TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: September 13, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

# "'" T E D ' I t4 P14,1 N 1 , T H-N 1 Lti
? ???? ? ' ? . .? . - ? .
? . ?
p.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875ROOCCOnfittentlal
F B S
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSP EC
Confidential
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 37)
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
A
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried if, foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FRIS without coordination with other U.S. Covermr Int
compononts.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
roved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
PRG Statement Presses U.S. Withdrawal, Provisional Government
Chinese Promptly Express "Firm Support" for PRG Stand
Le Duc Tho Sees Chinese, Soviet Leaders on Way to Paris
.
1
7
9
Paris: Vietnamization Again Target at 7 September Session . .
.
11
Dill/ Routinely Protests U.S, Strikes, Praises Plane Downings .
. .
13
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Denies Link Between Munich Events, Israeli Raids
18
PRC Deplores "Incident in Munich," Scores Israeli Attacks . .
. .
22
DRV Blames Bloodshed on "Aggressors," Sees U.S. Hand in Raids
. .
24
Bulgaria, Albania: Munich Act Did Not Help Palestinians . . .
.
25
SALT AND DISARMAMENT
Moscow Questions U.S. Support for "Equal Security" Principle .
.
27
Polish Army Paper Comments on "Difficult" SALT Agenda
29
CZECHOSLOVAKIA-FRG
CSSR Official Signals Possible Concession on Munich Pact Issue
.
31
YUGOSLAVIA
Tito Pledges Continuing Purge, *!)eplores "Hue and Cry" Abroad .
.
35
KOREA-USSR-CHINA
Katushev Visit, National Day Observances Reflect Relations . .
.
38
CHINA
Vigilance Demanded Despite Currpat Period of "Order"
42
Further Tempering of Higher Educational Reforms Revealed . ? ?
?
43
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/0ittogleirfiglifiggfraa90039995,412R-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 4 - 10 SEPTEMBER 1972
Moscow (2979 items)
Peking l434 Items)
Vietnam
(17%)
9%
Domestic Issues
(32%) 34,
[Solidarity Month,
International
(4%)
3%]
Asian Table Tennis
Tournament, Congress
(14%) 18,
Protest Day
Vietnam
(15%) 1],
[DRV National Day
(8%)
1%]
[DRV National Day
(13%) !
China
(9%)
8%
DPRK National Day
(--) 9;
[Aleksandrov PRAVDA
(--)
4%]
Soviet, Egyptian Press
(--) 5;
Article
Recriminations
DPRK National Day
(0.1%)
7%
Bulgarian National Day
(--)
5%
Middle East
(3%)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "com:pentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during tne preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of thP Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in ther cases the propaganda coritent may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
INDOCHINA
The 11 September PRG statement on a Vietnam settlement comes in the
wake of authoritative Hanoi comment on the issue and coincides with
the return to Paris of Le Duc Tho, the DRV's senior adviser to the
four-power talks. The statement shows particular concern to appear
forthcoming on the issue of a political settlet?Int in South Vietnam,
stressing that the proposed provisional government of national
concord would be composed of three segments "of equal strength and
on an equal footing." After months-long denials by Hanoi and the
Front that they would attempt to impose a communist government on
South Vietnam, the PRG statement now goes beyond those denials to
say that should the United States seriously negotiate, "the PRG is
prepared to reach agreement to the effect that neither a communist
regime nor a U.S. stooge re2ime shall be imposed on South Vietnam."
The statement does not repeat the specific political demands in the
February 1972 PRG statement, such as the call for President Thieu's
resignation, although it does reaffirm that one component of the
provisional government would be "the Saigon administration without
Thieu." On the other hand, the statement reiterates the detailed
stipulations in the February document on U.S. withdrawal and adds a
new demand that "technical personnel" as well as troops, advisers,
and military personnel be withdrawn from South Vietnam.
The PRG's 11 September statement was promptly carried in full by
Peking, and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien expressed Peking's "firm
support" for the PRG's stand when he received a copy of the
statement during a meeting with the PRG ambassador on the 13th.
Blaming the U.S. military actions for "the failure so far" to achieve
a settlement, Li reaffirmed Peking's pledge to support the war effort
as "a fixed policy." Further alining Peking with the Vietnamese
communists' demands, Li introduced a call for the United States to
end support for the Saigon regime that has been absent from Chinese
statements recently.
Moscow's TASS has carried only a brief account of the PRG statement.
A routine followup radio commentary called it "a reasonable stand"
and repeated Soviet promises that aid to the Vietnamese will continue
"until they win their just cause."
PRG STATEMENT PRESSES U.S, WITHDRAWAL, PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Following extensive Hanoi discussion of the political settlement
issue--in the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article and in DRV
Premier Pham Van Dong's speech marking DRV National Day on
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08EF:Ir9Eltr-IIFP85T0087F5BINORtUDOS050037-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1.972
2
2 September--the statement from the PRG seems calculated to
point up its role in the negotiations. The return to the Paris
talks of Le Duc Tho may have heightened the concern to cast
the PRG in a leading role. Such concern had seemed evident
last winter following the President's disclosure in his
25 January speech that the United States had been negotiating
privately with the DRV on the basis of the latter's nine-point
proposal and his release of the U.S. eight-point proposal
which, he revealed, had been presented to the DRV last fall.
Hanoi departed from its usual practice of immediately reacting
authoritatively to a major U.S. pronouncement, while the PRG on
2 February issued its official statement containing the two-point
elaboration of its seven-point proposal of 1 July 1971.*
The current PRG statement was first monitored from a Liberation
Radio broadcast at 2200 GMT on 10 September; it was repeated by
Hanoi radio and appeared in VNA's English-language transmission
at 0700 GMT on the lith, which characterized it as an "important"
statement. The VNA review of the Hanoi press for the 12th said
that the papers "prominently frontpaged" the PRG statement
along with "news of victories" of the South Vietnam liberation
fcrces. Hanoi as yet has issued no followup comment, but an
LPA commentary on the 11th paraphrased much of the statement
and observed that the proposal for a three-component provisional
government proves the PRG's good will.
U.S. WITHDRAWAL VNA prefaced its transmission of the full
text of the statement by quoting verbatim
the two points--on ending a U.S. role and on a settlement in
South Vietnam--described by the PRG as "the two requirements" the
United States must meet. The first point essentially repeats
point one of the PRG's February elaboration, but with an additional
demand: To the call for a rapid and complete withdrawal of U.S.
and allied "troops, advisers, and military personnel," it now
adds "technical personnel." The statement goes or, using the
language of the February statement, to demand the withdrawal of
weapons and war materials and the liquidation of U.S. military
bases in South Vietnam." It also echoes the February statement in
calling for an end to U.S. military action in both North and South
Vietnam.**
See the TRENDS of 2 February 1972, pages 1-6.
** By way of taking note of current U.S. actions, the statement
specifies that the United States must "end. the bombing, mining, and
blockade of the DRV" as well as end "all U.S. military activites in
South Vietnam."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
3
Along with the new demand for the withdrawal of technical pernonnel,
point one now includes other elements which have usually been
brought up in the political rather than nilitary contexts in
formal proposals. Thus, point one prefaces its call for an end to
U.S. military action with the assertion that the United States
"must respect the Vietnamese people's right to true independence
and the South Vietnamese people's right to effective self-
determination." In the February elaboration, the phrase on
self-determination was the first demand under point two on a
political settlement. The current statement, after the call for
a liquidation of military bases, injects another element that has
normally been linked to political demands: Saying that the United
States "must end all military involvement in Vietnam," it adds
that Washington must "stop supporting the Nguyen Van Thieu stooge
administration." The call for an ed to U.S. support of the
Saigon regime was expressed in a political rather than a military
context in both the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article and
Pham Van Dong's National Day speech.* The interjection in the
military context of the demand for an end to U.S. support of the
Saigon regime, taken together with the new call for withdrawal of
U.S. technical personnel, thus appears to harden the communist
position as compared with the February statement.
Along with these additions, the statement deletes one element that
appeared in point one of the February elaboration, although it had
been repeated in the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article's
recapitulation of the February statement: The current statement
does not repeat the demand that the United States set a timetable
for withdrawal and the assertion that this date would also apply
to the release of prisoners. Moreover, it indicates that
prisoners would be released only after an overall settlement: It
says that if the United States ends the war, withdraws all U.S.
troops, ends all military involvement in Vietnam and its support
of the Saigon "puppets," and lets the South Vietnamese form a
three-component government of i-tional concord, "this will bring
about an early release of all captured U.S. servicemen and an early
restoration of peace in Vietnam." In another passage, the statement
ridicules the President's withdrawal of U.S. ground combat troops
standard fashion, saying it is meaningless given the escalation
of air and naval action.
* The NHAN DAN Commentator article and some aspects of Pham Van
Dong's speech are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 September 1972,
pages 3-8.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-4
PROVISIONAL The PRG statement does not repeat the detailed
GOVERNMENT stipulations of the Februnry elaboration regarding
a political settlement in South Vietnam. Instead
it begins point two by saying: "A solution to the internal
problem of South Vietnam must proceed from the actual situation
that there exist in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies,
and other political forces. It is necessary to achieve national
concord, and all sides in South Vietnam must unite on the basis
of equality, mutual respect, and mutual non-elmination* in order
to insure freedom and democracy for the people." It then adds
merely that "it is necessary to form a provisional government of
national concord ,yith three equal segments to take charge of
the affairs in the transitional period and to organize truly free
and democratic general elactions."**
An earlier passage in the statement ictroduces some details
regarding a provisional governnent, hrwever. It observes that the
three components of a provisiolal government of national concord
would be "of equal strength and on an equal footing.' It goes
on to say that "the PRG and the Saigon administration without
Nguyen Van Thieu will appoint each of its people to participate in
the government. The appointment of people belonging to the third
component will be made through consultations."
The assertion that the components would be equal and on:the name.
level as .far as position is concerned has appeared in recent
propaganda, including Pham Van Dong's National Day speech. Dong
* The Vietnamese phrase which VNA translates as "elimination" 5a
"thoon tinhs." Hanoi's dictionary defines this term to mean the
procese by which a stronger country invades and takes over a
weaker one, and it suggescs "annex" as a translation in the
illustrative sentence "Hitler annexed Austria."
** Point twr of the February elaboration specified that "hieu
must resign immediately, the Saigon administration must end its
warlike policy, disband at once its machine of oppression and
constraint, stop its pacification policy, disband the concentration
camps, set free political prisoners and guarantee democratic
liberties as provided for by the 1954 Geneva agreements. .Then the
PRG will immediately discuss with the Saigon administration the
formation of a three-component national concord government in order
to organize general elections, elect a constituent assembly, work
out a constitution, and set up an official government."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
5
did not ment1.4 the matter of selection of participants in the
government, but this issue, along with references to "equality"
in a provisional government, has been broached by the PRG
delegate at the Paris talks since they resumed on 13 July after
a two-month hiatus. For example, Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen
Thi Binh said at the 20 July session that the provisional
government "would be set up on the principle of equality and
without constraint of each against the other." She went on to
discuss the matter of selection at the 10 August session. In
arguing against allied charges that the provisional government
of national concord would be an "imposed" government or a
communist regime which would not come to power through a
democratic process, she said that the provisional government
would not be appointed by the PRG but would be "set up through
negotiations on the basis of equality and mutual respect among
the various political forces." And at the 17 August session,
she said the provisional government would include not only the
component representing the PRG and one representing those who
stand for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy, but
also "the component of the Saigon administration, without Thieu,
chosen by itself."*
The PRG statement repeats what has become routine deprecation--at
the Paris talks as well as in other propaganda--of U.S. contentions
that Hanoi and the Front want to impose a communist regime on
the South. It says:
The broad segments of public opinion support the
seven points of the PRG, the two key questions
of which have been elaborated. They regard them
as a fair solution guaranteeing lasting peace in
Vietnam and making it possible for the United
States to get out of the Vietnam war in honor.
President Nixon's claims that the U.S. negotiating
terms are "very generous" and that the negotiating
position of the PRG is tantamount to "imposing a
communist regime" on South Vietnam are nothing
but shameless tricks to fool public opinion . . . .
It is after this passage that the statement goes on to express
readiness to "reach agreements" that neither a communist regime nor
a U.S. "stooge regime" shall be imposed on South Vietnam.
* Only Mme Binh's remarks on 10 August were included in VNA's
accounts of the Paris sessions.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
\.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FELS TRENDS
13 r2TEMBER 1972
6
ATTACKS ON U.S. POLICY, The PRG statement assails President
APPEALS FOR SUPPORT Nixon's Vietnamization policy in
standard fashion and at thP same
time claims that it is "irretrievably heading fcr its collapse."
The statement does not acknowledge any of the substance of the
President's proposals when it says that it appears from his
25 January 1972 eight-point proposal and his 8 May statement
"that the United States obdurately demands from the South Vietnamese
people a ransom for its aggression and acceptance of the Saigon
stooge administration--which is tantamount to demanding the
elimination of the PRG and the PLAY in an attempt to impose U.S.
neocolonialism on South Vietnam." It adds that a correct political
solution must proceed from present reality: "This reality is the
existence of the people's power and armed forces which are developing
in a victorious fight . . . ." Pham Van Dong in his DRV Natio:Nal Day
speech had referred to the President's proposals without citing any
of their substance, but the NHAN DAN Commentator article of
31 August recalled that the President's 8 May statement called for a
cease-fire and release of U.S. prisoners and pledged a complete
U.S. withdrawal within four months. Commentator had also noted that
the U.S. eight-point proposal calls for a general election with
NFLSV participation six months after a cease-fire to choose a
presideut for South Vietnam.
The PRG statement concludes by expressing the belief that "the
world's peoples" will not allow the United States to continue the
war, to carry out the Nixon Doctrine in Vietnam and then extend it
to the whole world. It claims to see increasing support for the
Vietnameae struggle, but in expressing gratitude it fails to
mention the socialist countries. Thus, the statement expresses
"sincere and deep gratitude to the governments and peoples of
peace- and justice-loving countries, the American people, international
organizations, and the forces of peace and progress," and it calls on
"all brothers and friends to urge the Nixon Administration to end
its war of aggression in Vietnam as well as in Laos and Cambodia."
A comparable concluding paragraph in the February statement hid
specifically included the "socialist" countries in such a listing
and had gone on to appeal for "increased support and assistance,"
The Fel,ruary statement had not mentioned aggression In Laos and
Cambodia in this context, although it referred elsewhere to
aggression in the whole of Indochina.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL
- 7 -
FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
CHINESE PROMPTLY EXPRESS "FIRM SUPPORT" FOR PRG STAND
Peking moved promptly to associate itself with the PRG's
11 September statement, carrying the full text on the day
it was issued and voicing "firm support" for the PRG's stand
two days later. During a meeting with the PRG ambassador
and the DRV charge d'affaires on the 13th at which he
received a copy of the PRG statement, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
reaffirmed continuing Chinese assistance in the war effort
while assailing U.S. military measures in Vietnam as "the root
cause" for the absence of a settlement "so far." On the terms
of a settlement Li went an additional step in alining Peking
with the Vietnamese communists' position by calling for the
United States to end its support for the Saigon regime.
In receiving the Vietnamese representatives Li took the role
previously played this year by Premier Chou En-lai.* If the
Chinese follow their practice at the time of the PRG's 2 February
"elaboration" of its peace terms, they will follow up this
meeting with a government statement and a PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial, both of which appeared two days after the 2 February
statement.
According to NCNA's account, Li had "a very cordial and fliendly
conversation" with the Vietnamese envoys when he received the
PRG statement and expressed "firm support" for it in the name of
the PRC Government. Li's demands that the United States
withdraw its troops and "make earnest efforts" in response to
the PRG's seven-point plan had been pressed by Peking in marking
the 2 September DRV anniversary, but his call for the United
States to stop supporting "the puppet Saigon regime" raised a
key political issue that has been absent from recent Chinese
pronouncements. This may represent a move by Peking to close
ranks with its allies after the appearance of a major new
statement on a settlement, particularly one issued in the name
of the PRG and thus making the issue of support for the Saigon
* On 15 July Chou met the DRV ambassador and was handed a copy
of the 14 July DRV appeal; on 16 April he saw the PRG charge
d'affaires to receive a copy of the 15 April PRG appeal; on
12 April he met the DRV ambassador and was handed the 11 April
DRV appeal; and on 2 February he met both the DRV and PRG
representatives and heard their denunciation of President Nixon's
25 January peace plan. The 2 February PRG "elaboration" had not
yet been released on the latter occasion.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 197/
- 8 -
regime even more germane, It may also reflect a calculation by
Peking--which, unlike the Vietnamese communists, has not been
mentioning Thieu's role--that an accommodation could be reached
on the issue of the U.S. relationship with Saigon.
In line with Peking's effort at the time of the DRV anniversary
to reassure the Vietnames of its unflagging backing, Li stressed
that lc is "a fixed policy" and "a bounden internationalist duty"
of the Chinese to "support and assist" the armies and peoples of
North and South Vietnam in their war effort. He declared that the
Chinese "will make every effort" to support the Vietnamese and
other Indochinese peoples until their "complete victory" over the
United States. He alto took the occasion to laud tha "brilliant
victories" recently won in both North and South Vietnam.
As in Chinese comment marking the DRV anniversary, Li assailed
the U.S. military actions while avoiding any attack on the Nixon
Administration by name. He criticized the "U.S. Government" for
having "obdurately clung" to the Vietnamization policy, continued
its "mining and blockade" of the DRV, and "stepped up" its naval
and air attacks, "thus indicating that it still refuses to give
up its aggressive stand." He said that it was this which "is
precisely the root cause for the failure so far to achieve a
settlement."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
coNFIDENna
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T008750
- 9 -
sit
1 0 4
Pt. 0
0 '
LE DUC THO SEES CHINESE. SOVIET LEADERS ON WAY TO PARIS
o??1,..$)
Le Duc Tho's fourth trip between Hanoi and Paris in as many months
included the usual stopovers in Peking and Moscow before his
arrival in Paris on 11 September. While again pledging aid and
political support, the Soviets this time gave less play to
military questions than during his previous stopover last month.
As in August, the Chinese did not go beyond the minimum in their
treatment of his stopover, having previously scaled down their
expressions of support since Chou En-lai's forceful remarks
during Tho's visit in April.* In the latest visit Tho saw Prince
Sihanouk, the first such meeting with a Cambodian leader since
Tho's stopover in Aupotist 1971.
As usual, Hanoi's coverage of Tho's trip consisted of a single
account reporting his arrival in Paris and taking note of his
activities while passing through Peking and Moscow. Hanoi's
report said that Tho's meeting with the Chinese leaders took
place in an atmosphere of "solidarity and fraternal friendship."
Its account of Tho's meeting with his Soviet hosts described
a "fraternal and coreal" atmosphere.
Hanoi's report noted the presence of the Soviet and Chinese
ambassadors when Tho arrived in Paris, but none of the available
reports mentioned the presence of a Soviet representative when
Tho departed from Peking en route to Paris via Moscow. According
to normal protocol, the host country's announcement on his
departure from the first stIpover cites the presence of a
representative from the next country on hit; itinerary. Thus,
In the comparable situation in July, the Soviet charge d'affaires
was reported by NCNA to have been present when Tho departed from
Peking, and on Tho's return home last month the Chinese
charge d'affaires was mentioned by TASS as being among those
seeing him off in Moscow. The only previous exception to this
pattern occurred in June when no Chinese representative was
officially announced as present at Tho's departure from Moscow
for Peking, though a VNA service message from Moscow to the Hanoi
office noted the presence of the Chinese ambassador on that
occasion.
* Tho's previous stopovers are discussed it? the TRENDS of
23 August 1972, pages 7-8.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/8NTRa8P85T00870 pim-o
-10-
PEKING The Chinese account of Tho's 8-9 September stopover
followed in detail t,.e one in August, again avoiding
any indication of the substance of his talks with the Chinese
leaders. Tho again had "a very cordial and friendly conversation"
with Chou En-lai and Chang Chun-chieo, and he was given the usual
banquet by Chang, who greeted and saw him off at the airport.
This bare-bones treatment of his stopover, with no pledges of
Chinese support or criticism of the United States, has been
Peking's practice on the last three occasions and reflects the
cautious approach Peking has been taking toward Vietnamese
developments.
Peking also reported that Tho had "a cordial and friendly
conversation" with Sihanouk on the same day as the meeting with
the Chinese. The only precedent for such a meeting during his
stopovers was Tho's talk with RGNU Premier Penn Nouth on 1 August
1971 as Tho was returning home and at a time when Sihanouk was in
Korea. That meeting took place against the background of the
release during the previous month of the PRG's seven-point
proposal and the announcement of Peking's invitation to President
Nixon. The recent Tho-Sihanouk meeting took place at a time when
the question of a political settlement has again become a subject
of major attention, suggesting that Tho may have briefed the
Cambodian on current developments.
MOSCOW During his 9-11 September stopover in Moscow--overlapping
with presidential adviser Kisoingt4r's arrival there on
the 10th--Tho was met at the airport by party and foreign ministry
functionaries Rakhmanin and Firyubin and had talks with Politburo
member and First Deputy Premier Mazurov. Politburo member and
Brezhnev deputy Kirilenko, who saw Tho during his previous stopover
in August, has reportedly been on vacation in YAloslavia. Party
Secretary Katushev, who has customarily been on hand for Tho's
stopovers, was leading a CPSU delegation visiting North Korea.
Mazurov had been the ranking Soviet official seeing Tho once before,
during a stopover in August 1968.
According to TASS, Mazurov and Tho had talks in "a fraternal, cordial
atmosphere" on "questions of further development of cooperation
between the Soviet Union and the DRV." The TASS account said the
Soviet side stressed again that "it will continue rendering to the
Vietnamese people all the necessary assistance until the complete
victory of their just caqse," supported the "constructive
proposals for peaceful Battlement" advanced by the DRV and PRG,
and "resolutely denounced the aggressive actions of U.S. imperialism."
CONFIDENTIAL
0/08/19 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09MMT13435T00875RIMMOS6037-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
An English-language Moccow radio report added that Tho thanked the
Soviet Government for "its all-round and effective help to
embattled Vietnam."
The Soviet account of the most recent visit represents only the
third report of all of Tho's stopovers in Moscow to indicate
any of the substance of the talks, the previous instances being
his August 1972 and July 1971 visite, both of which timea he met
with Kirilenko. However, the latest account cam. down less
strongly on military issues than on those occasions. Last month
Moscow reported that the two sides discussed not only the
strengthening of "friendship and cooperation" but also "the
development of the struggle of the Vietnamese people," and the
Soviets specifically denounced the U.S. bombing and "mining and
blockade" of the DRV. At that time, in addition to expressing
support for the Vietnamese communists proposals for a peace
settlement, the Soviets pledged to continue "economic and military
aid" until the Vietnamese attain "complete victory."
PARIS: VIETNAMIZATION AGAIN TARGET AT 7 SEPTEMBER SESSION
Both PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh and DRV delegate Nguyen Minh
Vy at the Paris session on 7 September repeated standard charges
that the U.S. Vietnenization policy is incompatible with "serious
negotiations." VNA's account reflected this stress, but it
omitted both delegates' denunciations of specific U.S. negotiating
positions and of President Nixon's statements, including those at
his 29 August press conference.* Thus, VNA did not report that
Mme. Binh again said the President's 8 May proposals constitute
an "ultimatum" or her allegation that the President's 23 Augunt
speech at the Republican Party convention and his press conference
on the 29th "reaffirmed the U.S. scheme to keep U.S. troops in
South Vietnam and maintain the Nguyen Van Thieu regime it has set
up . . . ."** But in reporting her defense of the PRG proposals,
* Front media, on the other hand, carried the full text of Mme.
Binh's formal statement.
** VNA's account of the 31 August session focused on the communist
delegates' remarks on the President's 29 August press conference.
Thus, it reported Mme. Binh's disparagement of the planned U.S.
withdrawal of an additional 12,000 troops from South Vietnam by the
end of November as well as the President's statement that the bombing
and mining of North Vietnam will continue in the absence of substantial
progress in the negotiations. VNA reported that DRV delegate Vy said,
among other things, that the question of the return of U.S. prisoners
is not the cause of the U.S. presence in Vietnam but a result of it. In
his prepared statement, Vy made a point-by-point rebuttal of the
President's press conference, describing it as "noisy propaganda" about
the continued withdrawal of U.S. troops and alleged progress in ending
the war.
Approved For Release 2000/08WPSHMDP85T008113RMEM5219727-0
-12-
VNA noted her statement that unless the United States gives up its
"scheme" to negate the role of the PRG and other "forces of peace
and independence," there cannot be a political solution to the
South Vietnam issue in particular or the Vietnam war in general."
The VNA account noted that Mme. Binh repeated the standard position
that a Vietnamese solution must be an overall one, including both
military and political questions. It truncated her recapitulation
of some of the details of the PRG's two-point elaboration. but it
did report her praise of the proposal for a provisional government
of national concord and her reaffirmation that the PRG does not
seek control over the political life of South Vietnam.
Div delegate Vy in his prepared statement set out to demonstrate
"tb, contradiction between words and deeds" on the part of the
Nixol Administration. VNA glossed over much of his statement on
U.S. attacks on North Vietnam, but it cited his reiteration of the
charge that the resumption of the air otrikes and the mining of DRV
ports are a "serious war escalation." The account quoted him as
claiming that U.S. proposals "in their approach as well as in their
substance" retain a "colonialist position." But the account did not
report the details of his attack on the United States for separating
the military and political questions, particularly his denunciation
of the President's 8 May proposal and his remarks at the press
conference on 29 August. Vy said that judging from these statements,
the U.S. solution of the military question turned out to be escalation
of the war and then the posing of conditions: "As long as the
adversary does not accept a cease-fite and the release of U.S. POW's,
the United States will neither withdraw its troops nor stop all air
and naval action." VNA did report Vy's concluding remarks that
serious negotiations cannot go together with VietnaMization and that
the United States mu rt "agree to an overall solution on both the
military and political plane- as provided in the PRG's seven points,
the two main points of which have been clarified."
The VNA account of the session as usual omitted any mention of the
GVN s?atement, which was presented by Nguyen Xuan Phong in place of
Ambassador Lam. It dismissed Ambassador Porter's statement as
making "slanders in a provocative manner in an attempt to cover the
aggressive nature of the Nixon Administration," but it did not
acknowledge that the Ambassador criticized Pham Van Dong's National
Day address. The account also ignored the additional remarks by
both sides, which included a lengthy rebuttal by Phong of the
communist charges and repetition by Ambassador Porter of questions
regarding Hanoi's failure to respond to the GVN's offer--advanced
at the 24 August session--to repatriate 600 sick and wounded North
Vietnamese prisoners.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-13-
DRV ROUTINELY PROTESTS UsSI STRIKES. PRAISES PLANE DOWNINGS
Foreign ministry reaction to relatively heavy U.S. air raids has
remained at the routine level of spokesman's statements since
17 August, the date of the last foreign ministry statement. That
statement, which protested U.S. attacks of 14 and 16 August on
Hanoi and Thanh Hoa cities, was in turn more muted in tone than
the preceding statement of the 8th, which had vigorously lashed
out at the President for asserting that it is not U.S. policy to
bomb civilian installations.* While large-scale attacks on Hanoi
have frequently triggered an authoritative protest at the level
of a foreign ministry statement, massive U.S. bombing of the Hanoi
area on 10 and 11 September drew only routine comment at the
spokesman's level. VNA in its news reports on the bombing
echoed this relatively low level response. A VNA report of the
10th, charging that U.S. aircraft had "attacked many streets
in Hanoi and populous areas in its outskirts," cited the chief
areas hit as a sandbank in the middle of the Red River and the
Gia Lam and Dong An suburban areas; on the 11th, claiming that
the raid of that day was the 26th since 16 April, VNA reported
damage in the Ha Ba Trung precinct within Hanoi.
Other areas reported by VNA as suffering damage in recent strikes
include villages in several districts of Thai Binh and Hai Hung
provinces, from 5 to 9 September; a school in an unidentified
location in Tuyen Quang Province, on 7 September; a Catholic church
in a hamlet in Tien Lu district of Hai Hung Province, on 8 September;
a number of villages and a tea plantation in Bac Thai Province,
on the 9th and 10th; and a college in Vinh Phu Province, on
10 September. VNA also reported that sever& hydraulic works were
damaged in air strikes of the 10th, including the Tra Ly dike
and Lan sluice in Thai Binh, hit by 12 and six demolition bombs,
respectively; and a one-kilometer section of the dike along the
Day River in Gia Khanh district of Ninh Binh Province.
Brief editorial comment on the recent bombings appeared in NHAN
DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 12 and 13 September, respectively, in
connection with the claimed downing of the 3,900th plane over the
North. And VNA's 13 September press review noted that NHAN DAN that
day "denounced the savage war crimes perpetrated by the U.3.
aggressors against North Vietnam in the early days of this month."
NHAN DAN on the 12th, after citing damage to "many of our
municipalities, cities, and heavily populated areas" since early
April, reviewed the bombing of this week, which it claimed had
* For a discussion see the TRENDS of 23 August 1972, page 12 and
9 August 1972, page 2.
CONFIDENTIAL
9 Cl A -RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
14
incurred "an additional blood debt to our compatriots." Referring
in addition to B-52 bombing of the DRV's southern provincas, NHAN
DAN repeated standard charges that "the bellicose Nixon clique's
crimes" exceed those of Hitler and "represent a stain on the
United States' honor that can never be removed." QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN, commenting in general on the nature and extent of U.S.
bombing, referred indirectly to the recent bombi4 in its mention
of Lang Son, the province over which the 3,900th plane was
reportedly downed; the army paper noted that this province is
111en the Vietnam-China border."
SPOKESMAN'S The following statements were issued by the
STATEMENTS spokesman of the DRV Foreign Ministry during the
past week:
+ "Exitermination bombing" of Haiphong on 6 September, as well as
strikes on the same day at the capital of Thai Binh Province and
populated areei in Yen Bei, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha,
Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces,
were protested in the statement of the 7th, which charged that such
bombardments were "ordered by the Nixon Administration against
populated areas to massacre civilians." The statement claimed
that such actions "have further exposed the Administration's
bellicose and sanguinary nature and its deceitful claim to be
'ending' the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and to 'pursue' the
course of negotiations for a solution to the Vietnam question."
+ The statement of 8 September protested bombing and strafing on
the 7th of the outskirts of Haiphong and the capitals of Quang
Ninh, Thanh Hoa, and Quang Binh provinces, as well as of populated
areas in Tuyen Quang, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha,
Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh. In addition, the
statement charged B-52's with bombieig a number of localities in
Quang Binh and U.S. warships with firing "thousands of artillery
rounds" on the coastal areas of the Vinh Linh zone.
+ The 9 September statement condemned "savage raids" of the
preceding day on Cat Ba Island off Haiphong, the capital and
several "chief towns" of Quang Ninh Province, the "chief town"
of Ba Don in Quang Binh Province, and "many other populous areas"
in Lang Son, Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh,
Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinceo. It further
claimed that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh and that
U.S. warships &Jelled Hon Mei Island in Thanh Hoa. Listing
specific targets hit in tha air raids, the statement cited a
leprosarium in Thai Binh, reportedly hit for the second time, and
the Ben Ngu sluice in rong Son district of Thanh Hoa Province.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL EMS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-15-
+ The 10 September statement protested the "frenzied and criminal
acts of war" of the 9th and 10th which it claimed, among other
things, to have "trampled upon every principle of international
law and the morality and conscience of mankind" and to have "laid
bare the deceitful claim that the United States is ending its
involvement in South Vietnam and keeping to the path of negotiation
to settle the Vietuam problem." Actions of the 9th cited in the
statement included the bombing of Kinn An municipality near Haiphong
and Hon Gai municipality in Quang Ninh Province, as well as "many
denrely populated areas" of Lang Son, Bac Thai, Ha Bac, Vinh Phu,
Ha Tay, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces
and the Vinh Linh zone; it also charged chat U.S. warships had
bombarded coastal areas of Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and
the Vinh Linh zone. Strikes on Hanoi and its suburbs--described
as constituting the 25th attack since 14 April 1972?highlighted
claims for the 10th, as well as the reported bombing and strafing
of Phu Ly township in Nam Ha and Chuong My municipality and "many
other areas" in Ha Tay Province.
+ Charging again that the United States is deceitfully claiming
to pursue the path of negotiations while continuing its "frenzied
and criminal war acts," the statement of 11 September protested
strikes of that day against Hanoi and its outskirts, as well as
attacks on populated areas of Ha Tay Province. It also condemned
strikes of the 10th at populated areas in the provinces of Bac
Thai, Vinh Phu, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Hoa Binh,
Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Hs Tinh and Quang Binh and in the
Vinh Linh zone. Without mentioning any specific date, the
statement claimed that U.S. warships had "indiscriminately bombed
and shelled" coastal hamlets and villages in Nghe An and Ha Tinh
provinces. Specific targets reported destroyed by U.S. bombs
and shells included an animal husbandry middle school in Hoa
Binh Province, "dikes and dams, many irrigation projects," the
Lai Trang sluice in Phy Ly township of Thli Binh Province, and the
Lan sluice in Tuyen Hai district of Thai Binh. In addition, the
statement charged that U.S. strikes had damaged "another dike
portion near the Lan sluice," and "another dike portion of the
La River" in Ky Anh district of Ha Tinh Province.
+ In addition to the strikes of the 11th mentioned above, the
statement of the 12th protested other action of the previous day,
including the bombing and strafing of Haiphong, the cities of Nghia
Lo, Kien An and Phu Ky, and many populated areas in Yen Bai, Ha Bac,
Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha
Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It further
charged U.S. warships with "wantonly" shelling coastal villages in
Ha Tinh and Quang Binh nrovinces.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL MIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-16-
PLANE DOWNINGS The air action over Hanoi was reflected in the
reported downing of three planes over the
capital on 10 and 11 September. Hanoi's total for planes downed
as of 13 September was 3,910, with downings reported over Quang
Binh, Quang Ninh, Vinh Phu, Nghe An, Bac Thai, Yen Hai, Thai Binh,
Thanh Hoa, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Ha !ac, Lang Son and Haiphong as
well as Hanoi. An unspecified number of U.S. pilots was reported
captured as a result of the downing of five F-4 Phantoms over Lang
Son on the 11th and 12th; one of the planes downed on the 12th was
claimed to be the 3,900th U.S. plane shot down over the North.
A 8-52 was reportedly downed over Quang Binh or 6 September, and
a Hanoi radio report of 12 September claimed that the armed forces
and people of Vinh Phu Province set fire to two U.S. warships on
25 August,
As noted above, the downing of the 3.900th plane on 12 September
received editorial acclaim in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.
The QUAN DOI NHAN DA h editorial of the 13th, available only in a
brief VNA summary, offered conventional praise of the North
Vietnamese armed forces, noting that "hardly 40 days had gone by
since the downing of the 3,800th [planer and that "the USAF has
received another fitting blow." It praised the victories of the
antiaircraft and air force, as well as of the home guard and
militia.
The NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast by Hanoi radio on 12 September,
differed from previous reaction to the 3,800th and 3,700th plane
downings, claimed on 6 August and 27 June respectively, in that
it placed less emphasis than usual on the achievements of the
North Vietnamese "armed forces and people" and more on the
crimes and declining situation of the "Nixon clique." After
reviewing U.S. strikes at cities and other populated areas,
the editorial echoed other recent propaganda in its castigation
of President Nixon, charging that he has made "deceitful statements
that he would take steps to end the war before the presidential
election, and that prospects for negotiation now were better than
ever." It said that, in fact, the United States has clung to its
"colonialist position" at Paris, and that U.S. policy will only
increase North Vietnamese determination to fight and win. It
added that "our victorious combat over the past five months is
eloquent proof of the failure of the war Vietnamization policy,"
and praised the formation of "aircraft battlegrounds" throughout
the North and the coordination between the self-defense forces
and the air and rocket forces in "punishing the air brigands."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-17-
The editorial charged that "during four years as President, Nixon
has wasted an additional more than 640 aircraft, including more
than 450 domed since April, with hundreds of aggressor pilots
killed or captured." It then claimed that "re-Americanization"
of the war will lead only to more disastrous defeats.
POW'S Further praise was accorded the North Vietnamese air
force's Wall in downing planes in Hanoi's accounts of
the capture of six )f the 10 pilots whose names were released on
25 August.* Dunn, the past week, Hanoi radio attributed the
downing of all six to missiles fired from North Vietnamese Migs;
in the case of lst. Lieut. Donald Karl Logan, reportedly captured
on 5 July, the plane was specifically described as a Mig-21. In
other reportage on the recently captured pilots, both Hanoi radio
in English to servicemen and VNA carried messages to their families,
allegedly written by the pilots, in which they stressed the good
treatment. they are receiving and their hopes for an early bnd to
the war. Several made oblique references to the November elections
after criticizing President Nixon for being recponsible for their
capture; the mesfiage allegedly sent by 1st Lieut. Gregg Hanson to
his parents, for example, urged them to vote for Senator McGovern.
Lieut. Hanson reportedly said, "1 feel confident that after George
McGovern is elected President in November, it will be a matter of
days until I will be able to return home . . . ." This is in keeping
with comments attributed to other POW's ia alleged interviews and
messages of the last two weeks, which have also contained direct
appeals to President Nixon and Congress to end the war.
* See the TRENDS of 30 August 1972, page 13.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-18-
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOWcDENIES LINK BETWEEN MUNICH EVENTS. ISRAELI RAIDS
Continuing to play down the significance of the "tragic incident"
at the Olympic games in Munich, Moscow seized on Israel's
8 September retaliatory attacks on Lebanon and Syria to focus
attention on Israeli "aggression." Soviet commentators have
repeatedly rejected Tel Aviv's "pretext" that the raids were
reprisals for the Munich events, at the same time betraying
sensitivity on that score in efforts to dissociate the Arab
states and Palestinians generally from the Black September
"extremists." The central theme is that the raids--"the biggest
air raids over Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian territories"
since the 1967 war--again illustrated Israeli expansionist
ambitions and "sabotage" of a peaceful political settlement
in the region.
Decrying the U.S. veto in the 10 September Security Council
debate on the Israeli attacks, Moscow charged that the American
action prevented the council from passing a resolution aimed at
ending Israel's "aggressive acts." Commentators almost unani-
mously concluded that the situation requires a speedy political
solution based on Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab
territories and recognition of the Palestinians' rights.
ISRAELI ATTACKS TASS on the 8th reported official statements
from Lebanon and Syria announcing Israeli
attacks. on "several camps of Palestinian refugees" in the north
and south of Lebanon and Israeli bombing of "a number of areas"
in Syria on the Mediterranean coast and near the Golan Heights
and Damascus. On the 9th, TASS cited Damascus radio for a report
that Syrian planes struck that day at Israeli positions on the
occupied Golan Heights and that in the course of a dogfighc two
Israeli Mirages wore shot down and the Syrians lost three planes.
Moscow apparently failed to report the official Jordanian
announcements on the 9th that a Jordanian village had been hit
by rockets "during the Syrian-Israeli dogfight" that day. But
on the 11th Soviet media inserted "a Jordanian populated area"
among the targets, in effect accusing Israel of deliberately
attacking Jordan--a specific charge the Amman announcements had
carefully avoided.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-19-
Portraying Israel's targets as peaceful villages and Palestinian
refugee camps, the Soviet coverage included correspondents' eye-
witness accounts of the destruction of small homes and shops.
Moscow claimed that the raids resulted in "hundreds of civilian
casualties." TASS on the 11th cited a report by UN observers on
the consequences of the attacks in Lebanon which "confirmed" that
the victims were "civilian without exception," and a Damascus
datelined TASS dispatch on the 13th observEd that the wounded
children, women, and old people in Syrian hospitals "have nothing
in common with the Palestinian guerrillas." Some commentators
likened the attacks to Israeli bombings of the "civilian targets"
of Abu Za'bal and Bahr al-Baqr in Egypt in February and April
1970.
MUNICH EVENTS Moscow's denial of any connection between the
Munich events and the 8 September Israeli raids
is consistent with its past guarded treatment of fedayeen airline
hijackings, which elicited reluctant and implicitly disapproving
comment when they were acknawiadged at all.* A SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
article on the 12th charged that the "Israeli extremists" were
only "exploiting the Munich events for their awn aggressive aims."
Several commentators sought to exonerate the Arab governments and
the Palestinians in general of any responsibility for the actions
of a handful of "extremists" in Munich.
Viewing the latest Israeli raids against the background of Munich,
Moscow domestic service commentator Ryzhikov on the 9th cited FRG
Foreign Minister Scheel as having said in aa "important statement"
that the Arab states "were in no way implicated in.the Munich
events" and that "only a small group" of Palestinians was
responsible. Ryzhikov also noted that the head of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) mission in Denmark had asserted at
a press conference that the "extremist" Black September group
had no connection whatsoever with the PLO and that the Munich
action did not serve the Palestinian cause. Drawing on background
by AFP, Ryzhikov said the Black September operated underground in
the Arab world, "including Palestine." He added that its leaders,
its headquarters, and the sources of its funds are not known.
* Moscow's treatment of the most recent such ivcident, at Lod
airport on 30 May, is discussed in the 7 June 197.1, TRENDS, page 25.
The initial Soviet handling of the Palestinian hijackings in
September 1970 and a resume of Moscow's reaction to previous
hijacking incidents appear in the 10 September 1970 TRENDS,
pages 14-16.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-20-
In a similar vein, Ovchinnikov's international review in PRAVDA
on the 10th quoted a joint statement by Arab ambassadors in the
FRG "expressing regret" and asserting: "We did everything within
our power to find a solution to the problem created by the seizure
of the Israeli hostages." Directing the blame elsewhere, Ovchinnikov
charged that "Arab reactionaries and Israeli agents" were pushing
the Palestinians toward extremism in order to convince world
opinion that the Arab partisans "are only fanatical terrorists."
He deplored the efforts of "reactionary circles" to use the Munich
events as a pretext for an anti-Arab campaign and for "intensifying
military provocations" against the Arab countries.
One of the most vehement denials of any connection between Munich
and the Israeli raids came from Moscow radio observer Rassadin in
an 11 September foreign-language cormentary. He dennunced as
"really monstrous" the "clumsy attempt by Israeli and American
officials" to represent Israel's "crimes" as a kind of reply to
the Munich tragedy. The purpose of this gambit, Rassadin asserted,
was to accuse the Arab countries of complicity in the Olympic
Village ivzident--"an out-and-out lie," aince the Arab countries,
first of all Lebanon and Syria, "have officially stated that they
had nothing whatsoever to dc with the actions of the terrorist
group in Munich." Rassadin charged that the latest Israeli "acts
of aggression" were planned well before the "tragic incident" at
the (rympic games.
U.S. VETO Registering indignation at American use of the veto
in the Security Council, Moscow accused the United
States of hypocrisy in professing to work for peace while protect-
ing Israel. But there has been no particular emphasis on the
veto, and the reaction has been relatively moderate--a restraint
presumably imposed by Moscow's sensitivity to its own past use of
the veto. The TASS account of the 10 September Security Council
session decried the draft resolution submitted by U.S. representa-
tive Bush which "tried to justify" Israel's action against Syria
and Lebanon by linking "the barbarous raids on peaceful villages"
with the "tragic incident" in Munich. TASS attributed to the
Washington POST a description of Bush's statement as "pro-Israeli
to a greater degree than a statement by the Israeli representative
himself could be." Soviet representative Malik rejected attempts
to justify the "barbarous killing of Arab civiliaLs by references
to the actions of Palestinian resistance organizations."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-21-
Subsequent Soviet reports and commentaries have noted Cairo press
criticism of Washington's "unseemly" use of the veto, mentioned
Tel Aviv's gratification at U.S. behavior, and called it signifi-
cant that the U.S. delegate was the only one to vote against a
proposal aimed at curbing Israel's "aggressive acts." Rassadin
on the 11th saw no surprise in the fact that the United States
had again "tried to rescue" Israel, remarking that Israel's "war
machine" owed its very existence to American aid. A commentary
in Arabic that day took the same tack, calling it unlikely that
the United States would let TJrael bs condemned when it was supply-
ing that country with "the most modern means of annihilation" as
well as with "military airmen who are piloting the Phantoms and
Skyhawks."
PRAVDA's New Yark correspondent Kolesnichenko, in an article
reported by TASS on the 13th, declared that by blocking the draft
resolution the United States demonstrated its support of Israel
and encouragement of Tel Aviv's "militeri provocations."
Kolesnichenko reserved his chief criticism for the U.S. draft
resolution, from which the "main issue"--the bombing of "peaceful
pJpullted localities in Syria and Lebanon"--was, he said, conspicu-
ously missing. He scored the American draft for suggesting
condemnation of "a small group of private persons" who staged
a terrorist act in Munich and for trying to blame the Arab
countries for the present situation in the Middle East and
specifically for the terrorists' actions in Munich.
WALDHEIM ON There is no available Moscow report on UN Secretary
TERRORISM General Waldheim's 8 September request that the
General Assembly include on its agenda as an
"important and urgent" -/tem the consideration of "measures to
prevent terrorism." But TASS crl the 13th did report Waldheim's
press conference on the 12th, noting-thst heiexpressed.seridusconcern
over the increased cases of terrorism and hoped the General
Assembly would be able to take positive decisions to prevent a
recurrence of such tcctics. TASS also reported Waldheim's view
that the assembly "should discuss specifically" the questien of
insuring the safety of diplomatic personnel in New York and else-
where, as well as his remark that the United Nations must do
everything in its power to solve the Middle East problem.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL
- 22 -
FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1.972
PRC DEPLCRE3 ?INCICt T IN MUNICH'n SCORES ISRALLI ATTACKS
Peking has touched only once, belatedly and without detail, on the
5-6 September incidents in Munich, in keeping with its habitual
reticence on extremist actions of the Palestinian fedayeen. The
sole Chinese references to the terrorist actions at the Olympics--
cryptic allusions, with no mention of any deaths--appeared in an
11 September NCNA rel,drt of the Security Council session held the
preceding day to discuss Israel's raids against targets in Lebanon
and Syria on the 8th.* PRC dcleg,te Huang Hua took the occasion
to put :.eking on record as opposing terrorist actions.
The Munich events were completely ignored in a PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article on the 13th assailing Israel's new "crime"
av.inst Syria and Lebanon. At the time time, Peking has muted
or avoided the theme of armed struggie by the "alestinians and,
consistent with the recent softening of its attacks on the
United States, has failed to press the line that Tel Aviv's.
tctions are supported and instigated by Washington. This line
appeared only in an NCNA pickup of a 10 September ZERI I POPULLIT
editorial, and then in the context of superpower machinations:
The Albanian paper charged that in its "hostile acts" Israel
enjoys the "direct and indirect suiport o. the u.S. imperialists
and the Soviet social-imperialists."
UN DEBATE NCNA's report of the Security Council session said
U.S. representative Bush "talked a lot about the
abduction of Israeli sportsmen" at the Olympics, "trying to link
the incident in Munich with the latest Israeli aggression against
Syria and Lebanon in an attempt to whitewash Israel's aimed
aggression." The report added that the Guinean yepresentative
said Syria and Lebanon should not be held responsible for the
"incident in Munich," and it noted that British amendments to
the draft resoluLion submitted by Somalia, Guinea, and Yugoslavia
"In essence equated" the Israeli attacks with the "Olympic incident."
* Peking had dealt in even more cryptic fashion with the 30 May
incident at Lod airport, merely citing the Lebanase premier as saying
that "whenever an attack took place inside Israel," that country
started making threats against Lebanon.
CONFIUNTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/OrTIOA1#85T00875,71032201393.20
- 23 -
PRC delegate Huang Hue, in a speech after the voting, rejected
as intolerable Israol's attempt "to use the Olympic incident as
a pretext to expand its war of aggression" against the Arab
countrles. Deploring the "unfortunate" episode, Huang said "we
have never been in favor of such adventurist acts of terrorism."
Pnking's handling of the U.S. veto, reflecting its careful treatment
of the United States, may have also betrayed some sensitivity to
its own recent use of the veto to forestall BangJadesh's admission
to the United Nations. NCNA noted that the U.S. representative
luneasonably" vetoed the draft resolution and went on to report
Huang Hua as pointing out "with regret" that as a result of the
veto "by a permanent member," even such a "minimum" draft resolution
failed to carry. Muting concluded ty reasserting the PRC's firm
support for the "just struggle" of the Palestinian people and
the Arab governments and people to restore their right to national
existence, recover their lost territories, and defend their
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Prior to the Security Council debate, NCNA had reported official
Egyptian and Syrian statements condemning the Israeli attacks. The
only reference to the Palestiniar. armed resistance in propagahda
relating to the 8 September striko: was attributed to a Fatah
member: An NCNA dispatch from Damascus on the 9th reported a
"leading member" of that fedayeen organization as expressing the
Palestinians' resolve to persist in armed struggle and as stating
that the commahdos were emulating the fighting spirit of the
Vietnamese.
PEOPLE'S DAILY The 8 September Israeli attacks were ,rotested
in a 13 September PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article which registered "most strong" condemnation of the "war
provocations" and said it was not Israeli security which was being
threatened but that of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples.
CommentAtor dismissed as a "sheer lie with ulterior motives"
Israeli assertions that once the Arab pec.....e ceased supporting
the Palestinian guerrillas, the time would be ripe for peace.
Ccmmentator saw no distinction between the Palestinians' struggle
to regain a lost homeland and national rights and that of the
Arab countries to recover their lost territories: The two "are
an integral whole." The article affirmed that the Palestinian
and other Arab peoples naturally sympathize with and support each
other and "have come to realize that they must strengthen their
unity."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/060PWAI#DP85T0081IVOLV51090/I7-0
A
-24-
Again subduing the theme of U.S. influence on Israel's behavior,
PEOPLE'S DAILY merely echoed Foreign Minister Chi Peng-feils
remarks, at a 24 August banquet for the visiting Tunisian foreign
minister, in accusing the superpowers of trying to maintain and
exploit the "no war, no peace" situation to realize their "plot
to carve out spheres of influence." While Chi had pointedly
mentioned Egyptian Government "measures to safeguard the
sovereignty of its country" in an implicit reference to the
ouster of Soviet military pernonnel, PEOPLE'S DAILY simply
expressed conviction that the Arab and PalesUnian peoples,
"upholding independence and keeping the initiative in their
own hands," would certainly win "one victory after another"
in their just cause.
DRV BLAMES BLOODSHED ON ?AGGRESSORS/1 SEES Me HAND IN RAIDS
An article in Hanoi's NHAN DAN on 12 September used the "bloody
incident" in Munich as the point of departure for a broadside
against the "brutal nature and perfidious schemes" of the Unit.;:d
States and Israel, and a commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN the next day claimed that the Israeli air raids again
exposed "the obstinate and utterly bellicose features of the
U.S. imperialists and Israeli reactionaries." Boll articles
betrayed sensitivity to the methods used by the terrorist srotT
in Munich, supprensing the details of the attack on members
of the Israeli tedM. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN referred to "the bloody
incident at the Municu Olympic games" only in asserting that
the "U.S. imperialists" took advattage of the incidenr. to "whip
up anti-Arab hysteria."
NHAN DAN, rather than praising the Palestinians, souglt to
exculpate them by shifting the blame .to "the aggressors," quoting
Algiers radio as commenting that the bloodshed resulted from
Israeli and West German treachery. Claiming that the bloods43d
"could have been avoided," NHAN DAN charged that the "aggressive"
elements who could have prevented the deaths of the 11 Israelis
were "whipping up a chauvinistic hysteria in Israel" and fomenting
a protest movement "within the so-called 'civilized world' to
vilify" the Palestinian people's struggle and threaten and split
the Arab countries.
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, focusing its charges on the United States,
accused Washington of "creating the 'Israeli republic," shoring
up the Israeli administration, and training and equipping its
army as a shock force in defense of U.S. interests in the Middle
CONFIDENTIAL
roved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09aNehlaRDR85T008751A90)49041?0037-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1.972
-25 ?
East. The paper noted the U.S. veto in the Security Council of
the draft resolution "submitted by the Arab countries" in
condemnation of Israel's "aggression."
Hanoi media have generally ignored past Palestinian extremist
actions, confining comment to standard expressions of oupport
for the Palestinian cause on such occasions ati the June 1967
war anniversary and the "international day of solidarity with
the Palestinian people" observed in May. Iaraeli raids in
couthern Lebanon earlier this year also prompted comment, and
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN last March assailed King Husayn's plan--
"masterminded by U.S. imperialism"--for a federated United
Arab Kingdom, calling it an effort to obliterate the Palestinian
partisans. DRV references to Palestinian guerrilla actions have
been undstailsd, in the general context of comment associating
the Palestinians--and the Arabs in general--with the Vietnamese
as victims of "imperialist aggressive" policies.
BULGARIA. ALBANIA: MUNICH ACT DID NOT HELP PALESTINIANS
Sofia, after a cautious start, has joined the other East European
capitals in criticizing the "extremist" action in Munich. Tirana,
while denouncing the act as failing to help the Palestinians'
struggle, has expressed continued support for their "just cause."
BULGARIA RABOTNICNESKODELO's sports page.owthe 6th had a fairly
objective news report accompanied by a commentary
which, after referring at the outset to the 5 September "incident
in Olympic Village ?Incerning the group of Israeli athletes,"
was largely devoted to the alleged failure of West German security
precautions against such standard foes as "pro-fascist" and "anti-
Soviet" elements. The news report on the incident, while cautiously
referring to the "armed persons" and "attackers," did cite the
MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY to the effect that the Palestinian "Black
September" had taken responsibility for the incident. The paper
also noted that the attackers demanded the release of 200
Palestinian prisoners.
Ou the 7th the news agency BTA reported condemnation of the "act
cc terrorism" at Munich in a statement by the Bulgarian Olympic
delegation, and akBOTNICHESKO DELO the same day denounced the
"Palestinian extremist organization" Black September for its
? 'senseless act, from the political point of view," against the
Israeli delegation. Like other East European reaction, the Sofia
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000Kediciiiihgt4AFDP85TOOPRWMA0050037-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-26-
paper declared that terrorism is the last thing that could
contribute to a solution of the Palestinian problem, and
claimed that "a series of arab countries along with the main
force of Palestinian resistalce" also condemned this act of
political terrorism.
ALBANIA In a 7 September ATA dispatch, Tirana reported
the deaths of the 11 Israelis as a result of the
Black September acLion and said the Albanian people condemned
the "terroriatic" act as one which did not serve the Palestiniffta'
"just struggle against the Zionist aggressors." But a BASHKIM1
article, reported by Tirana's domestic service on the 10th,
assailed President Nixon for "shedding crocodile tears" for the
victims and Jordanian King Husayn for "expressing contempt for
the Palestinian patriots." Although the methods used by the
Black September in Munich and the "extremes of some minor group"
were to he condemned, the paper said, the Palestinian cause
was just and would be supported by the Albanian people.
CONFIDENTIAL
0300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/090SIVRIDR85T00875R0033091163037-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
A
-27-
SALT AND DISARMAMENT
MOSCOW QUESTIONS MI SUPPORT FOR "EQUAL SECURITY" iRINCIPLE
Implicitly calling into questi?n the Administration's continued
support for the "principle of equal security" to which both sides
subscribed at the Moscow summit, an article in the Soviet foreign
affairs weekly NOVOYE VREMYA further blurred the thin line Moscow
has drawn between the view of the Administrrtion and of the
"military-industrial complex" in the controversy surrounding
the Senate debate on the SALT agreements.
Eititled "A Game on deaten Trump Cards?--On the Principle o. Equal
Security and Relapses into the 'Policy of Strength' in Washington,"
the article was signed by V. Larionov, a USA Institute section head
who has written hardlining articles on U.S. military and nuclear
strategy for Lila journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY. The
NOVOYE VREMYA article, in issue No. 37 published on 8 September,
appeared as the Senate debate remained otalemated on the U.S.-
Soviet Interim Agreement on limiting offensive weapons and just
before Presidential adviser Kissinger's arrival in Moscow for
talks on the 10th. NOVOYE VREMYA has frequently been used as a
vehicle fer comment on international issues that are avoided or
treated more warily in the central daily press.
Reviewing the Congressional debste on the SALT accords and the
Defense Department appropriation proposals submitted to Congress
for the 1972-73 fiscal year, the article stated that an arms race
"disguised" by an effort to improve the quality of armaments takes
advantage of the letter of the SALT accords, which proscribe the
buildup but not the modernization of strategic weaponry, in order
to contravene their spirit. The proposed new U.S. weapons programs,
Larionov said, could provoke a new round in the arms race "and
consequently impede the consolidation of trust" between Moscow and
Washington.
The thrust of Larionov's article, more pointed than in prior
Soviet comment, was to caution the Administration against leaning
toward support of "Pentagon" demands that are out of harmony with
the principles espoused in Moscow. Larionov argued that the
SALT agreements were concluded vtrictly an the basis of "the
realism and readiness of the 11S.. leaders to adhere to. the
principle of equal security." If the Administration believes
it reached the accords on the basis of a "position of strength"
CONFIDENTIAL
rove For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08POSMATRIDP85T00878111906806050037-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-28-
stant:e vis-a-vis the USSR, he contended, then "shortsighted deci-
sions by the Administration could step up" the arms race. Larionov
imputed "precisely" such views to Secretary Laird, saying Laird
testifiPd before CongressicAl committees "that the favorable
outcome of the first phase of the [SALT] negotiations proved
possible solely because the United States acted throughout 'from
a position of strength' and that it 'must continue to maintain
this position' if it wants 'to insure success in the next phase
of the negotiations." Pointing out that both the USSR and the
United States have repudiated such views, Larionov cited remarks
by Brezhnev and the President, quoting the latter's 23 May Moscow
dinner toast calling for "agreements based on mutual respect and
reciprocity."
Larionov outlined three arguments used by "the Pentagon and its
advocates in Congress" in their demands for "colossal appropria-
tions for the development of strategic arms systems":
-I- "New programs are necessary 'to reinforce' the accords"--a
position Larionov ascribed to Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer.
Secretary of State Rogers, the article noted, has sought to refute
this by stating publicly that the agreements are "reliable and
verifiable."
^ "New arms systems are 'a strong bargaining chip' for the new
stage of the negotiations with the USSR"--a replay, Larionov
remarked, of arguments advanced earlier in suvlort of deployment
of the Safeguard ABM system.
^ The new arms programs "provide for the modernization, not the
buildup, of strategic forces, and this is not prohibited by the
agreements signed in Moscow." Here Larionov cited the New York
TIMES for the view that this approach brings into question "the
atmosphere of trust" established at Moscow.
Directing an implicit admonition at the Administration and the
President on the last point, Larionov said "many senators have
drawn attention to the disparity between the Pentagon's demands
and the provisions of the document on the Basic Principles of
Relations Botween the USSR and the United States." Moscow has
made a special point since the summit of noting that the document
bears the signatures of Brezhnev and the President personally.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09(SAFFRIR5T00875RppA3q9M037-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-29-
The Larionov article went beyond tha 23 August remarks by CPSU
Politburo member Suslov, who labe13d as "absurd" the "illusion"
that the U.S. "Tr-litary-iAustrial complex" could conduct the
forthcoming round of SALT negotiations with the USSR "from a
position of strength" and warned that the USSR would follow the
attempts of these forces "to distort the spirit and letter" of
the SALT accords. The article also went beyond the 5 September
Trofimenko IZVESTIYA article which called on the United States
to observe "not only the letter but the spirit" of the accords,
pointing out that "without formally violating the letter of the
Moscow egreements, it is possible through unilateral actions to
violate the common spirit of agreement so gravely and sharply
as to endanger the effectiveness of the agreements themselves."
POLISH ARMY PAPER COMMENTS ON "DIFFICULT" SALT AGENDA
In the most forthcoming treatment of the agenda for the next
round of SALT to appear in either the Soviet or East European
central press since the Moscow summit, the Polish army paper
ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on 5 September discussed the "difficult" issue
of NATO's nuclear potential and the "greatest difficulty" of
getting Britain and France to agree to let the United States
"represent them" in the next SALT round. The article, signed by
Jerzy Rulicz and entitled "Before the Second Round of SALT,"
appeared the same day as the Trofimenko IZVESTIYA article on
SALT--on the eve of the resumption of the Senate debate on the
Interim Agreement.
In markedly harsher terms than Moscow has used, Rulicz took issue
with alleged Administration attempts to exploit "loopholes" in
the SALT agreementc for the modernization of strategic arms.
Regarding prospects for halting the arms race, he stated flatly
that "much depends on the good will of the sides concerned," but
that "as the information to date shows, this good will on the part
of the American side had better not be expected."
Predicting that the second round of SALT "will certainly be far
more difficult than the first," Kulicz said the new round "will
cover more complicated areas on which agreement will be more
difficult." The problem of "the nuclear potential of NATO," in
his view, is complicated by unwillingness on the part of Britain
and France to let the United States speak for them and by a
resistance in NATO to "all ideas of denuclearization."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08619ft pP85T0087MROAN61950037-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
- 30 -
Linking the future of SALT with the projected European conference
on security and cooperation, the ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI article
observed that if progress is made in preparing the Europaan
conference, the "atmosphere of relaxation" will grow and "will
no loubt exert an additional impact" on the SALT round in Geneva.
TroEimenko's IZVESTIYA article had likewise linked the SALT
accords and European security issues, saying the U.S. press had
stressed that the accords have "created a good basis for solving
the problem of troop and arms reduction in Europe, in Central
Europe in the first place, as well as favorable conditions for
progress along the road of ertablishing an all-European security
system." Regrrding the next SALT round, Trofimenko merely cited
U.S. press accounts indicating that the discussion "could center"
on converting the Interim Agreement into a permanent agreement,
as well as on the expansion of limitations to cover all kinds of
offensive weapons and the problems of controlling the technological
--qualitative?aspects of the arms race." In very limited comment,
Moscow has made clear its view that the "important problem" of
force reductions in Europe "must become the subject of independent
discussion" rather than serving as a precondition for the European
security conference.
The Warsaw press has on occasion in the past elaborated substantive
issues under consideration at the strategic arms talks which
Moscowhas approached cautiously in its own name. Notably, a
TRYBUNA LUDU article on 17 February 1971 examined in some detail
the issue of U.S. forward bases which a PRAVDA article had
broached in more general terms two weeks earlier; the Polish
article ackmwledged in the process that Washington had rejected
two Soviet proposals advanced in Helsinki.*
*See the TRENDS of 24 February 1971, pages ').)-35.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL PUS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-31-
CZECHOSLOVAKIA-FRG
CSSR OFFICIAL SIGNALS POSSIBLE CONCESSION ON MUNICH PACT ISSUE
A possible concession on the issue of the 1938 Munich agreement,
a continuing stumbling block in the Prague-Bonn exploratory talks
on normalizing relations, seemed indicated in Prague reports of
3 September remarks in which CSSR Foreign Minister Bohuslav
Chnoupek called for FRG recognition of the invalidity of the
agreement without adding the standard "ab initio." The stipula-
tion that the agreement must be recognized as invalid from its
inception has been a staple of Prague's long-standing formula on
the issue. The West German position, maintained in five rounds
of the exploratory talks, has been that to recognize the
invalidity of the Munich pact from the beginning would have
the effect, among other things, of invalidating civil acts
involving Germans in the Sudetenland following Hitler's take-
over of the area; Bonn grants that the agreement is invalid
today but argues that it was merely "unjust"--not invalid--at
its inception.
Prague has made one clear concession. The initial Czechoslovak
formula called for FRG recognition of the invalidity of the
Munich pact ab initio, "with all the consequences arising
therefrom." The Czechoslovaks dropped the final phrase on
consequences, which had left the West Germans no room for
maneuver on the issue, in a concession Signaled when the
formula appeared without that phrase in the communique of
the " August 1971 Crimea meeting of Soviet bloc first
secretaries. Subsequent Prague statements have adhered to the
Crimea formulation.
Whether Chnoupek's apparent further dilution of the formula
represented a trial balloon or foreshadows a softening of
Prague's negotiating position is unclear. No text of his
speech has been publicized, but summaries by the Prague domestic
radio, CTK, and four Czechoslovak newspapers all dropped the
"ab initio" phrase--heretofore an ingredient of the formulistic
positinn Prague media have always expressed with the utmost
care. At the same time, the central party daily RUDE PRAVO
carried a , xse report of Chnoupek's remarks which did not
quote him at all on the subject of relations with Bonn; instead
the paper highlighted a speech by another leading Czechoslovak
figure who used the standard formulation complete with "ab initio."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
32
And Moscow, after totally ignoring Chnoupek's speech, quoted him
in a TASS interview four days later as repeating the standard
formula, including "ab initio."
CHNOUPEK SPEECH Summaries of Chnoupek' s 3 September speech,
delivered in Ostrava to mark the anniversary
of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising, were carried by the Prague
domestic radio and CTK on the 3d and printed on the 4th in the
Prague dailies MLADA FRONTA, PRACE, and LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE as well
as in Bratislava PRAVDA. Chnoupek was reported as stating, on
the score of "normalizing" relations with Bonn, that "the
settlement of the question of FRG recognition of the invalidity
of the Munich agreement would undoubtedly have a favorable
influence on the general atmosphere in Europe."
Indirectly recalling the impasse at the fifth round of bilateral
talks held in Prague in June, Chnoupek reportedly added that
"even this question could be brought to agreement acceptable
to both sides without any 'breaks for reflection' and delays."
The FRG representative, State Secretary Frank, had noted at the
end of the June round that the two sides had agreed to recommend
tr their respective governments "a pause for reflection" before
rusuming the deadlocked discussions. Subsequent Prague comment
criticized pessimistic estimates of the status of the .talks by
the West German "reactionary" press.
Chnoupek also remarked that in the exploratory talks Prague had
said "it was ready to oblige" in settling questions concerning
"the legal security of persons" and was prepared to give "suitable
guarantees" on this point, adding that "such a solution could
still be reached before the West German parliamentary elections
even if they should be held this year";--an optimistic view that
had also been expressed in the party organ RUDE PRAVO on 8 July,
just after the end of the latest round of the talks.
RUDE PRAVO's report of Chnoupek's Ostrava speech was notably brief
and undetailed. On an inside page uf its issue of the 4th, the
paper noted that the speech was delivered to mark the Slovak
anniversary and added that Chnoupek "also dealt with the current
international situation and praised the unified peaceful policy
of the Soviet Union." The same issue of the paper gave frontpage
attention to a harvest festival speech in Nitra by Slovak CP
First Secretary Lenart which included the standard call for FRG
recognition of the invalidity of the Munich ;act ab initio.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREN1S
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-33-
On the 10th, however, the Prague domestic service, reporting a
speech by CPCZ Presidium member Kapek in the city of Cheb on
the border with West Germany, said Kapok "again stressed the
necessity of annulment of the dishonorable Munich agreement"--
without the "ab initio" stipulation. Czechoslovak First
Secretary Husak, in a harvest festival speech in Hradec
Kralove broadcast live on the same day, brushed broadly over
the Prague-Bonn relations issue in the statement that "we are
striving for normalization, for a reasonable resolution to the
problems we have with neighboring West Germany, Austria, and
other states."
SOVIET BLOC REPORTS PRAVDA on 5 September, having ignored
Chnoupek's Ostrava speech, reported
Lenart's speech in Nitra and a speech erlivered by conservative
CSSR Federal Assembly Chairman Indra at Namest nad Hana on the
same day Chnoupek spoke. On the 7th TASS carried an interview
with Chnoupe% by its Prague correspondent in which the Czechoslovak
Foreign Minister reiterated virtually all the points he had made
on Prague-Bonn relations in the Ostrava speech and, in the passage
in FRG recognition of the invalidity of the Munich pact, restored
the element of the formula dropped in the Prague reports. He
declared in the interview, TASS said, that FRG recognition of
the Munich agreement "as null and void from its very inception"
would Laprove the general atmosphere in Europe. The TASS interview
was reproduced in PRAVDA on the 8th.
In the 13 September morning IZVESTIYA, however, an article on the
FRG-Czechoslovak talks by V. Novikov begs the question of the
"ab initio" proviso, to judge from two passages quoted in TASS'
summdry of the article. TASS quotes Novikov as recalling that
at the last round of the bilateral talks the CSSR delegation
"demonstrated good will by pointing out a possibility of solving
the question concerning the invalidity of the Munich agreement."
It also quotes him as observing that "most states have long ago
announced that they regard the shameful deal in Munich as invalid."
The appearance of a Soviet press article devoted to the Prague-
Bonn talks at this juncture is noteworthy in itself: Moscow
seldom discusses the talks in its own name, normally confining
itself to citing Prague, and comment on the subject in the central
preed has been extremely rare.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONMENTIAL PSIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-34-
East European reporting of Chnoupek's 3 September speech has
not clarified the status of the Czechoslovak formula on the
Munich agreement. A brief PAP account of the speech in the
Polish party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on 5 September obscured the
situation by citing Chnoupek's remarks on the Munich agreement
twice, first including the phrase "from the very beginning"
and in the next paragraph omitting it. The East Getman party
daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, on the other hand, in a brief report
on the 4th attributed to ADN' s Prague correspondent, used the
same formulation that appeared in the Prague dailies, omitting
"ab initio."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-35-
YUGOSL,AVIA
TITO PLEDGES CONTINUING PURGE, DEP-ORES "HUE AND CRY" ABROAD
In a wide-ranging series of speeches during a tour uf Croatia and
Bosnia, Tito vigorously defended the continuing campaign against
nationalism in Yugoslavia and reaffirmed his pledge to purge
party members and other dissidcnts who do not live up to their
responsibilities. With foreign and possibly also domestic
critics in mind, Tito admonished his audiences against letting
themselves be influenced by the "hue and cry" which Yugoslavia's
"enemies" were raising over the anti-nationalism campaign. At
the same time, however, he warned centralist, hardline elements
against waging "witch hunts"--injunctions reflecting concern
over the destabilizing internal impact of such actions and the
adverse international effects they would have at a time whan
political trials in Czechoslovakia are being widely assailed as
neo-Stalinist manifestations.
Tito's decision to take to the provinces to defend the clampdown
came against the backdrop of trials of government and party
officials and intelloctuals in Croatia and other republics in the
aftermath of last December's crisis over the Croatian nationalist
movement. The current trial of four former student leaders for
"counterrevolutionary" actions; on charges arising out of the
student strike last November, is being given ample coverage in
Yugoslav median Where Soviet media have approvingly reported
Tito' il tightening of party discipline, Western reports have
portrayed a mood of bitterness and alienation in Croatia result-
ing from the crackdown and have raised questions about the
direction in which Yugoslavia is moving politically.
In an address to shipyard workers in Rijeka on 4 September,
reported by Radio Belgrade, Tito set the tone of his tour by
seeking to mobilize worker support for the anti-nationalist
crackdown. Attacking the nationalist danger along af:uck lines
to develop the rationale for the action against dissidents, Tito
praised the workers for opposing nationalist manifestations dur-
ing the November-December crisis, noting that even in Zagreb
natioralist elements had "not won support from workers." He
added pointedly: "It was different there with segments of the
intelligentsia."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/02citiceM,M85T0087519p5041i2a0037-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
- 36 -
In the Rijeka address and in subsequent speeched Tito exploited
the "enrichmenta" theme--the charge that unnamed persons have
been amassing wealth through "various speculations" at the
workers' expense. Addressing a group of Zagreb worker organiza-
tions on the 8th, he stressed that "those who are unjustifiably
acquiring what the workers create cannot be in the League of
Communists." He also called for a purge of communists who continue
to disregard party directives. Pointing out that the party's
first task is "to clean up our ranks, he rebuked critics with the
remark that "nobody has the right to reproach us and to inter-
fere." In this context he urged workers to ignore "the hue and
cry raised by our enemies outside the country the moment we put
pressure on somebody."
In a lengthy speech in Bosnia on the 10th--broadcast live by
Radio Belgrade--on the anniversary of the Kozara battle, Tito
avIr. called for energetic action against "opportunists" in the
party and indicated concern about the orientation of the youth
in plrticular. Declaring that the struggle against nationalism
must extend to all republics, he again in effect defended the
methods being used:
We must point out that there is no room for compassion,
compromise, or sentimentality in our ranks when such a
dangerous enemy as the class enemy is involved. Such
communists cannot remain in leading posts.
Despite the uncompromising language, Tito again declined to name
names and cautioned against the waging of "a witch hunt and who
knows what else" under the banner of the anti-nationalist struggle.
Since the crackdown began last winter, the party leadership has
continued to direct such warnings at hercaine centralist elements
who have called for even harsher actions against dissident elements,
including the trial of the ousted Croatian party leadership.
Laying propaganda groundwork for the third youth conference in
November, Tito returned to a familiar theme in assailing professors
who "poison" the youth with anticommunist, anti-self-management
ideas. He went on to dwell on the need for "reinstituting"
Marxism at all levels of education and thundered: "No autonomy
of any kind of the university can prevent us from doing this!
We must do this!"
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0
Approved For Release 2000/08/041;0101MRDP85T00875R0001309080037-0
13 SEPTEMBER 1972
-37-
TAW prompt summary Gf thu mpeech
stressing the need for party unity
Tito said the main task now is "to
and to fight the "class enemy not
abroad as well."
highlighted those portions
and discipline. It noted that
purge the ranks of the LCY"
only within the country but
CONDEMNATION In the 10 September speech, dwelling on the "out-
OF TERRORISM side enemy" in an effort to shore up internal
unity, Tito assailed anti-Yugoslav terrorist
groups and the sources--unnamed--that finance them and took West
Germany, Sweden, and Austrialia to task for "tolerating" them.
He went on to observe that the Ynsnelav people's task is "to
welcome such groups nicely and let them vanish here"--a critical
allusion to the treatment of 19 Croatian emigre guerviLias who
were reportedly killed by the Yugoslav police after entering
Croatia in June,
Tito wound up tie provincial tour with an indictment of "terror
in general," iacluding the Munich killings, Israel's retaliatory
actions against the Arabs, and the bombing in Indochina. In
contrast to the more cautious Yugoslav 'tend on earlier terrorist
acts by Arab extremist groups, Tito declared that "it is now
necessary to learn some lessons from wh.c happened in Munich and
to do something through the United Nations to insure that
terrorism w 11 no longer exist on a world scale." Tito's remarks
on this score may have been responsive to Secretary General
Waldhelm's 8 September call to UN members to put an "important
and urgent" item dealing with terror on the agenda of the next
General Assembly.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/RTErkeiP85T0087W
A
- 38 -
KOREA - USSR - CHINA
.0
ipp
ikoiqh3-0
KATUSHEV VISIT, NATION. DAY OBSERVANCES REFLECT RELATIONS
A Soviet party delegation led by Secretary Katushev, who is in
charge of relations with ruling parties, visited the DPRK from
3 to 11 September on a "friendly visit" at the invitation of the
KWP Central Committee. Party relations were discussed, but the
precise purpose of the visit was not specified. The visit came
against a background of warm Sino-Korean relations centering on
convergent interests in recent developments concerning Korean
unification. Moscow has been notably reserved toward these
developments, perhaps reflecting pique over not being suffi-
ciently informed as well as concern over their implications for
the German question.*
The last high-level Soviet delegation to visit the DPRK was a
party-government delegation led by Politburo member and First
Deputy Premier Mazurov which attended the celebrations in July
1971 of the 10th anniversary of the Soviet-DPRK treaty of
friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. Mazurov had
led a similar delegation to Pyongyang in August 1970 to attend
the observance of the 25th anniversary of Kozean liberation.
Comment on the Katushev visit reflected something less th4n a
complete meeting of the minds between the two sides. The visit
was highlighted by a meeting with Kim Il-song, which both
sides' media as well as the joint communique described as having
taken place in "a cordial and friendly atmosphere." A TASS
report added that "questions of party cooperation" and "other
questions of mutual interest" were discussed. According to
TASS, Katushev said at a Soviet embassy reception that his
talks with Kim were "useful and fruitful" and that there was a
"thorough exchange of opinion."
* It is possible that the Soviets were briefed on che North-
South Korean contacts when a foreign ministry delegation
comprising M.S. Kapitsa, head of a Far Eastern affairs
department, and the vice director of the ministry's inter-
national organizations department visited in June, though that
visit's primary purpose was presumably to discuss the handling
of the Korean question in the forthcoming UNGA session.
Moscow's reserved tre-tment of the 4 July North-South Korean
joint statement 4s discussed in the TRENDS of 23 August 1972,
pages 25-27.
CONFIDENTIAL
roved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050037-0