DAN editorial suggested that all
the signatories are responsible for implementing the provisions
for a political settlement in South Vietnam. A 12 February DRV
Foreign Ministry statement had also implied a broad U.S.
responsibility when it said that along with its own strict
adherence to the accord the United States must stop protecting
the Saigon administration in its violations. And on 1 March a
NHAN DAN editorial went beyond earlier demands that the United
States help assure Saigon's implementation of the agreement to
suggest that there were in fact secret understandings regarding
U.S. responsibilities. It said that in addition to signing the
agreement, the United States had made "private commitments on a
number of problems."*
In addition to maintaining that the United States is responsible
for Saigon's adherence to the peace accord, the DRV Government
statement of 30 March warned that U.S. actions are the decisive
factor for the future of DRV-U.S. relations as well as for the
maintenance of peace. The statement said that only if the United
States gives up its policies that led to war and strictly
implements the peace accord can there be an "era of reconciliation"
and a "new relationship" with the DRV. This notion, which seems
to indicate Hanoi concern regarding the course of future U.S.
actions, had first been articulated in a 19 March NHAN DAN
editorial which warned that the United States must choose between
resuming its military involvement or seriously implementing the
* See the TRENDS of 31 January 1973, page 8, 14 February, page 3,
and 7 March, page 2.
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peace accord and advancing toward normal relations with the DRV.*
This was in sharp contrast to Premier Pham Van Dong's 20 February
speech before the National Assembly--a week after Kissinger's visit
to Hanoi--in which he merely paraphrased the language of the peace
accord in declaring that its "strict implementation" would "create
conditions for establishing a new, equal, and mutually beneficial
relationship" between the DRV and the United States.
Hanoi's uncertainty about U.S. policies also seems reflected in its
reaction to the President's 29 March TV address marking the
completion of the U.S. troop withdrawal and the release of the
American POW's. Comment on the speech came in the relatively
low-level form of an article in NHAN DAN on the 31st which, in
referring to unspecified criticism of the speech, raised the
suggestion that U.S. leaders were not united around a single
Vietnam policy: The paper claimed that "public opinion" had
pointed out that the President was silent on "the fact that
important forces in the U.S. ruling circles, while wanting to
withdraw U.S. troops from the Vietnam quagmire, still cling to
the Vietnamization policy in the hope of maintaining their
neocolonialism." The article did not elaborate on the positions
of various "forces" in the U.S. Government; as in the case of
Hanoi comment on the President's 15 March press conference,
however, the paper duly reported his charge of DRV infiltration
into South Vietnam as well as his "threat" that the Vietnamese
should have no doubts about the consequences if they fail to comply
with the agreement. The article, as broadcast by Hanoi radio,
did not comment on the President's warning but did take issue with
his assertion on U.S. compliance with the accord, and it noted U.S.
criticism of the President fur failing to produce any juridical
basis for U.S. air strikes in Cambodia.
Hanoi did comment on the question of possible U.S. retaliation in
a 4 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article which criticized Defense
Secretary Richardson's remarks, in his 1 April Meet the Press
interview, acknowledging that the United States might resume
mining and bombing of the DRV. The article recalled that
Richardson's statement "followed Nixon's threat of 'retaliatory
measures,' emitted twice within just two weeks." It asserted
that "what the authorities in Washington say is quite inadmissible,"
and it charged that "the White House and the Pentagon's threats
are meant to give more heart to the U.S. henchmen in Saigon to
nibble at the liberated zone."
The editorial is discussed in the 28 March 1973 TRENDS, pages 1-2.
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4 APRIL 1973
Unlike Hanoi, the PRIG promptly responded to the President's
warning with a 30 March statement by its spokesman in Paris,
Le Van Sau. As reported by Liberation Radio, he Declared that
"the Vietnamese people will never submit to such threats and
that President Nixon is well aware that the Vietnamese people
have in the recent past stood firm in the face of all U.S.
threats and massive bombing." President Nixon's remarks on
DRV infiltration drew further attacks in a 3 April Liberation
kdaio commentary which described the President as "a whistle-
blowing international gendarme who has always grossly intervened
in other countries' affairs."
Questions about future U.S. policies were also raised in the
3 April NHAN DAN editorial on Thieu's trip to the United States.
The editorial took note of Thieu's remark, in a LE NOUVEL
OBSERUATEUh interview, that in the event of a serious communist
attack the Llited Statcs might resume bombing without being
asked. Pointing out that the United States has signed the peace
agreement, the editorial asked: "How can they resume the bombing?
Would they want to re-enact the tragedy which shook the United
States and upset their global strategy?" (The Thieu interview
had previously been reported in a 1 April Hanoi broadcast which
criticized Thieu for "fabricating the story that the PRG is
preparing for a major offensive to be launched in the next three
to six months.")
Initial reaction to the 3 April Nixon-Thieu communique came the
following day in a Liberation Radio broadcast which claimed that in
the communique "Nixon continued to advance slanderous allegations
about so-called North Vietnamese movements of troops and
armaments" to the South anu "threatened to make strong reactions."
The broadcast also quoted REUTER, however, as noting that the
communique "made no specific guarantees to Thieu." The President,
the radio charged, is continuing to use Thieu as a tool to
implement neocolonialism and Vietnamization and is "paving the
way for the Americans to continue to intervene in South Vietnam
in the new situation by intensifying the odious slander and
brazen intimidation campaign . . . ."
Despite the warnings of U.S. persistence in "neocolonialist" schemes
vis-a-vis South Vietnam, the propaganda pictures the communists as
having won a greater victory than they did against the French in
1954. Along with expressions of jubilation over the withdrawal
of the United States, "the main enemey," a NHAN DAN editorial on
30 March said that at the same time "half of our South Vietnam"
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4 APRIL 1973
has been "liberated." The editorial contrasted this situation
with that in 1954 when the French withdrew and "half the country"
was liberated. At the same time, propagandists have been careful
? to reiterate the reminder that the final objectives of the
revolution have yet to be achieved.
In sL,:essing its "victory," Hanoi has admonished the leaders in
Saigon that they can no longer count on the United States for
help and that "national concord" should be achieved. For example,
a 30 March NHAN DAN editorial said that "outcasts in Saigon"
should reconsider their actions. And a NHAN DAN editorial on the
3d, while denouncing Thieu as a tool of the United States, at the
same time called on the "rulers in Saigon" to return "to live
with the people and the fatherland."
U.S. CHARGED WITH VIOLATING ACCORD; POW COMPLAINTS DENIED
Hanoi and the PRG commentaries have continued to berate the United
States for a host of alleged violations of the Vietnam peace
accord, and Hanoi on 31 March issued a DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement claiming--for the second time since the
signing of the accord--that U.S. planes had carried out reconnaissance
flights over North Vietnam. The flights allegedly took place on
29 and 31 March, over Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces. The only
other such protest in the past two months, issued on 15 March, claimed
that there had been overflights on the 12th and 13th.
Hanoi predictably rejected U.S. denials of communist charges that
U.S. military personnel are being illegally retained in South Vietnam.
A 3 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article reiterated Hanoi's claim that
10,000 military personnel are staying in the South disguised as
civilians, and it specifically denounced recent statements about the
civilian forces in the South by State Department spokesman Bray
and Defense Secretary Richardsot,. The U.S. spokesmen's explanations,
according to the army paper, were aimed at "covering up their crimes."
REACTION TO Beginning on 1 April, DRV and PRG media rejected
POW STATEMENTS recent claims by former U.S. POW's that they had
been tortured and mistreated while in communist
detention camps. Hanoi radl, stated on ]. April that some of these
men were "again serving as pawns in the hands of the White House and
Pentagon leaders." On 2 April a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, broad-
cast by Hanoi radio, traced the POW statements to "a White House plan"
which called for press conferences in which the former prisoners would
detail their "'real situation"' in captivity as soot: as all POW's were
freed. Referring to a statement "made by Nixon in 1971 in which he
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said North Vietnam was treating the U.S. POW's inhumanely," the
commentary alleged that the current campaign is aimed "primarily
at easing the psychological impact that runs counter to Nixon's
fa;)rications."
A NHA.N DAN commentary, excerpts of which were carried by V1"?A on
1 April, recalled statements by U.S. observers that the POW's were
in good health when they were released and charged U.S. authorities
with trying to "rouse bigoted chauvinism among the American people
in order to plead for their former mistakes and wreck the friend-
ship between the Vietnamese and American people." It added the
warning that "their trick will bring them no good and will not
contribute to the building of normal relations between the DRV
and the United States, as they often claimed."
COMMENT MARKS END OF FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY CCWISSION
The end of operations by the four-party Joint Military Commission
(JMC) was marked with statements, publicized on 31 March, by the
chiefs of the DRV and PRG delegations routinely deploring alleged
allied violations of the peace agreement. PRG delegation head
Tran Van Tra's statement was amplified by a deputy head of the PRG
delegation, Vv Dong Giang, at a press conference for foreign news-
men on the 3'3t. Giang was particularly outspoken on the issue of
the United S;.ates' failure to dismantle its bases in South Vietnam.
He rejected as "ridiculous" the U.S. argument that the bases had
been turned over to the Saigon government prior to the signing of
the peace accord, aski.,g why, then, the United States had signed
the agreement providing for the dismantling of the bases. As in
the case of earlier press conferences, Giang deplored the fact that
Vietnamese newsmen could net attend, observing that if their
presence was forbidden by the constitution then the constitution
should be changed.
The first meeting of the two-party JMC, on 29 March, was noted by
Hanoi and PRG media in reports on remarks made at the session by
Tran Van Tra. A 30 March VNA account of the session reported
that the two sides had reached agreement on procedural matters
concerning the work of the JMC but complained that the Saigon side
had "refused to recognize" previously-agreed-upon points on the
privileges and imaunities of the two delegations. Hanoi on the 2d
belatedly reported the 31 March extraordinary session of the JMC,
noting that the PRG representative at the meeting had rejected
Saigon charges about communist attacks in the Tong Le Chan area
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and accused the ARVN of provoking the fighting by trying to move
into PRG areas after the cease-fire. According to Hanoi radio's
account, the PRG also denounced Saigon's "incorrect attitude"
in calling for the cancellation of JMC sessions.
Hanoi has warmly welcomed a visit by the PRG chief delegate to
the JMC and the return of the DRV delegation to the now-defunct
four-party JMC. Tra arrived in Hanoi on 30 March and was met
by a group of North Vietnamese military figures led by the head
of the General Political Department, Song Hao. On the following
day Tra was received by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and
other leaders of the Defense Ministry, and on 2 April he met
with Premier Pham Van Dong. Giap on 1 April also received the
DRV's JMC delegation, which had returned on the preceding day,
and in remarks on both occasions he expressed an optimistic view
of the conditions for the Vietnamese revolution. At the 1 April
gathering he propounded the theory that the United States had
underestimated Vietnamese strength 18 years agc and had had to
correct that mistake by stopping the war through negotiations and
the signing of the peace agreement. He added the warning: "Now
they should think twice before plunging into new adventurous
schemes and acts."
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PEKING OFFERS RESTRAINED SUPPORT FOR ALLIES' PRONOUNCEMENTS
Peking responded with careful restraint to the 30 March DRV and
1 April PRG government statements on the implementation of the
Paris peace agreement over the past two months, accenting the
positive achievements while softpedaling its Vietnamese allies'
charges against the United States. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
on 3 April, Peking's only substantive commentary on Vietnam since
early last month, highlighted the completed U.S. troop withdrawal
as having created "favorable conditions" for the Vietnamese to
settle their own affairs and as thus representing "an important
result" of the implementation of the Paris accord. Reflecting
Peking's interest in a settlement and its sanguine view of
developments, the editorial characterized the completion of
"some important provisions" of the agreement--the U.S. withdrawal,
return of POWs, establishment of the ICCS, and the international
conference--as "conducive to the maintenance of peace in Vietnam
and the easing of the situation in Southeast Asia."
Earlier, in "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with the
DRV and PRG envoys in Peking on 30 March, Chou En-lai congratulated
the Vietnamese on "their tremendous victories" in the war and "in
implementing" the Paris agreement. NCNA's account of the meeting
made no mention of the DRV statement that day, but Chou was quoted
as having "firmly supported the correct attitude and the solemn
and just stand" of the DRV and PRG regarding implementation of the
agreement. In a highly unusual departure from Peking's customary
prompt reporting of such meetings, the NCNA report was dated
4 April, five days after the fact. Peking may have delayed the
report in order to assess the DRV and the subsequent PRG statements
and to prepare its own editorial comment. It may also have
decided to issue the report in response to President Nixon's
meeting with Thieu.
NCNA duly carried the texts of the DRV and PRG statements, but in
its own name Peking has struck a balance between supporting its allies
and sustaining a propitious atmosphere for Sino-U.S. relations.
Thus, on the question of violations of the Paris agreement, the
Chinese editorial placed primary blame on Saigon and only
secondarily on the United States, in contrast to Hanoi's stress
on U.S. responsibility. Similarly, Chou on the 30th had condemned
Saigon for allegedly violating the agreement "with the support of
the United States." The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial criticized the
United States in mild terms for retaining "disguised" military
personnel in Vietnam, delaying the removal of mines, and continuing
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air strikes in Cambodia, but there was no echo of the more sweeping
Vietnamese charges that the United States is seeking to mainLutn
"neocolonialism" in South Vietnam, has continued bombing in Laos,
and has maintained a force in ThaiImd and elsewhere in Southeast
Asia that directly menaces the security of the region. In keeping
with Peking's silence on Preside it Nixon's warnings to the
communists in his 15 March and 29 March remarks, tho editorial
also failed to repeat the Vietnamese charge that the United States
has threare,,orl to use force against the DRV.
On the b u:e of Saigon's alleged violat-ons, the editorial seconded
charges relating to cease-lire violations and persecution of the
South Vietnamese people, but there was no attempt to match the
Vietnamese communists' pr'rtrayal of these acts as "in no way
different in scale and atrocity from wartime operations." The
editorial also avoided Hanoi's claim that the alleged violations
have created an extremely grave situation which directly threatens
peace in South Vietnam."
The editorial concluded by routinely pledging that the Chinese will
"firmly support" their allies' "Just struggle." In Peking's only
other recent elite pledge of support, Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan
was reported by NCNA as declaring during a 1 April meeting with a
visiting DRV youth delegation that the Chinese will continue backing
the Vietnamese "like brothers" and that the two peoples will
maintain their friendship "for generation after generation."
VIETNAMESE GOALS In addition to the five-day delay in releasing
the report on the meeting, another curious
feature of NCNA's account of Chou's talk with the DRV and PRG
representatives on 30 March was the set of goals he attributed
to the "Vietnamese people's cause." According to NCNA, Chou
expressed his belief that their "cause for peace, independence,
democracy, and national concord" will surely triumph. Such a list
of goals notably omits the customary reference to reunification,
unless the much vaguer reference to "national concord" can be
taken as a substitute. In contrast, the 3 April PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial concluded with an expression of confidence that the
"Vietnamese people's national aspirations for the peace,
reunification, independence, democracy, and prosperity of their
fatherland" will surely be realized. Likewise, the 28 January
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and the Chinese leaders' message on
the next day hailing the Vietnam agreement contained these
five goals.
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PRG FOREIGN MINISTER AINH PAYS OFFICIAL VISIT TO USSR
PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh's visit to Moscow ad hood
of an "official friendship" delegation, from 2u March to 2 April,
received c.rrect but not unduly effusive treatment. While Binh
met with Podgornyy as well. as with Gromyko, there was no indication
that she was rec,-ived by either Brezhnev or Kosygin. By contrast,
her officini visit to Peking last December had occasioned all
unusually strong leadership turnout.*
The joint communique is available at this writing only in summary
form, as carried by TASS on the 3d. Judging from the summary,
while the communique expressed concern over serious violations by
Saigon, it contained no charge of U.S. violations. However, TASS
noted that it said "both sides believe that the United States,
just as the other sides, should strictly fulfill the Paris agree-
ment." In conclusion, TASS reported, the Soviet side reaffirmed
its support for the Vietnamese cause as its internatioualist duty.
Circumspection regarding U.S. implementation of the peace accord
was also reflected in Podgornyy's remarks during the visit.
Speaking on the 28th when he presented the Order of Friendship of
the Peoples to Mme. Binh, Podgornyy referred to Saigon's attempts
Lo sabotage the peace but did not mention the United States, The
Soviet leader followed a similar pattern on 2 April when Binh
again met with him to hand over a copy of the 1 April PRG statement
on implementation of the peace accord during the past two months.
Thus, Judging from the TASS report, Podgornyy "resolutely condemned
the actions of the Saigon authorities" but apparently ignored the
anti-U.S. charges in the statement. Moscow, however, duly reported
both the PRG and DRV government statements; and a radio commentary
on the 3d, reviewing Binh's visit, noted that the PRG statement
accused the United States of maintaining a covert military presence
in South Vietnam and of illegally delivering arms to the GVN.
In presenting the friendship order, Podgornyy went beyond prior
elite Soviet statements when he called the PRG "the lawful spokes-
man of the interests of all the South Vietnamese people." He
observed that the award was in recognition of Mme. Binh's great
services in the strengthening of international solidarity of all
progressive and democratic forces. Binh in reply expressed
"sincere and deep-felt gratitude" to the Soviets for their "great
and valuable" assistance which she called an important factor in
the Vietnamese communists' victory.
* See the TRENDS of 4 January 1973, pages 13-15.
CONFIDENTIAL
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h AI'ItLI, h /I
tHlnli'H uthar act lvItlow Includad ti maatIng wlth altarnata
Polltburo mambur I'onomarav an wall, am with horaign Miniwtar
Croniyko, who howtwd a IUnchaon rot. liar on the 280h, Hlia
alao nirt with vartouw public orgnnl.yatlonw and wpoka at a
Sovleit-Victnaniawa Priandwhl.l: ninotlnu on tha 29th, on that
or.Cnuiun tigu.in axprwwwing liar puopta's greititudo tor. Cllr
Sovl.wt Union's actlvu support,
a
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(.111410'111.N'I'IAl hillll 'I'ItENIP1
Is A111411, 1911
USSR-UN
MOSCOW CALLS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON NONUSE OF FORCE
In NEW '1'1MI;1, 1111AVDA, rnd SOVI"I'IIKAYA ROSNI.YA art.iclum .1.nwt wouk
Mo1Cov en IIed on I. le 1UN Secur.Ity Council to take munmurru to
Implrment t:ho Gene.rnl AHflambl.y'4 rr.HOlution on nonuHC of force
and it pi'rmnnunt ban on the une of nuclour weapons (NUF). The
c rnproml.He ruHolutfon, which wnu pnssad lost fnl.l. after the now
Soviet Inltlntive on this issue, hnd called on the Security
Council to take "nppropr.inte monsureH" for its implementation
nn moon no possible. To date the NUF package has received only
modest publicity in Soviet media. The notable exception was
frezhnev'H statement at the ISSR'o 50th Anniversary celebrations
lost December. Indicating the USSR's willingness to sign bil.ntoral
NUF agreements with the nuclear powers. That offer was renewed
most recently by Soviet delegate Roshchin at a session of the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva reported by
PASS on 29 March.*
The propaganda dimension of the renewed call for Security Council
action on NUF was apparent in the nature of the action called for.
G. Stake, in the 23 March 1973 (No. 12) NEW TIMES, recommended
that the decisiou be made -,n accordance with Article 25 of the UN
Chaser under which member states agree to "accept and carry out"
rive decisions of the Security Council. According to Stakh, such
a procedure would "make it possible to avoid he complex procedures
of internal legislation connected with the adoption of inter-
national obligations by a number of states."
Stakh, as well as V. Viktorov in the 31 March PRAVDA and Boris
Svetlov in ?I.e 30 March SOVETSKAYA F'OSSIYA, criticized Chinese
opposition to the resolution last fall. That Moscow had the West
as well as Peking in mind in setting forth the NUF proposal, however,
was suggested in Stakh's explanation of Moscow's reasons for linking
the general nonuse of force pledge with a specific ban on the use
of nuclear weapons--a subject that was obscured in earlier comment.
Clearly alluding to past West European and U.S. objections to
nuclear weapons ban proposals, he explained that NUF provides a
way out of the "vicious circle" in which "powers which possess
nuclear weapons have in the past repeatedly alluded to the oresence
in other states of powerful armed forces equipped with conventional
weapons in order to avoid banning nuclear weapons."
* Poland's Vice Foreign Minister Jan Bisztyga in a 12 March speech
(discussed in the TRENDS of 21 March 1973, page 9) implied that
Moscow will also push NUF as a major agenda item at the proposed world
disarmament conference.
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AI'I(11, 11)71
USSR-GERMANY
MOSCOW l3LG I NS PREPARATION FOR I3REZHNL:V VISIT TO FRG
MoHrow 111114 begun to prepare Ilia ground fur III-vzIIIIvv,H L oil tit l:.lva.Iy
HclluduItiff May VIM IL to Lhu Fudoral I(epuhIIt of Curnulny, the f.Irut
by the Lop Sovlut party leader, although t.lio Soviet people have
yi't to hu ofl'.lcl.nll.y Informed thnt_ the vIHIt Is planned. Moscow's
central, medlu had not publlc.lzud Lho InnVI.(11Llon extended by
Brandt to Brezlnlev during their SupLemher 1.971 Crimea talks, nor
dEd Moscow report Brezllnev'H HuhHeduent 14tntement to n West
German correHpondent fit MfnHk--at the time of the January
Pompidou-Brezhnev talks--Lhat: an InvltaLton was outstanding but
Litat no (late had yet been net.* The media have now begun to
depict West German pleasure over the "posHlhle" visit, in
tint ictpaLion of it firming up of arrangements that will permit
an "nnouncement of the dates.
Noting that a "great deal" of comment had been stimulated by the
26 March meeting between Brezhnev and FRG Ambassador Salim,
IZVESTIYA's M. Mikllay.lov observed In the 1 April Moscow domestic
service observers' roundtable program that the West German press
is calling "this noteworthy event:" a "beginning of a new dialog
between the top leaders of the two states." Recalling the 1.971
meeting between Brezhnev and Brandt, Mikhaylov said that Soviet-
West German relations "have been developing favorably" since the
ratification of the USSR-FRG treaty; and without explicitly
stating that Brezhnev will meet with Brandt, he observed that
it was understandable that the public should greet with satisfac-
tion the news of "a continuation of contacts at the summit level."
He went on to say that both the FRG and the USSR are now "shov,ing
readiness for a further expansion of cooperation and a deepening
of mutual understanding."
On the 3d TASS carried a long dispatch from Bonn reviewing West
German press discussion of the "possible visit" by Brezhnev.
Observing that the West German papers say the visit "%'il1 be
held in the near future, although no definite date hau vet been
* The West German DPA reported on the 3d, citing Bonn "diplomatic
circles," that Bonn had suggested 12-18 May for the visit and that
Moscow was expected to respond within the next few days.
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CON leIIIEN'I'IAI, F14Itl TRENDS
/e APRII, 19/3
Nut," TANS wunt can to point out th&' "polIIIcal Lmportnncu" the
WQNL Cirmanu attach Lo Lhu I.d011, quoting onu paper NN pointing
out. Lluit ChIH wil.1 bu It ruzhnuv'a ftrNt: vINft to Bonn. Ru1'luct1ng
HvnN I L I v i ty to old an ImtJH.L t I CIN toward the GermnnH dating from
World War I1, TASS pointedly quoted one Wost German paper's
comment that Brerhnev "wants to umphaHIzu that the lengthy
per.lod of confronl.atlon is becoming a matter of the past."
I)IHCuHui.ng the devu.lop(ng USSR-FRG relationship, TASS also
noted that WuH1 German spokesmen have mentioned the possibility
that hi Lut:erai. agreements on cultural. and scientific-technical
cooperation and air travel may be signed during the visit.
KOSYGIN, PONOMAREV SPEECHES Kosygin's speech at a dinner in
Stockholm on 2 April contained
passages that seemed contrived with an eye to Brezhnev's West
German trip. In remarks devoted almost entirely to the
developing international detente, with particular reference
to Europe, Kosygin went out of his way to laud the Brandt
government for its policy of "realism." Singling out only
the Brandt-Scheel government in addition to the Soviet Union
and "other socialist countries" for praise in thito connection.
Kosygin paid tribute to the FRG's "realism" as a factor which
had contributed to bringing about a change toward the question
of European security, particularly "fall respect by all [countries]
of the existing European borders." While outlining in general
terms the Soviet aims for the European security conference,
Kosygin made no mehtion of the Vienna force reduction talks.
Along with these intimaticns of closer ties with the FRG,
Mos.:ow has sought to reassure the GDR leadership that the
Soviet-West German relationship can develop only along
nonideological lines. Thus CPSU Politburo candidate member
Ponomarev, in a broad-ranging speech reviewing world developments
since the 19'9 Moscow international communist conference, told
the 15-16 March conclave of communist parties in East Berlin--
convened to honor the 125th anniversary of t're Communist
Manifesto--that "on the question of ideology there is not nor
can there be any cooperation with the West German Social
Democrats." Naming Brezhnev as the authority for this position,
Ponomarev noted that Soviet-FRG cooperation is limited to
"finding common points of view" in developing peaceful relations
between the'two countries and in E,irope. He described the FRG
treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, the four-power agreement on
"West Berlin," and the agreements between the FRG and the GDR--
"two sovereign German states"--as constituting a "recognition
under international law of the territorial and political realities
on the European continent." Thus, Ponomarev concluded, "the final
line has essentially been drawn under the results of World War II."
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USSR - UK
MOSCOW AGAIN SIGNALS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH LONDON
t4oacow has again conveyed its .1ntoroaI in :Improving rul.ntions with
London in an article by TASS director general Leonid Znmyattn. In
a 29 t1nrch SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article, written in response to a
London Tvn?,s article on the deterioration of Soviet- Britioh
relations, Zamyatin declared that "the leaders of our country
stated that we are or.ennreel to improve relations with those
European countries with which they are still not smooth--provided,
of course, they show a willingness to do the same." The passage
cited is from Brezhnev's 21 December speech, which did not
mention Britain by name.
Zamyatin, in reviewing relations between the two countries, stated
that the Soviet Union was "optimistic about the development of
bilateral relations with Britain, realizing full well that there
is a great store of friendly sentiments amidst the British people
for the Soviet people and an understar1dir; that Britain was just
as interested as the Soviet Union in all-round business cooperation."
He sought to place the onus for the current climate of hostility
on the Conservative government and the British press. He
appealed to the British press to improve, rather than "undermine,"
Soviet-British relations in the present period of developing
European detente.
It is noteworthy that TASS transma'-' ' the Zamyatin article
textually in its international English service, a procedure
usually reserved for significant speeches, documents, and articles.
The Zamyatin article is the latest in a series o;: his commentaries
in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on important international issues.. On
18 January, in a review of the Pompidou-Brezhnev meeting at Minsk,
he discussed the possibility of French participation in force
reduction talks; on 27 February he discussed the 15-19 February
Kissinger visit to the PRC; and on 13 March he reviewed the state
of Soviet-Japanese relations.
A similar hint of Moscow's attitude had come in an article in
the 23 February London EVENING NEWS by Victor Louis. Opening
his article with the statement that "Moscow wuuld very much like
to see the Queen in Russia," Louis observed that there was "hope"
in the Kremlin that such a state visit was "more than a possibility."
Louis made this statement in the context of discussing the
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4 AI'lt 11, 1971
poauLbLitt.y that Prince Philip and Prtncu u Anna would visit
in Ktuv In September for an tnternatlunnl uquuNtrLan compatItc.on
and would axtunJ their stay in the USSK tit the Invitation of
thu Supramt, Soviet--u inove daacribed by Lochs am "breaking
the Ica" to the "still strained relations" butwuun Moscow
and London.
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CONI~IUEXI'IAl, I1:I4 'I'ItI;NI)N
4 / I'k L I, 19173
CHIi'JA
PRC PROMOTES "NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT" IN THIRD WORLD
Itnl'.Lecting it major a Lamont In Lts current foreign p(.).licy, Puking
lilts Introduced n now formula into Ltu .lr.xlcon: "the nati.onnl.
Lndupondence movement." 't'his formula, which is to be dist.Lngui.uhed
from "thca nationat liberation movement," encapuul.ates Peking's
.novcM acr.osM a broad front to identify its interests with thoss
of it wide variety of third-world stateu and to broaden itu
dlplomat.lc base in the International community in competition
with the superpowers. It also reginter.s a shift in the 1970'r
from Peking's former obsession with the politics of insurgency---
in which Vietnam was held up as a model of people's war--to an
active diplomatic campaign that has markedly enhanced its
international political ass^'-s and overcome its earlier isolation.
The Chinese made use of last month's UN Security Council meeting
held in Panama City as an appropriate forum for promoting the
theme of a growing national independence movement in the third
world. Speaking on 19 March, PRC representative Huang Hua noted
that the Panama City meeting and a Security Council session in
Africa last year marked the first time that the council had met
in Africa and Latin America since the founding of the UN.
According to Huang, this shows that during that period important
changes have taken place in the international arena and "great
progress has been made in the national independence movement"
in Africa and Latin America. He added that countries in the
third world--among which Peking counts itself--"are enjoying
an i.ncrezsingly higher and st-:onger position and role" in
international affairs.
Identifying China as a developing country, like the Latin American
countries, Huang set forth a Chinese model for the developing
nations, much as Peking had formerly propagated the Chinese
revolutionary experience as a model of people's war for the
national liberation movement. In both cases self-reliance has
been stressed while external aid has been minimized as being
of only supplementary value. Thus, according to Huang's reading
of the Chinese experience in "the independent development of
national economy," it is "most essential to rely on one's own
strength and to wage protracted arduous struggle in pursuance
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4 AI1R1.1, 1973
of the policy of relying mainly on one's own effor.t:H while socking
external, asslstincu as an auxiliary."*
Peking took another opportunity to enunciate its policy on the
occasion of the ro cunt vislr by the Cameroon president. A
25 March PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial welcoming the visitor hailed
the Camurooci Government fot its policy of nonalinement and its
support for "the national independence movement in Africa."
According to the editorial., Cameroon opposes the "monopoly of
International affairs by the superpowers" and advocates "stronger
unity and closer cooperation" with countries of the third world.
Striking a recurrent theme of common interests c.mong these
countries, the editorial observed that the people of China and
Cameroon had the common experience of suffering from imperialist
oeliression and now are "confronted with the common task of
opposing imperialism and building their own countries."
FROM INSURGENCY Peking's vigorous, wide-ranging effort to
TO COOPERATION develop friendly and cooperative relations
with a variety of governments represents a
reversal of Chinese priorities in the 1960's, when the
ideological needs deriving from the Sino-Soviet rivalry dictated
an emphasis on insurgent movements as representing the Maoist
revolutionary model. That trend had been further fueled by the
"Red Guard diplomacy" of the cultural revolution, with its
xenophobic overflow into foreign affairs. In the present phase,
however, Peking has sought to establish its credentials as a
trustworthy friend of the developing countries and as a supporter
of their efforts to counteract superpower hegemony.
In addition to the ongoing efforts to develop diplomatic and trade
relations as well as to offer Chinese aid, Peking has tried to make
clear its determination to promote friendship and cooperation
without undue regard for ideological considerations. Thus,
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei declared during a speech before a
group of Tanzanian visitors on 20 August 1972 that the PRC "is
determined to establish and develop friendly relations with all
the independent African countries" on the basis of the principles
of peaceful coexistence. On 17 September Chou En-lai, whose
* Lin Piao's September 1965 tract on people's war insisted that
"it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance" in
fighting a people's war and that "foreign aid can only play a
supplementary role."
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CON FI.UI;N'I.'IAl, IS TRENI)H
AL'RLI, 1.973
pronouncement in the previous decade that Africa WnH rips for
revolution had evoked shudders among African leaders, offered
his assurance at a banquet for the Zambian vice president that
the Chinese are determined to "continue their efforts" to
establish friendly relations with "nil independent African
states" while supporting the national liberation struggles of
those peoples still under colonialist rule.
Two visits by African heads of state before the recent one by
the Cameroon president exemplified Peking's current approach.
After having previously supported the Eritrean Liberation
Front's campaig., against Ethiopian control, Peking in late 1970
established diplomatic ties with Addis Ababa and in 1971 warmly
welcomed Emperor Haile Selassie for a visit. More strikingly,
Peking early this year cordially received Zaire President Mobutu,
who had formerly been reviled as "chief running dog for U.S.
imperialism in Africa."
Peking thus far has taken a less ecumenical approach toward
Latin American states, perhaps reflecting a reluctance to offer
a blanket enc;orsement that would embrace regimes with which
Peking would be loath to identify common interests. Nonetheless,
as registered in the formula on the national independence
movement, Peking has replaced its former ideological propaganda
keyed to the Sino-Soviet competition in the communist movement
with a campaign linking the PRC's interests with those of a
widening range of Latin American states.
The other area of the third world, Asia, presents even more
complications and has nct been explicitly included within the
new formula. In Asia Peking has followed a dual approach of
cultivating better relations with existing governments while
offering limited support for selected insurgent movements.
Here also, however, the trend has been toward diplomatic rather
than insurrectionary instrumentalities.
REGIONAL UNITY In the process of encouraging African and
Latin American governments to pursue a policy
of national independence, Peking has demonstrated an increasingly
favorable view of various regional groupings of states that are
promoting unified opposition to extraregional forces. NCNA's
30 December 1972 yearend review of the situation in Latin America
carefully noted Peking's changed assessment of the rvie played
by the Organization of American States and other inter-American
bodies, stating that such groups in the past had been "instruments
of the United States" but have increasingly become forums for unity
against the superpowers. A similar trend has been reflected in
CONFIDENTIAL
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Peking's view of the Organization of African Unity and similar
Inter-African bodies which Peking now welcomes as safeguards
for African interests. Chou expressed this view in remarks at
a 27 March reception in Peking given by African diplomats in
which he hailed African unity as the means "to win and safe-
guard independence" in the struggle "aga:.nst imperialism,
colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, and hegemonism."
Peking's stress on African cohesion has been reflected in its
line on African insurgent movements directed against colonial
and white-ruled sub-Saharan states. In the past Peking had
usually bestowed its favor only on those segments of the
insurgent movements that would tout Peking's line and eschew
Moscow's tutelage--a policy that had the familiar effect of
splitting liberation groups into pro-Peking and pro-Moscow
factions. Now, however, Peking has begun puhlicizing efforts
sponsored by the OAU and other African groups designed to
reunify these splintered movements in the interest of more
effectively conducting the struggle against white-ruled regimes.
Most recently, NCNA last month reported on the unification as
a result of OAU mediation of a PRC-backed anti-Rhodesian insurgent
group with its Soviet-backed counterpart.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 APRIL 1973
CUBA
HAVANA ENDORSES "ILaOLOGICAL PLURALISM" IN LATIN AMERICA
Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, speaking
at a meeting of the Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA) in Quito on 26 March, embraced the concept of "ideological.
pluralism" in Latin America--in effect formalizing policies that
Havana has followed in Latin America during the past four years.
He declared that until socialism triumphed throughout Latin
America the Cuban regime would "work in association with
dissimilar political and social systems." However, in defining
the concept of "ideological pluralism," Rodriguez stipulated
that it did not mean coexistence with hostile regimes or hostile
ideologies.
Rodriguez' statement provides ideological justification for
Havana's policy of courting regimes which pursue courses of
action inimical to the United States regardless of their
professed ideologies. Havana's endorsement of pluralism at
this time appears related to its belief that polarization is
growing in the hemisphere and that the United States is becoming
increasin&ly isolated. Both the ECLA conclave and the UN Security
Council meeting in Panama have been cited regularly by Cuban
media as evidence of this phenomenon.
Implicit in Rodriguez' statement was the notion that ideological
differences between Latin American states must be submerged in
the interest of hemispheric unity v,i.s-a-vis the United States.
He made this clear in a Havana TV interview on the 28th after his
return from Quito, when he was askeL whether a U.S.-Latin American
"confrontation" was occurring. Rodriguez noted in reply that "a
process of unity vis-a-vis the United States' pos ion again
surfaced at the ECLA meeting" despite "the divers: y of regimes
in Latin America." Alleging that "we accept the resent
ideological plurality but we do not resign ourselves to it,"
he concluded that the Cuban example had been a catalyst in
promoting the confrontation.
In his address to the ECLA, published in the Cuban party organ
,RANMA on the 27th, Rodriguez stressed that there were certain
limitations on Cuban acceptance of ideological diversity. For
Cuba, he said, "ideological pluralism" does not signify
"coexistence with petty tyrants" or a betrayal of "peoples who
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4 APRIL 1973
see in the Cuban revolution a vision of their own destiny."
And a 29 March PRENSA LATINA commentary, highlighting the
significance of Rodriguez' remarks, noted that he had severely
criticized such "reactionary" regimes as those of Brazil and
Paraguay. It went on to report that at a Guayaquil press
conference Rodriguez had said Havana's "acceptance of peacetul
coexistence" in Latin America did not denote any slackening of
"the ideological struggle--which is more necessary now than ever
to help the countries of the area understand the fatal consequences
of the capitalist system."
BACKGROUND The PRENSA LATINA commentary stated that the concept
of ideological pluralism had been "accepted in fact
but not verbally until now by the leaders of the revolution."
The Cuban shift away from a virtually exclusive policy of
supporting Latin American guerrilla movements seeking to topple
established regimes had come in 1969. A more flexible approach
was signaled by Havana's public endorsement of the "revolutionary"
character of the newly established Peruvian military regime.
Although Hav.na had initially censured the Peruvian leaders as
typical Latin American "gorillas," it quickly changed its line
with Castro hailing as "revolutionary measures" the new regime's
expropriation of International Petroleum Company assets and the
enactment of a new agrarian reform law.
While he did not use the term "ideological pluralism," Castro
espoused a similar concept in his April 1970 Lenin Day speech.
Noting that Havana's support for revolution did not have to be
confined sole':' to guerrilla movements, he asserted that it
could extend to "any government that sincerely adopts a policy
of economic and social growth and is for liberating the country
from the Yankee imperialist yoke." Castro stressed that
"regardless of how such a government has come to power, Cuba
will support it." In Havana's estimate, such criteria have
already been met by Chile and Panama as well as Peru and by
the Caribbean ministates that recently established relations
with Cuba. Regime spokesmen have even intimated that Ecuador
and Argentina (after the Peronists take power next month) may
also qualify for membership in this circle.
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USSR
NEW CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED AGAINST UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM
The Ukrainian leadership has launched a new offensive against
Ukrainian nationalism, marked by regional meetings called to
intensify "international education" and denounce nationalist
deviations. Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy touched
off the campaign with a 16 March speech stressing the primacy
of national values and interests over provincial ones.
Shcherbitskiy has emphasized these themes ever since he succeeded
Shelest last May, reflecting a reaction against Shelest's
p7:omotion of Ukrainian historical traditions and his defense
of Ukrainian economic interests. At the same time, the c:.;prsure
cf nationalist deviations in literature and the arrest of a
foreign tourist for contacts with dissident Ukrainian writers
have apparently served as pretexts for a new shakeup in the Ukrainian
writers union, placing the mos_ reactionary writers in firm control.
REGIONAL MEETINGS According to RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 17 March,
Shcherbitskiy launched the new offensive
a Kiev aktiv meeting the previous day with a call for greater
emphasis on the notion of "a new historical community of people--
the Soviet people--and the significance of a unitary national
economic complex for development of each union republic and the
country as a whole." Emphasizing a class approach to evaluating
the past, he attacked the idealization of "patriarchalism" and
the stress on Ukrainian nationhood in Ukrainian literature.
Assailing errors by the Ukrainian institutes of archaelogy and
philosophy and by the Ukrainian Society for the Protection of
Monuments of History and Culture, he called for closer party
control over writers and publishers and personnel in the social
sciences.
Addressing the sam. meeting, Kiev First Secretary V. M. Tsybulko
attacked the Kiev city organizations for failing to take effective
action against manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism and
Zionism, antisocial acts, "incorrect. understanding of our Soviet
life," and "ideologically harmful" literary works. Deputy
party secretary of the Ukrainian writers union B. Chalyy likewise
declared that lack of firm ideologic:' leadership had encouraged
some writers "to get carried away with false romanticizing of the
past, patriarchalism, and ethnc-raphy and sometimes deviate from
class evaluations of the past and present."
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The Kiev meeting was fcllowed by similar aktJ.v meutJ.ngs in Lvov,
Donetsk, Kharkov, Poltava, Dnepropetrovsk, Chern[gov and Vinnitsa.
While attacks rn nationalism are common in Lvov Lind the western
Ukraine, such attacks are rare in the east Ukrainian cities of
Kharkov and Poltava. However, the meetings in these two cities
received special attention, as they were supervised by Secretary
for ideology Malanchuk and Premier Lyashko, respectively. The
Kharkov meeting called for increased vigilance against Ukrainian
nationalism and Zionism, while the Poltava meeting criticized
manifestations of an "oversimplified approach" to the nationality
question and an "incorrect understanding of historical processes."
Party committees in Poltava were instructed to inturvene more
directly in the choice of repertoires for professional and amateur
cultural groups to ensure greater emphasis on "teaching the workers
a feeling of pride in belonging to one socialist fatherland and
to the great international family of fraternal people."
'DISTORTIONS' OF HISTORY Attacks on nationalist deviations in
historical novels commenced immediately
after the replacement of Shelest protege F. D. Ovcharenko by the
reactionary historian V. Yu Malanchuk as ideology secretary on
10 October. LITERATURNA UKRAINA ON 20 October reported that a
historical novel by Ivan Bilik and a science fiction work by Oleo
Berc1nik had been criticized for ideological errors, and a long
17 November LITERATURNA UKRAINA article berated Bilik's novel for
portraying Ukrainian culture as predating Russian culture.
Bilik and Berdnik were again criticized in LITERATURNA.UKRAINA
on 6 February and RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 18 February, but a writers
meeting was reported in LITERATURNA UKRAI.JAon 6 March to have
heard complaints that Bilik's novel -iad not been adequately
criticized. Citing Bilik's historical errors, conservative Kiev
writers union chairman Yuriy Zbanatskiy closed the meeting by
urging a joint conference of historians and writers to enable
writers to gain a proper understanding of the Kievan period in
history. In the wake of these attacks, LITERATURNA UKRAINA on
20 March reported that a 15 March writers union presidium meeting
had accepted the resignation of the chief editor of the Soviet
Writer Publishing House, which had been criticized by Zbanatskiy
in October for publishing Bilik's work.
RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 13 March announced the arrest of a Ukrainian
tourist from West Germany who was alleged to have contacted Berdnik
and two other Ukrainian writers. Berdnik was assailed for accepting
gifts sent by anti-Soviet emigres.
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4 APR 11. 19 /3
Wlil rLHS UNION yIIAKI UP RADYANHKA UKRAINA on 24 March raper t ud u
Ilkral n l an wr l to rw un l:on hoard p l unum on
the "ldeolog[cal convict. b u N of the SovleI writer." 'I'hu pIotluni,
which was attended by Mal.anchuk, heard demands for it clads approach
to evaluation of the past and condemnation of writers who yb 1.ntu
the writers union statutes and "bring "tame on the high tltlw of
Soviet writer." Writers union first deputy chairman Vasil Koztieh4anko'
longtime leader of the harditne faction, keynoted the plenum.
assailing Bilik's novel and calling the matter "much more serious
than the author and certain defenders of his novel pretend,"
according to the 27 Marsh LITERATURNA UKRAINA account of his spuoch-
He also attacked Berdr.ik for writing works propagating the
"messianism" of the Ukr., tnian nation and for disseminating hundreds
of "provocatory" letters, some of which were published abroad
He cited the 13 March RADYANSKA UKRAINA article to show that
Berdnik "willingly associates with doubtful nationalist elements
from abroad" and violates the writers union statutes.
At the conclusion of thr? plenum, 72-year old Yuriy Snolich
resigned as leader of the writers union, allegedly for reasons
of health, and was replaced by Kozachenko. The posts of
chairman, deputy chairman, and organizational secretary were
abolished in favor of a secretariat, consisting of First
Secretary Kozachenko and Pavlo Zagrebelnyy, Yuriy Zbanatskiy,
0leksandr Levada, and Ivan Soldatenko. Zagrebelnyy and
Zbanatskiy had been deputy chairmen and Soldatenko had been
organizational secretary. ueputy chairman Boris 0liynik, a
modecate, was dropped, leaving Zagrebelnyy as the only moderate
in the top leadership. Zagrebelnyy has been under fire for his
historical novel "Death in Kiev," which allegedly portrayed an
embellished image of a tsarist prince. The novel had been
criticized at meetings reported it LITERATURNA UKRAINA on
12 December and 6 March, but at the latter meeting Zagrebelnyy
defended the novel and the right of writers to interpret history
without being dictated to by historians.
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4 APRIL 191'1
ALL-NthiY CONFLFIENCE SHUNS DOCTRINAL I SSUES 111oosis UR`ZI INEV
'1'Iiu t irat gill-army conference of sucretartus of party organizationw
to be held In 13 yaar-i mat Ln the Kremlin from 27 to 29 March to
hear v jarluw of largely .mall-congratulatory apaechas on the work
?f party orgnnl.rat.tonu in the armed forces and on the atatun of
party-military aftai.re in general. Pugged to the recent issuance
of now Regulations and Instructions governing the functions of
polLI-Lcal organs and party organizations in. the armed forces,
the uonfarencu concerned itself mainly with low-level organizational
rind moral.o-training questions. As for the larger issues between
the party and the military--the questions of the respective pro-
vinces of political control and Institutional prerogatives--no
hint of dlssati.sfactions emerged from the spokesman of either
side. Indeed, the conference marked a post-Khrushchev high in
declarations of mutual satisfaction in this regard, with Grechko's
assertion that the Politburo "headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev"
concerned itself "directly" with all issues of military develop-
ment representing an extreme, but characteristic. c;ipression cf
the love-feast atmosphere/ which this fear-;ca of the proceedings
exhibited.
In this respect, the conference was iii marked contrast with the
last such conference which met from 11 to 14 May 1960--a period
of turmoil in party-military relations following the ouster of
Zhukov. The first steps in restoring party control had been
taken in 1958, when new Regulations and Instructions on
political organs and party organizations were issued; the 1960
conference represented the second step and was aimed at reinforcing
the 1958 reforms. The thrust of the deliberations, thus, reflected
a clearly pro-party bias.
By contrast, the speeches at the present conference appear to
reflect a pro-army bias--in the sense that they gave precedence
to the combat-related, as opposed to the more purely indoctrinational,
aspects of military training. Most speakers, in referring to the
subject, listed the tasks of political work in the above order,
and one, General Yepishev, described the shift of emphasis to the
professional side of the soldier's training as a "povorot"--
a turning point--in the style of political work.
That the dividing line between these two aspects of training is
likely to become blurred under the new dispensation is suggested
by some of the goals of political work in a number of the
speeches. They include injunctions: (1) to raise the combat
readiness of the armed forces; (2) to encourage an offensive
CONFIDENTIAL
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1;1)NVII)ISNlIAt, lellI!I RENU11
4 AI'1411, I971
wplrIi among thu troopw; (3) to wupport Iha campaign for a
butter undarwtandl.ng oI wc+aponw and pqulpmunt; (4) to Inwpi.ru
n forwiird - Iouking up lrIL In mllltary affaIrw, partIcu Inr]y with
ruwpuct to tho potuntinlitlrw of science and technology. One
upuakvr, MnrNhnl Kutnkhov, wont wo Car nu to wuggest that
party-political work wnw wimp].y an exemplary performance of
mI.Iltairy dutiew. "It fu carried on everywhere," he said, "on
fllghtw and during exurcliea."
Marshal Crechko's unstt.nting tribute to the party and Brezhnev
personally was notable both as a declaration of the military's
allegiance to the political. leadership, and no an example of
the political benefits Brezhnev has been able to derive from
his patronage of mlliLnry interests. In these respects, the
statement Is unparalleled in the poet-Khr.ushchev ern:
In deciding the great and important national economic
tasks, the part,,, its Central Committee, and the
Politburo of the Central Committee, always keep the
questions of nati.onal defense at the center of their
attention and regard the strengthening of the Armed
Forces :.s onn of the most important tasks of t,ieir
practical activity. There is not a single question
affecting the develonrient of the Armed Forces,
regardless of how important or unimportant it may be,
that is not addressed by the Central Committee, and
by the Politburo directly, under the leadership of
Comrade L.I. Brezhnev.
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