TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 14, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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rB'S
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
14 MARCH 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 11)
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 s
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by F BIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
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NATIONAL. SECURITY INFORMATION
L Unnuthor:zed disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBtS TRENDS
14 MARCH 1973
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
DRV Links Political and Military Aspects of Peace Agreement . . . . .
1
U.S. Scored for Pace of Mine Clearing, Supplying Arms to GVN . . . .
3
DRV Conference Sets Flood Control, Dike Maintenance Tasks . . . . . .
5
Cambodia: Sihanouk's Front Presses Hard Line on Settlement . . . . .
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
6
Moscow Reacts With Restraint to Kissinger China Visit . . . . . . . .
9
Peking Derides Brezhnev's "Social-Imperialist" Policies . . . . . . .
USSR-EGYPT
11
Moscow Assails Haykal for "Anti-Soviet" China Articles . . . . . . .
PALESTINIAN QUESTION
14
USSR Appeals to Jordan for Clemency, Outlines Refugee "Rights" . . .
FRENCH ELECTIONS
17
USSR Gives Mixed Assessment of Results; PRC Slights French CP . . . .
EAST EUROPE
19
Prague Improves Relations With Romania, Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . .
UN SECURITY COUNCIL
20
Cuba Suggests Broad Agenda for Panama City Meeting . . . . . . . . .
USSR
23
Moldavia Strengthens Kolkhoz Council on Experimental Basis . . . . .
25
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
14 MARCH 1973
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 MARCH 1973
Moscow (2974 items)
Peking (1237 items)
International Women's Day
(--)
12%
Domestic Issues
(40%)
56%
Vietnam
(14%)
9%
International Women's Day
(--)
20%
South Yemen Prime
(--)
7%
Vietnam
(32%)
4%
Minister in USSR
NCNA Condemnation of New
(--)
4%
China
(7%)
5%
USSR Place Names in
Ponomarev Speech on 125th
(--)
3%
Far East
Anniversary of Communist
Pyongyang Ctty Delegation
(1%)
3%
Manifesto
Middle East
(4%)
3%
in PRC
PRC-Spain Diplomatic
(--)
3%
Chile Elections
(1%)
3%
Relations
Cambodia
(77)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior issues;
In other cas', the propaganria content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi and the PRG continue to complain about a host of alleged
allied violations of the peace agreement, awl U.S. operations to
remove mines in North Vietnamese waters have been criticized as
inadequate and too slow. Comment warning that the policies of
the Saigon government prolong the danger of the outbreak of a
new war includes a 9 March NHAN DAN editorial which belabored
the GVN for alleged repression of opposition forces and asserted
that the political and military questions cannot be separated.
Vietnamese communist media have reported, without comment, the
arrival in Paris of the DRV delegation to the U.S.-DRV Economic
Commission talks, opening on the 15th, and the departure for
France of a PRG delegation to the GVN-PRG Consultative
Conference, due to begin on the 19th.
Moscow has continued to express satisfaction over the outcome of
the 12-nation Paris conference and low-level. comment persists in
pressing the notion that the Vietnam peace agreement should pave
the way for the establishment of a collective security system in
Asia. Brief reports of DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's
Moscow stopover en route to Hanoi from Paris routinely said that
during a meeting with Politburo member Kirilenko views were
exchanged on the further development of fraternal relations under
the circumstances of the peace accord.
Peking has maintained its low profile on Vietnam developments.
Routine publicity for DRV Foreign Minister Trinh's 10-12 March
stopover in Peking en route home noted that at a reception on
the 11th he :aianked the Chinese for their support at the Paris
conference and jabbed at the "U.S.-backed Saigon regime" for
obstructing the Vietnam agreement. Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
was reported as having lauded the conference in standard terms
and reiterated the stock promise of continued PRC backing.
DRV LINKS POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF PEACE AGREEMENT
The 9 March NHAN DAN editorial indicting the policies of the
Saigon government stressed the importance of insuring democratic
rights in South Vietnam and reiterated that the peace accord
"has laid a stable and legal basis for the struggle or .:reedom
and democracy." The editorial seemed to serve notice that the
cease-fire cannot stand unless the political aspects of the
accord are lived up to. Maintaining that "thc political and
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military aspects cannot be separated from one another," it
repeated the warning, voiced periodically in the past two weeks,
that fighting might be resumed:
as long as the Nguyen Van Thieu clique clings to
its fascist policy and uses violence to repress
freedom and democracy and trample on our
compatriots' right to live, conditions will be
lacking for the South Vietnamese parties to
implement the Paris agreement, the war situation
will be prolonged, and the danger of an outbreak
of war will remain.
The editorial raised the issue of U.S. responsibility only
briefly, asserting that "the U.S. Government, which has placed
the Nguyen Van Thieu clique in a position to run the neocolonialist
ruling machinery in Saigon, also cannot shirk its responsibility."
Hanoi and the PRG have continued to publicize alleged GVN military
actions in violation of the cease-fire agreement, and issued
official protests about some specific incidents. Thus, VNA on
the 9th reporrsd that Dang Van Thu, deputy head of the PRG
delegation to the central four-party Joint Military Commission (JMC),
had sent a memorandum on the previous day to the U.S. and GVN
delegations asking them to reply to a 6 March note requesting the
investigation of an alleged GVN naval attack south of Cua Viet,
Quang Tri Province, on 4 March, and subsequent air and naval
bombardment of the area. The note on the 6th was nut publicized
although LPA on the 5th had reported the alleged incident.
The treatment of the communist delegations to the JMC has continued
to draw f ire, and GVN restrictions on newsmen attempting to meet
with the communist JMC delegates were protested by the PRG delega-
tion's spokesman. An 11 March Hanoi broadcast complained about
the failure of the Saigon delegate to the JMC to agree to a joint
appeal for the implementation of Article 4 of the cease-fire
protocol--the article calling for commanders of the opposing
military forces to meet in areas where the forces are in contact
and reach agreements on temporary measures to avert conflict and
to ensure supply and medical care. Declaring that the issue had
been raised at JMC meetings since 7 February, the broadcast
pressed the position that such meetings between commanders should
generally be held at the basic levels of the company and battalion.
It charged that Saigon had attempted to avoid such local
consultations by proposing that meetings be held instead at the
military region and division levels.
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r]
VIETNAMESE PRISONERS Despite Saigon's move on 7 March to
increase the number of POW's to be
returned in the current phase, Hanoi and the PRG have continued
to point to problems in the exchange of military prisoners.* They
noted Saigon was to return the larger number of prisoners
beginning on P March in Quang Tri, Bong Son, Duc Pho, and Tam
Ky. However, a 10 March note from Tran Van Tra, the head of the
PRG delegation -o the JMC, charged that the ARVN had repeatedly
attacked the Duc Pho and Tam Ky sites and raised the possibility
that the scheduled 11 t:arch POW exchange in those areas would
be canceled. VNA on the l'_:?h claimed that on the previous day
a JMC fact-finding team visi`ed Duc Pho, Quang Ngai Province,
and "collected full evidence" on ARVN attacks on the PRG zone
there. A 13 March VNA report indicated that the allied delegations
on the previous day had refused to sign a statement on the results
of the investigation but had agreed to ask the ICCS to send a team
to the area.
The issue of Vietnamese civilian prisoners continues to be raised,
with Hanoi and the PRG claiming that Saigon is detaining hundre:s
of thousands of j:olitical prisoners and is trying to avoid
releasing them. A NHAN DAN commentary on the 11th asserted that
"by deliberately delaying the return of captured civilian
personnel, the United States and the Saigon administration are
seriously violating the Paris agreement, and pursuing their
scheme of establishing a fascist regime opposed to peace, national
concord, and the aspiration of the Vietnamese people." In this
same vein, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 7th had seen Saigon's
policies toward civilian prisoners as part of allied efforts to
"insure that only one power group exists in the South--that is,
the fascist Nguyen Van Thieu dictatorship, a tool employed by
U.S. neocolonialism."
U.S. SCORED FOR PACE OF MINE CLEARING. SUPPLYING ARMS TO GVN
On 8 March, two days after U.S. mine-clearing operations began in
the Haiphong area, Hanoi complained that the pace of the U.S.
efforts was too slow, claiming that 20 U.S. vessels and dozens
of helicopters had succeeded in exploding only one of the 8,000
mines. At the same time, Hanoi derided Secretary Rogers' remarks
* The dispute over the number of communist prisoners to be
released is discussed in the 7 March 1973 TRENDS, page 3.
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before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 6 March suggesting
that ships were able to depart from Haiphong because of the
U.S. mine-clearing operations. Another Hanoi report on the
12th claimed that from 6 to 11 March only three mines had been
detonated. Suggesting that North Vietnam will demand more
thorough disposition of the mines, the report complained that
"the Americans still avoid using methods to remove or
deactivate mines permanently." Noting a 9 March Defense
Department suggestion that the mines had become inactive, the
report pointed out that "the Americans did not use any
methods to prove that their mines had become permanently
inactive."
Hanoi did not report the departure of six Soviet ships; however,
TASS on the 5th and IZVESTIYA on the 6th reported they had left
Haiphong and that four more were preparing ti go. IZVESTIYA
noted that a special staff of the Far East Maritime Steamship
Line from Vladivostok is in charge of operations to get ships,
irrespective of registration, out of the DRV ports. On 11 March
Moscow's domestic service reported that a Soviet ship had docked
in the harbor of Haiphong for the first time since the mining
began in May 1972.
WITFDRAWAL OF U.S. Hanoi and the PRG reported on 11 March
TROMPS, WEAPONS that the JttC military subcommission had
agreed to organize joint groups to super-
vise the withdrawal of U.S. and foreign troops. The absence of
such supervision has been the subject of repeated counnunist
criticism since mid-February. Not content with, the agreement on
supervising the troop withdrawal, the reports go on to score
the United States and Saigon for failing to agree with a further
PRG request that the joint group determine whether or not the
withdrawing troops take along their weapons and other war materiel.
They charged that allied refusal to meet this request indicates
that the United States and Saigon are scheming to illegally leave
the weapons in South Vietnam.
Another Hanoi broadcast on the 11th cited a Japanese report two
days earlier that the United States was transporting ammunition
from Japan to South Vietnam. The radio charged that such unilateral
introduction of munitions prior to the formation of a government
through elections and without supervision is a "grave violation"
of Article 7 of the Paris agreement and is aimed at encouraging
Saigon to violate the cease-fire. Similar views were set forth in
a 17 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary which also labeled as
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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"slanders" Pentagon charges that the DRV and PRG have "undertaken
acts for military purposes." Hanoi and PRG have not responded
directly to recent statements by U.S. spokesmen on communist
infiltration of troops and materiel.
DRV CONFERENCE SETS FLOOD CONTROL, DIKE MAINTENANCE TASKS
Hanoi radio on 7 March reported on a "recent" conference called by
the Premier's Office to discuss the tasks of dike maintenance and
flood prevention and control for 1973. According to the broadcast,
the conference also praised "great achievements" in dike maintenance
during the previous year, claiming that the people had not only
quickly repaired bomb damage to the dikes but had also "completed
the dike building plan" and "finished the building of protective
dikes according to?plenned norms." A similar conference last year,
reported by Hanoi radio on 15 March 1972, had stressed the
implementation of both short- and long-term measures for controlling
floods, especially flash floods. This year's conference again
emphasized the need to control "such great flood disasters as
those of 1971." The general tasks remain the same as last year's--
strengthening the dikes, building diversionary and storage
systems, and clearing river beds of obstructions.
In a speech to the conference, Vice Premier Do Muoi, who presided
over last year's meeting, expressed concern over delays in carrying
out this year's tasks. The vice premier suggested the nature of
some specific problems when he urged closer guidance of work at
local levels, careful implementation of Central Committee
resolutions, mobilization of workers and the proper equipment to
do the job, strict quality control, and adherence to regulations.
Reflecting a perennial concern, he also reminded local levels
that they must "resist the subjective thought that dikes have been
built high in recent years, that there will be no big floods and
typhoon this year, and so forth."
Do Muoi described the clearing of the river beds as "a great
problem . . . requiring careful calculation" and called for
intensive efforts to remove collapsed bridges and other obstructions.
The report on the conference suggested that longer-range attention
was being given to the problem of opening the river channels when it
noted that the Water Conservancy Ministry had initially stepped up
the tasks of exploring river beds, clearing soil deposits, and
working out projects and concrete plans to dredge and manage river
sections and river entrances clogged by soil deposits.
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CMIBODIA: SIHANOUK'S FRONT PRESSES HARD LINE ON SETTLEl1ENT
Following the show of flexibility by Prince Sihanouk's front in
the wake of the Vietnam agreement, a hard line on a Cambodia
settlement has been reflected in a subsequent spate of statements
by three "ministers in the interior" as well as in pronouncements
by the Peking-based contingent of the movement. Sihanouk had
indicated of ter the signing of the Vietnam accord that his
government (RGNU) was undertaking a reappraisal of its policy on
the advice of its patrons, and statements issued by the RGNU
had stressed a desire for a settlement while muting the
uncompromising language that had previously marked its pronounce-
ments. Beginning-in mid-February, however, statements in the
name of the three ministers on the front line--Khieu Samphan,
Hou Youn, and Hu Nim--have vehemently denounced the "sham peace"
and "deceitful maneuvers about peace, cease-fire, and national
concord" pursued by the United States and the Lon Nol government.
The RGNU leaders in China later chimed in with similarly hardline
pronouncements, including Sihanouk's latest "message to the Khmer
nation" on 4 March.
APPEALS FROM THE INSURGENTS The three ministers in the interior
have issued five appeals since
10 February calling on monks, youths, soldiers, officials, and
common people under Phnom Penh's control to make a clean break
with the Lon Nol regime and denouncing "peace tricks" designed
to bring about a compromise between the insurgents and the regime.
Typifying this approach, the three ministers' 13 February appeal
to "compatriots" under Phnom Penh's rule characterized recent
peace and cease-fire moves as designed to persuade "all the
patriots to lay down their weapons and extend their necks for
the traitors to behead them." It went on `o draw a sharp
distinction between the insurgents and the Lon Nol government,
concluding a harsh diatribe against the Phnom Penh leaders by
asserting that "we, the patriots, do not want to hear the names
of traitors Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, In Tam and
consorts. Nor do we want to coexist with them. As U.S. imperialist
lackeys in Cambodia, they must be completely overthrown."
The appeals have been accompanied by an outpouring of commentary
by the insurgents' radio and press agency portraying mass meetings
at which participants voiced support for the appeals and rejected
a cease-fire. The insurgents' media disseminated a 25 February
communique from the office of Khieu Samphan declaring that
"liberated" areas have now expanded to 90 percent of the territory
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of Cambodia and include 5.5 million people, an upward-revised
claim that underscores the intransigent line toward the Lon Nol
government.* A 4 March radio commentary pointed to the expanded
insurgency as demonstrating that "the fate awaiting traitors
Lon Not, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, and In Tam in Phnom Penh
and a handful of provincial cities is unnatural death and total
and final collapse. They cannot escape from this fate despite
frenzied military and diplomatic maneuvers }y U.S. imperialism."
SPOKESMEN IN CHINA Sihanouk and RGNU officials in China were
all but silent during the initial weeks
of the campaign in the interior, but recently they made moves
to keep pace by taking a tougher line on the settlement question.
In this period Sihanouk has disappeared from public view, his last
reported appearance taking place on 16 February when NCNA
announced that he had left Hainan Island for Shanghai by plane
that day. There has been no report that he in fact arrived in
Shanghai, though his 4 March message as reported by NCNA on the
6th wav, datelined Shanghai. Earlier, an unusual statement to be
issued in Sihanouk's name alone was transmitted by NCNA under a
27 February Peking dateline. The statement charged that the United
States, contrary to the commitments assumed under the Paris
agreement, has continued to supply military aid and to provide
air support for the Phnom Penh regime. Demanding that the United
States immediately implement Article 20 of the Paris agreement
(dealing with Cambodia and Laos), the statement made no direct
reference to negotiations on a cease-fire but asserted that the
problem of Race in Cambodia "is not difficult to solve:"
Tf that statement represented a move by Sihanouk to leave the
door ajar for negotiations with the United States, his 4 March
message--Sihanouk's only other recent pronouncement--pointedly
excoriated Lon Nol and his associates as "despicable traitors"
and "dogs of the worst species" and took a tough stance against
negotiations with Phnom Penh. Sihanouk asserted that "the Khmer
people do not and will never need to negotiate with the Lon Nol-
Sirik Matak-In Tam gang." Stressing the present "large-scale,
violent, and incessant attacks" by the ins-argent armed forces
against Phnom Penh, Sihanouk asserted that "the whole world
should know" that the "dirty 'republic' anI the pitiable army of
Lon Nol cannot escape being thoroughly wiped out soon" and that
the insurgents "will carry out their struggle, arms in hands,
with no retreat, compromise, or negotiations." Warning those
* The figures in use since June 1972 had been 85 percent of
the territory and 5 million people.
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still working for Lon Nol to "immediately quit the sinking boat"
and cross over to the insurgents, Sihanouk said that those who
insist on serving Phnom Penh "will soon die an ignominious and
inevitable death."
Statements recently issued in the name of the RGNU Foreign Ministry
spokesman in Peking routinely protesting U.S. military actions in
Cambodia have also reflected a hard line concerning a settlement.
Dated 27 February, 3 March, and 8 March, the statements affirmed
a determination to pursue the struggle for the goals set forth
in Sihanouk's March 1970 five-point declaration on a settlement,
but the latter two went further in pointedly criticizing alleged
U.S.-sponsored maneuvers to bring about a compromise settlement.
Peking-based RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth meanwhile, has issued
only one recent statement, in the form of a 25 February message
to the DRV Premier thanking him for a pledge of support for Cambodia
in a 20 February report to the DRV National Assembly and attacking
the "U.S. imperialists and their accomplices and lackeys" for using
every means to bring about "a lame U.S. styled peace."
Peking has duly carried recent RGNU pronouncements, including
shortened versions of the appeals of the ministers in the interior
that included passages highly critical of a compromise settlement.
In its own name, Peking has limited itself to seconding Sihanouk's
27 February statement with a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on
1 March charging that the United States has violated the Paris
agreement by providing military aid to the Lon Nol regime and
bombing the "liberated zone" in Cambodia. Commentator echoed
Sihanouk's statement in saying thPc a settlement would not be
difficult provided that the United States ceases its intervention.
Recent Moscow comment has, as usual, been restricted to brief TASS
dispatches and replays of Viet'gmese comment concerning American
military actions in Cambodia.
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6 1 1 4 0 RELATIONS
MOSCOW REACTS WITH RESTRAINT TO KISSING,R CHINA VISIT
During a period of restraint in its treatment of the China question,
Moscow reacted in a low key to Dr. Kissirtter's 15-19 February visit
to China, giving the impression that the Soviets are taking the
accelerated movement in Sino-U.S. relations in stride while needling
Peking for making concessions to Washington. The Soviets have made
a point of citing Washington's avowals that normalization of relations
with Peking is not directed against third countries. At the same
time, however, Moscow has again reflected its sensitivity to
interpretations of Sino-U.S. developments as being responsive to
a Soviet threat to China.
Apart from reaction to the Kissinger China visit, Moscow has been
largely quiescent on the China question since delivering harsh
polemical attacks on Peking in early February. Elite comment has
ignored China, with the exception of P. brio i ideological swipe at
the "Maoists" by Politburo member Shcherb itskiy in a 27 February
speech in the Ukraine. Brezhnev avoided the China question during
his 22-24 visit to Czecho3lovakia, in contrast. to !i's denunciations
of Peking during a visit to Hungary in late November ..-id in his
keynote speech on 21 December at the USSR's semicentenary celebrations.
Soviet commentators have been drawing on the latter speech as
well as Brezhnev's major 20 March speech last year in expounding
Moscow's line on Sino-Soviet relations,
For its part, Peking has shown little inclination to adopt a
conciliatory posture toward the Soviets. In particular, Peking
has engaged in polemical forays on two sensitive fronts, the
border question and the Brezhnev leadership's performance.
MOSCOW ON KISSINGER Moscow's most authoritative comment on the
CHINA VISIT latest Kissinger visit to China came in a
27 February SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article by
L. Zamyatin, the director of TASS and a frequent commentator on
international affairs. Striking a dominant theme in Moscow's
reaction, Zamyatin drew on Kissinger's press conference to argue
that the United States does not intend to withdraw its forces
from Taiwan even though the condition of reduced tension cited
in the February 1972 Shanghai communique has been met by the Vietnam
and Laos cease-fires. Subsequent Soviet comment has given consider-
able play to the Taiwan issue as one on which Peking made a major
concession by permitting the exchange of liaison offices with
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a capital where the ROC retains its cinlomatic presence. Thus,
a roundup of world reaction carried in the weekly LITERATURNAYA
GAZETA on 7 March highlighted the view that the agreement to
exchange liaison missions represents "a considerable climbdown"
from Peking's formerly adamant position and in effect amourts to
acceptance of two Chinas. Soviet broadcasts to China have
forcefully driven this point home.
Zamyatin raised the sensitive issu'.; of thn implications of
Sino-U.S. rapprochement for the triangular relationship by
charging that there are those using the press and other media
to give an anti-Soviet back' ound to Sino-U.S. developments,
particularly by portraying a Soviet threat to China. Significantly,
Zamyatin avoided questioning Washington's motives in this context
and made a point of noting "straightaway" that Kissinger stressed
that normalization of relations with Peking was not directed
against a third party and that the President had made the same
point previously. Zamyatin added that the Soviet leaders have
stated clearly that Moscow has "no territorial or economic
claims" on the PRC--the reference Lo economic claims presumably
having been inserted in response to the announcement that there
were to be talks on frozen Chinese assets in the United States
and private Amarican claims on the PRC.
As for the "mythical" Soviet threat to China, Zamyatin took
particular note of "certain journalists" who have visited China
and "spread these lie-3," Zamyatin evidently had in mind the lilies
of Joseph Alsop, whose ritings on this score have drawn Moscow'n
polemical ire. In this context Zamyatin referred scornfully to
a "Cairo editor," clearly meaning AL-AHRAM's Haykal, whose
reports on his recent China visit have elicited a spate of
Soviet attacks.* Echoing Brezhnev's 21 December remarks,
Zamyatin :hallenged the Chinese to respond to Moscow's offers
to undertake bilateral nonaggression commitments if they are
redlly worried about a Soviet threat.
Zamyatin closed his article with the complaint that Peking
tries to put any Soviet peace initiative on its procrustean
bed of collusion between the two superpowers. He noted wryly
that Peking's normalization of relations with the United
States represents an acknowledgment of peaceful coexistence
by those who had branded the Soviets as revisionists for
pursuing detente policies.
* See the USSR-Egypt section of the TRENDS.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 MARCH 1973
PEKING DERIDES BREZHNEVIS `SOCIAL-IMPERIALIST" POLICIES
Having taunted the Brezhnev leadership in early February for
making Politburo member Polyanskiy a scapegoat for Soviet
agricultural failures, Peking returned to the attack with
further denunciations that have couched on the scnsitive
border issue and have directed scorn at Brezhnev personally.
Also during this period, the stalemate at the border
negotiations was reflected in Peking's announcement on 8 March
that no agreement was reached at the 18th session of the Sino-
Soviet joint commission for border river navigation. The
session was held from 5 Jaruaty to 5 March in the Chinese
town of Heiho. The two sides agreed to hold the 19th session
in the Soviet Union at a date to be determined later. The
failure to reach an agreement reflects the effect of the
territorial dispute on the deliberations of the commission,
which deals with technical matters concerning navigation.
Moscow has not reported the commission's meeting. At the
end of the commission's 16th session, which lasted from
10 July to 19 December 1970, a Ta33S to?ort was phrased in
such a way as to suggest that sore accord had been reached,
but NCNA reported four days lat2r that no agreement was
registered. That was one of several insta~ices at the time
in which Peking undercut Soviet efforts to portray improvement
in bilateral relations. In the case of the 17th session
(6 December 1971 to 21 March 1972), as on the latest occasion,
Moscow left it to the Chinese to announce the results of the
session.
Two days before NCNA's 8 March announcement on the 18th
session, an NCNA correspondent's article seized upc< Moscow's
"despicable trick" of changing place names in the Soviet Far
East from Han and Manchu to Russian names as evidence of the
"ambitions for aggression" of "Brezhnev and his like." After
giving linguistic ..ad historical backzround on several place
names changed by a decree of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, NCNA
cited the New York TIMES as having gone "right to the heart
of the ipatter" in explaining the Soviet move as aimed at
removing evidence that the region was once Chinese. NCNA
also sarcastically noted that [lace names "glorifying the
Tsarist aggressors" are "invaluable national treasures which
must never be changed."
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The region in question comprises the areas north of the Amur
and east of the Ussuri rivers that were incorporated into
Tsarist Russia as a result of what Poking brands as "unequal
treatise." Though the NCNA report charged that the Brezhnev
leadership has manipulated place names in tho interest of its
"social-imperialist policy," the territorial question as a
subject of current negotiatiotis was carefully skirted. Thus,
NCNA referred to "the Chinese territory occupied by Tsar::*.
Russia" but avoided any formulation asserting Peking's present
territorial claims.
The Brezhnev regime's "social-imperialist policy of aggression
and expansion" figured in another NCNA correspondent's article,
on the 13th, which assembled data to show that Moscow's plans
for expanding the production of consumer goods have been falling
well short of target. Brezhnev was repeatedLy cited by naine
for having failed to deliver on his promises to improve the
standard of living. Reflecting Peking's resentment over the
soviet buildup during the period of Brezhnev's leadership, NCNA
noted that Soviet military expenditures have reached a record
high since he came to power and that tens of billions of rubles
have been allocated to nuclear and missile development. The
article did not, however, refer to the Soviet military buildup
opposite China.
Repeating the pattern of recent years, Moscow reported that the
Chinese again refused permission for Soviet embassy representatives
to go to towns in northeast China to lay wreathe at graves of
Soviet servicemen on the occasion of USSR Armed Forces Day
(23 February). As in 1972, Peking reported that Chinese
p:?ovincial officials laid wreaths at the Soviet graves in
those towns. In addition, this year NCNA reported that
representatives of local branches of the Sino-Soviet Friendship
Association participated in the wreath-laying ceremonies. This
organization, one of the victims of the cultural revolution
and its shattering effect on Sino-Soviet Meat ions, had all but
disappeared from view. In a rare previous reference, Radio
Peking's Russian service on 8 December 1971 carried a m&:asage
from the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association to its Moscow
counterpart expressing condoleeces on the death of the chairman
of the Soviet organization. However, that message had not been
carried by NCNA.
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14 MARCH L973
The revival of the Dino-Noviat Friandship Association's rote
marks a stop toward normalizatl.un of relations, but Pektng'N
denunciations of Nriazhnav's stewardship of Soviet affairs
hardly augur wall for a breakthrough on fundamental :Lasuaa.
The reconstitution of the friendship organization follows n
general trend toward reconstruction of organizations in China
that were destroyed during the cultural revolution.
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0
IISSR-EGYPT
MOSCOW ASSAILS HAYKAL FOR "ANTI-SOVIET" CHINA ARTICLES
Egyptian editor Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, who has long irritated
Moscow with his analyses of Soviet-Egyptian relations, has now
provided the last straw in his recent series of AL-AHRAM articles
on his Par East trip and the publication of a lengthy interviow
with Ch,3u En-lai. While Moscow in the past has responded with
implicit criticism of the AL-AHRAM chief editor,* Haykal's
China articles prompted a campaign in Soviet media seemingly
designed to defend its Middle East policies to the Arabs in reply
to Haykal's "tendentious, lying, unfriendly statements," his
"slander" of Soviet policy toward the Arabs, and his publicity
for "Chinese propaganda fabrications."
Haykal's articles on 21, 23, and 25 February, including the
Chou interview on the 23d, first drew blood in a Moscow broadcast
in Arabic to Algeria on 5 March, followed in quick succession by
a Borisov article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on the 7th and an
Osipov article in IZVESTIYA on the 10th. Both articles have been
broadcast in Arabic, and that in IZVESTIYA was summarized in a
Mandarin broadcast on the 10th. Still another article, by Yuriy
Potomov in the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM, was reported by TASS on the
8th and briefly summarized in Arabic the same day.
With such publicity aimed at Arab audiences, Moo-ow displayed
obvious concern over the influence Haykal's articles might have
on Arab opinion. At the same time, the Soviet commentators were
at pains to demonstrate that he does not speak for the Egyptian
Government or for public opinion.
The propagandists conceded Haykal's prestige but attacked him
personally as well as denouncing his opinions. In IZVESTIYA,
Osipov acknowledged that Haykal was a prominent figure in Egypt
and it was "perfectly natural" that his "Frankly Speaking"
column should be popular, since one should know the views of
"one of the leading Cairo papers on questions related to the
Middle East crisis." Osipov accused Haykal of vanity,
"exaggerated self-importance," and indulgence in the luxury
of making definitive judgments on any subject. Potomov in
* SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA had ob'iquely replied to Haykal last August,
in a period of Soviet-Egyptiat press polemics following the
expulsion of the Soviet Iilittry personnel from Egypt in July.
See the 30 August 1972 TRENDS pages 27-30.
CONFIDENTIAL
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14 MARCH 1973
ZA RUBEZHOM complained that it was one thing for the editor's
"personal" views to be expressed in his office and "quite
another thing" when outlined on the pages of a mass-circulation
newspaper "taking part in the formation of public opinion in
the cnvntry." Potomov registered a "legitimate protest" at
Haykal's attempts to distort friendly Soviet-Arab relations
and to present the USSR's Middle East policy as "allegedly
'based on expansionism, on a striving for domination and
strengthening Soviet presence."' Boribov's article entitled
"Parroting," in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, claimed that while Arab
public opinion saw the USSR as the firm bastion of the national
liberation movement, Haykal, "who claims the role of spokesman
of the Arab public's views and even almost that of its leader,"
was trying to resist the development of Soviet-Arab relations.
The commentators distinguished between Haykal's views and the
position of the Egyptian Government, pointing out that while
Haykal's articles were in preparation and publication, official
Soviet-Egyptian contacts were taking place in Moscow and Egypt
was "extensively celebrating" the 15th anniversary of the
signing of the Soviet-Egyptian economic and technical coopera-
tion agreement. Further making the distinction, the articles
cited statements by President as-Sadat and other officials in
praise of Soviet-Arab friendship and the "firm principles" of
Egyptian-Soviet ties.
Osipov made clear in IZVESTIYA that the Soviet irritation with
Haykal was no new development when he said that Haykal had
sometimes offered Washington the key to a solution of the Middle
East crisis, sometimes denied it the key, sometimes put it in
the hands of West Europe, and "sometimes kept it in his pocket."
Osipov added that Haykal sometimes praised friendship with the
Soviet Union and sometimes called for a "frank dialog" with
Moscow--as he did last August, for example, in the wake of the
expulsion of the Soviet military advinors. He warned that Haykal's
"rude distortions" of Soviet policy harmed the Egyptian people first
of all, the more so since "they are often accompanied by an open
expression of doubt" about the victory of the Egyptian people's
just cause.
"PARROTING" OF Moscow was incensed by Haykal's repetition of
CHINESE LINE "Chinese propaganda fabrications" about the
"so-called danger to China posed by Russia."
Borisov complained in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA that Peking propaganda
theses were increasingly appearing in AL-AHRAM, without attribution,
and singled out the "notorious thesis of the 'two superpowers."'
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14 MARCH 1973
Citing the Lebanese CP daily AN-NIDA' as stressing that the
Chinese leaders were trying to separate the Arabs from their
allies. Borisov charged that Haykal was trying to publicize
"precisely this activity of the Mao'.st leadership." Moscow
also took offense at Haykal for "wining Chou En-lai in allega-
tions" that the USSR was seeking leadership of the Afro-'Asian
solidarity movement.
The articles accused Haykal of contradicting his own previous
positions with respect to Egypt's relations with both the USSR
and the PRC. Borisov cited Haykal's recent book "The Cairo
Documents" to show that the "hegemonistic actions of Peking
with regard to Egypt and President an-Nasir" had been "eloquently
described" by Haykal. And he went back to 1963 in selecting
declarations of gratitude by Haykal for Soviet assistance to
the Arabs, additionally quoting an-Nasir since 1958 to
illustrate his contention that an-Nasir was scarcely dead before
his "closest fellow fighter" had rejected the late president's
heritage and called for revising or abandoning his views.
Moscow showed itself equally irked that Haykal, employing his
"favorite journalistic technique" of presenting his views by
quoting others, cited "biased and untruthful statements" by
Chinese officials regarding the nature of Soviet military aid.
PEKING Peking has taken note of Moscow's campaign in the
REACTION usual indirect fashion in an NCNA report of
editorial comment in the Kuwaiti paper AR-RA'I
AL-'AMM. NCNA on 11 March quoted the paper as remarking that the
Soviet Union was concentrating its attacks on Haykal, who had
been accused by the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM of saying that Soviet
policy in the Middle East was based on expansionism and
strengthening the Soviet position in the region. The Kuwaiti
paper expressed skepticism that the USSR had invested billions
of dollars in the area "only for God's sake," according to NCNA,
and it wondered how Lae Arabs could believe in "gratuitous"
Soviet friendship when it opened the door for emigration of
Jews to Israel. NCNA also cited the editorial as observing
that the Arabs viewed the Soviet Union as almost the same as
America; both stand opposed to the Arabs, for while the United
States supplies weapons to Israel, the USSR supplies the manpower,
which is "more dangerous."
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14 MARCH 1973
PALESTINIAN QUESTION
USSR APPEALS TO JORDAN FOR CLEMENCY. OUTLINES REFUGEE "RIGHTS"
Moscow has to date offered only minimal comment on the seizure
of the Saudi embassy in Khartoum on 1 March and the killing of
three diplomats by members of the Palestinian Black September
Organization. But while une major commentator again deplored
"such excessive manifestations of extremism" as the Khartoum
incident, Moscow has at the same time chosen to underline its
general support for the Palestinian cause. The USSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium, according to Moscow domestic service on 8 March,
appealed to King Husayn on "humane grounds" to save the life of
"the noted figure of the Palestinian resistance movement, Abu
Dawud, and the arrested Palestinians condemned to death." TASS
had reported three days t:arlier the Jordanian Government decision
confirming death sentences meted out to Fatah leader Abu Dawud
and other Palestinians arrested last month while infiltrating
into Jordan in an attempt to stage a coup d'etat, and reportage
on the Khartoum events had noted the Black September demands for
the release of this group. TASS on the 11th reported a telegram
of "profound gratitude" from Palestine Liberation Organization
chairman Yasir 'Arafat to the Supreme Soviet for its appeal.
A second gesture to the Palestinians came in a commentary broadcast
in Arabic on 5 March which called for restoration of the "legitimate
rights" of the Palestinian Arab people. The author, Doctor of Law
Igor Blishchenko, secretary of the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers, has occasionally in the past discussed aspects
of the Middle East problem from the standpoint of internationi.1
law.* This commentary preceded two others by Blishchenko on the
downing of the Libyan airliner by Israel ant, the Israeli attacks
on Lebanon, broadcast in Arabic on the 6th and 12th, respectively.
Blishchenko's views on the Palestinian people's struggle are
notable for providing some definition of what Moscow consistently--
and vaguely--supports as the Palestinians' "Just" or "inalienable"
rights--primarily, said Blishchenko, "the legitimate rights of the
Arab refugees to return to their homeland, to receive compensation
* For instance, in a 28 June 1967 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article
Blishchenko discussed the international legal aspects of
navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Tiran Straits.
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for the damage done to them, and to recover their property."
The most important of these rights, he added, is that of
determining their own destiny as they wish and without
external inturference. He explained that the Palestinians
themselves "can deal with the question of the form of exercising
their right to determine their own destiny"--a position
consistent with Moscow's general evasivenes.; on the matter of
a possible Palestinian state or a federated 'J.ngdom of Jordan
as proposed by King Husayn last March.*
KHARTOUM EVENTS Followup attention to the Black September
operation in Khartoum hao been confined to
TASS reports on the activities of PLO chairman Yasir "Arafat.
On the 8th, TASS noted a telegram sent by 'Arafat to Egyptian
President as-Sadat.in which he called attention to attempts to
"liquidate" the Palestinian resistance oovement following the
"feverish and astonishing" campaign launci:gd by Sudanese
President Numayri and King Husayn. TASS added that Numayri
had charged the Fatah branch in Khartoum with complicity in
the Saudi embassy seizure and the murder of three diplomats,
pointing out that Fatah representatives had refuted this
accusation and called the Black September responsible for the
Khartoum incident. TASS the following day reported that 'Arafat
had sent messages to the heads of Arab states warning that
"forces hostile to the Arabs" were trying to exploit the Khartoum
events to "step up the campaign" against the Palestinian peoples.
Fatah, TASS said, had issued a statement urging Sudan to stop
its anti-Palestine campaign and c..lling for a "direct bilateral
dialog" to avoid aggravation of relations between the Sudanese
and Palestinian peoples.
The only comment came in the weekly commentators' roundtable
broadcast by Moscow's domestic service on the 11th. Former PRAVDA
Middle East expert Primakov, just returned from a visit to Iraq,
concluded a discourse on the Middle East conflict by trying to
strike the usual balance on the question of Palestinian fedayeen
activities: "We must bear in mind," he said, that Israel is
occupying Arab territories and trying to thwart a settlement of
the Palestinian problem, and this is "causing a growth of extremism"
in the Palestinian ranks. But even so, he pointed out, "we do not
justify by any means such excessive manifestations of extremism--
individual terrorism aimed at nonmilitary, civilian objects and
civilians." He added Moscow's customary admonition that such
actions by individval elements of the Palestinian movement would
harm the common Arab struggle against Israel.
* Moscow's cautious reaction to H:-.sayn's proposal is discussed in
the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, pages 32-33, and 29 March, pages 21-22.
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14 MARCH 1973
FRENCH ELECTIONS
USSR GIVES MIXED ASSESSMENT C-F RESULTS. PRC SLIGHTS FRENCH CP
Moscow has reacted to the 11 March final round of the French
parliamentary elections along the lines of preelection comment.
While clearly conveying satisfaction over the continuation of the
Gaullist orientation In French foreign policy, the comment has
generally supported the French Communist Party (PCF) and its left-
wing allies without explicitly endorsing their electoral program.
Echoing post-election statements made by the PCF leadership, TASS
correspondents and Moscow radio commentators labeled the outcome
a "big success" for the PCF and the leftwing parties. They
reiterated the point made by the French leftwing spokesmen
that despite the "reactionary" nature of the electoral system
the left considerably strengthened its position in the National
Assembly at the expense of the Gaullist party which, in fact,
lost its absolute majority.
Moscow's attempt to have it both ways is reflected in a pair of
commentaries on the 12th. Moscow radio's Lev Korolev described
the election as a "great defeat" for the reactionary forces,
demonstrating the advantages of "unity of action" tactics for the
leftwing parties. On the question of the implications of the vote
for French policy, however, he limited himself to the observation
that the electorate wanted changes "in many spheres of domestic
life," saying nothing about foreign policy. TASS commentator
Fraaikov gave much the same mixed assessment, noting the good
showing made by the opponents of the present Gaullist government,
but citing, with evident satisfaction, a report that "circles
close to President Pompidou" have made clear that "there will be
no changes in the main orientation of French foreign policy."
NCNA REPORT Reflecting the poor state of relations between
the PCF and the Chinese Communist Party, NCNA's
account on the 12th of the election results scornfully omitted any
:?eference to the Frencl. CP when, in summarizing the new National
Assembly makeup, it said "the 'Leftwing Alliance' which consists
of the socialist and other parties won 176 seats." Speaking at the
22d PCF Congress last December, French party leader Marchais had
? strongly denounced the Chinese party for its "harmful" and "anti-
Soviet" policies and revealed that the Chinese, in addition to the
Albanian party, had rejected a PCF invitation. NCNA's disdainful
treatment of the PCF is all the more notable when contrasted with
the explicit mention it made of the Chilean CP in reviewing the
gains made by the Popular Unity government in the 4 March legislative
elections in that country.
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EAST EUROPE
PRAGUE IMPROVES RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA., YUGOSLAVIA
Recent high-level contacts between Czechoslovakia and two staunch
critics of the August 1968 intervention, Romania and Yugoslavia,
mark a further step in the detente between the orthodox Warsaw
Pact countries and the two communist mavericks which began with
Brezhnev's landmark visit to Belgrade in September 1971. The
"unofficial" visit of Ceausescu to Prague on 6-7 March was the
first by a Romanian leader to a Warsaw Pact country for purposes
other than formal diplomatic functions since 1968,* Similar visits
in the reverse direction had been undertaken earlier, by Husak in
March 1971 and by Zhivkov in August 1972.
On a lower level, Prague sent its foreign minister Chnoupek to
Bucharest on 4-9 December and to Yugoslavia on 5-8 March. This
was the first visit by a foreign minister of the orthodox Warsaw
Pact countries to Belgrade since 1968, thus underlining Tito's
recent statement, in his interview published in VJESNIK on
23 February, that the disagreements provoked by the 1968 inter-
vention had been "outgrown" and no longer posed difficulties
for Yugoslavia's foreign policy. Also giving point to this
atmosphere of reconciliation was the fact that the visit went
smoothly despite obvious Yugoslav displeasure over an article
in Prague's RUDE PRAVO on 3 March commemorating the anniversary
of the 1878 San Stefano Treaty--a sore memory for Yugoslavia,
since the treaty laid the basis for subsequent Bulgarian
pretensions to historical rights over Macedonia.
Soviet media carried brief reports on Ceausescu's visit, incltiding
a Prague-datelined TASS summary of the final communique in PRtVDA
on the 10th under the heading, "In the Interests of Cooperation."
* The previous visits were occasioned by the signing of friend-
ship treaties or the meeting of Warsaw Pact member states. Thus,
Ceausescu visited Sofia to sign a new 20-year treaty in November
1970 and hosted, for such treaty signing in Bucharest, the USSR's
Kosygin in July 1970, Hungary's Kadar in February 1972, and the
GDR's Honecker in May 1972. Ceausescu's brief trip to Moscow in
May 1970 for unspecified "talks" was evidently related to the
treaty signing which took place in Bucharest in July.
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CEAUSESCU IN PRAGUE The statement issued at the close of
Ceausescu's Prague visit, carried in
RUDE PRAVO an_ SCINTEIA on 8 March, described the talks between
Husak and Ceausescu as "comradely and cordial." The two
leaders' talks in Bucharest in March 1971 had been described
less warmly as "sincere and comradely."
The Prague talks, like the earlier ones in Bucharest, were
attended by hard-lining CPCZ Politburo member and secretary
/asil Bilak. Also present this time were Romanian Foreign
Trade Minister Patan and CSSR State Planning Commission Chairman
Hula--underscoring the economic aspect of the deliberations.
The communique was obscure on international issues, referring
only to an exchange of views on "certain topical questions of
the current international situation and the international
communist and workers movement." It made no claim that the
talks had produced a unanimity of views, but it said they had
contributed to bilateral cooperation between the two parties
on the basis of "Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."
The statement concluded with an announcement that the Romanian
leader had "renewed" an invitation to Husak to pay an "official"
visit to Bucharest.
Although there was no mention in the statement of the phrase
"equality, sovereignty, and independence" in international
communist relations--the codeword in Romanian usage for
independence from Moscow's domination--this omission was
partially amended in an article on the visit in the 9 March
SCINTEIA which added the words "equality and mutual respect"
to the qualities specified in the communique as characterizing
the two countries' mutual relations.
CHNOUPEK IN YUGOSLAVIA The communique issued at the end of
Foreign Minister Chnoupek's visit to
Yugoslavia hailed the "positive" developments which had been
registered in bilateral economic relations It admitted the
existence of continued differences in both domestic and
foreign policy but said these differences should not hinder
increased cooperation "in all fields of mutual interest."
It also said the two foreign ministers informed each other
"about their assessments and stands" on international topics
and detailed aspects agreed upon in regard to Indochina, the
Middle East, and a European Security Conference.
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Using terminology absent in the Ceausescu-Husak com'.aunique,
Chnoupek and Yugoslav foreign minister Minic agreed on
adherence to "equality, independence, sovereignty, and
noninterference" in bilataral relations. The communique
noted that Minic had been invited to make an "official"
visit to the CSSR, and Pragua radio on the 8th reported
that at a meeting that day between Chnoupek and Tito a visit
by Husak to Yugoslavia "was agreed upon and should take
place not later than this year."
The CPCZ party daily RUDE PRAVO had struck a sour note on the
eve of the visit by publishing an article on 3 March effusively
commemorating the anniversary of the 1878 San Stefano Treaty.
The article did not directly mention that the San Stefano
settlement had awarded Macedonia--now part of Yugoslavia--
to Bulgaria, a move that was nullified only four months later
when the Treaty of Berlin in July 1878 restored Macedonia to
Turkish rule. Bulgaria's persistent commemoration of San Stefano,
with unmistakable overtones of a claim to continued rights to
Macedonia, has regularly gi 'en rise to public protest on the
part of Belgrade.
The authoritative Belgrade BORBA on the 8th complained that the
RUDE PRAVO article "provoked astonishment among the Yugoslav
public." coming as it did "immediately prior" to Chnoupek's
visit. The CSSR foreign minister, the paper added; had
expressed "regret" over the article, during his bilateral
talks in Belgrade, and gave assurances that the article, by
RUDE PRAVO's Sofia correspondent Stano, "does not represent
official CSSR views."
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UN SECURITY COUNCIL
CUBA SUGGESTS BROAD AGENDA FUR PANAMA CITY MEETING
In a departure from earlier commentary, two recent PRENSA LATINA
commentaries have indicated Havana's interest in broadening the
agencig of the UN Security Council session scheduled to meet in
Panama City on 15-21 March beyond the issue of the U.S. presence
in the Canal Zone. The commentaries have urged discussion of
other "colonial" enclaves in Latin America and hava ir.Pimated
that questions concerning the U.S. Guantanamo naval base and
the "U.S. commercial and financial blockade" may be raised.
Previously, Havana comment on the meeting had focused exclusively
on the Canal Zone issue, stressing that the conclave would serve
as a useful international forum for denunciation of the U.S.
"colonialist occupation" and that Panama had placed the United
States on the defensive by gaining approval of the meeting in the
face of U.S. reservations.
An 8 March PRENSA LATINA commentary argued that Panama, in
raising the issue of the Canal Zone and "protev;ing the colonial
regime imposed by the United States in this mill.tE.rily and
economically occupied strip of land," had openeu "a debate that
voill go beyond geographical boundaries." It went on to assert
that "other colonial cases" in the hemisphere should be raised
at the meeting. The first among these was the independence of
Puert,) Rico-??a cause long championed by Havana at international
forums. Other colonial enclaves menti;ned as worthy of
consideration by the Panama City session were Belize, Surinam,
French Guiana, and islands of the Lesser Antilles under European
contrc 1.
The following day a PRENSA LATINA commentary by Lionel Martin
hinted at other issues that might be raised at the Security
Council session by the so-called "little entente" of Latin
American states comprised of Cuba, Panama, Peru and Chile.
Alleging that the "little entente" seeks to keep Washingt-.)n "on
the defensive until a whole host of questions is solved,"
Martin observed:
The Panama question is only one. There are also
the problems of the U.S. Guantanamo naval base
on Cuban territory and the U.S. commercial and
financial blockade, presented so poignantly by
President Allende of Chile in his recent UN speech.
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Defining the members of the "little entrrnte" as states which had
"won the wrath of the United States and suffered some retaliatory
punishment" and had demonstrated a "disposition to fight back,"
Martin predicted that Washington would be "confronted at every
turn" by the grouping which could well "end the decade by being
not so little," Another PRENSA LATINA commentary tho -a,ne day
alleged that the Central Ame-'ican states were "alarmed" by the
prospect of the upcoming meeting and as "pawns showing solidarity
with the king" would back the United States on the issue of the
Canal Zone, It concluded, however, that Panama could "count on
the solidarity of Cuba, Chile and Peru."
MOSCOW AND PEKING Routine Soviet comment on the meeting has
touched only on the Canal Zone issue,
upholding the legitimacy of Panamanian Maims, Peking has not
.ommented on the subject, but NCNA has carried items reporting
the Panamanian position on the Canal Zone. Neither Moscow,
Peking nor Havana has touched on issues that may be raised in
Panama City on which they take divergent stanrts: the 200 mile
territe_?ial water,, limit and the Latin American nuclear-free zone.
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II 'MARCH 1973
1
USSR
MOLDAVIA STRENCfPL:NS KOLKHOZ COUNCIL ON EXPERIMENTAL BASIS
(laving gained Lite approval of the CPHU Central. Committee, Moldavla
convened a republic congress of kolkhozniks ahead of schedule,
nssignod control of kolkhozes and interkolkhoz organisations to
the republic kolkhoz council, and removed the latter from under
the control of the agriculture ministry. The decision to strengthen
the kolkhoz councils was approved as an experiment, according to
Bodyul.'s speech at the congress, suggesting that the Moldavian
Innovation will not be introduced immediately or widely In other
republics. Nevertheless, Its national significance was underscored
at the i March session of the USSR Kolkhoz Council, which heard a
report on the Moldavian "experiment in improving leadership of
kolkhoz production" and elected Agriculture Minister Polyanskly
as new council chairman.
The CPSU Central Committee apparently approved the Moldavian
innovation in January--about the same time it decided to remove
Agriculture Minister Matskevich, a longtime opponent of any
transfer of power from his ministry to elective kolkhoz agencies.
Following Matekevich's removal, the Moldavian kolkhoz council met
on 6 February to approve an "initiative of kolkhozes and
interkolkhoz enterprises backed by the CPSU Central Committee"
granting the kolkhoz councils power over kolkhozes and
interkolkhoz associations. The meeting also decided to convene
rayon conferences of knikhozniks on 20-25 February and a republic
kolkhoz congress in early March, according to the 8 February
SOVIET MOLDAVIA. The following day Body-dl addressed a kolkhoz
report-and-election meeting to support the innovation and
announce its approval by Moscow. At this meeting and at subsequent
local conferences, the notion of making the councils "single
organs" with "full responsibility" for administration of kolkhozes
and interkolkhoz organizations was endorsed.
Nothing was said about the future role of the agriculture ministry
and other agricultural agencies, but Bodyul indicated in a speech
reported in SOVIET MOLDAVIA on 3 March that the councils would have
wide ranging authority. He explained that they would decide all
questions of kolkhoz life, receive plan assignments from the
state and levy them on farms, set norms and pay scales, distribute
equipment, manage the seed, insurance, fodder and food funds and
investments for interkolkhoz development. His speech also revealed
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14 MARCH I911
that the councils would assume coat rol over the I Iyu Id aesete
and fixed capital owned by the 217 Intsrkolkhot enterprises and
aaaeiciationa In the republic.
Although 8odyul drecribed the reorganization as a move to more
"democratic" forms of mar,,gement, the newly elected luadoYshIp of
the councils simply represented a whift away from exclusive
domination by the agriculture ministry. Nor example, Molda% '-:n
Agriculture Minister I.N. Nereahnoy delivered the report at tii
congress but was not, reelected council chairman or *van a mcml-er
of its 12-man presidium, and at some rayon conferences kolkhoa
chairmen replaced rayon agricultural. administration heads as
chairman of the rayon councils. The now republic council. chairman
is Moldavian Deputy Premier. N.M. Zayclionko. his first deputy is
a raykom first secrete y, and the five deputy chairmen include
the head of the republic agricultural equipment association, twi,
deputy ministers of agriculture, and the head of the republic
interkolkhoz construction association. The presence of a party
official at the level of first deputy chairman of the council is
particularly noteworthy, since the party previously had been
represented only by three kolkhoz party secretaries on the
83-mar' council.
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