TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050031-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 2, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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uontial
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
ILLEGIB
I
Confidential
2 AUGUST 1972
5T00875R0069k10011-41?. 31)
Approved For Release 2onfotomatkapP85T00875R000300050031-6
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
2 AUGUST 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
DRV Rid14.u1es President's Remarks, Insists Dikes Being Bombed . 1
U.S. Strikes Protested by DRV Foreign, Education Ministries . . 5
Hanoi, Front Laud "Victories" in FJur-Month-Old Offensive . . . 11
DRV Military Journal Discusses War, Backing of Socialist Camp 15
Peking Marks Time on Indochinese Developments 17
Moscow Comment Focuses on Alleged Bombing of DRV Dikes . . . 18
Pham Van Dong Continues to Be Absent from Public View 19
CHINA
Army Day Editorial, Reception Indicate Return to Normality . . 21
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Hails Friendship with Arabs, Warns Against U.S. Policy . ? 24
SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY
RED STAR Lobbies for Greater Arms Expenditure.; 28
SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CUBA-USSR
Georgian Police Chief Takes Over Corruption-Ridden Tbilisi . . 48
CONFIDENTIAL
Moscow Welcomes Communist-Socialist Cooperation in Europe . . . 39
Election of Ukrainian President Reflects Cont'nued Stalemate . 46
West European Communist Parties Publicly Censure Czech Trials 34
Castro Rationalizes Cuban Dependence on USSR
Bloc Leaders Discuss "Pressing Issues" at Crimea Meeting . . ^ 31
Hungarian Official Attacks Chinese, Nationalist Deviations . ^ 32
COMMUNIST PARTY RELATIONS
42
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TOPICS AND EVENTS
Moscow (2965 items)
GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 24 - 30 JULY 1972
allina_SIALLapal
Vietnam
(11%)
12%
Domestic Issues
(32%)
29%
[U.S. Air Strikes
(3%)
5%]
Indochina
(17%)
19%
[Conference of
4%]
[Sihanouk Tour
(5%)
8%]
European Communist
[U.S. Air Strikes
(1%)
5%]
& Workers Parties
Withdrawal of Soviet
(3%)
7%
Cuba 26 July
(--)
8%
Advisers from Egypt
Anniversary
Yemeni (Aden) Government
(6%)
5%
Syrian CP-CPSU Talks
(--)
3%
Delegation in PRC, DPRK
in Moscow
UN Committee Discussions
(--)
4%
CEMA Session
(6%)
3%
on Seabeds
China
(3%)
2%
Middle East
(0.5%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestiu and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Top1c4 and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi media have described President Nixon's 27 July press
conference as an unsuccessful attempt to counter widespread
condemnation of alleged U.S. bombings of North Vietnamese dams
and dikes. The State Department report released on the 28th,
citing photographic evidence that there has been no intentional
U.S. bombing of the dikes, has been noted only in a Hanoi broad-
cast on the 29th unich dismissed it as a further effort to
assuage public opinion. Continued denunciations of U.S. actions
included DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap's remark, at an
embassy reception on 31 July on the eve of Chinese army day, that
the United States is "ruthlessly bombing and shelling many heavily
populated areas . . . and deliberately destroying dikes and
Irrigation works."
In addition to continuing, virtually daily protests over tbe
strikes by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, a higher-level
foreign ministry statement on the 31st dr.nounced recent bombing
of Haiphong. And on the 28th Hanoi released a lengthy DRV
Foreign Ministry memorandum in connection uith the four-month
U.S. "war escalation" against the North.
DRV comment on the President's press conference ignored his
remarks on a political setdement and his assertion that the
chance for successful negotiations is now better than it has ever
been. Hanoi has not commented on the Paris talks, but the VNA
account of the 27 July session duly noted that the communist
delegates again argued for a simultaneous military and political
settlement. The account also reported that DRV delegate Xuan
Thuy had asked why the United States is now press-111g the
President's 8 May call for an immediate cease-fire when it had
previously agreed that a cease-fire should come after both
military and political problems are settled.
Sihanouk's return to Peking from an extensive trip occasioned a
pro forma reaffirmation of Chinese support for the war effort
in Indochina, but Peking's comment on a settlement has been
couched in generalities. The Indochina conflict received only
a passing mention in celebrations of the PLA anniversary this
year.
DRV RIDICULES PRESIDENT'S REMARKS. INSISTS DIKES BEING BOMBED
Hanoi has reacted only with routine radlo and press comment to
President Nixon's 27 July press conference in which he reaffirmed
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that U.S. air strikes in North Vietnam are not aimed at dikes or
other tarAets where heavy civilian casualties would be likely.
The DRV press spokesman at the Paris talks issued the usual
prompt statement?which charged that the President had "once
more advanced sophistic arguments"--but it was not carried in
Hanoi media until the 29th. The first monitored reaction
was a Hanoi radio broadcast on the 28th which stated that the
President had to convene a "surprise" press conference in the
fnce of continued denunciations of the alleged bombing of
dams and dikes. It said he "admitted" that a number of North
Vietnamese dikes had been hit but tried to argue that they
were "insignificant and hit accidentally." On the 29th Hanoi
broadcast comment from the party paper NHAN DAN and the army
daily QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, but there has been no NHAN DAN
Commentator article--a vehicle used to react to most of the
President's past press conferences and other pronouncements.*
Statements by two DRV officials regarding alleged U.S. strikes
at dikes and DRV maintenance of the dikes did not mention the
President's press conference but seemed to have been publicized
to counter it as well as other U.S. pronouncements. These DRV
statements took the form of an article by the head of the
"Central Anti-Flood and Anti-Typhoon Command Committee," broad-
cast by Hanoi on the 28th, and a press conference held in Hanoi
on the 29th by a vice minister of the Water Conservancy
Ministry, reported by Hanoi radio on the same day.
The commentaries on the press conference cited the President's
remarks selectively, glosteng over such details as his state-
ment that if damage to the dikes did occur, every effort is
being made to see that it will not occur again. Instead
they characterized his remarks as an "admission" of his "crimes"
of intentionally attacking the dikes, and they claimed that he
* Mcst recently, a NHAN DAN Commentator article was prompted by
the President's 29 June press conference at which he announced
that the Paris talks would be resumed on 13 July and reiterated
his intention to continue the air strikes and mining of DRV
ports in the absence of a response to his 8 May proposals.
Commentator articles in NHAN DAN have not been issued on all of
the President's press conferences, however. For example, those
of 29 April and 1 June 1971 occasioned only lower-level comment.
Atypically, Hanoi completely ignored the 4 August 1971 press
conference in which the President spoke about his planned trip
to China as well as about Vietnamese issues.
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personally admitted the damage. They were particularly
scornful of his references to civilian casualties in the
South caused by the communists. For example, a Hanoi
rhdio broadcast on the 28th called this "brazen allegation"
a smokescreen for the U.S. "genocidal, biocidal, and
ecocidal crimes." The commentary was notably abusive toward
the President, calling him a "criminal and a liar" and a
"carnivorous wild beast." It accused him of crimes more
barbarous than those of the Hitlerites and "greater than the
crimes of dropping the atomic bomb."
The Hanoi press comment was also personally abusive, with the
NHAN DAN article on the 29th observing that the President
"brazenly spoke of the U.S. imperialists' ahility to cause
big floods and to ravage Vietnamese territory"--apparent allusions
to his remarks that if it were U.S. policy to bomb the dikes
they could be taken out in a week, and that the United States
is not using and will not use the great power that could finish
off North Vietnam in an afternoon. NHAN DAN went on to say:
"What is clear is that Nixon has gone mad and lost his reason,
because on the one hand world opinion has driven him intr a
corner and on the other hand, what is more important, despite
all his moves, he has failed to save the Saigon puppet clique."
A QUAN DOI NHAN rmi commeni.:ary on the 29th said that "the Nixoa
clique's scheme" is to deliberately cause floods in the coming
rainy season in order to bring large-scale destruction to the
populous delta area and "to create difficulties and lower our
people's will to resist." It concluded that "once again Nixon
has exposed his deliberate intent to commit crimes as did Hitler,
a war criminal cursed by all of mankind."
Much of the comment repeated Hanoi's statistics on the alleged
damage to dikes and water conservation projects since April.
A Hanoi radio commentary on the 28th cited Water Conservancy
Ministry figures to support its contention that the dikes hit
were indeed major ones. It also noted statements by foreign
visitors, including "newsmen, artists, diplomats, and religious
people." The only acknowledgment; of the State Department
report on dikes came in a Hanoi radio broadcast on the 29th.
.t.ting AP, it noted that the study acknowledged a dozen strikes
on dikes but.said the damage had been minor. Without elaboration,
it added tnat the report "advanced scores of reasons to prove
that the United States had not deliberately struck at these
dikes and demo and that if any had been hit, the damage was minor."
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While the account of the 29 July press conference held by Vice
Minister of the DRV Water Conservancy Ministry Phan My made
no mention of President Nixon's press conference, the timing
suggests that the purpose was in part to counter U.S. statements
that any bombing of dikes was inadvertent. None of the commert
pegged to the President's press conference acknowledged his
remarks on North Vietnamese laxity in repairing and maintaining
the dikes in view of the serious 1971 floods. But Phan My made
a point of reiterating details about maintenance work in recent
mouths. He also declared that "during the flood in 1971, which
was the biggest in a hundred years, all the dikes belonging
to the Red River system were well maintained. Damage was
limited to a number of districts belonging to the Thai Binh
River system."* A detailing of alleged U.S. damage to the dikes
as well as DRV maintenance of them appeared in the 28 July
broadcast of an avticle by Ha Kc Tan, head of the Central
Anti-Flood and Anti-Typhoon Command Oommitree. He said that
"our dikes are very firm, are big and high 4:nough, are consistent
with technical standards, and are capable of withholding the
flash flood water level reached in 1971." He concluded that if
dikes in North Vietnam break this summer, "Nixon must bear
responsibility for the genocide."
REPORTS OF Hanoi media during the past week reported
RECENT STRIKES several new instances of alleged U.S. strikes
at the DRV's colter conservancy and irrigation
systems. Hanoi radio on the 31st claimed damage on 29 July to a
portion of the Chu River dike and to the Ngoc Quang sluice, both
in Thanh Hoa Province, describing the latter es a major drainage
sluice and the raids as "intentional" and carried out in "a careful
and premecLtated manner." It also reported the destruction of the
Lan water lock in Thai Binh Province fin the 29th; VNA, in
detailing the destruction of this "important" project in a report
on the 31st, stressed that it was remote from "any highway storage
or anything else that could be allied to a 'military target" and
charged that it was hit by "teleguided air-to-ground missiles"
and bombs. One other target reported hit on the 29th was a
section of the Phong Chu dike in Tho Xuan district of Thanh Hoa
Province; this action was among those cited in a foreign ministry
spokesman's statement of the 30th.
* The State Department report said, among other things, that the
floods of last August rank with the most serious ever recorded.
Four major breaches occurred in the primary dikes along the Red
River.
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Radio reports this week also mentioned earlier alleged strikes
not previously reported: on the Tra Ly River dike, Thai Binh
Province, on 21 July, and on portions of dikes and other
hydraulic works along the La River in Ha Tinh Province on
25 July. Charges of deliberate attacks nn civilians repairing
dikes in Ha T4.nh Province werl leveled in the DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statement of 1 August.
U.S, STRIKES PROTESTED BY DRV FOREIGN, EDUCATION MINISTRIES
DRV FOREIGN MiNISTRY In addition to the continuing official
"MEMORANDUM" DRV protests over current U.S. air
strikes, VNA on 28 July transmitted
the text of a lengthy memorandum from the press and information
department of the foreign ministry entitled "New U.S. War
Escalation Against the DRV." The memorandum, which was
released at a Hanoi press conference, was divided into four
sections: 1) The Character of the Nixon Administration's New
war Escalation Move, 2) Why the New War Escalation, 3) Escalation
Cannot Stave Off Defeat, and 4) The Correct Way to a Settlement
of the Vietnam Problem. The memorandum rounds up the air strikes
since the step-up at the beginning of April. There was no
explanation in the propaganda regarding the release now, but it
may have been timed with the anniversary of the Geneva agree-
ments in mind. In a departure from practice for the past
several years, Hanoi this year issued no foreign ministry
document on the anniversary.
The substance and form of the current memorandum is similar to
one issued by the press department of the foreir ministry on
22 July 1966. That one detailed the "new criminal U.S. steps
in the escalation of the war in the North from 31 January to
15 July 1966," after a bombing pause. On 10 July 1965, on the
occasion of the 20 July 1954 Geneva agreements anniversary, the
same department had issued a white book on U.S. "intervention
and aggression in Vietnam during the last 20 years." Like the
current memorandum, the white book included a section on
political settlement.
The section on political settlement in the current memorandum
included the standard demand for an immediate end to the bombing
and mining of DRV ports, as well as an end to the Vietnamizatior
policy and all U.S. involvement in South Vietnam. It called for
an end to U.S. support for the Thieu regime, the removal of its
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machinery of "oppression and coercion," and the establishment
of the three-segment government of national concord to organize
elections. It declared that that is the spirit of the PRG's
seven-point solution, "the two key points of which--total
withdrawal and political power in South Vietnam--have been
elaborated." It also assailed the President's contention that
the communists want to impose a government on the South and
countered that "his generous terms" in fact boil down to
maintaining the Saigon administration and demanding that the
PLAF la) down its arms.
FOREIGN MINISTRY On 31 July the DRV Foreign Ministry issued
STATEMENT its second ministerial-level protest in as
many weeks, in response to U.S. strikes of
26-30 July on Haiphong city and harbor. This is in keeping
with Hanoi's general policy of reacting to strikes at the two
major cities of Hanoi and Riiphong with high-level statements.
Describing the intensive attacks on the city as "extermination
bombings and shellings," the statement charged that residential
areas, hospitals, and factories within the city were hit, as
well ns densely populated areas surrounding it, and that many
innocent civilians ware killed or wounded. It charged that
such "extermination attacks" on Haiphong and other cities "lay
bare the shameful denials of the Americans," who arc. concocting
schemes to "systematically" bomb and shell cities and other
populated areas, as well as "dikes, dams, and irrigation systems."
In appealing for support from peoples and government of the world
in the Vietnamese btruggle, the statement included among them
"various fraternal socialist couni:ries"--a standard appeal that
had been revived in the 22 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement
after having been omitted from those of 26 June and 4 July.*
(A 31 July and 1 August 'NA report of U.S. air strikes on
Haiphong on the 29th, 30th, and 31st said that many Chinese
residents of various precincts within the city were killed ir.
the "savage raids" of 31 July.)
The claims made in the Foreign Ministry's statement were repeated
in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of 2 August. As carried by VNA,
it classed the reported destruction in Haiphong and other
populated areas as "a genocidal crime of exceptional gravity"
perpetrated by "the White House and Pentagon war criminals."
* See the TRENDS of 26 July 1972, pages 2-3.
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The commentary charged that the attacks on Haiphong and the
alleged recent strikes at the dikes, occurring just a few
days after the "Nixon clique" had "denied any bombing of
civilian areas and dikeu in North Vietnam," have revealed its
true nature as "a gang of bloodthirsty killers who have lost
all human character."
EDUCATION MINISTRY Claiming that "all education cadres
SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT and teachers and millions of students
in the DRV" are determined to defeat
the U.S. aggressors, a statement issued by the Education
Ministry spokesman on 27 July condemned alleged U.S. strikes
on schools in North Vietnam since April. As reported by Hanoi
radio on 29 July, the statement tied such strikes in with those
on "the dike system and water conservancy projects" as part
of the "extremely barbarous crimAn" ordered by the Nixon
Administration against the Vietnamese people.
According to the statement, damage was suffered by schaols tn
the provinces of Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Ninh
Binh, Nam Ha, Thai Binh, Hai Hung, Ha Tay and Quang Ninh, and
the cities of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam Dinh, and "several hundred'
teachers and students were killed or injured. Several "typical
:aces" of destruction were cited, with emphasis on details of a
vrsonal or human-interest nature. The statement charged that
the alleged U.S. attacks were "genocidal," since they are "aimed
at annihilating the future generatic- .f the Vietnamese people"
and represent a deliberate attempt to kill not only students
but the teachers who are "performing their duty of training the
younger generations," as well as to destroy the cultural and
educational establishments of the DRV.
FOREIGN MINISTRY
SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENTS
DRV" were protesced in six
statements during the past
U.S. bombing, mining of the harbors,
and "all other acts encroaching upon
the sovereignty and security rf the
routine Foreign Ministry spokesman's
week.
-I- The statement of the 27th condemned alleged strikes at
populated areas in the outskirts of Haiphong and in the provinces
of Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh
and the Vinh Linh area, as well as bombardments of coastal areas
In Quang Binh by U.S. warships.
4. In the statement of the 28th, the "round-the-clock" nature of
U.S. bombing and strafing was said to have exposed the true
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nature of "U.S. imperialism" and its claim that "it only hits
military targets." The statement denounced several strikes on
the 27th against Vinh and the Haiphong suburbs, as well as on
populated areas in Quans Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh,
Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the
Vinh Linh area. It also charged that U.S. warships attacked
ccastal areas in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and that
B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh
Linh area.
4 A brief statement of the 29th denounced the "barbarous
war acts" of the previous day, when U.S. aircraft allegedly
bombed and strafed many populated areas in Ha Bac, Hai Hung,
Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang
Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. Many economic and
cultural establishments and private dwellings were reported hit
and many innocent people killed or wounded.
4 Strikes on the dikes highlighted the statement of the 30th,
which chsrged that these and other attacks represented deliberate
massacring of civilians and destruction of dikes and dams,
hydraulic works, and economic establishments serving the
livelihood of the Vietnamese people. The dikes specifically
mentioned were a section of the Phong Chu dike in Xuan Vinh
village of Tho Xuan district, Thanh Hoa Province, and the Lan
water lock in Tien Hai district of Thai Binh Province.
There were standard, more general denunciations of alleged
strikes on the 30th at residential areas in the suburbs of
Hanoi and nearby localities, as well as in Haiphong and its
outskirts. Also condemned were the alleged bombing and strafing
on the 29th of populated areas on the outskirts of Haiphong and
in Lang Son, Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh,
Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the
Vinh Linh area. U.S. warships were charged with "wantonly"
striking many localities in Quang Binh Province.
Citing the "extermination attacks" recently directed at
Haiphong, the statement of 1 August charged that U.S. aircraft
on 31 July bombed and strifed populated areas in Ha Bac, Quang
Ninh, Hai Hun3, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Rua, Nghe An, Ha Tinh
and Quang Binh r-ovinces and in the Vinh Linh area. It further
charged that 8-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh Province
wad that U.S. warships hit a number of coastal villages in Nghe
An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces. In denouncing the
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destruction of "many cultural and economic establishments," it
said the Americans "deliberately" attacked people who were
repairing the dikes at Nghi Pho village, Nghi Xuan district,
Ha Tinh Province."
+ The 2 August statement charged U.S. aircraft with "continued
savage strikcs" the preceding day on populated areas in Thai
Blahs Ninh Llah, Thanh Hoag Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh
provinces and on Cat Ba Island near Haiphong. It also claimed
that U.S. warships shelled coastal villages in Xuan Thuy district
of Nam Ha Province and Queng Xuong district in Thanh Hoe and
that II-52's bombed several localities in Quang Binh Province.
The attacks were said to have killed and wounded a number of
civilians and to have destroyed many dwellings and economic
and cultural installations.
CAPTURED PILOTS, Hanoi radio and VNA on 1 August released what
PLANE DOWNINGS they called "data about some (34 the U.S.
pilots captured recently." Captain James
David Kula and Captain Melvin Kazuki Matsui were reported
captured in Lang Son Province on 29 July, and Lt. Col. William
John Breckner and Lt. Larry Donald Price were said to have been
captured on the 30th after being shot down over Hanoi. The VNA
press review of 2 August said that pictures of the four pilots
appeared in papers of that date. At a 29 June Hanoi press
conference, 16 U.S. pilots capt-red since the April intensification
of the air strikes had been identified and 14 of them put on
display. One pilot said to have been captured "recently" had
been presented at a 17 April press conference. Pilots had also
been presented at a press conference on 12 May, but all had been
captured in February or earlier.*
Claimed plane downings as of 31 July reached a total of 3,794
with reported downings during the past week including one over
Nghe An, one over Quang Binh, one over Lang Son, two over Thanh
Hoa, two over Hanoi, and one over Haiphong.
The achievements of the DRV's local air defense forces continued
to receive commendation as Hanoi radio on the 26th broadcast a
letter from President Ton Duc Thang congratulating the people of
Nghe An Province on downing their 500th plane** and exhorting
them to continue to serve the frontline and to cooperate with the
* See the TRENDS of 6 July 1972, pages 8-9.
** Earlier propaganda on this feat is discussed in the TRENDS of
26 July 1972, pages 6-7.
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armed forces and people throughout the country in working toward
total victory against "U.S. aggression." A similar
presidential commendation on 11 July had hailed the alleged
downing of the 300th plane over Hanoi.
Detailed descriptions of the operations of local units appeared
in a 25 July Hanoi radio report on the "low-altitude firenet of
the self-defense militia force" in Thanh Hoa Province, which
was credited with the twin achievements of downing 300 planes
over the province and 100 over the Ham Rong bridge area.
Presenting recorded statements by the leaders of several of
these units--including a young girl just out of school as well
as a deputy village chief and a low-level political commissar--
the report stressed their determination to win and their
mastering of combat skills while they continue in production
activities. It emphasized the constant vigilance required in the
work of spotting planes and using infantry weapons either to
down them directly or to force them higher where they become
vulnerable to antiaircraft and artillery file. The report
concluded with comments by the provincial military commander
stressing the great capability and promising future of the
"low-altitude fire forci" and the comprehensiveness of its
deployment "in every self-defense militia cell and squad, in every
labor unit of the cooperative, in every hamlet and village, in
every work shift at the factory, in every organ and in every
school, so that every place will become a battleground to resist
enemy aircraft."
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HANOI. FRONT LAUD "VICTORIES" IN FOUR-MONTH-OLD OFFENSIVE
Vietnamese communist propaganda has continued to hail the "great
victories" of the spring offensive and it ridicules Saigon
reports on inroads made into areas captured by the communists.
The offensive was predictably praised by DRV Defense Minister
Vo Nguyen Giap in his speech at a 31 July reception marking the
45th anniversary of the PRC army day. Giap claimed that the
offensive had "obtained resounding and all-sided victories on
all battlefields" and made the "war situation more favorable . . .
than ever before." And he asserted that the South Vietnam
revolution "is now provided with favorable conditions to push
forward its offensive and win complete victory."
Statistics on the communists' alleged military achievemen,
since the start of the offensive on 30 March were publiciz-d by
LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) in a 31 July report which cleimed
that 220,000 allied troops had been put out of action, 20,000
of them captured, including "hundreds" of U.S. and South
Vietnamese officers. At the end of June the communists had
claimed that 150,000 allied troops had been put out of action,
thus 70,000 of these alleged losses were purportedly inflicted
in the past month.* LPA's latest summation also claimed that
1,300 aircraft were downed or destroyed and that 5,400 military
vehicles, including 1,800 tanks and armored cars, and 1,200
artillery pieces were seized or destroyed.
The failure of the communists to claim spectacular gains
comparable to those in the first month of their offensive is
apparent when the current summation of alleged achievements is
compared with a similar summation at the beginning of May. LPA
now says that "nearly half" the South Vietnamese infantry
divisions have "sustained extremely heavy losses," but
propaganda in early May had already claimed that "almost half" of
the 13 ARIM regular divisions had been "annihilated or heavily
decimated." The current figures on alleged allied losses of
tanks and armored vehicles and artillery pieces are more than
* Propaganda at the end of June indicated that 60,000 troops
had been put out of action in the previous two months; 90,000
were allegedly lost in April, the first month of the offensive.
See the TRENDS of 6 July 1972, page 11, and 10 May 1972, page 20.
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double the figures claimed at the beginning of May.* But,
perhaps reflecting the influx of materiel for Saigon forces
since the start of the offensive, LPA again merely echoes
claims made in May that "nearly half" of Saigon's tanks and
armored cars and one-third of their artillery units were
"wiped out."
LPA's release of the statistics on the offensive was followed
by editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 1 August
which, according to VNA, claim that the alleged feats are
"stunning blows" to Vietnamization and have opened better
prospects than ever before for the Vietnamese people's
struggle. Both papers reiterated the claim that the offensive
has resulted in a favorable shift in the balance of forces.
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said that the offensive is "continuing to
develop strongly," and it reviewed action throughout the South
to demonstrate that attempted allied counterattacks have failed.
QUANG TRI Hanoi and Front comment on the fighting in Quang
Tri ridicules reports of allied military advances.
The 25 July Saigon announcement that its airborne troops had
entered the Quang Tri citadel that day was denigrated in a
barrage of comment beginning on the 27th. On that day, a NHAN
DAN article dismissed the claim as a "psywar trick," citing as
evidence military reports from the Quang Tri PLAF command that
the citadel remained under the control of liberation forces
through the afternoon of the 26th and that no Saigon soldier
had broken in. In line with earlier comment on the Saigon
counteroffensive, NHAN DAN maintained that the recapture of the
citadel was "fabricated" to shore up the morale of Saigon troops
and cited a Western journalist as observing that 'the recapture
of Quang Tri city is Thieu's number one political objective ';hat
would at least permit the U.S. and Saigon representatives
returning to the Paris talks to hold their heads high even if
they are not in a position of strength." An article in QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN on the 27th, similarly ridiculing the claimed entrance
into the citadel, went on to claim that "Western public opinion"
has criticized the allies for entering an area of strong
communist fortifications, adding that "the puppet airborne troops
have allowed themselves to fall into the communists' trap and have
been seriously routed."
* A 6 May PLAF command communique claimed that in the first month
of the offensive 750 tanks and armored cars and 460 cannon were
destroyed or captured.
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On the 28th, another ()LAN DOI NHAN DAN article cited the
announcement the previous day that the marines were replacing
airborne units in Quang Tri city as evidence of the failure
of allied efforts in the city. This same point was made in
a 28 July Liberation Radio commentary, attributed to "Nguoi
Ban Tai" (the sniper), which commented that "the puppe
paratroopers and marines?who have been pushed into the Quang
Tri trap--are crawling about in a very awkward situation because
they are being resolutely intercepted and attacked both in front
and at the rear." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commented again on the
fighting in Quang Tri in an article on the 30th which also took
note of fighting in Thua Thien Province including the action
at Fire Base Bastogne (designated Dong Tranh by the communists)
which was evacuated by the ARVN on 26 July. On the 31st the
army paper published details on the defense of the Quang Tri
citadel, including a deocription of the alleged destruction of
a squad of soldiers "sneaking" toward the citadel with a flag.
On 30 July, for the third time in a month, allied bombing and
shelling in support of the GVN counteroffensive in Quang Tri
was protested by the PRG Foreign Ministry. The statement
charged that the United States attempted to destroy the citadel
in Quang Tri city with attacks by "hundreds of tactical planes
of various types and dozens of warships." Like earlier foreign
ministry statements on 11 and 18 July, it warned that "the PRG
is resolved to take all necessary military and political
measures to punish the U.S. aggressors for their criminal war
acts."*
BINH DINH Although propagandists have been less forthcoming
about the counteroffensive by Saigon forces in
Binh Dinh Province, the 1 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial
lauding the communist offensive did claim that in Bong Son and
Tam Quang in Binh Dinh Province, the ARVN were beaten "as soon
as they made an attempt to recover lost territories." A
30 July LPA report claimed that from 10 to 27 July the PLAF
and people in Binh Dinh had "mounted repeated attacks on enemy
troops engaged in nibbling attacks against the liberated areas
north of Phu My district, south and north of Bong Son bridge
and De Duc area, Hoai Nhon district." According to LPA, over
1,100 troops were wiped out and captured and, "in face of the
PLAF's violent attacks, the garrisons in Bong Son had to flee."
* For a discussion of the previous statements, see the TRENDS
of 12 July 1972, pages 11-12, and 19 July 1972, pages 16-17.
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On the 29th and 30th Hanoi and Front media publicized statistics
on alleged achievements from 8 April to 20 July in central Trung
Bo--the central South Vietnamese provinces including Binh Dinh.
They claimed that some 79,500 soldiers were wiped out and
captured during this 100-day period. A 30 July QUAN DOI NHAN.DAN
editorial hailing these achievements observed that the allies,
"in their perilous situation," have "frenziedly counterattacked
by mobilizing their aircraft and launching disorganized counter-
attacks with a view to recapturing a number of towns." Predict-
ing that further counterattacks would result in more serious
setbacks, the editorial claimed that "recently many puppet
battalions were annihilated in Binh Dinh, Quang Nam, and Kontum."
It cited reports by U.S. and Western news agencies for the
conclusion that the communists control almost all of Quang Ngai
Province, the greater part of Binh Dinh Province, and almost
all of Kontum Province,
MEKONG DELTA, Alleged achievements in the first 100 days of
SAIGON AREA the offensive in the Mekong Delta area were
lauded by Hanoi and Front media on 25 and
26 July. The communists claimed that during the period from
7 April to 17 July their forces put out of action almost
57,000 troops, overran or forced the surrender or evacuation
of 600 posts and positions, "liberated" nearly 1,100 more
villages and hamlets, and enabled an additional one million
people to "regain control." It was also claimed that 130
aircraft, 150 military vehicles, and 110 artillery pieces were
destroyed. 26 July QUAN DCII NHAN DAN editorial on these
alleged feats claimed that the "newly liberated areas" have
made "substantial human and material resources" available with
which to develop forces and "establish very advantageous
offensive springboards."
The specter of further attacks in the delta and in provinces
around Saigon was raised in a series of articles broadcast by
Liberation Radio on 31 July and 1 August and attributed to
Nguyen Ngoc. Ngoc declared that the liberated areas had been
greatly expanded in this area and that the allies could not
check "the big leap forward in the guerrilla war." He claimed
that the offensive had provided a good opportunity for the
liberation forces in areas near Saigon to stage offensives and
uprisings, specifically maintaining, for example, that
"offensive springboards" in northern Gia Dinh "are being
expanded to the outskirts of Saigon in order to advance toward
besieging the enemy there." After reviewing the situation in
other provinces around the capital, Ngoc concluded that "it is
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clear that the encirclement by guerrilla warfare has been
gradually tightened and is increasing its threat against the
U.S.-puppets' biggest lair in Saigon."
DRY MILITARY JOURNAL DISCUSSES WAR, BACKING OF SOCIALIST CAMP
On 30 July Hanoi broadcast an article from the monthly military
journal QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, under the pseudonym "Quyet Thang"
(determined to win), which argued that the "strategic offensive"
over the past three months has "dealt a mortal blow" to
Vietnamization.* As documentation, Quyet Thang asserted that
165,000 troopo of the Saigon army had "disintegrated" or been
Uannihilated" during the offensive and that, by contrast,
"the liberation main force army is standing firm on several
important offensive areas and is unprecedentedly powerful."
Discounting the role of air power to turn the tide for the
allies, the article observed that the concentration of air
attacks in a certain area for a certain period can "to some
extent increase the puppet troops" ability to resist, but that
It caa "in no way change the strategic situation on the battle-
field." In this connection, Quyet Thang denied allied claims
that the air force has stopped the offensive and exhausted the
communists, and he argued that the offensive has demonstrated
the "revolutionary military viewpoint" that men are the
decisive factor and that the outcome of war is determined by
ground combat.
Quyet Thang in standard fashion dismissed the notion that
aid for the South and international assistance can be hindered
by mining DRV ports and bombing. And he also reaffirmed
confidence that the Administration's "many deceitful political,
diplomatic, and psywar tricks" will not isolate the revolution
in the South. He declared pointedly that socialist countries
consider solidarity and support for Vietnam to be both "a sacred
international obligation as well as an act consistent with their
* The broadcast said that the article was published in the
August issue of the journal, but it appears to have been written
in early July and it is unusual for the journal to be publicized
before the middle of the month. Quyet Thang's last article,
published in the April issue of the journal, was broadcast on
21 May.
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people's interests."* Refernmg in standard indirect fashion to
President Nixon's visits to China and the USSR, the article
charged that Nixon "has hurriedly run across earth and heaven
and used many blatantly deceitful tricks and plotted to sow
dissension to bridge the gap between socialism and imperialism
and between aggression and the antiaggression force and to
eradicate the contradiction between the U.S. imperialists . .
and the peace-loving revolutionary people." The article
denounced this "cunning but idiotic plot" and went on to
strongly attack the notion that differences with the United
States can be papered ove...:
The contradiction between socialism and imperialism
is the most basic contradiction in the world today.
This contradiction will forever remain a conflict
stemming from the class nature of two opposing
social systems tnat have been decisively shaped,
and it will never 'ne coacealed or eradicated by
any subjective scheme of the U.S. imperialists. 1k7
matter how the Nixon clique may try with its deceitful
tricks, it will never be able to cover the aggreemive
and bellicose nature of the U.S. imperialists--number
one enemy of mankind.
An article in the June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, only now available
in translation, had also raised the question of socialist support.
Repeating a charge voiced in comment earlier this year aimed at the
President's trips to China and the Soviet Union, the article declared
that the Nixon Doctrine attempts to "divide the socialist camp and
the anti-imperialist forces" in the hope of preventing support to
Vietnam. It added that the world front could not be divided and
noted that the Vietnamese fight to protect "the interests of tae
socialist camp" as well as their own independence and freelom. In
its discuseion of the situation in South Vietnam the article was
notable for its warning that further efforts would be needed to
insure victory. It asserted, for example, that "only by making the
most extensive efforPn to launch resolute, continuous, vigorous, and
widespread attacks against the enemy and keeping him from regaining
his strength can we drive him from being violently shaken and from
collapsing part by part to total collapse."
* A similar allusion to the self-interest of socialist nations
supporting Vietnam was made in an article in the QUAN DCI NHAN DAN
paper, broadcast by Hanoi on 5 July and discussed ih the 6 July
TRENDS, pages 4-5.
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PEKING MARKS TIME ON INDOCHINESE DEVELOPMENTS
Ceremonies attending the 29 July return to Peking of Cambodian
Prince Sihanouk from an extensive trip to Europe and Africa
occasioned a pro forma reaffirmatiod of Chinese support for the
war effort in Indochina, but Peking has continued to mark time
on the question of a settlement while awaitiug devolopments on
the negotiations front. In a speech at a banquet for Sihanouk
on 30 July, Chou En-lai limited himself to generalities in
pledging support for Sihanouk's "just position" on a Cambodian
and Indochinese settlement and for his expressed determination
to carry on the war "without compromise or retreat." Similarly,
a 28 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial welcoming Sihanouk cited his
"solemn and just stand" on a settlement, but neither Chou nor
the editorial took the occasion to mention specific peace
proposals.*
Like Chou, the editorial nourished Sihanouk's determination that
no accommodation be arranged on Cambodia that would undercut
his front. Chou said Sihanouk had "exposed the political schemes
engineered by certain big powers," and the editorial cited his
opposition to a new international conference and referred to
"all sorts of political conspiracies" aimed at dividing the
anti-Lon Nol forces. But while expressing support for Sihanouk
on this score, the Chinese failed to mention his government's
vigorous attacks on the notion of a cease-fire. Peking has
avoided critical comment on this issue since President Nixon's
8 May proposal calling for an Indochina cease-fire.
Peking's cautious approach to the Indochina question was also
reflected during the celebrations commemorating the 45th
anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army.
In contrast to last year, when the Indochina struggle figured
prominently both in the joint editorial and in a speech by
now-purged PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, the only mention
this year was a passing reference in a 31 July speech by MAC
Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying to the "great victories" won in
Indochina. Last year Huang had pledged Chinese support for the
war effort as well as for the PRG's seven points, the Pathet Lao's
peace proposal, and Sihanouk's five-point declaration.
* The 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 1954 Geneva
agreements anniversary endorsed the PRG's seven-point plan
only in connection with its proposal for a tripartite coalition
government.
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Peki.ag has been characteristically selective in carrying
Vietnamese comment on the war, deleting passages that might
compromise broader PRC interests. In Peking's only reaction
thus far to President Nixon's 27 July news conference in
which he reiterated that it is not U.S. policy to bomb North
Vietnam's dikes, NCNA' s accounts of Vietnamese comment omitted
the more virulent attacks on the President. Sarlier, in
picking up a 27 July DRV Foreign Ministry memorandum, NCNA
omitted harsh charges against the President or the alleged
bombing of the dikes and deleted attacks on the President's
intentions in the Paris negotiations as well as a discussion
of internal American political opposition to Nixon Administration
policies. NCNA repeated that part of the memorandum demanding
that the United States negotiate seriously on the basis of
respect for the Vietnamese people's national rights "as
recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements." But while quoting
the memorandup's recital of the communistn' demands as embodying
"the spirit" of the PRG's seven points ano its elaboration of
"the two key questions," NCNA deleted from the otherwise intact
passage the memorandum's specification that the two key
questions concern U.S. withdrawal and "political power in South
Vietnam."
MOSCO4 COMMENT FOCUSES ON ALLEGED BOMBING OF DRV DIKES
Routine Moscow comment continues to center on denunciations of
the alleged U.S. bombing of dikes in North Vietnam and to insist
that the "only" way to solve the conflict ia at the Paris
conference. A WPC-designated "world day of protest" against
U.S. bombing of dikes and meteorological warfare, marked on
1 August, ills been publicized by Moscow. Commentators
repeatedly call attention to UN Secretary General Waldheim's
condemnation of U.S. bombings of DRV dikes and point ort that
although U.S. spokesmen have tried to deny the strikes, they
have been forced to "admit" that such raids have occurred
unintentionally. Moscow has, however, given minimal publicity
to President Nixon's 27 July press conference remarks on the
bombings and the 28 July State Department report on the dike
bombing issue.
TASS on the 28th carried its usual editorialized report on the
President's press conference, but the only other available
comment came in a 29 July foreign-language radio commentary
which said his press conference shows that the United States
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Intends to continue bombing dikes and dams, using "poisonous
chemicals," and waging "..deteorological warfare." TASS noted
that the bulk of the presq conference was devoted to the
bombing issIA, reporting that the President criticized Secretary
General Waldheim as being taken in by enemy propaganda and that
he asserted it is not U.S. policy to bomb dikes but to attack
only military targets. TASS added, however, that the President
also "admitted" that there have been reports of "incidental
damage" to peripheral irrigation installations. TASS concluded
by noting that President Nixon said he did not want to
jeopardize negotiations, but that bombing would be continued
and he did not preclude strikes at DRV irrigation structures
if needed to protect U.S. pilots from antiaircraft missiles.
The only available Moscow acknowledgment of the State
Department report on DRV dikes came in a 31 July English-language
radio commentary which said the report "admitted" that the
North Vietnamese system of dikes and dams had been damaged in
12 places although claiming twat the destruction had not been
deliberate. Moscov called the report a "cover statement" for
the American pLblic, charging that in fact the bombing policy
had been "planted well ahead of time."
Moscow's support for the Vietnamese struggle is currently
highlighted by publicity for the 27 July Paris meeting of
27 European communist and workers' parties to express
solidarity with Vietnam. The Soviet delegation was headed by
Politburo member Ponomarev. While the conference statement
did not go beyond routine pledges of "all-round assistance"
and support for tha "reasonable and constructive" proposals
of the DRV and PRG which offer "a fair basis" for a peacaul
settlement, Moscow comment expressed satisfaction with the
fact that the meeting represented a united expression of support
from all the communist and workers' parties of Europe.
PHAM VAN DONG CONTINUES TO BE ABSENT FROM PUBLIC VIEW
Hanoi media marked the 25th anniversary of Wounded Soldiers and
War Heroes Day on 27 July in 4:le usual fashion with press
editorials and the announcem, . that a delegation of leading
officials had laid wreaths al. a military cemetery in Hanoi and
visited a military hospital.* The delegation was headed by
* Propaganda in preparation for the anniversary is discussed
in the 26 July .RENDS, page 9.
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Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi and included VWP Secretary Nguyen
Van Tran, Vice Chairman of the National Asaembly Standing
Committee Tran Dang Khoa, Minister of the Interior Duong Quoc
Chinh, and Deputy Defense Minister Maj. Gen. Tran Sam, as well
as rcwresentatives of the Fatherland Front, the PRG, and thA
Hanoi Administrative Committee, Pham Van Dong has usually
headed the delegation, although he failed to do so in 1971
and 1966; in those years it was led by Vice Premier and
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Minh. The reason for Le Thanh
Nghi's assumption of the role this year is not clear. Trinh
was evidently present in Hanoi, where he attended a Cuban
embassy reception on 26 July.
The absence of Premier Pham Van Dong from the anniversary
delegation pointed up his failure to appear in public in
recent weeks. Although he did not participate in the anniversary
activities last year, he had headed the wreath-laying delegation
in the four previous years. Hanoi last reported an appearance
by Pham Van Dong on 10 June, when VNA indicated that he had
"recently" chaired a Council of Ministel:s meeting. His last
reported activity on a specific date was a 6 May meeting with
Cl.ban medical volunteers, and his last appearance at a public
function was at the 30 April May Day meeting. The most
recent occasion on which Dong would have clearly been expected
to appear but did not was during Soviet President Podgornyy's
15-18 June visit to the DRV. There have been no occasions since
then which would have demanded an appearance by Dong, but his
absence for this length of time is uuu6ual. Routine messages
from Pham Van Dong continue to be publicized, confirming that his
failure to appear in public cannot be viewed as evidence that
his official position has changed.
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CHINA
ARMY DAY EDITORIAL. RECEPTION INDICATE RETURN TO NORMALITY
For the first time since the 1 August PLA anniversary last year,
the PRC has celebrated one of its major holidays in a traditimal
manner with a PEOPLE'S DAILY/RED FLAG/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY joint
editorial and a reception. Since the cancelation of National
Day activities following the purge of Lin Piao last September,
Peking had sharply curtailed its anniversary observances, failing
in particular to issue editorials on May Day and the 1 July party
anniversary. he joint editorial on Army Day represents the
third such pronouncement this year, the other two being the New
Year's Day joint editorial and one on 2: May marking the 30th
anniversary of Mao's Yenan Talks. In a departure from the
practice of recent PLA anniversaries but consistent with Peking's
behavior in recent months, the joint editorial was devoted almost
wholly to domestic rather than foreign affairs.*
In both form and content, Peking's treatment of Army Day seemed
designed to show that the PLA's loyalty is insured and that
matters are safely in hand in the wake of the Lin affair,
though Lin was no. mentioned by name and no restaffing of
vacant military posts was announced. The current state of
affairs was reflected in a new formulation underscoring the
PLA's subordination to the party by saying the army was
"founded and commanded by the great leader Chairman Mao and
the Communist Party of China." Previous formulations beginning
during the cultural revolution did not mention the party and
said Lin commanded the army. ?
The joint editorial pointedly cited the second plenum--a major
watershed in the developments leading to Lin's purge--as the
starting point from which the PLA has achieved "remarkable
results" in the rectification campaign that has been taking
place. In this context the editorial invoked Mao's "three
* Two of the occasions this year--May Day and the anniversary of
Mao's 20 May 1970 anti-U.S. statement--on which Peking failed to
produce editorials would have called for pronouncements on foreign
affairs. Apart from the one for New Year's Day, the joint
editorials from the time of the 1 December, 1971 editorial on
strengthening party leadership have dealt mainly with domestic
affairs.
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basic principles" that have figured pro.. aently in ideological
attacks on Lin'.. deviations. After observing that the PLA's
history confirms its loyalty to the party, the editorial
alluded to the recent crisis: "Any careerist or conspirator
who wants to undermine this army is only daydreaming. Mountains
may be shaken, but the Liberation Army--never!"
The edLtorial repeated a curious phrase introduced in last year's
editorial on the eve of Lin's purge in saying the army "is
distinguished by a remarkable unity within its ranks and with
those outside them." Last year this may have been intended aa
a warning to Lin and his associates, and the repetition this
year may be a reminder that most of the PLA did remain loyal.
Referring to the army as being "unaer the absolute leadership
of the party and an instrument for carrying out the party's
program and line," this year's editorial credited the PLA wf.th
winning "splendid victories" by relying on correct principles
of behavior.
The editorial did not clarify the future tasks of the army,
tho.qh it took note of the PLA's cultural re7olution role in
the tvil sector and its "contributions to the peop7e." The
editorial did not indicate that the PLA's involvement in such
duties would continue; rather it stressed, in line with other
pronouncements since Lin's downfall, that a "mass campaign for
military training is gaining momentum."
Military Commission Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, continuing to
replace purged PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng on various
occasions, delivered the speech at thr: defense ministry's
reception on 31 July. In his brief speech Yeh e.rAciated the
PLA with moves to purify the party by saying the army has worked
with the people to shatter "the criminal schemes of the traitors,
enemy agents, and careerists who wormed their way into the party"
to usurp leadership. He declared that the army "is now more
unl'ed and more powerful than ever before." Yeh also used the
occasion to voice Peking's line on growing opposition to the
superpowers. Echoing Chou En-lai's 17 July remarks disparaging
the Soviet-U.S. agreements on limiting strategic arms, Yeh said
thr: two superpowers are in reality intensifying their arms
expansion and their contest for world hegemony while preaching
arms control and international security. Both Yeh's speech and
the joint editorial contained a ritualistic vow to "liberate"
Taiwan, but there was no repetition of last year's demand for
the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
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LEADERSHIP TURNOUT All of the active Peking leaders except
Mao appeared at the reception in a show
of stability and unity. In a ranking according priority to
state titles, NCNA listed PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and
NPC Chairman Chu To ahead of Chou, who was followed by the
standard ranking of other Politburo members.* Several leaders
who have been grouped with Politburo members on some recent
occasions were not accorded that position, notably Hunan chief
Hue Kuo-feng, who was listed among other members of the central
committee. Listed among the high state officials were the
three active vice ministers of national defense, reshuffled
somewhat since their last appearance together on 10 July
when Su Yu was ranked first. On the Army Day lisi; the
precedence was Hsiao Ching-kuang, Sul and Wang Shu-sheng.
Some reappearances particularly symbolized the return to favor
of individuals whose careers suffered during the cultural
revolution. Chen Yun and Li Fu-chun were listed as vice
premiers in the group of state officials coming immediately
after the Politburo. This represents the first public
appearance since 1969 of Chen Yun, who was criticized during
the cultural revolution. Another noteworthy appearance was
that of Chen Tsai-tao, now listed among leading mAmbers of the
PLA and previously commander of the Wuhan military region at
the time of the Wuhan mutiny in mid-1967. At that time he
reportedly resisted the dictates of the central authorities,
imprisoning cultural revolution group member Wang Li aid
detaining Hsieh Fu-chih after they arrived to cope with local
problems. However, there was no campaign in the media at that
time against Chen, and in fact most of the cultural revolution
group was soon purged for having started a campaign to "drag
out the handful in the army" in the wake of the Wuhan incident.
In retrospect it appears that the Wuhan incident may have been
an early trial of strength between Lin and Chou rather than
a mutiny against the center as such. If so, the episode
prefigured the eventual linkage of Lin's fate with that of
Chen Po-ta, head of the cultural revolution group.
* This represents a new ranking for leadership turnouts, though
for other pur?oses Tung and Chu had previously been listed ahead
of Chou. Chou appeared above Tung and Chu in lists of leaders
appearing for the May Day celebrations and for an Albanian ballet
performance on 24 June,
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MIDDLE EAST
USSR HAILS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARABS, WARNS AGAINST MI POLICY
References to the exodus c 'oviet military personnel from Egypt
have virtually disappeared Sovie- !midis, and the windup
observances of Egypt's 20th revolution anniversary have been
given only meager notice. Moscow has instead, not unexpectedly,
underlined its relations with the other "progressive" Arab
states, hailing economic and technical cooperation with Iraq
and Syria and noting in both cases the growth of cooperation
in the "political field" as well. Perhaps seeking to mute the
military angle, Moscow has mentioned only once, in a brief
Arabic-language report on 1 August, the presence in the USSR
of the Iraqi defense minister on what was billed by the IRAQI
NEWS AGENCY as a two-week visit at Grechko's invitation.* And
the Soviet defense minister's customary greetings to his Syrian
counterpart on Syria's 1 August army day has thus far not been
reported by either side.
Moscow has played up the communique on the 21 and 25 July talks
between CPSU leaders Kirilenko and Ponomarev and a Syrian
Communist Party (CPS) delegation--talks which, according to
Arab media, dealt with reconciliation between warring Syrian
communist factions rather than with the altered Middle East
political scene. The CPSU-CPS communique denounced any attempts
to undermine Syrian-Soviet friendship as serving only the
interests of imperialism and reaction; and threaded through
other pry7paganda are reiterated warnings of stepped-up attempts
by "imperialism" and Israel to foster Arab disunity and "drive
a wedge" between the Arabs and their true friends, the socialist
countries.
Along with the theme of imperialist "intrigues" come signs of
an effort to counter any resurgence of U.S. influence in the
Middle East in the aftermath of Cairo's action. Thus a 31 July
broadcast in Arabic depicted the United States as exerting
"desperate efforts to rehabilitate itscIlf" in the eyes of the
Arab; and convince them it is "prepared to do something for
them" regarding a Middle East settlement. Claiming that
Washington was now desirous of rest.iring diplomatic relations
with Arab countrics, the broadcast agreed with "many Arab
* Iraqi Defense Minister Shihab was in the USSR in September-
October the last two.years for lengthy "rest" visits; the current
stay might be in return for Grechko's visit to Baghdad last
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personalities and the press" that there was no bsais for hope of
a radical change in U.S. policy toward the Arabs, which was
unthinkable." And a 1 August broadcast, also in Arabic, seized
on the Iraqi foreign ministry's denial of rumors about a change
in relat.l.cns with the United States to assail "tendentious
rumors" by "imperialist propaganda" about the "alleged peaceful
role the United States could play" to bring about a solution
to the Middle East crisis. It conceded that the United States
did have a "key"--influence over Israel--but claimed that Tel
Aviv was confident it would never be used, "either now or after
the U.S. presidential elections."
While seeking to disabuse the Arabs of any notion that the
United Statas might now reconsider its Middle East policy, Moscow
has of course studiously avoided connecting speculation about
changes with Its setback in Egypt. It has made no attempt to
exploit Egyptian Prenident as-Sadat's charges against the United
States, probably smarting from his contrasting of Soviet support
for Egypt with U.S. sopport of Israel. An Arabic-language
broadcast on the 27th, referring to Mrs. Melee 26 July Knesset
speech, wondered ingenuously why the Israeli leaders "have
chosen this time to talk about peace" and concluded that Tel
Aviv and its "imperialist protectors" were simply seizing every
opportunity to weaken the Arabs and wring concessions from them.
For listeners in Israel, a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast
in Hebrew the same day also professed bewilderment over why
Mrs. Meir believed "congenial conditions have now been created"
for direct summit contacts. It put forth the standard objection
to direct talks as "tantamount to Arab surrender" under conditions
of Israeli occupation of Arab territory, although it twice spoke
of the "impracticality"--raf.her than impossibility--of the idea.
EVENTS IN EGYPT The departure of two more groups of Soviet
specialists from Egypt was noted in Moscow
domestic service and Arabic-language broadcasts, on the 28th and
31st respectively, reporting "warm sendoffs" by Egyptian naval personnel
in Alexandria and an unspecified artillery unit. The Soviets
were presented with "token presents" and thanked for their
"effective and good quality" aid and "combat experience and
knowledge."
Functions connected with t' revolution anniversary observances
were reported only briefly: Soviet media took note of the
conclusion of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) National Congress
session on 26 July, TASS singling out a decision on strengthening
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national unity and the internal front and a resolution terming
the U.S. stand the main obstacle to a just settlement of the
Middle East crisis. A short domestic service item added that
the ASU also "discussed the question of strengthening friendly
relations with the Soviet Union" and cited Cairo's AL-AKHBAR
as calling the development of relations with the USSR "one
of the main trends" of Egyptian foreign policy.
Presenting a picture of friendship as usual, TASS on 1 August
reported that Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov held a reception
in honor of an Egyptian parliamentary delegation leaving on a
visit to the Soviet Union; it mentioned that the event was
attended by ministers, ASU Central Committee membero, and
"executives of Egypt's foreign and war ministries" as well as
by prominent public personalities. Earlier, an Arabic-language
broadcast on the 27th reported Vinogradov as assuring the
Egyptians, at a anniversary ceremony held at the Soviet
cultural center in Cairo, that the SP let Union would continue
to stand Ly them and would be a "sure friend." But TASS on
the 27th, briefly brushing off a launching ceremony at the
Alexandria dockyard, failed to mention the presence of
Vinogradov; according to Cairo radio's account, President
as-Sadat "shook hando with the deputy prime ministers, the
ministers, senior donkyard officials, and the Soviut ambassador."*
MObCOW radio and TASS also gave short shrift to as-Sadat's
27 July speech at Alexandria University in which he remarked
that "maybe," when Soviet-Egyptian cooperation "in the coming
stage runs along the same line, as it did today at the shipyard,
then everything wi.L1 be wonderful." Moscow radio's four-
sentence report dealt solely with as-Sadat's "firm rejection"
of Israeli Prime Minister Meir's "hypocritical proposal" on
direct Israeli-Egyptian talks. TASS' equally brief item in
addition noted his description of the U.S. position on the
Middle East crisis as very dangerous.
* Soviet ambassadors have been active in other major Arab capitals:
Arab media have reported Mukhitdinov's meetings with the Syrian vice
president and president on 22 July, the ambassador to Iraq's meeting
with Saddam Husayn on the 27th to "review the good relations"
between the two countries, and Ambassador Azimov's meeting with the
Lebanese foreign minister on the 31st to review Arab-Soviet relations
"in light of President as-Sadat's recent decisions." In Algeria the
foreign ministry secretary general received "Soviet ambassador-at-
large" Tsarapkin on 1 August and also received the Soviet charge
d'affaires who "handed over a communication from the Soviet government
concerning the evolution of the Middle East situation."
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A routine dispatch in PRAVDA on the 29th, dealing with the direct
talks issue, was notable because the Cairo dateline revealed
the presence there of the item's author, Icor Belyayev, a
former editorial board member of PRAVDA and one of the paper's
chief Middle East specialists. Belyayev is now deputy director
of the Africa. Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
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SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY
RED STAR LOBBIES FOR GREATER ANIS EXPENDITURES
Spokesmen for the Soviet defense establishment, while continuing
to treat the Moscow summit meeting as a significant contribution
to world peace, have begun to sound the alarm for increased
military spending. The organ of the defense ministry, RED STAR,
which in recent weeks has displayed heightened concern over the
level of U.S. defense spending and the progress of new U.S.
strategic weapons programs, has now resumed publication of
articles championing the claims of the defense establishment
for more funds. To judge from a 21 July RED STAR article,
which pointedly warned would-be doves against any relaxation
in Soviet military preparedness, the claims of the military
have apparently been challenged by those seeking to exploit
the peace dividends flowing from the detente policy.
SELECTIVE RED STAR, like other Soviet papers, duly applauded
REPORTING the results of the summit as a triumph nf Soviet
diplomacy put did not participate in the carefully
orchestrated campaign launched by the media after the summit in
defense of the Soviet detente policy. This campaign, aimed at
unnamed critics of the Soviet role at the summit, was waged
exclusively by PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA among the major Moscow
newspapers. RED STAR characteristically focused attention,
through the device of selective reporting, on the continuing
threat to Soviet security posed by the United States.
For example, on 7 July RED STAR published a TASS dispatch from
Washington reporting the news conference called by Secretary of
Defense Laird the previous day to assail Senator McGovern's
proposed cuts in U.S. defense expenditures. RED STAR quoted
Laird as stating: "We are not going to plan a reduction in
the military budget while the talks in the field of strategic
arms are not completed." Moreover, in an unusual followup
published in RED STAR on the 8th, Laird's statement on Pentagon
planning was repeated but without the proviso linking the
Pentagon budget to SALT. By contrast, IZVESTIYA did not report
the press conference, and PRAVDA:a account, published on the
8th, failed to report the statements quoted in RED STAR.
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RED STAR likewise gave greater prominence than other papers to
the 11 July Kremlin reception for graduates of military academies.
The event wan given front-page treatment in RED STAR, alone among
the major Moscow newqpapers. And the summary of Defense Minister
Grechko's speech at the reception published in RED STAR on the
12th reported his remark that "the most effective means of
bridling aggressors is to strengthen our defensive might in
every way"-.a remark that did not appear in PRAVDA's abbreviated
summary of the Kremlin reception.
21 JULY ARTICLE Perhaps the clearest indication of the interests
and apprehensions of the Soviet defense
establishment appeared in a 21 July RED STAR article authored by
Col. V. Khalipov, entitled "Peaceful Coexistence and the Defense
of Socialism." Significantly, the last previous unmistakably
polemical article to appear in RED STAR in rscent months was
published under a similar rubric, "Problems of the Defense of
Socialism's Achievements"; that article pointedly stressed the
vital role of heavy industry in the strengthening of Soviet defense
capability and was published on 17 November 19/1--on the eve of
the November CPSU plenum.
The Khalipov article began by noting that the policy of peaceful
coexistence had led to "a significant improvement in the
international climate," but it went on to stress that this
eventuality was "inseparably" connected with the growing power
of the USSR and its allies. "It is precisely because of the
growing economic and defense might of the USSR and the fraternal
socialist countries," Khalipov asserted, "that even the more
powerful capitalist states are obliged increasingly to take
us into account." And he maintained that a "further strengthening"
of Soviet defense capability was needed in view of the "complex
and contradictory" international situation.
To be'lster this argument, Khalipov pointed to the "ominous"
signs of opposition to detente in the United States where, in
his words, "the circles of the U.S. military-industrial complex
are particularly rabid." He cited estimates indicating that ths
Pentagon's budget would reach 100 billion dollars by 1977, and
he observed that "the Pentagon is striving to build up U.S.
military might in fields not restricted by the agreements
signed in Moscow." The appropriation of additional funds
for the Pentagon and the deployment of new weapons systems Rich
as the Trident missile submarine and the B-1 bomber were viewed
as "dangerous" developments which, in Khalipov's view, compelled
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the Soviet Union and its allies "to show tireless concern for
the further strengthening of their defense capability and for
the reliable defense of the peoples' revolutionary achievements."
Khalipa,..1 case for strengthening Soviet defenses was accompanied
by a sharp rebuke to unnamed domestic critics of defense spending.
As he put it, "Only someone who is insufficiently mature and
shortsighted 2o:l1tica11y could suppose that, as successes accrue
in the affirmatioA of the principle of peaceful coexistence
between states, it is possible to lower our vigilance and permit
a slrckening in our military preparedness." This rebuke, in
addition to suggesting high-level differences over foreign
policy, indicatem that the perennial debate over the military
budget is now in full swing.
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SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
BLOC LEADERS DISCUSS "PRESSING ISSUES" AT CRIMEA MEETING
Moscow's efforts to increase intra-bloc coordination on foreign
policy issues during a period of fluidity in East-Wet relations
and in the wake of the recent developments in the Middle East
seemed evident in the informal meeting of Soviet bloc first
secretaries in the Crimea on 31 July, announced by TASS on the
same day. Where Romania's Ceausescu was notably absent from the
last such informal Crimean gathering in August 1971--a period
when Moscow seemed intent on isolating the Romanian mavericks
because of their relations with Peking--he took part in the
latest display of Soviet bloc unity during a calmer period in
Soviet-Romanian relations. Ceausescu had last conferred with
the other top leaders at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's
Political Consultative Committee in Prague in January of this
year. In the wake of the NATO ministerial meeting in May and
the MOSCOW summit, was wide? - rumored that the Political
Consultative Commitzee would cm.yene again in June, but that
meeting d-ld not materialize.
The TASS account of the latest gathering was generally
uninformative, stating merely that the party chiefs, while on
"a brief rest" in the Crimea, "had a fruitful exchange of
opinions on the progress of the building of socialism and
communism and on the further development of all-round
cooperation among the socialist states." It added tersely
that "pressing international issues were also discussed."
Unlike the lengthy TASS account of the 1971 Crimea meeting
which, without Ceausescu, had set forth the participants'
coordinated positions on European problems, the Middle East, and
Indochina, the report on the present session made no reference
to specific foreign policy questions, thereby obviating the need,
to present compromise formulations on any issues in dispute.
With Finland on record with its proposal to open multilateral
preparations for a European security conference on 22 November
and with the FRG-GDR talks slated to reopen on 2 August, it may
be assumed that European problems were a major topic of
discussion.
In addition to Brezhnev and Podgornyy, according to Radio Moscow,
the Soviet delegation included, among others, Katushev,
secretary in charge of relations with ruling cotmunist parties,
and Foreign Minister Gromyko. TASS reported on 1 August that
Brezhnev and Ceausescu met that day and "exchanged views" on
developing bilateral party and state ties as well as on "other
matters of mutual interest." It added that the talks were held
in "a friendly atmosphere."
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HUNGARIAN OFFICIAL ATTACKS CHINESE, NATIONALIST DEVIATIONS
A Hungarian party official who played a central role in the
preparations for the 1969 Moscow international communist conference
has acteJ as Moscow's spokesman in calling for cohesion in the
Soviet b2oc during a period of detente and active Chinese
diplomatic moves. In an article in the August issue of the
Soviet journal RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYY MIR, reprinted in
the July-August issue of Budapest's TARSADALMI SZEMLE, Z. Komocsin
has used the third annive:sary of the international conference
to put in an elaborate plea for unity in the face of Peking's
"anti-Soviet platform" and the dangers of nationalism in the
communist movement. Moscow's most authoritative comme-t on
the anniversary, an 8 June PRAVDA editorial article coming
close on the heels of President Nixon's visit, had made only
a passing swipe at the Chinese while combining a sharp attack
on nationalism with a defense of Moscow's summitry.
Komocsin makes it clear that Peking's resurgent role in inter-
national affairs poses serious difficulties for Mnscow. While
some may have hoped that the Chinese would alter their divisive
policies following their seating in the United Nations,
Komocsin says, "time, unfortunately, has not justified these
hopes." Maintaining that rather than closing ranks with the
socialist countries Peking is giving "priority" to developing
relations with the Uni.ed States, he charges that the Chinese
are "causing serious damage to the anti-imperialist m^vement
in connection with every significant concrete problem and thus
are playing objectively into the hands of the imperialists."
In this connection, he observes that "not even the most
elementary cooperation has been achieved on the fundamental
questions such as support for the Indochina peoples."
Concern over nationalist tendencies in the Soviet sphere is
reflected in pointed passages taking to task those in the
communist ranks who "overestimate national pecularities"
and indulge it a mystique about the sovereignty of states
and parties. In passages challenging views held by the
Romanians and other independent-minded parties that are
loath to subordinate their interests to those of proletarian
internationalism, Komocsin argues that those who follow the
road of "sovereignty with nationalist content are losing
sight of class goals and are following the road of abandoning
internationalism." Apparently with the maverick Romanians
chiefly in mind, he goes on to deride attempts by those who
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talk of equal rights while at the same time telling others
what to say and interpret every word to them as "a violat!.on
of the sovereignty of their party."
Implicitly indicating that Hungary itself may have been the
recipient of fraternal counsel, Komocsin states: "We Hungarian
communists do not regard a comradely exchange of views or
frank criticism connected with our own problems to be
intervention in our internal affairs." In another passage
that could have relevance to Hungary's relations with the
Soviet bloc, Komocsin acknowledges that "frictions" may
arise over the conflict of national and international interests.
Although he tries to minimize such differences by declaring that
they are "only at the level of the short range" and not "in the
historical sense," his observation is more candid than the
standard line promulgated at the Moscow conference that national
and international interests are organically combined and hence
cannot be in conflict. His main point, however, is quite
orthodox, indisting that "it is always the task to put correctly
interpreted national interests on the higher strategic level"?
that is, to subordinate national interests to "class" positions
as interpreted by the Soviet Union. Driving the point home,
he asserts: "It is historically proven fact that an effective
harmonization of differing national interests can be realized
only by recognizing the priority of common international
interests."
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COMMUNIST PARTY RELATIONS
WESTERN EUROPEAN COMUNIST PARTIES PUBLICLY CENSURE CZECH TRIALS
The political trials in Czechoslovakia have drawn public criticism
from West European communist parties, with the large French and
Italian CP's betraying eoncern lest they share in the opprobrium
attached to the trials by their domestic constituencies and their
electoral prospects suffer as a result.
With an eye to the coming French parliamentary elections, the
French Communist Party (PCF) issued a statement on 28 July
publicly criticizing the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCZ)
for putting on trial people charged with political offenses
that are not "truly subversive." The statement came on the
heels of public condemnations of the trials by other leftist
political parties in France, including a reported telegram to
Czechoslovak President Svoboda from French Socialist Party (PS)
leader Mitterand deploring the disregard of civil liberties.
The PCF thus displayed its apprehensiveness about the iwpact the
trial3 could have on the credibility of its pledges of concern
for individual liberties in the recently publicized PCF-PS
joint government program.
The PCF statement treads a careful line between recognition of
the political context in which the party functions in France and
deference to the party's role in the Soviet-led communist move-
ment. It sought repeatedly to assure the French people that the
PCF upholds the principles of freedom of thought and expression
and that these principles would be scrupulously observed if a
PCF-PS coalition government came to power in France. At the
same time, it balanced its criticism of the CPCZ with the asser-
tion that the French party would -?Iver allow itself to denounce
"as a whole" the actions taken by the Czechoslovak party in the
interests of the working class and would continue to struggle
agaiast campaigns waged by "reaction" against the communist
countries.
The Italian Communist Party and the Communist Party of Great
Britain have also reacted publicly to the trials. The Italian
CP organ published articles reaffirming the party's position,
without explicitly restating it, on the "events" of 1968 in
Czechoslovakia and expressing "concern" over the current trials.
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The British party, in the words of Assistant Secretary Falber
as published in MORNING STAR on 2d July, said that if the
reports on the nature of the charges are true, "the proceedings
and sentences are greatly to be deplored." Falber noted that
there "is an absence of adequate official information" on the
trials, adding that according to the published reports "most
of the defendants appear to have been accused of producing and
distributing leaflets on the people's rights in last autumn's
elections."
CPCZ RATIONALE The Czechoslovak party's justification for the
FOR THE TRIALS trials was set forth in an article in the
party organ RUDE PRAVO on 18 July, the day
after the official news service CTK announced the opening of
proceedings against six people accused of "distributing illegal
printed matter" at the time of the 1971 fall elections and of
"subversive activicy against the Czechoslovak Republic."
Entitled "Without Indulgence," the article, by Jiri Hecko,
maintained that "hostile activity aimed against our socialist
society, its socialist system and its leading force, the CPCZ,"
is a "serious criminal activity" that could have "dangerous
consequences" if society were to "indulge" it and allow it to
"grow into large dimensions." While "a number of rightwing
representatives" left Czechoslovakia in 1968-69, the article
said, "a number of defeated rightwing representatives have also
remained in Czechoslovakia and are continuing to carry out
activities aimed against the basic principles on which we are
building our socialist society." Hecko went on to list activi-
ties which he categorized as sharply conflicting, by their
"content and form," with socialist law:
printing and mimeographing of leaflets containing
slanderous lie; about our party-state organs .5:3 well
as about our closest allies; various printed matter
aimed at inciting our citizens to sabotage . .
instigation to reverse our present system, even with
the use of violence and arms . . . ; efforts to malt-
tamn permanent contact with traitors who left their
country or for the passing of information to these
traitors . . . ; attempts to form various groupings
of persons conducting activities intentionally hostile
to our system.
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Acknowledging that "leading party-state representatives have
declared on many occasions that no one in Czechoslovakia will
be persecuted for his political views or convictions," the
article contended that this does not mean anyone will be per-
mitted "to destroy with impunity, by punishable activity, all
that entire generations of the best members of our nations
have fought and died for." Reflecting the list of charges in
the RUDE PRAVO article, the few terse reports on the trials
that have been carried in Czechoslovak media have repeatedly
stated that the defendants were being tried for "hostile" and
"subversive" activities against the "socialist state," includ-
ing the preparation and disseminating of "antistate" pamphlets.
Firs'. Secretary Husak, who has in the past promised that there
wild be no show trials violating individual liberties, has
belt' sitting out the trials on vacation in the USSR since
15 July. But hardlining CPCZ Presidium member Bilak, in a
28 July CTK interview on his return to Prague from the preceding
day's Paris conference of European communi.A parties on Vietnam,
commented directly on the Western press reports which he said
expressed indignation over the trials of "disruptionist"
elements in Czechoslovakia rather than directing their indig-
nation against "the atrocities in Vietnam or the shooting of
children in Ireland." Bilak charged the "imperialists" with
trying to divert attention from their own "crimes against
humanity."
Bilak seemed to display pique over the West European parties'
criticisms when he observed pointedly that "it is the tas% of
the fraternal parties to mobilize the whole world public,
especially in Europe, to condemn the crimes" in Vietnam and
Ireland. The subject of the trials had apparently come up in
Bilak's talks with du:French . ommunists; the PCF statement,
released the day Bilak left Paris, noted that the French party
had been in contact with the CPCZ to ascertain the facts about
the trials.
Themes similar to those played by Bilak in the CTK interview
were emphasized in RUDE PRAVO comment the next day and in
Prague international broadcasts on 1 August defending the
trials against the "campaign" of criticism in the Western
press. RUDE AlAVO proclaimed on the 29th that the party is
now in a position to "rap on the knuckles" people who "do not
heed warnings" and "want to make fire."
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The sole monitored mention of the trials in Soviet central
media was a brief TASS report in the 28 July PRAVDA citing CTK
on the conclusion of the proceedings against Dr. Silhan and
others in Brno who were sentenced for "active hostile activity
aimed at overthrowing the socialist state system." East Berlin
media, however, have chimed in with vigorous defense of the
trials and of the Czechoslovaks' right to defendthei, state in
accordance with "socialist legality."
FRENCH CP STATEMENT The PCF statement, dated the 28th and
published in the party organ L'HUMANITE
the next eay, noted that the French party Politburo had met on
25 Jul) to study the situation surrounding the "political trials"
in Czel:hoslovakia and decided to "make representations" on the
subject to the CPCZ. It recalled that in February, when Western
saurces were reporting numerous arrests of Czechoslovak dissi-
dents, the PCF had held talko olith CPCZ leaders including Husak
and had received a promise that there would be "no trial or arrest
for reasons connected with people's opinions" and that "socialist
legality" would be scrupulously respected.
Underscoring the PCF's concern for human rights in the communist-
ruled countries as well as in the West, the statement uaid the
French party had taken note of Husak's February promise and had
issued a declaration on 18 February recounting the results of
the PCF-CPCZ consultations. That declaration had quoted Husak
as assuringPaPolitburo member Leroy that "the time of con-
trived and preiabricated trial.; is definitely over," that "an
illegal conspiratory network" had been investigated but that
.last of the people "summoned and questioned" had been freed.
The declaration registered something less than full satisfaction
with these assurances, stating cryptically that "the PCF will
continue to maintain, tinder any circumstances, its consistent
positions regarding it-. stand" toward the fraternal parties.
The 28 July statement now publicizeddetails of arrests and
trials said to be based on information received from the CPCZ,
specifying that some 70 people had been questioned and half of
them released. It said legal proceedings had been started
against 32 people, "some" of whom had since been acquittcd
whIle "others" were sentenced. It asserted that 11 peop:t.e are
soon to be tried "for 'activities hostile' to socialism.' In
ensuing convoluted passages, placing the party on record as
recognizing the need for acLions to defend socialism against
"maneuvers of the clasr! enemy," while at the same time
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disclaiming PCF support for any violation of individual liber-
ties, the statement said:
Whenever forces hostile to socialism, either in or
outside a country, indulge in truly subversive activi-
ties, whenever they resort to violence or sabotage, it
is both just and necessary that they be dealt with by
all the strictness of the law. The new regime has the
duty to protect the achievements of the workers against
auch maneuvers of the class enemy . . . . It appears
from the information we possesa that the trials now in
progress in Czechoslovakia are not directed against
activities of that kind. When it comes to political
and ideological opposition, we believe that to defeat
and isolate the enemies of socialism it is necessary
to resort to an intensive political and ideological
struggle ? 9 ?
Citing party documents and the French Communist-Socialist joint
government program, the statement strassed that if the PCF
should enter the French Government, minority rights will be
respected and "the working class will always choose noncoercive
methods of struggle, persuasion, and education"; however, the
s-atement continued, "it woull not hesitate to resort to coer-
cl.on if forces hostile to socialism resort to subversion and
violence." The party pledged in conclusion that it would
continue to fight campaigns in the West which "grossly"
misrepresent reality in the communist countries.
ITALIAN CP COMMENT Reasserting the stronger and less
equivocal position of the Italian
Communist Party (PCI) oa events in Czechoslovakia, an unsigned
article in the party organ L'UNITA on 22 July said the PCI
position "on the entire Czechoslovak affair is well known and
was confirmed at the 13th congress" in March. Maintaining that
the PCI has always stressed its "desire not to interfere in
the domestic affairs of the aocialist countries and communist
parties," the article went on to say, however, that "it is
obvious in our opinion that the trials which 'nave taken place
in Prague do not concern solely internal affairs but raise
questions and prol,lems which T.;e must also ansver." Alleging
that "little is known" about the trials "because there was
no real public attendance," a circumstance which is "detri-
mental to those who would like to form a considered and
careful opinion" and which "casts a dark shadow on the
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-39-
procedure," the article asserted that "there should be no fear
of publicity concerning crimes which are obvious or considered
to be so."
In harsher terms, the article said that "to arrive at trials
and sentences in connection with the facts as they have been
officially announced is certainly a causs for political concern.
L'UNITA argued that "antistate" and "slanderous" publications
should be countered not by trials but with "an argued defense
and public polemic, with an ideological and political counter-
attack, and with a campaign where truth and possible slanders
are confronted." It lectured that "resorting to administrative
and judicial methods does not solve matters but aggravates
them"--a passage which underscores the PCI's concern, liLe the
PCF's, to dissociate itself from positions that could hurt its
chances with the national electorate.
A second unsigned L'UNITA article, on 24 July, vigorously
defended the PCI position on the trials in rebutting criticism
of the PCI by other Italian parties, including the dissident
Il Manifesto communist group. Rejecting charges by the latter
group, L'UNITA noted that the recent PCI congress had confirmed
the party's stand on the August 1968 "events" and had mani-
zested "great" support for the independent-minded Spanish
Communist Party, which has been at odds with the CPSU since
the 1968 invasion. The article emphasized that the PCI has
expressed and will "continue to express our criticism also
with regard to those whom we consider friends, and we do so
always inspired by our principles and by our policy"--a policy
which follows an "autonomous" path.
On the 29th L'UNITA published a dispatch from Paris summarizing
the French party's statement, including the wrapup of information
received by the PCF from the CPCZ and the PCF's criticism of the
Czechoslovaks. At this writing, the PCI has offered no comment
on the validity or completeness of this "information."
MOSCOW WELCOMES COMNUNIST-SOCIALIST COOPER^:110 IN EUROPE
Moscow media in recent weeks have hailed growing signs of
cooperation between the communist and socialiJt parties of
Western Europe as a "realistic" means af overcoming "conserva-
tive" opposition and enhancing the prospects for a communist
role in West European governments. Attention has focused on
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the 12th congress of the Socialist International held in Vienna
on 26-29 June, the 26 June agreement by the French Communist
and Socialist parties on a joint government program, and the
16 July decision by the majority of the small, leftwing
Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) to join
the Itulian Communist Party.*
UNITY MOVES Moscow radio commentator Levin on 18 July, for
example, described the joint program worked out
by the French Communist and Socialist parties as a document
that "reflects the trend of joint action on the part of leftwing
forces--the trend for cooperation which has always been supported
by the communists." He stressed that the PSIUP's decision to
join the PCI "increases the influence and importance of the
political life not only of the PCI but also of the communist
parties of other countries," citing the activitiwi of the French
CP and of the small West German Communist Party (DKP).
The negotiations between the French Communist and Socialist
parties leading up to the final agreement and the formal approval
of the agreemelt at national conferences of the two parties on
9 July were reported by Moscow media in considerable detail.
TASS repeatedly cited remarks made by French CP Deputy General
Secretary Marchais to the effect that the agreement "is an
unprecedented event" in the French workers movement and that the
party is ready to develop cooperation with "all left, demot.zatic
forces of France." A NEW TIMES commentary on 7 July noted that
the present agreement goes beyond the 1936 Popular Front and the
alliances of the immediate postwar years when communists and
socialists were represented in the government. The magazine
observed that "all democratic organizations and trade unions"
support the agreement and called this fact "important" in view
of the forthcoming parliamentary elections.**
* The PSIUP's decision to join the PCI, made at its fourth and
apparently final congress in Rome 13-16 July, was approved by
67 percent of the party's members; eight percent voted to join
the Italian Socialist Party, from which a small group of left-
wing members had defected in 1964 to form the PSIUP; and the
remaining members decided to stay in a rump PSIUP.
sos A 30 June French Central Committee resolution announced
the decision to hold the 20th Congress of the French CP
13-17 December 1972 in Saint-Ouen.
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Reviewing the French Communist-Socialist agreement from an
Italian perspective, an article in the Italian CP theoretical
journal RINASCITA of 7 July stated bluntly that the "initiation
of unity talks" among the leaders of the Italian communist,
socialist, and Catholic political forces for the purpose of
drafting a government program similar to the French one "is
of course not possible." While ruling out such an agreement,
the author asserted that "what is necessary, and unavoidable,
is the initiation of an effort to find and to define common
directions leading to a solution of the principal problems of
the workers and of the nation."
VIENNA CONGRESS OF The 12th congress in Vienna of the
SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL Socialist International, consisting
predmenantly of leaders and repre-
sentatives of European social democratic and socialist parties,
also prompted a rather favorable response in IZVESTIYA on
20 July. The author of the IZVESTIYA article, A. Bovin, was
previously associated with the CPSU Central Committee apparatus,
but since the period of Tito's visit to the Soviet Union in
June he has been identified as a political commentator for
IZVESTIYk. While noting areas of continued disagreement between
the communists and social democrats and the existence of differ-
ences between individual social democratic parties, Bovin's
article repeatedly referred to the "positive aspects" of the
Socialist International movement. Bovin's conclusion was that
the congress "showed that the trend toward pursuing a realistic
and constructive line on foreign policy questions is continuing
to become stronger in social democratic circles."
Other Moscow comment on the congress also stressed that coopera-
tion between the parties of the Socialist International and
communist parties was developing with a "greater force than ever
before," citing the comments of French Socialist leader Mitterand
and Finnish Social Democratic Party delegate (and Foreign
Minister) Sorsa on cooperation with the communist parties in
their respective countries.
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CUBA-USSR
CASTRO RATIONALIZES CUBAN DEPENDENCE ON USSR
Pervading Fidel Castro's 26 July address was a defensive insistence
that Cuba's status as a client member of the Soviet "socialist
camp," dictated by economic realities, redounds to Cuba's benefit
and in no way vitiates Cuba's independence, integrity, or aspira-
tions to tutelage of an eventual Latin American community of
socialist states. Coming on the heels of his talks in Moscow
and East European capitals and Cuba's admission to the Soviet
bloc's economic organization, Castro's speech again underscored
Havana's increasing reliance on Moscow at the expense of its
once militant line on Latin American revolution as a means of
resisting U.S. influence in the hemisphere.
Castro used the occasion of his annual address on the anniversary
of the assault on the Moncada Barracks to sum up for mass public
consumption the results of his nine-week tour of 10 African and
European countries, capped by a 26 June-5 July sojourn in the
USSR which Moscow clearly viewed as a success. The Soviet
leaders' congratulatory message to Castro and Dorticos on the
26 July anniversary called Ult.; consultations with Castro in
Moscow "a new important stage in broadening and consolidating"
Soviet-Cuban relations and described those relations as
"becoming closer, more varied, and richer in all fields of
socialist and communist construction."* Castro referred in
his speech to a detailed, closed-door briefing on the trip
which he had delivered at an enlarged meeting of the Cuban
Communist Party (PCC) Central Committee in three sessions
lasting 22 hours from 15 through 17 July. Havana media had
reported that the briefing took place but publicized none of
the substance of Castro's report, noting only that it was
approved unanimously.
* The Soviet message on last year's anniversary had noted,
more briefly, tha- bilateral friendship and cooperation was
becoming "increasingly active and multilateral." This year's
greeting is distinguished by the portrayal of a qualitative
step forward as a result of the visit, presumably alluding to
Cuba's admission to CEMA.
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On 20 July a PCC Central Committee res(Aution on Castro's trip
report implicitly registered continuing qualms and concerns
about Soviet summitry and its implications for small, dependent
communist countries--immediately Vietnam and ultimately Cuba
itself. Most notably, the resolution took note of an 'important"
Jtatement by Castro to the effect that successful revolution
requires that anti-imperialist struggle be based on "full
awareness that imperialism's apparent cooperation with any
truly revolutionary process is deceptive and false in the long
run." Elsewhere the document cited U.S. actions in Vietnam
as "a demonstration of the hypuarisy of the assertions made
by the U.S. President when he said he was prepared to cooperate
in working for peace in the world."
At the 26 July rally, with the PRG's Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh on
the podium, Castro conveyed his view of Cuba's stake in the
Indochina conflict, arguing that "when the war in Vietnam ends
with the imperial 'sts' defeat" it will "not be so easy to
plan wars against Cuba." Again truculently discounting the
idea that Cuba would welcome an overture from the United States
and insisting that it is not up to Washington to call the shots
("U.S. relations with Cuba will not take place whenever President
Nixon wants them"), he in effect excluded Cuba from the trend of
detente promoted by the President's summitry: "There will be
no political deals made with the Cuban revolution. No one can
play with the Cuban revolution . . . . Cuba's doors have been
completely closed to the politicking and trickery of Mr. Nixon."
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Castro devoted a major part of his
speech to what amounted to a rationaliza-
tion of Cuba's submission to tighter Soviet economic control
through the machinery of the Council for Economic Mutual
Assistance (CEMA), to which Cuba was admitted at a CEMA Council
session shortly after the end of Castro's tour. Castro's
sensitivity on the subject was reflected in his failure to
specifically mention CEMA in the course of a lengthy, elaborate
discourse on the necessity of socialist economic coordination
He had said nothing about CEMA in his publicized speeches in
Eastern Europe and the USSR, where the details of the move to
bring Cuba into the economic alliance were apparently worked
out. The CEMA Council's admission of Cuba did not occasion
commentaries hailing the event in Havana media, nor w,s it
mentioned in the Central Committee resolution. Castro, dealing
with the subject indirectly in the 26 July speech, expatiated
on "the enormous importance attached by all socialiwz countries
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to international cooperation," especially in the economic
sphere, and on the "extraordinary and generous" economic aid
provided by the Soviet Union.
"Economic relations between Cuba and th:1 Soviet Union have
been the most generous and most revolutionary that could exist
between two countries," Castro assured his audience. He took
note of all the "free weapons" the Soviets had sent to Cuba
and recalled the credits and materials they had provided to
help Cuba over "difficult years." Polemically, he told the
pseudorevolutionaries, the intriguers and slanderers" that
Cuba owed its security to "the support of the socialist bloc
and the Soviet Union . . ., the weapons of the socialist bloc
and the Soviet Union." The charge he was particularly at pains
to rebut was the "ridiculous claim," traced to "imperialism,"
that Cuba is therefore "a satellite of the Soviet Union."
Castro also sought to debunk the notion that integration with
the socialist bloc today "will have to conflict with" ultimate
integration of Cuba's economy with those of other Latin American
countries--a process that must await "the inexorable hour of
the revolution" in the hemisphere and may take "10, 15, 20, 25,
30 years." Meanwhile, he argued, in a notably elaborate rejection
of any economic trafficking with the United States or U.S.-
dominated economies, Cuba was not going to "integrate with the
United Fruit Company, the Standard Oil Company, ITT," or the
other "monopolistic octopuses." Cuba, "a small country,
surrounded by capitalists, blockaded by the Yankee imperialists,"
had no alternative but to integrate with the Soviet bloc.
RELATIONS WITH U.S. In rejecting improved relations with the
United Sr46es in present circumstances,
Castro indulged in a redundant discourse on Cuba's ability to
get along without any help from the United States: "No
advantage of any type, no economic advantage could tempt us,"
and "no economic benefit could compensate morally for what
Yankee tourism would mean in this country." And again: "No
economic advantage in any sense could tempt our country. Cuba's
development in all fields is assured without any relations with
the United States."
In the vein of his May Day speech, in which he had said Cuba
"will wait quietly until one day when realistic men rule" the
United States, he looked forward now to "the possibility that
some time" a "realistic" government would come to power in
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Washington that would respect Cuba's "interests, sovereignty,
and rights." In this context, he greeted "with satisfaction
those advances and new formulations being made in U.S. politics,"
noting that "it is even said that one of the candidates favors
ending the blockade against Cuba." But he went on to complain
that "they include in a platform that Cuba cannot become a
military base"--alluding to the passaly in the Democratic Party
platform calling for "recognition tha, nile Cuba must not be
permitted to become a foreign military ,ase, after 13 years of
boycott, crisis and hostility, the time has come to re-examine
our relations with Cuba and to seek a way to resolve this cold
war confrontation on mutually acceptable terms." Singling out
only the stipulation that Cuba must not be allowed to become a
military base and ignoring the rest of the passage, Castro
commented that "no party platform has the right to establish
conditions here of any sort."
The Democrats nevertheless emerged in Castro's portrayal as the
lesser evil. "We believe," he said, ". . . that the Republican
Party, Nixon's party, has the worst position and is the most
criminal, the most reactionary, and the most warmongering."
LATIN AMERICA Castro's appraisal of developments in Latin
America followed standard lines, with Peru,
Chile, and Panama singled out as harbingers of revolutionary
change. In the wake of Peru's reestablishment of diplomatic
ties with Cuba, Castro gave pride of place to Peru and observed
that "conclusive proof of Peru's confirmation of its sovereignty
has been its attitude toward Cuba." He paid briefer but
typically warm tribute to Allende as "our comrade and great
friend of our revolution."
Once again rejecting the idea of Cuba rejoining the OAS, he
acknowledged the Peruvian and Chilean view that the organization
should exist and granted that "the day might come when the
anti-imperialists become a majority" in the OAS. These remarks
prefaced a reference to Panama as a country where "anti-
imperialism" is gaining ground in the "just struggle for
liberation of the Canal Zone." Castro has regularly singled
out Chile, Peru, and Panama in recent speeches. Panama was
unmentioned in the joint communique winding up Castro's trip
to the USSR, in the wake of the U.S.-Soviet summit, but was
duly included along wi-h Chile and Peru in some of the
communiques Castro signt.d in Eastern Europe.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
ELECTION OF UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT REFLECTS CONTINUED STALEMATE
The 28 July election of I.S. Grushetskiy as Ukrainian Supreme Soviet
Presidium chairman--the No. 3 post in the Ukraine--suggests
continuing disagreement among Ukrainian leaders, who by naming
Grushetskiy appear to be deferring a more basic redistribution
of power in the wake of Shelest's removal. ;nitially, when
A.P. Lyashko left the post of Presidium chairman to become
premier at the 9 June Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session, the Ukrainian
Politburo was unable to agree on a successo:: and the decision was
postponed until the next Supreme Soviet session, now held almost
two months later. In selecting Grushetskiy, the leaders passed
over all the full Politburo members to pick the oldest and least
influential member of the hierarchy, apparently as a compromise.
At 68, Ukrainian party commission chairman Grushetskiy is the oldest
member of he leadership and has been treated as the least important.
Although his tenure in the Politburo was exceeded only by that of
First Secretary V.V. Shcherbitskiy and First Deputy Premier
11.T. Kalchenko, Grushetskiy was only a candidate member and was
normally ranked last even among candidate members, suggesting
that he was in disfavor with former First Secretary Shelest. He was
promoted to full Politburo member at a Ukrainian Central Committee
p....enum held one day before his election as Supreme Soviet Presidium
chairman. Grushetskiy, as one of Khrushchev's oldest and closest
proteges in the Ukrainian Politburo, fell into eclipse after
Khrushchev's fall and was dropped as Central Committee secretary
and shunted into the sinecure of Ukrainian party commission
chairman in December 1965. Although serving briefly in Dnepropetrovsk,
as obkom secretary with Brezhnev during 1939, Grushetskiy has spent
almost his entire career in the west Ukraine and has had no other
visible tie to the Dnepropetrovsk or other factions.
PROMOTION OF Although the factional implications of
LYASHKO PROTEGE Grushetskiy's selection are unclear, the 27 July
Ukrainian Central Committee plenum's other main
personnel action is clearly a victory for Premier Lyashko. Kiev
Oblast First Secretary V.M. Tsybulko--Lyashko's assistant for cadres
while Lyashko was first secretary of Donetsk obkom and later
Ukrainian second secretary--was elected a candidate member of the
Politburo. Tsybulko had been transferred to the Kiev post and
removed as Ukrainian cadre section head in 1970, after Lyaehko was
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removed as second secretary and kicked upstairs to Supreme Soviet
Presidium chairman, presumably on Shelest's initiative. Although
the Kiev first secretary has always been elected a Politburo
candidate member in recent years, Tsybulko was not so honored at
the March 1.971 Ukrainian party congress, apparently because of
opposition by Shelest, who sharply criticized his obkom's work
in early 1971.
With Tsybulko's promotion the Donetsk faction under Lyashko continues
to gain in power, despite Brezhnev's links with Shcherbitskiy and
the Dnepropetrovsk faction. Of the 14 members and candidate members
of the Politburo, five formerly worked under Lyashko in Donetsk:
Central Committee Secretaries A.A. Titarenko and Ya. P. Pogrebnyak,
Donetsk First Secretary V.I. Degtyarev, trade union chairman
V.A. Sologub, and Tsybulko. The Donetsk organization, the largest
in the Ukraine, has long been markedly underrepresented in the
Ukrainian leadership but is now more influential than at any time
since its former leader L.G. Melnikov served as Ukrainian first
secretary 1949-53. First Secretary Shcherbitskiy consequently may
face difficulties in gaining support in the Politburo, since he
apparently can count only on two votes out of the nine--his own
and Dnepropetrovsk First Secretary A.F. Vatchenko's--against three
Donetsk full members, perhaps joined by his old Kharkov rival
First Deputy Premier G.I. Vashchenko and Second Secretary I.K. Lutak,
an apparent Shelest ally.
REMOVAL OF Another personnel action, taken two days before the
CADRE CHIEF Ukrainian Central Committee plenum, also appears to
be a setback for Shchefbitskiy, who loses his
prime agent in the cadre field. Ukrainian Central Committee cadre
section head A.A. Ulanov was elected a secretary of the
Voroshilovgrad obkom at a 25 July obkom plenum. As Dnepropetrovsk
city first secretary 1966-70, Ulanov was a close protege of
Dnepropetrovsk Oblast First Secretary Vatchenko and presumably of
Shcherbitskiy as well. While another Shcherbitskiy man way succeed
Ulanov, it will be difficult to find anyone with closer ties to the
Dnepropetrovsk group. Further, Ulanov's removal is clearly a
demotion, since his predecessor, Tsybulko, became first secretary
of Kiev oblast when removed in 1970, while Ulanov now occupies a
less important post.
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GEORGIAN POLICE CHIEF TAKES OVER CORRUPTION-RIDDEN TBILISI
Recent exposures of crime and corruption in Georgia have led to
the election on 25 July of Georg;.an MVD chief E.A. Shevardnadze
to the pnet of Tbilisi city party committee first secretary and
to Georgian First Secretary V.P. Mzhavanadze's sacrifice of two
of his closest proteges, Tbilisi leader 0.1. Lolashvili and
Central Committee Secretary for Industry N. Sh. Tskhakay.. The
highly unusual selection of a police official to head an
important party organization is reminiLcent of the appointment
in 1969 of Azerbaydzhan KGB chief G.A. Aliyev as republic party
boss after exposure of widespread corruption in Azerbaydzhan.
However, in Georgia the young MVD chief Shevardnadze, who served
as Komsomol first secretary in 1957-61, appears more suited to
the task of executing a crackdown than old KGB chief A.N. Inauri,
who assumed his post nearly two decades ago along with
Mzhavanadze.
Shevardnadze's predecessor Lolashvili was censured by the CPSU
Central Committee in March, but his removal appeared unlikely in
view of Mzhavanadze's repeated expressions of confidence that
Lolashvili and the Tbilisi party organization would correct the
shortcomings. The current Georgian difficulties apparently began
when Tbilisi First Secretary Lolashvili was called to report to
the CPSU Central Committee and a Central Committee decree on the
Tbilisi organization's work was published in PRAVDA on 6 March
criticizing a wide range of shortcomings, including corruption,
poor choice of cadres, and ideological and nationalistic
deviations. A 14 March Tbilisi gorkor. plenum heard Lolashvili
demand improvement of cadre work and admit that "criminals"
had "turned up as leaders of industrial enterprises and heads of
stores." (An April issue of AGITATOR indicated that 1.7 million
rubles had been stolen at just one Tbilisi factory alone.)
Mzhavanadze spoke at the plenum and, while urging tough measures,
pronounced the Tbilisi party organization "healthy" and "capable
of coping with any difficulties" (PRAVDA, 17 March). At a
Georgian Central Committee plenum in early April Mzhavanadze again
reassured his protege: "Now we may again say with confidence that
the Tbilisi party organization is healthy . . . and capable of
coping with any difficulties . . . ." And he praised the speeches
of Lolashvilt and other city leaders for showing that they
correctly understood how to correct the shortcomings (ZARYA
VOSTOKA, 4 April).
Despite Mzhavanadze's statements, harsher action was initiated
two months later. A 5 June Georgian Central Committee plenum
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exposed "errors" in the work of Central Committee Secretary
N. Sb. Tskhakaya, and he was expelled from the leadership.
Tskhakaya had been in charge of industry and hence presumably
was held responsible for the scandals in industrial plants.
He was a close protege of Mzhavanadze, who at a June 1967
Georgian plenum had devoted special praise to him while he was
serving es a secretary at a Tbilisi plant; Mzhavanadze elevated
him to Tbilisi city secretary in November 1969 and to Georgian
Central Committee secretary in April 1970. Tskhakaya wao
replaced by Z.A. Pataridze, an obscure local secretary from
Chiatura city who was not even a Georgian Central Committee
member or candidate member.
The plenum aim) replaced the head of the Central Committee's
trade, planniig, and financial organs section, placing this
scandal-ridden realm under I.A. Shevardnadze, who presumably is
MVD chief E.A. Shevardnadze's brother (they have the same
patronymic, and I.A. was released as Tbilisi second secretary
shortly before E.A. became city first secretary, apparently to
avoid the elarge of nepotism).
Two new Tbilisi secretaries were elected at a late-May city
plenum, and at a 25 July city plenum Shevardnadze replaced
Lolashvili as first secretary. On the same day Lolashvili was
demoted to Georgian building materials minister, and on 28 July
a Georgian Central Committee plenum removed him from the
Georgian bureau. Lolashvili's career had marked him as a
trusted Mzhavanadze protege: Selected to head the Georgian
Central Committee's administrative organs section in 1962,
he soon became second secretary, then first secretary of the
Georgian capital.
CONFIDENTIAL
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