TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050030-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: July 26, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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26 JULY 1972
PEKING MARKS GENEVA ANNIVERSARIES CONDEMNS BOMBING OF DIKES
For the ~aecond successive year, following a f ive-year absence of
authori-.ative comment on the occasion, Peking has marked the
20 July anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreeme-~ts on Indochina
with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial endorsing a negotiated settlement.
As last, year's anniversary editorial came in tho wake of Peking's
prompt endorsement of the PRG's seven-point peace plan, this
year's has appeared at a time when Peking has been calling for
an agreement that would enable the Vietnamese parties to reach an
accommodation .Free of outside involvement. Consistent with
this approach, the editorial focused on the issue of a coalition
government ae the basis for a Vietnam settlement. At the same
time the editorial again pledged Chinese rear area support for
the communist war effort so long as the fighting continues.
The editorial also took brief note of the 10th anniversary of
the 23 July 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, an anniversary which
was not mentioned in lust year's editoria:' and was last marked
authoritatively on the fifth anniversary ii': 1967. In marking
the two anniversaries, Peking has replayed statements from its
Indochinese allies and reported a film show at the DRV embassy
on the l9th which was attended by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei.
Also during this period Peking's increased attention to charges
Chat U.S. planes are attacking North Vi~;tnam's dikes was highlighted
by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 25th supporting DRV
protests. However, while lending its voice to the condemnatio:~,
Peking carefully limited the target of its criticism and avoided
raising broader issues.
VIETNAM SETTLEMENT This year's editorial on the Geneva
anniversary was more carefully tailored in
expressing support for the Vietnamese communists' negotiating
position than was last year's offer of "firm and full support"
for the PRG's seven points. Thus, in the only explicit endorse-
ment of the PRG plan, the editorial observed that the plan
"stands for" the formation of a tripartite coalition government
and the subsequent election of a government in South Vietnam.
''This is completely reasonable and dust," the editorial stated.
In this connection the editorial took issue with the U.S. position,
rebuking Washington not only for refusing to cease its support
for the Thieu government but also for spreading the "lie" that
the communist aide seeks to establish a communist regime in South
Vietnam. This shows, according to the editorial, that the
United Staten is out to "obstruct a genuine solution'' and to
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"sabotage the peaceful reunification" of Vietnam. However,
apart from the issue of a coalition government, the editorial
did not criticize the U.S. negotiating approach. Similarly,
NCNA's account of the NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary
omitted passages disparaging President Nixon'e 8 May proposal
and attacking "cunning political and diplomatic" mouse by the
United States.
In what may reflect Peking's emphasis on a settlement by the
Vietna-~.eee themselves and its eenei:ivity concerning outside
involvement, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial this year avoided
striking the positive note thtt stood out in the 1971 editorial's
praise ~f the Geneva agreemento ae "an important success."
NCNA'? account of a North Korean article on the anniversary
deleted a passage referring to the agreements as a "brilliant
victory."
The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial concluded by reaffirming last
year's pledge to provide "powerful backing" for the war effort
and declared that the Chinese "will resolutely support" the
fight to the end as their "bounden internationalist duty.''
However, Peking's reluctance to associate its own security
interests with the Indochinese conflict was reflected in NCNA's
failure to include in an account of an 18 July DRV "war crimes''
statement a charge that U.S. planes have. struck Chinese ships
during attacks on the North.
ALLEGED ATTACKS Weighing in with the first authoritative
GN DIKES Chinese comment on the alleged bombing of
North Vietnamese dikes, the PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article on the 25th supported recent DRV protests
and "strongly" demanded that the United States immediately
atop "such barbarous undertakings." But while feeling constrained
to loin in the chorus of condemnation, the Chinese have limited
their attack on this issue ,snd have stressed that the alleged
bombing will not change the political and mi'itary situation.
Thus, Commentator made the point that the alleged U.S. raids
show not only the "brutality" but also the "feebleness" of the
United States, and the article's concluding passage went to some
length to express confidence that the North Vietnamese could not
be intimidated and would persist in the fight. Consistent with
this focus, the article did not raise the question of a settlement
or mention Chinese aid. It also avoided an attack on the Nixon
Administration by name, referring vaguely to attempts by "U.S.
official circles" to "cover up the crimes."
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In addition to replays of DRV charges, the Commentator article
was preceded by dispatcher from an NCNA correspondent in Hanoi
detailing eyewitness reports of the alleged bombings. Like
Commentator, the correspondent expressed confidence that th~+
North Vietnamese could not be subdued.
HANOI. FRONT CLAIM SIX:CESSES IN (~UAANG TRI. SCORE US~c Cf GAS
Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to portray the Saigon
counteroffensive in Quang Tri as a failure. LPA on the 22d
maintained that in the first 23 days of the offensive--from
28 June to 20 July--some 9,500 allied troops were put out of
action or captured, 81 aircraft downed or destroyed on the ground,
and 120 vehicles wrv.:ked, more Chan half of which were tanks
and armored care. Communist battle reports highlight fighting
on 20 and 22 July when the PLAF allegedly killed or woundv.d nearly
500 troops; no mention ie made of thg current Saigon ass?,ult in
Quang Tri city to capture the citadel.
A 23 July NHAN DAN editorial claimed that President Nixon had
ordered Saigon to launch the counteroffensive because the
a111es needed a military victory to press their position at
the Paris talks as well as to prevent the "disintegration of the
puppet army." The paper said, however, that the allies'
political ambitions are in sharp contradiction to their strength
on the battlefield where they are encountering insurmountable
problems. Commenting that the counteroffensiv~a, like the
Vietnamization policy and the war itself, ie a mistake, the
editorial said that the Saigon troops are being sent into a
death trap.
The alleged allied use of "toxic gas to massacre the people of
Quang Tri" was protested in a 20 July statement by the committee
on ~var crimes in South Vietram, reported by LPA on the 22d. It
echoed complaints on this issue in PRG Foreign Ministry statements
on 11 and 18 July,* but was more precise when it cited the use of
CS gas, rather than referring generally to "toxic chemicals.' The
statement cited several instances when chemicals were allegedly
used and accused the allies of using "poison-gas bombs and shells
to force the civilians out of their air-raid shelters" and then
'killing them with anti-personnel bombe and shells."
* See the TRENDS of 12 July, pager 11-12, and 19 July, pages 16-17.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIUEN'f ZAL FBLS 'CftENUS
'L6 JULY 1972
USSR-EGYPT
M06COW WWITEWASWES CAIRO OUSTER OF SOVIET PERSONNEL
Acknowledging, a day after President as-Sadat's 18 July announcement,
that Soviet military advisers were being returned from Egypt, Moscow
has sought to present the action as a perfectly natural outgrowth
of the "completion" of their mission, a move arrived at by mutual
consultatiot- and signifying no change in either side's desire for
continued friendship and cooperation. But Soviet sensitivity is
betrayed in a resurgence of complaints, particularly in broadcasts
for Arab audiences, about intrigues by "imperialists" and local
"reactionaries" aimed at undermining Soviet-Egyptian friendship--
a theme also prominent in Moscow media at the times of the
successive consultations now identified by ae-Sadat as landmarks
in the exacr:bation of Soviet-Egyptian frictions.
The withdrawal was formally acknowledged in a TASS communication,
released late on the 19th, which claimed that the ~lecieiion was
taken after "an exchange of opinions" between the two sides.
Subsequent Moscow comment, both on the withdrawal and on the
20th anniversary of Egypt's revolution on 23 July, has hewed
closely to the TASS announcement, couched in language that bears
out as-Sadat's characterization of Egypt's "friend" as being
"excessively cautious." Propagandists have reiterated TASS'
assertion that the Soviet Union plans to continue developing
and strengthening "in every way" its relations with Egypt based
on the "strong foundation" of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty.
The pledge to continue to develop relations wAs notably absent,
however, from the Soviet leaders' message of congratulations
to as-Sadat on the revolution anniversary. The message did
hail the two countries' relations, "consolidated" in the
treaty, as an example of "true equality, full understanding,
and fraternal solidarity," and it repledged f:,rm support for
the Egyptian and other Arab peoples in their struggle to
regain the occupied territories. But where last year's "warm"
congratulations from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin l~sd assured
Egypt it could always rely on Soviet "aid" as well as support,
this year's "sincere" congratulations said nothing about aid.
And where last year the military paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published
a congratulatory telegram from DefenAe Minister Grechko to his
Egyptian counterpart, no mention of such a message has appeared
in any Soviet media this year. Press and radio sources have
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reported only the cable from the three tap leaders, Kosygin'e
separate message to Prime Minister Sidqi, and Gromyko's
congratulations to his Egyptian counterpart Ghalib. Articles
marking the anniversary duly appeared in the Soviet central
press, but Radio Moscow gave the anniversary far lees play
than would normally be expected on the mayor decennial,
observance.
TASS ANNOUNCEMENT Setting the tone for subsequent reportage
and comment, the TASS announcement noted
Chat in response to Egypt's request for help in insuring its
"defense potential," a "number" of Soviet military personnel
had been "temporarily" stationed in Egypt to give friendly
assistance "over a number of years" to help the Egyptian
forces master Soviet military equipment. Now, it said, the
military personnel had completed their mission; "with the
awareness of this, after the exchange of opinions," the two
sides deemed it expedient to bring back the personnel who had
been in Egypt "for a limited period." TASS Chen underlined
as-Sadat's assurance, in the 18 July speech, that the "measures
taken now" would not affect Egyptian-Soviet friendship. It
di4 not acknowledge that the measures included Egyptian takeover
of military equipment and installations or that se-Sadat had
called for talks with the Soviets. TASS stressed as-Sadat's
high assessment of Soviet assistance and his desire for
continued friendship. It was in this context that TASS pledged
the Soviet Union to continue developing and strengthening its
relations with Egypt on the basis of the treaty and in pursuit
of the point struggle for "liquidation of the consequences of
Israeli aggression."
In a Cairo-datelined dispatch carries; shortly after the formal
announcement on the withdrawal, TASS reported that in .his speech
of the 18th as-Sadat emphasized the "great role" played by the
Soviet Union in assisting Egypt. Quoting from his remarks on
Moscow's military, political, and economic support, TASS
brushed off--toward the close of the report--the fact that he
"also made an announcement" about the windup of the Soviet
military advisers' mission.
The next day Moscow publicized an "official statement" issued
by the Egyptian embassy in Moscow expressing gratitude for the
assistance of "individuals--officers and soldiers--of the Soviet
armed forces" who had accomplished their duties "efficiently and
satisfactorily." The embassy statement said the Egyptian forces'
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development had enabled tr-em now to assume their national tasks
themselves. Zt added, in an echo of as-Sadat's theme of
independence, that Egypt would not allow others .to bear the
brunt of i.ts fight and that the Egyptian people alone were
responsibJz for undertaking the necessary tasks for their
country's defense.
Moscow of course has not revealed the time frame of as-Sadat's
move; he said in his 24 July speech that the "resolutions" were
issued on 8 July, and "I gave the friends nine days, to 17 Jul;,
the day they should be implemented." Adding that "not a creature
in the world had any indication unt11 16 July," as-Sadat claimed
that the secrecy was maintained "out of care for our friends."
The TASS announcement on the 19th said the Soviet personnel would
"shortly return" home. On the 21st TASS reported that the
Egyptian forces were giving a warm sendoff to the departing
Soviet advisers, and on the 22d TASS welcomed home the "first
group" of "military specialists" and reported an order issued
by the defense minister praising their conduct in the discharge
of their teaks.
Acknowledgment of the presence of military "advisers" in Egypt
has been infrequent in Soviet media. The one such statement
at the elite level--by Kosygin in u 4 May .1970 cress conference
in Moscow--got virtually no followup publicity. Asked at Chat
time about Soviet pilots flying operational missions over
Egypt, Kosygin replied, according to the Moscow domestic
radio: "We have an agreement with the UAR Government to the
effect that our military advisers are attached to the UAR
troops. This is done with the object of combating .Israeli
aggression, which again, in turn, is taking place only because
of the great assistance frc:~ the United States, which is in
fact delivering the necessary weapons and supplying and
supporting the aggression Israel is waging against the UAR.
The respective functions of our military advisers are being
coordinated with the UAR Government."
TREATMENT OF Broadcasts of the three top Soviet -leaders'
ANNIVERSARY congratulatory message to as-Sadat accounted
for the bulk of Radio Moscow's generally 1ow-
key publicity for Egypt's revolution anniversary on the 23d.
Moscow also reported, on 26 July, that as-Sadat's telegram in
reply expressed "deep-felt gratitude" for the Soviet "sentiments"
of support and solidarity as well as "high appreciation" of
Soviet-Egyptian friendship based on mutual understanding, joint
struggle, and fruitful cooperation.
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Moscow's Arabic-language service carried, among other things, the
customary anniversary statement by the Egyptian.ambaesador in
Moscow and an account of a ceremony held by the Soviet-Egyptian
friendship Society in Moscow, as well as an interview with the
society's chairman, Electricity and Power Minister Neporozhnyy.
A broadcast in Arabic on the 21st noted that a Soviet-Egyptian
"sports week" had begun in Egypt in connection with the
anniversary, witr. the opening ceremony attended by Soviet
Ambassador Vinogradov and--pointedly--"the Soviet .experts
working on construction of industrial and agricultural projects
in Egypt."
Articles pegged to the anniversary appeared in PRAVDA, IZVISTIYA,
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the 23d and in the
July issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, signed to press 21 June.
All the articles paid tribute to Nasir, and all made at leas t
passing reference to as-Sadat. Each, discussing aspect., anu
achievements of Egypt's domestic developments, called attention
to Soviet assistance to Cairo in various fields, including the
military. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's article referred to the "Soviet
specialists' selfless labor" in construction of the Hulwan
metallurgical complex, and it dwelt on how Egyptian prc~udices
against Europeans turned to "respect and liking" once "Soviet
man" appeared in Egypt.
The opening of the anniversary session of the Arab Socialist
Union (ASU) National Congress on 24 July--rather than on the
23d, as is customary--was reported by TASS in a two-sentence
item which noted cryptically that "the question of national
unity at the present stage" was on the agenda. A brief Moscow
domestic service report on the 24th mentioned that as-Sadat
made a "long speech," and a later newscast that day disposed of
the speech 1n the statement that the Egyptian president "summed
up the results of Egypt's developments over the 20-year period
and dwelled on the main tasks for the present period." It
added only that he pointed out the deep social changeF that have
taken place in the country and the considerable successes achieved
in the development of the Egyptian economy, culture, education,
and medical services. Monitored Soviet media have totally igr.ore~
his lengthy discourse on relations with the Soviet Union and tae
United States.
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CW~R~ES [~F Moscow's insistent emphasis on continuing Soviet-
"I(VTRIGI.'''," Egyptian friendship has been accom,~anied by
repeated rejections of alleged attempts by "the
imperialists" and their "agents" as well as by "Arab reaction" to
disrupt that friendship. On the 20th a dispatch from Cairo
correspondent Kudryavtsev, broadcast in Arabic, said AL AHRAM's
political commentator had declared that any attempts to sow seeds
of doubt as to the stability of Soviet-Egyptian friendehip.scrve
only the Arabs' enemies. The paper's commentator--presumably
chief editor Haykal--had in fact written on the 20th that "many
people" had called for a serious discussion of Soviet-Arab
relations, not wantinE to cast doubt on Chem but rather to
preserve them; the commentator also said that the question of
the advisers was not the corgi: of Arab-Soviet relations, and he
explained !:hat the results of the Moscow summit conference "were
the pointthat necessitated the 'objective pause "' in Soviet-
Egyptian relations referred to by President as-Sadat.
Soviet broadcasts in Arabic have continued almost daily since
the 20th to impress on listeners the dangers of imperialist
plots. A commentary on the 21st deplored "imperialist lies
and provocations" in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet
military personnel; it charged that when imperialists go to a
country they never leave it, while in contrast the Soviet .staff
which worked in Aswan had left Egypt "a long time ago." On
the 24th, for its Arab audiences, Radio Moscow .accused Lsrael
and "the imperialist powers behind it" of recently stepping up
subversive activities against the Arabs in "several mayor
directions," including the continued arming of Israel by the
United States despite Arab protests. It also charged .the
United States with trying to "divide patriotic forces in
this or that Arab country" and to mobilize "internal reaction
and the bourgeois elements."
In what may have been a suggestion of Soviet concern lest Egypt's
move set off a chain reaction among Moscow's other Arab clients,
a iiudryavt,aev commentary in Arabic on the 20th claimed that
imperialists and their "Israeli agents" were trying to deprive
Egypt of its friends and allies by, among other things,
consolidating the activity of reactionary forces in Egypt and
' "the other Arab countries." Similar overtones seemed.preseic
in the IZVESTIYA anniversary article, by Klenov, which observed
that while "Egypt has first place in our thoughts" on its 20th
annlversary, "everything which has been said about it .also
applies to the whole Acab world, primarily tI~e countries with
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progressive regimes." Klenov observed that Syria's economic
potential and "defense capability" were developing successfully
in cooperation with the country's "natural ally, the Soviet
Union," end added that Iraq's "anti-imperialist positions"
had strengthensd.*
Echoing the theme of the broadcasts in Arabic, the PRAVDA
anniversary article by Demchenko complained of "speculation"
by "enemies of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation" about .the return
of the Soviet military personnel from Egypt. Demchenko also
expressed concern that "in a number of Arab countries, including
Egypt, rightist, reactionary forces who oppose the social
transformations being pursued there are striving to step up
their actions."
A flurry of similar comment on "imperialist intrigues" against
Soviet-Arab relations had appeared last fall, around the time
of as-Sadat's October visit to Moscow; again last February,
after his next visit; and still again in April,. .prior to his
last talks in the USSR.** The theme cropped up again early
this month: A Moscow broadcast in. Arabic on 3 July defended the
May U.S.-Soviet summit--which as-Sadat indicated in hie 24 July
speech was a sore point--and rejected "irresponsible allegations"
in "some Arab newspapers" that the USSR had made "certain
concessions" harmful to the national liberation movement.
Broadcasts in Arabic on 5 and 6 July denounced propaganda by
"hostile forces" seeking to misrepresent Arab-Soviet cooperation.
The one on the 6th professed bewilderment and regret that
"certain Arab journalists" were portraying Soviet aid to the
Arabs as a "commercial deal in which each side seeks its own
advantage"; undoubtedly responding to Egyptian arguments, the
broadcast maintained that when the USSR provides "impartial
aid to Egypt," it does not at all seek special advantages "or
aims such as access to warm waters."*** PRAVRA on the 11th
* Moscow gave no special emphasis to the 20 July ceremonial exchange
of ratification documents on the Soviet-Iraqi treaty as a counter-
balance to its Egyptian embarrassment; publicity for the occasion was
less than half that given the same ceremony for the Soviet-Egyptian
treaty ~~ year ago.
** Belgrade's POLITIKA recalled on 20 July that at the time of
as-Sadat's Apri?. talks in Moscow it could have been deduced from
articles in PRAVDA, I7,VESTIYA, and NOVOYE VREMYA that "the USSR was
aware of some phenomenon in the Arab world which it did not like."
*** A Budapest broadcast on the 25th noted that .Egyptian Minister of
Statn., for Information az-Zayyat, in a 22 July press conference,
affirmed that Soviet warships would continue to enjoy Egyptian port
facilities. Neither the short TASS account nor the Cairo reports of
the press conference mentioned this point.
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drew on Cairo's AL-JUl~41URIYAH for refutation of 1Qfalee .rumors"
of alleged Soviet interests in Egypt and rejection of any
analogy between the USSR and the United States as great powers.
AIR INCIDENT The air incident on 24 July, when .Cairo cle:imed
that it had downed one of four Israeli Phantoms
in Egyptian airspace, was reported by Moscow radio in the usual
fashion with a short factual account attributed to the MIDDLE
EAST NEWS AGENCY. The incident was brought up on the 25th in
aforeign-language commentary by Shakhov which cited the
alleged intrusion into "Egyptian airspace" as an example of
Israeli provocations and claimed that "the crime did not go
unpunished." Shakhov drew the standard propaganda conclusion
that renewed Israeli provocations meant still another secret
agreement with Washington for the dispatch of new arms.
In an atypical and perhaps significant remark on .Israeli
withdrawal, Shakhov reaffirmed the Soviet position on
unconditional withdrawal on the basis of Resolution .242.. but
went on to add that "of course, the ways and means of the
withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces can be the subject
of discussion."
PRC PLEASED AT CAIRO MO~fE: USSR RFJrCTS TO PEKING CANT
Peking's obvious satisfaction over Moscow's discomfiture comes
through in NCNA's reportage on the Egyptian action and in
remarks by Chou En-lai. NCNA on the 20th reviewed in some
detail the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report on as-Sadat's
18 July speech, concluding with the observation that Cairo
citizens thronged the streets listening to broadcast reports
of the president's speech and asking: "Indeed, what have the
Russians really done for us?" An NCNA dispatch on the 21st
quoted ASU First Secretary Mari for the remark that as-Sadat's
decision to terminate the Soviet military mission was "one
we're all looking forward to." Other NCNA reportage has under-
scored Egyptian support for as-Sadat's "wise decisions," as
well as approval from Libya and Lebanese?prese comment critical
of the Soviet Union.
Chou En-lai took the occasion of a 21 June farewell banquet in
Peking hooted by visiting Yemeni Prime Minister al-'Apdi to
obliquely congratulate the Egyptians: "We are glad to see that
the Arab peoples' s'.ruggle in defense of independence and
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sovereignty and against the superpowers' control and interference
is forging ahead." More r~~rthrightly, the congratulatory
message from Chou and Tung s'i-wu on the Egyptian revolution
anniversary referred specifically to as-Sadat's 18 July speech
in which he "once again expressed the strong determination of
the Egyptian Government and people to fight for justice."
The Chinese Government and people, the message went on, firmly
and consistently "support you in opposing the aggression
committed by Israeli Zionism with the connivance and suppor~
of the superpowers."
The sentiments of the message were echoed in a 23 July NCNA
dispatch which noted that as-Sadat's speech had evoked warm
support at home and "won the sympathy and support of the people
of the world." On the same day, NCNA reported the Cairo weekly
AKHBAR AL-YAWN as saying Char Egypt had requested "a certain
type" of weapon from the Soviet Union, which accepted the request
but demanded that the weapon's use be subject to Moscow's
approval. NCNA quoted the paper as adding that Egypt found it
difficult to accept such a condition and that consequently "this
type of weapons did not arrive." The article wondered, sa:!d
tJCNA, what use Soviet experts served if they belonged to a state
that did not want to fight. On the 26th, an NCNA dispatch quoted
liberally from passages in as-Sadat's 24 July speech "sternly
condemning" the United States and detailing his differences
with the Soviet Unian.
SOVIET REJOINDER Moscow promptly set about countering Peking's
gibes. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast
in Mandarin on the 20th reported as-Sadat as having "emphatically"
pointed out Chat the Soviet Union had played an important role in
Egypt's struggle against U.S.-Israeli "aggression." Almost as
an afterthought, the broadcast observed in passing that as-Sadat
also said the Soviet advisers who had worked in Egypt at Cairo's
request had completed their mission.
On the 23d, a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin maxked the Egyptian
anniversary with the usual praise of Cairo's domestic progress
achieved with Soviet assistance. Without mentioning the
affair of the withdrawn advisers, the broadcast charged the
Chinese leaderFhip with distorting the nature of Soviet-Arab
relations and sawing seeds of distrust toward the Soviet Union
"and the nature of its policy and assistance to the Arab
countries."
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C O R R E C T I O N
FBIS TRENDS
26 JULY 1972
In the USSR-Egypt. sF:ction of the 19 July TRENDS, page 19, second
paragraph, the last 'sentence should read: The apparently
hastily arranged Sidgi visit was announced in Cairo on the
11th with MENA reporting Chat Sidqi had met twice the previous
day with Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov.
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ROMANIA
CEAUSESCU UPHOLDS ROMANIAN IImEPENDENCE. REJECTS "GtNERAL LAWS"
The 19-21 July national conference of the Romanian Communist
Party (RCP) was used by Nicolae Ceausescu as a forum to reassert
Bucharest's independence vis-a-vis the "general laws" of socialist
building propounded by Moscow. The maverick Romanian leader
implicitly challenged the guidelines laid down at the June 1969
Moscow international cc,nF~.rence of communist parties by calling
for a redefinition of "the principles and norms that should
guide relations among all socialist countries." He reaffirmed
his country's determination to mai~~tain gcod relations with
"all" socia~ist countries, including Moec~w and its bloc allies
as well as Peking and Tirana. While emphasizing Bucharest's
economic ties with Mo...,ow, Ceausescu ca13_ed for an expansion of
trade with tre West and the establishment of a Bslka:: organiza-
tion to promote economic cooperation in the region. He strongly
reiterated the need to reach international agreements guarantee-
ing the equality, independence, and sovereignty of "all" states
and went sn far as to call for the codification of such agreemen~s
in international law.
On domestic affairs, Ceausescu conveyed a picture of only modest
economic gains since the 1969 party congress. He was chosen by
the party conference co head a new "Supreme Council of Economic
and Social Development" designed to supervise the newly formed
coordinating councils in such fields as machine-building,
finance, and banking. Although Ceausescu did not address himself
directly to the subject of factionalism in `he party, as he had
done in his 7 May 1971 speech on the 50th anniversary of the RCP,
he made an unusual appeal for a personal vote of confidence:
"From this forum of the national conference I wish to assure the
party, the entire people, than sei f.zi~ as I am concerned I will
devote my whole activity, my life, to j~~:hieving this goal, to
the cause of socialism and communism and to the happy future of
our entire r.gtion." To shore up party unity, he proposed the
addition ~ the Central Committee of "20 to 30 party activists
who are di.rectl.y employed in production" and "a greater number
of women."
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26 JULY 1972
BLOC RELATIONS In hio treatment of foreign affairs,
Ceausescu stressed the importance of
Romania's close tied with the USSR and hie pet~.onal relations
with the Soviet leaders. Ilo noted "the intensification of
file exchange of experience between our country and the Soviet
Union" and the "important role" played by tiie contacts with
Drezhnev, Pougornyy, and Kosygin. Calling attention to the
importanc? of the economic exchanges, he said: "I want to
particularly noise that within the framework of our inter-
national trade, the first place is occupied by the Soviet Union,
whose share ie 25 percent." He added that "this requires our
permanent concern with further Pxpanding our exchanges and
cooperation in production with the USSR."
Ceausescu'e affirmations of friendship with the USSR were
matched b3? hie expansive remarks on Romania's good relations
with other countries, including Albania, China, Israel, and
the United States, anct by hie polemical statements on the need
to develop "new" etar..dards to govern relations among communist
parties and socialist states. While conceding that relations
among "the 14 socialist countries"--a pointed formulation that
includes China and Albania--must be based on the "single"
philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, Ceausescu went on to declare
that "the mere assertion of the general principles is not
sufficient for the creation of relations of a new type." The
socialist states, he argued, require a "better definition" of
the principles governing their relations, and they "mus'~
establish in more detail how these pr.inciplee should operate."
The Romanian leader thus delivered a new tacit rebuke to
Moscow's view that a "new" type of relations had been estab-
lished in the socialist world and that "general laws" of social
development were applicable to all socialist countries. In his
speech to the 24th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev had authoritatively
restated the thesis of the main document of the June 1969
Moscow international party conference on the "indivisibility"
of national and international interests. And Soviet commentary
has since consistently hewed to the 1969 conference formulation
on the dialectical unity of national and international intere.a*_s
and to the notions of "general laws" of socialism and of a "new"
type of socialist international relations.
As a counter to the Soviet view, Ceausescu repeatedly emphasized
the need to develop "new production relations," "a new type of
of nation," and "a new type of relations" between the socialist
countries based on the overcoming of differences through conaul-
tatioas and negotiations and "excluding any form of i,lterference."
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Tho Romanian leader called for "a unity of a new type" among the
world communist parties "which should in its turn start out from
the dialectical-materialist outlook, from the principles of
Marxism-Leninism, and should be based on full equality among
a1i parties and on the observance of the independence of each
party."
Ceausescu reasserted "rho right of. each party t~~ work out its
political line in keeping with the concrete r:.ndit:ons" in which
it operates, buttressing this assertion with a reference to the
dissolution of the Comintern--a body which Moscow portrayed in a
notably favorable light in recent comment commemorating the 90th
birth anniversary of Bulgarian leader Georgl Dlmitrov. Ceausescu
recalled "the appraisal made by the Communist International in
1943, when 1t decided to dissolve itself,' to the effect that
"tho existence of a single leading center is no longer possible,
and each party ~ bears the entire responsibility for the
working out of revolutionary strategy and tactics." In a
further slap at Moscow's traditional dominance in the movement,
Ceausescu added that "nobody can hold the absolute truth" and
"it is the duty of each party always to support what is new and
what ie developing, r.o act in a conscious manner against the old,
against all that is outdated and does not correspond any more to
the demands of social life."
SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT Presenting an updated review of
Romania's views regarding a conference
on European security and cooperation, Ceausescu repeated long-
standing positions with typical Romanian colorations that stressed
the independence and security of "ail" European states. After
calling on the European countries to reE.ch ar, understanding on
equali~ , independence, and sovereignty of ull states and non-
interference in internal affairs, he said that a "solemn pledge"
to uphold these principles was "necessary" and that "nothing could
,justify their violation"--a clear refection of the notion that any
socialist state could arrogate to itself the right to into:rvene
in another's affairs in the cause of "proletarian internaL?ionaliem."
As if to reinforce Romania's firm stand on this issue, he added
that an agreement in "an appropriate juridical form is also
required" whereby the European states would pledge themselves to
refrain from the use or threat of force in relations with other
states and in the "settlement of divergencies in existence or
which might crop up." Ceausescu continued: "These pledgee
should explicitly specify that any transgression ^f 'these rules
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by any state signifies a violation of the peoples' right to
independence, of the United Nations . ." In a related
vein, in a passage outlining Romania's views on Che United
Nations, Ceausescu declared that the world organization "must
also be more active" and that "it should not permit the viola-
tion of thA sovereignty of a member state by other states for
any reason whatsoever." He added that "any such act must be
considered ae being incompatible with UN membership and should
incur public condemnation and adequate measures."
Ceausescu made no direct reference to the issue of force reduc-
r~,ons in Europe, but he reiterated Bucharest's calla for "military
disengagea.ant" and for "reducing and withdrawing troops on the
territories of other states and of foreign military bases,
including the reduction of national troops." And in a vaguely
wordb~ passage expressing Romanian interest in force reductions,
he said "it is also recessary to act eo as to create appropriate
conditions for the liquidation of opposed military blocs ."
Later, after stressing that international problems must be
solved with the participation of the "small- and medium-sized"
states and with the interests of those states in mind, Ceausescu
declared that "any violation" of the principle of equality or
interference in their internal affairs "shall be considered acts
directed against peace and mankind." In a passage that drew
strong applause from the assemblage, he proclaimed that "the
sacred right of all countries to freedom and sovereignty should
be recognized, ae well as their legitimate right to defend
themselves with all means, including military means, against
any violation of this right."
In discusetng nuclear disarmament, Ceausescu seemed to offer
proposals containing elements taken from both Soviet and Chinese
proposals. He appealed to all states, "and first and foremost
the big countries," to renounce the use or threat of force
against other states, "i.ncluding the use of nuclear weapons
and rockets"--a formula which coincides with the ChinesR call
for a world summit conference to discuss the complete prohibition
and destruction of nuclear weapons, and as a first step "to
reach agreement on the non-use of nuclear s-eapons." Balancing
this appeal with one drawn from the Soviet proposal for a world
disarmament conference, Cea~ieescu also called for a "general
conference on disarmament with the participation of all the
peoples of the world " He said that the Geneva disarmament
committee should imp?cove and extend its activities, which
should then be "submitted to effective public control," and
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that the committee should be "democratized"--a possible allusion
to tha restricted membership of th? committee, particularly the
absence of the French and the lack of Chinese representation on
Ln calling for a meeting of Balkan representatives, Ceausescu
reiterated the proposal to convert the Balkans into an atom-free
zone--> notion also endorsed by the USSR on occasion in the
past--;end a zone free of military bases.
BAU(AN ORGANIlATION Ceausescu went beyond previous Bucharest
pronouncements in calling for formalized
cooperation among the countries of the Balkan region. He
declared that "the time has come to pass over from general
statements to concrete actions" in the 8alkane and that "it
would be particularly useful to pass on to achieving closer
economic collaboration by the ec:ting up of an organization for
this purpose, which should help in intensifying exchanges and
organizing cooperation in production."
An unsigned commentary carried by AGERPRES on 14 September 1971
had said, in a discussion of European security, that "a11 the
Balkan countries are duty-bound to take initiatives and actions
with the objective of improving the climate in that zone" and
that "large possibilities exist" for development of closer
economic cooperation in the zone.
MOSCOW GLASSES OVER SPEECH: PEKING REPORTS IT APPROVINGLY
Ceausescu's proposal for a Balkan economic organization and his
remarks on European security and disarmament were ignored in
Moscow's brief coverage of hie speech. A Moscow domestic service
report--attributed to a TASS correspondent but not carried in
TASS' English and Russian international services--noted
Ceausegcu's statem~::~t that 55 percent of Romania's trade is
with CEMA and ~~ent on to sharpen Ceausescu's tribute to the
Soviet Union: "The Soviet Union, he pointed out, which with
its outstanding successes in many fields of activity has
shown itself to be a giant force in the world today, is first
and foremost in Chis respect. The corresponding passages in
the text as broadcast by the Bucharest radio do not contain
tr.~~ underlined portion, which the TASS correspondent lifted
from another passage in which Ceausescu had balanced prates
of the Soviet Union with praise for the PRC. A PRAWA
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correspondent's report, published in the paper the same day,
also singled out Ceaueescu'e call for expanded trade and
cooperation with the USSR and hie remarks on meetings with
the top Soviet ]sedate.
Ceausebcu's remarks on relations with the Soviet Union were
similarly emphasized in reports in the GDR'8 NEUES DEUTSCHLAND,
Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO, and Prague's CTK and RUDE P1WV0.
East German, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak reports took note of
the Romanian leader's endorsement of a conference on European
security and cooperation, hie statements on Vietnam, and--
selectively--hie remarks on the Middle East,. but for the moat
part focused on domestic affairs. Reports in Wareaw'e TRYBUNA
LUDU on the 20th and 24th notably avoided any mention of the
content of Ceausescu'8 remarks on foreign affairs.
A report in Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on the ~Oth was notably
fuller that the other countries' accounts, including Ceausescu's
references to "erroneous measures" in the economy, hie appeal
for over~aoming "nationalist and chauvinist" manifestations''
at home, and hie call for "uni.ty and overcoming disagreements
of a temporary nature" in relations between the socialist coun-
tries. At the same time, Romania's independent course was
implicitly attacked in an article on the third anniversary of
the June 1969 Moscow conference written by Hungarian party
Politburo member and secretary Komocsin for the August issue
of the Soviet ,journal RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENP~YY MIR,
reprinted in the July-August issue of the Budapest theoretical
Monthly TARSADALMI SZEMLE. The appearance of the article in
TARSADALMI SZEMLE was announced by the Hungarian Government
orga;~, MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 21st, the last day of the Bucharest
party conference. The article contained a thinly veiled
warning to the Romanians: It observed that "lasting success
cannot be achieved by proclaiming a sovereignty with nationalist
content," a course which it alleged gains the approval of "the
class enemy" and leads to "abandoning internationalism and the
international workers movement."
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PEKING COVERAGE Peking promptly reported Ceausescu's speech
in an NCNA dispatch that included the
Romanian leader's account of hie talks in the Far Eaet with
Mao, Chou, Kim 11-songs and Le Duan but ignored all his refer-
ences to other socialist countries including Albania.
Consistent with Peking's eff orte to encourage East European
independence vie-a-vie the Soviet Union, the report's main
thrust highlighted Ceauseecu'8 defense of Romania's "independence
and national eavereignty~" emphasizing hie call for an end ro
"all inequality and national oppression" in relations among
socialist countries. NCNA also cited approvingly the Romanian
leader's support for the Vietnamese war effort, Sihanouk's
Peking-backed Cambodian "government" which Moscow has not
recognized, and Pyongyang's efforts toward Korean reunification.
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- 29 -
COMMU~!IST RELATIONS
PRAVDA PUBLICIZES SPANISH CP DELEGATION`S VISIT TO USSR
In the first known direct reference to the Spanish Communist
Party (PCE)--the "official" faction led by Dolores Ibarruri
and Santiago Car,:: 1.o--to appear in Soviet media 1n more than
a year, PRAVDA on 5 July published a brief report that a group
of PCE "journalists" had toured the Soviet Union "for three
weeks at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee" and had
met with party, trade union, and youth organizations. No
dates were cited.
Neither the PRAVDA report nor similar reports in Moscow radio
newscasts in Spanish and Portuguese carried any additional
information on the delegation's visit. But the PCE's clandestine
Radio Independent Spain (REI) noted on 15 June that the five-man
delegation had arrived for "an information-gathering visit" and
reported in broadcasts on 1 and 6 July that the delegation
included Central Committee members Ramirez, Izcaray, and Melchor.
REI said the delegation's account of the visit would appear in
a forthcoming issue of the PCE Cheoretical journal NEUSTRA BANDERA.
Th^ only reference to substantive issues discussed by the CPSU
and the PCE visitors appeared in the clandestine radio's broadcast
of 6 July, which said the delegation had noted the CPSU's "deep
interest" in the situation in Spain and the struggle of the
Spanish people and the PCE "against the Franco dictatorship."
REI reported that "everywhere, stress was laid on the fraternity
of Soviet and Spanish communists in the common struggle against
imperialism." It added--in a statement which implied that the
visit was a success--that the delegation "expressed .Lts
appreciation to the CPSU Central Committee for the attention
and courtesy it had received" and promised the CPSU "and all
those who contributed to the fulf illment of the delegation's
mission" to convey its impressions to the people and communists
of Spain.
The appearance of even the brief, undetailed report of the visit
in PRAVDA, obscuring as it does the fact that PCE Central
Committee figures were in the delegation, suggests a desire
by t-~e Soviet Union to place its relations with the maverick,
indep~:ndent-minded PCE on a firmer basis. Moscow has recently
made clear its concern over the freewheeling behavior of such
parties as the PCE and the small Communist Party of the
Netherlands (CPN), with a PRAVDA Observer article in May
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evincing interest in resuming long-interrupted contacts with
the CPN. Cool. CPSU relations with the PCE date back to the
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia ar.d could only have deteriorated
further with PCE leader Carrillo's v~~?it to Peking last fall
and Carrillo's public espousal of a Roam. ' ~r-type line on the
desirability of cordial relations with "awl" parties. Moscow
media have, of cour-;e, never mentione4 Carrillo's Peking trip.
In the period since the Czechoslovak events, a splinter pro-
Soviet faction of tt~e Spanish party has been organized under
the leadership of General Enrique Lister, with apparent behind-
the-scenes Soviet eupport.*
That Moscow may now wish to move to mend its fences with the
Carrillo-led faction of the party seemed indicated 1n a report
appearing in the PCE organ MUNDO OBRERO of 10 June. According
to this report a meeting hosted by the PCPs permanent
representation in the USSR in Moscow on 29 April, to express
solidari:; with the people of Spain, too'.t place in a "packed
house" and was marked by "indescribable enthusiasm." Among
those reportedly attending the meeting were Secretary of the
PCE Committe~~ in the USSR Juan Avestaran, who outlined the PCE
struggle 1n Spain, and Emilio Garcia, who praised the work of
the illegal "workers' commissions" in Spain and personally
pledged allegiance t~ the PCE Central Committee headed by
Ibarruri and Carrillo. Moscow media did not publicize the
meeting, but it could only have taken place with Soviet approval.
The PCE's perms Went representation has remained in the USSR
throughout the period of cool CPSU-PCE relations; Soviet media
have carefully suppressed the continued in-fighting between
this group and the Lister faction, whose existence Moscow has
never acknowledged.
In recent months, commenta,ies and reports on Spain in Soviet
central media have discussed the internal Spanish situation in
broad, general terms and have made only passing reference to
the Spanish communist m~~vement. Moscow has noted the activities
of the Spanish work"rs' commissions, linking them to Spanish
communists among other opposition forces but not specifically to
the PCE organization as such. The weekly NEW TIMES (No. 15,
7 April 1972), for example, published an interview with an
unidentified representative of the workers' commissions to the
Soviet trade union cc,~.gress in March which made no reference to
the PCE.
* See FBIS Special Report No. 305 of 7 March 1972, 'Spanish
Communists Reestablish Relations with Peking: Background and
Ramifications," for background on the split in the PCE.
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JAPAN-CHINA-USSR
PEKING FORTHCOINING. MOSCOW CAUTIOUS TpWARp TANAKA CABINET
The 6 July election of Kakuei Tanaka as Japanese premier was
greeted favorably by Peking and welcomed more .cautiously by
Moscow. The Chinese lost no time in signaling their .readiness
to deal with~the new government, with Chou En-lai noting on
9 July that thr Sato government-='which long remained hostile
toward China"--had been "forced to step down" and .expressing
"welcome" to the new cabinet's statement that "normalization
of relations between China and Japan would be expedited."
Chows approving acknowledgment of the change in Japanese
government appeared 1n a mayor address hailing .trends .toward
detente in Asia free of superpower control. The abrupt shift
in Peking's posture toward Japan, previously a target of
sustained polemical attack, has servP.d to bring Sino-Japanese
relations into the pattern of Peking's moves to enhance its
leverage against the two superpowers and to erode their
influence.
Peking's extensive publicity for the new Japanese .government,
which has been free of critical comment, has included reports
on activities by two Chinese officials in Japan.thb.t.in effect
mark a step toward opening diplomatic relational or .at least
convey Peking's interest in developing official contacts.
Peking reported a reception in Tokyo on 20 July given by
Fujiyama, an LDP member long associated with PRC-Japanese
relations, in honor of the two Chinese officials, the new
chief of the Chinese trade office and the leader. .of .a~Shangh$i
dance troupe now in Japan. NCNA quoted Fu~iyama .as .hailing .the
presence ~at the reception of new Foreign Minister Ohira as "an
epoch-making event" which conferred added significance on .the
gathering. The Chinese trade official, Hsiao Hsiang-chien, was
quoted as expressing the readiness of his office to work for
the normalization of PRC-Japanese diplomatic relations."at an
early date." Speaking at another reception on the same day,
also reported by NCNA, Hsiao echoed Chou's welcome .f or what
he called Tanaka's "positive statements" on Sino-Japanese
relations since taking office, noting that the premier .had.
expressed an intention to realize diplomatic relations at .an
early date. NCNA reported on 22 July that the two.Ghinese
officials and Foreign Minister Ohira had a "friendly" .talk that
day in which they expressed the hope that Sino-Japanese relations
would be normalised as Boon as possible and agreed to hold talks
again "if required."
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In a show of flexib111ty, Peking has not been presaing.its three
principles for establishing diplomatic relations-that the PRC ie
the sole legitimate government of China, that Taiwan is part of
China, and Chat the Japan-ROC treaty must be abrogated--while
taking note of the Tanaka cabinet's professions of "full under-
standing" of the three principles. NCNA'e account .of Tanaka'~o
19 July press conference juxtaposed hie statement that the China
question is the biggest diplomatic question and that .the time
1s ripe for normalizing relations with his remark .that Taiwan
represents $n important question which should be .settled.
"together with such a big question as the normalization!!.of
PRC-Japanese diplomatic relations. If unchallenged,. such an
approach would circumvent the demand that Tokyo sever its
formal ties with Taipei as a precondition for negotiating.
relations with Peking. NCNA's account of the Tanaka cabinet's
replies to opposition questions on 18 July included the
assertion that the clauc~e on Taiwan in the U.S.-Japanese
point declaration was a product of its bane and that the
situation "underwent a tremendous change later on,'! resulting
in a change in the "understanding" of the government.
Peking's first reference to an i-~vitation to Tanaka to visit
the PRC was contained i:i a 24 July NCNA dispatch reporting his
speech that day at the first meeting of the LDP's council for-
normalizing Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.. Tanaka was
quoted as saying that "as to the vie it of the foreign minister
and I to China, it should be decided" by the council... He
was next quoted as saying he would hold talks with President
Nixon next month and that he hoped to learn "the .U..S.. attitude
and ideas on China." NGNA's report on Tanaka's J9 July press
conference had quoted his statement that Tokyo would maintain
the U.S.-Japanese security treaty.
MOSCOW Soviet reaction to the Tanaka cabinet has .been one.
of cautious welcome. Soviet media reported factually
the formation of the new cabinet and a PRAVDA article. on 8 July
"welcomed" a statement by Nakasone, one of the chief ministers
in the new cabinet, that he supports "cooperation with .the Soviet
Union." An IZVESTIYA commentary on S July observed. that only
"time will show" the new government's approach but noted that
Tanaka!s expressed desire for "closer ~~lations with the .Soviet
Union" had been "favorably received by the Soviet.puhlic."
Soviet caution was reflected in the TASS account .c Tanaka's
frees conference on 1S July. TASS took note of his c~ll_ for
concluding a peace treaty with the USSR but did not .report his
remarks on the need to solve the northern territories issue.
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