TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 7, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
7 FEBRUARY 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 6)
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 FEBRUARY 1973
'C014TEN TS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
L. I
INDOCHINA
. i
DRV, PRG Note Post-Agreement Developments, Affirm Goodwill. . .
. 1
Hanoi Marks Lunar New Year, Party Anniversary . . . . . . . . .
. 5
Chinese Extend Triumphan" Welcome to Vietnamese Negotiators . .
. 8
Moscow Praises Peace Accord, Expresses Hope for Detente . . . .
. 12
Communique on Sihanouk's Hanoi Visit Records "Unanimity". . . .
EUROPE FORCE CUTS
. 13
Moscow's Allies Take Issue with NATO Concept of "Balance" . . .
USSR - ROMANIA
. 16
Divergent Interests Underscored on Treaty Anniversary . . . . .
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
. 19
Politburo Member Polyanskiy Demoted to Agriculture Minister . .
. 22
Agricultural Official Removed in Aftermath of Scandal . . . . .
. 24
Hijacking Issue Raised in Comment on Fishing Boat Attack. . . .
. 25
Havana Media Circumspect in Coverage of Guerrilla Landing . . .
. 27
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: DRV Annual Aid Agreements with Communist
Countries Concluded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S1
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 JANUARY - 4 FEBRUARY 1973
Moscow (2719 icems
Peking (1307 items)
Vietnam Peace Accord
(17%)
28% Vietnam Peace Accord
(20%)
39%
[DRV Leaders in
(--)
10%] [DRV Leaders in
(--)
12%]
Moscow
Peking
30th Anniversary of
(--)
7%
Domestic Issues
(45%)
33%
Stalingrad Battle
Cambodia
(1%)
12%
25th hnniversary of
Soviet-Romanian
Friendship Treaty
(--)
3%
Chile Government
Delegation in PRC
(--)
4%
Soviet-Uruguay CP Talks
(-?-)
3%
China
(2%)
2%
These statistics are based on the vuicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. ;
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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7 FEBRUARY 1973
INDOCHINA
Ilanoi propaganda Las continued-to describe the peace agreement
as a "victory" for the Vietnamese, who now must see that is is
fully implemented. At the stage when only initial steps have
been taken to implement the accord, Hanoi has avoided substantive
^omment. Thus, it has only briefly reported the announcement of
Kissinger's impending visit to Hanoi from 10 to 13 February as
well as the joint U.S.-DRV proposal that the international
cuuter-nce called for in the peace agreement be convened in Paris
on 26 'F. be-tary. The i-aportance of achieving "national concord"
among he Vietnamese people was stressed in a 7 February NHAN DAN
ec?.corial, which maintained that national unity has historically
)-den the path of survival in the face of foreign aggression.
)'eking followed its strong endorsement of the peace settlement
'1ith a major show of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity during the
stopover of the DRV'o Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh. Both
Chou En-lai and Chang Chun-chiao reaffirmed the Chinese
"proletarian internationalist duty" to continue support and
assistance to the Vietnamese in the aftermath of the war.
Peking has replayed DRV announcements on Kissinger's visit to
Hanoi and the convening of the international conference. 'Its
own announcement on Kissinger's visit to China has been ignored
by Hanoi.
Laudatory Soviet comment on the Vietnamese "victory" in achieving
the peace agreement echoes Brezhnev's expression of hope--in his
30 January speech during Le Duc Tho's stopover--for a general
relaxation of tensions. An IZVESTIYA article on 6 February made
a plea for postwar cooperation and assailed both "imperialists"
and "Maoist groups" who criticize Scviet aid and "vilify socialist
solidarity."
DRV. PRG NOTE POST-AGREEP'ENT DEVELOPMENTS. AFFIRM GOOD WILL
Hanoi and Front media have given selective publicity to efforts in
South Vietnam to set up the machinery for svpervlsion of the
Vietnam cease-fire. The convening of the first meeting of the heads
of the delegations to the four-party Joint Military Commission (JMC)
on 2 February was duly reported, and the commuuist representatives'
sta%:ements of the meeting were broadcast. Other JMC meetings have
not been reported, although a 4 February Hanci radio account of
the first session did note that the delegations had agreed to meet
again on the 4th. While .here has been no publicity for the
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7 FEBRUARY 1973
initial deployment of JMC regional teams on the 5th, VNA's
announcement of the 2 February meeting noted that the disposition
of the JMC at regional and local levels was one of the questions
discussed. Both DRV delegation head Le Quang hoa and the PRG's
Tran Van Tra pledged at the initial meeting that: the parties
would cooperate with the International Commission of Control and
Supervision, but activities of the ICCS have not been
publicized.
The statements by the DRV and PRG military representatives were
moderate in tone, emphasizing their sides' good will and
refraining from charges .i GVN cease-fire violations. Although
scattered low-level propaganda continues to accuse the Saigon
forces of violations, the last official protest was in a
1 February PRG Foreign Ministry statement endorsing the
preceding day's DRV Foreign Ministry statement, which had
charged Saigon with continuing military operations and hampering
the work of the communist delegations to the JMC.*
In describing the communist military delegations' arrival in
Saigon, Hanoi radio and the army paper QUAN DOI NHA; DAN on
the 6th claimed that they were "Joyfully" greeted by Saigon
citizens despite the heavy GVN guard around them. In a rather
incorgruous reference to the communist assaults in Saigon
during the 1968 Tet offensive, the radio observed that "the
Saigon compatriots previously saw the revolutionary combatants
during the marvelous strategic Mau Than offensive."
The 5 February meeting in Paris between representatives of the
PRG and GVN was reported briefly in a VNA item which said the
two sides had reached agreement on a number of questions and
agreed to meet again on the 7th to settle the remaining--
unspecified--"procedural questions." 0?i the 4th Hanoi and
Front media had reported the 3 February PRG proposal t%) convene
the two-party meeting and the announcement that it would be
held on the 5th.
ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. DRV media on 31 January carried without
comment the announcement that
Presidential adviser Kissinger would visit Hanoi from 10 to 13
February to discuss the postwar relationship between the two
countries and other matters of mutual concern. With similar
* The DRV Foreign Ministry .catement is discussed in the
31 January 1973 TRENDS, page 7.
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7 FEBRUARY 1973
brevity, VNA announced on the 6th that a U.S. delegation
concerned with the removal of mines from DRV ports had arrived
in Haiphong on the previous day and had met with DRV
representatives.
Hanoi's circumspect treatment of the Nixon Administration in the
wake of the peace settlement was illustrated in a 2 February
NHAN DAN commentary. As broadcast by Hanoi radio, the commentary
complained that the size of the propoFsd U.S. military budget
reflected President Nixon's polic of negotiating from a
position of strength. But it went on to recall approvingly that
the President had spoken in his inaugural address about
restricting the U.S. role in the world and building a peace
in which the rights of other nations are respected. By contrast,
before the peace agreement was announced, the 22 January NHAN
DAN editorial offering Hanoi's initial comment on the inaugural
address had said the President "only spoke of empty philosophy
and made vague promises on i.he so-called era of peace . . . ."
IMPORTANCE OF Hanoi and Front propaganda on the need for
"NATIONAL CONCORD" "national concord" was highlighted by a
7 February NHAN DAN editorial which said
the thorough implementation of the peace accord requires that the
concept of national concord be "correctly and fully reflected."
NHAN DAN maintained that national unity has historically been
Vietnam's "path of survival" in the face of foreign aggression
and that only foreign invaders and those Vietnamese who
cooperated with them have promoted divisive policies. The
editorial appeared to reflect the communis,:s' desire for active
involvement of all political elements when it said that
"national concord does not embrace only" the members of the
NFLSV and the Vietnam Alliance and that "recently the voice of
the third force advocating national concord has been heard more
and more distinctly." It urged political forces that had aided
with the Saigon regime in the past to "adopt a clearcut attitude,
to advocate national concord or oppose it."
NHAN DAN's theme had appeared earlier--for example, in a statement
on the peace accord by the Vietnam Alliance Central Committee
broadcast by Liberation Radio on 4 February. The Alliance
similarly held that unity and concord are "a precious tradition
of our race" and that the policy of "sowing division and cresting
hatred is a wicked scheme of the foreigners, aimed at ruling us."
Although the statement urged the Saigon government to hold
consultations with the PRG to set up the Council of National
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Reconciliation and Concord, it also hinted that unilateral
moves would be taken to set up the Council: The Alliance, it
proclaimed, "is ready to side with all political parties,
religious, cultural, and social organizations and groups,
and notables and intellectuals at home and abroad in
coordinating their action, organizing themselves into a broad
fro?.it, and promptly holding consultations with the PRG so as
to ,go ahead with setting up a Council of National Reconciliation
and Concord at various levels, composed of three equal
segments . . . ."
In keeping with the communists' avowed aim of seeking unity,
both Hanoi and Front media have publicized statements on the
peace accord by noncommunist Vietnamese living in France. LPA
reported on 1 February that a group headed by former Saigon
economic minister Au. Truong Thanh had releasea.?a statement
calling on the South Vietnamese parties to restore democratic
liberties, release political prisoners, and promptly set up the
National Council. Hanoi media on t.: 3d and 5th reported that
on 31 January a group of Vietnamese had presented a statement
to the PRG delegation in Paris which urged the South Vietnamese
"governments" to quickly set- up the National Council and
maintained that the Council, because of its representative
character and "power," vc.ald "push ahead" the implementation
of the agreement and the organization of elections. Hanoi
list..d some of the Vietnamese associated with this group,
identifying them. as follows: Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Chau, former
head of the psywar directorate general in the Ngo Dinh Diem
administration and former military attache in Washington;
Cao Minh Chuyen, journalist, member of the "movement for the
people's right of self-determination," and secretary general
of the peace movement of 1965; Col. Do Khac Mai of the GVN
air force; Pham The Truc, former Saigon opposition deputy;
and Bonze Thich Thien Chau.
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FBIS
7 FEBRUARY 1973
HANOI MARKS LUNAR NEW YEAR, PARTY ANNIVERSARY
Injunctions on the tasks ahead in consolidating the peace in the
"new situation" pervaded Hanoi's observance of the lunar new
year and the customary editorial comment in NHAN DAN and QUAIv
DOI KHAN DAN marking the 43d anniversary of the Vietnam Workers
Party (VWP).
TET OBSERVANCE From 31 January through 7 February, VNA and
Hanoi radio reported the customary visits by
the DRV leaders on the occasion of Tet. The largest number of
reported visits was made by VWP First Secretary Le Duan, who
visited citizens in the bombed areas of Hanoi, cadres of Hanoi
radio, army units, representatives of various nationalities of
the DRV, "southern compatriots," and foreign residents. Visits
to various localities and army units were reported to have been
made by President Ton Duc Thang and by all but one of the other
Politburo members in the DRV.* These included visits by Hoang
Van Hoan in his firpt reported public appearance since he returned
from the Soviet Union in late January,** and by special advisor
to the Paris talkb Le Duc Tho, whew was reported to have visited
antiaircraft units on the day following his 3 February return
to the DRV after stopovers in Moscow and Peking.
The leaders' speeches predictab3l- welcome-i the sighing of the
peace accord, offering-praise and thanks to the people or units
visited for their part in achieving the great "spring victory"
and urging them to contribute to the building of socialism in the
"new situation." In remarks to military units, Ton Duc Thang,
Giap, and VPA Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung stressed the delicate
nature of the peace, echoing the 28 January party-government Joint
appeal in cautioning that peace has not yet-been consolidated.
They urged the armed forces to maintain vigilance against any
attempt by "the enemy" to sabotage the peace and at the same time
to work toward developing a "modern" and "regular" army.
* No visit by Nguyen Duy Trinh was reported this year and Pham
Hung continues his years-long absence from the DRV. For a report
on Tet visits in 1971 and 1972, see the TRENDS of 16 February 1972,
page 19.
** Hoan, whose record of public appearances is erratic,,-.was in the
USSR from 18 December to late January; his departure for home was
reported by PRAVDA on 26 January (TRENDS, 31 January 1973, page 21).
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The latter themes were treated in greater detail by Giap in a
recorded new year's talk broadcast by Hanoi radio. on 4 February
concerning "the significance of the success inherent in the Paris
agreement" and "the new situation and tasks." Citing the
absence of foreign forces on Vietnamese soil "for the first time
in 100 years" as creating conditions for Vietnam to move forward
on its own initiative, Giap expressed confidence that the North
Vietnamese are fully capable of repairing war wounds, building
socialism, and creating "an increasingly firm base for the
revolutionary struggle of our people countrywide." Likiawise,
he acclaimed the situation in the South, which he described as
"strikingly different from the situation that prevailed after
the Geneva agreements were signed." Under the leadership of the
PLAF, tho NFLSV, and the PRG, he asserted, "our compatriots in
the South will-certainly fulfill their revolutionary tasks and
achieve v Lc;i.Gry" despite efforts to block them by "the warlike,
bureaucre.tic, and militarist forces serving as a tool for foreign
no;.onialism."
PARTY ANVIVERSARY NHAN DAN's editorial marking the VWP anniversary
provided a relatively short, sober assessment of
the current situation and tasks faced by the party now that "the
greatest resistance in the history of our people's struggle against
foreign aggression has ended successfully."
The editorial reviewed three stages in the party's history since
its founding in 1930 and described the primary task facing the
party in the fourth stage, just beginning, as the dual one of
"stepping up socialist construction in the North and at the same
time completing the historic tasks of the national and democratic
revolution in the South." Stressing that this task will not he
easy, the paper called on party cadres to devote all their "spirit
and energy" to it, draw on their courage and resourcefulness, and
pat..icipate actively in "writing the first pages of the fourth chapter:'
NHAN DAN emphasized the organizing and guiding role of the party and
exhorted cadres to "really master all the new fronts of sociall,c
construction." it observed that `!modern industry must be a
foundation for prosperity" and that "building a modern industry is
the central task of our North." Reflecting the impact of the peace
agreement on the party's goals in South Vietnam, the editorial
pointed out that "the struggle to maintain peace, achieve independence
and democracy in the South, and proceed toward the peaceful unification
of the country is being waged by new methods in a new situation at
home and in the world."
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7 FEBRUARY 1973
Where the NHAN DAN editorial praised past and recent party triumphs
but put primary stress on gearing to meet the future, QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN s anniversary editorial dwelt on the party's "glorious achievements,"
its "correct" Marxist-Leninist line, and its "clear-sighted leadership."
The army paper had special praise for party members in the armed forces,
declaring that "no honor is as great as that of being a communist
combatant" and that "our party members in all fields of activity
have upheld the lofty quality of the communist combatants, who
fear no handicaps or difficulties, sacrifice themselves for their country
and people, and struggle and make sacrifices for a great cause."
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CHINESE EXTEND TRILVIPHANT WELCOME TO VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATORS
Following its strong endorsement of the Vietnam peace settlement
in a 29 January leaders' message and accompanying authoritative
comment, Peking took the occasion of the stopover of DRV
negotiator Le Duc Tho and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh to
stage a major show of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and support
for the agreement. In contrast to Peking's usual treatment of
such layovers in the past, the Vietnamese were given full honors
comparable with those accorded PRG Foreign Minister Binh
during her "official" visit at the turn of the year. They
were received by Mao on 1 February, were honored at a banquet
that evening hosted by Chou En-lai and attended by all the
active Peking-based Politburo members, and were guests of
honor at a 2 February rally (given live radio and television
coverage) attended by the same Politburo contingent and over
10,000 people.
NCNA accounts of the proceedings were filled with especially
warm and effusive language, as in noting that Chinese leaders
embraced the two visitors at the rally and that prolonged
applause "rocked the hall" during the exchange of banners.
NCNA atypically disclosed the length of the meeting with Mao,
noting that it lasted an hour and a half, and reported that
Mao in welcoming the visitors "tightly clasped" their hands.
Similar to its coverage of Binh's December meeting with Mao,
NCNA provided a relatively lengthy quotation of Mao's remarks
to them.
Tho was greeted on arrival on 31 January by Politburo members
Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan and alternate member Chi
Teng-kuei, and on the next day Trinh was greeted by Vice Premier
Li Hsien-nien, Politburo alternate member Li Te-aheng, and
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei; the combined Chinese contingent
was present to see the viattors off for home on 3 February.
Chou, Chang, and Yao went to the guest house on 31 January .or
"a cordial meeting" with Tho that NCNA said lasted nearly
three hours. On the lot Chou and Chi went to the guest house
to see Trinh, with Tho also present, for what NCNA reported
in standard fashion was "a very friendly and cordial
conversation." Sihanouk's premier, Penn Nouth, was present
at the banquet and the rally, and NCNA reported he had "a
cordial and friendly conversation" with Trinh on the 2d.
Peking's all-out demonstration of support for the Vietnamese
may have been designed with an eye to surpassing the Soviets,
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but its only anti-Soviet thrust in the Vietnam context during
this period took the indirect form of NCNA's replaying on
31 January of passages from an Albanian editorial on the
Vietnam agreement. As quoted by NCNA, the editorial derided
the "Soviet revisionists" for seeking to represent Soviet aid
as the decisive factor in the Vietnam struggle and charged
that Moscow's policy on Vietnam has never gone beyond the
framework of the preservation of Soviet and U.S. spheres of
influence. However, NCNA duly noted the presence of the
Soviet amI.,aador and representatives of the Soviet bloc
members of the ICCS at airport ceremonies for Tho and Trinh
in Peking.
VIETNAM AGREEMENT In keeping with Peking's initial
endorsement of the Vietnam agreement,
Chou En-lei's banquet speech and Chang Chun-chiao's rally
speech acclaimed the settlement as a great victory creating
conditions in which the Vietnamese can settle their o+.'n affa&zs
free from outside interference. Thus, Chou called the signing
of the agreement "a major event which brings Joy to the people
of the whole world" as well as a brilliant axample for the
national liberation movement. At the same time, the Chinese
have stressed the importance of strict implementation of the
agreement and pointedly linked prospects for easing tension
in the Fur East with observance of the terms of the settlement.
Both Chou end Chang voiced Peking's "hope and demand" that the
United States and "particularly the Saigon authorities" will
refrain from "procrastination, expansion and sabotage" and
will strictly carry out the agreement. In Peking's first
direct charge of violation of the agreement, Chang complained
that the "Saigon authorities" were continuing military
activities "to nibble" at the liberated areas and "setting up
obstacles" to the functioning of the Joint Military Commis; Lon,
but he did not directly implicate the United States. Peking's
accounts of DRV and PRG protests have discreetly deleted
charges that the United States as well as Saigon is responsible
for recent alleged obstruction.
Neither Chou nor Chang dwelt on the question of the political
evolution in South Vietnam, having recourse to generalized
expressions of hope for a peaceful, independent, democratic,
and prosperous South to develop under the leadership of the NLF
and PRG. The Chinese continue to characterize the PRG as the
"authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese but have
refrained from following the Vietnamese communists' revival
of the claim that the PRG is the "only" such representative.
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Chang reaffirmed Pekin9'A view of the agreement its calling for
reunification of Vietnam to take place on a peaceful, step-by-
step basis free frum foreign interference.
Peking has remained silent on its future role in an international
conference, though it has repla;ied Hanoi's announcements on the
date and site of the conference and on Kissinger's visit to the
DRV. NCNA's announcement on the impending Kissinger visit to
Pe'ing was virtually identical to the one on his last visit,
with no direct reference to Indochina.
Peking avoided authoritative comment on Cambodia and Laos in
the woke of the Vietnam agreement until 1 February, when a
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article endorsed the RGNU's 26 January
statement on a Cambodian settlement and Chuu interjected comments
on thu subject during his banquet speech acclaiming the Vietnam
settlement. Chou also endorsed the RGNU statement and complained
that the United States "has -tot yet stopped its war of aggression"
against Cambodia and Laos. He made no reference to a Laos
settlement.
PRC SUPPORT As the highlight of expressions of Sino-Vietnamese
solidarity that pervaded the visits, NCNA quoted
Mao as saying during his meeting with the visitors that the
Chinese and Vietnamese have "helped each other all along." In
acknowledging Le Duc Thole expression of gratitude for Chinese
aid in the war, M~-o struck a note of modesty that may have been
intended to contrast with Moscow's claims in behalf of Soviet
aid as a factor in the Vietnamese struggle. Mao remarked. that
Chinese aid has been "very little" and that it has been the
Vietnamese who have helped the Chinese by fighting the United
States for more than 10 years.
Both Chou and Chang reaffirmed Peking's "proletarian inter-
nationalist duty" to continue support and assistance to the
Vietnamese in the aftermath of the war, and Chang invoked as
image that has been prominent recently in saying that the
Vietnamese and Chinese "are one family." Chang cited the
personal authority of Mao and Ho Chi Minh as a source of Sino-
Vietnamese friendship, adding that it is ':tilt on the basis of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The
Vietnamese speakers were also forthcoming in characterizing this
friendship while lauding Peking's past assistance and expressing
confidence of receiving "still greater" Chinese support. In
notable contrast to the failure: of Vietnamese speakers in the
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past year to reciprocate Peking's invocation of Marxism-Leninism
as the basis of PRC-DRV relations, Tho on 2 February affirmed
this as the foundation of unity between the two parties and
peoples.
SOUTHEAST ASIA During this period Peking has shown interest
in the future alinement of the broadbr
Southeast Asian area. NCNA on the 1st cited without comment
part of an Australian-New Zealand communique that expressed
the two governments' "understanding and support" for the desire
of ASEAN states to limit outside interference in the affairs
of Southeast Asia and sympathy for their efforts to make the
area a zone of "peace, freedom, and neutrality." Earlt^r,
NCNA on the 29th cited passages from a Burmese Government
statement on the Vietnam agreement that stressed the need for
Rangoon to move out of its traditional isolation and work
together with nations in the area to insure a durable peace.
While Peking has muted criticism of a c( tinued U.S. military
presence in areas adjoining Indochina, the FRC-based clandestine
radio statior.a that broadcast in the name of the Maoist Southeast
Asian CPs have given increased attention to the Amerit.ar.
presence, particularly in Thailand. Thus, the Thai.CP':1 radio
has been issuing daily attacks on the "Thrauom-Praphat clique"
for allowing a continued U.S. military presence in the country,
for colluding with Vang Pao, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and "U.S.
lackeys in Laos," and for warmly welcoming Vice President Agnew,
"the messenger of death sent by Nixon," on his current Asian
tour. The Malayan CP's radio has called critical attention to
Lee Kuan Yew's recent trip to Thailand, charging in a 30.January
commentary that the two governments are stepping up efforts
aimed at becoming "U.S. bodyguards" in carrying out the Nixon
Doctrine in Asia. Peking has not replayed these comments or
mentioned the Agnew and Lee trips.
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MOSCOW PRAISES PEACE ACCORD. EXPRESSES HOPE FOR DETENTE
Soviet commentators have echoed the sentiment expressed in
Brezhnev's 30 January speech, during Le Duc Tho's and Nguyen
Duy Trinh's stopovers, that the peace agreement should lead
to a general relaxation of international tension. Most notably,
Moscow radio on 6 February widely summarized for Asian communist
and other foreign audiences an IZVESTIYA article by Kudryavtsev
pointedly titled "Favorable Possibilities."
Kudryavtsev stressed the importance of the DRV's socialist path
in 'Victoriously" achieving the peace treaty, and he added that
the victory also shows the effectiveness of "the internationalism
of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries." He
called it deplorable that "Maoist groups"--not further identified--
have not only joined "imperialist" propagandists in attempting
to discredit Soviet aid but are doing everything to "vilify
socialist international sc?iidarity." To bolster his argument
that Soviet aid leads to the strengthening of the recipient's
independence, Kudryavtsev observed that the peace agreement
"logically entails the establishment of relations between the
United States and the DRV on principles of coexistence." He
went on to ridicule "imperialist and Maoist propaganda" charges
that Soviet aid leads to the infringement of the national
independence of recipient countries.
Kudryavtsev echoed Brezhnev in saying that the ending of the war
creates a favorable atmosphere in Southeast Asia for easing tension
and went on to say--as have some other commentators--that the
prospects for the creation of a collective security system in
Asia are becoming more favorable. He also echoed Brezhnev in
observing that aid to the DRV for postwar reconstruction will be
forthcoming from countries regardless of their social syetem.
Although Kudryavtsev brought up the notion of an Asian collective
security system which Peking has assailed in the past, he
carefully avoided indicting Peking directly when 'ae attributed
censure of the L'SSR vaguely to "Maoist groups." At the same
time, with the P,tris conference in the offing, to be attended
by both the Sov!sts and Chinese, Moscow seemed to be signaling
good will any! a cooperative attitude by tak'.ng the unusual step
of replaying Peking comment: PRAVDA as weli as TASS carried
excerpts of the 28 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial which
congratulated the Vietnamese on the peace agreement and reported
Chou En-lai's remark, during the stopover of Le Duc Tho and
Nguyen Duy Trinh, that the peace accord was a "common victory for
the peoples of the whole world."
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COMMUNIQUE ON SIH ANOUKIS HIANOI VISIT RECORDS "UNANIMITY"
Against a background of efforts by Prince Sihanouk to give a new look
of moderation to his stand on a Cambodian settlement in the wake of
the Vietnam agreement, a joint communique on 7 February recorded a
"unanimity" of views on all questions discussed during Sihanouk's visit
to the DRV from 30 January to 7 February. Taking note of "the new
situation obtaining in Indochina," the communique cited the RGNU's
26 January statement--issued in the mime of Sihanouk, Premier Penr.
Nouth, and deputy Khieu Samphan--asserting that a Cambodian settlement
can be based only on Sihanouk's 2;i March 1970 five-point declarntion.*
The communique also invoked a 28 January statement attributed to
three RGNU ministers in the "interior," Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, and
Hu Nim, as reaffirming the Front's stand, and it recalled statements
issued by the DRV and the PRG on 1 and 2 February respectively in
support of the RGNU statements.
Sihanouk hold talks with a DRV delegation headed by Premier Pham Van
Dong and including the defense and foreign ministers. Declaring that
the victories achieved by the two sides have confirmed the "extremely
great effect" of their solidarity and friendship, the communique
expressed their resolve to strengthen solidarity and mutual support.
The communique also declared that support from the socialist countries
and other progressive people constitutes "an extremely important
guarantee" for victories in the future as well as in he past. The
Cambodians hailed the "great victory" by the Vietnamees in achieving the
Vietnam agreement, while the hosts reaffirmed that Sihanouk represents
"the legality, legitimacy, and continuity" of the Cambodian state and
his government is "the only and unique legal and legitimate government."
Before and during his visit to Hanoi, Sihanouk had indicated that the
front was "reexamining" its policy on the advice of "friends" who
warned against appearing to be a warmonger at a time when "peace is
being built." In a 31 January interview carried by APP, Sihanouk said
his new policy includes as "overture" to the United States, a reduction
in military actions by the insurgents, and a general amnesty in Cambodia.
He reiterated his refusal to hold talks with the Phnom Penh regime and
demanded Lon Nol's removal. Sihanouk emphasized that his policy has
the "total support" of Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong.
In a 6 February AFP interview in Hanoi, Sihanouk denied that a meeting
with Kiss{.nger had been arranged and expressed the opinion that any
Cambodian settlement would be attained through the mediation of the
PRC and the DRV rather than through direct contacts. **
* See the TRENDS of 31 January 1973, pages 23-25.
** Sihanouk went from Hanoi to Canton for "an official friendl,j visit"
to Kwangtung province.
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He added that Chou and Dong would tell Kissinger that a Cambodian
settlement depends on recognition of the RGNU by the United States,
and he warned that the PRC and DRV would leave the forthcoming
international conference if representatives of the Lon Nol government
were invited.
Sihanouk had indicated particular sensitivity to the views of the
insurgents fighting in Cambodia, whose inclinations may diverge from
his own, and those of his patrons' in Peking and Hanoi at the present
stage of developments. Before leaving Peking for Hanoi he had said
that the views of the insurgents in the interior would be decisive
in the policy reappraisal and that no joint communique would be issued
on his visit unless this reappraisal was completed before the end of
his stay. In the event, the joint communique incorporated the two
RGNU statements dated before his trip as well as the DRV and PRG
statements pegged to those pronouncements. Citing the 28 January RGNU
statement by the three ministers in the interior, the communique spelled
out the front's demands as calling for total withdrawal of all U.S. and
allied military personnel and advisors, termination of all U.S. support
and aid to the Phnom Penh regime, and "total elimination" of that
"clique of traitors."
The status of the representatives of the "interior" has been enhanced
during recent de?=velopments, as reflected in the inclusion of Khieu
Samphan with Sihanouk and Penn Nouth in the 26 January statement as
well as the prominence given the statement issued in the name of Khieu
Samphan an,i the two other ministers in the interior. In addition, the
"special envoy" of the interior, tang Sary, who again accompanied
Sihanouk during his trip to Hanoi, was reported by VNA to have had a
separate meeting with the DRV premier.
RGNU STATEMENTS Much like the 26 January statement, the one dated
the 28th and broadcast by the front's radio on
2 February stressed the front's desire for peace and a settlement based
on Sihanouk's March 1970 declaration. While taking note of the Vietnam
settlement, the statement declared that the Cambodian insurgents ''must
carry on their struggle" because the United States continues its
"aggressive activities" and its support for the "traitors" in Plinom
Penh. Echoing the 26 January statement, the one of the 28th appealed
to the Vietnamese, Lao, Chinese, and Korean peoples and those of
other friendly countries to demand that the United Stares withdraw from
Cambodia and end its "diplomatic tricks and activities." However,
the statement did not elaborate on these diplomatic activities, did
not directly reject a cease-fire or negotiations, and did not
repeat past calls for offensives to take: control of the whole country.
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Lon Nol's unilateral cease-fire declarations which had been
criticized in earlier routine-level comment, drew strong condem-
nation in the form of a statement dated 29 January by the RGNU
spokesman. The front's press agency AKI issued the statement under
the dateline "Cambodia, 1 February," presumably an attempt to attribute
the statement to the insurgents in the interior rather than to the
Peking-based segment. The statement dismissed Lon Nol's cease-fire
move as an attempt to cover up an inability to launch an offensive and
a "perfidious". maneuver to deceive world opinion. Taking a hard line
in the question of a settlement, it asserted flatly that "no compromise
is possible" with the "traitorous clique" and said "peace will be
restored in Cambodia only when all the objectives of the Cambodian
people's struggle are realized." These goals were defined in terms
similar to those incorporated in the joint communique on Sihanouk's
Hanoi visit.
PEKING The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 1st
endorsing the RGNU leaders' 26 January statement pledged that
the Chinese "will continue to firmly support to the end the just
struggle waged by the Cambodian people" inder Sihanouk's leadership.
Chou in his 1 February banquet speech also endorsed the 26 January
statement while charging that the United States "has not yet
stopped its war of aggression" against Cambodia and Laos.
Peking has not commented on the statements by the RGNU ministers in the
interior or by the RGNU spokesman, though NCNA duly reported these
statements as well as those by the DRV and the PRG.
MOSCOW Consistent with its failure to recognize Sihanouk's govern-
ment, Moscow has virtually ignored the recent spate of
authoritative statements on a Cambodian settlement. TASS briefly
reported the PRG statement but noted only that it expressed support
for "the just struggle of the fraternal Cambodian people and their
just and reasonable position on the question of a political settle-
ment." TASS did not mention Sihanouk or his government.
Moscow is not known to have reported the DRV statement.
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EUROPE FORCE CUTS
Moscow IS ALLIES TAKE ISSUE WITH NATO CONCEPT OF "BALANCE"
Comment from some of Moscow's orthodox East European partners since
the Vienna preparatory talks on force reductions opened on 31 January
has been aimed chiefly against NATO's concept of "balance" in force
cuts by the two rival military blocs in Europe. Moscow itself has
refrained from authoritative comment on the talks since they opened,
confining itself to routine-level comment focused on the need for
reductions in central Europe and tracing Soviet "initiatives" on this
score. While this comment has avoided the pivotal issue of what
constitutes "balance," Moscow's proxy spokesmen Hungary in particular--
have taken it up in press, radio and television comment.
Budapest's comment has carefully avoided any reference to the specific
role Hungary may play in force reduction talks. Budapest TV's Moscow
correspondent Kulcsar on 1 February, referring to the "various
strategic, geographical, and other" arguments raised by NATO since
1968 in calls for "balanced" reductions, charged that NATO's motive
has been to gain a "unilateral advantage" and added: "In principle,
the USSR does not oppose a proportionate or balanced troop reduction.
On the contrary, it is in favor of this, but not in the form as
proposed" by NATO. Kulcsar did not elaborate on the "form" of balanced
force reductions Moscow would accept, but an article in the Hungarian
party organ NEPSZABADSAG by J. Nemes on the 3d was more explicit in
defining the Pact's interpretation of "balanced" force reductions.
Nemes wrote that a quantitatively and qualitatively equal reduction
of armed forces and armaments would not change the "prevailing military
balance of power." Addressing himself to the numbers involved in any future
force withdrawals, a subject rarely discussed in Soviet or East European
media, Nemes wc:nt on to argue that a hypothetical "mutual withdrawal
.,= 100,000 soldiers each would not 'disproportionately' diminish the
security of either side, while it cannot be denied that European detente
would only gain by the fact that fewer soldiers were confrontir.g each
other."
Current East European press discourse o;a the NATO concept of "balanced"
reductions in effect rehashes the only recent serious Soviet comment
outlining Moscow's position on force reductions--the articles by
European disarmament specialist Yuriy Kost&co in the June and September
1972 issues of MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA.* A
* See the TRENDS of 12 October 1972, pages 17-19, for a review of the two
Kostko articles.
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commentary in the Bratislava PRAVDA on 31 January in fact used
Kostko's aiguments almost word for word, without attribution, in
rejecting the NATO "-iew that reductions in Warsaw Pact and NATO
forces must be asymmetrical in order to make up for the geogra-
phical advantage enjoyed ;,y the USSR.
The Slovak paper draw directly from the Kostko articles in noting that
the USSR has a vast territory which it must guard "not only in the west,
but also in the south and the east" and that the Urals and Lake Baykal
are farther from central Europe than New York is from London. The
Slovak paper went on to say that a military conflict in central Europe
could not be restricted to that area alone but would inevitably involve
air force, missile, or naval units outside "the rather small territory
of central Europe," and thus "this entire problem logically does
not concern only a narrow group o states." The paper also echoed
Kostko's argument that because th :e are no "objective" means of
comparing different types of conventional weapons, it becomes
"imposs1ble to separate the correlation of forces in convc..Laonal wea-
pone from the correlation of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons,
or to separate the local correlation of forces in central Europe from
the all-European and global correlatior in general."
ROMANIA AND BULGARIA The difference between the NATO and Warsaw
Pact states on who should participate in
the force reduction talks was acknowledged explicitly only in a brief
Warsaw domestic radio broadcast on the 6th. Where Soviet and all the
other East Eurcp!kAn media have remained silent on the role of Romania
and Eulgaria in. any future talks, the Polish radio reported that the
reason a plenary session--tentatively planned for the 5th and then for
the 6th--had failed to materialize was the inability of members of the
two blocs to reach agreement on whether Romania and Bulgaria would be
admitted as iegotiators "with full rights or only as observers."
Bucharest media continue to refrain from any direct comment on the
talks. However, Bucharest did publicize comments made by the Romanian
delegate in Vienna on 31 January to the effect that the preliminary
discussions on "military disengagement and disarmament in Europe"
should have the "direct contribution" of all European states.
Avoiding the terminology used by NATO or the Warsaw Pact to describe
the force reduction talks, the Romanian delegate at the Helsinki talks
on the 2d used the same long-standing Romanian formulation calling for
"military disengagement and disarmament in Europe"'and added that the
discussion of such issues should have the participation of "all the
countries concerned."
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Sofia media have not directly addresaed the issue of Bulgarian parti??
cipation, but Sofia comment has publicly asserted Bulgaria's intercat
in the talks. In a commentary entitled "Bulgaria Is Vitally Interested
in Them," Sofia's BTA on 31 January noted the presence of the Bulgarian
delegate in Vienna and want on to say that Bulgarian participation
in the preparatory talks "is conditioned by the fact that Bulgaria is a
member of the Warsaw Treaty and is a state which directly borders on
the southeastern NATO flank." BTA said there are "no foreign troops
stationed on Bulgarian territory, but as a European country and as a
constituent part of the socialist community, BulgariR is vitally
interested it the further warming of the European climate." This
flexible larguage could easily be compatible with virtually any
arrangement reached in the current Vienna consultations.
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FBIS TRENDS
7 FEBRUARY 1973
USSR-ROMANIA
DIVERGENT INTERESTS UNDERSCORED ON TREATY ANNIVERSARY
Moscow's concern for unity under the Warsaw Pact and Bucharest's
independent stance pervaded the publicity for the 25th anniversary
of the two countries' first treaty of friendship, cooperation,
and mutual assi3tance of 4 February 1948. The anniversary fell
in a period in which Romanian representatives were asserting
their country's influence at the multilateral talks in Helsinki
and Vienna. In the recent background was Bucharest's adoption,
at the end of December, of a new defense law which, among other
things, transparently ovtlawed any application to Romania of the
Brezhnev doctrine aseer~6ing the USSR's right to "defend
socialist gains" in any allied country wherE they are threatened.
MOSCOW OBSERVANCE Moscow devoted a substantial propaganda
effort to the Soviet-Romanian treaty
anniversary--publicity comparable to its observance if the 25th
anniversary of the first Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship pact in
December 1968, in the immediate aftermath of the Warsaw Pact
invasion of the CSSR, but considerably in excess of the normal
play for the quinquennial anniversaries of the USSR's friendship
treaties with its orth3dox partners. Notably, although the 20th
anniversaries normally get more publicity than the 25th, Moscow's
attention to the current Soviet-Romanian treaty anniversary
considerably exceeded its publicity for the 20th.
The message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to Ceausescu and
Maurer, broaccast in Romanian on 3 February, conveyed "cordial
congratulations" to the Romanian leaders and reminded them that
the 1948 bilateral tvaaty was based on "true equal rights" and had
played a key role in "strengthening the gains of socialism in
Romania.." Regarding the new 20-year pact signed in Bucharest on
7 July 1970, after a delay of more than two years, the message
said it reflected the "changes" that had taken place in "the
international situation" and went on to declare that the CPSU
and the Soviet Government were working unswervingly for the
solidarity of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA member-states and would
"continue to exert efforts" to insure that Soviet-Romanian
relations "grow in strength and develop on the principled basis
of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." In
summarizing the Soviet leaders' message, the Bucharest radio on
the 4th omitted the references to the Warsaw Pact and CEMA and
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to the strengthening of socialist gains in Romania. Where the
Moscow version said the Soviets would continue efforts to
strengthen "fraternal" relations, the Bucharest summary referred
to "comradely" relations.
An article in IZVESTIYA on the 3d, keyed to the treaty anniversary,
stressed at the outset that the pact was "a firm foundation" of
Soviet-Romanian friendship "within the framework of the Warsaw
Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance." It went
on to point out that for the young Romanian People's Republic the
treaty with the USSR meant "the consolidation of its inter-
national positions, its independence." Also on the 3d, a Radio
Moscow commentary broadcast only in Hungarian underscored the
"political" importance of the pact with Bucharest "because the
Soviet-Romanian treaty is a component part.of the comprehensive
system of treaties" between allies of the socialist community.
In similar vein, a Radio Moscow talk.by Mikhaylov on 31 January
reminded Romanian listeners: "You know,.of course, that the
bilateral treaties between the socialist countries, together with
the Warsaw Pact, form a vast and well-knit system of pledges made
by states both to one another and to the entire socialist community."
It recalled that Brezhnev, at the USSR!s 50th anniversary on
21 December, had called for unity in order to deal "a resolute
rebuff to all aggressive plots of imperialism, to all attempts to
infringe on the interests c' socialism."
BUCHAREST OBSERVANCE The Romanian leaders' message, carried by
AGERPRES on the 3d, conveyed "most cordial
congratulations and a hearty comradely salute" to their Soviet
counterparts. Predictably, it portrayed developing cooperation
on an equal basis between the two countries since the signing of
the original treaty in 1948 and the new one in 1970, on the basis
of "socialist internationalism, observance of national independence
and sovereignty, fully equal rights, noninterference in internal
affairs, and mutual advantage." It forecast further development
of friendship and "comradely solidarity" between the two parties
and states "in the spirit of the meetings and talks we had with
you last year"--in the Crimea on 1 August and in Moscow in
December--to the benefit of bilateral and world communist unity
and world peace. TASS' summary of the message the same day
included all of there points.
A Stoian article in SCINTEIA on the 4th, after recalling that "the
Soviet Union made a decisive contribution" to the victory.over the
Nazis in World War II, stressed that the 1948 treaty provided "a
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legal form" for Soviet-Romanian ties on the basis of
independence, sovereignty, and noninterference. Highlighting
contacts between Brezhnev and Ceausescu and bilateral economic
cooperation, the article noted that the two "socialist,
neighborly, and friendly" states had expressed their intent
to "consistently militate to strengthen the forces of
socialism, thwart imperialist policy, safeguard people's
independence and freedom," and promote peaceful com 'atence.
Bucharest's publicity for the treaty anniversary omitted any
reference to the Warsaw Pact and CEMA or to the new Romanian
defense law. Its restrained view of the current degree of
warmth of its relations with Moscow was further in evidence
on the 6th when the Bucharest radio reported "a comradely
talk" between Ceausescu and USSR Ambassador Drozdenko, at the
latter's request. There was no indication of the subject.
The only other figure reported present at the meeting was RCP
Secretary Stefan Andrei.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
POLITBUt0 MEMBER POLYANSKIY DENOTED M AGRICULTURE MINISTER
PRAVDA on 3 February announced the removal of the Politburo's
agricultural overseer D.S. Polyanskiy as First Deputy Premier
and his demotion to the post of Agriculture Minister, replacing
V. V. Matskevich. Unlike the recenL demotions of Voronov,
Shelest, and Mzhavanadze, Polyanskiy's was preceded by no
advance indications, and his position appeared to be especially
strong following the eclipse or his rival Voronov in 1971.
Polyanakiy's recent activities have appeared normal; he was
accorded his customary ranking at.the October.Revglution
anniversary and at the December Supreme Soviet session and
50th anniversary ceremony. Nevertheless, his removal au one
of Kosygin's principal deputies and his transfer to a position
below that of Kulakov, Central Committee agriculture secretary
and junior member of the Politburo, are the latest indications
of high-level differences over agriculture.
By contrast, Matakevich'a fall was presaged by numerous signs
of slippage. In the last year the leadership of his ministry
has been shaken up, and the ministry has been under heavy
pressure to reform. Indeed, shortly before his ouster,
Matskevich had just returned from a four-day visit to Moldavia
to study the new forms of agricultural organization promoted
by Moldavian First Secretary I. I. Bodyul. According to
SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA on 13 January, Matskavich visited various
inter-kolkhoz enterprises, agro-industrial complexes, and
production unions and heard Bodyul's detailed axplaniition of
the "effectiveness, special features, and future prospects
for these new forms." Matekev?ch'n ministry wa.y sharply
criticized last year for resisting new forms of organization,
and his removal may foreshadow changes in agricultural
administration and greater receptivity to innov at ion..
RESOURCE DEBATES Polyanskiy's demotion may be .i?nked to
controversy over resource allocation in
the aftermath of last year's agricultural debacle. In 1967
his outspoken advocacy of increased allocations to agriculture
carried him to the point of publicly challenging official policy,
and it is possible that he, like Voronov, breached the limits
of collectivity arguing his case. In the spring of 1970 when
the draft five year plan was under consideration, Polyanskiy
authored an article in the April SOVIETS OF WORKERS DEPUTIES
urging that the new plan favor agriculture. With Brezhnev'a
support, he won an appreciable shift of resources to agriculture
at a May 1970 Politburo meeting.
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Nevertheless, the new plan fell short of the goal set by
Polyanskiy in his October 1967 KOMMUNIST article--that
allocations to agriculture should reach one-third of total
investment. Brezhnev's agricultural assistant V.A. Golikov
complained in a July 1972 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article
that the "growing needs" of agriculture were still not being
"fully" met. More recently, an editorial in the January
PLANNED ECONOMY indicated that in 1973 agriculture would receive
27 par-cent of all investments in the economy -- well below
the level advocated by Polyanskiy.
The revised 1973 plan presented to the December 1972 Supreme
Soviet session by Gosplan Chairman Baybakov contained virtually
no increase in agricultural investment over the level previously
planned. In his concluding speech to the session on 19 December
Baybakoi tad that several speakers had "raised the question
of the need to allocate additional material resources for the
needs of agriculture," but he replied that the plan already
allotted "big funds" to agriculture and that the main problem
was to "ensure rational use of these funds." The alleged
appeals for more funds, however, were deleted from the published
versions of speeches at the Supreme Soviet session.
SIGNS OF DISFAVOR The retirement of Matskevich, at age 63,
removes a seemingly permanent fixture of
the Soviet scene. Though a constant target for complaints and
pressures, Matskevich has occupied the agricultural post for a
total of more than 13 and a half years--longer than anyone else.
While owing his advancement ii the agricultural hierarchy to
Khrushchev, both in the Ukraine and later in Mosc-,w, Matskevich
fell at odds with his patron in the late 1950's and was exiled
to the virgin lands as Tselinnyy Kray executive committee
chairman. Following Khrushchev's oue':er, he was recalled to
Moscow to head a new, more powerful agriculture ministry.
Matskevich appeared firmly entrenched until early 1972, when
the ministry came under fire for resisting innovation, some
of its agencies were restructured, and some new deputy ministers
were appointed.* Matekevich's position was further undermined
when one of his assistants, the deputy chief of the ministry's
* See the TRENDS of 5 April 1972, page 36; 3 May, page 43;
1 June, pages 39-42; 14 June, pages 27-29; and 28 June, pages 38-41.
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secretariat, rsa arres?ed for taking bribes and the ministry's
leadership w.r blamed ...or permitting such abuses. Matakevich
personally acknowledged the accuracy of the charges in the
16 August PRAVDA. Although Matskevich's position has 'Shown
signs of weakening, there has been no public attempt to hold
him or any other official responsible for the 1972 agricultural
failures.
AGRICULTLRAL OFFICIAL REMdVED IN AFTERMATH OF SCANDAL
The removal of a third agricultural official was also announced
last week but appears unrelated to the demotions of Polyanskiy
and Matskevich. According to PRAVDA on 31 January, S.V. Shevchenko,
chief of the RSFSR Agricultural Equipment Association since
March 1961, was removed "for violation of state discipline,"
a charge suggesting personal guilt for financial abuses rather
than administrative or operational shortcomings.
Shevchenko had no career ties to.Polyanskiy and Matskevich; he
was, on the contrary, a protege of Polyanskiy's rivals. A
longtime associate of K.G. Pysin in the Altay, he was transferred
to Moscow in early 1961 along with Pysin after Voronov had
become RSFSR Bureau deputy chairman. With the 1971 demotions of
RSFSR Premier Voronov and his first deputy Pysin, Shevchenko',
position was obviously weakened.
Shevchenko's downfall may be linked to the scandal involving one
of his top assistants. In the October PARTY LIFE, it was reported
that the Party Control Committee had exposed "violations of party
and state discipline" by V.P. Zhavoronkov, deputy chief of the
RSFSR Agricultural Equipment Association's main administration
for supply of machinery. Zhavorcnkov was charged with having
misused his position to build himself a dacha. He was fired and
expelled from the party, and Shevchenko was censured for having
ignored signs of Zhavoronkov's misconduct.
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HIJACKING ISSUE RAISED IN CO1+ENT ON FISHING BOAT ATTACK
Havana comment on the 28 January attack on a Cuban fishing boat
in Bahamian waters used the incident to underscore the need for
a hijacking agreement that would encompass all forms of "piracy."
Cuban accounts of the incident alleged that a boat "bearing a
Miami registration" carried out the assault, that one Cuban
fisherman was wounded, and that unlike past forays, which were
limited to "acts of intimidation," the intent this time was to
"murder" the six crewmen.
While the ;-aiders were described by one Havana commentator .s
pirates at. the service of U.S. imperialism," stress was placed
on the responsibility of U.S. naval authorities. For example,
the Cuban party organ GRANMA charged in a frontpage article on
1 February that "counterrevolutionary bands" are launching
attacks from U.S. territory "with impunity" and with "U.S. naval
officials' approval and support." In stressing a U.S. role,
Havana appeared to be underscoring the Cuban view that it is
the responsibility of the U.S. authorities to bar exile forays
against Cuban vessels and territory.
Comment linking the incident to the hijacking issue came in two
broadcasts by the authoritative Havana domestic service commentator
Guido Garcia Inclan, whose broadcasts have contained Cuban
media's only comment on the U.S.-t,uban hijr.cking negotiations
since the release of the 14 November Cuban Government statement
urging rapid bilateral agreement to resolve the hijacking problem.*
In a 2 February broadcast discussing the fishing boat incident,
Garcia Inclan urged that "these pirates. . . be arrested and
returned, just as the United States wants us to do with the
persons who hijack its places and come to Free Cuba." Referring
to the hijacking negotiations, he stressed that "when it comes
to pirates, let us remember those of the land and of the sea."
The notion that any bilateral agreement will have to deal with
all kinds of "piracy," not just skyjacking, has been a pervasive
feature of all of Garcia Inclan's commentaries on the subject.
For example, in an 11 January commentary he claimed that a
U.S.-Cuban accord hid been "delayed somewhat" because Washington
* Garcia Incla'A s comment in the wake of the 14 November
statement is reviewed in the TRENDS of 22 November 1972,
pages 26-28.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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wanted to confine the agreement to skyjacking, "restricting it
to what is convenient to them." Ho argued that in the Cuban
view, "piracy 0 everything: It doss not matter if it takes
place in the air, at sea, or on land."
Using his standard "L'itter from Freddy" format, built around
missives from a fictional Cuban expatriate newsman in Miami to
an old crony, -:artia Inclan again brought up the fishing boat
attack in a broadcast on 5 February, this time implying that the
ongoing hijacking negotiations were having a sobering effect
on Cuban "counterrevolutionaries." Noting that "every one
o;. them" wanted to claim credit for the incident, he declared
that none dared to do so fov fear of reprisals by U.S.
authorities. The letter from "Freddy" in Miami continued:
They know that some of the turncoats who arrived
here in a stolen sailboat or launches have been
arrested. These are being held at the immigration
department. This is because everything hinges',on;.the
negotiations for a pact governing the diversion of
planes, which is being discussed, or, as a State
Secretary said here, are nearing conclusion.
This is Havana media's first allusion to three Cubans who
commandeered a fishing boat and landed in Florida in December and
who are under investigation by immigration authorities.
U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS Recent "Letters from Freddy" touching
on the hijacking negotiations have
depicted growing political pressure in the United States
for "normalization" of relations with Cuba, sometimes even
suggesting that such a move may be in the offing. Thus the one
on the 5th reported that a group of U.S. Senators had just
"asked President Nixon to reestablish relations with Cuba,
and the exiles . have become fit to be tied." The topic
of "peaceful coexistence with Cuba," the broadcast alleged,
had become a subject of frequ3nt public comment. A broadcast
on 20 January had said "it is evident that U.S. foreign policy
will be very different within two or three months" and cited
a statement by Senator Kennedy favoring a change in U.S. policy
toward Cuba.
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS T E
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HAVANA MEDIA CIRCUMSPECT IN COVERAGE OF GUERRILLA LANDING
Initial Cuban reaction to t;1t reports of a guerrilla landing on
the southern coast of the D':minican Republic on 5 February has
been very cautious, wholly ignoring Dominican Government charges
that the invaders came from Cuba and noting without comment
foreign media reports of rumors that the guerrillas are led by
Colonel Francisco Caamano, leader of the 1965 Dominican revolt.
Some Havana radio news items, quoting APP ..nd UPI, cited reports
implying that the operation is a government-inspired hoax. Thus
reference has been made to an "alleged" landing of an expeditionary
force "supposedly" led by Caamano and to allegations by the
opposition Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) that the affair
has been fabricated by the government as a pretext for banishing
opposition leaders from the country and for intensifying
repression prior to the Dominican prdaidential elections. No
Cuban comment on the landing has been monitored so far.
CAAMANO AND CUBA The closest Havana media have come to
acknowledging Caamano's reported involvement
was in a 6 Febi;ary TV newscast which observed that "the rumors
all point to C:afnano's leading the group." While the telecast
went mn to note that Caamano had "vanished mysteriously" in 1967
from his post as Dominican military attache in London, it did not
mention the widespread reports 4'.ioat he had subsequently been
in Cuba.*
With Cuban media totally silent on Caamano's whereabouts, Fidel
Castro responded warily to a question on the subject in an
interview published in the Dominican paper AHORA in January 1971.
Asked about the reports that Caamano was in Cuba, Castro replied:
What do you want: that I issue a certificate saying
G,iamano is in Cuba? I have to refrain completely from
commenting on that because possibly the enemies of
the revolution may be interested in knowing where
Caamano is. . . . Really, I am not willing to cooperate
with the enemy in any way by giving information.
As in earlier speeches, Castro was unstinting in his praise of the
Dominican revolutionary, remarking that he had "the attributes
necessary to lead a revolution." Describing Caamano as "a great
* A Venezuelan newspaper alleged on 19 January that Caamano
had died in Cuba, estranged from the Castro regime--a report
ignored in Havana media but promptly denied by the PRD secretary
general.
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leader" of the Dominican people and a peerless "hero" of the
1965 revolt, Castro observed that "many Dominicans" shared
this assessment.
In the months prior to the reported landing, Havana media alluded
to Caamano rarely, and then only in quoting Dominican CP Secretary
General Narciso Isa Conde.. For example, when lea Conde was in
Havana in August 1971, the party organ GRANMA published an
interview in which he lauded Caamano'e leading role in the 1965
revolution and concluded that "many people in Santo Domingo"
believed Caamano could "greatly contribute" to surmounting the
difficulties facing the cuntry. In a May 1971 interview
carried by PRENSA LATINA, %sa Conde alleged that Caamano's
example continued to proviie impetus to "the nationalist
movement among the armed i,)rces."
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7 FEBRUARY 1973
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
DRV ANNUAL AID AGREEMENTS WITH CCI+IUNIST COUN"1RIES CONCLUDED
DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi returned to Hanoi on 28 January
after leading an economic delegation on a two -and-a-half-month
tour of communist countries to sign the annual aid agreements.
The tour represents a return to the patters followed since 1965
in concluding most of the annual aid agreements. Last year had
been an exception, when most of the communist countries had sent
delegations to Hanoi to sign the accords. in an obvious effort
to reassure and mollify the DRV in the wake of plans for
President Nixon's trip to China, Li Hsien-nien had headed a
Chinese economic delegation which went to Hanoi to conclude the
agreement in September 1971; and the Soviet-DRV agreement was
signed during President Podgornyy's official visit to Hanoi in
October of that year.
Le Thanh Nghi's delegation left Hanoi on 15 November for Peking
where an agreement was signed on the 26th. The agreement with
the USSR was signed in Moscow on 10 December.* Nghi and some
members of his delegation then attended the French CP Congress,
held from 13 to 17 December, after which the group went on to
tour East Europe. After visiting all of Moscow's.Europea. Allies,
the delegation stopped off briefly in Moscow before proceeding to
North Koeea, and then visited Peking en route to Hanoi.
The delegation's final stopover in Peking coincided with the
conclusion of the Vietnam peace agreement. According to a VNA
report, Nghi at a banquet hosted by Li Hsien-nien on 27 January
observed that: "the Soviet Union and China have made enormous
contributions" to the "victory" in concluding the pea-::e agreement.
As if concerned to give his two big communist allies even-handed
treatment, Nghi cited the PRC first when he went on to express
the belief that in carrying out the "heavy task ahead," the
Vietnamese people "will enjoy the great and vigorous support and
assistance of China, the Soviet Union and the other fraternal
socialist countries." VNA also reported that during a meeting
with Nghi on the 27th Chou En-lai pledged "all-out support and
assistance for the Vietnamese people in fighting as well as in
* These agreements are discussed, respectively, in the TRENDS
of 29 November 1972, pages 6-8, and of 13 December, pages 6-7.
The usual separate PRC-DRV trade protocol, signed in Peking on
27 December is discussed in the TRENDS of 4 January 1973, page 17.
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peaceful construction." in contrast to the final stay in
Peklag, there were no substantive reports regarding the
delegation's 20-22 January stopover in Moscow during which
Nghi had what TASS characterized as a "friendly" talk with
Soviet Vice Premier Novikov.
As usual, the propaganda has given only general indications
of the nature of the agreements. DRV Vice Minister of National
Defense Tran Sam was reported as having participated in the
negotiations in Peking and Moscow but not in the other
countries. His whereabouts were not mentioned from 10 December,
when he was present at the aid agreement signing ceremony in
Moscow, until 4 January when a brief NCNA report said that he
had been feted at a Peking banquet given by a PRC vice defense
minister upon his arrival on the 3d after visiting "some East
European countries." Propaganda is not known to have
mentioned him since then.
Most of the accounts described the agreements as being for
"economic and military" aid. And there were reports that
during the Nghi delegation visits regular meetings were held
by the joint commissions for economic, scientific, and technical
cooperation which were set up between the DRV and East European
countries over the past few years.*
ROMANIA Both Hanoi and Bucharest media reported the signing
on 30 December of agreements on Romania's "economic
and military aid" to the DRV in 1973 by Le Thanh Nghi and Vice
Premier Radulescu. At the same time other members of the
delegations signed an accord on "goods exchange and payments"
and a protocol on the first session of the Romanian-Vietnamese
joint commission for economic, technical, and scientific
cooperation, which had been established when the aid agreements
were signed last year. Since 1967 both sides have acknowledged
that the agreements include military as well as economic aid.
HUNGARY The aid agreements with Hungary, signed by Le Thanh
Nghi and Vice Premier Lajos Feher on 5 January,
according to both Budapest and Hanoi reports, covered "economic
and military assistance" to the DRV for 1973, "goods exchange,"
and a protocol on the third session of the Hungarian-Vietnamese
* Last year's agreements were discussed in a Supplementary
Article in the TRENDS of 5 April 1972.
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7 FEBRUARY 1973
joint commission on economic, scientific, and technical coopera-
tion. The commission was set up at the time of the signing of
the aid agreements in January 1+71. It hell its first meeting
at that time and the second meeting when uhe aid agreement was
signed last year.
Hungarian reports gave some details on the nature of the aid,
emphasizing economic assistance. Last year, Hungarian speakers
stressed military assistance, elaborating to some extent on the
weaponry and equipment being supplied. Budapest had referred
frequently to military aid in previous years as well. This
year, speaking %t the signing ceremony, Feher indicated that
"longer-term economic cooperation" was agreed upon, with food
assistance already under way and increased assistance in economic
reconstruction envisioned after a cease-fire. A Budapest
domestic sc.:vice report said that "apart from military aid"
the assistance would include "complete insta.+.lations, small
factories, power generators, and medicines," and that Hungarian
experts would aid in exploiting the DRV's bauxite deposits and
in irrigation construction. Other assistance would include help
in animal husbandry and co-'n production. The report said that
"essentially, cooperation will continue at an unreduced level in
the same fieldr as before."
EAST GERMANY The aid agreements with East Germany were
signed on 9 January by Le Thanh Nghi and Vice
Premier Gerhard Weiss. According to the joint communique as
published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the agreements covered "material
aid and support, mutual goods exchange, and further cooperation
in the economic and scientific spheres" in 1973. The fourth
meeting of the joint commission for economic, scientific, and
technical cooperation was held. This commission has held meetings
at the time of the signing of the aid agreements each year since
it was established in October 1969. VNA specified that the
agreements covered "economic and military aid" as well as economic,
scientific, and technical cooperation and goods exchange.
The joint communique listed industrial, transport, and
construction equipment which the GDR was to send the DRV in trade,
and noted that medical and educational aids and equipment
financed from public donations would be sent. An agreement
on the construction of small repair and construction workshops
in the DRV was sinned, and measures were discussed to help
economic recovery in the fields of agriculture, forestry, light
industry, and construction and transport. The communique noted
the fulfillment of past agreements on the education and training
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7 FEBRUARY 1973
of DRV citizens in GDR enterprises and added that such training
would be continued in professions "of particular importance for
overcoming the consequences of the war."
CZECHOSLOVAKIA The aid agreements with Czechoslovakia were
signed on 12 January by Le Thanh Ngh? and
Vice Premier Jan Gregor. Hanoi media reported that the en-cords
covered Czechoslovakia's "economic and military aid" for 1973,
and included a document on the establishment o:' a joint
commission for economic, scientific, and techni:al cooperation,
and a trade agreement signed separately by other members of the
delegations. Last January, when the aid agreements; for 1972
were signed, both sides reported that it had been "agreed to
set up" a point commission but there wee no specific reports
of a document being signed. Last year's "agreement" was
apparently formalized with the signing of the document this
year.
Available Prague reports of the agreements rated the signing of
accords on Czechoslovak "assistance" to the DRV in 1973 as well
as on the establishment of the joint "omission and on trade.
Prague gave some details, noting that Czechoslovakia would
provide "trucks, medical apparatuses and materials, "machine
tools, pumps, and machinery spare parts," but there was no
specific mention of "military" aid. Last year, when the
agreements were signed in Hanoi by a visiting Czechoslovak
delegation, both sides said the agreements covered "economic
and military aid."
BULGARIA On 16 January Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Premier Mako
Dakov signed the Bulgarian aid agreements.
According to Sofia media they included an agreement on "the
granting of long-term credits to the DRV in 1973," a protocol
on Bulgaria's "free aid" to the DRV for 1973, and a protocol on
the second session of the joint commission for economic,
scientific, and technical cooperation. The joint commission
had been established when aid agreements were signed in November
1970 and held its first meeting at the time of the signing of
last year's Accords in December 1971. Also signed this year
was an agreement on trade exchange and payments, and BTA
reported that decisions were made on cooperation in agriculture,
engineering, and scientific and technological activity.
VNA described the agreements as covering Bulgaria's "economic
and military aid to Vietnam.for 1973" as well as for economic,
scientific, and technical cooperation and goods exchange.
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7 FEBRUARY 1973
POLAND Aid agreements signed on 19 January by Le Thanh Nghi
and Vice Premier Jozef Tejchma, according to VNA,
covered Poland's "economic and military aid" for 1973 and
economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. Warsaw media
referred to Poland's "assistance to Vietnam in 1973" and said
the agreements include a protocol providing for the develop-
ment of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation as
well as a trade agreement signed by other members of the
delegations. The third session of the Joint commission for
economic, scientific, and technical cooperation was held.
The commission, formed at the time of the signing of the annual
agreements in 1969, did not have its first meeting until the
aid accords were signed in 1971.
NORTH KOREA The aid agreement signed on 26 January by
Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Premier Kim Man-kum in
Pyongyang covered North Korea's "free aid to the DRV for the
latter's economic. development and increase of national defense
capacity" for 1973, according to KCNA. An agreement on
"commodity exchange and payments" was signed separately by
other members of the delegations. VNA's report of the signing
of the accords described them similarly. Last year both sides
reported that separate economic assistance and military aid
agreements were signed by different officials in the two
delegations. In previous years both sides normally characterized
the agre-ments as covering "military and economic aid."
AGREEMENTS WITH CUBA, The accord for Cuba's '173 aid to the
MONGOLIA, ALBANIA DRV was signed in Hanoi on 20 September
by the DRV minister of foreign trade
and a visiting Cuban vice minister of foreign trade. According to
VNA, the agreement covered Cuba's "non-refund aid" and trade.
La et year's agreement, signed in Havana on 30 December 1971 at the
same ministerial level, had been described as covering Cuba's
"economic aid" and trade. Siriilar agreements had been signed
in previous years alternately in Havana and Hanoi.
The 1973 trade agreement with Mongolia was signed in Hanoi on
15 December by vice ministers of foreign trade. The VNA report
said that under the agreement the DRV would supply Mongolia
with consumer goods in exchange for agricultural.and industrial
products. There was no specific mention of aid but on 4 January
VNA reported that DRV Vice Premier Nguyen Con received the
Mongolian ambassador to thank Mongolia for its "economic aid for
1973."
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In January 1973 Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh had similarly
conveyed to the ambassador gratitude for Mongolia's economic
aid for 1972, and a NHAN DAN article thanked Mongolia for its
"non-refund economic aid" for 1972, but there was no available
report on the negotiation of an agreement. Reports of
Vietnamese gratitude constituted the only available references
to aid in January 1971, although the assistance then was
described as also including "military eid." Trade agreements
were the only accords specifically reported in 1969, 1968,
and 1967, but in July 1968 NHAN DAN also praised a "letter on
Mongolia's economic and military aid to Vietnam" reportedly
brought from Premier Tsedenbal by a Mongolian friendship
delegation. Le Thanh Nghi.visited.Mongolia in 1966 and
signed an agreement for "non-refundable material aid."
Hanoi and Tirana media reported the signing in Hanoi on
6 February of agreements on Albania's "non-refund economic
aid" and goods exchange and payments . The agreements were
signed by vice trade ministers, the Albanian delegation having
arrived in Hanoi r?n 29 January. Last year a DRY group visited
Albania to sign what Tirana described as agreements on
"gratuitous ai.d" and trade and which VNA specified as "economic"
aid. Previous agreements had been signed alternately in the
two capitals and had similarly beet- characterized as providing
"economic" aid.
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