TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 24, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBA
"TRENDS
in Communiaf Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
24 JANUARY 1973
(VOL. XXIV, N0. 4)
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This propaRandn analysis report is based exclusively ors material
carried in foreign broadcast and gross media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFILENTIAL
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coN~rcNTs
Topics and Evenre Given Mai or Attention
INDOCHINA
i
Hanoi, Front Media Publicize Vietnam Peace Accord
l
Moscow Reports Agreement, Expresses CauCious Hopes.
2
PRG Council Sets Tasks, nears Military, Diplomatic Reports.
5
Hanoi in Wake of Bombing ~Ha1t Citea Heroism, Vigilance.
l0
DISARMAMENT
Moscow Clarifies Stand on Teat Ban,. Latin Nuclear-Free Zone
ll
CZECHOSLOVAKIA - FRG
Foreign Minister Chnoupek Welcomes Brandt Statement on Munich
l4
CUBA - CHILE
Havana rledia Play Down Reporting on Problems Facing Allende
l6
SZNO - U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Ofrers Straightforward Accot:nt of Inaugural Address.
l8
CHINA
Several Provincial Young Communist League Organs in Offing.
20
Provincial Comment Explains Priority Task of Criticism.
2l
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TOPICS AND BVEN'.CS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 JANUARY 1973
Moeco~~ (27.57 items)
Peking (1107 items)
Luna ~1 Moon Landing
(2%)
10%
Domestic Issues
(44%)
53%
Vietnam
(10%)
7%
Indochina
(13%)
11%
Brezhnev/Pompidou
(12%)
6%
[Vietnam
(6%)
8%~
Talks in Minsk
Zaire President
(8%)
8%
Soviet Note on
(--)
6%
Mobutu in PRC
Reduction of Forces
Japanese Trade
(--)
4%
in Europe
China
(6%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given mayor attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Rome may have been covered~in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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24 JANUARY 1973
INDO%HINA
Hanoi maintained cautious restraint regarding the peace settle-
ment in the period prior to the simultaneous U.S.-DRV announce-
ment fast an agreement had been initialed on 23 January
and would be signed in Paris on 27 January.' While the
announcement Chat Kissinger and Ise Duc Tho would resume talks on
23 January "to complete thy: text of the agreement" Baas carried by
VNA and Hanoi radio in their English-language transmissions, it
is not known to have been broadcast to Vietnamese audiences.
Hanoi'8 careful avoidance of any reference to the private talks was
also apparent in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 22d which repeated
Hanoi's stereotyped call for the United States to sign at once the
accord it had agreed to in Oct:obey and complained that "President
Nixon in hie inaugural address put forth nothing def initr? about
restoring peace in Vietnam."
Elements of the peace accord, including issues reportedly in
dispute between Washington and Hanoi, were reviewed by PRG
President Huynh Tan Phat in his report to a regular PRG Council of
Ministers session, publicized on the 18th. The session, held from
8 to 10 January, followed the pattern of meetings for the past
three years in reviewing the situation in the South and setting
forth tasks. But in apparent anticipation of the peace agreement
and of a shift to a political struggle, the conference for the
first time defined the main task as expanding the "united front."
tioreover, concern Chat policy guidance be disseminated widely in
this critical transition period seemed reflected in the media's
release for the first time of malor.~ reports delivered at the
meeting.
Moscow carried prompt reports on the announcement of the initialing
of the peace accord and on President Nixon's address. The first
official Soviet reaction came from Kir ilenko in a 24 January
speech in which he expressed "hope that we are now on the threshold"
of the end of the war and praised t:he agreement as a victory for the
Vietnamese people and for the "solidarity of the fraternal E~acialist
countries."
Having abstained from comment while calling attention to s'gns of
movement toward a settlement, Peking promptly repl,s;-ed thF. DRV's
announcement of the agreement. PRC media have not mentioned a brief
foreign ministry statement welcoming the agreement, as reported by
REUTER.
? HANOI. FRONT MEDIA PUBLICIZE VIETNAM PEACE ACCORD
In tandem with the United States, Hanoi at 0300 GMT on 24 January
transmitted a DRV Foreign Ministry communique containing the point
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24 JANUARY 197
U.S.-DRV announcement of the conclusion of the Vietnam accord
and began to publicize the text of the agreement at 1500 GMT.
The only followup comment from the DRV at this writing has comp
from nRV Premier Pham Van Doug, at a gathering held on the 24th
to mark Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's departure for Paris
to sign the accord. Zn his remarks, carried by Hanoi radio at
1120 GMT, Dong portrayed the agreement as a "great victory"
and "great success" and indicated that the Vietnamese people
will "continue to step up their struggle" for their "groat
revolutionary cause" while implementing the accord .and urging
others to do likewise. The send-off ceremony was attended by
First Secretary Le Duan and all the other North Vietnamese party
Politburo members known to be in Hanoi. Politburo member Hoang
Van Hoan, who was not present, has not appeared in public since
29 December, when he was in Moscow as part of a Vietnamese
delegation attending USSR anniversary celebrations.
Liberation. Radio carried the DRV Foreign Ministry communique
announcing the conclusion of the accord at 0400 .GMT, an hour
after Hanoi released it. A little more than an .hour later, the
Front radio carried a PRG Foreign Ministry communique repeating
the details of the DRV camn~unique and pledging that the PRG
will "seriously implement" the accord. The PRG Foreign Ministry
communique was reFeated in all subsequent Liberation Radio
programs on the 24th. The Front radio joined Hanoi in broad-
casting the text of the agreement at 1500 GMT.
Front media have not yet broadcast a 24 January statement by
the PRG delegation, to the Paris conference, transmitted by
VNA's Paris off ice to the VNA off ice in Hanoi at 1113 GMT.
The statement went further than the terse PRG Foreign Ministry
communique when it briefly su~mnarized the agreement, among
other things stating that it recognizes the existence ~n
South Vietnam of "two administrations, two armies, two zones
of control, and three political forces." The statement evaluated
the accord .as "a great victory for the Vietnamese people, the
American people, an3 the peace-and-~ustite-loving forces in the
world ."
MOSi:OW REPORTS AGREEMENT, EXPRESSES CAUTIOUS HOF~S
Moscow carried prompt reports of the announcements by the DRV
Foreign Ministry and by President Nixon of the peace agreement
initialed in Paris. A TASK report of the President's speech
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CONFZDENTZAL 1~'BZS TRENDS
24 JANUARY 1973
singled out without comment hig statement Chat the United States
will continue to recognize the Saigon regime ae the sole
legitimate government of South Vietnam. As would be expected,
the report dial not acknowledge his remarks directed at the
USSR and China, urging restraint in order that the peace can
be kept. Moscow also reported the departure of DRV Foreign
Minister Trinh for Paris to sign the agreement. Soviet reports
of the statements by Pham Van Dong and the PRG delegation in
Par~.s emphasized their assertions that the initial+.ng of the
agreement is a victory for the Vietnamese people and for the
"solidarity of the fraternal socialist and other countries" and
that it has the consent of the PRG.
The first official Soviet comment came in a speech by Kirilenko
at a 24 January congress of scientific and technical workers.
Calling the initialing of the agreement an "important milestone,"
he observed cautiously that there are now "grounds for hope Chat
we are now on the threshold of the liquidation" of the war. Like
Pham Van Dong, he assessed the agreement as a victory for the
Vietnamese people and for the "militant solidarity of the fraternal
socialist countries rendering all-round assistance and support
to the Vietnamese people," as well as for the forces of peace.
Prior to the announcE,ient of the initialing, Moscow had carried
typically brief reports of the developments in Paris, including
Kissinger's a~:rival, talks with Le Duc Tl~o, and return to the
United Stags. Restraint .and caution had marked Moscow's limited
comment, typified by a 22 January domestic service commentary
which said the talks were regarded as "signif scant".by
"international public oi,inion," coming as they did after
"considerable progress" at previous meetings. Adding that
"political observers abroad" noted that the new round of talks
had come only after the December mass bombings "failed," the
commentator said the observers also pointed out that the war--
and Vietnamese "vigilance"--were continuing. Other commentaries
noted that world L~action to the bombing halt had been "mixed"
and "restrained" because the wcr was continuing and the United
Staten had in the past halted and then resumed the bombing.
Moscow media duly reported President Nixon's assessment, in his
inaugural address, that the war was "drawing to an end," but a
Moscow domestic service report said that this statement was
received with "reserve" by Americans who had heard such assertions
too of ten in the past. TASS noted that antiwar demonstrations
took place throughout tt.e United States on inauguration day and
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24 JANUARY 1973
that nearly 160 congressmen boycotted the ceremony ':o protest
the delay in reacning a paace settlement.
SOVIET Moscow publicized ito support of the Vietnamese.
SUPPORT with brief reports that Ksrushev received the DkV
ambassador on 18 January for talks on "further
development of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation" in a "cordial.,
comradely atmosphere." No further details were given, but Vice
Premier Novikov--who customarily handles Soviet aid to the DRV--
received DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, who stopped in Moscow
on his way home for hie annual tour of East Europe to sign aid
agreements. Le Thanh Nghi and Novikov had signed the Soviet-DRV
a1d agreement on 9 December. Le Thanh Nghi arrived in Moscow
on 20 January and saw Novikov on the 22d for a talk in an
atmosphere TASS characterized as "friendly." Nghi left Moscow
the same day for North Korea.
TASS briefly reported Mme. 8inh's 20-21 January stopover in
Moscow on her way pack to Paris but did not indicate that she
conferred with any Soviet leaders. Last month, when she was
attending the USSR anniversary celebrations before proceeding
to Hanoi, she was received (on 26 December) by Gromyko for a
discussion or the Vietnamese struggle on "the military, political,
and diplomatic fronts" in an atmosphere of "friendship and
cordiality."
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CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
24 JANUARY 1973
PRG COUNCIL SETS TASKS, NEARS MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC REPORTS
Judging by the communique of the 8-10 January PRG Council of
MinisteY:~ meeting, broadcast on the 17th, the session followed
the pattern of similar Council meetings at the beginning of
each year, reviewing the situation in the South and setting
forth guidelines and tasks for the future. Since the founding
of the provisional government in June 1969, its Counci~. of
Ministers has met every year in January or February and in 1972
a meeting was also held in June.*
In addition to broadcasting the communique of the 8-10 January
meeting, Liberation Radio departed from Asst practice by
releasing the mayor reports t~~ the Council by PRG President
Huynh Tan Phat, Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, and Le Chanh,
a representative of the PLAF Command and the PRG Defense Ministry.
'the PRG has not publicized speeches rt~ade at any previous Council
m:~tings; it seems likely Chat they were released this time in
anticipation of a peace accord and a shift to a political
struggle. The speeches are probably intended to supply policy
guidance during the critical transition period. An 18 January
Hanoi broadcast indicated that other reports were a18o presented
at the meeting, including a "diplomatic report" delivered by
Tran Buu Kiem, minister attached to the off ice of the PRG
president.
EXPANSION OF In a departure from the pattern of the two
UNITED FRONT most recent PRG Council of Ministers communiques,
which stressed strengthening the revolutionary
administration, this one stated that "the most important and
basic task i$ to further strengthen and enlarge the national
united front." It said Chat diverse elements must be gathered
together to "oppose the U.S. aggressors and the stubborn,
be111cose Nguyen Van Thieu lackey clique." Atid it went on to
note that the Council had agreed that "the national concord
policy is the most appropriate policy in line with the realities
of the present situation in South Vietnam and with the
requirements for our national salvation and building."
Groundwork for elevating the expansion of the united front to the
status of the mayor task had been laid in the past six months.
* Previous Council of Ministers meetings are discussed in the
FBIS 9.~~.NDS of 14 June 1972, 2 February 1972, 24 ?ebruary 1971, and
4 February 1970.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 JANUARY 1973
Thus, the communique of the June 1972 session, while giving
primary stress to strengthening the revolutionary administration,
also noted that the session had "paid special attention" to
"promulgated policies aimed at expanding the anti-U.S. national
salvation unity front." More recently, a communique issued by
a point conference of the NFLSV and Vietnam Alliance on
1-2 November 1972--five days of ter Hanoi released the draft
peace accord--declared that the two groups considered national
reconciliation and concor$ to be their "foreu~ost, fundamental,
and long-term policy."* The current PRG communique, after
lauding a policy of national concord, endorsed "the basic
present and future policy" set forth at the November Front/A111ance
meeting.
Huynh Tan PhaC's report to ?'he Council of Ministers meeting,
broadcast in installments beginning on l8 January, included the
injunction contained in the communique that the moat important
and fundamental task at present is to broaden the national united
front. Phat scored the allies for attempting to divine the people
and set Vietnamese against Vietnamese, and he repeated the
contention that "except for a handful of uprooted people who
have deliberately served as lackeys for the enemy," the
overwhelming, ~a~ority of th~- people are unanimous in their
"hatred for the enemy." He voiced an emotional appeal to "unite
and love one another" and eliminate antagonisms so as to reunito
families and bring harmony and happiness to all hamlets. Phat
urged that Chose who have gone astray be persuaded to return
and that the people unite to fight and delve out the "U.S.
aggressors and their lackeys," heal the wounds of war, rebuild
the country, and "restore to everyone a meaningful and beautiful
life."
Speaking of people who had "served the enemy," Phat maintained
Chat the PRG "advocates unity and collaboration with al.l those who
want to return to the nation and contribute in the glorious
national salvation undertaking, except for a number of henchmen
who deliberately oppose the revolution and follow the enemy to
the end to ki1~. the people." Phat's statement of policy on this
question is consistent with past communist pronouncements, most
notlbly a l0-point pol{.cy toward members of the ARVN and their
* The NFLSV/Alliance meeting is iiscuesed in the 8 November 1972
FBIS TRENDS, pages 5-6.
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CONFIDENTIAL ,FBIS TRENDS
24 JANUARY 1973
families adopted at the January 1972 Council of Ministers meeting
which seemed aimed at bringing about affiliation with. the PRG
of the widest possible range of people in South Vietnam.*
Phat related the PRG's concern for unity to ~rhe proposed
provisions of the peace accord: The PRG, ha said, is
convinced that with the implementation of the principles in
the October agreement "there will be sufficient favorable
conditions for eliminating hatred, achieving unity, healing
the war wounds, and leading South Vietnam to a stable, lasting
era." Here he echoed the 28 October PRG statement endorsing
the 26 October DRV Government statement in which the substance
of the peace accord had been revealed. Phat pointedly recalled
that the PRG had advocated formation of a coalitio-: government
and "f firmly continues to demand" the establishmen*_ of a
three-segment Council of National Reconciliation and Concord.
OTHER TASKS The Council of Ministers communique, in addition
to stressing the united front effort, outlined
other "guidelines and tasks" for the coming days, including a
call for the offensive and uprising to be stepped up so as ~o
"completely defeat" Vietnamization. It also urged that any
new allied schemes be shattered and that the United States be
"forced" to sign "the agreement already approved." In addition,
the communique called for building and developing political and
arched forces and consolidating the liberated areas and
revolutionary admi.tistration, "insuring that we defeat the enemy
under any circumstances and advance toward total victory."
Phat's report provided a more detailed list of "immediate tasks"
in which he called for stepped-up military and political
activities, for strengthened unity and insistence that Lhe
Waited States sign the already reached accord, for development
of she political and military forces, for the immediate
construction and conr-olidation of revolutionary administrations,
and for efforts to win foreign backing. In the course of his
discussion, Phat noted that "the problem of administration is a
fundamental problem of all revolutions." He cited specific
problems faced by local administrations including the need to
"eliminate [quets sach~] spies and lackeys left by the enemy." .
* The 10-point policy and earlier policy statements are discussed
in the TRENDS of 2 February 1977., pages 21-23.
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CONFIDENTIAL FIlIS TRENDS
24 JANUARY 1973
ISSUE OF SETTLEMENT Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, in
her report to the Council of Ministers
meeting, claimed that the PRG's serious attitude and good will
had been reflected last year in its initiatives for a settle-
ment, including the 1J September PRG statement which, she said,
"contributed to leading the U.S. and DRV governments" to
achievement of the October accord. She scored the United
States for "refusing to sign the agreement as reached" and for
asking for modifications in its content, but she did not discuss
the substance of the accord.
By contrast, Huynh Tan Phat's report to the Council meeting
summarized the accord in terms similar to those used by
Nguyen Huu Tho in hie speech on the 19 December NFLSV
anniversary. Among other things, he stated that the United
States had agreed to "recognize the reality that there are in
South Vietnam two administration., two armies, and three
political forces' and that a National Council of National
Reconciliation and Concord would be set up "at various levels"
composed of the three segments. Other Hanoi and Front comment in
December contained such a reference to the formation of councils
at various levels, departing from the language of the accord
which specified that "the two South Vietnamese parties will
consult about the formation of councils at lower levels."
MILITARY SITUATION Liberation Radio's account of the report
by Le Chan, broadcast on 21 January, did
not indicate what position he holds, merely identifying him as
a "representative of the PLAF Command." The 18 January Hanoi
Radio report on the meeting said he also represented the Defense
Ministry. The usual spokesman on military affairs would be PRG
Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung, who delivered, for example, the
military report at the November 1972 NFLSV/Alliance conference.
Le Chan reviewed the fighting since the start of the communist
offensive late last March and maintained: "After one year of
fierce test of strength and hard, tenacious, and valiant
struggle, our. southern compatriots and PLAF won strategically
significant victories in every respect, changing the balance of
forces and the war situation and revealing that our military
line is correct snd creative and our military art is skillful."
Discussing the military science revealed by the offensive,
Le Chan lauded the coordination of attacks in different areas
of the South, the launching of "complicated point operations,"
the successful centralization of leadership, and the close
coordination among the armed services and of the m111tary,
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poliCical~ and proselyt~ng activities, Lilce other communist
analyses o# the o#fenei~re ].set year ~ hie report claimed that
the communist attacks succeeded in limiting the response o# the
allies aircraft and artillery and in causing Saigon to move
its main forces around haphazardly. Le Chan also noted that
the alJ.ies were surprised by the communists' ability to fight
in any region in both the dry and rainy seasons.
Reviewing the factors responsible for "victories" in 1972
Le Chan incJ.uded a gratuitous allusion to North Vietnr~m'e troops
in the Routh. He said the victories resulted in part from "the
considerable contriburione in mattpuwer and materiel, from
kith-and-kin r.ove~ from the noble sacri#ices~ and from
the wonderful fighting coordination of the valiant nu~Lbern
fighters and compatriots."
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WANOI IN WAKE OF BONGING WALT CITES WEkOISM. VIGILANCE
With the ceeea.ti~~? of U.S. bombing of the North, Hanoi has confined
~1t3 comment: on that subject to praise of heroic actions of various
units, comb,ned with affirmations of their determination to maintain
"r.ev~lutionaiy vigilance." A i7 January order by President Ton Duc
Thar.~g awarding, medals to 140 localities and units for their actions
in opposingz the "U.S. aggressors" since last April drew editorial
praise the following day from both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.
The party paper set ::orth the future tarke of ouch unitr+ and
localities in general terms typical of comment on the subject. It
said the Vietnamese people are determined
to constantly heighten their vigilance and combai: readinese~,
to step up all activities, to quickly overcome the consequences
caused by the enemy, to care for and stabilize the livelihood
of the victim compatriots, to firmly maintain and develop
production, to strengthen tt~e aconomic and national defense
potentials, and to worthily fulfill the obligations of the
great rear base toward the great frontline.
The bombing halt itself was disc~~gsed directly in a 19 January LPA
commentary which described Press Secretary Ziegler's announcement
of the halt as mere "drumbeating about the U.S. good will" on the
part of the Nixon Administration, carried out in order "to placate
public opinion." It claimed that "everybody knoae that the United
States has many a r+~te declared total or partial cessation of the
bombing and shelling of North Vietnam, but later resumed it with
even greater violence." It went on to demand that the United States
end its involvement in the South and sign the peace agreement.
Other criticism of the Nixon Administration was confined to reports
of such criticism as that by various peace delegations ~?tsiting
Hanoi. Premier Pham Van Dong's remarks to three of these groups,
as reported by VNA on 19 and 20 January, merely expressed thanks
for their support and that of "peace forces *'roughout the world."
Hanoi radio on the 19th quoted Western sour.;.3 on criticism of the
December bombing by former CIA Director Richard Helms and Ohio Senator
William Saxbe. Reportage of U.S. and foreign. demonstrations on
Inauguration Day focused on the demonstrators' demands that the
President sign the peace agreement immediately and withdraw U.S.
forces from Vietnam. The harshest language appeared in a Vietnamese-
language item of the 21st whi~?.h described the burning of the President
in effigy at rallies in several European countries and referred to
shouts "opposing the Americans and cursing the new Hitler."
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2~i JANUARY 1973
D I SARMAMEPJT
MOSCOW CLARIFIES STAND ON TEST BAN. LATIN NUCLEAit-FREE ~nNE
An article by A. Alekseyev in the year's first issue of MLZNDUNARODNH:4
ZNI,ZN, explair,ing the Soviet votes on diearrnament issues at the UN
General Aesc:mbly session last fall, expr~,seed in unequivocal ternre
the position that all states possessing iauclear weapons must adhere
to any future comprehensive test ban agre~ner.x--a question on which
prior Soviet statembnts had hedged. Alekb?yev's formulation may
reflect increaA~d Soviet concern over end Chinese nuclear capability.
Th~a article also ~uetif ied Moscow's opposition to a Latin American
nuclear-free zone as defined in the Treaty of Tlatelo.lco, in effect
responding to Chinese effrxte to denigrate the Soviet Position in
the eye9 of the Third World. Aleksegev'8 comments on he question
of a world disarmament. conference (WDC), following the UNGA'e
establishment of a committee to study various countries' views
on the aub1ect, aimed .some explic~: babe at Peking rztd served to
underscore the propagandistic motivations of the USSR's WDC proposal.
TEST BA~~ TREATY Alekseyev'e a~.~ticle, defending the USSR's
abstention in the UNGA on a resolution calling
for unilateral cessation of underground testing by 5 August 1973,
stated that Moscow now considers a comprehensive test ban pobsible
"only on the basis of an international agreement to which all
nucl:3r power-, are parC.y." Previous Soviet comment had left open
the possibility cf some form of agreement without China and France.
Alekseyev's newly categorical statement, taken together with hie
own and other recent Soviet press comment on the chemical weapons
(CW) issue, suggests that the Soviet Unian hopes to deemphasize
discussion of restrictions on weapons testing at the f arthcoming
session of the Gene~~a Conference of the Committee on Diearmsment
(CCD) opening 20 February and to focus on CW. The latter objective
had already been anticipated by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Shevel
in an UNGA speech last fall, reported in the 2 October PRAVDA
UKRAINY, when he said chemical weapons should be the subject of the
"next" agreement at Geneva.
While repeating Soviet assertions that seismic technology had
progressed to a point where "national means" were sufficient to
monitor a comprehensive test brn and that only a "political
decision" was needed to reach an agreement, Alekseyev said Moscow
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had offered at the last UNGA session to broaden international
cooperation in tha exchange of seismic data within the framework
of a comprehensive test ban treaty as "an important supplement"
to verif ication by n+~tional means. Although they have r.ot
recently broached the issue in publ1.c, Soviet spokesmen in the
past have indicated that such exchanltes could take place only on
a strictly voluntary basis. Alakseyev's remarks appear tc indicate
some `lexibility on the iseue.~
Alekscyev reaffirmed Moscow's recent positions in the CW
discussions at Geneva, noting that the main poire of disagreement
continue to con ::ern the scr.pe of a CW agreement e~rd procedures for
monitoring it. Recent articles in PRAVDA and KRABaAYA ZVEZDA have
reported on continuing CW research 8nd development activities in
the United States and have cited the 8ritioh mage~?zine NEW F.CIENTIST
in asserting that the "volume" of U.S. research o~: CW hra almost
doubled in the last three years. Neither article mentioned the
CCD, although hcth criticized continued U.S. delay in ratifying the
1925 Geneva Protocol.
LATIN AHERICAN ZONE Thy. 5.~~idt Union abstained in the UNGA last
fall on a?reeolution which cal.~d nn France
and the USSR to adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. '~wSS and
central press dispatches on the progress of the 27th UNGA session
did not report the debate, nor was it menti~ned.in post-session
wrapups. Responding to Peking's attempts--through NCNA reportage--
to make propaganda capital of the Soviet position, a Radio Peace
and Progress commentary on 24 November had justified that position
by noting that the treaty did not restrict U.S. nuclear weapons at
ba3es or on ships in the area and asserted that Moscow would
recognize Latin America as a nuclear-free zone when all nuclear
powers agreed to do so. The NCNA reports had focused on Moscow's
objections to the treaty provision on zone of applicability which
allowed Latin American nations to def ine~ their territorial
waters unilaterally.
Moscow has been reticent on this issue in the past, but Alekseyev
cited the full argument which had been put forth by Soviet
delegate Roehchin in the First Committee debates, including the
* Moscow media have reported that the point U.S.-Soviet agreement
on enviromaental cooperation includes provisions for the study of
earthquake prediction, but they have not reported thRt the two
countries will set up seismic detection facilities un each other's
territory, as reported in the West.
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24 JANUARY 1973
complaint that "the designation of the area of the zone in the
treaty was madF~ in violation of existing generally recognized
norms of international law, and in particular of the 1958
Geneva ~;onvention on the Open.Sea." Roehchi.n had been slightly
more explicit, asserting that a state has no right to e.~~ablish,
without the consent of other interPSted slates, a particular
regime on the high seas at its own discretion.
Peking's comment on the UN debate had sought to play on Moscow's
vulnerai,.:.ity on the Latin American zone, and specifically the
territa~ial waters issue, in the eyes of the Third World.
Peking cited Moscow's position on the Mexican-sponsored resolution
ae well as its abstention on the other Third World disarr.:ament
initiative--Sri Lanka's resolution on establishing a zone of peace
in the Jndian Ocean area. In both cases, Peking contended,
Moscow had exposed .its posture on authentic disarmament measures
as opposed to those emerging from the CCD discussions, which hay
only served to maintain the nuclear monopoly of the "euparpoWers."
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE Moscow and .Peking have recently traded
charges over last fall's UNGA action on
a world disarmament conference. T. Kolesnichenko in the 9 January
PRAVDA attacked the Chinese for declining the seat reserved for
them in the study committee on WDC called .f or by the UNC:~
resolution and subsequently nsmed by the Assembly President,
Poland's Trepczynski, and accused them of "backstage intrigues"
aimed at wrecking preparations for the conference. Peking in turn,
in a statement by its permanent representative Huang Hua reported
by NCNA on 12 January, accused Trepczynski of "catering" to Moscow
by naming a committee that violated the sense of the UNGA
resolution, by failing to .consult w+_th regional groups, by
reserving places for the.four nuclear-weapon states .other than
the Soviet Union, and by basing the membership on that of the
CCD--a forum Peking has long rejected. With res~:ct to the .position
of other states, Moscow has mentioned only that the majority favor
a speedy convocation of the study committee.
Further underscoring the propaganda nature of th~~. Soviet Union's
WDC initiative, Alekseyev's MEZHDUNA~tODNAYA ZHIZN article focused
on U.S. and PRC oppositio:~ to the Soviet-proposed WDC and noted that
"Third World co~intries regard a world confe:rence.as a rostrum for
bringing pressure to bear on the enemies of disarmament for the
purpose of spurring all the mayor states. and prianarily the United
States, to initiate substantive measures to limit the race in both
conventional and nuclear arms." Alel:seyev reaffirmed that Moscow .
did not envisage a conference that would detract in any way from the
Geneva CCD forum.
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CONFLDENTLAL FBLS TRENDS
24 JANUARY 1973
- 14 -
CZECHOSLOVAKIA-FRG
FOREIGN MINISTER CHNOUPEK WELCq~1?_S BRANDY STATEMENT ON MUNICH
Prague'8 efforts to maintain a position of flexibility on the issue
of the invalidity of the Munich pact ar.d revive the stalled talks
with the FRG were ref le:ted in its positive reaction to Chancellor
Brandt's 18 January statement welcoming an early FRG-CSSR agreement
"so that the Munich agreement will no longer impede relations
betweer. the two states."
The prompt response by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek, in
an interview with CTK the next day, did not include Prague's once-
standard condition that the FRG acknowledge the Munich pact as
invalid "from the beginning"--a condition involving the invalidation
of all legal acts concluded by residents of the German-occupied
regions of Czechoslovakia after the 1938 Muni-ch agreement. Chnoupek
noted Chancellor Brandt's statement "wir:Z interest" and reiterated
Prague's long-standing desire for "normalization" of relations with
the FRG, which he Said would include "the formulation of the
nullity of the so-called Munich agreement that would be acceptable
to both sides." Chnoupek hopefully observed that "now, after the
statement of the Herr Bundeskanzler, the pause fur reflection ends
and a period beltins in which the FRG Government will t?.ake concrete
initiative steps." Chnoupek's reference to a "pause for reflection"
was in rebuttal to a statement by the FRG side, after the June
bargaining session in Prague, that the talks had reached an impasse
requtring a "pause for reflection" by both sides.
TASS on the 20th reported Chnoupek's interview.. including his
remarks on Prague's readiness to resume negotiations, on the Munich
pact, and ?his hope that the FRG would take concrete steps to
nullify Munich. However, the TASS report made no reference to the
policy statement by GMzncellor Brandt which had evoked Chnoupek's
response. On the 18tr~, TASS had reported details of Chancellor
Brandt's policy statement, including his expression of hope thbt
the Munich agreement would crane to complicate relations between
the FRG and CSSR.
BACKGROUI~'D Since the windup of the biaa.teraY talks last June,
statements in Prague and other Soviet bloc media
have dioplayed inconsistency and a measure of flexibility on the
Munich pact issue. While some statements still insist trat the
FRG declare the pact invalid ab initio, others have skirted t