TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050049-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: December 6, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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F B I S
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
6 DECEMBER 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 49)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried In foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal snr'etions
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOREIGN BROADCAST IIFOF 1ATICVJ SERVICE
CORRECTIONS
TO FBIS TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, 6 DECEMBER 1972
In the Indochina section, page 2, second paragraph, line one
should read: The editorial on the 3d echoed other Hanoi
propaganda x x x (correcting the date).'
Also in the Indochina section, page 8, the third line in
the footnote should read: The massive attacks an Hanoi and
Haiphong on 16 April prompted x x x (inserting the date). The
third from last line of the same footnote should read: x x x
go-rnment statement on 10 May. Foreign Ministry statements x x x.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
DRV Rejects Any Revision of "Basic Principles" in Peace Accord . 1
DRV Foreign Ministry Assails U.S. Bombing for Past Month . . . . 7
Moscow Assails U.S. Delay on Settlement, Pledges Assistance . . . 10
USSR-HU14GAR.Y
Brezhnev, Kadar Stress Unanimity, Score Rumors of Rift . . . . . 12
SINO-SOVIF'C RELATIONS
Brezhnev Denounces Chinese During Visit to Hungary . . . . . . . 16
Chinese Again Challenge Soviets to Withdraw Troops . . . . . . . 17
EUROPE
Brezhnev Asserts Optimism on Force Reduction Prospects . . . . . 19
SALT
Moscow Interprets U.S. Film as Direct Attack on SALT II . . .
.
CUBA-USSR.
Raul Castro Says Military Ties Are Non-negotiable . . . . . .
.
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Titarenko Protege Becomes Ukrainian Cadre Chief . . . . . . .
.
CHINA
Provinces Seep Up Rebuilding of Young Communist League . . .
. .
Heilungkiang Broadcast Reveals Serious Discipline Problem . .
.
ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY: USSR Raises Concept in Connection
with Iran, Persian Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
23
. 30
. Si
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6 DECEMBER 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS Gf.VEN MAJOR ATTENTION 27 NOVEMBER - 3 DECEMBER 1972
Moscow (2642 items)
Peking (1546 items)
Brezhnev in Hungary
(1%)
25%
Domestic Issues
(38%)
34%
[trezhnev speeches
(--)
12%]
Albanian National
(--)
20%
50th Anniversary of
(11%)
11%
Day
USSR,
30 Dec.
Indochina
(13%)
16%
Vietnam
(5%)
7%
[Vietnam
(9%)
12%]
China
(4%)
3%
[Cambodia
(3%)
4%]
Europr.an
Security
(5%)
2%
UNGA Session
(21%)
t%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics a I events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL F3IS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972
INDOCHINA
Hanoi's determination to stand firm or the basic points of the
peace accord, au summarized in the DRV Government statement on
26 October, was again indicated in a NHAN DAN editorial on
3 December, the day before the resumption of the Kissinger-Le
Duc Tho private talks after a nine-day recess. The paper said
that if the Nixon Administration demands revisions on such
principles as the unity of Vietnam and self-determination in the
South, this would mean that the real U.S. intention is to scrap
the agreement. Like the NHAN DAN Commentator article on
25 November which had acknowledged some of the issues in contention,
the editorial ridiculed such demands by Thieu as those for a
withdrawal of North Vietnrmese troops and reestablishment of the
demilitarized zone.
Also on the eve of the resumed private talks, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
article assailing U.S. "double dealing" on the peace accord warned
that the Nixon Administration should not count on military pressure
to achieve its aims. The article observed that the Administration
should remember its four-year history of failure "to drive the
adversary's main force units" out of South Vietnam by military
pressure.
Having gone on record on 29 November with Foreign Minister Chi
Peng-fei's "important statement" voicing hope for a Vietnam settle-
ment, Peking's only authoritative comment has been a 6 December
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article in support of a PRG statement
accusing the Thieu government of intensified terrorism. Peking has
not mentioned the current round of private talks, but Commentator
demanded that the United States "cease beefing up" Thieu's army,
halt the alleged repression in the South, and sign the draft
agreement "as soon as possible." In another sign of support for
Hanoi, Peking Cock the unusual step of replaying the full text of
the 3 December NHAN DAN editorial on settlement terms.
Soviet support for Hanoi's demand that the United States sign the
peace accord without delay was reiterated by Kosygin during a
2 December meeting with the DRV delegation in Moscow to sign the
annual aid agreement. Moscow has avoided discussion of the issues
in contention, while merely repeating routine criticism of continued
U.S. military action and support of Thieu.
DRV REJECTS ANY REVISION OF "BASIC PRINCIPLES" IN PEACE ACCORD
As was the case with the daily private U.S.-DRV talks from 20 through
26 November:, Hanoi has barely mentioned that the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho
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6 DECEMBER 1972
meetings resumed on 4 December. VNA reported tersely on
6 December that following the DRV-U.S. meeting on the 4th,
Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy "held consultations" with Mme. Nguyen
Thi Binh and other members of the PRG delegation. Characteris-
tically, the 3 December NHAN DAN editorial, in criticizing the
United States for wanting to renegotiate basic points of the peace
accord. did not even mention the private talks.
The editorial on the 2d echoed other Hanoi propaganda in pointing
to the DRV's "good will and initiative" in the private
negotiation of the peace accord. Notably, however. the editorial
emphasized U.S. modifications of previous positions: It said that
the negotiations were able to proceed favorably and lead to
completion of the text of the agreement because the United States
finally recognized "the sacred inviolable national rights of the
Vientamese people and the South Vietnamese people's right to
self-determination, which the U.S. side had opposed tooth and
nail for four years." The paper said that the peace accord
contains fundamental principles which are indispensable
prerequisites for a lasting peace, and that the first of these
prerequisites is that "the United States respects the independence,
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as
recognized by the 1954 agreements." The editorial added further
emphasis by observing that "in other words" the United States has
finally agreed to make this pledge regarding Vietnam's territorial
integrity and unity "after so many years of war of aggression in
Vietnam."*
* Hanoi's stand that Vietnam is one country temporarily
partitioned was dramatically illustrated in propaganda following
the communist offensive in South Vietnam last March. Reacting to
President Nixon's 26 April 1972 TV speech condemning the
offensive, a 29 April NHAN DAN Commentator article took explicit
issue with his charge That North Vietnam had crossed an inter-
national border to invade its neighbor. Commentator asked
rhetorically "what neighbor, what border? On what international
document did he base his statement that North and South Vietnam
are two countries?" The article went on to list the articles in
the 1954 Geneva agreement which provide for international
recognition of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity of Vietnam. See the TRENDS of 3 May 1972, pages 7-8.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972
The 25 November NHAN DAN Commentator article had also quoted
paint one of the draft summary, on U.S. respect for the unity
of Vietnam, but had not gone on to say that it was basic to
moving the negotiations forward. The editorial on the 3d
insisted that the principles on the basic national rights of the
Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese right to self-determinatic:.
"are major and organically interrelated. They act as main
pillars, the absence of one of which will cause the whole
building, that is the agreement, to collapse." It had prefaced
this declaration by quoting selectively from the points in
Hanoi's summary of the peace accord, though without clearly
identifying the passages as such:
+ It quoted from point two on U.S. withdrawal the stipulation
that the United States "must terminate its military involvement
in South Vietnam and its interference in South Vietnam's
domestic affairs."
+ From point four on self-determictatior in the South, the
editorial cited the passages noting that the South Vietnamese
shall decide their future "through really free and democratic
general elections"; that the United States "is not committed to
any political tendency or to any personality" and "does not
seek to impose a pro-U.S. government" in Saigon; that `democratic
liierties" will be insured; and that "an administrative structure
called the national council of national reconciliation and
concord of three equal segments will be set up."
+ The editorial followed the above passage by quoting point five--
reunification shall be carried out step by step through peaceful
means--and then reverted to quoting the passage in point four
stating tE t the question of the Vietnamese armed forces in South
Vietnam shall be settled by th%s two South Vietnamese parties,
and that among the questions to be discussed "are steps to reduce
the military numbers of both sides and to demobilize the troops
being reduced. . . ."*
* VNA supplied the ellipses; the summary of the agreenent goes
on to say that the two parties shall sign an agreement on internal
matters as soon as possible and try to do this within three months
after the cease-fire comes into effect. The editorial did not
cite the provision in point two of the agreement that a cease-fire
would be observed throughout South Vietnam 24 hours after the
signing of the agreement.
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CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972
The editorial asserted that if the United States had respected
"these approved principles" Vietnam would be on a path to
peace by now, and it acid the U.S. "about face" had aroused
indignation throughout the world. Citing Thieu's demands--on
North Vietnamese withdrawal from the South, restoration of
the DMZ, and "a clear definit4on" of the council of
reconciliation--the editorial rejected the notion that he had
made such demands without U.S. backing. Like earlier comment,
it sniped at the President's and Kissinger's comments, saying
there is no denying that the agreement the United States should
have aimed on 31 October is the "right" one for the Urited
States to achieve "peace with honor." While the editorial for
the most part referred to the Nixon Administration throughout,
it said at one point that "bellicose forces of aggression in
the United States" are attempting to reverse the situation in
Vietnam, adding that "they have not yet come to realize the
Vietnamese peop'e's determination to fight and their intensive
strength." It concluded that if the Nixon Administration
wanted to revise the basic principles laid down in the agreement,
"then its real intention would be nothing other than to scrap
all the commitments already made, in or"'er to prolong its war
of aggression in Vietnam and Indochina."
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 3d set out to demonstrate
the ;nmmunists' determination and to document the claim that
they are capable of successfully continuing the struggle in the
youth if necessary. Arg,iing that the major allied military
initiatives during the Nixon Administration have all been thwarted,
the army paper particularly noted the inability of the allies to
drive the communists' main forces out of South Vietnam. QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN claimed that the strength and victories of the resistance
will grow if the war continues. Maintaining that this year's
offensive had surpassed the 1968 Tet attacks, the article lauded it
as "a new peak" in the resistance and "an unprecedentedly great
and all-around strategic victory."
POLITICAL Persistent attacks on Thieu's "persecution and
PRISONERS liquidation" of political prisoners culminated in
a PRG statement on 3 December. And a supporting
NHAN DAN editorial on the 5th recalled that the draft peace
accord takes note of the people's democratic liberties and
provides for the release of all prisoners. The editorial quoted
the passage from the PRG statement to the effect that the
"terrorist" campaign along with intensification of the war "is
dimming the I.rospects of ending the war and restoring peace in
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972
Vietnam." The paper said it was necessary to emphasize the
heavy U.S. responsibility for this "white terrorist campaign"--
a scheme, it said, for which more favorable conditions have been
created by the U.S. delay in signing the peace agremeent. The
United States, the editorial declared, must be held responsible
for "putting an immediate end" to the campaign of "torture
and killing."
In the second instance since Hanoi's 26 October release of the
summary of the peace agreement, the editorial noted that it
provides for the release of all prisoners of both sides. The
previous reference was the onP in the 8 November NHAN DAN
editorial: Elaborating on the 26 October summary, it explained
that the detainees referred to in the peace agreement are
"captured patriots and military men and the civilian internees--
meaning, according to provision 21b of the Geneva agreement,
'all perscns who have in any way contributed to the political.
and armed struggle between the two parties."'
Point three of the summary of the agreement said tersely that
"the return of all captured and detained personnel of the
parties shall be carried out in parallel [song song] with the
U.S. troops' withdrawal." The VNA translation of the NHAN DAN
editorial of the 5th similarly rendered the passage as providing
for the release of all prisoners "in parallel." However, a more
accurate translation of the Vietnamese would be: There "would be
a stipulated time for the return of all persons captured and
detained by all sides with the withdrawal of U.S. troops."*
INTERNATIONAL A 2 December NHAN DAN a i:...tclc reiterated
CONTROL COMMISSION Hanoi's criticism of Indocaesia's stand on
a Vietnam settlement pre'-iously expressed
in QUAN DOI KHAN DAN and NHAN DAN articles on 19 and 20 November,
respectively. The current article went beyond other Hanoi
comment since 26 October, however, when it discussed the
* The phrase "stipulated time" (thowif gian quy dqinhg) seems
more ambiguous than "in parallel." Hanoi media never acknowledged
an MP report that Xuan Thuy had said in a 10 November interview
that Hanoi believes the two sides should free prisoners at the
same time, but that to show its good will it had accepted the U.S.
view that the foreign military and civilian prisoners will be freed
within two months and the South Vietnamese civilians within
three months.
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6 DECEMBER 1972
N
international control commission called for in the draft agreement.
NHAN DAN said that "on 29 November Foreign Minister Malik stated
that Indonesia would become a member of an international control
commission and was prepared to send in approximately 2,000 troops
and officials to fulfill its obligation." The paper asserted
that "this is a showy, precipitous, mean, and ill-willed
attitude" and scored Indonesian officials for incorrectly giving
the impression that peace was about to be restored.
The 2 December article still did not directly address itself to
U.S. statements favoring efforts to insure that the ICC is in
place to be activated at the time of the cease-fire. However,
it may have been reflecting the issues in contention when it
questioned why the Indonesians had to send troops to Vietnam and
when it asserted that once the agreement is signed "the inter-
rntional commission of control and supervision would fulfill its
obligation in conformity with the organizational system and
obligations prescribed for it, and not as it pleases. No one
asks or allows them [the Indonesian officials] to do what they
stated."*
Another attack on Indonesian officials appeared in a 6 December
LPA commentary, which similarly cited Malik's statement about
readiness to dispatch troops to Vietnam as part of a control
commission. The commentary did not discuss this point, instead
concentrating its attack on a report in an Indonesian paper that
the government would close the NFLSV representation in Djakarta
once the peace agreement is signed and that the foreign ministry is
preparing to repatriate the NFLSV representation. The commentary
seemed to avoid condemning the government as a whole when it
aimed its denunciation at "some people in the Indonesian ruling
circles" who "have gone too far on the road of subservience to the
United States."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSAILS U.S. BOMBING FOR PAST MONTH
Hanoi on 2 December broke its pattern of daily protests over
U.S. bombing of the North by the spokesman of the DRV Foreign
Ministry and issued a foreign ministry statement assailing
attacks over the past month. Like earlier propaganda, the
statement indirectly acknowledged U.S. restriction of the
bombing to areas below the 20th parallel when it listed the
four southern provinces and the Vinh Linh zone as being repeated
targets of U.S. attacks during the last month. This is the
first protest to be issued at this higt2r level since 11 October,
when a foreign ministry statement assailed that day's bombing
of Hanoi in which the French mission was destroyed :nd the
French delegate general fatally wounded.
Since the statement is not pegged to any specific attack or
incident it may have been issued at this level now to bolster
criticism of the U.S. delay in signing the peace accord. The
statement charged that the continued U.S. "crimes--more savage
than those of the Hitlerite clique--" are not isolated acts.
But, it said, the bombings have occurred "at a time when the
Nixon Administration is prolonging the negotiations and plotting
t' ask for modification to the agreement," as well as stepping
up military supplies to South Vietnam, intensifying bombings
there, and supporting Saigon in "tens of thousands of police
operations" to suppress and terrorize the people.
The statement reiterated Vietnamese determination to continue
the struggle in standard fashion. And, in terms regularly used
in the daily ministry spokesman's statements, it demanded that
the Nixon Administration "stop at once the war of aggression in
Vietnam, immediately end the bombing, mining and blockade of
the DRV and all other encroachments upon her sovereignty and
security." In keeping with most previous foreign ministry
statements, the current one expressed thanks for the support of
the socialist countries and various other governments and peoples
and called on "friends in the five continents" to demand that
the United States stop the war and sign the peace agreement,
as well as to continue their support and assistance until the
Vietnamese people achieve complete victory.
The issuance of the statement at the foreign-ministry level at
this time is at variance with Hanoi's pattern of issuing only
routine ministry spokesman's statements since mid-August
despite intense bombing during September and October. It
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TRENvS
6 DECEMBER 1972
might be conjectured that Hanoi did not issue ministry staten;;,nts
at that time because the peace negotiations were at a sensitive
stage. There were no foreign ministry statements in September
and it deemo possible that the single one in October might not
have been issued had the diplomatic missions not been hit.*
OTHER COMMENT Bombing and shelling during the past week was
ON AIR WAR routinely condemned in statements by the
foreign ministry spokesman, issued daily
except for 2 December, the day of the higher-level statement.
Further concern over the continuatio:i of U.S. air strikes was
expressed in a NHAN DAN cditorial of 4 December which extolled
the "vigilance, determination, and readiness" of the people and
called for continued efforts in many tasks, including evacuation.
Lauding the people's achievements in transportation and agricultural
and industrial production while fighting at the same time "to
punish the U.S. aggres.ors' Aircraft and warships," the
editorial sttedsed 4hat they are prepared to continue the
struggle in the face of further "aggression." KHAN DAN then
cited the 2 December foreign ministry statement to bolster its
charge that U.S. officials have "blatantly exposed their
wicked intention to intensify military pressure in oruer to gain
a position of strength in negotiations."
On 4 December, VNA reported on a "recent" communique by the DRV
War Crimes Commission which condemned U.S. actions in both
North and South Vietnam during the month of November. With
respect to the North, the communique maintained that while
U.S. strikes are 1'.%. limited to regions further south," they
are more concentrates than before. The communique also charged
that U.S. aircraft continued to drop "water-mines and magnetic
bombs" on major waterways, including the La, Lars, and Ben Hai
* The full-scale resumption of the U.S. air strikes last April
was initially denounced in an 11 April DRV Government statement.
The massive attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong prompted a joint DRV
Party-Government appeal that day--unprecedented during the war
except for one of December 1970 ~n the wake of large-scale air
strikes and the abortive U.S. prisoner-rescue attempt. The
President's 8 May decision to mine DRV ports brought a
government statement on 18 May. Foreign ministry statements
were issued periodically, peaking to four in July but with
only two in August--on the 8th and, the 17th.
CONFIDENTIAL
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6 DECEMBER 1972
rivers and the Le canal, and that "Marine gunships based on
the USS Cleveland" made frequent raids on Ha Tinh and Quang
Binh provinces.*
Reviewing the results of air defense work in the provinces
south of the 20th parallel since late October, Hanoi radio on
1 December claimed that a total of 47 U.S. planes weree downed
during the period from 23 October to 28 November in Thanh Hoa,
the provinces of the 4th Military Region, and the Vinh Linh
zone. These included 19 F-4's, one F-105, 16 A-;'s, five A-6's,
three 1'-111's and three B-52's, according to the item. It also
claimed 15 ships set on fire in this interval., and four
"pilotless U.S. aircraft" downed over the outlying provinces of
Ha Bac, Hai Hung, and Vinh Phu, and the pity of Haiphong. As
of 3 December, Hanoi claimed a total of 4,1,'0 planes downed
over the North.
* See the TRENDS of 29 November 1972, page 10, for a charge in the
War Crimes Comlmission communique of 24 November that helicopters
were involved in an attack on Ha Tinh on 22 November; the previous
communique of 21 November (22 November TRENDS, page 10) had
claimed that helicopters were also involved in U.S. air attacks
during the first 19 days of that month. ,
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6 DECEMBER 1972
MOSCOW ASSAILS U.S. DELAY ON SETTLEMENT, PLEDGES ASSISTANCE
Moscow continues to comment along established lines regarding a
Vietnam settlement, taking the United States to task for
postponing signing of the U.S.-DRV agreement while stepping up
bombing in North and South Vietnam and increasing military
supplies to Saigon. At the same time, commentators continue
generally to avoid discussing any substance of the agreement.
Moscow media duly reported, without comment, Kissinger's
3 December departure for Parts for his resumed talks with
Le Duc Tho.
The 2 December Joint communique on Brezhnev's visit to Hungary
noted that the leaders of the two countries expressed their
"unchanged solidarity" with the struggle of the Vietnamese
people and Lao and Cambodian "patriots" against U.S. aggression.
The communique made no explicit mention of the peace accord
when it expressed support for the stand of the DRV and PRG
"regarding the ending of the war and the restoration of peace in
Vietnam" and opposed the U.S. "delaying tactics and continued
aggression." On the other hand, explicit Soviet support for the
DRV demand that the United States sign the accord "without
delay" was voiced by Kosygin during a 2 December meeting with
the DRV Government economic delegation led by Vice Premier
Le Thanh Nghi, which arrived in Moscow on 27 November to
dlacuss aid for 1973. Moscow media's continued restraint in
criticizing the United States was illustrated, however, when
TASS' report of the meeting omitted Le Thanh Nghi's strong
criticism of the Administration. TASS merely noted that Nghi
"described the situation in Vietnam, the successes of the
Vietnamese people in rebuff lag the imperialist aggression and
in socialist construction." VNA's longer account said Nghi
also "denounced the obduracy and bad faith of the Nixon
Administration and its attempt to prolong the U.S. war of
aggression again;st Vietnam."
Both TASS and VNA reported that Kosygin stressed that the Soviet
Union, "loyal to its political line," will continue to give "the
necessary assistance in the strengthening of the DRV defense
potential, in the implementation of important economic tasks, and
in the efforts to restore peace in Vietnam." VNA's longer
report also noted that Le Thanh Nghi thanked the USSR for its
support ana assistance and described the atmosphere of the
talks as one of "close militant solidarity and fraternal friendship."
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6 DECEMBER 1972
Moscow's reluctance to discuss the substance of the peace
agreement was illustrated in a Washington-datelined dispatch
in IZVESTIYA on 30 November which criticized the United States
for retreating from Kissinger-'s 26 October statement that
"peace is at hand," for procrastinating and for trying to
obtain changes in the agreed nine points. The correspondent
said that the way to a cease-fire is being blocked by
Washington, but he mentioned no issues, merely citing
speculation in the Washington POST that the difficulties stem
from "r?vised U.S. demands" made by Kissinger at the Paris
talks with Le Duc Tho. He noted that Warhit,gton is silent
on the substance and scope of the differences. A participant
in the 3 December domestic service roundtable discussion
alluded to the issue of a political settlement in the South
when he asserted that all of Washington's maneuvering and
procrastination seams motivated by the hope of leaving behind
in Saigon after a U.S. withdrawal a regime which would continue
to be an "obedient champion" of U.S. policy in So::theast Asia.
But he said nothing about the peace accord provisions regarding
a settlement in the South.
TASS carried a brief report of the 3 December SWAN DAN editorial---
which had been carried in full by NCNA--criticizing the United
States for its failure to sign the agreement. The TASS report
reflected none of the substance of the editorial, which had
discusser; such basic points of the agreement as U.S. recognition
of the "unity" of Vietnam and the issues of "Vietnamese" armed
forces and political power in the South.
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USSR-HUNGARY
BREMIEV, KADAR STRESS UNANIMITY# SCORE RUMORS OF RIFT
The lengthy communique issued at the windup of Brezhnev's
27 November-1 December visit to Budapest provided what was
clearly deemed necessary at this juncture in the tense Soviet-
Hungarian relationship--public certification of "complete
identity of views" on a broad range of bilateral and international
topics, buttressed by warm Hungarian praise for the Soviet example
and by general approval from the Soviet side of the current
Hungarian program of building socialism. Notably, however, the
Soviet endorsement contained no direct reference to the Hungarian
economic reform. Contrasting with the serene tone of the
communique, the major speeches by Brezhnev and Kadar and the
followup comment in the media of both countries defensively
denounced alleged Western schemes to split the two Warsaw Pact
allies through conjectures about disagreement over Budapest's
five-year-old economic reform program.
PRAVDA's 4 December editorial, entitled "Fraternal Unity,"
underscored unanimity during Brezhnev's "official, friendly"
visit and cautioned: "It should not be forgotten that imperialism
seeks to retain its position by any means, resorting to aggression,
provocation, and slander." The paper added that "our adversaries
seek to hamper the successful developmert of our countries, to
weaken our unity, but these attempts are futile." It went on to
highlight Kadar's remarks at the 30 November friendship meeting
in Budapest to the effect that Hungary's interests lay in strengthening
its ties with the USSR.
Similarly defensive, NEPSZABADSAG's editorial on the :1d said on the
score of Hungarian-Soviet relations that "it would br, gocd if our
enemies realized at last that neither their poison-blended
'objectivity' nor their fawning compliments or attempts to revive
nationalist prejudices can be of any use." And the Budapest
political weekly 14AGYARORSZAG on 1 December remarked that "her
political opponents urge Hungary to take 'a role in foreign affairs
that is independent of the superpowers,' by which they mean
disrupting her alliance with the Soviet Union."
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An apparently restrained reception given Brezhnev at the Csepel
plant meeting on the 30th prompted the Budzpest city committee
daily ESTI IIIRLAP to remark on 1 December that "it has cost us
a bitter lesson, but luckily we have unlearned the repeated
rhythmic clapping and the unceasing noisy ovations of the past."
The paper described the atmosphere of the gathering as "ardent"
if undemonstrative, attesting to "the stand of the Hungarian
people and of their emotions."
BREZHNEV In his major speech at thy'. Csepal plant on the 30th,
Brezhnev gave a degree of attention to Soviet-Hungarian
tensions which contrasted with his brief, passing assurance during
Zhivkov's mid-November visit to Moscow that "nothing can cloud"
Soviet-Bulgarian relations. In Budapest, where such a conclusion
was not so clearly to be taken for granted, the Soviet leader noted
that "the methods of influence by imperialism on the socialist
countries are varied-'from direct aggression, as in the case of
the DRV, to the most refined, flattering methods calculated to
revive nationalist prejudices and encourage any break." Brezhnev
added pointedly that "sometimes there are promises of economic
advartages addresped to one socialist country or another" and that
"even if the imperialists write something true about us--and they
can no longer avoid it--they will without fail add some poison,
will write with poison." Such attempts to "weaken our unity,"
he declared, will receive "a resolute rebuff."
Brezhnev seemed at pains to drive home the point that any disharmony
over economic or other internal matters should not be taken to
indicate less than full unanimity in foreign policy, though his
language notably fell short of claiming unqualified unity: In
the "political. cooperation of the socialist states," he said,
there is "practically no single big event in the international
arena in regard to which we are disunited."
Brezhnev studiously avoided any direct reference to the current
Hungarian economic reform, confining himself to a general tribute
to the MSZMP's achievements over the past 30 years and repeatedly
reminding his hosts of the benefits of economic "cooperation."
He remarked in this connection that "life is difficult for a
lonely man." Presumably to avoid drawing attention to his silence
on Hungarian economic affairs, Brezhnev refrained from any
discussion of the Soviet economy either.
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KADAR On the same platform at the Csepel rally, Kadar was
similarly preoccupied with offsetting the reports of
tensions: "The mixed bag of imperialists, stubborn reactionaries,
and their
cart-pushers preoccupy themselves often and a great
deal with" Hungarian-Soviet relations. "Obviously," he edded,
our friendship does not please them, and they would like by all
means to cast a shadow over it nd if possible loosen it. As
long as we know this, it doesn't matter, and in one way or another
this is the corollary of the struggle." The two countries'
friendship is "unbreakable," he continued, and "there is no force
within or outside, no subversion or intrigue, capable of making our
party, country, and people deviate" from the path of strengthening
ties with the Warsaw Pact and CEMA states and "every socialist
country."
Kadar went out of his way to assure Brezhnev that his party was
resolute in shoring up weaknesses in the Hungarian economic reform.
He recalled that the 14-15 November MSZMP plenum had called for
imposition of "greater state and civic discipline"--through, among
other things, tightening up the central plannir.g mechanism and
braking inflation--and "assured our Soviet friends . . . that the
Hungarian people are going about their work in a state of awareness
and are successfully marching relentlessly forward" to completion
of socialist construction. At the same time, Kadar's lengthy
tribute to the Soviet example and support wound up on an implicitly
independent note: Declaring that the Hungarians "are true champions
of the concept of socialism," he added that "therefore, going beyond
historic and emotional motivation, they believe in and foster
Hungarian-Soviet friendship out of principled conviction."
The 2 December joint communique juxtaposed praise by the Hungarian
side for the USSR's "tremendous successes in communist construction"
with a statement that "the Soviet side highly assessed the achievements
of the fraternal Hungarian people, its successes in building a
socialist society and the development of Hungary's economy, science,
and culture," on the "sound foundation" laid by the 10th MSZMP
Congress of November 1970.
KOMOCSIN ABSENCE MSZMP Politburo member and Secretary Zoltan
Komocsin, the key Hungarian party spokesman: on
international affairs and a prime mover in the preparation of the
June 1969 Moscow international party conference, was absent from the
p'iLli:. proceedings during Brezhnev's visit for announaed reasons of
illness. MTI on the 27th listed Komocsin among those greeting
Brezhnev at the Budapest airport, but it deleted his name in
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transmitting a similar report some four hours later. On the 29th,
MTI, reporting a meeting that day between CPSU Secretary Katushev and
MSZMP Secretary Pullai at Hungarian party headquarters, added that
Katushev and Pullai "also met today with Zoltan Komocsin . . .,
who is on sick leave." On 4 December, a Budapest broadcast in
Hungarian to Europe reported that a meeting of the National
Assembly's foreign affairs committee that day was chaired by
Miklos Nagy "instead of the committee's chairman Zoltan Komocsin,
who is on sick leave."
Komocsin was reported by MTI on 29 September to have held talks
with an Indian CP delegation whose visit to Budapest ended that
day. Since then he has been mentioned only in connection with the
publication of a collection of his speeches and articles under
the title "National Interests, International Objectives," reviewed
by NEPSZABADSAG on 21 November.
The relative importance of national versus international interests
of the socialist countries has been a preoccupation of Komocsin.
In an article in the August 1972 issue of the Soviet journal
RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNY MIR, reprinted in the July-Auduat
issue of the MSZMP theoretical journal TARSADALMI SZEMLE, he
assailed the Chinese and, implicitly, the Romanians on the score
of nationalism. In the September 1971 issue of PROBLEMS OF PEACE
AND SOCIALISM, on the other hard, he had stressed "different"
approaches to economic management by the socialist countries and
implied that Hungary should be allowed to pursue its economic reform
without outside in,:erference.*
* The articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 16 February and
2 August 1972, respectively.
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6 DECEMBER 1978
S I dO - SOVIET RELATIONS
BREZHNEV DENOUNCES CHINESE DURING VISIT TO HUNGARY
Against a background of bitter Chinese invective directed against
Soviet disarmament initiatives at the United Nations, Brezhnev's
visit to Hungary from 27 November to 1 December produced a show
of Soviet bloc unity in the face of what the joint communique called
"the danger of Maoism." In a major speech on 30 November,
Brezknev explicitly acknowledged the bad relations between the
Soviet Union and China, which he attributed to Peking's policies
aimed at aggravating relations and splitting the communist camp.
Briefly reiterating Moscow's line calling for normalization of
relations with the PRC, Brezh-ev pointedly invoked Hungary and
the other fraternal countries as being in "full agreement" with
Moscow on "this important matter." The joint communique condemned
Peking for opposing the "common interests" of "the socialist
community."
Condemnation of the Chinese at these communist summits has by no
means been ritualistic in the past couple of years. During that
period none of the joint communiques on Brezhnev's meetings with
bloc party chiefs--the most recent previous one having been the
mid-November visit to Moscow by Bulgaria's Zhivkov--had referred
tc China directly. On the other hand, meetings between Moscow's
allies have produced anti-Chincoe statements, as in the communique
on Zhivkov's talks with Poland's Gierek just before the former
went to Moscow. The Soviets may have been stung into joining
in these attacks as a re oinder to Peking's recent polemical
assaults, which have again brought.the bitterness of Sino-Soviet:
relations into prominence. In addition, Brezhnr:v may have chosen
Budapest as an appropriate site for stressing bloc unity against
the Chinese. The PRC foreign trade minister concluded a visit to
Hungary on 16 November as part of a tour that inciaded two other
East European countries, the independent-minded Yugoslavia and Romania.*
* Seeking to leave no doubt of his party's pro-Soviet loyalty,
Kadar declared in his speech on 30 November that the Hungarians take
a firm stand against "nationalism" in the communist movement and
condemn the "chauvinist, anti-Soviet, schismatic, great-power policy"
of Peking. Having played a centrai". role iu: organizing the 1969
international communist conference, the Hungarians have long
served as proxy spokesmen for Moscow in international communist
affairs.
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Brezhnev introduced his remarks on China by observing that Peking's
hostility toward the Soviets and its activities in the international
arena "perfectly suit imperialist reaction." Addressing a particularly
sore point, he took the Chinese to task for propagating the "absurdity"
that the Soviets are preparing to attack China. Moscow has long
been sensitive on this matter, as reflected in a 23 September
PRAVDA article denouncing Joseph Alsop for speculating about a
Soviet preventive strike. Brezhnev may, in fact, have had in mind
the fact that this insistent purveyor of such speculation is now
visiting the PRC.
Brezhnev renewed the call for normal relations with the PRC in
pro forma fashion, citing without elaboration the line formulated
at the 24th CPSU Congress. Consistent with Soviet practice in
recent months, he failed to mention the border talks, and he also
neglected to recite the "concrete and constructive proposals" for
improving Sino-Soviet relations which he first disclosed in a
conciliatory speech last March during the period between the
Peking and Moscow summits. That speech had coincided with one of
the periodic returns to Peking of the chief Soviet negotiator to
the border talks. Moscow has tended to make conciliatory gestures
at the times its negotiator has gone to Peking, most notably
Brezhnev's hopeful address a week after the talks opened on
20 October 1969. However, the return to Peking of Soviet negotiator
Ilichev in mid-October this year has been followed by Peking's
virulent portrayal of the Soviets as deceitful practioners of
military pressure behind a show of detente. Brezhnev's gloomy
assessment of the state of Sino-Soviet relations now suggests a
judgment the there is little hope for real improvement and that,
in these circumstances, unity in the Soviet bloc is important in
order to limit the effect on Moscow's interests.
CHINESE AGAIN CFALLENGE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW TROOPS
On the day before Brezhnev's foreign policy address in Budapest,
the Chinese indulged in yet another withering denunciation of the
"Soviet socia.i imperialists" for "harboring murderous intent
behind their smiles." PRC delegate Huang Rua, explaining his
vote against a UNGA resolution on nonuse of force which he said
war substantially the same as an earlier Soviet proposal, re eated
the challenge to the Saviets to withdraw their troops from the
Sir -Soviet border and from Mongolia if they truly oppose the use
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or threat of force. In this connection Huang referred to Soviet
representative Malik's earlier statement on Soviet readiness
to restore good-neighborly relations w~Gh China in the absence
of the threat of force.*
Huang pointed to the crux of Peking's objection to a general
renunciation of force when he said that such a demand is tantamount
to asking countries to "recognize the imperialist, colonialist, and
neocolonialist aggression and military occupation as permanently
legal." Taken together with Peking's position that the withdrawal
of troops from abroad is the most fundamental need, this line
reflects Peking's concern not only over its security interests
but also over its right to redress territorial inequities and to
regain sovereignty over areas it claims. At least juridically,
this concern presumably covers Taiwan as well as contested areas
along the Sino-Soviet border, but in the course of enunciating
its line Peking has ignored the Taiwan question while repeatedly
referring to the border conflict with the Soviets.
* See the TRENDS of 29 November 1972, pages 22-25, for a discussion
of recent Sino-Soviet exchanges on nonuse of force.
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EUROPE
BREa-INEV ASSERTS OPTIMISM ON FORCE REDUCTION PROSPECTS
Brezhnev used his speech at the Caepel factory in Budapest on
30 November to make his most forthcoming statement on the issue
of force reduction in Europe since 11 June 1971, when he stated
in a preelection speech that the Soviet Union was "ready to
discuss" limitations on both foreign and national armed forces.*
Picturing a newly propitious climate for ",vetting down in real earn-
est" to the limitation of forces and armaments on the continent,
he foresaw the possibility of "a useful and constructive solution"
given good will on the part of the participants.
Brezhnev's comments in Budapest, while optimistic in tone, were
couched in generalities. His fairly elaborate linkage of the force
reduction issue to the European climate appeared to view progress
on the issue as contingent on progress in the Helsinki multilateral
preparatory talks on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE). After mentioning the recent West German election
and expressing support for the GDR in the international community,
he took approving note of the Helsinki consultations and then looked
"further ahead" to a continuing process of "improvement in the
European political climate" that would in turn open prospects for
serious progress on force limitation. The Soviet-Hungarian commu-
nique issued on 2 December at the close of Brezhnev's visit re-
flected the Soviet stand that force reduction negotiations must
not encumber the CSCE: Declaring that both sides stressed the
importance they attached to the problem of reducing armed forces
and armaments in Europe, it added pointedly that this would be a
"separate step" in the process of European detente.
* In Tbilisi on 14 May 1971 Brezhnev had noted speculation by NATO
spokesmen on whether the March 1971 CPSU Congress proposals on
reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe meant Moscow
would include "foreign" as well as "national" forces. He
challenged them to get the issue clarified by "starting
negotiations." His statement on 11 June that the USSR'was prepared
to discuss both foreign and national forces was accompanied by
censure of the'Lisbon NATO ministerial session for not clearly
answering the Soviet proposals. See the TRENDS of 19 May 1971,
pages 20-22, and 16 June 1971, pages 18-20.
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Brezhnev's comments came in the wake of the NATO allies' 16 November
invitation to the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Hungary
to participate in initial talks on force reductions at the end of
January. His choice of the Budapest platform, after having totally
ignored the force reduction issue in public statements during Bul-
garian leader Zhivkov's 13-18 November visit to Moscow, may have
been designed to convey Soviet approval of Hungary's participation
in the force reduction talks while leaving open the role of the
Warsaw
Pact "flank" states, Romania and Bulgaria. (The NATO
"flank" states, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, are
slated to play a more limited role than that of the chief
participants on the Western side, the United States, Canada, Britain,
West Germany, and the Benelux countries.) Nothing was said about
the force reduction issue in the Soviet-Bulgarian communique.
Brezhnev commented in the Budapest speech that the problem of limiting
armed forces and armaments in Europe is not a simple one and that,
among the "many factors" to be taken into account, "due consideration
must be given to the sovereign rights and interests of various states."
One factor underlying the generalized nature of his remarks may
have been a desire not to preempt a collective statement of position
by the Warsaw Pact allies--perhaps forthcoming after the summit
meeting which Western press reports say is to take place in Moscow
prior to the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations in the latter half
of December. Any such statement may be expected to underscore
Soviet bloc initiative.
At the same time, the Soviet leader's remarks appeared to be part
of an orchestrated effort to pave the way for such a collective
statement and for the official response to the 16 November NATO
demarche. Where Brezhnev did not specifically state that the
Soviet Union was ready to participate in exploratory talks in
January, Soviet Ambassador to the FRG Falin, answering a question
by a West German radio interviewer on 30 November on whether the
USSR will accept the Western invitation, stated: "We will
participate in such negotiations." And on the eve of Brezhnev's
remarks, a Radio Moscow international service commentary stated that
"today the question of talks on reducing the armed forces and
armaments in Europe has become a factor of practical policy.
An agreement in principle has been reached on that issue, and the
negotiations are to start at the beginning of next year." The
commentary was devoted entirely to the force reduction issue, which
has seldom been the sLbject of a full Moscow radio or press
commentary. It has been broadcast in a number of European
languages over a period of several days.
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6 DECEMBER , ",72
SALT
MOSCOW INTERPRETS U,S, FILM AS DIRECT ATTACK ON SALT II
Moscow has belatedly attacked the film "Only the Strong" produced
by the American Security Council, shown on television stations in
the United States beginning this summer, as a direct attack on the
SALT II negotiations that opened in Geneva on 21 November. An
initial TASS report on the film in September had focused on
film's "concoctions" about a Soviet military threat to the United
States. A succession of recent radio and press commentaries,
appearing just as SALT II wai getting under way, has now used a
Seymour Hersh article on the film in the 16 November New York
TIMES as the peg for attacks on the film as a calculated effort by
opponetts of arms control to undermine the Geneva negotiations.
Although according to Hersh the film does not specifically attack
the SALT I agreements or SALT II, the recent Soviet commentaries
viewed the film and the Council's campaign for its dissemination
as directed both in timing and in substance against SALT II.
A 4 December commentar- by Radio Moscow's Vladislav Kozyakov linked
the film vii .h a "new anti-Soviet campaign" by opponents of detente
in the United States, noting that it appeared "Just at the time
when the strategic arms limitation talks have entered their second
round in Geneva." Articles by V. Matveyev it, the 30 November
LZVEST]YA and by V. Bolshakov in the 1 December PRAV.)A were more
restrained, emphasizing that considerable opposition now exists
within the United States itself to the film's message. Matveyev
took pains to dissociate "offizial Washington circles" from any
connection with the film and cited President Nixon's expression of
confidence in a "successful outcome of the second stage of the talks"
in his letter to the conferees in Geneva.
Moscow's sensitivity to the film may be traced to its expressed con-
cern over the size of the U.S. milita, y budget and t :e Defense
Department's strategic weapons modernisation program, both of which
have been trested in Soviet comment as potential obstacles t,) a
satisfactory outcome for SALT II. Bolshakov in PRAVDA, not:-'ng
that the film's target was the "U.S. man in the street," concluded
that its goal was "to enlist support from him for the militarist
lobby which is 'trying to persuade Congressmen to vote or new
allocations to the Pentagon."
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The showirg of the film on U.S. television was first reported in a
Washington dispatch by Vitally Chukseyev transmitted by TASS on
23 September, but the report was not picked up by other Soviet media
at that time. Chukseyev had evinced no special concern about the
impact of the film in relation to SALT; he had alluded to SALT
only in noting that such "soberminded Americans" as Senator Fulbright
had strongly condemned it for, among other things, ignoring the
significance of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on limiting strategic
weapons. The thrust of Chukseyev's dispatch was against the film's
crudeness, as illustrated in sequences in which "Soviet diesel
submarines are presented as atomic submarines" and "the 'nuclear
threat' from the USSR 'is confirmed' by photographs of the Vostok
spacecraft." The recent commentaries have made no such efforts
to rebut specific cases of misrepresentation, but they have
similarly ridiculed the film as an effort to fabricate a threat
to U.S. security from an imaginary "red danger."
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CUBA-USSR
RAUL CASTRO SAYS MILITARY TIES ARE NON-NEGOTIABLE
In a 2 December speech marking the 16th anniversary of the founding
of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), First Vice Prime
Minister and FAR Minister Raul Castro declared that Cuban-Soviet
political and military ties are non-negotiable and that Cuban
ports will "remain open" to the Soviet fleet, "whether it be for
training cruises or friendship visits that they make to the con-
tinental seas." Appearing against the background of the ongoing
U.S.-Cuban negotiations on highjacking and widespread U.S. press
speculation that an agreement on hijacking may be the precursor of
a Havana-Washington detente, Castro's remarks may have been
designed in part to reassure Moscow that Cuba will not weaken
its ties with the Soviet Union for the sake of improving relations
with the United States. At thp, same time, Havana media's handling
of the speech and Castro's other comments suggest that the speech
was intended in large part as a warning against any Cuban relaxation
of vigilance.
Castro's statements on the :inviolability of Soviet-Cuban ties and on
continu?:d Soviet naval accevs to Cuban ports have appeared to date
only in two FAR programs broadcast by the Cuban domestic radio on
4 December. The most extensive available vr;,,;aion of the speech,
transmitted by Havana TV on 3 December, confined itself to quoting
a cryptic observation that while the Cuban revolution is "firm as
a rock" and the "economic and political blockade" is disintegrating,
"there are still these who are attempting to foist conditions on
us." Even these ambiguous remarks did not appear in a 2 December
PRENSA LATINA dispatch, the only available Havana international trans-
mission of the speech.
A 4 December TASS summary of the speech stressed Castro's effusive
praise for Soviet assistance, but wholly ignored his comments on the
non-negotiability of Soviet-Cuban ties and on the continuation of
port privileges for the Soviet fleet.
In addition to assuring his audience, in effect, that Cuba's
relations with the Soviet Union will not be altered as a
consequence of negotiationa with the United States, Castro
appeared to be cautioning the Cuban military against
premature conclusions that the alleged threat to Cuban
security from the United States has receded. Declaring that
Cuba will continue to strengthen its "defensive capacity," he
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promised that Cuba "shall remain vigilant as lcn' ad we have
before us a powerful, treacherov5 enemy oppr.or, to the Cuban
revolution." But Castro went on to make other statemmnts
that were more conciliatory toward the United States and more hope-
ful of an improvement in Havana's relations with Washington. Noting
that several Latin American states are pursuing policies in defiance
of U.S. tutelage, he declaredi
This new situation raising its head in Latin America is
occurring amid singular historical circumstances which
are thrusting increasingly more realistic criteria
upon various imperialist governments. Thus we observe
how political forces which early in this decade were
clamoring for a revision of the results of World War II and
which encouraged the restoration of capitalism in the socialist
camp countries by force now adopt and even encourage measures
to case international tension.
This change, Castro stressed, does not signify that "imperialism
has changed its nature," but rather is a consequence of the formid-
able power possessed by the socialist camp. Castro also repeated
the stock Cuban charge that the United States acts as a "gendarme"
4n Latin .`.merica, but in the available versions of his speech he
did not pursue the line recently taken by his brother that U.S.-
Cuban relations cannot improve until Chu United States abandons its
"gendarme" role in the continent.
HIJACKING NEGOTIATIONS In the available versions of his speech
Castro made no reference to the hijacking
negotiations, The only recent reference
in Havana media to the progress of the negotiations appeared in a
5 December dome;tic service broadcast by Guido Garcia Inclan, who
has on occasion in the past been used as an official conduit.
Employing his "Letter from Freddy" format (Freddy is a mythical
Cuban expatriate working as a journalist for a U.S. newspaper),
Garcia Inclan declared: "It is my understanding that agreements will
be reached to avert the diversion of planes. Though secret, the
talks are going ahead."
BACKGROUND While Raul Castro's affirmation that Soviet warships
may continue to use Cuban ports appears to be the
first such statement by a key regime spokesmen, the
notion that Havana will not bargain away its ties with Moscow for the
sake of a rapprochement with Washington has been underscored by
Fidel Castro on several occasions over the last two and a half years.
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He made this point several times during his awing through Eastern
Europe and the USSR earlier this year. For example, speaking at a
Cuban embassy reception in Moscow on 3 July with Kosygin present,
he alleged that the Ni3 n Administration sought a severance of Cuban
links to the USSR and i, renunciation of Cuban support for revolu-
tionary movements as prere.juisites for improved relations. Castro
promised that Cuba would "never" make such concessions "running
counter to our principles, our loyalty and gratitude to the Soviet
Union." After his return home, in his 26 July speech, he obj er.ted
to a statement in the U.S. Democratic Party platform that Cuba
cannot become a foreign military base.
Castro's comments in Moscow and elsewhere ap eared to reflect
concern that in the wake of improved U.S.-Soviet relations the
USSR' might press Cuba to make unpalatable concessions in order to
normalize relations with the United States and that Moscow and
Washington might reach an understanding on Cuba which would be
presented to Castro as a fait accompli and which might be inimical
to Havana's interests.
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6 DECEMBER 1972
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
TITARENKO PROTEGE BECOMES UKRAINIAN CADRE CHIEF
G. K. Kryuchkov, a protege of Ukrainian Central Committee secretary
for industry A. A. Titarenko, has become head of the Ukrainian
Central Committee party organizational work section, filling the
vacancy left by Ukrainian First S. rotary V. V. Shcherbitskiy's
protege A. A. Ulanov, who was demoted to the post of Voroshilovgrad
obkom secretary in July. The new appointment seems to be aimed
at checking Shcherbitskiy's power, since Titaranko has been a close
associate of Shcherbitskiy's main rival, Premier A. P. Lyashhko;
it probably also represents a tradeoff for the promotion last July of
I. S. Grushetskiy, a probable Shcherbitskiy ally, to the post of
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman.
Kryuchkov, previously identified as a deputy head of the Ukrainian
party organizational work section, was listed in the 25 November
RADYAWSKA UKRAINA as head of an unnamed section while meeting a
Czechoslovak people's control delegation along with Second Secretary
I. K. Lutak, who supervises the cadre section. Kryuchkov is from
Zaporozhe, where he served as oblast Komsomol secretary in the late
1950's and rose to cadre section chief by the mid-1960's.
Although the Zaporozhe organization is probably friendly to Brezhnev,
who headed it after the war, it appears closer '?.o Premier Lyashko
than to Brezhnev's protege Shcherbitskiy, since Lyashko's longtime
colleague Titarenko and the latter's protege M. N. Vsevolozhskiy
have headed it during the last 10 years. After serving as second
secretary of Donetsk oblast under Lyashko, Titarenko was transferred
in 1962 to the post of first secretary of Zaporozhe. Soon afterward,
he promoted Zaporozhe oblast cadre section head Vsevolozhskiy to
ablest second secretary and chose Kryuchkov as his successor.
Titarenko was promoted to Ukrainian Central Committee secretary for
industry in 1966 succeeding his colleague Lyashko, who be.:ame
second secretary, and by September 1470 his assistant Kryuu-tkov
had become Ukrainian cadre section deputy head.
Kryuchkov's promotion thus appears to be part of a carefully
negotiated balance between Shcherbitskiy and Lyashko :n the wake
of Shelest's ouster in May. In late July I. S. Grushetskiy, who
as a onetime Brezhnev associate in Dnepropetrovsk is probably
allied with Shcherbitskiy, became chairman of the Supreme Soviet
Presidium and full Politburo member, while Lyashko's protege
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V. H. Tbybulko, Kiev first secretary, was promoted to Politburo
candidate member and Ulanov was removed as leader of the cadre
section.
The next major change occurrad in October, when cultural hardliner
V. Yu. Malanchuk replaced Shelest protege F. D. Ovcharenko as
ideology secretary and Politburo candidate member. Malanchuk's,
election presumably .'aq welcomed by Shcherbitskiy's russified
Dnepropetrovsk following ? d also by Grushetskiy. As Lvov first
secretary during 1950-51 and 1961-62, Grushetskiy must have known
Malanchuk, who was elected oblast Komsomol secretary in 1950
and who worked in the party obkom apparatus from 1951 to 1963,
rising to head the sensitive science and culture section. Lyashko's
attitude toward Malanchuk is harder to assess, since he and his
Donetsk colleagues were not prominent in the cultural crackdown,
even though they represent one of the most russified oblasts.
With Kryuchkov's promotion, Ukrainian cadre work is now in the
hands of officials independent of, if not hostile to, First
Secretary Shcherbitskiy. Lutak, an apparent Sheerest ally,
continues to supervise cadre work as second secretary, while the
cadre section is directly headed by a protege of Titarenko and
perhaps of Lyashko as guring ill. The present situation is similar to
that faced by Shelest his last years as Ukrainian party
chief, wh?.n his riva.' Lyashko served as second secretary and the
proteges of Lyashko and Shcherbitskiy succesbivAly headed the
cadre section.
The turmoil in the Ukrainian leadership has been clearly reflected
in the appointment of three new cadre chiefs du::ing the past four
years. Although prior to 1969 the post had been held by one man
for about 13 years, Lyashko's Donetsk cadre assistant V. M. Tsybulko,
appointed in the spring of 1969, lasted only a year; Shcherbitskiy's
Dnepropetrovsk protege A. A. Ulanov, appointed in the fall of 1970,
lasted only a year and a half.
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CHINA
PROVINCES STEP UP REBUILDING OF YOUNG COMINVIST LEAGUE
A spate of recent provincial reports indicate that rebuilding of
the Young Communist League (YCL), destroyed during the cultural
revolution, is now underway in line with central directives. The
central media have not yet mentioned these directives, whicl have
been cited in several provincial radix; reports on meetings sa,!aling
with YCL developments. The bellwether has been Politburo member
Chang Chun--chiao's Shanghai, a provincial-level municipality that
has held a preparatory meeting for a YCL congress to be convened
next year. Kweichow and Shansi have held provincial YCL forums
and Kirin has conducted a YCL work conference. There have also
been reports on YCL rebuilding in Yunnan and Shensi. A common
thread running through these reports has been a stress on the
party's leading role together with condemnation of efforts by
"swindlers"--meaning Lin Piao and his followers--to lead youth
astray.
The Kweichow radio announced on 16 November that from 7 to
14 November the politicsl department of the provincial revolu-
tionary committee had held a forum on strengthening youth work
and YCL building. Warning that the struggle "to win over the
younger generation is extremely severe," the forum decided--"in
accordance with the spirit of the relevant instruction of the
center"--to set up preparatory organizations for YCL congresses
at provincial, regional, and county levels. YCL committees at all
levels will be established "gradually," according to the forum.
The Shansi forum, held from 13 to 17 November but not announced
until the 29th, pointed up provincial achievements in youth work
over the past year and called for further efforts to establish YCL
organs at all levels.
The Kirin YCL work conference was held from 6 to 11 November,
according to the provincial radio on the 19th. Besides repudiating
"revisionist fallacies" spread by the swindlers, the conference
praised model upper-level areas which had already established YCL
committees and laid plans for establishing YCL committees at the
county and regional levels "in a well-planned and well-guided way
this winter and next spring." The conference revealed that 90
percent of the basic YCL branches and 85 percent of the basic-
level committees have already been established, and that during
the three years of rebuilding thus far 280,000 new members have
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Joined the YCL while 25,000 YCL members have been admitted to the
party. Acknowledging that the struggle against those trying to
spread their rotten ideas and way of life" among the young is
still. sharp, the conference emphasized the need for training YCL
cadres who can lead the struggle against "the revisionist line."
YCL organs were instructed to strengthen their leadership among
children through the Little Red Soldiers and to organize youth in
various activities such as sports, scientifi- experimentation,
and cultural activities.
According to a 25 November Yunnan broadcast reporting a YCL congress
in a Kunming district, four counties in the province have held Y(:L
congresses thus far this year. The broadcast called on youth to
observe discipline and continue class struggle. A 3 December
Shensi radio report on a county YCL organization that was
established in April 1971 pointed out that YCL committees formed
some time ago must continue the struggle and that local YCL
organizations "had been engaged in daily routine work and had
failed to grasp cla.;s struggle tightly." The county party
committee, however, was said to have engaged extensively in
youth work and to have revitalized the youth organization.
SHANGHAI MODEL Shanghai became the first provincial-level area
to indicate its readiness for a YCL congress,
in the process prefiguring the nature of the body that is to emerge.
According to a Shanghai radio report on 25 November, a congress
preparatory meeting was held from 20 to 22 November under the
auspices of the municipal party committee and chaired by Shanghai
chief Chang Chun-chiao. The meeting studied "important instructions
on consolidating and building the youth league issued by Chairman
Mao and the CCP Central Committee" and nominated members of the
congress preparatory group. According to the meeting report,
basic-level YCL organizations have "in the main" been established
in Shanghai, and district and county levels have formed their
committees.
Organizational rules prescribed by the municipal party committee
for the preparation of the congress outline with some precision
the composition of the congress and of the YCL leadership orgat.
that is to be formed "gradually." There are to be 1,500 delegates,
with at least 40 percent of them women and with an average age
not to exceed 27. The number of more senior party leaders in YCL
leadership positions is to be high, though the instructions set
outer limits by stipulating that the total number of CCP members
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on the municipal YCL committee should not exceed 70 percent and
the number of committee members who hold government offices should
not exceed 25 percent. The once powerful--.and destructive--Red
Guards are to be put in their place by being limited to 300 middle
school representatives attending the congress as "observers."
In line with the current push to make use of experienced officials,
the new committee is to include "some of the members of the last
municipal YCL committee," though "the majority" of its members are
to be drawn from the ranks of cultural revolution activists in order
to "maintain contacts" with the masses of youth by a process of
cooptation. Similarly, delegates to the congress are to include
some instructors of Little Red Soldiers, and the total number of
committee members is to be larger than before the cultural revolution
and they will remain in their units among the masses.
A joint WEN HUI PAO-LIBERATION DAILY editorial broadcast over the
Shanghai radio on 26 November noted that much ideological preparation
is still necessary before the congress is convened "at an appropriate
time in 1973." The major task of youth organizations in the coming
months is to be "thorough criticism of the crimes of swindlers" who
have "frenziedly contended" with the proletariat for influence over
the younger generation. Young people were told to carry forward the
revolutionary traditions of their parents in building the motherland
and to study vocational skills for the revolution, becoming both red
and expert.
HEILUVGKIANG BROADCAST REVEALS SERIOUS DISCIPLINE PROBLEM
A Heilungkiang broadcast on 3 December aired in remarkably frank
terms the regime's problems in securing disciplined responsiveness
from local officials after the repeated leadership convulsions of
recent years. The broadcast sharply criticized those party members
and organizations in the province whose f4tilure to carry out the
direcL?ves of higher units has "affected the implementation of
Chairman zao's revolutionary line and damaged the party and the
revolutionary line as well." Though the broadcast did not name
specific individuals or units, it made painfully clear the problems
bedeviling the province, where the party first secretary has been
absent from public view for nearly a year, the second secretary
since July, and where the revolutionary committee chairman was
apparently purged two years ago. The broadcast indicated that
there are serious problems with cadre morale and discipline in
he province and that the economy has been adversely affected.
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In attributing the breakdown in control to the "remaining
influence" of "swindlers like Liu Shao-chi," the broadcast
indicated by its charges of "a lack of discipline and a state
of anarchism" and its reference to this effect of "sectarianism"
on party unity that the of tarmat. of the cultural revolution
and tha purge of Lin Piao have seriously complicated the restoration
of party command and control. Some organizations were said to have
failed to carry cut instructions from higher levels while in other
cases individuals were said to have disobeyed their organizations.
The broadcast located the problem not among the masses generally but
in the party itself, indicting "party members and cadres within the
party" as responsible for violating discipline.
Though the broadcast skirted most specific issues, a major point
of contention seems to lie in the area of economic policy, with some
cadres apparently refusing to accept such recent policies as the
easing of restrictions on using work-points to determine labor
remuneration. Though pointing out that most party members are
observing economic and labor discipline, the broadcast singled
out the economic front in lamenting "a relatively serious lack of
organization and discipline among a small number of party members
and cadres." These were said to have used "industrial products,
materials, and machinery to carry out projects not undar the state
plan," thereby adversely affecting planned construction. Other
provinces have also called for abandoning some of the small
industrial plants set up outside the state plan during the cultural
revolution, when the masses were said to be capable of almost any
sort of economic initiative and Liu Shao-chi was being attacked
for closing down plants after the Great Leap. Other provinces have
not, however, indicated serious opposition to recent measures to
restrict such plants or to moderate other economic policies. The
Heilungkiang broadcast went so far as to imply some coordination
or illegal economic activities through "barter transactions" in
order to circumvent the state plan.
The crackdown on disobedient cadres has apparently been impeded by
uncertainty over the stability of the central line and resistance to
the dictates of current policy. The new cadres who rose during the
cultural revolution and are now the main target of attack are apparently
still a source of resistance, while the old cadres they replaced but
who have now been rehabilitated seem to fear that the pendulum might
swing again and thus are loath to undertake effective action. The
Heil.ngkiang broadcast sought to cut through this impasse with the
advice to old cadres that they need not fear that "they would be
charged with attacking others in retaliation." While they may "offend
some people, hurt certain people's dignity, and cause dissatisfaction,"
cadres were told to remember that what is hurt is the "bourgeois
clannish style," a formulation suggesting that beleagured cadres are
banding together for mutual support in uncertain times.
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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY: USSR RAISES CONCEPT
IN CONNECTION WITH IRAN. PERSIAN GULF
Several Moscow broadcasts in Persian beginning on 19 November
have advocated the idea of an Asian collective security system
as being in line with the national interests of Iran. Soviet
support for such a system, first advanced by Brezhnev at the
June 1969 world conference of communist and workers parties in
Moscow,* was reiterated authoritatively by Podgornyy in his
10 October speech at a dinner hono..ing the Shah. Podgornyy
remarked on the "positive features" of Soviet relations with the
northern tier states--Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey--and "other
states" of the adjacent region. Looking toward settlement of
the Indochina and Middle East conflicts, normalization of the
situation in the Hindustan peninsula, and improvement of
inter-state relations in "other parts" of Asia, he asserted that
such developments would "make for a practical realization of
the idea of creating a collective security system" in the Asian
countries.
The Shah, for his part, indicated some receptiveness to the
idea in his reply speech. Saying it was a pleasure to observe
"the process of activization of efforts to insure European
security," he asserted that Iran greeted with satisfaction
the FRG treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland and added
that "perhaps with time it will be possible in Asia, too, to
consider somethin, resembling the steps that have been taken
in the European continent." He went on to express hope for a
speedy settlement of the Pakistani-Indian dispute.
The joint communique r.t the conclusion of the Shah's visit
said the two sides "Exchanged opinions" on the situation in
Asia and were of the opinion that renunciation of the use or
threat of force, respect for sovereignty and inviolability of
frontiers, noninterference in the internal affairs of others,
and extensive development of all-round cooperation on the basis
of full equality and mutual benefit were an effective way to
* After discussing collective security in Europe, Brezhnev had
expressed the opinion that "the course of events is also putting
on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security
in Asia."
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establish peace. The sides concluded that "it takes joint
efforts and cooperation by all countries of Asia to insure
peace and security in the area."* A 19 November Persian-
language commentary pointedly cited Brezhnev as stating at
the 15th Soviet trade union congress on 20 March this year
that a collective security system s1,ould be based on just
these principles.
An Observer article in IZVESTIYA on 31 October, "highly
evaluating" the Shah's Soviet visit, seemed to set the stage
for suture propaganda on "collective" relationships. Along
the lines of Podgornyy's 10 October speech, Observer declared
that the relations which are evolving in a spirit of friendship,
good neighborliness, and cooperation between the USSR and its
southern neighbors--Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, and "the other
states of the contiguous region"--benefit both these countries
and the cause of general peace.
In raising the subject recently, Moscow may have viewed the
opening of the Helsinki talks on European security and coopera-
tion on 22 November as a propitious occasion to pursue the
companion concept in Asia. A Persian-language commentary
broadcast on 24 November opened by referring to the Helsinki
talks and went on to recall that in the joint communique on
the Shah's visit the USSR and Iran had outlined the need for
peace in the East as well as in the West. They concluded, it
said, that to preserve peace and security in the area it was
necessary for the region's countries to cooperate. A talk
broadcast in Persian on 21 November had maintained that the
climate of trust stemming from good-neighbor relations between
the USSR and Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey had brought about
a favorable situation for future extension of "multilateral
cooperation" between the Soviet Union on the one hand and its
southern neighbors and "other countries in the aced" on the
other.
Moscow may be pressing the idea with Iran in light of the Shah's
willingness to go as far as he did in conceding, in his Moscow
speech, that "with time" such a concept might be considered
for Asia and in subscribing in the communique to the notion of
Asian cooperation to insure peace and security. Turkey and
* No such passage appeared in the 31 March 1970 communique on
Podgornyy's visit to Iran.
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Afghanistan have apparently not been the target of Moscow
propaganda extolling a collective security system, and comment
on the subjec" beamed to east Asian audiences has generally
been less expli"it in recommending the advantages of such a
system for any given country.
The Persian-language broadcasts did suggest an effort to dispel
Iranian concerns vis-a-vis Moscow's treaty relationship with
Iraq, with whom the Shah has long been feuding, and also
possibly with India. Thus a 20 November commentary maintained
that neither the Soviet-Iranial treaty on economic and technical
cooperation, signed during the Shah's October visit, nor the
Soviet-Indian friendship and cooperation treaty and those with
Egypt and Iraq involve any threat to the interests of other
countries. The commentary preceded this assertion with a
rebuttal of "unfounded suspicions about a collective security
system for Asia" voiced by "imperialist quarters and Peking's
leaders. The broadcast claimed that the Soviet-Iranian treaty
as well as the Soviet treaties with Egypt and Iraq reflect a
mutual confidence and a confidence in the future which "could
presumably serve as a foundation for a collective security
system in Asia."
TURKEY In citing the Soviet agreements with Iran, India,
Egypt, and Iraq as possible bases for a collective
security arrangement, the recent Persian-language commentaries did
not refer to the Soviet-Turkish declaration signed during
Podgornyy's visit to Turkey last April. Two recent Moscow
commentaries broadcast in Turkish, without specifically mentioning
the collectiv~? security concept, defended Soviet policies in the
Middle East and the Mediterranean and claimed that Soviet-Turkish
political cooperation plays an increasing role in European and
Asian affairs.
Podgornyy had broached the collective security idea in a dinner
speech during his April visit to Turkey, remarking that world
developments put the question of Asian collective security "on
the order of thf day." While the topic was not reflected in the
Joint communique on that visit, the "Declaration on the
Principles of Good-Neighbor Relations" between the USSR and
Turkey embodied most of the points which Podgornyy said in his
speech "might be" the principles of collective security. The
points he listed were those later incorporated in the Soviet-
Iranian communique on 21 October in the passage on the "situation
in Asia."
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An article in NOVOYE VREMYA (No. 17, 21 April), summing up
Podgornyy's Turkish visit, said that the Soviet Union and
Turkey were "vitally interested also in strengthening of
security in Asia" and described the Soviet-Turkish declaration,
"like other international documents pertaining to the USSR's
relations with Asian countries," as a "weighty contribution"
to peace in Asia in general and its western part in particular.
A Moscow broadcast in Turkish on 29 November defended Soviet
policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, asserting thPc
the USSR "is not after a presence or hegemony in this or
that area" and that interference in other states' affairs and
"so-called export of revolution" are contrary to Soviet policy.
The broadcast added that a stable peace opened possibilities
for all countries "for liberation from the control of such
military blocs as NATO and Cyr-NTO." A 2 December Moscow radio
commentary in Turkish, after a passing reference to the Helsinki
talks, underscored the increasing role in Europi.?n and Asian
aff'iirs, "in terms of strengthening security an.; peace,"
pla;ed by the political cooperation between the USSR and Turkey
as the only countries with territory in both continents. The
commentary recited the same set of principles--peaceful
coexistence, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity,
rejection of the use of force, noninterference in internal
affairs, constructive contacts--as the bases of Soviet-Turkish
relations. Charging "imperialist circles" with trying to
involve Turkey in war preparations through its NATO and CENTO
membership, the broadcast also defensively rejected "imperialist"
allegations that the Soviet Union tries to dictate to its southern
neighbor.
AFGHANISTAN The question has also been raised with Afghanistan.
At a luncheon on 14 March this year Kosygin,
addressing the visiting Afghan prime minister, suggested that
measures taken by the Asian states to insure collective security
in the region would help consolidate peace. He mentioned three
principles on which such a system could be based--nonviolence in
resolving questions between states, peaceful coexistence between
states with differing social systems, and the development of
mutually advantageous cooperation. He added the assurance that
these principles were in no way directed against any state.
(Podgornyy similarly assured the Turks that the idea of Asian
collective security was not directed against any state.) The
Soviet-Afghan communique issued at the conclusion of the prime
minister's visit stated that in the course of a discussion of the
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situation in Asia "it was noted" that an effective way to
establish stable peace in the region lay in adherence to the
principles of peaceful coexistence, renunciation of the use
or threat of force, respect for national sovereignty,
equality of all countries and peoples, and the development
of broad, mutually profitable cooperation in accordance with
national interests.
PERSIAN GULF Moscow has also been cautiously injecting
the collective security notion in connection
with the Persian Gulf in recent commentaries broadcast to Iran.
These talks made the usual charges that Britain and the United
States are continuing to pursue neocolonialist policies in
the gulf region to assure capitalist exploitation. of the area's
oil resources. They defended Soviet policy in the gulf, ci:.ing
the position spelled out in the 21 October communique on the
Shah's visit. That document expressed the belief of both aides
that questions relating to the gulf should be settled "in
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter by the states
of the area themselves without any interference from outside."
The 31 October Observer article in IZVESTIYA, after referring
to Moscow's good-neighborly relations with the northern tier
states, rhetorically asked who would not wish for friendly
relations and mutually advantageous ties between these countries
and for settlement of disputed questions between them by
political means. Observer added that "this fully applies, for
example, tc the zone of the Persian Gulf."
A talk in Persian broadcast by Moscow on 29 November agreed wii."
a view attributed to the Iranian paper KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL that
a permanent presence of Western warships in the Indian Oman
would not help stabilize the area, and that to forestall such a
course of events "the coastal countries should undertake
collective measures forthwith." The broadcast concluded that
the principles proposed by the USSR and Iran--in the 21 October
communique--"constitute the founcstion of such collective
measures." A Persian-language coranentary on 28 November declared
that all questions relating to the Persian Gulf should be settled
throu%h peaceful means, on the basis of respect for the rights
and legitimate interests of all countries of the area, and that
all foreign military bases should be removed. It went,on to
assert that "these principles were explicitly noted in the Joint
Soviet-Iranian communique."
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Moscow's position that the gulf countries alone have t-.e right
to determine their fate had been set forth authoritatively in
a TASS statement of 3 March 1968. The statement had focused on
alleged efforts by the United States and Britain to crepte a
military bloc of Persian Gulf states and claimed that Iraq,
Iran, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Turkey had "declined proposals for
the establishment of the so-called 'joint defense system."'
Subsequently, joint communiques issued by the Soviet Union with
Iraq and South Yemen generally affirmed the right of the peoples
of the gulf to determine their own destiny without foreign
intervention. At least four such documents additionally called
for abolition of all foreign military bases in the gulf--a call
not repeated in the most recent Iraqi and PDRY communiques, of
19 September and 26 November, respectively; it was of course not
contained in the Soviet-Iranian communique on 21 Octob'r.
BACKGROtJND The Middle East in general and the northern tier
states in particular have only rarely been cited
in Soviet propaganda since Brezhnev propounded his Asian collective
security scheme.* Terse references to Iran are known to have
appeared a few times in 1969, however. For example, PRAVDA's
Belyayev in a 17 August commentators' roundtable broadcast on
Moscow's domestic service explained that "when we speak about
a collective security in Asia we have in mind the struggle for
a political settlement in the Middle East and the abolition of
those hotbeds of trouble which still exist." He argued that the
diddle Eat is "also Asia if, of course, one discounts North Africa."
Belyayev explained that by strengthening political independence and
fostering the national economy of Asian countries that part of the
world could become a tranquil region where the idea of peace would
triumph. He went on to suggest that, "for instance, countries like
Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and to a certain extent Iran" could
reach agreement on important issues such as transit trade. "If an
* The only known reference to regional security systems in a Soviet-
Arab communique appeared in the 17 July 1970 document at the conclusion
of Egyptian President Nasir's last visit to the Soviet Union. The
communique recorded the two sides' view that "the creation of effective
systems of collective security in Europe, Asia, Africa, and other
parts of the world" would help ease tensions and establish fruitful
international cooperation.
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 Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050049-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
6 DECEMBER 1972
alliance" which would prompt the solution of the transit trade
problem "were to come about," this would benefit the organization
of good relations among the Asian countries.*
Another reference appeared in a 21 September 1969 radio commentary
broadcast in English to South Asia after Gromyko had presented the
Soviet draft appeal on regional security systems to the UN General
Assembly. Discussing Asian concern for means of collective efforts
for peace and security, the commentary said that the Soviet people
would like to see India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Nepal,
Ceylon, and other Asian countries develop friendly relations among
themselves. Three days later, another broadcast to South Asia pegged
to the Gromyko proposals pointed out that the Middle East crisis
directly affected the Asian countries by depriving them of the
shortest trade route. Noting interest in the collec ive security
system in Malaysia and Ceylon, the broadcast added that Iranian
media were also focusing attention on Gromyko's UNGA speech and the
idea of collective security for Asia.
* Article 5 of the Soviet-Iranian economic and technic! . cooperation
treaty signed during the Shah's October 1972 visit says the parties
"express readiness to facilitate the realization of the i'sa of regional
cooperation in the fields of economy and trade, as well La of transit
transportation, taking into account the interests of &11 countries
sharing and supporting this idea."
Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050049-7