TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050044-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: November 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
TRENDS
in Con~rnunist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
1 NOVEMBER 1972
T00875RO~~bb~v~~i44'-'~' 44)
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This propaganda an:!ysis report is based e~;cl~isively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coorclinaNon with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized d' ?~losure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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t
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRL'NDS
l NOVEMBER 1972
CONTE~~TS
Topics and Events Given Mayor Attention
A
i
INDOCHIN
Hanoi, Front Press for Speedy Signing of Peace Agreement
1
DRV Summary of Draft Accord Leaves Many Points Ambiguous
3
Kosygin Urges Continued Talks for Vietnam Settlement.
10
Peki~ig Issues Government Statement Backing Hanoi's Stand
13
Sihanouk Visits DRV, Again Rejects Cease-Fire Upon Return
15
DRV Routinely Protests Air Strikes South of 20th Parallel
18
U.S. ELECTION
Moscow In Effect Concedes Victory to President Nixon
19
YUGOSLAVIA
Tito Calla for "Settling Accounts" With Opponents in LCY
21
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Agriculture Official Rebuts Writer's Attack on Virgin Lands
23
CUBA-BOLIVIA
Havana Airs Views of Guevariat Guerrilla Group in Bolivia
25
D I SAFtMAMENT
Moscow, Peking Clash ai UN on Disarmament Conference
30
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FOR OFFICIAL UgE ONLY ~'P ]. 'R DS
.1 NOVEMBER 1972
TOPICS ATE,.: EVENTS GIVEN t?IAJOR ATTCNTICN 23 - 29 OCTOBER 1972
Moscow (2773 items)
Pekin .1200 items
Indochina
(12%)
19%
Domestic Issues
(41%)
37%
[Vietnam
(].%)
15%]
Indochina
(28%)
21%
[Internntional
(8X)
3%]
[Vietnam
(169'0)
13%]
Solldflrity Week
[Cambodia
(7%)
6%]
ICalian Prime
(--)
4%
UPIGA Session
(9%)
12?0
Minister Andreotti
7.ambia Nntional Day
(--~)
G%
in USSP.
AnniversAry o# CPV
(??-)
~E%
China
(4%)
3%
in Yoreun War
:'heat statistics are based on the voicecaat commentary outpst of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" fa used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorlay, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
P'lgures in parentheses indicate volume o! comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given manor attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
!n other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor signlRcance.
FOR OFFICIAL U8E ONLY
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CONIPLDEN'i'IAL F13IS TRENDS
1 NOVEMBER 1972
I NDOCII I NA
The predictr-bte propaganda fanfare hae followed the 2G October
DRV Government statement revealing that the United States and
North Vietnam in private talks had reached a peace accord which
calls for an immediate cease-fi.re in South Vietnam and for the
establishment of a three-segment "administrative structure" to
promote implementation of the agreement by the GVN and PRG and
to organize general elections. The DRV statement was formally
endorsed in a PRG statement on the 28th and has been lauded at
meetings of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee, the Vietnam
Father.l:n~? Front, ana lower-level organizations. The PRG statemen t
claimed that the accord--released only in brief summary form--
responds satisfactorily to the two basic demands of the 11 September
PRG statement--?that is, that the United States will end military
involvement in Vietnam and that the internal affairs of South Vietna:-n
will be settled on the basis of "the reality that there are in South
Vietnam two administrations, two armies, and other political forces."
Followup propaganda has echoed the DRV statement in arguing against
the U.S. stand that the agreement cannot yet be signer because of
"difficulties in Saigon" and because further negotiations are
needed on some points. Hanoi first acknowledged Kissinger's
26 October press conference in a domestic broadcast on the 31st
which denied that there had been any misunderstanding about an
agreement to sign the accord on the 31st. While Hanoi continues to
press for a speedy agreement, it typically reiterates the Vietnamese
communists' determination to continue the struggle until victory
if a settlement is blocked.
Moscow has characteristically sought to strike a carFful balance in
expressing support for its allies while encouraging flexibility.
No official Soviet statement has been issued thus far, but Kosygin
expressed hope for a settlement when he met the DRV and PRG envoys
on 27 October.
Pekir-g has outpaced Moscow in lining up behind the Vietnamese
comrades, issuing a government statement on the 30th that endorsed
the DRV statement and pledged continuing assistance in the war
effort. The Chinese statement, charging that Washingtcn has raised
new obstacles on the "pretext" of difficulties with Saigon, called
on the United States to sign the draft agreement "as soon as possible."
HANOI. FRONT PRESS FOR SPEEDY SIGNING OF PEACE AGREEMENT
DRV media have repeatedly echoed the claim in the 26 October govern-
ment statement that the schedule for signir-g the U.S.-DRV peace
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CONFIDENTIAL S ~ ~
]. NOVEMBER 1972
accord on 31 October had in fact been suggested by the United
States on the 20th. According to Hanoi's version, President
Nixon in a message to DRV Premier Pham Van Dong on the 20th
had welcomed the DRV'8 good will--in accepting the U.S. position
on two unspecified issues which had remained in dispute ae late
as the 17th--and had confirmed Chat "the formulation of the
agreement could be considered complete.'' The statement went on
to say that the President in his message on the 20th had also
raised a number of "complex points" but that: two days later, in
another message, he had expressed satisfaction with the DRV'e
explanation of these points. Thus, as of the 22d, Hanoi maintains,
agreement had been reached that on the 23d the United States
would stop the bombing and mining 1n North Vietnam, on the 24th
the peace accord would be initialed in Hanoi, and on the 31st
the U.S. and DRV foreign ministers would sign the accord in
Paris. The government statement said that "a serious situation
which threatens the signing of the agreement" was brought about
by the United States on the 23d when it referred to difficulties
in Saigon and demanded that negotiations be continued in order to
resolve new problems.
It was not until the 31st that Hanoi media acknowledged Kiseinger's
press conference, held after Hat.oi had released the summary of the
peace agreement. The Hanoi domestic service commentary claimed
Chat there was no misunderstanding about the schedule and observed
Chat the 31st was the day on which the agreement should have been
signed. It a~aid that the Nixon Administration has adopted a
"crooked attitude," not only having dodged the signing but having
raised the question of changing the points agreed on. The broadcast
noted that Kissinger had said that peace was at hand and that the
six or seven issues which could to discussed in three or four days
were minor. Without mentioning President Thieu, it countered that
it would be a normal thing if "some aide" [been naof door] raised
new issues for discussion while the two sides were still ire the
process of continued talks, but that the U.S. and DRV governments
"and even thElr state leaders, grave and digni,f ied, exchanged
~~
messages and reached agreement. The commentrary called it noteworthy
that it was while Kissinger was hording consultations with Thieu
from 18 to 22 October that President Nixon sent two messages--on the
20th and 22d--confirming that the U.S. Bide considered the text ad
completed and expressing satisfaction with the DRV's interpretations.
Asking if it was reasonable to say that the President sent messages
without awareness of Kissineer's discussions in Saigon, the broadcast
accused the United States of deliberately prolonging the talks.
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CONb'IDRNTIAL FDIS TRENDS
1 NOVTMBER 1972
In ridiculing the U.S. "pretext" of difficulties with Thieu, the
commentary claimed that in the bilateral negotiations the United
States and the DRV had agreed that they were responsible for
obtaining the concurrence of their allies and that the DRV had
the PRG's and the United States had Saigon's. To further document
its argument Chat no further consultations with Saigon should be
necessary, the commentary referred to press conference statements
by Kissinger and the President last February. The radio broadcast--
like other comment, including a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on
the 28th--quoted the President as having said in a 10 February
press conference that an;~ proposal he would advance would be a
common proposal by the South Vietnamese and the U.S. governments,
and that the United States would not advance any proposal without
exchanging views with the GVN and obtaining its agreement.
The radio commentary on the 31st indicated that efforts to bring
about a signing of the agreement would go on when it noted that
the struggle must be continued on the "military, political, and
diplomatic fronts." While insisting that further consultations with
Saigon should not be necessary and that the text of the agreement
should nor be changed since the United States had approved it, Hanoi
has taken care not to suggest that the DRV will make no changes.
It seems noteworthy in this regard that there has been virtually
no substantive Hanoi discussion of the nine-point ouL?line cf the
draft agreement. The NHAN DAN editorial on the 27th did
cryptically paraphrase moss of the points but, perhaps significantly,
did not even mention point six calling for point military
commissione,made up of the four parties and of the two South
Vietnamese parties; an international commission of control and
supervision; and the calling of a conference on international
guarantees.
DRV SUMHARY OF DRAFT ACCORD LEAVES MANY POINTS AMB;G000S
In the absence of a full text of the peace agreement, it is difficult
to compare current positions with those thst have evolved over the
years. The government statement, in observing that on 8 October the
DRV took "a new, extremely important ini*.iative," said the Vietnam
problem "will be settled in two stages in accordance with the
oft-expressed desire of the American side." However, the statement
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1 NOVEMBER 1972
avoided describing the agreement as separating military and
political questions* when it said that
the f iret stage will include a cessation of the
war in Vietnam, a cease-fire in South Vietnam,
a cessation of the U.S. military involvement in
South Vietnam, and an agreement on the principles
for the exercise of the South Vietnamese peopJ.~'8
right to self-determinbtiun; in ire second stage,
the two South Vietnamese parties will settle
together the internal mattass of South Vietnam.
An article in the September issue of the DRV theoretlcai journal
HOC TAP** is instructive regarding the meaning of Hanoi's
assertion that the military and political questions are linked
and must be settled together. HOC TAP said that according to
American propaganda, the United States wants to separately
settle two kinds of questions, military and political, whereas
the Vietnamese aide wants an all-inclusive solution. The
journal article said that
in reality, in what the Unites States calls military
questions, such as cease-fire, withdrawal of
troops, release of POW's. ,cease-fire encompasses
a key political problem because it means recognition
of the puppet administration. In the so-called
political questions--that is, questions pertaining to
the internal affairs of South Vietnam--there is the
question of the Vietnamese armed forces in South
Vietnam, which is a question of military character.
The United States desires that the political
questions be solved only some time after the settle-
me:~t of what it calls military questions.
* Last winter, in divulging the DRV-U.S. private negotiations,
President Nixon had acknowledged that the United Staten had.var ioualy
proposed separating military and political questions--as in a secret
31 May 1971 U.S. proposal--or, in accordance with Hanoi's desirE., had
negotiated combined military and political questions as set forth in
the DRV's nine-point proposal submitted in private on 26 June 1971 and
revealed by the President on 25 January.
** The importance Hanoi attached to the HOC TAP article, which sF:t
out the respective negotia*ing positions, was indicated when VNA and
Hanoi radio carried it in their international services--unique. handling
of a HOC TAP article on the Paris talks. Moreover, the transmissions,
on 27 September, coincided with the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho meetings in
Paris on the 26th and 27th. See the TRENDS of 27 September 1972~page 1,
and 4 October, page 12.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 NOVEMIlER 1972
CEASE-FIRE Point two of the agreement as summarized in the
DRV Government statement says that 24 hours after
the signing of the agreement, a cease-fire shall be observed
throughout South Vietnam. While this is at variance with the
PRG's 1 July 1971 seven-point proposal, it is similar to the DRV
nine-point proposal advanced in the private Calks on 26 June 1971.
The approach taken in the nine points was reflected in the
article in the September issue of HOC TAP and in the 31 August
NHAN DAN Commentator article which had treated the issue of a
political settlement in greater detail than any propaganda since
last winter.* Commentator called the military and political
aspects of the Vietnam issue inseparable and said that after the
United States agreed to a solution, a cease-fire would be put
into effect. HOC TAP had said that following the signing of a
comprehensive agreement, there would be a cease-fire and
"implementation of provisions agreed upon" would ensue.
The PRG's seven-point proposal made public on 1 July 1971 dealt
separately with cease-fires with U.S. and Saigon forces. Thus
point one, after spelling out the demands on U.S. withdrawal, said
that a cease-fire would be observed between U.S. and PLAF forces
after agreement was reached on U.S. withdrawal. Similarly, point
two of the July proposal, on a three-segme~it government of national
concord which would o:-ganize general elections, said Chat a PLAF-
ARVN cease-fire would be observed when the government of national
concord was formed. The maeter of a cease-fire had not been raised
in the PRG's 11 September statement.
Point seven of the DRV's nine-point proposal of 26 June 1971 said
that a cease-f ire would be observed after the signing (ky ket) of
agreements on the problems outlined in the previous points of the
proposal. (Point six of the U.S. eight-point proposal had called
for a general cease-fire throughout Indochina to begin when the final
agreement was signed.)
See the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 3-6.
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CONFIDENTIAL F~IS TRENDS
1 NOVEMBER 1972
The DRV Government statement introduced some confusion regarding
the cessation of U.S. bombing and mining of North Vietnam. TI~e
statement indicated Chat the bombing and mining would be stopped
and then the agreement would be initialed and signed. But point
two of the summarization of the agreement, after declaring that
the cease-fire will be observed throughout South Vietnam, says
that "the United States will stop all its military activities and
end the bombing and mining of the North." The specification in
point two that U.S. troops will be withdrawn within 60 days is
consistent with time frames for withdrawal in proposals on both
sides in the past.
"SELF-DETERMINATION" Point four on self -determination for the
IN SOUTH VIETNAM South Vietnamese, as summarized in the
government statement, provides fo'r the
continued existence of both the Saigon government and the PRG.
It thus drops t'~e commtmist demand that the two governments get
together to form a pro~~iaional coalition government made up of
their representatives 3i.id a third neutralist faction. Instead
it says that an adm{nistrative structure of three equal segments
called "the Nations]. Council of National Reconciliation and
Concord" will be set up to promote the implementation of the
signed agreements by the PRG and GVN and to organize general
elections.
The recognition of the PRG meets a complaint repeatedly voiced in
Hanoi and Front propaganda in the past too months that the United
States denies the existence of the PRG. The 31 August NHAN DAN
Commentator article--which had indicated a notable Hanoi attempt
to call attention to the seriousness and reasonableness of its
negotiating posture--had said that by referring only to the
Liberation Front, President Nixon wants to deny the existence of
the PRG, "the South Vietnamese people's genuine and legal
representative and a government whose prestige has continually
risen in the world," as allegedly proved most recently at the
nonalined conference in Guyana.* Following the release of the
* President Thieu in his 24 October TV speech, following Kissinger s
flue-day visit to Saigon, did not deign to mention the PRG in complain-
ing that the North Vietnamese "wanted us to recognize the existence o#
two differen*_ governments in South Vietnam." He continued: "I. am
against this demand and hold that the problems concerning the North and
the South must be solveA by the Saigon and Hanoi governments, and the
internal affairs of the South must be settled by the legal and
constitutional T,VN Government and the Liberation Front." The U.S.-Saigon
eight-poin~ proposal publicized last January had said that presidential
elections would be organized by an independent body representing-all
political forces in South Vietnam. .President Nixon in his 25 Janriary
speech and President Thieu on the 271:h had specified that these forces
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L NOVEb1P ~:R l9 7 2
11 September PRG statement expressing readiness to reach agreement
that neither a communist regime nor a U.S. "stooge regime'' would
be imposed, Hanoi and Front propaganda stressed that in fact
the United States was intent on "maintaining" Thieu and denying
the existence of the PRG.
The nature of the "administrative structure" callecl for in the
agreement is complicated by the fact that the word Hanoi chose to
use for "ad!~inistrative"--"chink quyen"--can also be used to
mean "government."* (Earlier communist proposals demanding a
coalition government had used the unmistakable term for government--
"chinh phu.") The DRV statement's opening summation of the
8 October initiative suggested that "chink quyen" should be
interpreted to mean a government when it noted that the two
administrations (chink quyen) in the South would hold consultations
with a view to forming an "administration (chink quyen) of national
concord." Instead of "chink quyen," Hanoi could have used a less
ambiguous term for administration, "hank chanh" or "hank chink."
In agreeing that two governments will exist in South Vietnam,
Hanoi has of course dropped the call for Thieu's resignation. A
notab]e precedent for such a reversal of attitude toward a South
Vietnamese leader exists in the treatment of former GVN Vice
President Nguyen Cao Ky. In early 1971 Vietnamese communist
media routinely reiterated the position, stated in the PRG's
17 September 1970 statement, that the PRG would negotiate with
a Saigon administration "without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem." Consistent
with this position, communist reports of Ky's criticism of Thieu
in the course of the presidential alection went on to declare twat
there was no essential difference between the two.** However, the
seven-point PRG proposal of 1 July 1971 dropped the previous
reference to the three top GVN leaders, instead asking that the
* As an example of the broad usage of the term chanh quyen, a
VNA English translation of a 23 September 1969 Truong Chink speech
variously translated '~hinh quye~i'as administrative organs,
administration, power, and state power. Hanoi also uses "chink
quyen" in referring to the Nixon or Saigon "administrations" as well
as in reference to the communists' "revolutionary administrations"
in South Vietnam.
** A 13 Play 1971 Hanoi broadcast cited Ky criticism of Thieu but
went on to declai~a that "everyone knows that both Thieu and Ky are
ugly traitors" and that they are denouncing each other "because
each wants to be the number one lackey of the Americans." See the
19 May 1971 TRENDS, pages 1112.
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1 NOVEMBER 1972
Prated States cease backing "the bellicose group headed by
Nguyen Van Thieu." Communist propaganda continued to attack Ky
for several days in the wake of the new proposals, but by
26 July Liberation Radio seemed to be justifying the proposal's
new line when it took pains to dissociate Ky from Thieu: The
radio claimed that Ky was "forced" by Ambassador Bunker to run
on the same slate with Thieu in the 1967 elections snd quote
him in 1968 as denouncing those elections as a farce.*
The stipulation in point four that "general" elections will be
organized by the .council is coaai4teat with the call for
general elections in previous coamnunist proposals and is at
variance with proposals for presidential elections in the eight-
poinr proposal and other allied statemenrs. Hanoi's summary of
the agreement does not elaborate on the nature of the general
elections or reflect Kissinger's explanation in his press
conference on the 26th that the two p~rtiea in Vietnam would
negotiate about the timing of elections, the nature of the
elections, and the offices for which the elections would be held.
President Thieu complained in his 24 October speech about the use
of the term "general elections"; he charged that the communists
want more Chan presidential elections and that "a general
election means that the current regime in the South must be
ended completely so that a new constitutional national assemb?.y
can be elected to draft a new constitution, and then a new
national legislative assembly, a new judiciary, and a new
executive will be formed." Past communist proposals bear out
Thieu on this point. The NFLSV's 8 May 1969 10-point solution
and the PRG's 17 September 1970 elaboration called for general
elections to set up an assembly, work out a constitution, and
install a new government. While the function of the general
elections was not spelled out in the PRG's 1 July 1971 proposal,
the PRG's 2 February 1972 elaboration of that proposal repeated the
scenario for general elections leading to anew assembly,
constitution, and government. In its 11 Sep te~nber statement the
PRG merely called for general elections. However, Mme. Binh at
the 5 October session of the Paris talks recalled that the
communists had proposed that the future government in Sout':
Vietnam be chosen through "g~~~.sra.l elections which would proviae
a constituent assembly. The new constitution will decide which
political regime South Vietnam will adopt."
* See the 28 July 1971 TRENDS, page 10-11.
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CONFIDCNTZAt, F>3ZS TRCNDS
1 NOVCMI3ER 1972
In addition to providing for the formation of a National Council
of National Reconciliation and Concord, the ARV summary of the
agreement indicates that "the twc+ South Vietnamese parties
will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels."
Previous communist proposals have not discussed the future
development of the political situation at the local level,
although the 2 February 1972 PRG elaboration had seemed to
require the dissolution of existing local governments in the South
when it demanded that Saigon "disband its machine of oppression
and constraint against the people." President Thieu in hie
1 November national day message and reception speech appeared to
interpret the agreement ae calling for tre formation of
three-part governments at every level. DF:tailing ob~ectiona
to the proposed agreement, Tht:u chargE~d in his reception speech
Chat "the communists propose the for?,~iation of a three-segment
government from the central level down Lo the village and hamlet
levels, demanding that all our institutions--including the southern
constitution, national assembly, armed forces, police, and cadres--
be eliminated."
VIETNAM "UNITY" Point one in the DRV statement's summary of the
peace agreement says that the United States
will respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial
integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements.
The U.S. eight-point proposal had called on both aides to respect
the 1954 and the 1962 Geneva agreements; and point five of Lhe
DRV's nine-point plan had called for U.S. respect of tine 1954 and
1962 Geneva agreements. But there was no call on Chat occasion for
the United States to recognize Vietnam as one country.
President Thieu in his 1 November message on GVN National Day, in
observing that the communists demand Chat everyone respect the
Geneva agreements, said that they say there are only three countries
in Indochina and do not recognize that there are four--Cambodia, Laos,
and South and North Vietnam. He went on to complain that the
communists give themselves the rtght to maintain "several hundred
thousand North Vietnamese troops" in the South.*
* Point two of the agreement, as summarized in the DRV Government state-
ment, says that "the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the
introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, arma-
ments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam." Point four says
that "the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be
settled by the two South Vietnamese parties." The 1 July 1971 PRG seven-
point proposal said that the "Vietnamese parties will together settle the
question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam." The DRV's 26 June
1971 nine-point proposal did not address this issue; however, point five
of the U.S. eight points said that among thekk probpblems that w~o}u~~lppd~~be
Appr~~~F$tbP~~~a~@~~dJ18 ~~-F~~titd~0~~~bdl~#fli~ their
'all armed orces o t e countr es o
national frontiers."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1 NOVEMBER 1972
KOSYGIN URGES CONTINUED TALKS FOR VIETNAM SETTLEMENT
Moscow's support for the 26 October DRV Government statement on
the peace agreement was highlighted by reports of Koeygin's
meeting the next day with the DRV and PRG charges d'affairea,
who handed hicn a copy of the DRV statement. Moscow said the
talks were held in "a cordial and friendly atmosphere." According
to available summaries of hie remarks, Kosygin did not mention
the 31 October deadlire dsmandecl ':-- the DRV for signing of the
agreement but expressed the hope that continued negotiations would
lead to agreement "soon." Successive reports of hie remarks,
however, subordinated the emphasis given his reference to
continued negotiations:
? The initial TASS report on the 27th led off by saying
Kosygin "expressed the hope that the talks on Vietnam would be
continued and lead Boon to the signing of an agreement ending
the war," adding that "this would meet not only the interests
of the Vietnam:~~ae and American peoples but also those of world
peace." TASS sent on to underscore the point by noting that
Kosygin, in avowing support for the Vietnamese struggle, declar?~d
that the USSR "supports the efforts aimed at the speediest
term+.nation of the war ."
~ A TASS report later on the :h, however, began by reporting
Kosygin as expressing "support" for the DRV statement, citing at
a later point his assertion of hope for continued talks.
~ The shift in emphasis was carried a step further in a version
of Kosygin's meeting with the DRV and PRG envoys frontpaged in
PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 28th. The press report highlighted
remarks by the DRV and PRG ~:nvoys, whic-l had been mentioned only
at the end of the initial TASS report, to the effect that the
U.S. line at the talks had constituted "an attempt to avoid
agreement and to drag out military operations" and that the BRV
and PRG would do "everything necessary to restore peace in
Vietnam on the basis of ensuring the Vietnamese people's national
rights." It `hen went on to cite Kosygin on "support," relegating
to the end his remarks on his hops for further talks.
VNA's report of the meeting predictably stressed the Vietnamese
envoys' remarks, attributing ,:o t!~~"n more millta~tt statements
than Moscow did. VNA note~t that they specifically criticized the
U.S. "scheme of maintaining the Saigon puppet regime" and charged
the Nixon Administration with responsibility for the delay in
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CON1~T11i:;NT'CA1. 1!'UIS TPrGNI)S
], NOVI~MIIrIt 1972
signing of: the agr.eemont. VNA quoted Cho diplomats ae asserting
that the VJ.etriamese people are determined to "step up the struggle
on Lh~ three f:r.onts, military, political, and diplomatJ.c," until
they a~.hieve their goal of liberating the South, defending the North,
and advancing Coward peaceful reunification. VNA briefly noted
Koeygin's remarks on "support," adding a reference to Soviet
"assistance" until "final victory." It omitted entirely hie
expression of hope that negotiations would cor~C.ir~ue.
Kosygin's remarks constitute the only authoritative Soviet comment
to date on the recent political developments.
BACKGROUiJD The PRG's 2 FehruaYy 1972 "elaboration" of its
seven-point program has been the only Vietnamese
communist statement on a settlement to occasion a supporting
official statement from Moscow--a USSR Goverment statement issued
belatedly on 11 February. MOPCOW had endorsed the PRG's
seven-point proposal of 1 July 1971 with a FRAVDA editorial on the
5th, the day after Peking had extended editorial support. The
PRG's l1 September 1972 statement on a settlement was given only
generalized support in speeches by various Soviet leaders, including
Podgornyy at a dinner for the visiting Zragi president on
14 September and Gromyko in his UNGA speech on the 26th.
There has been no consistent pattern of Mos~:ow media reporting on
Soviet leaders' meetings with the DRV and P}lG envoys to receive copies
of Vietnamese communist statements. TASS reported that CPSU
Secretary Katushev saw the DRV ambassador on 15 September, the day
after Kisainger's departure from Moscow, but the report contained
no indication that the ambassador handed over a copy of the
14 September DRV Government statement s+spporting the PRG's
11 September proposal. Nor was there any report that a Soviet
leader met with a PRG representative at that time. Two days after
the PRG had issued its 2 February 1972 elaboration, TASS reported
that Kosygin received the DRV and PRG ambassadors, who informed
him of the PRG statement and the DRV's "stand" (Hanoi's ow-t
statement not having yet been released).
COMMENT, REPORTAGE Moscow has been most forthcoming, in keeping
with the initial emphasis in the reporting
of Kosygin's remarks, in a 28 October domestic service commentary
which observed that "at the present responsible moment it is
particularly important to show flexibility and realism." This
remark was prefaced by a statement of support for the PRG and DRV
stand on a settlement and followed by a condemnation of U.S.
efforts to delay a solution by bringing up difficulties with Thieu.
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But the message was clear. Without specifying either aide, the
commentary welcomed in th? recent U.S.-DRV talks "a realistic
and constructive approach, an essential flexibility and the wish
to find a key to solution of the Vietnam question." The agreement,
the commentary said, shows that "real possibilities exist" for
peace.
Moscow's reports of statements by Administration spokesmen have
highlighted remarks suggesting that agreement i? close. TASS'
brief account of Kissinger's 26 Octobsr press conference cited
hie conf irmation of the main provisions of the agreement and
hie comment that peace is close at hand, with only relatively
less difficult points outstanding. TASG noted that Kissinger
"contended" that the United States could not sign the agreement
on the 31st and that 'he "Cried to justify this approach" by
citing the need to rt^ch agreement with Thieu. Hanoi's insistence
on a 31 October signing had been noted at the outset in TASS'
prompt report of the DRV Goverment statement, which had been
followed by longer reports and by publication of the full text
iri PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. While Moscow picked up calls by
Vietnamese spokesmen for signing of the accord on 31 October. its
ot..z comment called in more open-ended terms for signing without
delay and did not explicitly endorse Hanoi's deadline.
A 28 October TASS report of President Nixon'e campaign speech at
Ashland, Ke.ztucky noted his remark that there has been "a
significant shift" in the peace talks and that while there are
still certain differences, "I believe that these will be resolved."
On the 3let TASS briefly reported the White House spokesman's
announcement that the United States would not sign the agreement
that day because it believed some points must be defined more
precisely. But TASS added the spokesman's expression of hope
that the agreement "will shortly be signed."
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l NOVEMBER 1972
PEKING ISSUES GCVERMIENT STATEMENT RACKING WANOI~S STAND
Peking moved promptly and authoritatively to line up behind
Hanoi's 26 October statement on the Vietnam negotiatione* and to
pledge continuing assistance should the war be prolonged. After
Chou En-lai had expressed generalized support for the Vietnamese
communists' stand when he received a copy of the statement from
their envoys on the 26th, Peking issued a government statement and
a companion PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 30 October
accusing the United States of delaying a settlement and calling on
Washington to sign the draft agreement "as soon as possible."
Until the date had passed Peking had skirted Hanoi's demand that
the agreement be signed by 3l October, a deadline not explicitly
mentioned in the government statement or Commentator article.
A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 1 November rather blandly took
note of the "timetable," observing that the date for the signing
had slipped by and blaming the UniC:d States for "this complication."
The editorial invoiced the international community as demanding
that the United States sign the agreement "as speedily as possible"--
a formulation leaving open the possibility of further negotiations.
Peking's issuance of a government statement and accompanying
commentary parallels the pattern of its reaction to the PRG's
2 February "elaboration" of peace terms and to President Nixon's
8 May announcement of the mining of DRV ports. Similarly, in
meeting with the Vietnamese envoys Chou repeated a practice he
followed in February, April, and July. In contrast, Peking had
not issued a formal statement in response to the PRG's 11 September
statement on a settlement, and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien had
substituted for his chief in receiving the PRG statement from
the Vietnamese representatives.
Peking has thus chosen on the latest occasion to lend the full
weight of its authority to pressures on the United States to sign
the draft agreement and to go on record as a firm backer of Hanoi.
In addition to expressing support For "the solemn and dust
position" taken in the DRV statement, the PRC Government statement.
took the occasion to reaffirm Chat the Chinese will perform 'their
* Peking has also in standard fashion carried the texts of the
DRV statement and the supporting PRG 28 October statement, the
27 October communique of the DRV National Assembly demanding that
Washington sign ti:~ accord, and the 29 October NFLSV appeal for
support for the I',nV and PRG statements.
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internationalist duty" of continuing "all-out euport and
assistance" in the war effort in the absence of a settlement.
TERMS OF A Peking's discussion of the to nee of a peace
SETTLEMENT settlement has focused on Thieu's objections to
the draft accord. The 30 October Commentator
article. warning that Thieu's position as reflected in hie
24 October speech "threatens to torpedo completely a peace which
is about to be realized," contended tt-at Thieu. "fundamentally"
opposed the draft agreement rather than disagreeing on minor
points. The article did not address the terms of a sett:E~_t~~ent
as such, broaching them indirectly by citing '~nieu's ob~ectione
on various points, but it indicated Peking's view on one issue
of particu.Lar significance to the Chinese in denying that a
cease-fire in Laot~ and Cambodia could be included in the Vietnam
settlement. At a Peking banquet on 29 October, Prince Sihanouk
"categorically" declared that an eventual Vietnam settlement
should not apply to Cambodia. Chou avoided this issue in hie
speech at the banquet (see the section of the TRENDS discussing
Sihanouk's visit to the DRV and the Peking banquet.)
While taking the United Staten to task for delaying r.he signing
of the accord on the "pretext" of difficulties with Saigon,
Peking has not explained what may have been Washington's
motive. The Commentator article, insisting that ~vashington
bears responsibility for "correcting the truculent and unreasonable"
attitude of the Thieu government, was at pains to rebut "the utterly
ridiculous and untenable" claims ascribed to both Saigon and
Washington that there h~sd not been time to consult Thieu. In this
connection the article cited remarks by President Nixon and
Kissinger last February to the effect that Thieu has always been
fully consulted, and it made Peking's only reference to the
26 October Kissinger press conference in noting his remark that
the South Vietnamese we.e informed of the negotiations ae they
proceeded.
The 1 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, echoing the Commentator
article, said the United States faces "a crucial test" in deciding
whether to achieve a settlement now. Repeating Peking's insistent
contention that Thieu cannot block a settlement if the United
States really desires one, the editorial observed that it is "by
no means accidental" that Thieu has set "an extravagant price" for
a settlement. The editorial did not explain what issues may be
involved, and it resorted to an exceptionally opaque formulation in
appearing to suggest that Thieu's demands could scuttle realistic
prospects for an early settlement. Nonetheless, the editorial's
call for a settlement "as speedily as possible" suggests that the
Chinese countenance further negotiations as required to firm up the
agreement.
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1 NOVEMBER 1972
SIHANOUK VISITS DRV. AGAIN REJECTS SFAS F-FIRE UPON RETURN
Cambodian Prince Sihanouk arrived in Hanoi or 26 October, the date of
the DRV statement on the Vietnam negotiations, for a visit that gave
the two sides an opportunity for c^:~sultations at a crucial puncture
in the Indochina conflict. Though there was the usual show of
solidarity, the results of the visit and statements by the Cambodians
upon their return to Peking reflected the two aides' divergent
situations at a time when the Vietnamese are pressing ror a cease-fire
agreement and the Cambodians insist that they will not accept a
compromise.
Sihanouk's visit, from 26 to 28 October, marked the fourth time he
has made a publicized trip to Hanoi since being ousted from power in
Phnom Penh. (His last previous visit, from 12 February to 3 March,
had been billed as an unofficial visit for Tet and provided Sihanouk
a pretext for being absent from Peking during President Nixon's visit.)
According to the point communique on the recent "friendship visit,"
released on 28 October, Sihanouk met with DRV President Ton Duc Thang,
Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh.
Unlike his previous visit, he did n~~t see Le Duan, but he had also
failed to see LeDwn duing earlier visits in May-June 1970 and January-
February 1971.
The point communique said that the talks took place in an atmosphere
of "militant solidarity, fraternal friendship, and complete mutual
trust" and that the two sides reached "identity of views on all
problems discussed"--formulas virtually identical to those used on
all the earlier visits. However, the latest communique seems to
reflect the current developments looking toward a Vietnam cease-fire
and raising the question of how Cambodia would fit into a settlement.
The two sides condemned the United States for "perfidious maneuvers
on the political and diplomatic planes" and hailed their growing
"militant solidarity and fraternal friendship." As in their communique
last March, they cited the passage from the Indochinese summit
conference declaration asserting Chat the liberat:Con of each country
is its own affair and pledging "reciprocal support according to the
desire of the party concerned and on the basis of mutual respect."
The latest communique went on to stress the "sacred and inalienable
right" of each Indochinese country to arrange its own settlement,
affirming that the two aides "strictly respect and resolutely support"
their respective stands on a settlement in conformity with the
peculiarities and interests of each country and the general situation
in Indochina."
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The communique insisted that the United States sign the draf t
agreement disclosed in the 26 October DRV statement by 31 October,
and it reiterated that the Cambodian question must be settled on
the basis of Sihanouk's five-point declaration of 23 March 1970 and
the FUNK program. Af:~irming Chat Sihanouk is the "representative
of the legality, legitimacy, and continuity of the Cambodian stela"
and that his government ie "the only legal anal legitimate government
of the Cambodian people," the communique stressed that the Gambodiane
are determined to "struggle uncompromisingly and unflinchingly" to
overthrow the "traitors" Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Son Ngoc Thanh.
It also expressed stock support for the NLHS' 6 March 1970 plan for
a Laos settlement, but there was no mention of t!:e negotiations now
taking place in Vientiane.
PEKING BANQUET Sihanouk pressed his adamant line at a 29 October
Peking banquet upon hie return frilm Hanoi. The
banquet, celebrating Sihanouk's 50th birthday, was hosted by RGNU
Prime Minister Penn Nouth and was also addressed by Chou En-lei, who
led a high-ranking Chinese turnout for the occasion.
Sihanouk again rejected a cease-fire in Cambodia, obliquely criticizing
the Soviets in the process. There are "big countries" other than the
United States, he said, who rely on the Lon Nol regime and "engage in
dishonorable political and diplomatic maneuvers" to prevent Sihanouk's
forces from "winning final victory." These "hostile governments,"
Sihanouk went on, believe that the day the DRV and PRG sign a peace
agreement with the United States the Cambodian liberation forces "will
vanish into thin air." Making his anti-Soviet barbs still more pointed
in another passage, Sihanouk thanked the DRV, PRG, and other friends
in Africa, Latin America, and Europe for having recognized the RGNU
despite "imperialist pressure and menace." 'T'his illustrates, he said,
the proverb "It is only in misfortune that une comes to distinguish
the true friends from the false."*
Sihanouk argued that an eventual cease-fire in Vietnam, far from
bresking up the Cambodian liberation armed forces, would only further
develop thE~-a. He asserted that the Cambodian liberation forces are
bent on "finishing off, in a very brief period of time, the Lon Not
* Peking has given 5lhanouk some low-level propaganda support on the
issue of Soviet failure to support the RGNU. For example, a 20 October
NCNA commentary took the Soviets to teak for voting in favor of the
participation of the representative of the "Lon Nol clique" in the
current UNESCO conference.
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1 NovEMBER '972
traitors who will then be deprived of U.S. air cover and armed
protection by the Saigon troops." He concluded by declaring that
"an eventual Vietnam-U.S. peace agreement should never extend its
authority to Cambodia" ar.d that Cambodia "will never accept a
compromise with the United States' and "will never carry out an
international agreement resulting from negotiations in which it
did not participate."
Penn Nouth echoed Sihanouk's line in hi.s banquet speech when he
recalled that Sihanouk's government has defeated all the U.S.
"schemes and plots designed to split Che FUNK and to obtain
'negotiations' and 'compromise' between the FUNK and the traitors
in Phnom Penh, a 'partition of Cambodia,' a 'cease-fire in
Cambodia', etc."
Unlike previous occasions when the Chinese voiced support for
Sihanouk's refection of a cease-fire, Chou did not address himself
to this issue in his speech at the banquet. Curiously, in taking
note o# Sihanouk's latest visit to the DRV Chou said the Cambodian
aide ham expressed its "resolute response" to the 26 October DRV
statement, but he reiterated Peking's "firm support" for the position
taken in the statement. Chows usage may reflect an ambiguity in the
point communique on Sihanouk's visit to Hanoi as to whether the
Cambodians went clearly on record as endorsing the 26 October
statement. At any rate, Chou professed encouragement over what he
called "the constant strengthening and consolidation of the militant
solidarity and fraternal friendship" of the three Indochinese peoples.
Having hailed the "brilliant victories of strategic significance"
won in the past year by the Cambodians, Chou concluded by pledging
that the Chinese will give "all-out support and assistance to the
Cambodian people's dust cause."
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CONFIDENTIAL BBIS TENDS
1 NOVENSBA 1~i72
DRV ROUTINELY PROTESTS AIR STRIKES SOUTH OF ~0'TFI PARALLEL
Despite the curtailment of U.S. bombing of the North, Hanoi has
continued to issue daily routine statements of protest by the DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman. Statements since 25 October have
referred to attacks only below the 20tY parallel--in the provinces
of Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Q~.ang Binh and i_n Che Vinh
Linh zone--and have consistently porgyrayed continuing U.S. strikes
as evidence of the "deceitful" nature of claims by the Nixon
Administration that "the war is coming to an end" and that "peace
is at hand."
Reiterating Hanoi's long-standing charge of deliberate U.S. strikes
at nonmilitary targets, VNA. on the 28th alleged that attacks took
place that day on Thieu Hos, Nong Cong, and Quang Xuong districts in
Thanh Hoa province. It said the attacks involved antipersonnel
bombs and were timed to u^_cur when the villagers were asleep; it
further stressed the civilian n~:ture of the targets by claiming that
at least one of the hamlets hit was "far from any military target."
A "special communique" issued ~n the 27th by Che DRV War Crimes
Commission detailed U.S. strikES on the Vinh Linh zone between April
and 25 October, charging that they were directed at "a great many
urban sectors and populous centers and that they caused damage to
farms, schools, dams, hospitals, and private homes, as well as
incurring large numbers of civilian casualties. The communique then
denounced the United Stares for continuing these strikes in October,
"the month when the Nixon Administration has been ceaselessly
claiming that it 'would end the war' and that it is 'seriously
negotiating."'
Widespread success in overcoming U.S. attempts to wage s "war of
destruction in the North" was claimed in a TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
commentar;~ publicized by Hanoi radio on the 26th. Portraying a
"stable atd powerful" North, the commentary applauded the armed
forces and people for carrying out air defense tasks while serving
"the frontline at the same time." Efforts to create an effective
antiaircraft firenet, which was said to have "punished U.S. aircraft
throughout our airspace both day and night and whether the enemy
made large or small attacks," drew specific praise in the commentary.
And a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of 1 November said that air defense
forces. aware of "the U.S. imperialists' cunning maneuvers," have
pledged to heighten their vigil~ce in response to the DRV's
26 October statement. Now "more than ever," the editorial declared,
it is important to defeat the "U.S. aggressors," defend North
Vietnam's airspace, and "wholeheartedly fulfill the great rear's
duties toward the great frontline." As of 29 October, Hanoi claimed
to have downed a total of 4,023 planes over the North.
CONFIDENTIAL
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1 NOVEMBER l97?
? U, S, ELECTION
MOSCOW IN EFFECT CONCEDES VICTORY TO PRESIDENT N'~N
While continuing to avoid direct speculation on the outcome of the
U. S. presidential election, Moscow commentators are in effect pre-
paring the Soviet public for the probable reelection of President
Nixon. Limited in volume and directed almost entirely to domestic
audiences, Moscow's comment on the election now poinCs consistently
to the President's commanding lead in public opinion pone and to
Senator McGovern's failure t~, galvanize the "general discontent"
which Moscow says ex~ats among "the majority of American voters."
The recent improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations has invariab~y been
treated in the Soviet radio and prase commentaries as the main
reason for the awing in public support behind the Administrate-c:t.
Panelists in the weekly domestic radio r~i:ndtable discussion on
22 October typically portrayed the Administration's current
popularity in the polls as being almost wholly dependent on its
"coniacts, links, and steps directed at improving relations with
the socialist countries." Correspondingly, Moscow's harshest
comments on Senator McGovern have been triggered by his stated
opposition to an expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade unless the Soviet
Union revokes the recently enacted exit fees for would-be emigrants.
For this position McGovern has been roundly scolded in both LITERARY
GAZETTE and ZA RUBEZHOM. Most notably, writing in ZA RUBEZHOM No.
43, 20-26 October, M. Yevgenyev declared:
George McGovern's attempt to use Soviet rules on the depar-
ture of citizens abroad as a pretext for putting a brake on
Soviet-American relations--for putting a brake on a process
whose success is desired by the overwhelming ma3ority of the
U.S. people--might seem stupid, to put it mildly, even to
Americans not very experienced in politics.
Seeking to define other deficiencies in Senator McGovern's campaign,
Moscow has continued to note "inconsistencies" in his public posi-
tions and their adverse impact on the electorate. A 24 October
domestic radio commentary by New York correspondent Valentin Zorin,
for example, ascribed McGovern's inability to overcome the President's
overwhelming lead in the polls to a widespread belief that the Senator
had abandoned many of the electoral promises he made in Miami. "The
electors, young people primarily," Zorin explained, "are disillusioned
by McGover:~'s reservations on the question of ending .'he war in
Vietnam and his retreat from hie promises to subsidize the poor and
cut military expenditures."
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Drawing up a balance sheet in which the improvement in U.S.-Soviet
relations was "a clear plus" far the Administration. a 26 October
IZVESTIYA dispatch by Washington correspondent S. Kondraehov went on
to observe that Vietnam had been "a minus" for the Administration in
the eyes of the "average American" but that McGovern's stand on the
war had been "an even greater minus," since it was "a retreat from
chauvinistic concepts and conventional rhetoric about 'America's
honor' and 'loyalty to allies' (read Saigon puppetu)." Among other
mayor drawbackR, Kondrashov listed McGovern's failure to win
"undisputed leadership" and "general loyalty" within the Democratic
Party and to make inroads into the Wallace constituency.
In keeping with tradition, the Soviet commentaries have at the same
time dispAraged the election campaign as an exercise in political
manipulation offering no "realistic" or "radical" solution to pressing
domestic problems facing the nation. According to Kondrashov, McGovern
was making a last-ditch effort to overccme liabilities in hie campaign
by focusing on the theme of "corruption in Washington"--"the scan-
dalous facts of eavesdropping on the national committee of the
Democratic. Party and the shadowing and sabotage in the headquarters
of the Democratic leaders." But Kondrashov sarcastically dismissed
the possible effects of such a tactic, stating that "the scandals.
widely illuminated in the prase, have nct aroused the anger of the
voters who, it appears, consider them a common phenomenon both for
American politico and for American politicians."
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1 NOVEMBER 1972
YUGOSLAVIA
TITO CALLS FOR "SETTLING ACCOUNTS~~ WIT~I OPPONENTS IN LCY
As the purge of dissident elements in the Yugoslav party and state
structure gathered momentum, Tito summoned the LCY Presidium to
Brioni on the 30th for a one-day meeting which he opened with a
firm defense of the current housecleaning. In his introductory
speech, released so far only in a 1,500-word TANJUG summary, the
Yugoslav leader noted the "very great acclaim" which greeted his
early-Oc~ober disciplinary letter sent tc all LCY members and
organizations end declared that "we will not stop at the letter
but shall proceed to deeds" to implement it. He charged that in
the chief target of the purge, the League of Communists of Serbia,
"much had been said about the need for struggle against nationalism,
various antiself-management elements, various technocrats,
Rankovicites, and others, but there had been no action.''
While denying that "heads would roll" literally, Tito served notice
Chat he would not be satisfied with a "few" resignations and
called for ",aobilizing all forces" to prevent splinter-graup
activity in all the republics, "particularly in Serbia." He
concluded that "nothing more is being demanded than is being done
now"--the creation of "a strong and united League of Communists
of Yugoslavia" capable of "settling accounts with all opponents of
our self managing socialist society."
DEVELOPING PURGE On the day the Presidium session opened,
TANJUG reported the "resignations' of S1c?rene
Premier Starve Kavcic and Aleksandar b'enadovic, chief editor of the
authoritative Belgrade daily POLITIKA. The moat prominent of the
recent purge victims is Marko Nikezic, a former Yugoslav foreign
minister, whose resignation as chairman of the League of Communists
of Serbia was announced after a five-day delay in an LCS Central
Committee statement on the 26th. The statement said the purge of
Nikezic and his deputy, LCS Secretary Latinka Perovic, served to
"eliminate vagueness regarding the readiness of the Central
Committee to consistently determine responsibilities and duties" in
the spirit of Tito's early-October letter and tough speech to the
Serbian aktiv on the 16th. Nikola Petronic, successor to the
purged Perovic as LCS secretary, had the honor of leading off the
parade of speakers at the Presidiums session who accepted Tito's
criticisms and vowed to implement the directives of his letter.
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On the 31st, the day after the LCY Presidium session, the Zagreb
radio announced that in the Karlovac, Croatia party organization
"so far 17 communists have bean expelled, 13 taken off membership
lists, and 23 punished with party warnings." Self -criticism
by the Federation of Youth of Belgrade was reported on she 24th
by POLITIKA, which said the youth federation "fully ac~~epts the
views and criticism of Chairman Tito" and admitted that "youth
began to call us a 'paper leadership."'
TANJUG on l November reported without elaboration that Yugoslav
Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac had "asked to be relieved of his
present post" and thpc hie deputy, Jaksa Patric, had been
appointed Acting Foreign Minister. Tepavac had held his post
since April 1969.
SOVIET COVERAGE Moscow has refrain:3d from any comment but
has reported the 30 October Brioni session
of the LCY Presidium and noted that it was concerned with
"implementation of the directives of the letter of the chairman
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia" to party organizations
and members. PR4VDA reported without elaboration on the 27th
that the Serbian LCY Central Committee had "accepted the
resignations" of Nikezic and Perovic from the posts of LCY
chairman and secretary, respectively, and TASS the next day
noted equally briefly the resignations of S. Milosavlevski from
the Macedonian party eecretar~at and of B. Pavlovic as Belgrade
city committee secretary.
On the 31st TASS publicized some of the contznt of iro's speech,
including the Yugoslav leader's remarks that his letter had
received a good response in the party and that the purge was
needed because "speeches" had not been followed up with "action."
TASS typically obfuscated a refere~sce to the heterodox
r3elf-management system in Yugoelavi.a: Where Tito spoke of his
tirest for a united LCY able to settle accounts with opponents of
the self-management system, T~,SS represented him as pursuing the
internationally oriented goal of a united LCY able to "defeat all
enemies of the socialist community."
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USSft I ~J'f ERIJAL AFFAIRS
AGRICULTURE AFFiCIAI. REBUTS WRiTER~S ATTACK ON VIRGIN LANDS
In tha 4 Uctobor LI'CERARY GAZETTE; Deputy Minister of Agriculture
Petr Morc.~zov defended the policy of intensification of agriculture,
and especially the cult:Lvntion of the virgin lands, against criti-
cisms made :Ln Vladimir Soloukhin's new book "Grass." Excerpts from
the book, published the same issue of LITERARY GAZETTE, featured
So].~ukh:ln'e claims that preservation of meadows and pasture land ?ln
their "natural" state would produce enough fodclcr to "bury Europe" and
that convers:lon of the virgin lands from grazing to grain production had
hindered the growth of livestock herds and disrupted agricultural
progress. Soloukhin, whose nee-slavophi.le writings in the mid-1960'e
were instrumental in the resurgence of interest in p.,~ssian history and
traditions, based hie opposition to rec:Pnt agricultural policies on
the belief that they violated nature and the traditional system of
farming.
The airing of Soloukhin's unorthodox views at this time is parti~;,ularly
noteworthy in view of the Soviet Government's massive purchases of
grain from abroad this year to save its livestock program and in
view of the good harvest in the virgin lands this yeaz~ that helped
offset some of the crop losses elsewhere in the USSR. His views were
presumably considered easie~~: to refute than other criticisms of
official policy because of his la~:k of scientiftc credenriAic and the
recent performance of the virgin lands.
Soloukhin argues that the historically-developed mixture of grasses on
natural meadows and pastures provides better and more varied feed
for livestock than the so-called "cultured" or improved pasturage
and on these grounds criticized the official program of plowing up
meadows and resowing them with selected grasses. He stressed the
absurdity of converting 20 million hectares of Kazakh and Altay
grasslands to grain while the fodder shortage was forcing the con-
version of millions of hectares of traditional RSFSR grain land to
fodder production. Waxing lyrical over the charm of the old Kazakh
grasslands, Soloukhin claimed that the virgin lands in their "natural"
state could today be supporting 20 million or even 200 million sheep.
In addition to contributing to inefficient land usage, the cultiva-
tion of the virgin lands had, in his view, caused a "violation of the
biological balance on a grandiose section of the planet."
CONFIDENTIAL
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1 NO'VEMEEE x.972
Despite the lieretiaal nature of Soloukhin's viewer they were not harshly
condemned; Ghe excerpts and Morozov'e refutation were presented simply
ae a dialog in which LZTERAItY (iAxE~~E's editors di,d not Cake sides.
While conceding that natural fodder land ie being poorly managed,
Morozov declared that Soloukhin's solution contradicts Soviet as well
ag advanced world practice. Characterizing Soloukhin's views as
backward, he assailed the writer for advocating that livestock
production by based on "wild greases" and even weeds and for attri-
buting "fantastic productivity" to natural pastures. He rejected
Soloukhin'e notion that replacement of virtually useless plants with
~taeful plants harms the environment. Defending virgin land policy
at length, he argued that it has greatly increased the production
of livestock as well ae grain.
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CUNFIDENTAL IrBIS '1'RI~NI)S
:I. NUVCMIlER 1972
CUBA-BOLIVIA
WAVANA AIRS VIEWS OF GUEVARIST GUERRILLA GROUP IN BOLIVIA
1 19 October PRENSA LATINA summary of an interview with the "high
conunan~'"' of the Bolivian National Liberation Army (EiiJ) , the
guerrilla organization founded by Clte Guevara, marked a departure
from I~lavana media's general reticence over the past year on the ELN
and Che Bolivian Auci-Imperi,nlist Revolutionary Front (FRA), the
leftist antiregime grouping with which it is affiliated. The
interview was notable for an assertion of the continued relevance
of Guevara's doctrines of guerrilla warfare, and the summary
disseminated by PRENSA LATIiJA was notable for a strengthening of
this assertion 84 originally transmitted to Havana from the PRENSA
LATIIVA office in Santiago, Chile.
Havana's reluctance to associate itself publicly with the ELN has
seemed dictated, at a time when expansion of ties with Lat9.n
American regimes is a mayor aim of Cuban foreign policy, by a
desire not to furnish ammunition to those in the hemisphere who
maintain that relations with Cast~.o cannot be resumed because of
his continued "export of revolution." Sensitivity un this score
was reflected in the media's handling of the ELN interview,
transmitted to Havana from PRENSA LATINA's Santiago office on
14 October under a La Paz dateline with a notation by the
interviewer, Alberto Urquieta, that it had taken place "somewhere
in Bolivia." In summarizing the ELN leaders' remarks five days
later on its external circuits, PRENSA LATINA gave the report a
Buenos Aires dateline and excised the mention of the locale of
the interview. No reporC of the inter~-iew was carried in
monitored Havana broadcasts or telecasts.
PRr,NSA LATINA's swntnary, however, while in most respects a faithful
summary of Urquieta's original report transmitted to lIavana on the
14th, doctored a reference to the validity of Guevara's teachings
to make it less defensive. The original version read:
The fundamental and strategic lines established by Che remain
fully operative and unchanged. But the roads leading to
revolution demand a correct interpretation of the political
moment and its tactical application to attain the objectives.
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CONFIDL'1VTIAL FBZS TRENDS
1 NOVEMBER 1972
PRLNSA LA'PINA'e summary somewhat strengthened the first sentence
and changed the second one in such a way that it no longer read
as a qualifier:
Che Guevara'e basic directives and strategy continue
unchanged because they are indisputably up to date. The
path to a revolution is a correct interpretation, ~f Che's
thinking and Che putting into practice of hie thinking.
In the version transmitted to Havana on the 14th, Che ELN leaders'
mention of Guevara was responsive to a question on whether the
ELN's charter membership in the FRA constituted a "change" in the
organization's 11ne. Replying in the negative and affirming the
continuing relevance of Che's dogma, the ELN spokesmen defended the
group's affiliation with the FRA: "We believe the FRA corresponds
to the true needs of the hour. But this dose not constitute our
only task, and the frontist policy forme only a part of our present
tasks." Later they asserted that the ELN still believed in the
primacy of armed struggle as a "superior stage" in C.he revolutionary
process. The reporter's question about a change in the ELN's line
was not included in PRENSA LATINA's summary, but the summary did
note that the ELN was one of the first to propose creation of the
FRA and it quoted the ELN spokesmen as asserting that joining the
front did not mean abandonment of armed struggle. "which is the
superior phase in the path to victory."
The question of the ELN's ties to the FRA is a touchy one for
Havana as well as for the ELN. One of the FRA components is the
pro-Moscow Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), w-~ich Castro in the
1960's had accused of betraying the ELN and had made the scapegoat
for the fiasco suffered by Guevara's guerrilla band in Bolivia. As
late as June 1971, Cuban media still conveyed signs of hostility
to the PCB, even as Castro was moving to mend hie relations with
a number of~other Moscow-leaning Latin American parties.* Havana
has given the FRA little publicity. The last statement by the
front to be given appreciable Cuban coverage was a document issued
in March 1972, summarized by Havana radio and published in full
* For background on Cuban attitudes toward the PCB as reflected in
Havana's treatment of the party's third national congress in June
1971, see the TRENDS Supplementary Article of 14 July 1971,
'Grievances Against Bolivian CP Resurface in Cuban Reports,"
Pages S1-6.
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C.ONFIDIaN'1'IAL L-BZS TRCNI)S
1 NOVEMBER 1972
several months later in the Havana-based magazine TRICONTINENTAL.
Cautious on the eub~ect of armed struggle, the statement appeared
to imply that it must await a later stage in the revolutionary
process:
It is evident that the FRA aims to conquer power in Bolivia,
but not in a haphazard way. Power must be taken by the
vanguard of the ~a~rking class as a result of an extensive
mass mobilization We assert that power must be
taken by the working class through its own methods and with
Che participation of the masses, culminating in popular
Insurrection, which ie the violent action by which legitimate
revolutionary power can replace the +~~wer of the bourgeoisie.
This was afar cry from Guevara's notion of an elite rural guerrilla
nucleus as the force vital to the revolution. Amore recent FRA
declaration reported to PRLNSA LATINA's home office by its Santiago
correspondent on 23 June, allegedly circulated in Bolivia in May,
was even less militant. No mention was made of insurrection;
Bolivians were simply admonished to "strengthen unity, preserve
popular organizations demand their rights, and strengthen the
FRA." They were also urged to improve their capabilities "by
struggling" to improve training "for the battles which are drawing
nearer."
In the recent interview, both as transmitted originally to Havana
and as summarized by PRENSA LATINA, the ELN guerrilla leaders
expressed the view Chat Bolivia "is the weakest link of the
imperialistic chain in Latin America" and therefore is the main
center for revolutionary influence in Latin America, looking
toward a prolonged struggle of continent-wide scope. While this is
consistent with Guevarist dogma, there was no mention of Che's
notion of a rural guerrilla nucleus as the vanguard of the
revolution. In fact, the locale for future armed struggle was
pointedly left undefined in the interview. ELN chieftain Osvaldo
"Chato" Peredo, however, in an interview appearing in the Chilean
Castroite publication PUi~TO FINAL on ?1 December 1971, had
inriicated that "urban and/or rural guerrilla warfare" would be
the "basic" method of struggle used.
Included in Urquieta's original report to Havana, but largely edited
out of the version disseminated by PRENSA LATINA, was a preface to
the interview which described the history and current status of
the ELN. Urquieta said his report of the interview could not
incorporate "a number of details regarding the present activity of
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
l NOVEMBER 1972
the ELN" because of ongoing regime efforts to repress the
organization. Praising the ELN as "one of the decisive tools
for changing the political situation," he observed that it had
attracted young revolutionaries to its ranks who are bent on
"reinitiating the struggle begun by Guevara in southeast Bolivia."
He described the ELN as "a clandestine organization par
excellence" which had proved its mettle in the attempt to abort
the August 1971 coup that deposed General Juan Jose Torres,
although he added that since then the ELN and the rest of the
Bolivian left had failed to "reach the level demanded by the
times to victoriously lead the Bolivia. masses."
GUEVARA ANNIVERSARY In marking the fifth anniversary of
Guevara's death in Bolivia on 8 October,
Havana gave less emphasis to "the Heroic Guerrilla's" final
campaign than it did last year. While Cuban Politburo member
Ramiro Valdes, in his speech marking the occasion, eulogized Che
as the embodiment of "Latin Americanism and internationalism,"
little was said about his abortive Bolivian venture. Valdes
did expatiate on Guevara's concept of a Latin American revolutionary
struggle based on "internationalist cooperation and unity" among
revolutionaries, but he did not allude to Guevara's belief in
rural guerrilla struggle as the most viable method available to
revolutionaries.
Touching on the debacle in Bolivia, Valdes was defensive in saying
that the "imperialists" were holding it up as evidence of "the
inevitability of '.he ' guerrillas' t t'.itary fiasco "' to an effort
to discourage Latin American revolu~.ionaries. Guevara's detractors,
he said, thus viewed Che's last campaign "from a purely military
point of view, leaving out political objectives and ideological
projection." Valdes concluded that despite such "imperialist"
efforts, Guevara would become more and more the symbol and the
exaw?le to be followed by all those who fight against imperialism
and oppression."
MOSCOW AND PRAGUE While Havana, in eulogizing Guevara, did not
ON CHE GUEVARA allude to his ideological differences with
the orthodox communists over the revolutionary
role of guerrilla warfare, Soviet and Czechoslovak commentaries on
Guevara'e death anniversary were less discreet. Moscow's Radio
Peace and Progress, in a 9 October commentary beamed to a wide
assortment of foreign audiences, inveighed against "treacherous
authors" who variously depict Che as a lone superhero, an
anarchist, a Trotskyite, a follower of ,Mao Tae-tung." But its
defense of Guevara was qualified. It labeled him "a revolutionary
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONB'ZDENTZAL FBIS '!'RENDS
1 NOVEMBER 1972
romantic," part of a group that merits sympathy "even when we
disagree with Chem."
An article in the Bratislava PRAVDA on 'October was more explicit.
Stating that Guevara's name had "become a myth which has been
misused" it observed:
He presevered in hie error, maintaining that small partisan
actions can replace a systematic long-farm work in the
organization and education of the masses, without which there
is no real and lasting revolutionary change. The vestiges
of the Bolivian partisan unit became the victim of a bad
assessment of the situation and of betrayal .
The Czechoslovak article wound up on a note of faint praise for
Guavara's "courage" and "sincerity" despite his "errors."
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D I SARi~1Af~EfVT
MOSCOW, PEKING CLASH AT UN ON DISARMAMENT r.At~ERENCE
A:. anticipated in their respective mayor addresses to the current
UNGA session, Moscow and Peking have collided in the debate on
disarmament that opened in the Political Committee on 23 October.
While Moscow has sought to capitalize on the atmosphere of detente
fostered by Soviet-U.S. agreements on nuclear arms control, Peking
has warned the world against being lulled by a deceptive relaxation
that leaves the superpowers unfettered in putting military pressure
on J.esser powers. In effect, the Chinese have been constrained to
qu?~lify their professed interest in detente in order to justify their
own arms program in the face of the Sino~-Soviet confrontation.
The Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference has brought
into focus the divergent approaches being taken by Moscow and Peking
before the international community. Soviet representative Malik
promoted the proposal at the opening day's meeting of the Political
Committee, drawing from NCNA the complaint that the Soviets have "again
peddled" a~.draft resolution that had been shelved at last year's
UNGA session. NCNA derided Malik for "openly opposing the reasonable
demand fax:? ~Me dismantling of military bases in foreign countries" on
the pretext of opposing prior conditions, a stand the*_ "once again
reveals Soviet revisionist social imperialism's true features of sham
disarmament and real arms expansion."
In his speech before the Political Committee, Chinese representative
Chen Chu maintained that necessary conditions for a WDC do not exist
and asserted flatly that "there can be no talk even about the prepara-
tory work for the conf.erence." Chen reiterated the "necessary condi-
tions" that the PRC hats said must be fulfilled before a WDC can be
convened: All nuclear countriee- must pledge not to be the first to use
nuclear weapons and Wust withdraw all armed forces and dismantle all
military bases on foreign soil.* Chen argued that until these condi-
tions are fulfilled a canf eren~e would be held under circumstances in
which the overwhelming ma~ori'cy of countries would be obliged to
* These conditions were posited in the 3 October address to the
UNGA by PRC delegation chairman Chiao Kuan-hua. See the TRENDS of
12 October 1972, pages 10-12.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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"accep" 'terms of surrender' under nuclear threat." Defensively,
Chen acknowledged a legit mate desire for peace among' many coun-
tries, but he insisted that concrete planning for a conference at
this time would "only give rise to fond 111ueione~' that would be
"moat harmful." H~ Declared that Peking declines to be a party to
an effort by "curtain ~;eople" to exploit the interest in disarmament
to serve their "deceptive trick of sham disarmament and real arms
expansion."
Anticipating Chinese opposition to the Soviet proposals Malik had
attempted to capitalize on the WDC issue in the Sino-Soviet rivalry
for Third World inf lusnce. The brief 24 October TA83 dispatch
reporting Malik'e speech emphasized his assertion that those who
want to prevent the holding of the conference are actually seeking
to deprive many small and medium states of a possibility to express
at a special forum their opinion on such an important problem."
TABS reports and Radio Moscow commentaries on Chan's speech have
also focused on Peking's "isolated" position by noting that 93
countries have expressed support for the Soviet proposal and that
Chen was the only speaker to express opposition, a move proving
that China "always comes out against any constructive steps in
disarmament, especially if the initiative comes from the Soviet
Union."
The treatment by both Moscow and Peking of the U.S. position
concerning a WDC has been peripheral to their exchange of
accusations. NCNA noted tersely that U.S. delegate George Bush
opposed the convocation of a WDC at this time because it would
not "be conducive to reaching concrete agreements on arms control."
Moscow's approach has not been u~~iform. A 28 October PRAVDA
article by Sergey Vishnevskiy f~l!oaed the usual practice of
stt.~ssing the similarity of the u.~. and PRC positions, but Radio
Moscow commentator Zholkver on 24 October played down U.S.
opposition by observing that the United States "no longer risks
a complete and total red action" of a WDC and "in principle"
even "accepts its usefulness."
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