TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050033-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: August 16, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
16 AUGUST 1972
CVOL. XXIII, N0. '3)
85T00875R000300050033-4
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This propaQancla analysis report is based exclusively on materinl
carried in foroign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONb'ZllEN'1'IAL FBIS TRENDS
l6 AUGUST 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Mayor Attention
DOCHINA
i
IN
International War Crimes Team Meets Premier, Concludes Visit
1
Hanoi Calls for Greater Vigilance, Laude Dike Repair Campaign
3
DRV Issues More Protests Over Bombings, Claims Planes Downed
6
PRG Denies Charges o# Atrucities, Accuses U.S. o# "Crimes"
9
Paris Talks: U.S. Views Scored, Rumors on Secret Talks Denied.
1v
Peking Mu##les Sensitive Issues While Decrying Bombing
l4
Hanoi, Peking Hail Seating o# PRG, RGNU at Nonalined Parley
l5
DISARMAMENT
Moscow: World Disarmament Conference Will Not Replace SALT
l8
SING-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Conveys Apprehension Over Peking's European Policy
20
Peking Puts USSR at Bottom o# List o# Soviet Bloc CounL?ries
22
CHINA-JAPAN
Peking Extends Formal Invitation to Tanaka to Visit China
23
CHINA-THAILAND
Peking Mutes Anniversary ~# Thai Communist Insurgency .
24
CHINA
RED FLAG Criticizes Lin's Role in Northeast Campaign
26
CZECHOSLOVAK TRIALS
Italian Party Charges "Persecution"; PRAVDA Backs Prague
28
CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP
Prague Media E##usive in Treatment o# Hardlin~r Bilak
33
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Press Airs Divergent Views on Private Enterprise
36
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FC-~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
16 AUGUST 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIV1~N MAJ01~ ATTENTION 7 - 13 AUGUST 1972
Moscow (2699 items)
Peking (1199 items)
Crimea Meeting of Soviet
(7%)
13%
Domestic Issues
(49%)
39%
Bloc Party Leaders
Indochina
(17%)
19%
Vietnam
(13%)
8%
[U.S. Air Strikes
~
(2~)
7%J
[U.S. Air Strikes
(4%)
3%]
[Sihanouk Tours PRC
(--)
4%]
Soviet-Indian Treaty
(--)
7%
NonAlined Conference
(--)
12%
Anniversary
China
(3%)
5%
in Guyana
Thai CP Anniversary
(--)
3y,
Soviet-FRG Treaty
(--)
2%
Ecuador Independence Day
(--)
3%
Anniversary
Bangladesh UN Seat
(--)
3%
Middle East
(3%)
2%
UT? Secretary General
(--)
2%
Waldheim in PRC
:~hese statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial., govern-
ment ~r party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extens!ve reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given mayor attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL U8E ONLY
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
16 AUGUST 1972
I NDOCIH I NA
Hanoi has continued to release virtually daily statements by the
DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman denouncing U.S. air strikes, but
there are fewer charges now of attacks on water conservancy
projects, and current comment points to good progress in dike
repair work. Further use has been made of comments attributed to
former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark and members of the
International Commission for Inquiring into U.S. War Crimes to
buttress claims th+at U.S. air strikes are aimed at civilian.
targets.
The DRV delegate at the 154th session of the Paris talks devoted
moat of his utatement to a protest against U.S. bombing, while
the PRG's Mme. Binh attacked the Thieu government and offered an
explanatio:: of the communist proposal for the formation of a
government of national concord. Hanoi took disparaging note of
Administration efforts to capitalize on "publi~.ity about the secret
Paris talks and rumors about a new U.S. peace proposal," but it
did not report the 14 August Kissinger-Le Duc Tho meeting and
has not yet mentioned Le Duc Tho'3 departure for Hanoi on the 16t-i.
While avoiding comment on issues affecting Chinese interests,
Peking has again added its voice to charges that the United States
is bombing DRV dikes. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 13th,
seconding the 8 August DRV protest, expressed "burning indignation"
over the U.S. bombing but made no mention of Chinese support for
the war effort. NCNA has publicized statements about bombing oP
the dikes by various foreign visitors to the DRV, including Jane
Fonda, but has yet to mention Ramsey Clark.
Routine Moscow comment has continued to assail the U.S. bombing
of the DRV along established lines and to call on the United States
to accept a political solution. Moscow has bri.efl~~ reported the
international investigating commission's activities in the DRV
and during its stopover in the Soviet capital, noting some of the
remarks by ~.~elegation members as well as some of the remarks Hanoi
has attributed to Ramsey Clark condeoming alleged U.S. strikes at
dikes and other ci-~ilian targets.
? INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TEAM MEETS PREMIER. CONCLUDES VISIT
Hanoi has continued to exploit comments attributed to former U.S.
attorney general Ramsey Clark and members of the International
Commission for Inquiring Into U.S. War Crimes in 4ietnam as the
delegation wound `up its two-week viei.t and left for home on
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS T)tENDS
16 AUGUST 1972
12 August. Highlights of Clark's activities included a two-hour
interview on the 10th with l0 U.S. prisoners of war and a
two-day visit to Thanh Hoa Province, reps.:: tedly the target of
recent severe U.S. bombings, where he listened to personal
accounts of the air strikes. The team was also received on
11 August by Premier Pham Van Dong in hie first reported public
appearance in three months--an event which received frontpage
attention in Ha:~oi papers, complete with "big-sized photos,"
according to VNA's review of the Hanoi press of 13 and 14 August.*
Clark's comments on the POW's, briefly quoted by Hanoi radio on
12 August, stressed that they were in good health, that they were
getting regular medical and dental care, and tl?at "there were no
prohibitions or restrictions on the prisoners." The broadcast
claimed that Clark contrasted the humaneness of the North Vietnamese
to the "inhuman and brutal" treatment allegedly meted out to the
Vietnamese people through the U.S. bcmbing of the North carried
out on President Nixon's orders. Claiming that Clark haul expressed
determination to inform the American people of what is actually
happening in the war, the report quoted him as declaring that "no
matter what the reason or the ob~ectiv~:s of the bombing, it is
impossible to justify it before mankind's conscience."
Hanoi propagandists have portrayed Clark's 8-9 August visit to
Thanh Hoa as a face-finding mission to expose, on film and tape,
the "bar'oarous crimes of the bloodthirsty Nixon clique." Hanoi
radio on the 13th typically described Clark as astonished when
confronted with evidence of American bombing of nonmilitary
targets in Thanh Hoa. The same broadcast claimed that Clark was
profoundly moved by the determin~.tion of the Vietnamese people to
maintain "their beautiful way of life" in the face of the bombing,
as well as by their friendly treatment of him, an American.
Referring to the President's action in ordering the contimlation
of the bombing as a mistake which he has not yet realized, Clark
stressed, according to the broadcast, that "several millions of
Americans" are calling for an end to the bombing and for withdrawal
of all U. S. troops from Vietnam.
* The premier also made a public appearance on 14 August when he
received departing DPRR Ambassador Kim Pyon-sam and another on
the 16th with GDR Ambassador Klaus Willasding. Prior to these
appearanceo, the lent Hanoi reference to an appearance by Pham Van
Doug was on 10 ::ure, in a report which said he had "recently"
chaired a Council of Ministers meeting. See the TRENDS of 2 August
1972, pages 19-20.
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CONFIDENTIAL F'BIS TRENDS
16 AUGUST 1972
In an interview with a Hanoi radio reporter, recounted by the
radio on the 14th, Clark was reported to have characterized
U.S. bombing as not only inhuman but also "a very stupid act"
which "cannot subdue the Vietnamese people." Remarks
attributed to Clark at the beginning of the interview refuted
Senator Goldwater's recent suggestion that some damage to the
dikes may have been caused by North Vietnamese SAM's falling
back on their own territory. Clark was quoted as asserting
that "it is sheer nonsense to say that this damage has been
caused by North Vietnam~sse missiles."
VNA on 11 August, reporting a press conference held by the team
that day, attribute+d tha following summary of the teea~'s
findings to former Irish parliamentarian Sean MacBride: 1) the
bombings were intentional and deliberate; 2) the targets hit
"would significantly affect the hydraulic system" and could cause
flooding; 3) the areas being bombed are heavily populated
agri:ultural regions; 4) the methods of destruction used "make
effective repair difficult and unsatisfactory"; and 5) the
damaged dikes observed by the team are not roads or part of a
road netvork and are removed from military targets. MacBride
reportedly concluded that these points "go far beyond the
question of the legality of the bombing of North Vietnam. They
involve flagrant violations of the laws of humanity and of
The Hague and Geneva conventions."
HANOI CALiS FOR GREATER VIGILANCE. LAUDS DIKE REPAIR CAMPAIGN
The volume of attention Hanoi has given the dike iosue diminished
markedly during the past week. Except for a charge in the foreign
ministry spokesman's statement of the 11th that three dike
sections had been hit and incidental mentions in a few other
articles, the only sa~ar propaganda attention to the subject came
in two radio articles broadcast by Hanoi on the 11th--one in the
domestic service and one in English to Southeast Asia. Both
sounded a note of optimism, pointing with satisfaction to t:.a
nearly complete repair of all dikes and dams allegedly damaged by
U.S. bombing.* The domestic broadcast cited the Chu and Ma river
* Positive evaluations of the campaign to repair water conservancy
projects first emerged at the end of last month. A 25 Jul; NHAN
DAN editorial, for example, atypically predicted that the coming
high water season could be dealt with satisfactorily and claimed
that "because of the early work on the embanl~ents, our dikes are
now big, high, and solid." For a more detailed discussion see
the TRENDS of 26 July 1972, pages 3-5.
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CO;VFZDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
16 AUGUST 1972
dikes and another dike in Thanh Hoa, as well ae the system of
dikes in the Nam Sach area of Nai Hung, ae having been
repaired; all of these dikes had been spotlighted in Hanoi
propaganda as alleged targets of U.S. bombing raids. The
English-language item, focusing on Haiphong and the eoutiiern
provinces of the DRV, claimed repair of "almost all" dike
sections ae well as the building of a new sea dike in Quang
Binh Province and said that Haiphong had completed its semiannual
earthwork tasks five to 10 days early, with a fourfold increase
over the amount of work done last year.
Both items urged cont:.nued vigilance despite these achievements.
After stating that the water level halfway through the rainy
season showed signs of not rising as high as it did last year,
the domestic radio article stressed that the dikes must be
?reinspected and that reb~ue`capability, stockpiling of materiple,
and projects to restore production after flooding as well as to
prevent it in the first place must be carried out in a fighting
spirit.
Emphasis on maintaining and improving an adequate dike and dam
system was evident i.n two earlier articles that have recently
became available. A lengthy article by Mis:lster of Water Conservancy
Ha Ke Tan in the July issue of HOC TAP focused on the importance
of fighting floods and flash floods, whether caused by natural
forces or by the "barbarous acts of the Nixon clique." After
touching only briefly on alleged instances of damage caused by
U.S. bombing, Tan confidently asserted that such actions will
"certainly not intimidate our people [or] force them to
agree to a solution be?.iE~ficial" to the Nixon Administration.
U.S. air strikes only increase the Vietnamese peo~.~e's hatred
and fighting spirit, Tan declared.
Tan then focused on more "practical and concrete" measures for
dealing with the situatio~~. All dikes and dams should be
strengthened and measures should be taken Lo protect them from
enemy attacks, he said, and river banks and beds are to be kept
clear so as to drain flash flood waters rapidly. Tan urged that
greater attention be given to properly organizing, training, and
equipping the "dike-protection forces," and he chastised backsliders
for tendencies toward complacency which, he cla,:med, had been
responsible for the breaking of three dikes during last year's
heavy floods.* Tan concluded that if the dikes do break this year,
"Nixon must be held responsible for this genocidal crime."
* The TRENDS of 19 July 1972, pages 4-5, reviews evidence of DRV
concern about the soundness of the vast water conservancy projects
stemming from causes other than U.S. strikes.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
16 AUGUST 1972
Stressing the impos.~tRnce of continuing t~ strengthen and repair
the dikes around Hanoi, a H/s10I MOI editorial on 28 July claimed
that the capi~te!_ "has succFesfully completed" dike repair tasks
and that loca'~ dika., nre "n~~w capable of resisting such a water
level as than of last yaar." But~it said efforts should be
intensified to maintain adequate communications among local
dike-repair forces and to insure their level of training and
preparation. Linking injunctions for greater mobilization to
the claim that the United States is attempting ro "sabotage our
dikes," the editoria.L called for increased vigilance to protect
the capital and to defeat the U.S. aggressors.
LAWYERS' COhMENT The only other significant attention givan the
dike issue in the past week appeared in parts
II and III of a five-part recorded discussion on President Ni~Gon's
"war crimes" broadcast in Hanoi's domestic service from 9 through
12 August.* Citing statistics reported earlier by the Water
Conservancy Ministry and "concrete proofs" provided by numerous
visitors to the DRV, the two lawyeLS--allegedly 'specialists in
international and criminal law--developed the thesis that President
Nixon :ls a "poor lawyer" who ridicules the charges leveled ar~ainst
him or else reiuear~ to answer them, t-iereby attempting to evade
responsibility fo;; his "crimes." Statements made by the President
at his 2? July press conference--that it is not deliberate U.S.
p~lic~ to bomb dikes or other civilian targets, that some of the
DRV's dikes were :improperly maintained, and that the United Mates
has the capability, if it wished, of destroying the dike syecem
within. a week--were denounced by both lawyers.
Describing the President as "a ruthless executioner of our people
who always threatens people and carries out brazen acts but denies
his wrongdoings," the lawyEre charged that he "obviously plans
to kill as many civilians aQ possible." Characterizing President
Nixon as a "new Hitler" by comparing him to a former Nazi governor
of the Netherlands who breached the dikes, the broadcast argued
that the President is even worse than Hitler because, instead of
waging war against an advanced industrial country, he attacks
countries "whose agriculture and industry are Lnderdeveloped" and
which "have dust regained their independence." 'ihe President was
urged to heed the evidence of U.S. strikes~at civilian targets
gathered by Ramsey Clark, Joseph Kraft, and other visitors to the
DRV.
* Part I i~, cliscuased in the TRENDS of 9 August 1972, pages 11-12.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TR>;!'~1S
16 AUGUST 1972
DRV ISSUES MORE PROTESTS OVER BOMBINGS. CLAIMS PLANES DOWNED
The Foreign Ministry spokesman issued five routine statements
during the week detailing alleged U.S. bombing actions in the
North and condemning these and "other acts encroaching on the
DRV's sovereignty and security."
~ The statement of the 10th charged U.S. aircraft with bombing
and strafing populated areas in Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh,
Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces on
the previous day. B-52's were said to have hit a number of
localities in Quang Binh, and U.S. warships were charged with
striking at Hon Me Island and a number of coastal villages i.n
Thanh Hoa Province and the Vinh Linh zone. Civilian casuHlt!es
and property damage repor~edly resulted from these attacks,
despire "the Nixon Administration's deceptive claim that it
does not bomb civilians [in] North Vietnam."
0
? The statemQnt of the 11th protested "savage raids" on the
10th on Vinh city, the outskirts of Haiphong, the vrovincial
capitals ui Ninh Binh and Thanh Hoa, and populated areas in Thai
Binh, Nam Ha, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh
Linh zone. The statement also reported strikes by I3-52's at
localities in the Vinh Linh zone and by warships on coastal
areas of Ha Tinh Province and the Vinh Linh zone. Sgecif is
targets said to have been hit include a junior middle school in
Thai Binh and seve::al d+.kes--the TMa Ly River dike in Thai Thuy
district, the Dau sluice in Vu Thu district of Thai Binh Province,
and the sea dam and a portion of the dike at Nghi Khanh village
in Nghi Loc district of Nghe An Province. It was noted that
these attacks occurred while "the Nixon Administration is still
stubbornly denying Chat U.S. aircraft are bombing civilian
establishments or deliberately striking at dikes and water
conservancy works in North Vietnam."
+ The 12 August statement condemned air strikes of the 11th on
populated a~:eae in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, end Quang
Binh provin~_F:s xnd the Vinh Linh area; B-52 attacks on Quang Binh
Province; anti strikes by warships at coastal villages in Ha Tinh
and Quang Bir~il provinces and the Vinh Linh area. The statement
charged t:?~t "these war acts of the Nixon Administration grossly
encroached upon the sovereignty and security of the DRV and on
every fundamental principle of international law, and constituted
an arrogant challenge to public opinion in the world and in the
United States."
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CONFIDEN'CIAL FBIS TRENDS
16 AUGUST 197
+ U.S. "criminal war acts" of the 12th were portrayed in the
spokesman's statement of the 13th as "brazenly violating the
pledge made by the U.S. Government in October 1968 to totally
and unconditionally end the bombing and shelling of North
Vietnam." The stat~+ment charged the United States with
attacking popu~ated areas in Quang Ninh, Hoa Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh
Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and
the Vinh Linh zone. It also claimed that 8~52's bombed a number
of localities in the Vinh Linh area and Quang Binh Province and
that U.S. warships shelled coastal areas in Ha Tinh and Quang
Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. The strikes were said
to have caused heavy civilian casualties and widespread destruction
of economic and cultural establishments.
+ The statement of the 14th denounced strikes of the previous
day on Vinh city, on the capital of Ninh Binh Province, and on
populated areas in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, Ha
Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. B-52's
were charged with bombing localities in Quang Binh Province, and
U.S. warships were said to have shelled coastal villages in Nghe
An and Ha Tinh provinces. The statement said that these attacks,
launched "in defiance of strong condemnatio~~ by the world and
American public," reveal the Nixon Adminis:ratioa's "utter
obstinacy and bellicosity."
+ "Extermination bombings" on the 14th of Thanh Hoa city, plus
bombing of the suburbs of Haiphong and Vinh city, were highlighted
in the spokesman's statement of the 15th. Also reported hit were
populated areas in Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe
An, Ha. Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. The
srat~ant further charged that B-52's bombed localities in Quang
Binh Province and that U.S. warships bombed and shelled coastal
areas in Nam Ha--all in "brazen violation" of the U.S. pledge "to
totally and unconditionally end the bombing and shelling of North
Vietnam."
Further comment on the bombing of Thanh Hoa city was carried in
NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 15th, according to the Vin
press review for that date. A VNA report of the 14th provided
further details on the nature of the targets allegedly hit:
suburban hamlets, the cathedral area, and the pharmaceutical
workship, bakery, noodle factory, and municipal cemetery. The
report claimed that, weapons used in "close to 100 sorties"
included dart bombs and 500- and 2,000-pound demclition bombs.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENnS
16 AUGUST 1972
PLANE DOWfYINGS Radio reports from Hanoi claim a total of l4
planes downed in action this week'over the
North--tw~~ over Quang ninh. including one helicopter; one each
over Ninh Binh. Haiphong and Ha Tay; two each over Hai Hung,
Vinh Phu and Hanoi; and three over Thanh Hoa. As of 16 August,
Hanoi claimed to have downed a total of 3,825 U.S. aircraft.
Hanoi also claimed that five U.S. warships were set on fire
since 4 August by the people and armed forces of Ha Tinh, Thai
Binh, and Thanh Hoa provinces.
The achievements ~f the militia in downing planes with its "low-
altitude firenet" were lauded in a KHAN DAN editorial of the
12th. Reminiscent of a similar editorial and a station article
of the 7th, it claimed that a "seething emulation movement" was
underway to down low-flying enemy aircraft. It praised the
effective leadership of party e~helone and regional administrations
for heightening the people's enthusiasm for this Cask and fcr
implementing the day-to-~9ay chores involved in maintaining and
improving the local air .o~'ense system.
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PRG DENIES CWARGES OF ATROCITIES. ACCUSES U,S, OF "CRIMES"
A 9 August PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman'? etatemenl denounced
President Nixon as "the biggest war criminal of our time" and
rebutted allied charges that the communists had fi .sacred
government off iciale in erase they controlled in Binh Dinh and
had deliberately killed civilians fleeing down Highway 1 from
Quang Tri city.* The Vietnamese communists have responded
publicly to previous allied charges of atrocities, though not
usually at the fore:.gn ministry level. For example, LPA
announced on l3 May that it was authorized to deny charges chat
the communists had executed two French missionaries. The
9 August statement referred specifically to 4 and 7 August
statements on the killings by a spokesman for the State Department
and to remarks by President Nixon in hie 27 July press conference,
but it gave no indication of the details of the charges beyond an
assertion that "the so-called 'massac?ces' dnd 'ki111ngs of
civilians "' are "a sheer fabrication.`' The statement asserted
that these "odious tricks of the White House" are aimed at
misleading pubic opinion, covering up the U.S. policy of
prolonging the war, and distorting the policif:a ?f the reeistanc:e;
and it recalled the PRG's 10-point policy on GVN soldiers and
officials, released on 25 January, as evidence of its humanitar~'sn
policy.**
More details of the charges were noted in a 10 August LPA commentary
which scored President Nixon and "the State Department psywar
machine" for "trotting out absurd allegations and slanders and
cooking up the so-called 'massacres of civilians,' 'she111ngs of
cities and wanton killing of refugees by the communists."' LPA
particularly noted that on 5 and 7 August "they invented stories
claiming that the communists had intentionally killed from 1,000
to 2,000 people. including women and children who were fleeing
from Quang Tri on April 29 and 30, and that 'the communists had
executed hundreds of Saigon functionaries and arrested and put in
fail thousands of others in Binh Dinh. "' Both the commentary and
Mme. Binh in her atPtement at the 10 August Paris session decried
the Administration's use of these "slanders" in an attempt to
demonstrate that a bloodbath ~ ~~Ld follow a communist takeover.
* See the 9 August 1972 T~._:.~~::, pages 14-15, for discussion of
initial communist reaction to these charges.
~`'~~ See the TRENDS of 2 February 1972, pages 21-23, and 9 February,
page 14, for a discussion of the 10-poini policy.
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The LPA commentkry contrasted the PRG'e l0-point policy with
allied policies, noting the "irony" that the "slanders" were
made public while "the traitor Nguyen Vsn Thieu had frenziedly
ordered cruel agents in the ao-called 'people's self-defense
force' to 'wipe out the communist infrastructures,' including
those whom he brands ae 'communist' village and hamlet
administrative pereonnol, tax collectors, and the like." On
11 August an LPA report cited "sources from Saigon" in charging
that Thieu "recently ordered all provincial governors to
secretly destroy all the eo-called organizations of the NFL
infrastructure Night inside the pup;,et adm?nistrative machine,"
even "ordering them to eliminate all members of the village and
hamlet administration suspected to Ue 'communist agents."'
Communist charges that the allies have carried out "criminpl"
attacks on "liberated" areas continue, with VNA and LPA on
14 and 15 August carrying accounts of an 11 August statement by
the people's revolutionary committee of Binh Dinh Province which
charged that "wanton" air and artillery bombardments supporting
ARVN counteroffensive operations in the province had caused more
Chan 300 civilian casualties and destroyed thousands of homes.
The statement cited specific air and naval attacks on populated
areas and added that "along with extermination bombardments against
villages, the U.S.-puppets also conducted air raids on dams and
pumping stations on either aide of the Lai Giang River, denying
water to thousands of t~ectaree of paddy-fields.'' A 3 August PRG
Foreign Ministry statement on alleged allied "crimes" in North
and South Vietnam had claimed that the United States had bombed
three dams on the Lai Giang River on 20 July "in an attempt to
strike directly at the life of the people" in Hoai An and Hoai
Nhon diatricts.* The Binh Dinh revolutionary committee's state-
ment also charged that Saigon forces, "directly commanded by U.S.
advisers," had compelled civilians to act as a shield for them.
PAR'^> TALKS: U.S. VIEWS SCORED. RI~IORS ON SECIRET TALKS DENIED
VNA's account of the 154th session of the Paris conference on
10 August omitted the details of Mme. Binh's extensive denunciation
of the Thieu regime but included her restatement of the PRG's
position toward the Saigon. administration. Thus VNA reported her
assertion that "as long as this administration exists, the war will
* The 3 August PRG Foreign Ministry statement is discussed in the
9 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 13-14.
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go on and the negotiations will remain in a deadlock" and her
statement Chat to achieve a solutic- khe United States must,
. along ~?ith withdrawing its troops, cease. support for the
Saigon "clique," Thieu must resign, and the Saigon adm~l.nistration
must change its policy.
VNA aJ.so included the main part of her explanation of the PRG
proposal for the formation of a national concord government.
The explanation was presented as a response to the view that the
United States does not have political responsibility and to the
statement--contained in Ambassador Porter's remarks at the
3 August session--that the PRG proposal raised psychological
and practical obstacles which stagger the imagination. Mme. Binh
also rejected t!-.e contention that the proposed national concord
government would be imposed undemocraticslly and would result
in an arbitrary partition of powers and the installation of a
communist government.
The PRG's "clarification" of its proposal was endorsed by Nguyen
Minh Vy--speaking in place of DRV delegation Tread Xuan Thuy, who
was said by the DRV spokesman at the poet-session press briefing
to be slightly indisposed. VNA omitted Vy's derailed charges
about "deliberate" U.S. attacks on dikes and populated areas in
North Vietnam but included his criticism of the United States
for violating its 1968 pledge to halt the bombing and his attack
on Thieu for advocating more U.S. bombing and the destruction of
the North. It also cited his concluding remarks in which he called
on the United States to atop a.11 war acts and enter into serious
negotiations and declared: "We ?"~s prepared to discuss immediately
with the United States the key points which the PRG has pointed
out and elaborated to rapidly achieve a solution satisfac"_ory to
the parties."
VNA's cryptic report of the allied remarks at the session appeared
to reflect the discussion during the give-and-take portion of the
session when Ambassador Porter recalled the 19 July HANOI MOI
picture of an antiaircraft gun on a dike and questioned the
North Vietnamese contention that there were no militar~;
installations near dikes.* In addition to declaring routinely
that the U.S. delegate "kept pleading for the '!...:un Administration's
* On 4 August Hanoi's domestic service responded to Voice of America
broadcasts referring to the HANOI MOI picture. The Hanei broadcast
quoted a statement in the 4 August HANOI MOI by the photographer
who took the picture, claiming that it actually showed a soil
emplacem.:nt next to a pond, not a dike.
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policy of aggression and neocolonialism," VhA charged that he
was "ec:eking new pretexts for the United States to continue its
attacks on North Vietnam's dikes."
Allied ca1rs ut the Paris conference for a cease-fire were
denounced it; a l3 August Hanoi radio "article" which appeared to
respond directly to Ambassador Porter's statement at the 3 August
session of the talks when it rejected as "hypocritical" the view
that the most urgent task is to end the killing and the notion
that the communists should pay attention to the Vietnamese people
rather Chan to their own political objectives. Pointing out ghat
the war is being waged because of the conflicting political
ob~QCt~'.ves of the two Bides, the radio declared that "in solving
the South Vietnam problem one cannot deal only with the military
problem without speaking of the political problem." The article
stressed the need to topple Thieu and held that as long as he
remains as a "tool" of the United States, "the request for a
cease-fire is itself meaningless." The article continued:
Such a cease-fire cannot eliminate the cause of
the war. Instead, such a cease-fire will
pera-anently maintain the factors for wagyng
war against any time. No one naively believes
that if there is a cease-fire, if the Americans
withdraw their troops, and if the captured
soldiers are released the Vietnamese people
will be able to solve their own political
problem, as Nixon boasted.
While not announcing the third of the recent private meetings
between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on 14 August, Hanoi responded to
rumors about the meeting in a 16 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN .article
deprecating reports from "Western sources" that a new U.S. peace
plan was tabled "at the Paris talks" on the 14th and a French
newspaper rep~~t quoting Kissinger as saying the war wou13 be over
before the end of September.* According to the army paper, "the
* Hanoi promptly reported the first in the current series of private
talks between Kissinger and the Vietnamese representatives in a brief
VNA news item on 19 July, and again referred to it in the VNA account
of the formal session of 20 July. DRV media did not report the
1 August private meeting, however. The DRV press spokesman, questioned
at the 3 August pos!:-session briefing about the abse:~ce of an
announcement, explained that "the form of the meeting with the Americans
is not very important, whether it is private or open."
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fact fie that the United States fie intensifying fiche war and has
done nothing to end it." QUAN DOI NHAIV DAN cited an AFP
report for the view Chat the Nixon Administration fie using
"publicity about the secret Paris talks and rumors about a
new U.S. peace proposal to serve its election campaign," and it
declared that "the eo-called 'new peace plan' of Nixon fie
obviously a mere peywar n-ove ."
Hanoi media have been routinely reporting Democratic criticism
of the Adminietration'e position on Vietnam, and on l5 August
VNA picked up the charge by Vice Presidential candidate Shriven
Chat President Nixon lost a chance for peace in 19b9. A
16 August VNA report noted remarks on the issue by former U.S.
chief delegate to the Paris conference Harriman. VNA quoted
Harriman's criticism of the Administration for supporting
Thieu rather than negotiating a settlement, bur it did not
note hie view that the communists had signaled their willingness
to reach a settlement when they withdrew combat troops from
South Vietnam's northern provinces.
Hanoi again registered its opposition to the reconvening of a
Geneva-type conference on Vietnam in an article which VNA on
the 15th said had appeared in "the biggest Hanoi paper." The
article scored the British for raising the question of a
conference last May, noting that the Indian Government was
approached at that tine but "refused to cooperate in this
inglorious venture." It criticized Britain's actions in its
role as cochairman and complained that "each time the United
Staten lands in a new difficulty in Vietnam, the British
Government unfailingly flies to its rescue by calling for a
reconvening of the 1^54 Geneva conference on Vietnam." Hanoi's
motive in recalling the British proposal at this time is unclear;
the article may have been prompted by the 25th anniversary of
Indian independence, marked in the Hanoi press on the 15th. The
call fora Geneva conference had previously been scored in a 17 May
DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which accused the
British Government of "lending a hand to the Mixon Administration
in its military adventure and perfidious diplomatic moves."
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PEKING MUFFLES SENSITIVE ISSUES WHILE DECRYING BOMBING
Consistent with its cautious approach in recent weeks, Peking has
muffled comment on sensitive is3ues affecting its interests in the
Vietnam conflict whilE again adding its voice to the chorus of
protest against alleged U.S. bombing of North Vietnamese dikes.
Chinese leaders' statements on the international situation have
all but avoided the eub~ect of Vietnam, as in the exchange of
speeches at the 12 kigust banquet welcoming UN Secretary General
Waldheim. 'Phuugh Wal.~iheim cited Vietnam as one of the persisting
problem areas, Foreign :tinister Chi Peng-fei made no mention of
Vietnam while focusing on the struggle against superpower hegemony.
Chi did refer to "continuous new vir_t~ries" in Indochina during a
speech on the 13 welcoming the Cameroon foreign minister, but
Peking's only recent pledge of support for the war effort was
contained in a lU August speech by a Shantung provincial leader
who welcomed Princr_. Sihanouk to Teinan by declaring that it is
the PRC's "bounden internationalist duty" to "support and assist"
the Indochinese.
Peking's extensive coverage of the nonrlined nations' conference
in Guyana included PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles on 13 and
15 August hailing the decision to accept the delegation of
Sihanouk's government ae the sole legal representative of Cambodia
and the PRG as a full member of the conference. NCNA accounts
of the conference have reported a resolution dr Indochina and the
Georgetown Declaration expressing support for the PRG's seven
points, but Peking has been avoiding the question ~f a Vietnam
settlement in its own comment.
Following the precedent of the 4 August
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial seconding DRV and
PRG Foreign Ministry protests against U.S. military actions,
another editorial on the 13th supported the 8 August DRV Foreign
Ministry statement denouncing U.S. air strikes and expressed
"burning indignation" over alleged U.S. attacks on DRV dikes and
"densely populated areas." Unlike the DRV statement, the editorial
evoided attacking President Nixon for having denied that it is
U.S. policy to bomb such targets; tH.a editorial referred
impersonally to the U.S. Government, charging that it is U.S.
policy to force the North Vietnamese to cease supporting "their
compatriots in the South" and that it is the U.S. intention to
cause floods during the rainy season.
As in the case of Peking's previous backing for Hanoi's charges
concerning the allegf't bombing of dikes, the editorial made no
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16 AUGUST 1972
mention of Chinese support for the war effort or of a political
settlement, though it called for an end to "indiecr~,minate"
American bombing in Vietnam. As reflected in the editorial's
title, "The Iron will of the Vietnamese People Is Unshakable,"
"raking again Cook the occasion to express confidence that the
Vietnamese can cope with the situation. But where tl-e DRV
statement asserted that neither bombing nor "perfidious political
and diplomatic maneuvers" of the Nixon Administration could
shake Hanoi's will, the PEOPL:E'S DAILY editorial referred more
vaguely to "outrageous means and intr~:gues" in this context.
As part of Peking's replaying of Vietnamese and other foreign
reports on bombing of dikes, NCNA on the 11th carried accounts
by foreign visitors in the DRV, including a report on Jane
Fonda's accusations, but PRC media have yet to refer to the visit
of Ramsey Clark. Peking belatedly on 10 August began picking
up VNA accounts of late ~uly and early August concerning
casualties suffered by Overseas Chinese f roo U.S. air strikes in
the Haiphong area. In its own name Peking has limited itself
to a two-sentence NCNA dispatch on the 10th reporting that a
Chinese embassy official had called on the vice president of an
Overseas Chinese association in Vietnam on 4 August to express
"indignation" and "deep concern" for the victims and their
families.
HANOI. PEKING HAIL SEATING OF PRG, RGNU AT NONALINED PARLEY
Hanoi and Peking hailed as a significant victory the seating of
the delegations of the PRG and of Sihanouk's government (RGNU)
as full members at the 8-1Z August conference of foreign
ministers of nonalined nations in Guyana.* Moscow, however,
consistent with its failure to recognize the RGNU, barely
acknowledged the admission of the two delegations at the end
of an 11 August TASS report on that day's session of the
conference. On the 12th TASS b~tiefly reported a speech by the
PRG delegate, but there was no further Soviet mention of the
RGNU delegation.
* The two delegations were not admitted as full members to the
Sep::ember 1970 Lusaka conference of heads of state and government of
nonalined countries. The PRG was admitted as an "observer," and
the question of which delegation was to represent Cambodia was
shelved. The seating issue accordingly received little attention in
communist media.
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A 12 August NNAN DAN editorial acclaimed the admission of the
PRG and RGNU delegations as a "victory of great significance"
for the anti-U.S. struggle in Indochina and for the "militant
solidarity" of the "oppressed people and progressive mankind"
with the Indochinese peoples. The Nixon Administration and
"a handful of lackeys" have tried to "slander and divide" the
Indochinese people, according to ::MAN DAN, which called the
Guyana conference decision "a bitter and ignominious failure
for the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys."
The editorial cited an AP reporter as speculating that the
decision "may further strengthen the posture of the Vietnamese
communists at the Paris peace conference because they will have
the moral support of 66 nonalined countries." NHAN DAN added
that the "deplorable attitude" of the Indonesian, Malaysian, and
Lao representatives at the conference--they walked out to
protect the admission of the PRG delegation--shows "the seamy
aide of the eo-called ASEAN solution to the Vietnam problem
which was recently rejected by our government and people."*
NHAN DAN also took the occasion to claim that the decision to
teat the delegations proves that "the U.S.-Thieu clique can
deceive no one with its false accusation that the PRG ie
plotting to set up a communist regime in one-half of Vietnam."
The conference,'s decisicn, the editorial said, confirms that
the PRG's policy of "peace, ind~pend~nc~, neutrality, and
national concord" is reasonable.
Pegging its comment a notch lower than an editorial, Peking
acclaimed the decision to seat the PRG and RGNU delegations in
a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 13 August. The article
was mainly devoted to puffing the cause of Peking's Cambodian
client, claiming that the conference's decision is proof of the
RGNU's "rising international prestige" and lenouncing the Lon Not
* Kuala Lumpur radio on 16 July quoted the Malaysian deputy
premier as reporting that at the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting
in Manila a definition of a Southeast Asian "zone of peace,
freedom, and neutrality" had been agreed upon and that the
conference agreed to contribute all it could toward an Indochina
settlement. The deputy premier said that "secret overtures"
rather than "open contacts" would be necessary to this end. On
10 August VNA reported that a DRV Foreign Ministry official
called in the Indonesian charge d'affaires and rejected "the
absurd proposal of the ASEAN regarding the settlement of the
Vietnam issue," but VNA did not disclose the content of the proposal.
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regime as a "handful of national scums" that destroyed Cambodia's
policy of nonalinement. Commentator also Cook the occasion to
claim that the nonalined countri~as constitute an important force
in the struggle agtinet the superpowers.
The seating of the two delegat~lons was singled out as particularly
noteworthy in another PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, on the
15th, hailing the results of the conference. The article said the
decision provided "vigorous support" to the Indochinese struggle
against "U.S. imperialist aggression." Unlike the KHAN DAri editorial,
neither Commentator article raised the question of a political
s~:tlement in Indochina.
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vISARMAMENT
MOSCOW WORLD DIS~~MNNENT CONFERENCE WILL NOT REPI~4CE SALT
Moscow has again stressed the. importance of holding a world disarma-
ment conference (~?DC) bur has made abundantly clear that such a
gathering cannot r~iplace the negotiations by the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament .(CCD) ir. Geneva ;or the strategic arms
limitation talks (SA;.T) with the United States. The Soviet
position on these matters.wae outlined in an article in the
28 July issue of the weekly NOVOYE VREMYA (No. 31) by Nikolay
Arkadyev, a commentator who has become the unofficial foreign
affairs weekly's principal spokemaan on diearma?nent. The article
apparently foreshadows the Soviet position on WDC to be forwarded
to the UN Secretary General, in response to the UN General Assembly
resolution ~f 16 December 1971 advising member states ro forward
their suggestions by 31 August. A,:'>adyev wrote that "the
preparation for a conference and its convening must not in any
degree detract from the significance of those forms and channels
for negotiations on disarmament which are being used at the present
time," and he went on to specify both the Geneva talks and SALT.
Reviewing what he labeled a general trend in international support
for the "Soviet initiative" to convene a world conference on
disarmament, including "a change in the U.S. position" as
reflected in the point Soviet-U.S. communique on President Nixon's
visit, Arkadyev cited the Mexican Government's June memorandum on
WDC as containing "a number of positive and rational opinions."
In particular, the ,article listed the Mexican proposal that there
be universal participation, that the conference convene in 1974,
that such conferences be held "periodically" thereafter, and that
"a special preparatory organ be created" i:~ which "appropriate
geographical and political representation would be guaranteed."
Underscoring his approval of the Mexican memorandum. Arkadyev again
stated that it "included many useful thoughts .znd ideas:"
.Prefacing his statement that a WDC "must not" detract from the CCD
and SALT, he recalled the Soviet proposal, at last year's General
Assembly session that a world disarmament conference should become
"a forum operating on a long-term basis and convened periodically"
to assign topics "to smaller working organs 'for negotiations."
Arkadyev said there was "no need to discuss in detail" the fact
that "alI nuclear powers must participate" in any arrangement
regarding nuclear disarmamentr he reminded his readers of the 1971
Soviet proposal to convene a conference of the five nuclear powers,
CONFIDENTIAL
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16 AUGUST 1972
a proposal which, he pointed ouC~ only the French GovernmenC
"acCively suppor.Ced." Acknowledging indirectly Chat Che PRC had
Oaken a negati?~e position on such a five-power gathering, a
fact repeaCedly recalled in routine SovieC polemics againsC Che
Chinese. he observed ChaC "true, not all Che nuclear powers
reacted posiCively" Co the proposal to hold such a conference
buC added optimistically that the USSR "does noC believe the
final word has been uttered concerning Chis ques.:ion." Arkadyev
argued that a five-power conference "could also promote effective
work by a WDC~" but ChaC "aC the same time it would be incorrect
to make a preliminary meeting of the five nuclear powers a
necessary condition for holding a world conference."
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SINO-SOVIET REL~ITIONS
M06Cq~V OOPNEYS APPREFlENS ION OVER PEKI NG ~S EUROPEAN POLICY -
With preparations for a European security confeL~nae scheduled for
Helsinki in .the fall and against a background of active Chinese
interest in Europe, Soviet bloc media ,have intensified a carefully
orchestrated campaign to discredit Peking's European policy.
Articles in IZVESTIYA, the GDR'e NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Warsaw's
IDEOLOGJA I POLITYKA, and Budapest's NEPSZABADSA~---the latter .
two widely broadcast by Radio Moscow--make the case that despite
Peking's efforts to normalize relations with some European
countries, it is persisting in its hostility toward the Soviet
Union while seeking to isolate Moscow from its allies and to
counter the Soviet detente campaign in Eurc~e.
NEUES DEUTSCHUWD, Concern over the prospect of Peking-Bonn
IZVESTIYA ARTICLES ties was reflected in Soviet bloc comment
on the recent visit to Peking by the West
German "shadow" foreign minister, Gerhard Schroeder. Typically,
East Germany's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, in an article on 26 July viewed
the Schroeder trip with alarm, characterizing it as "the beginning
of a phase of open cooperation between Lhe Peking leadership and
the imperialist forces of the FRG." It went on to interpret the
trip as confirmation that the
diplomatic acti:vit:ec pursued by Peking are o~,.-iously
dictated by 4carcely hidden hostility toward a European
security conference and by the attempt~to subvert the
vi3lble successes of the policy of peaceful coexistence
and thus to frustrate the coming of peace and security
to our continent.
Taking a slap at the Brandt-Scheel government, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
went on to ask how in the face of Schroeder's obvious motives
for visiting Peking "is one to understand the tact that FRG
Chancellor Brandt, as stated by hie spokesman Ahlers, received
Schroeder officially for full talks, that he euppurtpd Schroeder's
plan from the very beginning and gave him necessary references
for his tai Wis."
In contrast to the GDR party organ's criticism of Brandt, the
article in the 12 August issue of IZVESTIYA., by M. Mikhaylov,
praised the efforts of the Brandt-Scheel government for "playing
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16 AUGUST 1972
its part in the favorable processes taking place in Europe." The
article limited its criticism to "Schroeder and hie eyr~pathizere
from the CDU/CSU who are acting in a diametrically opposite
direction." Mikhaylov went on to charge Chat Schrueder was
invited to Peking precisely because of hie "wachinrltions" against
European detente ~;,d his opposition to improved Fite relations
with the Soviet bloc countries. In this context, Mikhaylov cited
an AP correspondent for the view that by ?,aooing Schroeder, Peking
hopes to "bring the opposition back into power in West Germany
and to slow down Bonn's implementation of its Oetpolitik."
A Grigoryev dispatch from Bonn in PRA'~Ur~ on the 6th had similarly
tied Schroeder's Peking trip to the upcaning Bundestag elections,
remarking Chat it wap designed to enable the "CDU/CSU bloc to
obtain. its own Eastern policy topic fo:r the election campaign."
The dispatch added that "the nearer the election approaches and
the more acute the election struggle becomes, the more frequently
and blatantly the Chinese argument will be advanced in the dis-
clssion of Eastern policy."
NEPSTABADSAG In keeping with Budapest's role as a leading
ARTICLE proxy spokesman for Moscow in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, NEPSZABADSAG's 10 August article,
entitled "China's European Policy.," charged Chat Peking's wooing
of the Bonn "conservative opposition in the person of Gerhard
Schroeder" is only part of its European policy, which sees
capitalist Europe and NATO as providing a political and military
counterbalance to the Soviet bloc. Broaching a eub~er.t generally
avoided in Soviet media, the article sought to counter the notion
that Moscow would attempt to exploit a European detente by
devoting greater attention to the Chinese problem. Thus the
article rejected the idea allegedly advanced by the Chinese in
theiz negotiations with the West to the effect that Soviet
involvement in Europe "represents a relief for China's defense."
China, the article concluded, "is not threatened by the Soviet
Union, but by imperialism."
IZVESTIYA Reflecting Moscow's effort to dissuade other
REPRINT communist states from being receptive to Peking's
diplomatic overtures, IZVESTIYA on 11 August
reprinted an article from the Polish journal IDEOLOGJA I POLITYKA
warning that dtespite its more f laxible tactics toward some states
Peking still considers the USSR "enemy number one." In passages
buttressing the case that the Chinese have not relented in their
anti-Soviet intransigence, the Polish article made a passing
reference to the Sino-Soviet border talks: "Despite the Soviet
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delegation's numerous initiatives, the Peking negotiations, which
have lasted nearly three years, have nor been brought to a
successful conclusion." (Jest four days earlier, IZVESTIYA had
indicated that the progress of the border talks was lase than
reas3uring by seizing on the publication of a new Chinese a.tlae
to charge Chat the Chinese are continuing to lay claim to Soviet
territory.) Maintaining that "anti-Sovietism" :.?ill remains the
core of Chinese policy toward Eastern Europe, tl~e article warned
that. Peking ~s using "differentiating" tactics toward various
~ountri.es in the hopes of fomenting "nationalistic tendencies" and
ultimate "disintegration" of the Soviet bloc.
PEKING PUTS USSR AT BOTTOM OF LIST OF SOVIET BLAC COUNTRIES
The differentiated line to which Moscow takes exc--ption was in
evidence during Peking's commemc;._.`.ion of its Army Day on 1 August.
NCNA carried a series of rep ort?~ on Chinese embassy receptions
marking the anniversary in various countrieP. Both the order in
which the reports were carried and the atmospherics they portrayed
were desfgned to provide a carefully calibrated reading of Peking's
relations with these countries. Bringing up the rear were the
Soviet bloc countries, azld among 'c'.:ese the Soviet Union was at the
very tail (the order was Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union; Romania was of course
accorded a high status outside this group). Alone among Chia group
of countries, the atmuephere at t:hp Moscow reception was not
characterized as friendly.
As it has octen done since the 5ino-Soviet border talks begbn in
October 1969, Peking used the occasion of an anniversary
reception--on 31 July marking Army Day--to take note of the
presence of the Soviet negotiators. NCNA reported that chief
negotiator. Ilichev and his deputy, Gankovskiy (who has returned
after a period during which another person served ae deputy chief
of the delegation), were present at the reception. The Soviets
also brought up the rear 1n this report, being named at the very
end of a list that but all other foreign guests -: the top.
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PEKING EXTEND6 FO!MML INVITATION TO TANAKA TO VISIT CWINA
A month after issuing an informal invitation through intermediaries
shortly after th? installation of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka,
Peking on 12 August formally invited Tanaka to visit China. The
announcement of Taraka's formal acceptance on l5 August stated thr..~
details of the trip would be disclosed simultaneously by both
aides after the timing of the visit is set. Chinese advance
publicity for the trip has been carefully designed to imply that
the visit will take place at Japanese urging, not as a result of
an informal Chinese invitation in July which apparently speeded ur
Tanaka's own timetable for establishing relations. Though Peking's
treatment of Japan since Tanaka's accession marked a dramatic shift
from its previous hostility,* the Chinese have been at pains to
avoid giving the impression that they are the supplicant party in
arranging the visit.
Peking's first reference to the possibility of a Tanaka trip was
contained in o 24 July NCNA dispatch reporting Tanaka's speech to
the first mee:.ing of the LDP'e council for normalizing PRC-Japanese
diplomatic relations. Tanaka was quoted as saying thRt "as to the
visit of the foreign minister and me to China, it should be decided"
by the council. On 4 August NCNA quoted the LDP council chairman
as telling Tanaka that he "should visit Peking personally to have a
frank exchange of views with the Chinese leaders." On 9 August
NCNA noted that the council had "unanimously adopted a decision in
favor of a visit." NCNA reported on the 11th that Japanese Foreign
Minister Ohira "told the Chinese aide officially" that Tanaka had
decided to visit China to discuss normalization of relations.
The formal Chinese invitation was finally released on 12 August in
the form of an announcement by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei that
Chou En-tai "welcomes and invitee" Tanaka. C:ntinuing to portray
Japanese eagerness, the announcement noted Ohira's talk with Chinese
officials in Tokyo at which he stated that Tanaka "wishes" to visit
China. The announcement suggested high hopes for the success of tMe
trip, stat~ing that Chou's invitation is for the purpose of
"negotiations and settlement" of the question of normalization of
Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. On 15 August NCNA carried an
account of Tanaka's meeting that day with Chinese officials to
formally accept the invitation. Again Japan was presented as the
beseecher, with Tanaka quoted ae expressing "heartfelt thanks" for
the invitation and the "hope" Chat the talks prove fruitful.
See the TRENDS of 26 July 1972, pages 31-32.
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