TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: August 30, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
30 AUGUST 1972
R000300050035-2 XIII, NO. 35)
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CONF113ENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
30 AUGUST 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Hanoi Comments on Nixon Convention Speech, U.S. Fi.ections . . .
1
NHAN DAN Announces Propaganda Drive to Mark Anniversaries . . .
6
Belated Release, Changes in DRV Slogans Follow Polemics . . . .
7
Paris: "Escalation" Assailed, GVN POW-Release Offer Ignored .
9
DRV Routinely Protests Air Strikes, Notes Dike Maintenance . .
12
Peking Protests U.S. Sinking of Vessel Off DRV Coast . . . . .
18
Moscow Denounces U.S. Bombings, Observes "Dike Day" . . . . . .
20
Pathet Lao Delegation Tours Several Communist Countries . . . .
23
Funeral, Pathet Lao Visit Prompt Leader Appearances in Hanoi .
26
Moscow Berates Cairo Critics But Claims Relations Unchanged . .
27
PRAVDA Urges Palestinian "National Front," Political Program .
30
U. S. ELECTIONS
Moscow Cites Republican Views on Need for U.S.-Soviet Dialog .
33
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Cinema Committee Chief Romanov Removed Under Fire . . . . . . .
36
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Husak Assaila Western "Progressive" Critics of Recent Trials .
38
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
30 AUGUST 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 21 - 27 AUGUST 1972
Moscow (2900 items)
Peking (1340 items)
Vietnam
(9%)
7%
Domestic Issues
(39%)
38%
[U.S. Air Strike
s (2%)
3%]
PRC Vessel Attacked
(--)
4%
[Solidarity Mont
h (2%)
2%]
Off DRV Coast
Romanian National. Da
y (--)
6%
Indochina
(10%)
9%
Supreme Soviet
(--)
4%
[Vietnam
(5%)
5%]
Discussion of SALT
Romanian National Day
(--)
8%
Accords
Bangladesh UN Sent
(0.1%)
4%
Mars 2 & 3 Probes
(0.1%)
3%
Tunisian Delegation
(--)
3%
Middle East
(1%)
3%
in PRC
China
(3%)
3%
Tanzanian Delegation
(--)
3%
in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases o,ie propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
? FOR OFFICIAL U8F ONLY
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi has departed sharply from its traditional portrayal of
differences among U.S. political leasers as superficial
disagreements over tactics and strategy- The conclusion of
the Republican Party convention and President Nixon's 23 August
acceptance speech prompted a flurry of propaganda attacking the
Administration's policies and expressing approval of the
Democratic Party's positions on Vietnam. Hanoi htis initially
reacted to the President's 29 August press conference with a
radio commentary on the 30th denouncing h#s statement that
bombing and mining of the North will continue unless there is
substantial progress in negotiations and his remarks on the
further withdrawal of U.S. forces.
In the wake of the 17 and 19 August NHAN DAN editorials, which
lectured Hanoi's big communist allies and bitterly assailed
policies of "reconciliation" and "compromise" with the United
States, a NHAN DAN editorial on 24 August announced the launching
of a large-scale drive to inform the populace about party policies.
The editorial carried no echoes of the renewed polemic, but it
did note that "recent important NHAN DAN editorials" will be among
the documents studied in the current drive. Hanoi media had
previously labeled the editorial of the 17th "important." The
possibility that there was disagreement on the content of the
annual slogans marking the anniversary of the August Revolution
(19 August) and DRV National Day (2 September) is suggested by
substantive changes and by the fact that they were released
considerably later--on 25 August--than in any previous year. DRV
leaders put on a show of unity, with Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and
Pham Van Dong making concurrent public appearances for the first
time in months.
The divergent interests of the communist powers have been
reflected in reactions to Peking's 24 August charge that U.S.
aircraft sank a lifeboat belonging to a Chinese merchant ship off
the DRV coast on the 22d. While Peking made a point of insisting
that the boat was not moving supplies to the North Vietnamese,
Hanoi seized on the incident to portray a systematic U.S.
challenge to China and other communist countries aiding the DRV.
Moscow's reports were contrived to indicate that Peking is not
letting the interdiction measures jeopardize its relations with
Washington.
HANOI CANTS ON NIXON CONVENTION SPEECH, U.S, ELECTIONS
In its attacks on Administration policies following the conclusion
of the Republican Party convention, Hanoi has repeatedly cited the
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Democratic Party's position on Vietnam in approving terms and
has altered its standard line that there is no significant
difference between the two U.S. political parties and their
candidates.
Initial DRV reaction to President Nixon's 23 August speech
accepting the nomination came in a radio commentary on the 24th
which reiterated recent Hanoi criticism of optimistic statements
attributed to Administration spokesmen on the po ssibil-ty of a
Vietnam settlement.* Noting that the Republican platform
endorsed the Administration's position on Vietnam and that the
President's speech "reaffirmed the maintenance of Thieu" to
prevent the imposition of a communist regime, the radio
declared caustically that
with such an obdurate and warlike position,
. . . it is clear that there is no basis for
moving toward an end to the war as promised
by the Nixon clique. On the contrary, we
have adequate griunds to affirm that the
Nixon clique is trying to prolong the Vietnam
war of aggression and will only negotiate to
end it when Nixon's impudent conditions are
Like other propaganda on the subject, the broadcast went on to
observe that the Democratic Party platform had "met the demands
of the American people" for an unconditional end to the bombing,
withdrawal of U.S. troops, and an end to support for Thieu.
The President's acceptance speech was discussed in detail in a
25 August Hanoi radio comr+.entary which deprecated his remarks
about achieving progress toward ending the war, traveling tens
of thousands of miles to reach a negotiated settlement, and
ending the U.S. ground combat role. It assailed his reiteration
of the proposal for withdrawing U.S. troops following a cease-fire,
noting that he had said nothing about the problem of the future
government of South Vietnam and calling his proposal a scheme
aimed at forcing the South Vietnamese people to lay down their
weapons and approve the existence of the Thieu administration.
* Previous Hanoi comment on this subject is discussed in the
TRENDS of 23 August 1972, pages 9-10.
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The 25 August commentary also dismissed the President's
suggestion of elections under international supervision and
with communist participation, protesting that such elections
would be held "within the framework of the U.S. lackey-puppet
administration's regime." Hanoi comment on allied peace
proposals this year has not specifically noted the offer of
communist participation in elections, but this offer had been
reported in Ha',ioi media when it was proposed by Thieu in his
11 July 1969 speech.* The President's pledges not to abandon
U.S. POW's, allow the imposition of a communist government, or
stain the honor of the United States were labeled by the
radio "brazen 'turning black into white' arguments."
DRV criticism of the President's speech was repeated in the
Hanoi press on 26, 27, and 28 August. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
article on the 26th accused him of "uttering hypocritical words
about peace" while "having his subordinates hurl threats."
Documenting the charge, the army paper cited Western news
agencies as reporting, among other things, that "U.S. air
commanders have brazenly shouted for continuing the bombing of
North Vietnam fur at least three more years." This may be
an allusion to an interview with unidentified high-level U.S.
Air Force officials on the 23d, which included a reference
to the possibility that the bombing might go on for another
three years as well as speculation that sizable amounts of
outside aid were getting through to Hanoi. QUAN DOI KHAN DAN
did not further identify the source of its quotation but went
on to say that "they revealed that they had proposed to Nixon
selected military formulas which would certainly cause
thousands of casualties to civil.ians."
The most direct Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's
remarks about the improvement of relations with the Soviet
Union and China came in a Liberation Radio commentary on the 29th
which opened with the observation that "if anyone has dreamed
of seeing a change in Nixon's extremely reactionary policy during
the last months of his Presidential term, that dream is now
surely lost." In an attack on the President's outline of the
? Administtion's foreign policy, the radio asserted that the
President
boasted about his perfidious maneuvers in
getting a compromise and establishing a
* This aspect of Thieu's speech was noted, for example, in a
13 July 1969 NHAN DAN article--see the 16 July 1969 TRENDS, page 3.
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relationship with one country in order to
have a free hand to cope with another
country, and in sowing disunity among the
socialist countries and other peace-loving
countries in the world in order to make it
easy for the United States to dominate
the world.
The commentary charged that the President is pursuing
"expansionist and aggressive designs based on the so-called
U.S. strength," citing as evidence the Administration's
"stubborn" orposition to a partial withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Europe and to ending U.S. support of "reactionary
administrations in Greece, Israel, and Taiwan on the
illogical pretext that it is necessary to maintain the
confidence of the U.S. allies." The issue of U.S. support
for "dictatorial" governments had been raised in a 21 August
NHAN DAN article by Nguyen Huu Chinh, which similarly held
that the U.S. policy of detente was aimed at gaining a free
hand to cope with the world revolutionary movement and to
bully the small nations."* Chinh asked: "How can one forget
that the Nixon Administration has always been the intimate
friend of the dictatorial fascist regimes in Greece, Spain,
and Portugal?"
U.S.-POLITICAL SCENE Hanoi's new, differentiated portrayal
of the views of the rival U.S.
political parties'had been foreshadowed in the 18.August
"Chien Thang" article which noted the presence of "reasonable
heads in U.S. political circles." A NHAN DAN article on the
28th made the change in Hanoi's appraisal explicit, stating
that the two American political parties no longer offer
virtually identical platforms. This and other commentaries c::
the subject dd not make clear what Hanoi hopes to accomplish
by airing its preference in the U.S. election. One article,
the 27 August QUAN DOI KHAN DAN discussion of the President's
acceptance speech, took note of his statement that the American
people will not tolerate any attempt by the enemy to interfere
with their right-to make their own decision on what is best
for America; calling this statement "impudent,' the army paper
remarked that "obviously Nixon looked down on the level of
consciousness of the American progressive, justice-loving, and
freedom-loving public."
* See the 23 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 5-6.
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NHAN DAN on the 25th developed at length the contrast between
Republican and Democratic views reflected in the two party
platforms. On the Vietnam issue, the article said, the
Democratic platform reflects "an effort to analyze the failures
and errors the United States has committed in Vietnam and
Indochina, and hence to find a way out." The Republican
platform, according to the article, is "replete with distortions
of facts and insults to the Democratic candtdAtes" while
"stirring the chauvinistic and conservative thoughts of a
number of Americans." The &'cle stated further that the
Republican platform "obviously runs counter to the urgent needs
of the Vietnamese and American peoples and stubbornly sticks
to an aggressive and neocolonialist stand." It concluded with
the charge that the Republican Party "represents the interests
of the leading American capitalists and of American political
forces cherishing many expansionist and aggressive ambitions,"
and that it is characterized by "hawkishness and conservatism."
Earlier Hanoi comment on the Republican convention had also
referred to the Democratic platform in favorable terms. A
22 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN report on antiwar demonstrations in
Miami observed that the Democratic Party, "faced with the U.S.
imperialists' stalemate and serious setback in Vietnam,
endorsed a platform containing positive factors to move toward
a correct peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem--a solution
consistent with the legitimate aspirations of the American
people, who demand an early end to the war." Ngo Dien, head
of the DRV Foreign Ministry's Department of Press and Information,
had been reported by VNA on 27 July as stating--in much the same
terms as QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 22d--that McGovern's po^ition on
Indochina "contains pcsitive elements which would lead to a
correct, peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem in accordance
with the legitimate aspirations of the American people for an
early cessation of the war of aggression in Vietnam."* Ngo Dien
saw McGovern' nomination as "mainly due" to this stand and as
reflecting "a new trend in the United States." The point was
carried to its full conclusion in the 28 August NHAN DAN article,
which observed that "in past years during the various Presidential
elections the American voters generally had to make a choice
between political twins," whereas this time they have "a clearcut
choice" between "two opposite paths and policies which are different
from one another in many fields."
* The comment was made in reply to a question during a press
conference at which Ngo Dien released a foreign ministry memorandum
on alleged U.S. escalation of the war. See the TRENDS of 2 August
1972, pages 5-6.
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The NHAN DAN article claimed that the present rival candidat's
differ most strikingly in their positions on Vietnam, the budget,
and the arms race. Citing McGoverr's proposAl for cutting
defense expenditures, the paper said it reflects "the stand of
a certain part of American capitalist circles" which believes
that the United States cannot be attacked by any country in
coming years and that savings from defense expenditures should
be used to increase investments in industry and building, to
strengthen the position. of the dollar, Lnd to restore the U.S.
competitive position "in the international capitalist market."
NHAN DAN went on to observe that the "McGovern phenomenon" has
taken place under conditions in which "millions of Americans
are associating their demand for the cessation of this unjust
and costly war with the demands for many changes in the country
along progressive'and democratic lines."
Hanoi's traditional view of U.S. election politics was typified
by a statement in a September 1967 article by Defense Minister
Vo Nguyen '3iap :
Despite a possible change of presidents, the
U.S. Imperialists' aggressive policy cannot
be changed in nature. The U.S. presidential
elections are but a distribution of
hierarchies among the personalities of the
parties of the ruling capitalist class in
the United States.
An unusually detailed exposition of the Marxist view of U.S.
politics in the September 1967 issue of the DRV journal
TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING) held that the two parties
merely represented the views of rival "monopoly groups in the
American capitalist class." As for politicians who criticized
the war, the author maintained that "the hawk and dove blocs
have two different strategies to resolve the war of aggression
in Vietnam, but they basically still represent the viewpoint of
the American monopoly cppitalists."
NHAN DAN ANNOUNCES PROPAGANDA DRIVE TO MARK ANNIVERSARIES
Broadcast in Hanoi's domestic service, NHAN DAN's 24 August
editorial heralded the launching of a large-scale propaganda
drive to inform the North Vietnamese people about Vietnam Workers
Party (VWP) policies. On the occasion of the August :evolution
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anniversary and DRV National Day, the editorial said, the
VWP Secretariat advocated the organization of "a political
activity drive with the aim of clearly explaining the basic
situation of the resistance" after the past four months of
fighting. This explanatory drive, the editorial added, will
enable "everyone to realize our great, overall, and steady
victories, our position of initiative, and our ascending
and certainly victorious posture and the enemy's passive,
bogged-down, and defeated posture." Secretariat circulars
released by Hanoi for the observance of past anniversaries have
similarly called for propaganda campaigns. This year's
directions from the Secretariat have not been released by the
radio or press.
While the 24 August editorial did not echo Hanoi's recently
renewed polemics against its big communist allies, it did
note that "recent important NHAN DAN editcrials" will be among
the documents studied during the propaganda drive, thereby
suggesting that the editorial of the 17th--previously labeled
"important" by Hanoi media--will be the basis for an explanation
to the people of Hanoi's problems with Moscow and Peking.
According to the editorial, the study drive will also review
"the Politburo's resolution" and statements by the DRV, NFLSV,
and PRC. The Politburo resolution was not further identified.
An article by the editor of NHAN DAN, Hoang '--published in
the 8 July issue of the paper--had similarly noted widespread
political activities including the study of various party
documents, among them a Politburo resolution. T4e Hoang Tung
article and the 24 August editorial both mentioned the role of
a newly-organized network of "reporters" in propagandizing these
documents and explaining the party line. Organization of such
a network had been urged in the January-February issue of the
journal TUYEN HUAN.
BELATED RELEASE, CHANGES IN DRV SLOGANS FnLLCW POLEMICS
The DRV's annual slogans to mark the anniversary of the August
Revolution (19 Auguut) and DRV National Day (2 September) were
released belatedly on 25 August, and their content differs
from that of previous years in several respects.* The departure
* The slogans were publicized during the first week in August
in 1970 and 1971 and have customarily been released no later
than 19 August.
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from past practice are particularly noteworthy against the
background of the 17 and 19 August NHAN DAN editorials, which
sharply registered displeasure with Hanoi's big communist
allies for pursuing policies of reconciliation and compromise
with the United States, and they raise the possibility that
there may have been disagreement about their content within
the DRV leadership.
The slogans contain the traditional expression of gratitude
for the sympathy and "wholehearted assistance" of the parties,
governments, and peoples of fraternal socialist countries.
However, the slogan than'aing peace- and justice-loving people
throughout the world for their sympathy and support for the
first time in recent years does not specifically mention the
"world communist and workers movement." This omission seems
especially pointed in the wake of the NHAN DAN editorial on the
17th, which stressed the significance of the support Hanoi had
received from the recently held nonalined conference in Guyana.*
At the same time, the slogans omit the call-added during Hanoi's
anti-China polemics last summer after the announcement of
President Nixon's Peking visit--to "uphold the spirit of
independence and sovereignty, rely mainly on ourselves," an
omission that seems curious in light of Hanoi's recent polemical
onslaught on its 'allies.
This year's slogans also omit the call for the "party, people,
and army" to "unite, around the Central Committee"--a phrase
which appeared repeatedly in Hanoi propaganda following Ho Chi
Minh's death in September 1969.** This phrase was first used
in slogans in January 1970 marking the 40th anniversary of the
VWP, and it recurred in the August Revolution-National Day
slogans in 1970 and 1971.*** The slogan which previously
contained the unity appeal now leads off with a call for
* The 17 August NHAN DAN editorial is discussed in the
23 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 1-4.
** The call for unity behind the Central Committee was made, for
example, in a 29 September 1969 VWP Politburo instruction--see
the 3 October 1969 TRENDS, pages 9-10.
*** For reports on these slogans, see the TRENDS of 21 January 1970,
pages 13-14; 5 August 1970, page 13; and 11 August 1971, page 2.
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"compatriots and combatants throughout the country" to "be of
one mind" and concludes by urging the implementation of Ho's
testament and defeat of the "U.S. aggressors."
The impact of the stepped-up action in the North and the South
in recent months is reflected in several of this year's slogans.
Last year the Lighting in the South was noted in a brief plaudit
for the victories of the southern PLAF and people. This year
there is an additional slogan asking "compatriots and combatants"
in the South, "under the banner of the NFLSV," to "step up
offensives and uprisings, win greater victories," and
thwart Vietnamization and pacification in order to "achieve
an independent, democratic, peaceful, neutral, and prosperous
South ViLtnam advancing to the peaceful reunification of the
country." There is also a new slogan addressed to "patriots
still in the r.i.ks of the puppet army and administration," who
are asked to join the fight to "defaat the U.S. aggressors and
their henchmen."
The North's concentration on the war is reflected not only in new
references to the military tasks of the North and he need to aid
the South, but also in the omission from several sloaans of
previously standard references to nonmilitary domesti: tasks.
Thus, the opening slogan calling for implementation of Ho's
testament does not include last year's reference to "building
socialism," and the slogan on socialist assistance does not note
that the aid is for "socialist construction" as well as for the
war effort. The slogan on the duties of northerners includes a
call for them to "continue to build socialism" while maintaining
and boosting production and organizing their life well, but
it leaves out the usual reference to the need to successfully
fulfill the state plan.
PARIS: ''ESCALATION" ASSAILED. GVN POW-RELEASE OFFER IGNORED
At the 24 August session of the Paris talks the PRG's Mme. Binh
enlarged on her remarks the previous week about the U.S. "error"
of pursuing Vietnamization instead of entering into "serious
negotiations." VNA, in its usual summary fashion, omitted most
of the detail of her four-point discussion, focusing mainly on
her charges of prolonga?-ion and expansion of the war and her
rebuttal of U.S. charges tha: the Viet Cong are exhausted. Of
her lengthy treatment of the 8 May proposal, VNA reported only
her statement that it is "aa ultimatum forcing the Vietnamese
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people to accept what the United States has not been able to
achieve by bombs and shells on the battlafields over the last
four years." It also completely ignored 'er ata'ement that
the U.S. position on the Thieu government--which the White
House "unfortunately" reaffirmed in the Republican Party
platform--is "the root cause of this war," and her lengthy
discourse on the nature of Thieu's "extremely warlike and
fascist ruling group."
Omitting also Mme. Binh's charge that "serious negot+.ations"
cannot proceed until the United States ceases its support to
Thieu, VNA did cover her concluding remarks in which she
reiterated the litany of basic Vietnamese communist demands--
withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops, cessation of support for
the Thieu administration and the resignation of Thd,eu, and the
formation of "a broad government of national concord."
In a prepared statement rrl.eased upon her arrival at the session
and reported in full by L1, on the 25th, Mme. Binh remarked on
President Nixon's acceptance speech at the Republican convention
on the 23d, claiming, in the spirit of her remarks at the session,
that it was an attempt to deceive the American people. Specifically,
she criticized the President's mention of the die?ance he has
traveled in order to try to bring the war to an end. "Why," she
asked, "should he make a trip round the world to seek a
solution while it is here at this conference and nowhere else?"
DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy--standing in for Minister Xuan Thuy,
who is on a 10-day visit to the French Alps--took up the theme
of U.S. presentation of a "false and distorted picture" of the
situation in Vietnam and contrasted this with the communists'
"good will" at the Paris conference. VNA providsd only the
briefest coverage of his remarks, reporting only his opening
statement on U.S. intensification and expansion of the war, his
charge that the United States is compensating for its withdrawal
of ground troops by escalating the air war, and his concluding
remarks on the PRG's ?'logical and reasonable" proposals for
ending the war The laccount omitted Vy's brief restatement of
last week's "'Lost opportunities" theme, as well an his charges
that the United States has "re-Americanized" the war whilA the
Saigon government has proven itself unable to stand alone. Also
unreported was his brief listing of recent U.S. attacks on the
DRV and his condemantion of recent remarks by Secretaries Rogers
and Laird.
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Also unreported by VNA was the exchango following the CVN's
offer to return 600 sick and wounded prisoners to the North.
Mme. Binh and Vy, in rejecting this proposal, called it a
"perfidious and well-worn maneuver" and a "meaningless stratagem."
The PRC press spokesman, in post-session remarks which as usual
went unreported by VNA, called the offer a trick designed to
mislead public opinion. As usual, VNA totally ignored the
GVN statement and dismissed the remarks of the U.S. side in
one sentence, claiming that "the U.S. delogation . . . kept
avoiding discussion of the basic points in the PRG's peace
plan, thus preventing the conference from making any progress."
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DRV ROUTINELY PROTESTS AIR STRIKES, NOTES DIKE MAINTENANCE
Hanoi han so far given only minimal attention to U.S. air strikes
this week, issuing four routine foreign ministry spokesman
statements. In addition, a series of short reports carried by
VNA from 24 through 28 August condemned various military actions:
the dropping of a canister bomb containing "hundreds of dart bombe"
on a hamlet on the outskirts of Hanoi on the 24th; "savage
attacks" by B-52's on the Vinh Long commune in the Vinh Linh
area, near the demilitarized zone, on the 25th and 26th, and
"tactical air raids" on peasants repairing dikes there; bombing
of "many places in and outside Haiphong city" on the 26th; and the
dropping of "hundreds of bombs" on a heavily populated sector of
Lam Thao district in Vinh Phu Province, northwest of Hanoi, on
the 27th. Typical targets reported hit included private dwellings,
handicraft and agricultural cooperatives, two schools, a market,
and a cemetery; several individual casualties were cited.
The low level of this reaction is unusual in view of the fact that
U.S. planes on 27 August attacked supply depots and barracks in
the Hanoi-Haiphong region in what U.S. officials termed the heaviest
raids on the area in more than four years, while a naval "task
force" of four ships shelled the Haiphong area in the first such
attack since those of 9-11 May. Large-scale attacks on either
of the DRV's two major cities usually provoke official reaction
at the level of a foreign ministry statement within two or three
days; in like manner, the earlier naval attack on Haiphong was
protested in a foreign ministry statement of 11 May.* The only
references to the raids so far available appeared in the 28 August
foreign ministry spokesman's stltement which condemned the
rocketing of a village in the suburbs of Hanoi and "tactical
air raids" on populated areas in the suburbs of Haiphong, and
in a routine VNA report on plane downings, datelined 28 August,
which claimed that the armed forces of Haiphong had "set ablaze
two marauding U.S. warships" on the previous day.
* The 11 May statement, discussed in the TRENDS of 17 May 1972,
page 7, was described by VNA as a foreign ministry spokesman's
statement and by Hanoi radio as a higher-level foreign ministry
statement. The press account of the statement confirmed that
it was issued at the more authoritative level.
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PLANES DOWNED, Hanoi's claimed total of U.S. planes downed
PILOTS CAPTURI.'D over the North reached 3,866 as of 28 August,
with the reported downing during the week of
planes over the provinces of Ha Tinh, Thanh Hoag Lang Son, Hai
Hung, Nam Ha, Hoa Binh, Q-ang Binh, Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Ninh Binh,
Bac Thai and Nghe An and t'e cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. An
unspecified number of "aggressor pilots" was reported captured
in downings of the 25th and the 27th. Tl,~ee U.S. warships were
reported 'set ablaze" on the 27th, two oif Haiphong and one off
Ha Tinh Province.
Hanoi utilized the occasion c" the release of the names of 10
"newly captured" U.S. pilots* to aim a inrther blast at President
Nixon's role in the U.S. "war of destruction" against Vietnam,
especially at his escalation of the war in the North since April.
A NHAN DAN editorial on the 26th, carried by Hano4 radio and
VNA, portrayed the capture of the pilots as "eloquent evidence
of Nixon's failure in using his air force to attack the northern
part of our country." Attempting to document its contention
that the general buildup of U.S. air and naval power over both
parts of Vietnam has been considerably greater and "more savage"
unc;er President Nixon than during the Johnson Administration,
the editorial pointed to the alleged bombing of dikes and
population centers and also claimed that the Nixon Administration
has been responsible for dropping three times as many bombs
over both parts of Vietnam as the Johnson Administration. The
editorial argued that President Nixon's "erroneous strategic
policy" of escalating the war in the North is not only a military
but also a political failure, since it has resulted in a loss
of U.S. prestige and an increase in the number of pilots captured.
Referr'ng to the upcoming U.S. election:,, the editorial claimed
that both the Republican Party and President Nixon have made
clear their intention to hold to their "aggressive and bellicose
viewpoint," and it urged the DRV armed forces and people to
heighten their struggle against the "U.S. aggressors"--specifically,
to down more U.S. aircraft, capture more pilots, and set fire to
* All listed as captured between 13 June and 11 July, the pilots
were identified by VNA on 25 August as Air Force officers Cregg
Ormar Hanson, first lieutenant; Richard Joseph Fulton, first
lieutenant; George Alan Rose, captain; Peter Alfred Callaghan, first
lieutenant; Thomas John Hanto.i, captain; Richard Henry McDow, first
lieutenant; Kevin Joseph Cheney, captain; Donald Karl Logan, first
lieutenant; Marion Anthony Marshall, captain; and Navy Lieutenant
Commander Henry Deas Lesesne.
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more warships. The editorial, predicting military defeat for the
United States in both the South and the North, claimed that the
North has been, able to maintain its support duties toward the
frontline, as well as downing "nearly 400 U.S. aircraft" and
capturing "hundreds of aggressor pilots."
Also pegged to the release of the names of newly captured pilots
was a Hanoi radio commentary of the 25th, which claimed that U.S.
air and naval power is "incapable of saving the puppet army from
defeat (or) sabotaging and preventing our compatriots in the rear
base from fulfilling their sacred duty toward their compatriots
on the frontline." It warned that the more modern techniques the
United States uses, the "more adequate, up-to-date techniques" and
"more effective fighting methods" will be used against them. It
praised the victories of the "Northern firenet" in downing U.S.
planes and capturing their pilots, both by day and by night, as
"proof of the latent strength and combat skills of our Northern
armed forces and people."
FOREIGN MINISTRY Foreign ministry spokesman's statements
SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENTS issued during the past week set forth the
following specific charges:
+ The bombing of a hamlet on the outskirts of Hanoi and of populous
areas in Ha Bac and Hai Hung provinces on 24 August was protested in
a spokesman's statement of the same day. The statement alac cited
strikes of the 23d on Dong Hoi city and populous areas of Thai Binh,
Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and
the Vinh Linh*zone; charged B-52's with bombing localities in Quang
Binh Province; and claimed that U.S. warships launched artillery
attacks on coastal villages in Thanh Hoe. Among specific targets
listed as hit were an elementary school in a village in Thanh Hoa
Province and another on the outskirts of Hanoi, and a portion of the
dike on the Red River in Son Thuy district of Nam Ha Province.
+ The statement of the 26th, citing alleged attacks of the 25th
and 26th, claimed that the raids were part of a "vicious scheme
of inflicting heavy civilian casualties, razing whole urban
centres, and destroying dikes in the rainy season to force
the Vietnamese people to accept the insolent terms of the
United States." In support of this charge, it mentioned
specifically the destruction of a portion of the dike surrounding
Nam Dinh city and damage to a portion of the Day River dike in
Ninh Binh Province. In more general terms, it condemned
extermination raids" of the 26th on Haiphong, as well as the
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rocketing of localities in and surrounding Hanoi, the city of
Kien An near Haiphong, and a number of populous areas in Ha
Tay Province. Alleged targets on the 25th included the cities
of Nam Dinh, Vinh and Ninh Binh, the town of Ninh Giang, and
populous areas in Lang Son, Quang Ninl, Hai Hung, Thai Binh,
Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, He Tinh and Quang Binh
provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. Also on the 25th, B-52's
allegedly bombed a number of localities in the Vinh Linh zone.
The statement concluded by asserting that President Nixon must
be held fully responsible for these "savage crimes."
+ The spokesman's statement of 28 August protested the "many
new war acts" of the previous day, which included the mining
of Bai Tu Long Bay, the rocketing of a village in the suburbs
of Hanoi, and "tactical air raids" on the suburbs of Haiphong
and populous areas of Lang Sop, He Bac, Vinh Phu, Quang Ninh,
Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An,
Ha Tinh and Quang Binn provinces and the Vinh Linh zone, as well
as the shelling by U.S. warships of Do Son resort and a number
of coastal areas in Quang Binh. Further bombing of the Day River
dike, this time in Nam Ha Province, was reported to have occurred
on 26 and 27 August, with "vast stretches" of the dike destroyed.
+ The statement of the 30th condemned the "barbarous strikes" of
the 28th and 29th on Dong Hoi, the capital of Quang Binh Province;
on the town of Can Loc; and on populated areas in Bac Thai, His Bac,
Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, He Tihh and Quang Binh
provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It also charged that B-52's
bombed localities in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh zone,
and that U.S. warships "wantonly shelled" coastal villages in
Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces. Among the targets reportedly
hit was the Dien Thanh dam in Dien Chau district of Nghe An
Province.
DIKES In addition to charges in the routine DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statements of U.S. attacks on
water conservancy facilities, attacks on dikes were mcntioned
in a VNA item on the 27th which claimed that "dozens of U.S.
planes" bombed the dike on the Dao River in Nam Dinh city, blowing
away two sections of the dike, causing craters below the water
level of the river, and destroying a concrete pier. VNA called
t'-is attack the 57th on "river and sea dikes and other hydraulic
works in Nam Dinh."
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Hanoi media gyve extensive attention to the dike issue in
connection !-tch "dike day" (28 August), recently proclaimed
by Cuba and endorsed by the World Peace Council on 21 August.
DRV Water Conservancy Minister He Ke Tsn offered typical
comment in an interview with PRENSA LATINA, reported by VNA
on 28 August. Tan denied U.S. charges that much of Hanoi's
treatment of the dike issue was "communist propaganda," and
cited as evidence 29 alleged strikes on the dike system in
the first 25 days of August and the views of the members of
the international war crimes investigation team which recently
visited the DRV. In additirn, Tan rebutted President Nixon's
statements in his 27 July press conference that the dikes had
been improperl" repaired after the 1971 floods and that any
bombing damage which might. have occurred could be easily repaired.
The minister claimed that the dikes "now would have the highest
capacity to combat flash floods such as those of 1971 if Nixon
were not deliberately bombing and destroying" them. Tan added
that dike repair work was quickly organized and carried out,
but that repairs to important positions and critical are i destroyed
by "deliberate" attacks were difficult because of the magnitude of
the undertaking. He listed the areas most frequently attacked as
the provinces of Nam Ha, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa,
Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh.
In the course of reviewing the history of dike building in the
North, a background report by the Water Conservancy Ministry on
the DRV's hydraulic system, reported by VNA on the 27th, referred
to 1971 as "a year of tremendous trials." It claimed that,
despite the highest water level in 100 years, the dike system
along the Red River held firm. "Only the dikes of (the) Thai
Binh River and Duong River were broken in two places," it said,
but the damage was quickly repaired. The report, like Minister
Tan, maintained that the repairs since the 1971 flood, "according
to the estimates of hydraulic experts and the experience of
the Vietnamese people," would have enabled the dike system to
resist the bigge3t floods "had it not been bombed by U.S.
aircraft."
Details of some of the alleged U.S. bombing were given by Vu Van
Dinh, chairman of the Thai Binh administrative committee, in a
talk on the status of the rice crop in his province, broadcast
by Hanoi radio on the 25th. He claimed that the United States
has struck at Thai Binh a total of 230 times since April and
54 times during the first 19 days of August. Thirty-five of these
attacks, he charged, damaged dikes and sluices, while 180 others
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were aimed at populated areas. Among the targets Dinh listed
was the Lan sluice, struck 13 times and said to have been
completely destroyed. Despite these attacks, the province
official declared, the dikes were being satisfactorily
repaired, the 10th-month rice crop was promising, flood and
storm control preparations were under way, U.S. planes were
still being downed, and the province was still sending youths
to the frontline.
Similar claims were made in a 29 August NHAN DAN editorial,
broadcast by Hanoi radio, on the role of the peasants in
maintaining the dikes in the face of U.S. bombings. And a
26 August VNA report cited the premier as commending the
provinces of Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, and Thai Binh for
their "achievements in consolidating and repairing the dikes
and hydraulic works bombed by the U.S." The report also
stressed that "without the bombing" the work done by the
four provinces "could guarantee the dikes against the
biggest flood of the type which occurred last year."
Concern over another possible threat to the dikes, from the
fourth typhoon of the season, was indicated by a directive
issued by the premier on 28 August outlining seven steps
for combating typhoons and floods, including reinforcement
of dike-protecting forces, especially those guarding sea
dikes. No reports have yet been monitored of any damage by
the fourth typhoon, which struck the coast near Haiphong on
the 29th and proceeded inland.
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PEKING PROTESTS U.S. SINKING OF VESSEL OFF DRV C( AST
The divergent interests among the communist powers have been
reflected in their reactions to what Peking charged was the
sinking of a Chinese lifeboat off the DRV'coast by U.S.
aircraft on 22 August. While Peking carefully narrowed the
focus of its protest to register concern over the security of
its own vessels and personnel, Hanoi seized upon the incident
to portray "a systematic and premeditated plan of provocation
and threat" against China and other communist countries aiding
the Vietnamese. Moscow has avoided direct comment, but Soviet
coverage of the incident has been designed to minimize any
impression that the Chinese are risking their improved relations
with the United States to help the DRV. Western press reports
on the presence of a Chinese minesweeper at Haiphong harbor
have not been acknowledged by Hanoi or its two big allies.
PEKING A PRC Foreign Ministry statement on 24 August charged
that U.S. aircraft on the 22d bombed a lifeboat
belonging to a Chinese merchant ship anchored off Vinh,.destroying
the boat and killing the captain of the ship and four other
crewmembers aboard. Calling this "a grave provocation" against
the Chinese people and expressing "great indignation," the
statement lodged "a strong protest" and demanded that the U.S.
Government prevent the recurrence of such incidents.
Peking's protest was very similar to the foreign ministry state-
ment it issued on 9 May charging that the United States had
shelled Chinese ships near Vinh. In contrast to protests
against similar Incidents a few years ago, neither the May
protest nor the recent one mentioned Chinese aid to Vietnam or
raised politically charged issues affecting Sino-U.S. relations.
Like the May statement, the latest one reserved the right to
demand compensation for losses; it was even less tough in its
demands than the May statement by omitting a warning that the
United States must bear full responsibility "for all the grave
consequences" arising from a recurrence of such incidents.
The incidents last May were not recalled in Peking's latest
protest.
The narrow focus of the Chinese protest was underscored by Peking's
response to a statement by the U.S.*military command in Vietnam
on the 25th acknowledging that a boat had been destroyed but
identifying it as a "supply craft." A statement issued on the
26th by the spokesman of the PRC Foreign Ministry's Information
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Department replied by going into considerable detail to document
the claim that the boat was clearly not moving.supplies to the
shore. An NCNA report. accompanying the initial Chinese statement
on the 24th had explained that the boat had been attacked while
returning to the merchant ship to which it belonged after
contLCting another Chinese merchant ship in the vicinity. Thus,
Peking's reaction has served to register concern over such
incidents while in effect denying that the Chinese themselves
were engaged in trying to penetrate the U.S. interdiction.
HANOI In contrast to Peking's carefully measured reaction,
Hanoi saw in the incident an opportunity-to raise the
issue of aid from its allies and to depict the matter as a
challenge posed by the United States to the PRC and "other"
communist countries. NHAN DAN on 29 August, using the occasion
to deliver a bitter denunciation of "the bellicose and arrogant
Nixon clique" for seeking to interdict supplies to the DRV,
reminded the Chinese that the United States is "the common enemy"
of the two countries and held up the Chinese seamen's sacrifice
as a shining example of heroic internationalist aid to the
Vietnamese. Unlike Peking, NHAN DAN made .a point of recalling
the incidents last May in a passage asserting.that the latest
incident was not an isolated event but part of a systematic effort
of "provocation and threat" directed against Hanoi's allies.
The aid question was also raised in Hanoi's account of a memorial
service for the Chincae seamen held by the DRV Ministry of
Communications and Transport on the 27th. According to VNA, the
Chinese were killed while engaged in ''the heroic deed of helping
the Vietnamese people fight the U.S. aggressors and build
socialism." NCNA's account of the service, however, noted more
cautiously that the seamen had "sacrificed their lives for
strengthening the fraternal friendship and militant solidarity"
of the two peoples.
A L?V Foreign Ministry statement on 25 A.iigust,.seconding the
Chinese statement of the 24th, did not specifically raise the
aid issue but broadened Peking's demands on the United States by
calling for an end to "all piratical acts" against merchant ships
of China "and other countries which ply the DRV's harbors" and
to the bombing of North Vietnam and the mini-ag.of its harbors.
The Chinese statement did not mention other countries or call for
an end to the bombing and mining.
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MOSCOW While avoiding comment on the incident,. Moscow has
carried brief reports indicating that Peking is
not permitting Vietnam complications to jeopardize the
improvement in Sino-U.S. relations. TASS on 25 August paired
one-sentence dispatches, datelined Peking and New York
respectively, citing the Chinese protest and the statement
by the U.S. military command in Saigon. On the-26th TASS
quoted a State Department spokesman as saying that PRC-U.S.
diplomatic contacts are being maintained as usual despite
the sinking of the Chinese vessel. TASS on the 28th repeated
the reports on the statements by the U.S. command in Saigon
and the State Department spokesman, adding an account of
remarks by a Pentagon spokesman that there have been no
Sino-U.S. incidents in cunnection with U.S. bombings in the
DRV near the Chinese border and that Chinese aircraft and
antiaircraft units have made no moves against t',e U.S. flights.
Also on the 28th, a Soviet broadcast to China renewed the charge
that Peking still refuses to join with the Soviet.Union and
other communist countries in coordinating aid to the DRV. The
broadcast pointed out that the need for such coordination is
particularly significant at a time wr m the DRV'a ports have
been mined.
MOSCOW DENOUNCES U,S. BONSINGS# OBSERVES "DIKE NY"
Moscow's continued condemnation of alleged U.S. bombings of DRV
dikes includes a 28 August.PRAVDA editorial.on the just-completed
Soviet-Vietnam solidarity month* as well as considerable
propaganda on the 28 August "international day of protest
against the U.S. bombing raids on the DRV's dikes," said to
be sponsored by the World Peace Council.
The PRAVDA editorial attacked the "savage and cunning forms
of military action in Vietnam" used by the "U.S. military,"
asserting that the war in the North and South "bears the stamp
of genocide and ecocide, the destruction of everything that
lives." Like the 5 August PRAVDA editorial article, it again
* The last previous PRAVDA editorial on Indochina, on i8 March
1972, had marked a "solidarity week." A 5 AugustPRAVDA editorial
article lauded the Paris conference of communist and workers'
parties which was held to pledge solidarity with Indochina.
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cited Brezhnev's strong 27 June condemnation ofU.S. measures
to "blockade" DRV ports and to bomt DRV economic targets and
communication lines. But the editorial contained only.stock
demands for a U.S. troop withdrawal and for a "just. political
settlement," supporting the "constructive proposals" of the
DRV and PRG. And in contrast to the editorial article's
asoertion that the Soviet Union had "recently increased its
aid," the editorial did not go beyond routine pledges of
assistance and support. It pointed out that Soviet workers'
fulfillment of Vietnamese orders demonstrates-their loyalty
to "the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism."
Noting that solidarity with the: DRV is continually growing
in other socialist countries, it said that they were organizing
"economic and military aid" and recalled.that aid and support
were pledged at the communist party meetings in the Crimea and
in Paris.
The editorial asserted that relations between the parties and
peoples of the USSP. and the DRV "have always been based on the
principles of proletarian solidarity," and it concluded with
a passage which may be read as an oblique rejoinder.to Hanoi's
recent polemical complaints that its big communist allies are
engaging in a policy of "reconciliation" ar.d "compromise" and
are departing from the true revolutionary path. After stating
that the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship is based-on a "firm
foundation," the PRAVDA editorial said that
the more the working class and people.of Vietnam
think of thair heavy, demeaning, servile past,
of the development and stages of their-tortuous
and selfless struggle--at.the same time filled
with glorious victories--the more they realize
to what extent they are indebted to Lenin and
the October Revolution.
The observance of "dike day" included a 27 Au3ust PRAVDA
article by senior commentator.Yuriy Zhukov, .tatements.by
various public organizations, and reports of low-level public
meetings. The propaganda expressed the Soviet people's
"indignation" at the U.S. "crimes" and "demanded" an end to
U.S. aggression, but it did not go beyond stock.pledges of
continued Soviet assistance. Yuriy Zhukov, writing in his
capacity as vice chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, said
the dike day would contribute to the Soviet cause.of."giving
practical assistance" to the Vietamese but went no further
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than to cite statements of solidarity and to note moratury
donations pledged at various low-level workers' meetings
during the solidarity month.
Some routine-level Moscow.broadcaets in Mandarin on dike day
took the occasion again to attack Peking's splittist policies.
A 28 August commentary, for example, denounced Poking for
staying aloof from the growing international movement of
support for Vietnam, noting that Peking media have failed to
mention the Paris meeting of European parties or the WPC''s
dike day. The commentary once again took Peking to task fo%
refusing to take joint action with the USSR and other socialist
countries in coordinating aid to the DRV.
Although Moscow is currently playing down its aid to the DRV,
Moscow and Hanoi media did report the signing in Moscow on the
25th of the annual "plan on cultural and scientific cooperation
for 1972." The plan reportedly covers cooperation in education,
the arts, the press, radio, health and sports., relations between
scientific and teaching establishments, and continued Soviet
assatance in "training cadres for the national economy." Last
year's plan was signed 1:t Hanoi on 5 June 1971, and a protocol
was signed in December 1971 at the 10th meeting-of the Soviet-DRV
Committee on Scientific. and Technical Cooperation.
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PATHET LAO DELEGATION TOURS SEVERAL. CO INIST COUNTRIES
A Pathet Lao delegation led by Nouhak Phoumsavan, member of the
NIILS Standing Committee, received high-level treatment during a
17-22 August visit to the DRV fcilowiog a tour that included the
PRC, the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The
functions of moms of the officials meeting the delegation during
its tour indicate that aid was a major topic of discussion. The
timing of the tour, coming after big-power summitry and in a
period of reopened contacts between Lao Princes Souvanna Phouma
and Souphanouvong on the question of a political settlement,
suggests that the political future of Laos also figured in the
talks. During the visit in the DRV the two sides agreed on the
establishment of an NHLS "representation" in Han*-., thus raising
its official presence from the level of an "information office."
Nouhak acclaimed this as "a historically sig-iificant" development
of the friendly relations between the two peoples and a move that
enhances the Pathet Lao's role and prestige in the international
arena.
VISIT TO DRV The visit to the DRV was not reported by Hanoi
and Pathet Lao media until after the delegation
had left, an apparent security precaution that has becom: customary
for Hanoi. The last high-level Pathet Lao visit to Hanoi was
that of Prince Souphanouvong from 24 to 30 May 1971.*
During its "official friendly visit" the delegation was received
by President Ton Duc Thang, party chief Le Duan, and Premier Pham
Van Long. Although Le Duan had been present at many of the
functions during Souphanouvong's 1971 visit, there was no report
that he ::qd a separate meeting with the Lao leader and he was
not mentioticd in the communique on that visit.
According to the current communique, the two sides reached "complete
identit' of views" on all questions raised in "cordial talks" with
a group of DRV leaders headed by Vice Premier and Foreign Minister
Nguyen Duy Trinh and Vietnam Fatherland Front leader Hoang Quoc Viet.
Also named was Maj.. Gen. Nguyen Trong Vinh, a Central Committee
alternate member not known to have made a public appearance since
1962. Taking part in some of the activities during the delegation's
visit were the DRV foreign trade minister and various officials
connected with economic affairs, such as marine products, geology,
communications and transportation, education, health, and light
* See the TRENDS of 3 June 1971, pages 1-4.
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industry, as well as a deputy chief of the VPA general logistics
department. Defense Minister Giap, who hv,d taken part in talks
during Souphanouvong's visit, did not appear this time. The
communique on Souphanouvong's visit, which had similarly
described the 'unanimity" of the talks, had characterized the
atmosphere even more warmly as one of "militqut solidarity,
fraternal friendship, and total mutual confidence."
The current communique routinely reaffirmed si;pport for the
political programs of the PRG, the NHLS, and iiihanock's RGNU
while stressing once again that the three Indochinese peoples
will step up their struggle to defeat the U.S. Vietnamization
policy and the Nixon Doctrine. The question of a Political
settlement also figured in an exchange of speech- at a
reception given for the Lao delegation on 21 August. Nguyen
Duy Trinh denounced the Nixon Administration for seeking to
create an impression that the Vietnam peace talks are making
progress in order to appease antiwar sentiment in an election
year. Taking a firmly negative stance, Trinh insisted that
Washington is stubbornly prolonging the -Aar and supporting the
Thieu regime, which is "why the Paris peace talks can never
progress."
The Pathet Lao leader echoed these uncompromising themes, charging
that; the Administration is fostering illusionvi about "a false
compromise" as a ploy in the election campaign. On the Lao
question, Nouhak claimed that the United States urged "the
rightist clique" to follow "a more reactionary plan" in order
to impede the talks between representatives of the Lao princes.
In p9rticular, ie complained against an effort to separate the
military issue from the political question. He did not, however,
acknowledge that this proposal was made by Souvanna Phouma in a
letter to Scuphanouvong and vas subsequently rejected by the
latter in a message of reply
In the communique the two sides expressed gratitude for "the
vigorous support and great assistance the socialist countries
and progressive mankind" hive given, but the USSR and China were
not named as they were in the communique on Souphanouvong's visit.
The only mention of these two countries by name was made by
Nouhak at the 21 August reception when he said that his "friendly
visits" to the PRC, the Soviet Union, the ^DR, and Czechoslovakia
had achieved "satisfactory success in consolidating the militant
friendship" between the peoples of Laos and these countries.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The communique recorded each side's gratitude to the other for its
"resolute support and devoted assistance," and the Lao side
*aimed Vietnamese aid in "the economic and culture! tionstruction
..nd development in the liberated zone of Laos--particularly in
the training of technical persounal and the supply of materials,
apeciolists, and skilled workers." The communique also praised
"the jxchange of delegations and the signing in the past years of
economic and cultural cooperation agreements," and it noted the
agreement on the establishment of an NLHS "representation" in
Hanoi. The communique's discussion of Vietnamese aid to the
Pathet Lao was unusually detailed, contrasting with the more vague
and generalized language in the communique on Souphanouvoug's visit.
TOUR OF OTHER The Lao delegation was received warmly in Peking
COUNTRIES twice, on its way to and from the USSR,* but the
visits got less publicity than the stay in the DR"
and no communique was issued, perhaps in deference to Peking's
diplomatic interests in Vientiane. The delegation had first visited
the PRC from 27 June tr 5 July, with Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien
serving as the ranking host. It returned to Peking on 5 August for
a second visit, on this occasion seeing the top Chinese military
official, Yeh Chien-ying, as well as Li and a group that included
officials involved with aid. The delegation left Peking via
Nanning on 14 August, arriving at Hanoi's Gia Lam airport on the
17th.
The visits to the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia, which
maintain more distant relations with the Pathet Lao, received little
publicity. Unlike Peking and Hanoi, Moscow is represented in
Vientiane by an ambassador. The delegation arrived in Moscow on
5 July and met with Politburo candidate members Ponomarev--who.
handles relations with communist and leftist parties--and Ustinov
as well as other officials. On 12 July TASS reported that during
a meeting the Soviets said that solidarity with the Indochinese
people was "a highly principled policy" of the CPSU and the Soviet
people and that the USSR "consistently supports the just struggle
of the Lao patriots for a peaceful, neutral, and independent Laos."
According to the TASS account, the Soviets said they shared the
views of the NLHS, "which is working for a political settlement
* The delegation-'a first stop in Peking and its arrival in Moscow
are discussed in the TRENDS of 12 July, 1972, pages 20-22.
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30 AUGUST 1972
through talks" between the sides in Laos, and demanded that the
United States stop all interference and bombing in Laos and allow
the Laotians Lo settle their own affairs.
The delegation's visits in East Germany and Czechoslovakia were
given minimal publicity beyond reports that it, was received in
East Berlin by Politburo member Albert Norden and in Prague by
Presidium member Vasil Bilak. The delegation left Prague to
return to Moscow on 26 July, but the second stop in Moscow
received no further mention until PRAVDA's 5 August report that
the group had departed the previous day.
FUNERAL, PATHET LAO VISIT PROri`T LEADER APPEARANCES IN HANOI
The funeral in Hanoi of a PRG leader anr' the visit of the Pathet Lai)
delegation prompted appearances by the LKV's top three leaders,
Le Duan, Truon Chinh, and Pham Van Dong.
+ In his first public appearance since Podgornyy's 15-18 June visit
to Hanoi, Le Duan met with the Pathet Lao delegation during its
17-22 August visit, although the 23 August VNA report did not give
the exact date of the meeting. According to VNA, he appeared on the
23rd at the funeral of Nguyen Cong Phuong, a member of the PRG
Advisory Council who died on 21 August "in Hanoi at the age of 84
after a period of illness and treatment in North Vietnam."
+ Truong Chinh, who appeared at the funeral, has been making
regular appearances. h-t did not, however, participate in the
visit of the Pathet Lao delegation.
+ Pham Van Dong, who attended the funeral and also met with the
Pathet Lao group, has been appearing regularly since 11 August,
when he received former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark--
Dong's first reported activity in two months.
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW BERATES CAIRG CRITICS BUT CLAIMS RELATIONS UNCHANGED
The Soviet-Egyptian press polemics were taken a step further in
a 28 August attack by Mikhaylov in IZVESTIYA directly accusing
AKHBAR AL-YAWN chief editor al-Quddus of joining the "campaign"
against Soviet-Arab friendship and cooperation. This followed
an implicit rejoinder to AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal in a
24 August SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article by Nikiforov, along with
continuing complaints in Soviet media that Arab "reactionaries"
were joining intrigues against Soviet-Arab friendship plotted
by imperialist and Zionist circles. Articles in IZVESTIYA on
the 22d and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the 24th warned as well of a
Saudi Arabian role in the campaign against "progressive
currents" in the Middle East. The latter paper additionally
professed to see stepped-up activity by "ultraleft forces"
advocating partisan warfare and "individual violent actions"
and thus influencing some Arab circles to reject a political
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Soviet commentators have defensively rejected "slanders" and
"fabrications" about changes in Soviet-Egyptian relations
deriving from the ouster of the Soviet military personnel
from Egypt, insisting that Moscow-Cairo friendship is unblem-
ished.* A concurrent theme has been the vital importance of
the socialist countries' support for the Arabs, by no means
in the military realm alone: Nikiforov in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
pointedly reminded the Arabs that "as a result of economic,
scientific, and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union
and other socialist states, the Arab countries have received
what no imperialist state will give them--an opportunity for
an ali-round development."
* Peking has now openly congratulated the Egyptians on their
decision to oust the Soviet military personnel. Foreign
Minister Chi Peng-fei, speaking at a 24 August banquet
honoring the visiting Tunisian foreign minister, remarked
that "of late the Egyptian Government has adopted measures
to safeguard the sovereignty of its country, measures which
are an expression of the Egyptian and other Arab peoples'
strong determination to decide their own destiny and carry
their anti-imperialist struggle to the end."
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Moscow has defended the Soviet position on various counts spelled
out in Arab charges:
+ A broadcast in Arabic on the 25th explained the Soviet-U.S.
accords in indirect reply to Egyptian complaints that Moscow and
Washington had both assigned a lower priority to the Middle East
question, in effect freezing the no agar, no peace situation.
+ The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article on the 24th, by Sim.)yan, denounced
"slanderous fabrications" that the USSR "is not offering
sufficient weapons" to the Arabs because it wants to perpetuate
this in-between situation. Simoyan seemed in effect to be telling
the Arabs to solve their problems themselves: He claimed that
the Arab peoples "have everything necessary" to thwart new
imperialist and Zionist intrigues, and he added that "no doubt"
they will do this, "making full use of their national resources"
and "relying on the friendly support" of the USSR and the other
socialist countries.*
+ Former PRAVDA Middle East specialist Primakov, in the domestic
service commentators' roundt::ble on the 27th, insisted that the
Soviet experts' departure from Egypt introduced "nothing extra-
ordinary" in Soviet-Egyptian relations; rather, this friendship
"is reinforced" by the Soviet position, which supports a
political settlement and not "preservation of the state of
affairs existing today."
4 -In a similar vein, an observer article in IZVESTIYA on the
26th declared that perpetuation of the status quo in the area
was "fraught with a grave threat to world peace and security."
The article expressed the hope that Ambassador Jarring's "new
efforts" to achieve implementation of Resolution 242 would
lead to progress in a settlement. Observer recalled that the
USSR had repeatedly expressed support for the Jarring mission
and for a just settlement on the basis of Resolution 242, and
it pledged that the Soviet Union was ready "to do all it can"
to help achieve concrete results--a pledge repeated in a
Potyomkin article in PRAVDA on the 28th.
* A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 29th cited Lebanese
Progressive Socialist Party leader Junblatt as declaring that
a Middle East solution "is not in the hands of the great
powers, as some believe; it is in the hands cf the Arab East
countries, which have obtained quantities of arms exceeding
what Israel has obtained."
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30 AUGUST 1972
MIK!'".YLOV IN The assault on AKHBAR AL-YAWM's chief editor
IZVESTIYA by Mikhaylov in the 28 August IZVESTIYA scored
al-Quddus for putting Soviet-Egyptian relations
on the same level with those between the United States and
Israel. According to TASS, Mikhaylov said one is led to believe
that the difference "is merely that the United States Is warring
on Israel's side, while the Soviet Union restricts itself in
Egypt to 'expansion."'
Mikhaylov was further incensed by al-Quddus' 19 August article
questioning Moscow's'observance of its obligations undar the
Soviet-Egyptian treaty: He "has the cheek to malign the Soviet
Union," the article declared, by alleging that it has failed to
honor the military cooperation clause in the treaty. In fact,
Mikhaylov explained, such cooperation is provided under the
treaty "'on the basis of appropriate agreements"' and the Soviet
side has implemented all these agreements "to the letter."
According to TASS' account, Mikhaylov apparently ignored
al-Quddus' complaint that Moscow failed to honor Article 7 of
the treaty--stipulating regular consultations between the two
parties on important matters affecting the two states'
interests--when it failed to consult with Cairo "before or
after" the Moscow summit. Al-Quddus also indicated that Moscow
had failed to observe Article 9 of the treaty, which stipulates
that the contracting parties will not enter into alliances or
take part in measures directed against either party; the
Moscow-Washington agreement might not be considered an alliance,
al-Quddus said, but "it has been interpreted as 'peaceful
coexistence"' and "we do not coexist peacefully with the United
States." Obliquely responding to this charge, Mikhaylov
dismissed al-Quddus' argument with a cryptic reference to his
"similarly absurd" attack on the policy of peaceful coexistence,
"although this policy has become a reality in internaticaal
politics."
Significantly, Moscow did not air the rebuttal of al-Quddus'
treaty violations charges in a version of the Mikhaylov
article broadcast to Arab audiences on the 28th, although this
version was described as "text of an article published in
IZVESTIYA." The Arabic version did note in conclusion, as
did an earlier short TASS summary of the article, that the USSR
is "profoundly confident" that Egypt is striving to continue
developing friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations, which are not
subject to "conjectural fluctuations."
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NIKIFOROV IN Nikiforov's 24 August SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
SOVETSKAYA POSSIYA article implicitly replied to needling by
AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal, making the
targ.:L apparent .,.un he borrowed a phrase used by Haykal in an
18 August article. Nikiiorov berated the "reactionary press"
for trying to play on "the nationalistic feelings of certain
sections in the Arab countries and on the sentiments of their
leaders," depicting friendly aid from the socialist countries
"as the derogation of national sovereignty and even as 'expansion."'
He asserted that Arab-Soviet friendship is "not like an
ornament" which can be replaced when one feels like changing
it for something new, but is "vitally important" for both sides.
Haykal had explained the Egyptian decision on the ouster of
Soviet military personnel against the background of the Moscow
summit; he declared that the two "superpowers"' agreement to
exclude all local disputes from their bilateral relations meant
that the Soviet military presence in Egypt no longer had any.
practical effect as far as the United States and Israel were
concerned, "as if it had become a mere ornament which is
decorative but not functional." Also likening the Soviet
presence to an artillery piece without "serviceable ammunition,"
Haykal went on to say that, leaving aside the similies, the
Soviet military presence had become, "or so it appeared," a
matter "connected more with the prestige of the Soviet Union
and the spread of its international influence" than with the
liberation of occupied Arab territories.
PRAVDA URGES PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL FRONT," POLITICAL PROGRAM
PRAVDA on 29 Augue;t carried a highly unusual analysis of the
Palestinian resistance movement, containing a call--
unprecedented in the Pd estinian context--for the formation
of a "national front" with a "political program." The
article, by Mideast commentator Pavel Demchenko, asserted
that such a program should take into account the "diversity
of situations and forms of struggle" and should facilitate
work among Palestinians in the occupied territories and among
the refugees, especially in Jordan, because "without a mass
basis the mo"ement cannot develop."
Moscow's routine, repetitive pledges of support ror the
"legitimate rights" of the Palestinians customarily appear
to the course of comment on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Soviet
press comment from time to time has contained passing criticism
of Palestinian "extremist" actions, deplored fedayeen disunity,
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and conveyed reservations about the movement's methods of
struggle. Sporadic articles in the monthly MEZHDUNARODNAYA
ZHIZN have dealt with the Palestinian refugee problem at some-
what greater length but scarcely any more substance. The
appearance of an article in the central press devoted entirely
to the Palestinian resistance movement, its methocls. and its
organization thus represents a noteworthy departure.
In offering a critique of Palestinian failings and suggesting
remedies, Moscow may be moving to exploit increasingly evident
Palestinian unease over Egyptian policy--betrayed in strident
diatribes over the "Voice of Palestine," which broadcasts
clandestinely as well as from Cairo and Baghdad. These broad-
casts have deplored recent Cairo moves as signs of accommodation,
capitulation, and defeatism and have registered concern over
rumors of a separate Israeli-Jordanian peace. The PRAVDA
article also appears against the background of reports in Arab
media of efforts by some Arab governments to replace Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir 'Arafat with a
"moderate" leader and pave the way for participation by the
Palestinian resistance in a Middle East settlement. It is
possible that the Demchenko article was designed in part to
reinforce advice which may have been given to the PLO delega-
tion led by 'Arafat that had talks in Moscow last month.
At the same time, the article may have been contrived to
register Soviet pique at the recent vocal Arab criticisms
of Moscow's policies by ostentatiously displaying support
for the Palestinians. In this connection, Moscow may have
wished to set the record straight following the publication
on 26 June, in the Beirut paper AR-RAYAH, of a document
purporting to set forth Soviet criticisms of the Syrian
Communist Party draft program, including caustic remarks on
the Palestinian question. AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal on
18 August, citing passages from the purported Soviet document,
had singled out some "strange and astounding" views. For
example, he quoted the document as saying: "It is clear that
the draft program gives more attention to the Palestinian
question than is necessary. There is also a stress on armed
struggle without considering any other solution. It is not
permissible to view all the Arab world questions through the
Palestinian eye."
Demchenko's article reviewed the history of the PLO since its
establishment in 1.964, when it lacked a "clear political
program and an ideological foundation" and possessed only
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limited financial and material resources. Turning to the
situation of the resistance movement after the 1967 war,
Demchenko again stressed the absence of a political party or
a united mass organization "capable of combining, in a clear
program, the armed struggle with political action among the
inhabitants of the occupied territories and the refugees."
He noted that divisions among the resistance organizations
had intensified and that the lack of unity among the Arab
countries "had a bad influence" on the movement.
Going beyond the standard vague Soviet criticism of "extremist"
groups which pursued "mass terror tactics," Demchenko
specifically assailed "acts of desperation" such as plane
hijackings, "blowing up nonmilitary targets," and "committing
terrorism inside Jordan." He lectured that such "adventurous
and unstudied actions" harmed the movement's reputation,
deprived it of international support, and provid':u opportuni-
ties for Arab reactionaries to raise obstacles to political
and organizational unity.
Referring cryptically to recent open activity by "imperialist"
and "reactionary" forces, Demchenko observed that this
activity had created new difficulties for the movement and
had brought to the fore "a number of radical problems
presently being discussed" by Arab progressive public opinion.
One such problem, Demchenko said, was how to define the
position and role of the Palestinian movement in the peoples'
"general front" on the basis of "actual strengths." He called
for formulating slogans and tasks which would conform with
every stage of the Arab struggle--"namely, distinguishing
between strategic and tactical tasks." Reiterating Moscow's
standard position, Demchenko asserted that the Palestinian
question could only be solved within the framework of the
general Arab liberation struggle. He reminded the Palestinians
that their "natural allies" were'the Arab and "international
progressive" forces and the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries.
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U.S. ELECTIONS
MOSCOW.CITES REPUBLICAN VIEWS AND NEED FOR U.S.-SOVIET DIALOG
As usual giving the rival parties and candidates about equal
time in limited, routine-level coverage of the U.S. election
campaign, the Soviet central press confined its comment on the
Republican. convention in Miami--as on the earlier Democratic
one--to correspondents' dispatches. Like the Democratic con-
clave, the Republican convention drew less t:an one percent of
Radio Moscow's comment during the week it was in progress. And
as in the case of comment on the Democratic convention, there
were suggestions that election-campaign promises in general are
suspect.* Notably, however, Moscow approvingly highlighted the
statements both by the President and in the Republican platform
on the efficacy of the U.S.-Soviet dialog. Sustaining Soviet
media's generally circumspect treatment of the President
personally, commentators played up the remarks on the Moscow
summit in his acceptance speech while citing the party platform
to air stock criticisms of U.S. policies in Vietnam, the Middle
East, and armaments.
Predictably publicizing the antiwar demonstrations outside the
convention hall, Moscow's reportage played up the tight security
measures and clashes between police and demonstrators. TASS
reported on 21 August that FBI agents, Marines, and National
Guard units were brought to Miami to contain the protesters.
Radio Moscow, reporting the concluding convention ceremonies
on the 24th, said that Miami looked like a "battlefield" and
that "the arms of the law dealt savagely with demonstrators
protesting the continuing slaughter in Vietnam."
Scrupulously abstaining from. speculation about the outcome in
November, a panelist in the 21 August domestic service commenta-
tors' roundtable typically declined to "go Into the fine points
of the election campaign or analyze the chances for success of
the Republican and Democratic tickets." He went on to observe
vaguely that "the whole struggle for a place in the sun" will
develop over "the American military" aggressioriuin.'Viotnam .and..
the question of how to resolve U.S. "economic difficulties"--the
two focal points of Mcscow's comment on the election campaign.
* See the TRENDS of 19 July 1972, page 26, Moscow Reacts
Cautiously to Senator McGovern's Nomination."
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30 AUGUST 1972
PARTY PLATFORM ON The platform adopted by the Republicans,
VIETNAM, MIDEAST dispatch in PRAVDA said on the 24th, out-
lines the party's plan "to impose its own
settlement terms on the Vietnamese people to end the war" and
"says frankly that if the U.S. terms of settlement are rejected,
peace will be achieved with the help of Viatnamization--in other
words, by military means." In commenting on the Democratic con-
vention, Moscow had cited Senator McGovern's Vietnam position as
a major factor in his nomination but avoided comparing it with
the President's, rather setting out to Impugn pre-election
promises in general.
With respect to the Middle East, TASS on the ?1st took note of
the platform's "support for Israel's policy in the Middle East,"
including the call for continuing aid in the form of "aircraft,
training, and modern and sophisticated military equipment."
Reporting; on the Democratic convention, Moscow had noted
McGoverv''s advocacy of continued military aid to Israel and
consequent encouragement of "the Tel Aviv extremists."
THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH The Initial TASS account of the
President's acceptance speech on
24 August emphasized his comment to the effect that "the Soviet-
American talks had made a big contribution to peace." Noting
that he said the SALT accords constituted a first step in limiting
the arms race, TASS went on to observe in a more negative vein
that "at the same time he opposed's reduction in the U.S. defense
budget,. declaring that the United States must be second to none
in the world." TASS also cited his comment on the need for the
United States to be strong'enough and intelligent enough to assume
responsibilities of leadership in the world. Reporting that the
President "sharply criticized the platform -,~ the Democrats," TASS
added that "the speech was obviously an electioneering statement."
Moscow's sensitivity over the triangular dimension was reflected
in TASS' failure to report the President's comment on China. TASS
also ignored his recounting of the "Tanya" story.
Radio Mosc'm's domestic service account of the President's address
on the same day, playing up U.S. economic problems for home
listeners, said thr.;, despite "the glowing picture" portrayrA in
the speech and iu the Republican platform, the Administration is
concerned about high unemployment, continuing inflation, and the
war in Vietnam. While noting that the convention expressed
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to
support for the "bankrupt" policy in Vietnam and for an increase
in U.S. military might, it pointed approvingly to the positive
appraisal of U.S.-Soviet summitry:
At the same time, taking into account the country's
mood, the Republicans hpve admitted the need to seek
realistic ways to relax tension, and President Nixon's
address and the party's election platform highly
appraise the results of the Soviet-American summit
meeting in Moscow, noting the importance of the agree-
ment reached in the realm of disarmament and emphasizing
the need to continue talks in this direction.
VICE PRESIDENTIAL Moscow reported the nomination of Vice
CAIDIDATES President Agnew without comment, as it had
initially reported that of the Democratic
Vice Presidential candidate. But Soviet commentators seized on
events surrounding Senator Eagleton's resignation as the Demo-
cratic nominee in an effort to discredit the American electoral
process and to forecast that Senator McGovern's chances for
election in November faced new complications. Radio Moscow's
Valentin Zorin on 1 August interpreted the "campaign" waged
against Eagleton as typical of the "dirty methods" used in U.S.
elections, and a dispatch from New York over Radio Moscow on
2 August said that the "hasty choice of Eagleton demonstrated
the imperfection of the American electoral system in the eyes of
even its most ardent supporters." The dispatch added that "there
is no doubt that the Eagleton affair has done definite damage to
the Democratic Party, which faces a desperate struggle with the
ruling Republican Party."
A brief dispatch in IZVESTIYA, also on 2 .+..aust, suggested that
Eagleton had been forced to relinquish the Vice Presidential
candidacy because of "rightist" pressures: Although Senator
McGovern initially resisted "the opposition's onslaughts," the
paper said, he had to face the possibility of a party split on
the eve of the election and "was forced to reckon with the opinion
of the party's majority." Moscow media carried brief, straight-
forward reports of the subsequent choice of Sargent Shriver.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
C INEI4 COMMITTEE CHIEF ROMIWOV REMOIVED UNDER FIRE
Simultaneous with the publication of a Central Committee decree
criticizing the Committee for Cinematography for poor supervision
of the film industry, the committee's longtime chairman A.V. Romanov
has been replaced by the Central Committee's cinema supervisor,
F.T. Yermash (PRAVDA, 22 August). Yermash, who appears to have
ties with Central Committee Secretary A.P. Kirilenko, ep'lier this
year exposed an "ideologically harmful" Ukrainian film and
Apparently organized the ouster of the Ukrainian cinematography
committee chairman for sanctioning production of the film.
The decree on the film industry complained in general terms about
poor handling of nationality questions, patriotic themes, and
other ideological subjects and criticized the cinematography
committee for poor leadership, lack of demandingness, and
application of low ideological standards "in a number of cases."
None of the ideologically delinquent films was named in the
decree, and remarkably few complaints of this sort have appeared
in the central press this year. A 16 March SOVIET CULTURE article
by Romanov on the state of the film industry in the period
following the 24th party congress gave no hint of unusual
difficulties in this sphere. However, the official furor over
the Ukrainian film "A Long Farewell," vhi:.h was investigated by
Yermash earlier this year and which led to the ouster of
Ukrainian film chief S.P. Ivanov in April, may have contributed to
Romanov's downfall.* The film had been condemned for ideological
shortcomings similar to those cite' in the Central Committee
decree.
Romanov, a longtime deputy Agitprop chief before assuming his
post as head of the film industry, has long appeared vulnerable.
In the spring of 1970 his removal was rumored along with that of
Agitprop chief V.I. Stepakov, Radio-Television Committee Chairman
N.N. Mesyatsev, and Publishing Committee Chairman N.A. Mikhaylov,
but unlike the others he survived. However, Romanov has appeared
infrequently in public since that time and was last identified in
connection with his 16 March SOVIET CULTURE article.
* For background to Ivanov's ouster, see the TRENDS of 19 April
1972, pages 47-48.
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30 AUGUST 1972
Yarmseh's career may have beat,i aided by ties with Kirilenko.
lid was 8verdiovsk city Komsomol secretary in the mid-1950's during
Kirilenko's tenure as oblast party first secretary. In February
1965 he was identified as head of the Central Committee's sector
for the cinema and in March 1971 as deputy head of the Central
Committee's culture section.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
30 AUGUST 1972
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
HUSAK ASSAILS WESTERN "PROGRESSIVE" CRITICS OF RECENT TRIALS
Czechoslovak party leader Husak's first public comment on the
recent series of political trials, in the course of an interview
for the September issue of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, was
published in the party organ RUDE PRAVO on 18 August--two days
after the paper indicated that the series had ended on :ho 11th
and that President Svoboda had pardoned several youthful Wanders.
Husak used the interview to briefly denounce critics of the trials,
and in a 26 August speech he took Western "progressive" critics to
task in the most pointed indictment of the vocal French, ItalLan,
and other West European parties yet to appear in Czechoslovak media.
BRATISLAVA SPEECH Speaking on the 26th on the occabion or he
anniversary of the 1944 Slovak National
Uprising, Husak portrayed a "normal, peaceful" attitude toward
the trials at home and decried the uproar over the proceedings
in "propaganda channels abroad." He went on to observe that
"unfortunately, certain representatives of the progressive forces
in the M-2st played into the hands of this bourgeois anticommunist
campaigns against socialist Czecho, - jvakia., showing themselves L.
be astonishingly indifferent to (?ojactive information about
Czechoslovakia." Charging that the progressive forces had
"added their voices to the bourgeois slanders of Czechoslovakia,"
'ie remarked that "we are sorry about this--not with a view to
developments in Czechoslovakia, because no bourgeois campaign
can change anything in this; we are sorry with regard to the
objective informing of the working class and progressive forces
in the West, with regard to the success of the anti-imperialist
and progressive front." He wound up with a rebuke to the Western
patties: "The position I am speaking of cannot help the common
class struggle."
TASS' prompt summary of the speech made Husak's attack sound
somewhat stronger than it came through live over Prague domestic
television: TASS rerderdd his "unfortunately" as "we deeply
regret" and his rem k that the progressive forces' position
"cannot help" as "far from helps" the common class struggle.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
30 AUGUST 1972
PROBLEMS OF PEACE S Husak's first public comment on the trials,
SOCIALISM INTERVIEW in a brief passage in his wide-ranging
interview for the Prague-based international
communis`. monthly PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, was in the
context of a discourse on the country'; return t-) "Marxist-Leninist"
principles since the 1968-69 episode ands-an attack on "rightists,"
"counterrevolutionaries," and "adversaries" who "today accuse us
cf reverting to the 1950's, to political trials." He went on to
complain that such statements "are especially voiced by those
people whose counterrevolutionary intentions were not brought to
realization." He added the standard Prague rationale that while
"no staged illegal political trials" are being held or contemplated,
violators of the laws must bear the responsibility"--a principle
which "our adversaries do not like."
RUDE PRAVO ARTICLE While there was no forn_al announcement of
the conclusion of the trials, a lengthy
defense of the proceedings by Dolezal in the 16 August RUDE PRAVO
appeared to signify that the seriea was over by noting at the
outset that trials had been held in Prague and Brno "between
17 July and 11 August 1972." The article said they involved
"nine groups," a total of "46 accused," who were "sentenced to
imprisonment for organized illegal subversive activities in the
period from 1970 to 1971--and some even at the beginning of 1972--
with the purpose of weakening the socialist state system and
est."tblishing conditions for its overthrow." In a conciliatory
gesture highl`ghted in CTK's summary, although it appeared near
the end of the published article, RUDE PRAVO dihclc,red that "for
10 persons, bax:ely exceeding the juvenile age, whom Doctor of
Philosophy Jaroslav Sabata had irresponsibly induced to engage
in criminal activities," President Svoboda had "used his
prerogative" and ordered the charges dropped.
The article was devoted largely to a review of the alleged
criminal activities of the principal defendants--Sabat, Milan
Silhan, Milan Huebl, Jiri Mueller, and Jan Tesar. It devoted
particular attention to alleged contacts between Huebl, the
former director of the Higher Party School, and the former
director of Czechoslovak Television Jiri Pelikan, an emigre in
Italy since the August 1968 invasion. It reiterated the charge
that the intermediary between Huebl and Pelikan had been the
Italian journalist Ochetto, whose arrest at Prague airport in
January 1972 was publicly protested by the Italian Communist
Party.
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CONVIDENTIAL fIS TRENDS
30 AUGUST 1972
The article appears to portend difficulties ahead for the top
leaders of 1968-69, as well as for the middle-level figures
involved in the recert trialss It said a letter written by
Huebl and takmn from Ochetto on his arrest at Prague airport
revealed that Huebl had helped draft the interview with the
leading liberal Josef Smrkovsky--still residing in Prague--
which appeared in the Milan paper GIORNO VIE NUOVE in
September 1971. Smrkovsky had said in the interview, among
other things, that only about 10 percent of the Czechoslovak
people supported the Husak regime.
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