TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050047-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: November 22, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

 0 ~,~..- e- 1Z
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~ P;BIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
22 NOVEMBER 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 47)
875R000300050047-9
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This propaganda analysis report is hosed exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
component.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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22 NOVEMBER 1972
4.1 CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
DRV Claims Good Will, Assails U.S.-Thieu Blocking of Accord. . .
.i
Cautious Chinese Comment Marks Visit of DRV Aid Delegation . . .
6
Moscow Urges Prompt Agreement, Notes Le Duc Tho Stopover . . . .
8
Hanoi Sustains Routine Protee is Against U.S. Air Strikes . . . .
9
Sihanouk's Government Emphasizes Rejection of Cease-Fire . . . .
11
DRV, PRG Support NLHS Charge That U.S. "Obstructs" Lao Talks .
15
SALT
USSR Notes SALT II Complexity, Stresses Equality Principle . . .
18
MIDDLE EAST
Soviet Propaganda Marks Time on Arab-Israeli Conflict. . . . . .
21
Cairo Announces Egyptian Military Delegation in Moscow . . . . .
23
CUBA-U. S.
Havana Urges Rapid U.S.-Cuban Accord on Hijacking. . . . . . . .
26
WEST GERMANY
USSR, GDR Welcome Victory of Brandt and Ostpolitik . . . . . . .
29
Soviet Bloc Pressures Prague to Reach Accord with Bonn . . . . .
30
Zhivkov Eulogizes Brezhr.-ev, Reaffirms Dependence on USSR . . . .
32
Soviet Media Prepare Ground for Brezhnev Visit to Hungary. . . .
33
Ukraine Ranks Shelest Last Among Politburo Members . . . . . . .
35
Leadership Failings Under Mzhavanadze Exposed in Georgia . . . .
35
Masherov Article in KOMMUNIST Stresses Russification . . . . . .
37
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE:
Peking and the Clandestine Radios Beamed to Southeast Asia . . . Si
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 13 - 19 NOVEMBER 1972
Moscow (2358 iteris)
Peking (1366 items)
Bulgarian President
(2%)
19%
Domestic Issues
(30%)
34%
Zhivkov in USSR
UN Session
(6%)
21%
[Brezhnev 12 Nov.
(--)
12%]
[Disarmament
(6%)
10%]
Speech
50th Anniversary
[LA Nuclear-Free
Zone
(--)
7%]
of USSR, 30 Dec.
(6%)
10%
Indochina
(33%)
18%
Indochina
(5%)
6%
[Vietnam
(14%)
11%]
[Vietnam
(4%)
5%]
[Cambodia
(18%)
4%]
International Working
Youth Conference in
(13%)
6%
Nepalese Prime
Minister in PRC
(--)
9%
Moscow
PRC-Luxembourg
(--)
5%
China
(2%)
4%
Diplomatic
Rocket Troops &
(--)
3%
Relations
Artillery Day
Albanian Military
(6%)
5%
European Security
(1%)
2%
Delegation in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output 11 the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have bean covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBI^u TRENDS
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INDOCHINA
Following the 14 November announcement that Le Duc Tho had left
for Paris, Hanoi media said nothing about private talks on the
peace agreement until the 18th, when VNA reported tersely that
the talks with Kissinger would resume on the 20th. Following
the private sessions on the 20th and 21st, VNA noted that Le Duc
Tho and Xuan Thuy held consultations with the PRG delegations;
however, current commentaries do not mention the talks in
insisting that there is no plausible reason for the U.S. delay in
signing the accord. In arguing that no changes in the accord
should be necessary, propagandists for the most part have not
specified issues over which Saigon has shown concern. In
exceptions to this pattern, however, Hanoi press articles on the.
19th and 20th atypicnlly raised the question of both sides
withdrawing troops from South Vietnam. The articles accused
Indonesian officials of commenting on this issue as well as
supporting U.S. calls for "clarification" of some points, charges
that take on added interest in light of U.S. reports that
Indonesia is one of four countries slated to supervise a cease-
fire.
Persistent complaints that the United States has delayed signing
of the peace agreement in order to continue supporting Thieu and
negotiate from a position of strength were repeated officially
in DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements on the 16th and 18th,
respectively, which assailed stepped-up U.S. shipments of war
materiel to Saigon.
During the DRV economic delegation's current stay in the PRC on
the first leg of the annual tour to negotiate aid agreements,
Peking has sought to keep the atmosphere propitious for a
Vietnam settlement while offering minimal pledges of support to
Hanoi. North Vietnamese comment surrounding the visit, on the
other hand, has sharply denounced Washington's delay in agreeing
to a settlement and has sought to associate the Chinese with
Hanoi's cause.
Routine Moscow comment has praised the DRV's good will in agreeing
to the U.S. request for further private meetings and reiterated
that an end to the war depends on the U.S. attitude. Commentacuia
have repeatedly cited Brezhnev's 13 November call for the
removal of American "obstacles" to signing of the accord.
DRV CLAIMS GOOD WILL. ASSAILS U,S.-THIEU BLOCKING OF ACCORD
Hanoi media on 18 and 19 November carried Le Duc Tho's statement
upon arriving in aria on the 17th in which he typically stressed
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DRV seriousness and good will regarding a peace settlement
and said that the Vietnam problem can be settled promptly if
the United States shows a similar attitude. However, like
earlier propaganda his statement was ambiguous regarding
the DRV's position on modifications in the accord. He said
he Lad come to Paris at the suggestion of the United States
"to hold once again negotiations with the U.S. side in order
to rapidly settle the conclusion of the agreement." But he
added that for the negotiations to be successful the United
States should "abide by the provisions agreed on tarween the
two parties."
In addition to decrying the United States' failure to sign
the accord on 31 October as it had allegedly agreed to do,
Tho deplored the "massive " dispatch of U.S. military supplies
to South Vietnam and Cai,ibodia and the continued U.S. air
strikes in both North and South Vietnam. On the eve of his
arrival in Paris, a DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting the
U.S. supplying of arms to Thieu as well as the continued air
strikes sniped at the President and Kissinger by quoting some
of their statements without attribution. It said these acts
"shed more light on the deceitful character of the allegations
of the U.S. Government to the effect that it is 'ending its
military involvement,' that it 'wants peace--peace with
honor--a peace fair to all,' and that 'peace is at hand."'
The foreign ministry statement said the record exposes the U.S.
aim "of negotiating from a position of strength and maintaining
the Thieu puppet administration." A supporting PRG Foreign
Ministry statement on the 18th said the U.S. delivery of arms
"proves that the Nixon Administ?ation not only refused to sign
the agreement already reached but also violated and is preparing
t:, sabotage its commitments still more seriously."
A Hanoi radio commentary on the 18th referred to the DRV
Foreign Ministry protest and said that another "boast of peace
objectives" contradicted by U.S. actions was Ambassador Porter's
assertion, at the 16 November plenary session of the Paris
talks, that "the restoration of peace in Vietnam is drawing near."*
The broadcast echoed earlier comment in ridiculing the notion
* 'The VNA account of the Paris session on the 16th had
dismissed Ambassador Porter's statement with the terse remark
that "the U.S. delegate repeated his old contentions."
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that the arms buildup was in preparation for a cease-fire; it
said the dispatch of the weapons shows that the Nixon
Administration is still using the Thieu regime as a tool to
proceed with the war anti maintain i.eocolonialism. The
broadcast concluded by warning that this is a "ver' subjective
calculation and a critical error" by the Nixon Administration,
which should be "realistic and wise" and proceed along the
path opened by the peace agreement and withdraw in honor.
Another Hanoi radio commentary on the 16th had said that along
with delivering equipment to Thieu, the United States has allowed
"this war-rabid lackey to shout for war and to put forward
insolent demands asking for a modification of the accord which
has been agreed upon between the United States a?.td the DRV."
The broadcast did not broach any specific terms of the agreement
to which Thieu has objected; however, a 19 November QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN commentary on the allegedly increasing urban opposition
to Thieu did so obliquely. The army paper's commentary, as
carried by VNA and broadcast by Hanoi radio, said that various
opposition factions have rejected Thieu's arguments "for
continuation of the war and partition of the nation" and have
demanded that "Thieu resign in order to establish a new
administration in Saigon which advocates peace, democracy, and
national concord." (A NHAN DAN editorial on the 10th had been
more specific when it said that Thieu opposes unificat-&.on
because he "b;razenly" considers the South and North as two
separate countries and that he opposes an end to U.S. military
invol?-3metit: and national concord, "specifically the formation
of a three-segment administrative structure in South Vietnam.")
The articles in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and NHAN DAN, on the 19th and
20th, respectively, in the course of their sharp attack on
Indonesian officials went beyond the NHAN DAN editorial on the
10th and other propaganda when they broached for the first
time Thieu's objection to the omission in the peace accord
of a call for withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the
South. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary cited AFP for the report
that Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik had echoed the
allegation that "the Vietnamese people are invading Vietnam"
and "tried to explain the arrogant demand by the Thieu clique
which the leader of his administration repeated on 9 November:
Any force located in areas below the 17th parallel which does
not consist of natives of those areas must withdraw." The NHAN
DAN commentary on the 20th attributed this statement to "another
Indonesian leader of even higher rank than Malik" and specified
that the forces not natives of the area included "both the North
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0
Vietnamese and Americans." The army paper observed that the
"worn-out demand" for mutual troop withdrawal "has even been
set aside" by the Americans.
Bct.h papers also took issue with Foreign Minister Malik for
supporting U.S, calls for some of the points in the peace accord
to be clarified. And as further evidence of Indonesian bias,
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said Malik himself had expressed sympathy
with the United States "when the entire world indignantly condemned
the Nixon Administration's horrible crimes of bombing and
attacking dikes" in the DRV. The commentary also observed that
Malik had opposed recognition of the PRG, ae well as the RGNUC,
at the nonalined conference in Georgetown last summer.
It has been long-standing Hanoi practice to periodically
criticize the Indonesians for being biased in favor of the United
States, but the current attacks take on added significance in
the light of U.S. reports that Indonesia is slated to be one of
the members of an international control commission--along with
Canada, Hungary, and Poland--that will supervise the Vietnam
cease-fire. The timing seems curious since, in quoting Malik
and other leaders, the papers cited AFP reports of 9 and 10 ?lovember.
It would appear that the articles were calculated to coincide with
the ret'irn of Le Duc Tho and Kissinger to Paris. Hanoi media,
characteristically, have to date said nothing about Si: singer's
trip to Brussels on 22 November to meet with Malik any Suharto.*
BACKGROUND ON DRV ATTACKS ON INDONESIA: The walkout of the
Indonesian, Malayan, and Lao representatives at the Coorgetown
nonalined conference last August in protest over tt.e admission
of the PRG delegation had been assailed in a NHAN DAN editorial
on 12 August. It said that the "deplorable attitude" of the
representatives of these three countries showed "the seamy side
of the so-called ASEAN solution to the Vietnam problem which
was recently rejected by our government and people." On 10 August
VNA had reported that & DRV Foreign Ministry official called in
the Indonesian charge d'affaires and rejected "the absurd
proposal of the ASELN regarding the settlement of the Vietnam
issue," but VNA did not disclose the substance of the proposal.
* A Djakarta broadcast on the 22d said it was believed that
Kissinger's talks concerned the possibility of Indonesia's
participation in a Vietnam cease-fire supervisory commission. It
went on to quote Indonesian Deputy Commander Gen. Paggabean as
telling the press in Djakarta on the 22d that no requests had
been received for such a force as yet.
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Kuala Lumpur radio on 16 July quoted the Malaysian deputy
premier as reporting that the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting
in Manila had agreed to contribute all it could toward an
Indochina settlement. The Malaysian was quoted further as
saying the conference had agreed upon a definition of a
Southeast Asian "zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality."
THE FRONT Front propaganda has continued to claim that the
draft peace agreement has met with broad support
in South Vietnam and that the southern people are uniting in
opposition to Thieu. An LPA commentator article, broadcast by
both the Front radio on the 17th and Hanoi on the 19th,
scored Thieu as the "main obstacle" to peace and alleged that
a "broad united action front" was developing in the South
made up of people who "are struggling to topple Thieu and open
the way for signing the agreement." Some commentaries have
gone on to urge that attacks and uprisings be accelerated to
force the United States to sign the agreement.
The media continue to focus on the Thieu government's alleged
persecution of opposition forces. A particularly strident
Liberation Radio commentary on the 16th charged, in this regard,
that Thieu "has not only refused to release patriotic prisoners
but . . . has also allowed puppet authorities to kill the
present detainees secretly Lefore peace is restored." This
commentary said that Thieu was "panic-stricken by the idea that
these patriots, after returning to their hamlets and wards,
would become forces struggling for peace, democracy, and freedom
and would become judges who would severely condemn him."
Among other things, the commentary cited "recent acts" by the
government in Hau Nghai to ducument its charges of persecution.
LPA on the 8th had cited "investigations by the Giai Phong
[Liberation) Security Department" of government actions in Hau
Nghia Province in a report which charged that the allies are
pretaring a campaign "aimed at destroying political prisoners
and other detained patriots who would--as feared by the United
States and Thieu--serve as able cadres for the revolution after
a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war."
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CAUTIOUS CHINESE COMMENT MARKS VISIT OF rRV AID DELEGATION
During the first week of the visit by the DRV economic delegation
now in China to negotiate the annual aid agreement f'r 1973,
tr: Chinese have sought t,-, keep the atmosphere propitious for
a Vietnam settlement while awaiting results from the new round
of negotiation: in Paris. The Chinese have uffered minimal
pledges elf support for Hanoi but have avoided strong anti-U.S.
polemics. The Forth Viet,,imese, on the other hand, have
pointedly sought to associate their Peking ally with their
cause, including the war effort, and have gone well beyond the
Chinese in criticizing the Nixon Administration's current moves
uo the Vietnam front.
The DRV delegation was honored by the usual welcoming banquet
on 16 November hosted by 'vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and held
"very cordial and friendly" talks with a delegation headed by
Li on the 16th and with Chou ,n-lai on the 17th. The Chinese
side included a vice foreign trade minister, a vice minister in
charge of aid, a deputy chief of staff, and the head of the PLA
armament department. The DRV group departed on the 19th for a
visit to Yunnan along the Sino-Vietnamese border, accompanied
by the aid vice minister. On the 21st the delegation proceeded
to Chungking.
Peking reported none of the substance of Chou's meeting with the
DRV delegation, but VNA quoted both Chou and the head of the
delegation, Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, as referring to the
Vietnam draft agreement and Chinese aid to the Vietnamese
comrades. Nghi was quoted by VNA as having denounces; "the ' harzzs
and acts of the Nixon Administration" in delaying the sign!.n;;
of the agreement and its "present efforts to push ahesi" t~te
Vietnamization program. He also expressed gratitude for Peking's
"great and precious support and assistance." According to VNA,
Chou demanded that the United States "stop delaying", ti.q signing
of the agreement and declared that the Chinese will continue
aiding the Vietnamese in "whatever eventualities."
The divergent approaches taken by Hanoi and Peking were also
evident in the 16 November banquet. speeches. Li Hsien-nien
made a point of noting that Le Duc Tho had agreed to meet again
wit:: the United States and called on the U.S. Government to
"keep its word and sign the already reached agreement as
quickly as possible." Most notably, Li offered no criticism
of the United States. He acknowleded that the DRV delegation
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had come for talks on 1973 aid, and he made the standard pledge
of continuing support and assistance to the Vietnamese as a
"glorious proletarian internationalist duty." These low-key
remarks stand in contrast to the conspicuous efforts to reassure
the North Vietnamese made by Li when he headed a Chinese aid
delegation to Hanoi in September 1971. That visit, coming in
the aftermath of Sino-Vietnamese strains occasioned by Peking's
invitation to President Nixon, was marked by especially strong
Chinese pledges of support, including readiness to risk the
greatest national sacrifices in behalf of the Vietnamese against
the United States as "the most ferocious imperialism of our time."
If militant language was absent from Li's remarks last week,
Ngh_-'ade a vigorous effort to make up for it. He denounced the
United %.,.ates as being "stubborn, bellicose, and unwilling to
abandon its ambition of aggression," and he claimed that the
Nixon Administration has "perfidiously gone back on its word"
by delaying the signing of the draft agreement. He also
castigated Washington for stepping up supplies to the Saigon
"lackeys" while the latter "are unscrupulously persecuting the
patriots they have unlawfully arrested and imprisoned."
Nghi expatiated on the importance of aid to the Vietnamese.
As the North Vietnamese had done during Li's visit to Hanoi
last year, Nghi mentioned the Soviets as well as the Chinese in
expressing gratitude for aid from throughout the world. He
made repeated references to Chinese assistance, including a
passage noting the "enormous supplementary aid" in 1972 and the
"many effective measures" undertaken to help the Vietnamese
overcome difficulties created by the United States. Where Li
had simply noted that the ARV delegation had arrived for "talks
on assistance for 1973," Nghi specified that this was to be
"economic and military aid."
In another pointed effort to identify the Chinese with the
Vietnamese cause, the Hanoi domestic radio on 21 November carried
a recorded statement by a political commissar of a Chinese ship
that had allegedly been hit by U.S. bombs in early May while
anchored off the DRV. The Hanoi broadcast said the recording
had "recently" been sent by Radio Peking, but no occasion was
specified. In the recording, which the introductory announcement
said had been translated into Vietnamese and read by a Radio
Peking announcer, the Chinese pledged to continue to support the
Vietnamese struggle as long as the war persists.
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U.S. MILITARY Recent statements by Peking's Indochinese allies
SUPPLIES denouncing U.S. military supplies to Saigon and
Phno!n Penh were seconded by a 22 November
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, the lowest level of authoritative
Chinese comment. The article was pegged to statements by the DRV
and the PRG on the foreign ministry level and by the foreign
ministry spokesman of Sihanouk's government. Commentator complained
that the United States had rushed large amounts of arms to its
allies after "putting off" the signing of the dr:%ft accord and
at a time when the world is "hoping eagerly for peace in Vietnam."
The article questioned whether the United States really wants to
cease fire in South Vietnam or to let the war flamer spread.
It addressed the question of a settlement in only vague terms,
calling on the United States to let the peoples of Indochina stttle
their own questions without foreign interference.
MOSCOW URGES PROMPT AGRE6v1ENT, NOTES LE DUC THO STOPOVER
Routine Moscow comment has a time-marking quality, praising the
DRV's "good will" in agreeing to the American request for
another meeting and stating repeatedly that an end to the war
depends on the U.S. attitude. Commentators continue to claim
that the United States' actions in Vietnam--pursuit of the bombing
and of "aggression"-.-do not square with its words about peace.
Soviet commentators have again taken the United States to task for
procrastinating on signing the draft peace agreement and have
repeatedly quoted Brezhnev's 13 November call for the removal of
American "obstacles" to signing of the accord. Charging the
United States with using Saigon's obduracy as a pretext for delay,
some commentar:ts, including PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles on
16 and 17 November, have accused Thieu of unleashing a "terror
campaign" to suppress the growing movement in South Vietnam in
favor of signing the peace agreement.
Le Duc Tho had talks with Suslov, Katushev, and Gromyko during his
15-17 November stopover in Moscow en route from Hanoi to Paris,*
his sixth visit to Moscow in as many months. He had met for the
first time with Suslov in addition to Katushev during his stopover
last month, but this is the first time he has ever been reported
to have met with Gromyko. TASS described the atmosphere of the
talks as "friendly and cordial," the characterization used in
* Le Duc Tho's stopover in Peking is discussed in the TRENDS of
15 November 1972, page 7.
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August when he saw Kirilenko, Le Duc Tho's talks with Mazurov
in September and with Suslov in October had been characterized
as "fraternal and cordial." As usual, Hanoi media covered
Le Duc Tho's Peking and Moscow stopovers only in their reports
of his arrival in Paris. Hanoi echoed Peking and Moscow in
characterizing the atmosphere of the talks in both capitals
as "cordial and friendly."
As in reports of the August and September visits, Moscow said
the talks with Tho covered "questions of further developing
Soviet-Vietnamese relations." The August and September
discussions had reportedly covered development of the two
countries' "cooperation" and "friendship." There had been no
such description of the talks in October, however. Moscow
also noted that thy: curre"L talks covered "the Vietnamese
people's struggle for freedom and independence" and that the
Soviet Union reaffirmec its "invariable support for the just
cause of the Vietnamese people struggling against the American
aggression." In October and August, Moscow had more forcefully
reported promises of "all-round assistance" or "economic and
military aid" but in September had pledged only "solidarity."
Moscow's accounts of the stopover also noted that the Sovlat
side praised the DRV and PRG position on a settlement as
"serious and imbued with good will," supported the Vietamese
demand for the "speediest" U.S. signing of the craft peace
agreement, and repeated Brezhnev's c.+ ! 1 for removaY. of "the
obstacles created by the American side." TASS duly reported
Le Duc Tho's 17 November statement to the effect that his
arrival in Paris attested to the DRV's "good will" and that the
United States must also take a "serious stand" and briefly
noted the Tho-Kissinger meetings on the 20th and 21st. On the
21st Moscow media also reported that Katushev received the DRV
Ambassador for a talk in "a warm and comradely atmosphere" but
did not indicate Cie substance.
HANOI SUSTAINS ROUTINE PROTESTS AGAINST U,S, AIR STRIKES
U.S. air activity over the North continued to evoke the standard
protests from the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, generally
including the charge that the Nixon Administration is engaging
in deceitful and stubborn behavior by pursuing the air war while
claiming that peace is at hand.
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The statemen,: of the 17th, reacting to heavy U-q. strikes on
the three preceding days, opened with a relatively strong
denunciation of U.S. bombing activities--especially B-52
raids--which it claimed had causeu damage from Thanh Hoa is
the DMZ. Carried textually by bith Hanoi radio and VNA,
this statement stressed that there were twice as many sorties
as usual on those days and that the strikes were "extremely
barbarouc." It calit-1 the B-52 attacks 'especially serious''
and said there was heavy damage fA.om both air strikes and
naval. bombardment. VNA echoed these claims on 20 November in
repotting destruction caused by B-52's on the 16th in 1
remote mountainous area of Thanh Hoa Province. The rest of
the daily statements, less strongly worded, routinely condemned
air strikes and naval shelling of areea below the 20th parallel.
U.S. air and naval action during the first 19 days of November
was condemned in a "special communique" of the DRV War Crimes
Commission carried by VNA on the 21st. Hanoi media have never
directly acknowledged the fact that U.S. air strikes have been
confined to the area below the 20th parallel since 24 October,
but the communique observed atypically that the Nixon Administration
"has frenziedly stepped up its criminal and naval war against
one-fourth of DRV territory from the 17th to the 20th parallel."
It claimed that "on certain days"--such as 2, 3, 6, 7, and 18
November--the intensity of the bombing exceeded that of strikes
"In the period of full war." It also claimed that the United
States had committed "even helicopters" to its arsenal of air
power on those days. Citing the raids of 15 November as among
the heaviest, the communique said there had been 410 tactical
sorties and "nearly 30" B-52 sorties that day; the record naval
shelling was said to have taken place on 17 November when 1,450
artillery shells were allegedly fired at coastal villages in
Quang Binh. Like routine comment on the air strikes, the
communique called upon the United States to end the attacks
immediately and "sign with equal speed the peace agreement it had
arrived at with the DRV."
Vows of DRV determination to continue the struggle in the
absence of a peace accord included a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial
of the 16th which hailed successes of the artillery forces and
pledged that these for:- s would continue to train ind fight
both "on the front" and in the "great rear" area. The editorial
paid particular attention to cadre training and to organization of
combat and supply, and a brief report in Hanoi's English-
language service on 20 November said officers and pilots of the
DRV air force were participating in a short course on improving
combat and command techniques.
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COMMENDATIONS FOR As of 18 November Hanoi claimed to have
CAPTURE OF PILOTS downed 11 more planes, for a total of
4,053, and to have set ablaze four more
U.S. warships. No pilots were said to have been captured during
the week, but on the 21st Hanoi radio reported a "recent"
circular issued by the Premier's Office on the proper procedures
for commending units and individuals who capture "aggressor
pilots." Stressing that the task of capturing pilots alive is
of "special military and political significance," the
circular directs that commendations be based on the promptness
and thoroughness of the capture--that is, the seizure of
documents, weapons, and other equipment as well as the pilots
themselves--and the degree to which the captors adhere to "the
conditions regarding the implementation of policies on
surrendering aggressors and POV's and policies on booty."
The circular also provides for careful assessment of each
individual's or unit's participation in the capture; stressing
that each capture must be regarded as a battle, it directo
higher commendation for those carried out under "complex combat
circumstances" than for those carried out under normal ones.
It directs that reports on each unit's or individual's achievements
be prompt and accurate, both in order that commendations can be
properly made and in order that exemplary captures can be studied
and emulated.
SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT EMPHASIZES REJECTION OF CEASE-FIRE
Cambodian National Day (9 November) provided an occasion for
Sihanouk's government (RGNU) to go on record with an authoritative
statement ruling out a cease-fire in Cambodia as a result of the
proposed Vietnam settlement. However, in what may reflect
divergent interests among the parties involved, the RGNU rejection
of a Cambodian cease-fire was not echoed by its allies. Peking
expressed generalized support for Sihanouk's cause but avoided
the question of a settlement. Hanoi praised Sihanouk's five-point
program while maintaining its silence on a Cambodian cease-fire.
Moscow, with its even more complicated position in Cambodia,
simply ignored the anniversary this time, unlike previous years.
Sihanouk took an unusually minor role in the National Day
festivities, having been in North Korea since 2 November for
what he said is to be a month-long vacation. His leaving his
Peking base at a time when negotiations are underway on Vietnam
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and Laos may seem odd, though in doing so he has further
distanced himself from a settlement that he insists has no
authority in Cambodia. RGNU Premier Penn Nouth and the
special envoy of the interior part," Ieng Sary, have also
absented themselves from Peking, departing on 18 November for
a visit to Shanghai. These two accompanied Sihanouk on his
trip to Hanoi from 26 to 28 October.*
RGMJ ON CEASE-FIRE Uamb.dian National Day was observed by
the ROYNU with a 9 November government
statement reaffirming determination to carry on the struggle
"without compromise or retreat." While supporting the Vietnam
draft accord publicized by Hanoi on 26 October, the statement
stressed that "this agreement is only valid for Vietnam" and
recalled that in a 29 October speech Sihanouk said that a
Vietnam-U.S. peace agreement would have no authority in Cambodia.
It pointedly rejected "the maneuver of cease-fire in Cambodia
hatched by U.S. imperialism with President Richard Nixon and
Mr. Henry Kissinger as ringleaders," and it notified countries
that are to be members of the international control commiAnion
monitoring a Vietnam cease-fire that if they violate the
territorial integrity of Cambodia they will be considered
aggressors. In a polemical referenze with anti-Soviet overtones,
the RGNU statement added that the Cambodiar people know from
past experience that the ICC only interferes in the internal
affairs of the country concerned and engages in activities "in
the interests of the superpowers."
Also on 9 November, Sihanouk's press agency released a statement
rejecting a cease-fire that was issued in `1e names of the
"interior part" of the RGNU, the Cambodian liberation armed
forces, and mass organizations. The statement, dated 2 November,
was said to have been adopted following a "recent" meeting in
the liberated none. Though it did not mention the Vietnam
draft agremeent, its timing seems responsive to that development.
A Cambodian cease-fire wes rejected yet again in a 15 November
statement by a spokesman of the RGNU Foreign Ministry denouncing
* Sihanouk's visit to Hanoi is discussed in the 1 November 1972
TRENDS, pages 15-17. His current visit to Pyongyang is his
fourth to be publicized. The previous ones were in June-July
1970, July-August 1971, and April-May 1972. In the first and
last previous cases, as now, his trips to Pyongyang came on the
heels of visits to Hanoi.
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stepped-up U.S. arms deliveries to the Lon Nol regime. It
charged that the United States talks "deceitfully" of peace
in Vietnam while at the same time refusing to sign the
agreement with the DRV and enhancing the military potential
of its Phnom Penh and Saigon allies. The statement
reiterated the line that any eventual peace agreement on
Vietnam will have nothing to do with Cambodia.
Cambodian intransigence hart been illustrat_d by routine-level
commentaries carried by Sihanouk's media on 6 and 18 November
warning that the liberation forces "will soon launch a general
attack to liberate Phnom Penh." The commentary on the 18th
stressed that it will be a major attack aimed at "completely
wiping out" the Lon Nol forces and at "totally, definitively,
and permanently liberating Phnom Penh.
As if to underscore the case for intransigence, the RGNU and
its Peking patron used the occasion of Cambodian National Day
to expand the claim of territory "liberated" to "nearly 90
percent" of the land and "over" five million of the seven
million Cambodian people. The previous claim of 85 percent
of the land and over five million people had first been
announced in a statement by the RGNU Ministry of Information and
Propaganda on 13 July 1972, also a time when Sihanouk was
vociferously opposing a cease-fire. The claim prior to July,
that 80 percent of the territory and "nearly': five million
inhabitants had been liberated, dated back to August 1971 when
Ieng Sary first came to Peking. That claim had been an
increase from the former one of 70 percent of the territory
and four million people.
The current claim of 90 percent of the territory appeared in
the 9 November RGNU statement and was also made by Penn Nouth
at a National Day reception in Peking. Its first appearance,
however, had been in Peking comment--in an 8 November NCNA
commentary and a 9 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the
anniversary. NCNA initially disseminated these two items
with the old 85 percent claim but followed up a few hours
later with corrections providing the new figure.
PEKING Peking marked the Cambodian anniversary with the
customary message from Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai
to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth and the usual PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial. This year, with Sihanouk out of the country, Penn
Nouth addressed a Peking reception which was attended by PRC
Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien.
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Chinese comment on the anniversary did not address itself
to the issue of a political settlement and accordingly
mentioned neither Sihanouk's five-.point program nor the
:ease-fire question. Peking had gone on record against
linking a cease-fire in Cambodia and Laos with a Vietnam
settlement in the 30 October PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article accompanying the PRC Government statement on the
Vietnam draft agreement. Approval of Sihanouk's five-point
program was voiced most 4.ecenriy by Chou at a 29 October
banquet marking the prince's birthday. Peking's subsequent
avoidance of these issues seems related to its evident
desire to see a Vietnam settlement firmed up and its effort
to keep the atmosphere as propitious au possible.
Although Peking did not mention a Cambodian settlement on its
own authority, NCNA's account if the Peking reception cited
Penn Nouth's denunciation of the "collusion" of the United
States and Lon Nol for a cease-fire to gain time for a
counterattack and his insistence that the Cambodian question
be settled on the basis of Sihanouk's five points and the
FUNK program.
The Chinese leaders' message portrayed a fighting unity of
the three Indochinese peoples under the banner of the Joint
statement of the Indochinese People's Summit Conference, a
reference not present last year. Peking seems recently to be
concerned to invoke the sense of unity symbolized by the
Indochinese summit at a time -when divergent interests among
the parties involved may come to the fore. The message
concluded with a standard pledge of "all-out support and
assistance" to the Cambodians in their struggle "until
complete victory."
VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS Cambodian National Day occasioned
the customary greetings messages
from,the DRV and PRG leaders acknowledging that Sihanouk
represents the legitimacy of the Cambodian state and that the
RGNU is the only legal government. The DRV message expressed
"unreserved" support for Sihanouk's five-point program and
pledged adherence to the joint declaration of the Indochinese
People's Summit Conference.
There has been no monitored reference in Vietnamese communist
media to any of the rejections of a Cambodian cease-fire
voiced by the RGNU. The 18 November DRV Foreign Ministry
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statement denouncing the increased U.S. military supplies to
Lon Nol asserted that the Cambodian question can be settled
only on the basis of Sihanouk's five points and the RGNU
statements of 24 October and 9 November, but it did not note
that those statements rejected a Cambodian cease-fire. The
21 November PRG Foreign Ministry statement on arms deliveries
to Lon Nol attacked the United States for delaying the
signing of the Vietnam agreement and for obstructing the Laos
talks, but it failed to mention a Cambodian settlement.
MOSCOW Moscow has apparently ignored the Cambodian
anniversary entirely this year, presumably reflecting
Soviet reluctance to acknowledge Sihanouk's movement at a time
when Indochinese negotiations are at a delicate stage. In 1970
Moscow had marked the occasion with routine-level radio comment
praising the fight of the "Cambodian People's Liberation Armed
Forces" against imperialism. Last year Moscow publicized a
"day of solidarity" and a low-level meeting of the "Moscow
public." There was praise for the FUNK's leadership of the
Cambodian people's struggle, but consistent with Moscow's
failure to recognize Sihanouk's government there was no mention
of the prince or the RGNU.
DRV, PRG SUPPORT NLHS CHARGE THAT U. S. "OBSTRUCTS" LAO TALKS
The DRV and PRG have issued foreign ministry statements in
support of an NLHS Central Committee statement charging that
intensified military actions by the United States and its
"henchmen" in Laos "obstruct" the political talks which have
been going on in Vientiane between Royal Laotian Government
and NLHS delegations. The NLHS statement, released on
13 November, charged that the United States and its "hirelings"
have stepped up attacks against the "liberated areas" in Laos
in various areas including the Plain of Jars and have also
intensified their bombing and plan to introduce more Thai
troops. It alleged that "since the latter part of October"
two-thirds of the U.S. warplanes in Southeast Asia had been
mobilized to bomb Laos and Cambodia.
The statement also scored Souvanna Phouma for "slandering" the
NLHS and the DRV during his visits to the United States and
the United Nations but did not, of course, acknowledge that
he was talking about the presence of DRV troops in Laos. While
af`:rm'ng that the NLHS is "determined to continue the talks
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with the Vientiane side in good faith on the basis of the
NLHS five-point solution," the statement said the Lao people
will heighten their solidarity with the people of Vietnam and
Cambodia in the spirit of the Joint communique of the
Indochinese People's Summit Conference, and it called upon
communist and peaceloving countries to "step up support and
assistance" to the Lao struggle.
The NLHS statement was issued the day before ti:e fifth session
of the peace talks being held in Vientiane between delegations
of the RLG and the NLhS. At the 14 November session the RLG
side presented detailed views on the peace plan put forward
by the NLHS at the opening session of the talks on 17 October.*
The NLHS' detailed stand was an elaboration of its five-point
political solution of 6 March 1970. Subsequent w:ekly
sessions of the talks, after the RLG presented its own
seven-point pence plan at the second session, had been bogged
down in procedural details, the sides apparently marking time
until Premier Souvanna Phouma returned from a trip abroad.
He returned to Vientiane on 9 November and the next day had a
meeting with NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit, who
had been in Vientiane for two weeks in the capacity of "special
adviser" to the NLHS delegation to the talks. On the llth
Phoumi Vongvichit returned to Sam Neua to report to NLHS
leaders.
The DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements supporting the
NLHS statement were released somewhat belatedly on 18 November.
They accused the United States and its "lackeys" of
intensifying military operations and "extermination bombings"
in Laos, thereby jeopardizing the talks in Vientiane.. The
PRG statement, but not the DRV's, mentioned in passing U.S.
postponement of the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement,
as well as intensified bombing in Vietnam, military deliveries
to Saigon and Phnom Penh, and intensification of the war in
Laos,as attesting to the "obdurate, brutal., and perfidious
nature of the Nixon Administration."
The Vietnamese communist statements complained, without
elaboration, about "slanders" of the NLHS and DRV by the
* The apening of the talks is discussed in the TRENDS of
26 October 1972, pages 11-1G
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Americana and their "lackeys," the DRV statement naming Souvanna
Phouma in this connection. The statements demanded that the
United States cease aggression and intervention in Laos and
allow the Lao parties to settle Laotian internal affairs on the
basis of the NLHS five-point prograri. The DRV statement
concluded with the avowal that the Vietnamese people will
"strengthen their solidarity and coordinate actions" with the
fraternal peoplAs of Laos and Cambodia for complete defeat of
the Nixon Doctrine in Indochina and the Vietnamization policy
in South Vietnam. The PRG statement expressed similar
sentiments.
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SALT
USSR NOTES SALT II COMPLEXITY, STRESSES EQUALITY PRINCIPLE
In limited, low-level comment on the opening of SALT II in Geneva
on 21 November, Moscow has affirmed that the success of the second
round of talks depends on strict adherence to the principle of
equal security for both sides, which followup comment on the Moscow
summit in May had emphsaized lay at the foundation of the SALT I
agreements and the document on Bdsic Principles of Mutual Relations
signed by President Nixon and Brezhnev. The comment also serves
notice that Moscow does not foresee a quick or trouble-free course
for SALT II.
Citing unnamed U.S. spokesmen who have suggested that further talks
be held "from a position of strength," a Moscow domestic service
commentary on 20 November said "realistic American politicians
understand that the main condition for success of the second round
of the Soviet-American talks is the strict observance of the
principle of equal security for both sides." The unattributed
commentary cited the "basic optimism" of recent comments on SALT II
by U.S. observers but added: "It is clear that they realize here
that the Lalks may be long and difficult, as complex questions are
being decided in a sphere of vital importance to both states."
Discussion of SALT II in Soviet media in the period since the May
agreements has been sparse and for the most part nonsubstantive.
A notable exception was an article by G. Trofimenko in the
5 September IZVESTIYA, which cited U.S. press speculation that
the next round "could center" on converting the Interim Agreement
on offensive arms into a permanent agreement as well as on the
expansion of the limitA'ions to cover all kinds of offensive
weapons and the problem of controlling the technological--
qualitative--aspects of the arms race."*
WARSAW COMMENT Commentaries anticipating SALT II have been
more frequent in East European than in Soviet
media, but only Warsaw comment dealt with substantive issues more
extensively than Moscow comment did.** An article in the
5 September issue of the Polish army paper ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, by
* Discussed in the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 27-29.
** See the TRENDS of 13 September 1972, pages 29-30.
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Jerzy Rulicz, discussed in the context of S4LT II the "difficult"
issue of NATO's nuclear potential and the problem c,F inducing
Britain and France to let the United States "represent them" in
the next round. A commentary marking the opening of SALT II by
A. Wasilewska-Sutkowska, transmitted by Warsaw's PAP on 21 November,
noted that according to "general, opinion" the SALT II negotiations
will attempt to check the qualitative race, since "the agreements
reached during SALT I . . . do not prevent the possibility of
rivalry and race in perfecting the quality of missiles, warbaads,
and other offensive weapons systems." MIRVing of offensive
missiles was cited as an example.
CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE An articles by V. S. Anichkina and V. F.
Davydov in the current issue of USA:
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY (No. 11, signed to press 13 October)
provides the most comprehensive Soviet analysis to date of the
amendments offered by Senator Jackson during the debate on
ratification of the SALT I agreements and of Administration support
for those amer_.nents as well as for the effort to li?.ik approval of
the arms limitation agreements with approval of the program for
modernization of strategic weapons.
Avoiding a direct judgment on the extent of Administration support
for Jackson's initiatives, Anichkina and Davydov cited U.S. press
sources that claimed the White House had "assumed certain commitments
toward the rightists in'exchange for their support" and thet the
"White House supports this amendment . . . in order to give the
President a new trump in furLaer disarmament talks." At the same
time,the authors noted the efforts of Administration spokesmen to
refute the most extreme arguments of Jackson amendment supporters
that the SALT I accords could put the United States in a strategically
inferior position.
The optimistic conclusions of the article, however, showed no
concern over the long-term impact of the extensive support received
by the revised Jackson amendment: "The dist.ussion of the Soviet-
U.S. strategic arms limitation agreements anc their subsequent
approval in the U.S. Congress by an overwhelming majority reflected
the considerable changes which have taken place in the position of
the U.S. ruling elite on the question of U.S.-:soviet relations."
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PEKING, TIRANA Chinese media have yet to take note of the
start of SALT II. But Albania's ATA, in a
22 November dispatch, noted the resumption of talks by
"representatives of the two 'superpowers"' and cited the pledge
by U.S. chief delegate Gerard Smith that "the United States
will make efforts at this stage of the talks that there should
be reached not only the ltt tation of offensive nuclear arms
but also an agreement on their reduction." ATA commented that
"in fact, this is another maneuver of the U.S. imperialists and
the Soviet social-imperialists to further strengthen their
relations and to hatch up new plots against the independence,
freedom, and sovereignty of peoples under the mask of disarmament
and peace."
CONFIDENTIAL
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MIDDLE EAST
SOVIET PROPAGANDA MARKS TIME ON ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Moscow has given only token propaganda attention to the Arab-
Israeli conflict in recent weeks, with the Israeli raids against
Syria and Lebanon eliciting routine denunciation of Tel Aviv's
"provocations." Kosygin, speaking at a 21 November dinner for
the visiting South Yemeni delegation, did not even mention the
problem; instead, presumably with Arab critics in mind, he
defensively outlined Moscow's "definite objectives" in its Middle
East policy: strengthening the forces of national independence
and progress, repelling imperialist aggression, and cooperating
"equally" with the Arab peoples in building a new life and insuring
international security.
Dispatches from TASS and IZVESTIYA correspondents in Cairo--the only
available comment pegged to the fifth anniversary of Security
Council Resolution 242--dwell on Israel's "annexationist plans"
for the occupied territories. TASS correspondent Trushin on the
21st repeated the assertion that the Arab countries have reaffirmed
their readiness for a political settlement of the crisis; he
also recalled Egypt's willingness to restore Suez Canal navi-
gation provided Israel withdrew from Sinai as a Brat step toward
total withdrawal and a peaceful settlement. Trushin reiterated
a version of the formula on the Arabs' right to liberate their
territories by various means, using the wording of the commu-
nique on Prime Minister Sidqi's October visit to Moscow. The
original formula, introduced in the communique on President as-
Sadat's visit to Moscow last April, was qualified in the October
communique with the addition of the pbeaea "in accordance with the
provisions of the UN Charter and the legitimate :,fight of states to
defend their freedom." Soviet propaganda has taade virtually no
use of the formula since the releaa:: of October commu-
nique.
Propaganda attacks on Israel's "'new' policy" vis-a-vis its Arab
neighbors have cited statements by Israeli leaders to demonstrate
that Tel Aviv now casts aside any pretense that its military
operations are reprisals and assumes the right to attack the
Arabs at times and places of its own choosing. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
on 19 November leveled the typical charge that the "premeditated
brigandage" sought to force ta:e Arab countries to capitulate one
by one. Continuing to avoid any concrete suggestions for ending
the stalemate, Moscow merely asserts that Israel's actions will
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not break the Arabs' will and calls on the United Nations an'. peace-
loving forces to insure a political settlement.
DAYAN VISIT, Minimal comment on Israeli Defense Minister Dayan'a
U.S. POLICY recent U.S. visit and his 14 November talks in
Washington routinely maintained that the purpose
was to seek further military support as well as funds. IZVESTIYA's
Kudryavtsev, in a 16 Novembar article, likened Tel Aviv's situation
to that of Saigon, arguing that Israel was drawing on South Vietnam's
experience in sending Dayan to Washington after having studied the
hurried U.S. transfer to Saigon of huge amounts of arms prior to a
cease-fire. Kudryavtsev called this a "naked form" of the Guam
doctrine and claimed that Israel was calculating on obtaining an
"appropriate reserve of weapons" to implement that doctrine in the
Middle East.
Along the lines of recent comment alleging that the Israeli leaders
were displaying "nervousness" in the face of a trend toward inter-
national detente, Kudryavtsev remarked toot Tel Aviv and Saigon were
holdire talks on the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations
out of a need to exchange experience on methods of "keeping in the
saddle" in view of the general trend toward detente. Kudryavtsev
claimed that Israel feared even "outward changes" in the '_J.S. atti-
tude. But in noting that President Nixon did not elaborate Dn the
"great deal of attention" he said the Administration would give
to the Middle East, Kudryavtsev went on to cite Israeli Foreign
Minister Abba Eban as declaring "not without satisfaction" that
"there are no changes" in the U.S. stand.
There has been virtually no speculation in Soviet media on what
Kudryavtsev called the expected "rcactivat-ion of the U.S. Middle
East policy." Moscow continues to insist that the pro-Israeli
orientai.ton of Washington's stance will not change. A domestic
service commentary on the 13th cited Eban as saying the United
States would, as before, apply no pressure on Israel and would
continue to press the question of opening the Suez Canal instead
of pursuing the problem of a general Middle East settlement.
IZVESTIYA'a Cairo correspondent Koryavin, in a 19 November dispatch,
reported the Egyptian info.-oration minister as stressing that "at
present there are no proposals whatever" from the United States on
a Mideast settlembnt.
KUWAIT CONFERENCE Moscow comment on the 15-18 November Kuwait
meeting of Arab foreign and defense ministers
professed to see some useful--if limited--
results but at the same time suggested Soviet irritation over the
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Arabs' inability to resolve their various differences. Moscow
domestic service commentator Ryzhikov said on the 20th that the
conference agreed that no Arab states would accept a settlement
of the crisis to the detriment of the Palestinian Arabs' interest,
and that it stressed the important role of the Palestinian resis-
tance in the Arab struggle. (The conference in fact recommended,
according to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, the "removal of all
obstacles in the path of Palestine commando action"; it also
recommended the establishment of an Arab arms-producing institution,
a point ignored by Moscow.) Ryzhikov conceded that "the attitude
toward the Palestinian movement" was one of the "complicated pro-
blems in the path of Arab unity," but he optimistically hailed
what he called the "unanimous positive solution of this matter"
at the Kuwait conference. However, a Moscow Arabic-language
broadcast on the 19th noted that the conference was not able
to settle "some of the differences, especially those between the
Palestinians and Jordan."
A broadcast in Arabic on the 20th saw some benefit in the fact
that "the question of tangible practical measures is raised, per-
haps for the first time," with the decision to hold an Arab Defense
Council meeting in January to study a military plan and the
possibility also of using "economic factors" in the struggle
against Israel. But the broadcast noted the "difficulties and
differences" in Arab relations and faulted the Arabs for being
"incapable of confronting Israel with a single front of resis-
tance and of mobilizing all their huge material and human
resources" to protect their rights. Presumably reflecting
Soviet exasperation with inter-Arab quarrels, the broadcast
added that the Soviets "welcome any initiative from the Arab coun-
tries, regardless of their social and political systems, to unite
the forces and resources of the Arabs" in the struggle against "Israeli
imperialist aggression."
CAIRO ANNOUNCES EGYPTIAN MILITARY DELEGATION IN MOSCC*
The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY announced on 18 November that it "had
learned" that an Egyptian military delegation headed by Air Force
Commander Maj. Gen. Husni Mubarak had been in Moscow for the past
three days and had held a number of meetings with Soviet military
commanders. Moscow has not acknowledged the visit, just as it did
not acknowledge Prime Minister Sidgi'a disclosure, in his 25 October
report, that4uring his talks with Soviet leaders "it had been
agreed" that Est would send a military delegation to the Soviet
Union "sometime between 10 and 15 November." The only other
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available Egyptian reference to the delegation's presence in Moscow
appeared in a Cairo radio broadcast on the 21st which denounced a
BBC report that "there has been disagreement in the higher council
of the Egyptian armed forces on the occasion of the departure of the
military mission to Moscow and that there has been opposition to the
departure of this mission."
An indication that there are continuing Soviet-Egyptian differences
over military supplies appeared in remarks made to journalists by
Egyptian Army Chief of Staff ash-Shadhili while he was in Kuwait to
attend the opening of the Arab foreign and defense ministers
conference on 15 November.* According to a 16 November report in
the Kuwaiti AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM, ash-Shadhili, asked by a TASS corres-
pondent if the Sukhoi and MIG-21 planes were not enough to confront
Israel, replied that the Sukhoi was a bomber, not a fighter, that it
was not as fast as some Israeli planes, and that it required MIG-21
cover. He added that the Arab armies' planes "are nr.t very effective
in the face of the American Phantoms which Israel 1tas." Ash-
Shadhili pointed out that even with enough money--and Egypt and
Syria were in "dire need" of money--delivery of planes after purchase
required no less than three years, and than another four.years to
train qualified pilots. He added that the West sells weapons but
wants money for them, while "the East--meaning the USSR--also gives
arms but with limits."
In the wake of the ouster of the Soviet military advisors from Egypt,
Moscow media have repeatedly and defensively denied "slanderous
fabrications" by "imperialist propaganda" that termination of the
mission was tantamount to a rupture of Soviet-Egyptian relations.
Moscow has avoided airing its differences with the Egyptians over
military matters, although a broadcast in Arabic in September did
contain an acerbic reference to Arabs who hold Soviet weapons
while at the same time criticizing the USSR. However, on 21
November TASS atypically replayed a Polish press agency report of an
article in the Warsaw KURIER POLSKI which said that the "recent change
* President as-Sadat, in an interview published in the Lebanese
AL-HAWADITH on 5 October,. had spelled out the "four principal things"
Egypt needed--tracked vehicles for desert war, fighter-bombers, tor-
pedo boats and electronic equipment. In the same interview he said
that in removing the Soviet military presence he wanted the Kremlin
leaders to understand that their strategy in the area could not be
fulfilled at Egyptian expense.
CONFIDENTIAL
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of the Egyptian war minister is generally considered as a manifes-
tation of President an-Sadat's desire to maintain friendly
cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states."
Moscow had reported without comment the late-October removal of
Sadiq as war minister and the appointment of Maj. Gen. Ahmad
Ismail 'Ali to that post, a development which had prompted
considerable Arab press speculation that Sadiq had been relieved
as a conciliatory gesture to the Soviets.*
A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 17 November took AKHBAR AL-YAWM chief
editor al-Quddus to task for views expressed not in his Cairo press
articles but in an interview with the Swedish papor DAGENS NYHETER.
The broadcast rebutted an assertion attributed to al-Quddus that
strategic considerations underlie Moscow's desire to maintain good
relations with Egypt.
* AKHBAR AL-YA.WM's al-Quddus, in a 29 October article, in effect
denied any Soviet influence in Sadiq's removal from office, insisting
that the decision to terminate the Soviet military mission had nothing
to do with Sadiq. Al-Quddus did, however, assert that "at one stage"
the Soviets did not conceal their "dissatisfaction with and objection
to Sadiq and many other" Egyptian personalities. He explained this
as a political tactic--"attacking those on the sidelineR instead of
the presidency, which was what they meant." Moscow ignored al-
Quddus' article.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CUBA-U, S,
HAVANA URGES RAPID CUBAN-U,S, ACCORD ON HIJACKING
Spurred by the Southern Airways plane hijacking on 11 r_aember,
the Cuban Government issued a statement on the 14th calling for
rapid negotiation of an agreement with the United States on measures
to cope with the hijacking of planes and ships and with "illegal entries
and exits between the territories of the two countries"--language
drawn from Cuba's 30 October response to U.S. notes on the Eastern
Airlines hijacking that occurred on 29 October. Cuban media have
not acknowledged any of the statements by F _te Department
spokesman Charles Bray about the imminence of negotiations between
Washington and Havana, through the intermediary of the Swiss, on
an agreement concerning hijacking; nor has there been any mention
i.." the media of Cuba's intention to try the hijackers of the
Southern Airways plane, which Bray said had been communicated to
the United States.
Followup commentaries in Cuban broadcast media on the 14 November
government statement have been authored exclusively by Castro
confidante Guido Garcia. Inclan and carried only iii the domestic
radio service. Like the statement !.tself, Garcia Inclan's
commentaries have conveyed a sense of urgency about concluding
an accord, reflecting apparent Cubav hopes to capitalize on the
curtent furor over hijackings to press for concurrent U.S.
consideration of Cuba's demands for curbs on anti-Castro exile
acti?ities and for the return of people who flee the island
illegally. The government statement included the full text of
Cuba's 30 October note on the preceding day's hijacking, which
emphasized Havana's readiness to take "serious and immediate steps"
looking toward an agreement; the note stated that the hijacking
problem could be "solved relatively soon," and the government
statement said measures to curb hijacking could be implemented
"immediately" if the United States cooperated. Garcia Inclan
declared in an 18 November broadcast:
We have said talk, not waste time. The problem cannot be
solved by holding talks today and next year and then the next
year, in Paris or Berlin. The problem can be solved with just
a few words and, above all, with great honor, without fears
or favors, in the manner that characterizes our revolution.
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On the 16th Garcia Inclan, whose commentaries on past occasions
have anticipated regime policy lines, implied that one of the
thornier questions that would have to be settled would be that
of distinguishing political refugees from common criminals. "The
word 'pirate,"' he said, "must be clearly defined and the term
'political refugee' must also be clearly defined." Although the
government statement did not directly raise the question of
political asylum, it did refer to t--,. ruban law enacted on
16 September 1969 which spelled out the regime's position on
hijacking and called for bilateral negotiations to solve the
problem. The law stipulated that Cuba "reserves the right to
grant the right of asylum in those cases it deems just to those
persons who arrive in our country for political reasons because
they found themselves in need of using an extreme measure to
avoid a real danger of death or serious repression."
U.S.-CUBAN DETENTE The government statement and Garcia Inclan's
commentaries shed little light on Castro's
view of the impact a hijacking agreement might have on the broader
question of Cuban-U.S. relations. But there have been hints in
recent and past Havana comment that the Cuban leader may envisage
a link between the problem of aerial piracy and other issues beyond
those of exile activities and political asylum. Most notably in the
recent comment, Garcia Inclan touched obliquely in a 17 November
broadcast on the notion that negotiations on hijacking could bring
a general thaw in Cuban-U.S. relations. Using his standard "Letter
from Freddy" format (built around letters from a fictional Cuban
expatriate newsman in Miami to his old crony Garcia Inclan), the
broadcast noted that after the Southern Airways hijacking "the
White House newspaper" the Washington POST had editorially urged
that the U.S. Government "normalize relations with Cuba and, above
all, try to discuss the problem of aircraft diversions."
Castro's last extensive public discussion of hijacking, in reply to
a U.S. newsman's question on the subject at a December 1971 press
conference in Chile, had been notable for a gratuitous linkage of
the issue with general U.S.-Cuban relations. In rambling,
sometimes contradictory remarks, Castro was ambiguous on whether
the hijacking problem should be discussed in the framework of
general negotiations on outstanding bilateral issues or treated
in isolation. He was unequivocal only on the point that there
would be "no agreement" with the United States on measures against
plane hijackings unless ships and illegal departures were also
covered in accordance with the Cuban law of lb September 1969,
Then he added:
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Someday, when the time comes to talk about everything,
I could say that we are going to include the airplane issue
in a general agreement. We have a ricnt to do this, because
since the law was drafted three year3 ago we have received
no reply [from the United States].
Castro went on to cite two other bilateral issues--the U.S. presence
at Guantanamo, "which is more illegal than the hijacking of planes,"
and the question of Cuba's right to indemnification for the damage
it suffered as a result of the U.S. "blockade and aggression." But
he proceeded to obfuscate the linkage of hijacking to such matters
when he remarked, with respect to hijacking, that "perhaps the
solution would be to settle some questions which interest you more
than us, because you are the ones who have the [hijacking] problem,
not us."
Castro has evinced preoccupation with the question of the U.S.
"blockade policy" toward Cuba, most recently responding to a
question at a 25 September press conference with remarks stressing
the need to end this policy if there is to be any improvement in
U.S.-Cuban relations.* And Havana spokesman in the past have suggested
a direct link between hijacking and U.S. pursuit of a blockade policy.
For example, a 28 December 1971 PIENSA LATINA commentary, in the
course of a review of the his tor} of aerial hijacking, called U.S.
pursuit of such a policy a major cause of the problem. More
pointedly, an article on hijacking in the December 1970 issue of
the journal CUBA INTERNACIONAL had observed, after noting that
only a minority of hijackers have political motives: "In these
cases, it is possible to find the remedy--lift the blockade of Cuba."
Against the background of the record of public statements by Castro
and his spokesmen on uncondit ionpl lifting of the blockade and
cessation of U.S. acts of "aggression" as prerequisites to any
improvement in bilateral ties, the 14 November government statement
was notably defensive on Cuba's current proffer of negotiations
with the United States at a time when the latter still pursues a
"policy of blockade and aggression" against the island. Cuba's
"constructive position," the statement explained, was motivated
by "esteem for the people of the United States and the international
community."
* See the TRENDS of 12 October 1972, pages 26-28, for a discussion
of Castro's 25 September remarks.
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WEST GERMANY
USSR. GDR WELCOME VICTORY OF BRANDT AND OSTPOLITIK
Soviet and East German media have reacted with predictable warmth
to the 19 November election victory of the Brandt-Scheel coalition
government. The initial comment, at official and routine levels,
praised Brandt and Scheel for their leadership in normalizing
relations with the socialist countries and the West German electorate
for endorsing the "realistic" policies of the Ostpolitik.
Emphasizing the progress represented by the Moscow and Warsaw
treaties, the four-power "West Berlin" agreement, and the initialing
of the East-West German basic treaty, the commentaries have
uniformly attributed the CDU/CSU opposition's defeat to its
failure to accept the present-day situation in Europe and its
adherence to a "negative" policy toward peace and cooperation in
Europe.
PRAVDA's Bonn correspondent on the 21st, according to TASS, described
the election as "tantamount to a plebiscite" and the SPD/FDP victory
as a mandate for continuation of the "realistic course" charted by
Brandt and Scheel. On the 22d the PRAVDA correspondent observed
that the West German electorate had based its vote on hopes for a
continuation of goodneighborly relations and cooperation with the
USSR and other communist countries. Moscow commentators have taken
particular Mote of Brandt's statement that he is now ready to sign
the basic treaty with the GDR before the end of the year. They have
also poi"tad to the Social Democratic Party's popular appeal
demonscrdtad by its achievement of a plurality for the first time
in a West German election.
East German reaction came within hours after Brandt was declared
the winner on the evening of the 19th. East Berlin radio and ADN
reported that "circles" of the SED Politburo and the GDR Council of
Ministers saw the election results as an endorsement by the "majority"
of West German voters of the policy of "businesslike relations with
the socialist countries, including the GDR," opening the way to the
signing and ratification of the basic treaty between the GDR and
FRG. In a similar vein, a 22 No imber NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article,
carried in full by ADN, added that "a decisive majority of FRG
citizens want, as proved by their vote, to live in peace and
tranquility with their neighbors." The paper concluded that the
"political effects" of the various agreements between the FRG and
the socialist bloc "influenced the election outcome and decidedly
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contributed to the defeat of the CDU/CSU." After reiterating
the GDR's willingness to bring the basic treaty to a quick
conclusion, the SED organ emphatically repeated the GDR's line
that the treaty, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence,
in no way alters the incompatibility of the social systems of
"the socialist GDR and the capitalist FRG."
SOVIET BLOC PRESSURES PRAGUE TO REACH ACCORD WITH BONN
Public statements by Soviet and East European leaders over the past
two weeks suggest that Moscow and its allies are pressuring Pragl,.e
to compromise on the divisive Munich agreement issue in the titalemated
talks on normalizing relations with Bonn. This pressut:s has been
reflected in public statements which omit any explicit support for
the Czechoslovak demand that Bonn recognize the 1938 Munich agreement
as invalid ab initio--a demand which Prague on some but by no means
all recent occasions has seemed to moderate by omitting the "ab
initio."
In his 6 November anniversary speech,CPSU Politburr, member Mazurov
simply called for the settlemett of relations between Prague and
Bonn without any reference to the need to invalidate the Munich
agreement. Brezhnev, in his speech on the 13th during the visit
of Bulgarian leader Zhivkov, made no reference whatever to Bonn-
Prague relations. And the 18 November communique on the Zhivkov
visit, without explicitly asserting support for Czechoslovakia,
"expressed hope for a successful end of negotiations between the
CSSR and the FRG and for a full normalization of the relations
between those countries on the basis of recognizing the Munich
agreement as invalid."
Zhivkov and Poland's Gierek,in their public statements during their
9-11 November talks in Sofia and in their joint communique, likewise
made no reference to Munich, limiting themselves to generalized
expression of support for the Czechoslovak stand. Without mentioning
the Munich issue, Zhivkov on the 10th went as far as to declare:
"I dare say that we are now on the eve of the normalization of
relations between the FRG and the CSSR."
Hungarian Politburo member Kallai, in a statement carried by Budapest
radio on the 20th conveying Hungary's "satisfaction" with the resctts
of the FRG election, was hopeful that Bonn would continue its present
path and take additional "concrete steps--primarily with the
continued normalization of present relations with the CSSR"--toward
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the further consolidation of European security. Where this
wording suggests that Budapest will not move to establish
diplomatic relations with the FRG until Prague reaches agreement
with Bonn, the Hungarian CP Central Committee's communique on
its 14-15 November meeting said that "conditions are ripening
for regulating the interstate relations between the Hungarian
People's Republic and the FRG, including the resumption of
diplomatic relations." The communique made no reference to a
Prague-Bonn settlement as a prior condition for Budapest relations
with Bonn.
Czechoslovak media appear to be marking time on the future course
of Prague-Bonn relations. In comment on the results of the West
German elections, the party organ RUDE PRAVO as well as other
papers on the 20th and 21st made no direct reference to the
stalemated talks between Prague and Bonn, which have been
adjourned since June because of the two sides' inability to
reach agreement on the invalidity ab initio of the Munich agrement.
However, in a possible oblique allusion to the bilateral talks,
RUDE PRAVO on the 21st said that. the consolidation of the Brandt-
Scheel coalition in the Bundestag now gives th,a Bonn leaders
"the prerequisites to continue asserting the realistic elements
in their policy even more boldly and at a faster rate. This is
what not only most of the West German electorate but also the world
public expect them to do."
The only available direct Prague reference to the Munich issue
since the election appeared in an international broadcast in
English on the 20th which reasserted the Czechoslovak stand that
Bonn must recognize "the Munich diktat as null and void from its
inception."
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SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
ZHIVKOV EULOGIZES BREDiNEV. REAFFIRMS DEPENDENCE ON USSR
Speaking in Moscow the day before his departure for home, Bulgaria's
Todor Zhivkov reinforced his country's image as the USSR's most
obedient junior partner with effusive personal accolades to Brezhnev.
Sofia's dependence on Moscow for material support was further
underscored in the joirt communique issued at the wi:rdup of the
Bulgarian leader's 13-18 November visit.
In the current round of top-level Soviet blo: visits, Zhivkov's
trip to Moscow followed a 9-11 November visit to Sofia by Poland's
Gierek and Jaroszewicz, and TASS on the 11th announced that Brezhnev
would go to Hungary "on an official friendly visit late in November."
ZHIVKOV ON BREZHNEV Where he had paid tribute chiefly to the
Soviet party in a Kremlin dinner speech on
the 13th, Zhivkov declared in his speech at the Lenin Komsomol
automobile production plant in Moscow on the 17th that "there have
never been such fraternal relations between our leadership and the
Soviet party-state leadership, between us and Comrade Leonid Ilich
Brezhnev, our brother, comrade, and great friend of the Bulgarian
people, as there are at present." He continued: "I wish to take
this opportunity to express from this rostrum our profound gratitude
to the Leninist Central Committee, the Politburo, and the General
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, for all
they are doing for the Bulgarian People's Republ+.c."
In a possibly oblique reference to Brezhnev's recent illness,
Zhivkov ...:?led attention to the "energy" displayed by the Soviet
leader in foreign affairs. He remarked that "we cannot, however,
fail to note the great personal services of Comrade Leonid Brezhnev,
because we know very well how much wisdom, patience, and energy" is
shown by the Soviet leader in the field of international relations.
Zhivkov vound up his speech by underscoring the staunchness of
Bulgaria's loyalty to "internationalism" on the orthodox Soviet
model: "All Bulgarians consider the borders of the Soviet Union
and of the enti, socialist community as sacred and inviolable
borders of Bulparia."
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COMMUNIQUE As broadcast by the Moscow and Sofia radios on the
18th, the communique on Zhivkov's visit recorded an
atmosphere of unalloyed "cordiality, friendship, and mutual under-
standing" in bilateral talks which "once more confirmed the complete
unanimity of views" between the two parties and governments "on all
questions discussed." The Bulgarian delegation of Zhivkov, Premier
Todorov, and Fatherland Front Chairman Traykov "expressed the joy
and admiration of the Bulgarian communists and of all Bulgarians for
the tremendous Soviet achievements in communist building," as well
as "warm gratitude to the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR
Government for the constant fraternal assistance and support" they
are giving to Bulgaria.
The communique may have hinted at L.e burden felt by the Soviet
economy in the heavy support of Bulgaria when it said the two sides
agreed on concrete measures for "solving with joint efforts a
number of particularly ,3ignificant national-economic problems
[problemy]." The more general term "voprosy" was used in the same
passage with reference to agreement on measures to solve "problems
[or questions] connected with a closer interaction between the
national economies" of the two countries under the CEMA integration
program.
Relatively restrained on the score of international communist
relations, the communique affirmed the decisions of the 1969 Moscow
international party conference and denounced "any manifestations
of nationalism, revisionism, and opportunism," in keeping with
Brezhnev's low-keyed treatment of the subject in his 13 November
Kremlin dinner speech. Zhivkov did not touch on international
communist strains in his factory speech on the 17th, but he
denounced "anti-Soviet slanderous fabrications by imperialist
reaction and opportunists of all shades" in his dinner speech on
the 13th. The 11 November "decli:i:_*'-n" issued at the close of
Zhivkov's talks with Gierek in Sofia had "decisively condemned the
dissident activity of the present CCP leadership" and called for
"consistent and firm" struggle against "the anti-Leninist and
anti-Soviet course of the Maoists."
SOVIET MEDIA PREPARE GROUND FOR BREZH1EV VISIT TO HUNGARY
The TASS announcement on the 3.1th that Rrezhnev would visit Budapest
late this month has been accompanied by comment aimed at allaying
conjectures about Moscow-Budapest tensions in the economic sphere.
Thus a broadcast by Radio Moscow in Hungarian on the 11th, hailing
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the impending visit as "a new important contribution" to bilateral
friendship and cooperation, declared "quite categorically" that the
Soviet-Hungarian friendship treaty, renewed in 1967, "has been
implemented to the letter" and that "there is no field of economic,
scientific, or cultural life where our friendship has not borne
marvellous fruit."
Also on the 11th, a widely broadcast talk on the coming visit
insisted that there is "no division" in the socialist community
"into large and small or strong and weak countries" and stressed
that "thousands of links join the Hungarian economy to that of
the Soviet Union." It recalled Kadar's statement at the 24th
CPSU Congress to the effect that Hungary's "main guarantee of
national independence" is the "mutual trust" which "monolithically"
unites Budapest with Moscow.
TASS on the 17th included negative features of the Hungarian
scene in its report on a just-concluded Hungarian party plenum.
It reported that the MSZMP Central Committee "criticized the
weak sides of party work" and called for "overcoming anti-Marxist
views through creative use of Marxism-Leninism and by convincingly
proving our truth."
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
UKRAINE RANKS SHELEST LAST AMONG POLITBURO MEMBERS
The new leadership in the Ukraine has demonstrated its disdain
for former Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest by ranking him
last among CPSU Politburo members. The 9 November RADYANSKA
UKRAINA's phr"to of portraits of Politburo members above th,:
tribune at the 7 November Kiev anniversary parade showed Shelest
in last place and his rival and successor Shcherbitskiy in
sixth place. For many years, including last May Day, Shelest
had consistently been ranked seventh; Shcherbitskiy had been
ranked tenth since he joined the Politburo at the 24th CPSU
Congress. The only other notable change in the Ukrainian
rankings'was the elevation of Moscow First Secretary Grishin
from last place to eighth--an unusual display of favoritism
for someone lacking ties to the Ukraine.
MAY 1971, NOV. 1971, MAY 1972
NOV. 1972
1.
Brezhnev
1.
Brezhnev
2.
Kosygin
2.
Ko syg in
3.
Podgornyy
3.
Podgornyy
4.
Kirilenko
4.
Kirilenko
5.
Suslov
5.
Suslov
6.
Mazurov
6.
Shcherbitskiy
7.
Shelest
7.
Mazurov
8.
Pelshe
8.
Grishin
9.
Polyanskiy
9.
Polyanskiy
10.
Shcherbitskiy
10.
Pelshe
11.
Kulakov
.1.
Kulakov
12.
Kunayev
12.
Kunayev
13.
Voronov
13.
Voronov
14.
Shelepin
14.
S'elepin
15.
Grishin
15.
Shelest
In contrast to the Kiev rankings, Shelest stood llth--ahead of
Pelshe and Kulakov--at the 7 November Moscow parade.
LEADERSHIP FAILOIGS UNDER MZHAVANADZE EXPOSED IN GEORGIA
A 1 November.Goorgian Central Committee plenum on industry
presented an extremely negative picture of conditions in Georgia
further discrediting the leadership of former First Secretary
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V.P. Mzhavanadze. In his first major speech since becoming
Georgian party boss, E.A. ::hevardnadze flailed rampant
corruption, poor leadership, and disastrous economic results,
suggesting that Georgia is in :or a prolonged period of
housecleaning similar to that ex}erienced in Azerbaydzhan.
In addition to these and earlier s'gns of disgrace,
Mzhavanadze, undisputed boss of Georgia for almost 20 years,
did not even appear on the tribune with other Georgian
leaders at the 7 November parade in Tbilisi.
In his plenum speech published in the 4 November ZARYA VOSTOKA,
Shevardnadze complained of "an atmosphere of liberalism,"
"dulling of vigilance," and "weakening of party and state
discipline and intraparty democracy" which he said permitted
the spread of embezzlement and imorality among high-level
officials. He declared that the early 1972 CPSU Central
Committee decree exposing the shortcomings of the Tbilisi
organization "in essence" charbrterized the work of the whole
republic. Another speaker, Local Industry Minister
M.A. Megrelishvili, inquired why Georgia had dropped from one
of the leading republics to a position of backwardness and
found it to be the result of "conditions of imaginary prosperity
and self-satisfaction created in our republic during the last
10 years or more."
Statements at the plenum reveal that the Georgian leadership
hab Len coping unsuccessfully with economic problems all
year and that the economy was one of its most serious failures.
The nine-month industrial growth rate fell from 5.8 percent
in 1971 to 2.2 percent in 1.972--as against a target of
6 percent--and the Georgian industrial plan was cut back by
103 million rubles in 1971 and by another 102 million in
the first nine months of 1972. Shevardnadze ridiculed the
"alchemy with figures" whereby a 30-million-ruble overfulfillment
of the plan was accomplished by reducing the plan target by
102 million rubles.
Mzhavanadze's young protega N.Sh. Tskhakaya was apparently the
first to suffer politically for the industrial failures, being
fired as Georgian Central Committee secretary in June for
unspecified "errors and shortcomings in work." During his
tenure as industry secretary in 1970-72, Georgia fell to last
place among Soviet republics in industrial growth. In their
plenum speeches Shevardnadze and Tskhakaya's successor,
Z.A. Pataridze, explained that the economic lag in the first
six months of 1972 had been discussed in detail at a late-July
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Georgian aktiv meeting and that in August the Georgian Council
of Ministers had ordered lagging ministries and enterprises to
tako ndditional measures, but that no improvement had occurred.
Shevardnadze also revealed serious shortages of consumer goods
and food stuffs and noted that the most recent session of the
Georgian bureau had punished the Abkhaz republic's second
secretary, trade minister, and consumer cooperative chairman
for permitting such shortages. Shevardnadze blamed the critical
shortage of fruits and vegetables on profiteering by kolkhozniks
who sell their produce privately instead of delivering them to
the state.
Shevardnadze harshly criticized past cadre policy for permitting
embezzlers to achieve prominent positions in industry, and
Megrelishirili characterized cadre policy as based on 'nepotism"
and "friendship." In line with these charges, the plenum removed
R. V. Metreveli--like T skhakaya, a young protege of Mzhavanadze--
as Central Committee cadre section chief and bureau candidate
member; Metreveli had been promoted from Komsomol first secretary
to republic cadre chief in 1970.
Apparently to avoid leaving the new republic first secretary open
to similar charges of nepotism, Shevardnadze's brother was
transferred from Tbilisi city second secretary to the Georgian
Central Committee shortly before Shevardnadze became Tbilisi
first secretary in July. With Shevardnadze's promotion to
Central Committee first secretary, the November plenum transferred
his brother from his position as head of the Central. Committee's
trade, financial, and planning organs section to a government post.
MASHEROV ARTICLE IN KONMUNIST STRESSES RUSSIFICATION
Belorussian First Secretary P. M. Masherov has authored an article
on nationality affairs in the October issue of KOMMUNIST that
goes well beyond previous pronouncements in stressing national
assimilation and russification. The numerous articles on this
subject appearing this year in commemoration of the 50th
anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union have been almost
uniformly bland, carefully balancing the contradictory themes
of the "drawing together" and the "flourishing" of individual
republics. Masherov's one-sided stress on the "drawing together"
theme--on economic integration of the republics, mixing of peoples,
and spread of the Russian language--and his strong attacks on
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"fetishization" of national customs, defense of republ:c interests,
and even publicizing of republic achievements are consistent with
the doctrinaire positions he has taken on other issues, particularly
against "consumerism" in economic policy.
Masherov asserted that "the tendency to draw together is more
and more acquiring the leading significance" and complained that
literary works and press articles are overemphasizing the
achievements of individual republics. Noting the progress toimrd
economic integration of the republics, he declared that "the
appearance of nationalistic and localistic tendencies in their,
so to speak, pure form is unthinkable" under present conditions,
but that they still appear in "veiled" form under the guise
of protecting the interests of particular republics--for instance
by seeking as much capital investment as possible. Even the
presentation of economic data showing a republic's progress was
viewed by Masherov as potentially dangerous because it tended to
obscure ro;:ognition that all successes in republics are the result
of nationwide efforts.
On the cultural and linguistic front, Masherov lauded the migration
of peoples between republics as "progressive" and the learning
of Russian as a necessary vehicle for progress. He condemned any
preservation of the national homogeneity of the population of a
particular republic of mesas of artificial measures" and advocated
the creation in all republics of "conditions maximally facilitating
and stimulating" study of the Russian language. "internat4onalization,"
he argued,'does not occur objectively but requires +;n active
drive by all party organizations and society.
Notably absent from Masherov's article were the conventional warnings
against assimilation found even in articles promoting "international-
ization." For instance, E. Bagramov's 22 June PRAVDA article attacked
authors who "write off" the national as "archaic" and warned against
confusing "drawing together" of republics with assimilation.
An editorial in the June issue of ZHURNALIST likewise :omplained
that "one of the moo,: vexing errors of a number of propaganda articles
is to substitute the concept of merger of nations for their drawing
together" and to present the former as a present-day task, a
mistake which it said "grossly distorts" nationality policy. The
thrust of Masherov's argument contrasted sharply with that of the
more nationalistic Kazakh First Secretary D. A. Kunayev, who in
the 30 June PRAVDA identified both "flourishing" and "drawing
together as "leading" tendencies and assailed the notion that some
nations are "chosen" and others "inferior" and therefore "biologically"
doomed to spiritual stagnation.
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SUPPLE-IENT ARY ARTICLE
PEKING AND THE CLANDESTINE RADIOS BEAMED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
In the increasingly fluid situation in Asia produced by the Sino-U.S.
detente and the prospects of a Vietnam settlement, Peking has been
positioning itself for further developing relations with Southeast
Asian countries* while muting its involvement with the Maoist
politics of insurrection that dominated Chinese policy in the
area a few years ago. With the shift in foreign policy priorities
toward normalizing state relations, Peking evolved a dual-track
approach in which naves to cultivate relations with Southeast
Asian governments proceeded apace alongside continuing support for
communist-led insurgent movements invoking Maoist doctrine.
PRC-based clandestine radios serve as.outlets for pro-Peking CPs to
air their hardline-ideology at the same time to Peking fosters an
atmosphere conducive to normal -state relations.
Peking's dual approach was clearly evident in its moves to repair
its relations with Burma, establishing a pattern that has been
followed in the case of Malaysia and, most recently, in the
breakthrough that has been achieved it Sino-Thai relations.
Peking has made similar moves toward the Philippines and has also
relaxed its hostility toward Indonesia. On the regional level,
Peking hv.s evinced a more tolerant attitude toward moves aimed at
developing cooperation among the countries in the area. The
Chinese expressed support for Malaysian and Indonesian efforts to
control passage through the Malacca Straits at:e have muted their
former criticism of su^h groupings as ASEAN and the British-backed
five-power defense pact. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article
on 14 January referred without comment to the proposal for neutralization
of Southeast Asia championed by Malaysia in particular.
As for support for the communist movements in the area, Peking
has been all but ignoring their representatives in China while
largely restricting coverage of these CPs to selective replaying
of material broadcast by their clandestine radios to Southeast Asia.
There are three such stations: the Thai CP's Voice of the People
of Thailand (VOPT), which was first monitored in 1962; the Malayan
CP's Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR), inaugurated 4.n November
1969 and beamed to Malaysia and Singapore; and the Voice of the
People of Burma (VOPB) broadcasting in the name of the Burmese
* This article discusses Peking's relations with the Southeast Asian
countries other than the Indochinese countries.
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0
communists sire March 1971. The VOPT is the most prolific in
originating material, each day initiating a new program of some
eight items. The other two stations initiate new programs every
three days. PRC media have regularly carried items attributed to
the VOPT and VOMR, but Peking has never acknowledged the existence
of the Burmese station.
There have been signs recently that the clandestine stations have
been easing their criticism of Southeast Asian regimes in what may
be a further effort inspired by Peking to promote a propitious
atmosphere for normal relations. Most notably, the VOM-c refrained
throughout October from criticizing the Malaysian government, possibly
in the hope of improving the prospects for further movement in
relations between Peking and Kuala Lumpur. In another change, thr
Thai CP's radio offered no critical comment on Bangkok's motivati..n
in connection with the establishment, of contacts with Peking when
a Thai table tennis team visited the PRC in September. In contrast,
when Malaysia and Burma sent delegations to China in 1971, the
VOMR and VOPB sharply impugned their motives in dealing with:':Peking.
BURMA Peking's moves to repair its relations with Rangoon while
providing facilities for a clandestine radio which it has
never acknowledged illustrates the dual approach in its purest form.
In the wake of the return of the Chinese ambassador to Rangoon and the
visit to Peking of Ne Win last year.. PRC media have given ample publicity
to official Chinese activities in Burma, including a recent report
on Chinese technicians who have been surveying PRC-aided projects. NCNA
reported that this year's embassy reception in Rangoon on PRC
National Day took place in a "warm and friendly" atmosphere, an;
advance over last year's merely "friendly" atmosphere. On 26 September
NCNA reported on the progress of Burmese government efforts to
eradicate illiteracy, marking Peking's first report on Burmese
internal affairs in years that was not critical of the regime.
Peking has reduced to a bare minimum its attention to the
Burmese CP and its resident delegation in China. PRC media
have publicized only four BCP messages in the past two years: on
the March 1971 Chinese satellite launching, on the CCP's 50th anniversary
that year, and on 19 January and 8 April this year expressing
condolences on the deaths of Chen I and Hsieh Fu-chih.
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The January message made no reference to the situation in Burm.1,
and the April one did so only in noting that Hsieh's death was
a loss to the "oppressed people of Burma." Peking acknowledged
the presence of Thakin Ba Thein Tin, identified as head of the
resident RCP delegation, at the PRC National Day celebrations
this year, but this marked his first reported appearance in a
year. He was not reported present on two occasions this year
which he had attended in 1971.
The VOPB has continued to offer its standard fare of combat
reports on the BCP-led insurgent forces, commentaries denouncing
policies of the "Ne Win military clique," and lessons in
Marxism-Leninism and Mao thought. The VOPB extends support to
Peking in international affairs, typically taking a harsher
line than PRC media. Thus, while Peking remained silent, the
VOPB on 20 January denounced Rangoon's recognition of
Bangladesh as an "extremely reactionary act."
MALAYSIA AND Following the exchange of trade delegations
SINGAPORE with Malaysia in 1971, Peking has played host
to a growing stream of Malaysian visitors who
have been feted and treated to what are officially described
as "friendly" meetings with Chinese officials. Peking has put
aside its former challenge to the legitimacy of the Malaysian
Federation and now consistently uses the official name "Malaysia."
This practice has also been extended to neighboring Singapore.
A 15 July NCNA dispatch on the visit of a Chinese ping-pong
team to Singapore referred, to Lee Kuan Yew as the prime minister
of the "Republic of Singapore"--the first such reference to Lee
and Singapore by their official titles.
Though Peking has occasionally replayed items from the VOMR
critical of Malaysian or Singapore policies, it has for over
a year carefully edited out all attacks on the governments by
name. Peking has also deleted passages from VOMR commentaries
that have implicated the PRC with the communist-led insurgency.
Thus, NCNA's 5 October replay of a VOMR editorial on PRC
National Day omitted a reference to China as the "base area
for world revolution" as well as a recital of Mao dicta that
only armed struggle and reliance on the gun can assure
liberation. In addition, the CP-led insurgency in North
Kalimantan, long a Chinese propaganda favorite, has not been
referred to in PRC media since NCNA on 29 March replayed a VOMR
account of the insurgents' battle successes.
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The VOMR has also shown some signs of moderation. In addition
to its atanddown on criticism of the Kuala Lumpur government
during October, the station has devoted leas attention to the
sensitive issue of "Malay chauvinism" and alleged oppression
of Overseas Chinese. The bulk of its comment nonetheless still
consists of criticism of Malaysian and Singapore policies and
battle reports on the communist insurgency. On 4 November it
sharply attacked Razak's recent trip to the USSR, in contrast to
Peking's silence on the visit, and it has directed criticism
at the five-power defense pact. The VOMR also continues its
function a. the major clearinghouse for commentary by pro-Peking
communist partibs throughout Southeast Asia. Most recently, the
station on 11 November hailed the PKI for its exploits in the
liberation of Indonesia from the Dutch, and on 9 September it
carried a statement by the Philippines CP.
THAILAND Reflecting the significant breakthrough in Sino-Thai
relations represented by the Thai table tennis team's
visit to China in September, Peking has pulled back from the
abusive attacks on the "Thanom-Praphat clique" that had continued
until as late as August. Criticism of Bangkok in PRC media is
now restricted to infrequent replays of VOPT commentaries that
are carefully sanitized to remove attacks on the government by
name. ?n another sign of .'improved relations, a Thai economic
delegation visiting in October was accorded a "friendly" talk
with Vice Premier Li Hsien-mien, marking an advance over NCNA's
neutral characterization of Prasit Kanchanawat's talks with
Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials in September.
The VOPT duly carried the NCNA reports on both visits and
stressed in its own commentaries the desire of the Thai people
for closer relations with China. However, the clandestine station's
regular fare still consists largely of sharp criticism of the
Bangkok government's involvement in the Indochina war, its ties with
SEATO, its allegedly oppressive internal policies, and its dealings
with American and Japanese big business. The VOPT has skirted
the sensitive issue of Bangkok's policy toward Overseas Chinese,
though a 22 October broadcast did attack the government for
permitting the KMT remnants to remain in North Thailand near the
Chinese border.
PHILIPPINES Though there is no clandestine station broadcasting
to the Philippines in the name of the pro-Peking
CP, several of the elements characterizing Peking's relations
with the other Southeast Asian countries have been present in its
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approach to the Philippines. Recent PRC coverage of developments
in the Philippines has avoided direct comment on the CP-led
insurgency and has generally sidestepped attacks on the Marcos
government in carrying material attributed to other sources.
An exception to this pattern was a low-level NCNA report on
the declaration of martial law in the Philippines this September.
In Peking's sole reaction to this step by the Marcos government,
a 26 September NCNA account replayed foreign press comment
that criticized Marcos for using martial law to solidify his
political position and called attention to demonstrations against
the "Marcos authorities." The report noted Marcos' reference to
a subversive threat in justifying martial law, but there was no
mention of alleged pro-Chinese sympathies among the subversives.
Peking broadcasts to the Philippines in Tagolog carried only this
NCNA report in taking note of the imposition of martial law.
Peking has muted its support for the Philippine CP in replaying
foreign comment. In Peking's last reference to the party, a
27 April pickup of a Philippine CP statement on the third
anniversary of the "New People's Army" contained no criticism
of the Marcos government by name. Prior to that time, Peking
had replayed reports on the insurgency at a rate of one every
one or two months. Meanwhile, Peking has been publicizing
"friendly" exercises in people's diplomacy, and Poking reported
on 24 July that the Chinese Red Cross provided aid worth one
million yuan for flood victims in the Philippines.
INDONESIA Peking's relations with Indonesia have shown the
least movement among the cowitries surveyed, but
in this case too the Chinese have retreated from the harsh
hostility they formerly directed at Jakarta. Peking has all but
abandoned criticism of the Suharto government, the last critical
reports being two brief NCNA items noting demonstrations against
Suharto when he visited Australia and New Zealand-in February.
Peking has also curtailed propaganda support for the PKI and
publicity for Adjitorop, the head of the PKI delegation in China.
The last reference to the PKI in PRC .edia was a 23 May NCNA
replay of a PKI statement on the party's anniversary which included
denunciations of the "bloody suppression" and "political swindles"
of "the Suharto fascist military clique." Adjitorop's only reported
appearance in Peking this year has been on PRC National Day.
N
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