TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050026-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: June 28, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
T
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
Illllllui~u~~~~u~mllllllll
H
ENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
28 JUNE 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 26)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report es based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FHIS without coordination with other U.B.
Covernreent components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
[eeluded I,.. euemalk
down ,edin0 and
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
28 JUNE 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
U.S. 25, 26 June Strikes Prompt DRV Foreign Ministry Protest . . 1
DRV Stresses Importance or Transportation, Use of "New Forces" . 6
Brezhnev Pledges Continued Aid to Vietnam, Assails "Blockade" . . 7
Peking Signs New Supplementary Aid Agreement with DRV . . . . . . 11
Hanoi Issues Instructions for Armed Forces Party Committees . . . 15
KOREA
Korean War Anniversary Receives Muted Treatment . . . . . . . . . 17
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Again Ueiends Summit, Affirms Ideological Purity . . . . 21
DIMITROV ANNIVERSARY
International Meeting in Sofia Stresses Soviet Leading Role . . 26
POLAND-YUGOSLAVIA
Cordial Communique Cape Tito's Five-Day Visit to Warsaw . . . . 30
MIDDLE EAST
Brezhnev Asks Israeli With4rawal; USSR Scores Raids on Lebanon. 33
CUBA-PERU
Cuba Welcomes Peruvian Move to Restore Relations . . . . . . . 35
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Goaplan Official Urges Reorganization of Agricultural Organs . 33
PRAVDA Article Justifies Unequal Investments in Republics . . . 41
PRC AND ENVIRONMENT
Peking ;Elaboro tea Views on Environment at UN Conference . . . . 43
CHINA
RED FLAG Strei'ees.Attention to Agriculture, Light Industry . ? 46
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FOR OFFICIAL USE 0' !T,Y FBIS TRENDs
28 JUNE 1972
- i -
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 19 - 25 JUNE
Moscow (2694 items)
Peking 1254 items)
Indochina
(4%)
9%
Domestic Issues
(49%)
37%
(Podgorn,y in DRV
(--)
5%]
Indochina
(14%)
30%
31st Anniversary of
Nazi invasion of
(--)
6%
(Sihanouk in Romania,
Albania
(0.3')
23X]
USSR
Rwanda Government
(--)
4%
Nixon USSR Visit
(5X)
5%
Delegation in PRC
Israeli Attacks on
Lebanon
(--)
3%
Sri Lanka Prime Minister
in PRC
(--)
3%
China
(2%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The to-m "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press art icle or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items ox extens: ie reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor aigniScan, e.
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INDOCHINA
In addition to the continuing daily protests over U.S. air strikes
from the spokesman of the DRV Foreign Ministry, a more authoritative
foreign ministry statement on 26 June--the second such high-level
protest this month--assailed strikes at Hanoi and Haiphong. The
statement and a flurry of press comment singled out alleged strikes
at the dike system and irrigation works for special condemnation.
At the same time, Hanoi's continuing concern with transportation
problems was reflected in an article on the 26th which discussed
problems in connection with the incorporation of "now forces" into
the regular transportation and communications branch. .
Moscow has continued to press the line that its detente policy is
not inconsistent with its support .'or Vietnam. And Brezhnev,
speaking at a 27 June banquet for Castro, was unusually forceful
in promising support to the Vietnamese until "victory" and in
condemning the U.S. "blockade" of DRV ports--an issue which had
been avoided in the Soviet-U.S. joint communique on the President's
visit. Soviet propaganctlsts have continued to assail the United
States for refusing to return to the Paris talks, insisting that
peace can be achieved only at the conference table.
The PRC and the DRV on 28 June signed another supplementary aid
agreement, providing for the supply of "ordinary materlals" and a
grant of "military equipment and material" to the Vietnamese. There
are indications, however, that `Le Chinese offered the aid less
enthusiastically than on a comparable occasion at the time of the
Lam Son 719 operation last year. Also on the 28th, a PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article reaffirmed Chinese support for the war effort in
seconding a series of foreign minis~ry statements by its Vietnamese
allies.
U,S, 25, 26 JUNE STRIKES PROMPT DRV 70REIGN MINISTRY PROTEST
Following the 10 June DRV Foreign Ministry protest over U.S. air
striker, Hanoi had reverted to the daily lower-level protests by
the ministry spokesuan. But on 26 June another foreign ministry
statement protested action against Hanoi on that day and against
Haiphong, among other targets, on the 25th. The statement again
underlined Hanoi's determ!.nation to continue the struggle, hat it
differed from other high-level statements since the early-April
escalation of the air war in its failure to mention support and
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assistance from the socialist countries. Where the earlier
protests had expressed gratitude and appealed to the socialist
and other countries to continue efforts to stay the hand of
the U.S. "aggressors,"* the current statement said: "Despite
the strong protest of the public opinion in the world and the
United Sc,,tes, the Nixon Administration obdurately continues its
frenzied and adventurous war escalation against the DRV. This
is an extremely gross encroachment upon the sovereignty and
security of the DRV and an insolent challenge to the whole of
progressive mankind." By contrast, the foreign ministry protest
of 10 June had expressed "sincere and deep gratitude" for the
socialist countries' condemnation of the U.S. escalation and
appealed to "brother;. and friends" to etr:'ggle evon more
vigorously to stay the U.S. hand and continue to support and
assist the Vietnamese.
It is unclear whether the foreign ministry statement's failure
to mention socialist support and assistance was calculated to
suggest dissatisfaction with Moscow's and Peking's current stands.
Despite the absence of any reference `o the socialist countries
in the statement, condemnations of air sl:rikec by. Soviet and
Chinese spokesmen continue to be cited in other current DRV1 comment.
A PRG Foreign Ministry statement of 24 June protesting the air
strikes in both North and South Vietnam echoed earlier high-level
DRV statements in expressing thanks for support "from brothers
and friends" and in asserting 'confidence that the peoples and
governmet-ts of various countries "will take active and timely
measures to stay the bloody hands of the Nixon Administration."
DOWNING OF PLANES Propaganda fanfare celebrating the claimed
downing of the 3,700th U.S. aircraft on
27 June underscored Hanoi's determination to "direct staggering
counterblows at the U.S.'air pirates and properly punish them
for all their criminal war escalation steps." Hanoi radio
claimed on the 27th that a total of 10 U.S. jets, "including the
3,700th U.S. aircraft downed over the North," had fallen victim
to DRV antiaircraft'and air force units that day, and it put the
total of U.S. planes downed at 3,704. Identifying a captured
pilot for the first time since the April escalation, VNA reported
on 20 June that a plane piloted by Richard Logan Francis "was among
the five U.S. aircraft shot down by the Hanoi aimed forces yesterday."
The VNA account said Francis' wounds were bandaged before his
captors took him to prison.
For backgr'und see the TRENDS of 14 June 1972, pages 3-4.
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On 26 June the VPA High Command sent commendations to the Hanoi
people and armed forces and the Vietnam people's air forces
"for their brilliant feat of shooting down 10 U.S. jet planes
within a few hours yesterday."* Exhorting the armed forces
in Hanoi and the people's air force to "steel their determination
to fight and win," the commendation noted that the 39700th plane
was downed during the action and that "a number" of U.S. pilots
had been "wiped out or captured." A NHAN DAN editorial on the
28th portrayed the downing of the 3,700th u.S. aircraft as having
"the force of a triumphal song praising the glorious journey
North Vietnam has made in the past eight years, bath:Lng in fire
but fighting unflinchingly and gaining strength all the time."
CHARGES OF STRIKES The foreign ministry statement on the 26th
AT DIKE SYSTEM highlighted alleged U.S. bombing of dikes,
claiming that "violent strikes on the dike
system and irrigation works" expose "the utterly brutal aggressive
nature of the U.S. imperialists and the fallacy of their propaganda
about peace and goodwill." The statement said that dike segments
were among the many areas bombed in Hanoi, Haiphong, Viet Tri, and
"many other populous areas."
A statement issued by the DRV Watar Conservancy Ministry on 16 June
had scored alleged strikes at the dike system from 10 April to
10 .June,** and propaganda has since been giving the issue increasing
Tattention. .1 23 June NHAN DAN editorial, for example, attacked
"the Nixou clique" for "moving further :-long the criminal path"
and sending "aircraft and vessels to bomb and shell many important
dikes on large river networks and many water conservancy projects."
It asserted that "the Nixon clique" hopes to break the dikes and
thereby cause floods and droughts. A NHL,-,' DAN article on the same
day claimed that recent U.S. attacks on coastal dikes and dike
sections neat the river mouths were timed just "before the flash
flood season with the aim of weakening the bodies and bases of
the dikes so that when the water level rises the dikes can easily
be damaged."
* The VPA High Command has sent several messages of commendation
since the escalatirn of the air war in early April. For example,
on 11 May the armed forces and people of Hanoi and Haiphong were
commended for downing numerous plane3.
** See the TRENDS of 21 June 1972, pages 12-14.
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A NHAN DAN article on the 26th also warned of futu,'e flooding
when it charged that President Nixon "has ordered" air and
naval attacks on many dikes and sluices along the major rivers--
the Red, Thai, Binh, Day, Ma, and tam--as well as the Nam Dinh
canal and many sea dikes in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, and Ninh Binh
provinces. The paper charged that the strikes at this time of
year had considerably weakened the dikes and "destroyed the
structure of the soil in the embankments." Observing that
the recent attacks have not caused immediate floods, the article
said that breaks in the dikes would be "unavoidable" if bombing
were stepped up during the flood season. An editorial in the
party paper on the same day urged that careful. preparations be
made to cope with floods when they occur, saying that each
family is expected to be prepared to move provisions and domestic
animals "to high and dry places" during the forthcoming rainy
season. The 28 June NHAN DAN editorial laudi'g the claimed
downing of the 3,700th plane the day before charged the President
with genocide, claiming that he "is launching attacks in a most
provocative manner on dike systems with the intent to carry out
mass murders through floods and famine."
A 27 June LPA commentary denouncing U.S. bombing in North and
South Vietnam focused on recent strikes at portions of dikes
and irrigation works along the Ma river and cited an article
published in THE GUARDIAN on 22 June for the claim that the
United Stbtes has resorted to ",.rti#icial rains" as a means of
causing "widespread floods."
FOREIGN MINISTRY In addition to the 26 Jude foreign ministry
SPOKESMAN PROTESTS statement, daily foreign ministry spokesman
protests ir. the past week have included the
following specific charges :
+ The 21 June statement alleged that on the previous day "U.S.
aircraft indiscriminately poured bombs and shells on many urban
wards, schools, hospitals, and factcries" within Nam Dinh
municipality. It also charged that on the same day B-52's hit
"many populous areas" in Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Nat, Ha, Thanh Hoa,
Nghe Pn, Ha Ti:', .and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh.
+ The statement on 22 June charged that "in addition to continuing
the dropping of mines to seal off various; ports of the DRV," U.S.
aircraft had bombed and shelled the outskirts of Haiphong city and
several other populated areas in Bac Thai., Quang Ninh, Hai Hung,
Thc.i Binh, Nun Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, and Ha Tinh provinces. The
statement also claima4 that B-;,2's had struck a number of villages
and hamlets in Quang, Binh Province and the Vinh Linh area.
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+ "Sternly" protesting the "killing and woundit.g of many
civilians," the statement on the 23d claimed "continued
barbarous strikes" withir. Lang Son, Ha Bac, Ha Tay, Quang
Ninh, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh,
and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh as well as at several
villages "on the outskirts of Hanoi."
+ Air strikes on 23 June were condemned in the statement on
the 24th, which charged that rockets fell "in the center of
Hanoi and on its outskirts," destroying the Nam Dan dam and a
portion of the sea dike in Nhan Ly hamlet. Ridiculing U.S.
denials that "it is not U.S. policy to bomb dikes," the
statement asserted that "U.S. imperialism cannot cover up
the obvious fact that for more than two months, U.S. aircraft
and warships have relentlessly struck at DRV dikes and
hydraulic works and even at the people who have been engaging
in repairing the damaged sections." The protest also claimed
that many populous areas in Yen Bai, Lang Son, Quang Binh,
Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh
provinces had been hit.
Additional details concerning the effects of the.-rockets
directed at Hanoi on the 23d were provided in an article
broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 24th. Citing several examples
of civilian deaths caused by the raids, the broadcast claimed
tnat the attacks had served culy to spur the Hanoi populace to
"exert greater efforts to Ft 3p up production and to satisfactorily
carry out antiaircraft and ewscuation tasks."
+ The 25 June statement condemned air strikes at populous areas
in Vinh Phu, Bac Thai, Hoa Binh, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Ninh
Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and
Vinh Linh. Echoing the statement of the 24th, the protest
specifically denounced the Nixon Administration for "continuously
attacking the DRV's dikes and water conservancy projects."
+ Strikes against Hanoi on 26 and 27 June, as well as continuing
bombing a.id shelling of "many municipalities, townships, and
villages in other provinces," drew a foreign ministry spokesman's
statement on the 27th protesting the "mad bombing and shelling"
of the capital which "killed and wounded many innocent people and
destroyed a large number of people's houses." Unlike the other
foreign ministry spokesman's statements issued during the past
week, the protest of the 27th invoked a lesson learned from "our
beloved President Ho Chi Minh," t,;kio "taught us that nothing is
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more precious than freedom and it:dependence," to buttress its
claim that the Vietnamese people "ire determined to, smash to
pieces all the U.S. mad steps o` war escalation to protect
their fatherland." In further contrast with the previous
protests issued during the past week, the statement of the
27th called upon the United States to "enter into serious
negotiations at the Paris conference on Vietnam and positively
respond to the seven-point solutian of the PRGRSV, the two key
problems of which were recently further clarified."
DRV STRESSES IMPORTMICE OF TRANSPORTATION. USE OF "NEW FORCES"
Hanoi's continuing concern with transportation problems was und.r
scored in a 26 June broadcast of an article by Communications and
Transportation Minister Phan Trong Tue pegged to awards recently
given to outstanding units and individuals in communications and
transportation work.* The article echoed earlier Hanoi comment
when it said that the Central Committee "regards communications
and transportation as the key and central task of all the party,
people, and armed forces" and that the maintenance of communications
and transportation is "one of the decisive conditions" in obtaining
victory. While devoted mainly to outlining actions to be taken in
the present situ'tion, the article also reflected current problems.
In observing that the communications and transportation combatants
have met "innumerable difficulties and hardships," it said, for
example, that "if food supplies are not brought in time the
combatants eat jungle plants so that they have sufficient energy
to continue working." Urging transportation forces to preserve
their cargoee; and vehicles, the article also noted the importance
of being careful with fuel--"considering gas as one's blood."
The strain of transportation tasks on manpower resources was
pointed up by the article's injunction to conserve manpower and
its acknowledgment that transportation work requires mobilization
of a "great number" of the masses and "the organization of people
along communications lines" to carry out such tasks as road repair,
the camouflage of supplies, and loading and unloading. Problems
in organizing the mast:, involvement in transportation tasks seemed
reflected in instructions the article offered for dealing with
"new forces" now supplementing the regular transportation forces.
"Cadres, workers, and assault youths in the communications and
transportation branch" were told to "provide utmost assistance for
* Earlier propaganda on the awards is discussed in the 21 June
TRENDS, pages 17-18.
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and closely cooperate with these new forces." The article
called for the "rapid readjustment and arrangement of the forces
in the branch and the new supplementary forces," and it seemed
to indicate the formula for such reorganization when it noted a
need to set up "many assault teams" to carry out such tasks as
the repair of roads and bridges and air defense.
BRED1NEV PLEDGES CONTINUED AID TO VIETNAM, ASSAILS "BLOCKADE"
In the wake of the Soviet-U.S. summit, Moscow has continued to
stress the constancy of its assistance and support for the
Vietnamese and to score the Chinese "splittist" stand on
Indochina. Brezhnev's 27 June remarks or. Vietnam, at a banquet
for the visiting Castro, were more forceful than most recent
Moscow comment. Brezhnev's assertion that Soviet "support and
all-round aid to the Vietnamese people will continue until the
victory of its just cause" goes beyond his 5 June speech during
Tito's visit as well as the 19 June Soviet-DRV announcement on
Podgorny3y's visit to Hanoi. Brezhnev had pledged cn 5 June that
Soviet support and assistance is "immutable," and the statement
on the Podgornyy visit merely promised "necessary assistance and
su,pport."
Brezhnev's criticism of U.S. actions in the DRV was also stronger
than that in recent authoritative Soviet comment, Thus, he said
"we resolutely condemn the measures undertaken lately by the
United States to blockade DRV ports and to intensify bombings of
economic objectives, Transport routes, and populated localities."
In the Joint communique on President Nixon's visit, Moscow had
demanded an end to the bombing but had notably failed to mention
the mining. The Soviet version of the announcement on the
Podgornyy visit reported that the two sides demanded an end to
the mining, while the Hanoi version additionally imputed to the
two sides a description of the mining as a "blockade." In his
speech on the 27th, Brezhnev also routinely called for a withdrawal
of U.S. and allied troops and repeated the view that "a basis for
constructive talks and for attaining a political settlement" is
provided by the DRV and PRG proposals and the proposals of the
FUNK and the NLHS.
Moscow's defense of its Vietnam stand included a 21 June domestic
service commentary which said the passage on Vietnam in the joint
communique ;n President Nixon's visit was couched "in the clearest
possible terms and gives absolutely no justification for any
speculation regarding the position of the Soviet Union." A Radio
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Peace and Progress commentary in Mandarin on the 24th said that the
PRG's message responding to Soviet congratulations on the 6 June
anniversary of the PRG's establishment again proved the USSR's
"genuine internationalist policy" when it expressed gratitude for
"very valuable" support and "huge and effecs.ive" aid. The broadcast
went on to score Peking's failure to join in united action and its
attempts "to sow discord between the Vietnamese and Soviet peoples"
with talk of "two superpowers." The commentary also charged Peking
with obstructing the transport of Soviet aid to Vietnam but left
it unclear whether the reference wao to current or past obstruction.
Moscow has not specifically complained of Chinese aid obstruction
since the mining, but a 17 June article by Varnai in the Hungarian
party organ NEPSZABADSAG alluded to the Chinese refusal to allow
Soviet ships to use Chinese ports when it charged that China
"rejected joint action in helping Vietnam even after the announcement
of the U.S. blockade."*
A 25 June !ASS report of Kissinger's press conference upon his
return from Peking noted that he acknowledged that Vietnam had
been discussed in detail. TASS, of course, did not acknowledge
his speculation on a "policy review" that may now be going on in
Hanoi, or the exchanges with reporters on Moscow's and Peking's
attitudes toward a settlement and on Peking's reported refusal
to let Soviet ships unload cargoes destined for Vietnam at Chinese
ports.
TASS noted Kissinger's remarks regarding U.S. support for direct
negotiations with the DRV, but it observed that he "refused" to
say when the United States would return to the Paris conference.
A brief report attributed to TASS in the 26 June PRAVDA on
Secretary Rogers' press conference before his departure on his
foreign tour noted without comment his assertion that the United
States continues to give preference to the Paris conference as
a forum for settling the Vietnam conflict and is hopeful that
"the other side is interested in talks." Moscow comment
criticizing the U.S. refusal to resume the Paris talks has
included a 21 June RED STAR article by Leontyev and Gavrilov
which said that "the Vietnam question cannot be resolved by
the force of weapons. It must and can be resolved only through
talks on the basis of respect for the national rights and
expectations of the Vietnamese people." The article praised the
PRG proposal as "a sensible and constructive basis" for restoring
peace in Vietnam and recalled that the 10 June DRV Foreign Ministry
statement again called upon the United States to hold "serious
talks" in Paris and give a "positive reply" to the PRG's seven-
point proposal.
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AIR STRIKES Moscow has been duly reporting Hanoi's continuing
official protests over U.S. bombing, but there
has been minimal Soviet comment. For example, a Serbin dispatch
from Hanoi, published in PRAVDA on 16 June, cited a worker as
referring to difficulties because so many of the men were in the
amy or working on road construction and transport and as saying
that the rice harvest will be a "frontline" harvest because of
the bombing.
According to VNA on the 25th, condemnation of alleged U.S. attacks
on DRV dikes and other hydraulic works had been voiced by the
Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Unions,
A. P. Shitikov, when he received a visiting DRV war crimes
commission delegation on the 22d. A Soviet report of the meeting,
broadcast by Moscow radio on the 22d and published in IZVESTIYA
on the 24th, reported only that Shitikov condemned U.S. "aggressive
actions" against the DRV. VNA also cited him as promising greater
economic and military assistance, but Moscow said he recalled
that Podgornyy's visit reaffirmed Soviet "solidarity" with the
Vietnamese people. The alleged U.S. bombing of dikes and dams
was brought up in a Moscow domestic service broadcast on the
27th which cast doubt on White House Spokesman Ziegler's denial
of such bombing. The broadcast pointedly recalled that General
Lavelle had gone beyond his authority in bombing North Vietnamese
targets. Another broadcast on the same day described U S.
actions in both North and South Vietnam as genocide.
EAST EUROPEAN Following the appearance of the 17 June Varnai
CONWf:NTARIES article in the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG,
which had sought to reconcile the Soviet-U.S.
summit with Moscow's loyalty to its Vietnamese ally, other
members at the Soviet bloc have chimed in with defenses of
Soviet policy and attacks on Peking in terms more outspoken
than Moscow itself has used. A 21 June article in the Polish
Government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY took issue with U.S.
"Kremlinologists" who see differences between Hanoi and Moscow
and who claim that the Soviet Union criticized the Vietnamese
leaders, urging them to adopt a more conciliatory position
toward American peace proposals. The article said the
communique on Podgornyy's visit to Hanoi shows that such
speculations are inaccurate. It went on to assert that the
Vietnamese need help from all the socialist countries and
have succeeded in the difficult task of maintaining friendly
relations with both the Soviet Union and China despite the
anti-Soviet overtones of Peking's policy, "with whir:h Hanoi
cannot, of course, be in solidarity." Casting doubt on Peking's
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motives, the article observed pointedly that China must be
concerned with the bombings, "especially those near her borders,"
but still is not ready to coordinate aid with the other
socialist countries. Rather, the article speculated, Vietnam
would probably be a topic of discussion during Kissinger's visit
to Peking..
A 21 June article in the Czechoslovak party daily RUDE PRAVO
emphasized the firmness of the USSR's Vietnam stand, pointing to
the Soviet Union's "powerful military, economic, and political
assistance" to the Vietnamese and recalling that during President
Nixon's visit the Soviet leaders "clearly and uncompromisingly
repeated" the point that a U.S. withdrawal and acceptance of the
Vietnamese peace proposals constituted the "only" road to a
political solution. The article emphasized that Vietnam is the
question on which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries
"know of no compromise and cannot compromise."
Also on 21 June, an article in Hungary's NEPSZABADSAG stressed
the determination of the Vietnamese to hold out until final
victory despite U.S. "genocide" and Washington's apparent
effort to impose a "peas-- of the graveyard" in Vietnam. The
article asserted that "never before have the Vietnamese people
been in greater need of a consolidation of international
solidarity," which is needed all the more because he Chinese
refusal to cooperate with the USSR "seriousl; harms those
struggling for their just cause."
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PEKING SIGNS NEW SUPPLE'M'ENTARY AID AGREEMENT WITH DRV
Peking has reaffirmed its backing for the Vietnamese war effort
by signing another supplementary aid agreement with the DRV and
issuing a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 28 June ia support
of a series of statements by its Vietnamese allies condemning U.S.
military actions. NCNA announced that an agreement was signed in
Peking on the 28th providing Chinese "supplementary economic and
military material aid" to the Vietnamese for 1972. The agreement,
which consists of a protocol on the supply of "ordinary materials"
and another one on the "gracIitous supply of military equipment
and material," is the product of the protracted stay of DRV Vice
Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban, who arrived in Peking on 3 May with
the announced purpose of discussing aid.
A protocol on supplementary military aid to Vietnam for 1972 had
been signed in Peking on 22 January, and a similar supplementary
protocol for 1971 was signed last July. A more comparable
occasion was the "agreement" on "supplementary economic and
military aid" signed in Peking on 15 February 1971 during the
Lam Son 719 operation in southern Laos. However, on that occasion
the NCNA announcement was prefaced by a statement of purpose
saying the agreement was concluded in order "to completely defeat
the U.S, aggressors and all their running dogs in Indochina."
There was no such statement in the current announcement.
Chou En-tai and PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng attended the
signing ceremony in February 1971. This time the ranking Chinese
officials present were Yeh Chien-ying, who has been performing
functions formerly carried out by the purged Huang, and Vice
Premier Li Hsien-nien.
There may have been a hint of Sino-Vietnamese strain in NCNA's
statement that Yeh and Li had "a cordial and friendly talk" with
the Vietnamese comrades. Peking's standard formulation for
relations with its close allies is "very cordial and friendly"--
the formulation used to characterize Chou'? tal'. with Ly Ban
three days after his arrival as well as the meetings between the
DRV delegation and the Chinese in February 1971.
CHINESE COMMENT The 28 June PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article, pegged to foreign ministry statements
issued by the PRG and the DRV on 24, 25, and 26 June, criticized
the U.S. mining of DRV ports and intensified bombing as well as
the redeployment of American forces from Vietnam to Thailand.
Commentator declared that no matter "how desperately" the United
States escalates the war, the Chinese "will, as always, resolutely
support" their Vietnamese and other Indochinese allies.
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The Commentator article represented Pekiteg'a first reaffirmation
of support for the Vietnamese since the 12 June PRC Foreign
Ministry statement protesting air strikes near the Chinese
border. Unlike the 12 June statement, however, Commentator made
no reference to Chinese security interests or provocations
against the PRC. Like the foreign ministry protest, Commentator
avoided mentioning the Nixon Administration or raising issues
concerning a political settlement in Vietnam--elements present
in the PRG and DRV statements.
Peking's choice on this occasion of a Commentator article--
rather thsn an official statement as ii: the cage of the protest
injecting Chinese security interests--reflects its carefully
calibrated expression of involvement in Vietnamese developments.
The Chinese may have felt constrained to reaffirm their support
for the Vietnamese after Kissinger's latest visit to Peking and
in view of the successive PRG and DRV statements, particularly
the one protesting air strikes on Hanoi proper.* Commentator
somewhat softened the 12 June statement's assurances to the
Vietnamese, making no reference to an "unshirkable inter-
nationalist duty" and saying that the Chinese and Vietnamese
people are "closely related like the lips and the teeth" without
noting also that they are neighbors. Similarly, where the
foreign ministry statement warned that the Vietnamese "are by no
means alone" in their struggle, Commentator less emphatically
pointed out that the Vietnamese "are not alone" in the struggle.
The U.S. mining and bombing measures in Vietnam were also
condemned in the customary 25 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
marking the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war. There
was no mention of Chinese security interests or support for the
war effort in Vietnam, the editorial simply claiming that a U.S.
defeat was a certainty. In a reflection of Peking's guarded
assessment of the communist offensive in Vietnam, the editorial
did not repeat last year's obser??,tion that the "raging flames"
of Vietnamese resistance were leaping "higher and higher,"
forcing Washington into an "unprecedented dilessnn," and that the
United States had been defeated in Vietnam on a scale not
duplicated since the Korean war. More generally, the editorial
reflected the change over the past year in the Sino-U.S.
* There has been no regular pattern in recent weeks in Peking's
response to official DRV statements. On occasion Peking has
seconded these statements on the same official level, at times
it has made use of an editorial or Commentator article, and at
other times it has offered no supporting comment at all.
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28 JUNE 1972
relationship by significantly muting the harsh attack in the 1971
editorial on the United States as the "most ferocious enemy of
the people of Asia" and as threatening "a new war of aggression
in Asia."
The day after the Korean war anniversary, NCNA announced the
arrival in Peking of U.S. Congressional leaders Boggs and Ford.
NCNA reported that they were feted at a banquet on the 26th
attended by NPC Vice Chairman Kuo. Mo-jo after having a "friendly"
talk with Kuo and other Chinese officials--marking the first time
Peking has offered an explicitly favorable characterization of a
meeting with U.S. officials. The Kissinger delegation, which had
arrived in Peking one day after the stopover of DRV negotiator
Le Duc Tho on his way home, had held "extensive, earnest, and
frank" discussions with Chou En-lai and other officials during
the previous week. The delegation was given a banquet on the
20th attended by Chou, Yeh Chien-ying, Foreign Minister Chi
Peng-fei, and PRC ambassador to Paris Huang Chen.
PRC COVERAGE OF The evolving Sino-U.S. relationship has been
FOF.EIGN COMMENT reflected in PRC media's selective coverage
of foreign comment on Vietnamese developments.
Thus, NCwA's account of the 24 June PRG statement on U.S. air
strikes deleted vitriolic references to President Nixon and an
attack on the Administration's 'deceitful" diplomatic efforts.
Similarly, NCNA omitted an attack on the U.S. "allegations about
peace and good will" contained in a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement of the 21st. Peking's cautious approach to the
Vietnamese communist offensive has also been reflected in accounts
of a North Korean pronouncement and a PRG-Mauritanian communique
that deleted references to "brilliant victories" won in the
offensive.
N"NA's account of the 24 June PRG statement deleted a passage
attacking the "perfidious maneuver" of the United States to
"weaken the united front" of world support for the Vietnamese--
a passage suggestive of delicate issues involving outside powers
and U.S. political moves. However, an NCNA report on a 22 June
Albanian editorial retained a passage accusing the "Moscow
social imperialists" of coping to the assistance of the United
States in Vietnam in an effort to strengthen the "holy Soviet-
U.S. alliance" and undermine the Indochinese struggle.
NCNA also carried harsh attacks on the -United States and the
Soviet Union in covering Prince Sihanouk's trip to Albania, but
this was in conformity with Peking's practice of putting its
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media at Sihanouk's disposal without editorir1l intervention.
Speaking at a banquet in Tirana on 23 June, ;.'ihanouk described
President Nixon as "more perfidious, more cruel, and more
obstinate" than his predecessor and denounced the "deceitful
peace maneuvers of the Machiavellian Richard Nixon." On the
same occasion the Albanian president excoriated the "modern
revisionists" as "sham friends" of the Indochinese people and
denounced Moscow's stand on the U.S. mining as well as its
failure to recognize Sihanouk's government as a policy of "anti-
imperialism in words but pro-imperialism in deeds."
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I
HANOI ISSUES INSTRUCTIONS FOR ARID FORCES PARTY COMMITTEES
On 20 June Hanoi radio and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN began
publicizing in installments a "document" issued by the VPA General
Political Department which amounts to a lengthy handbook of
instructions on the functioning of party committees in the army.
The five-part document spells out in meticulous detail 1) the
organization and position of army party committees; 2) rules on
the makeup and ta6ks of the committees, including the specific
responsibilities of standing committees, party secretaries,
committee members, and control committees; 3) principles of
the committees' leadership and relations with other elements;
4) work methods, including rules on the convening of meetings
and implementation of resolutions; and 5) basic guidelines for
building the committees' leadership.
The release of these instructions at this time may have been
prompted, at least in part., by the need to strengthen party
organization in order to deal with strains created by the new
military demands and personnel losses resulting from this
spring's offensive in South Vietnam. However, the detailed,
basic nature of the document suggests that it is aimed at the
long-range, ongoing tac'.: of guiding and strengthening the party
organization in the VPA. similarly, with this apparent purpose,
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN from 24 to 26 February had published a lengthy
set of instructions for party chapters in agencies (co quan)
which it said was an excerpt from a book on the subject "edited
by the VPA Department of Organization under the direction of
the General Political Department as a document of study and
guidance in building the party in various army agencies." The
March issue of the army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN journal carried an
article attributed to Le Tat Thang which discussed the same
problem.
The document currently being publicized was anticipated in
another article by Thang in the April issue of the army journal
which pointed out the importance of strong, well-run party
committees in combat. Thang maintained that party committees
play "a more important role in large-scale battles and in combat
with coordination of various armed services." The author may
have been alluding to the current offensive in a passage in
which he declared that "in view of the requirements of the present
combat task," the "strengthening of the leadership of party
committees becomes more important 'nd urgent."
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The importance of the role of the party committee in the army
was also noted in a 20 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, on
building the army and in an editorial in the army paper on the
25th which discussed the duties of political commissars. The
latter editorial argued that "the strengthening of the party's
leadership in every field and under all circumstances, especially
in the present violent struggle, is a decisive factor for
victory."
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KOREA
KOREAN W,^R ANNIVERSARY RECEIVES MUTED TREATMENT
The 22d anniversar:' of the outbreak of the Korean War (25 June)
and the attendant "solidarity month" have been marked in a
lower key by Pyongyang as well as by Pelting and Moscow than
has been customary in past years. Pyongyang's treatment of the
anniversary has been bland and more notable for its
omis:rions than for any new developments in issues discussed.
The downplaying of the anniversary, traditionally an occasion
for vituperative attacks on the alleged aggressive intent
of the United States and its South Korean "puppet," is
consistent with the DPRK's evolving line of moderation and
flexibility in dealing with the ROK and the United States.
This line was first manifested last summer and reflects
the changing relationships in Asia stemming from the Siro-
U.S. rapprochement.*
Pyongyang rarked the anniversary with the customary rally
in thn capital, a joint statement by public organizations,
and editorial comment. This year's rally, however, was
given somewhat less prominence than has been customary even
for nondecennial anniversaries.** The ranking official
present was KPA Chief of General Staff 0 Chin-u and the
address was made by the trade unions chief. Normally, the
nondecennial rallies have been attended by First Vice
Premier Kim I1, and last year's was addressed by Second
Vice Premier Pak Song-chol, a higher-level official than
usual. This year's rally was reportedly attended by some
20,000 people; last year's was said to have been attended
by 100,000 and previous nondecennial rallies reportedly
drew 200,000.
* The "preliminary" talks between the North and South Korean
Red Cross organizations, begun last August to discuss the
fate of families separated by the Korean War, arrived at an
agenda for the "fuV.i-dress" talks on 16 June after some
20 meetings and a number of "working-level" sessions. Since
the beginning of the year, Kim Il-song has elaborated on various
proposals for the reduction of North-South tensions in a series
of interviews with foreign newsmen, most recently in a
21 June interview with Selig Harrison of the Washington POST.
** The major 20th anniversary in 1970 was attended by Kim Il-song
and special foreign delegations and was addressed by Kim I1.
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Anniversary comment routinely attacked "U.S. imperialism" and
"Japanese militarism" in stock terms, but otherwise few
issues were raised. The unification issue was not developed
beyond expressions of support for the eight-point program for
peaceful unification adopted at the DPRK Supreme People's
Assembly in April 1970 and for Kim I1-song's 10 January
YOMIURI interview and hie 26 May interview with the New York
TIMES in which he elaborated proposals for a North-South
peace agreement and political contacts. Standard demands
for U.S. withdrawal from South Korea and the dissolution of
UNCURK were repeated, and the public organizations' joint
statement added that the U1:!tdd Nations should no longer be
"abused" by the United States as a tool for aggression and
"must annul all the previous illegal 'resolutions' on Korea."
The joint statement alluded to President Nixon's detente
diplomacy to the course of calling upon the United States to
withdraw its troops from the South. Recalling that in the
past the United States argued that it had to retain its
military bases in South Korea to prevent communist expansion,
the statement said that now that the Americans "are going to
have good relations with big socialist countries there will
be no ground for them to keep their military bases in South
Korea."
Pyongyang used the occasion to call upon the ROK rulers to
discard their "reliance upon outside forces" and to accept
the DPRK's "fair and aboveboard proposals" on unification
through North-South negotiations. The "appeal to the South
Korean peoples" adopted at the rally was notable for its
failure to F,ttack Pak Chong-hui or to call for the overthrow
of his "clique" as was standard in previous years. Although
Pak was si4bjected to scathing criticism in a low-level KCNA
commentary on his own speech on the anniversary, even this
commentary did not demand his ouster, merely calling upon
his "clique" to "atone for its crimes" and heed the DPRK's
proposals on peaceful negotiations.
The theme of Asian unity and the emphasis on Sino-Korean
solidarity, which dominated the proceedings last year, '7ere
all but absent this year. There was no particular effurt
to link Chinese and Korean security interests, and Asian
unity received only a passing reference in the rally speech.
The speaker called upon "all revolutionary peoples of the
world" to unite and deal joint blows against U.S. imperialism,
appealing for such unity "particularly" among the "revolutionary
peoples of Asia."
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PEKING The effect of Sino-U. S. developments in the part
year was also evident in Peking's muted treatmer-t
of the anniversary. Where last year the occasion was marked
by a Peking rally addressed by NPC Vice Chairman Kuo Mo-jo
as well as the customary PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, this year
the rally was omitted and the editorldl pulled its punches
against U.S. Asian policy. The 1971 editorial, depicting a
U.S. "policy of aggression and war in Asia," called the DPRK
"an impregnable fortress standing rock-firm at the anti-U.S.-
imperialist front in East Asia." This year's editorial more
blandly Described the DPRK as "a powerful socialist state
standing firm at the eastern outpost of the anti-imperialist
struggle." It did not repeat last year's references to the
Pueblo, the downing of U.S. planes, or alleged provocations
against North Korea. The editorial referred to the "blood-
sealed friendship and unity" of the Chinese and Koreans as
"a reliable guarantee" for defeating common enemies, but it
did not invoke the possibility of a new war with the
United States and did not repeat last year's characteriza-
tion of the two allies as being as close as "lips and teeth."
The editorial demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
South Korea and the peaceful unification of the country,
endorsing the eight-point program and the "major proposals"
advanced by Kim I1-song in his press interviews on a peace
agreement between North and South, political negotiations,
and the establishment of a confederation. It reiterated that
"U.S. troops under the signboard of the 'UN forces"' should
pull out from South Korea and that UNCURK be dissolved. The
editorial's passages on other subjects, such as Taiwan,
"Japanese militarism," and Vietnam are largely pro forma and
devoid of harsh attacks on the United States.
MOSCOW Moscow gave the anniversary minimal attention this
year, with routine press and radio comment and
brief reports of greetings messages from Soviet public organiza-
tions on the occasion of the "month of solidarity." The
customary Moscow rally was addressed by a Soviet friendship
society official and the DPRK Ambassador. In the usual
manner, Moscow comment stressed the peaceful unification issue,
expressing appr:val of the DPRK's proposals on contacts with
South Korea and calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops, and
emphasized the DPRK's peaceful economic development--with
Soviet assistance. A RED STAR article mentioned the Soviet-
DPRK treaty on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance
in the usual manner on this occasion, asserting that it
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aerves the cause of "peace and security in the Par East" but
avoiding a depiction of U.S. aggressiveness in this connection.
This year's treatment of the United States in general was
even milder than usual. An IZVESTIYA article merely noted
that the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea is "a source
of tension is the Korean peninsula." A RED W:t article
denounced the South Korean "puppet regime" for transforming
the country into "a military-strategic bridgehead for the
Pentagon," but it did not further attack he United States in
this context. Last year Moscow had pointed out that "one
of the biggest contingents of U.S. troops in Asia" was
stationed in South Korea, had elaborated on U.S. military
assistance to "eoul, and had charged that the United States
was trying to involve Japan in aggressive plans. A PRAVDA
article had gone so far as to link U.S. modernization of ROK
forces and the moving of "fresh U.S. troops into the South"
with a planned "march on the North" to "do away with" the
DPRK.
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U.S. -SOV I ET RELATIONS
MOSCOW AGAIN DEFENDS SUMMIT. AFFIRMS IDEOLOGICAL PURL TV
Moscow has sustained its effort to Justify the results of the
summit to domestic and foreign communist audiences. Authoritative
comment extolling the summit, more measured and less euphoric than
earlier assessments, is balanced by more pointed affirmations of
the continuation of the class struggle in the international arena
and the undiminished need for Soviet ideological vigilance and
military preparedness. Concurrently, Soviet media are devoting
increasing attention to the evolving arms debate in the United
States, with particular reference to Secretary Laird's requests
for new strategic weapons.
In keeping with this more militant stance, Brezhnev, in his
27 June speech at a dinner honoring Fidel Castro, applauded the
"successes" achieved at the summit but cautioned that they "in
no way signify a possibility of weakening the ideological
struggle." He even allowed for an "intensification" of the
latter and the possibility of its becoming "an increasingly
acute" form of struggle in the future. As if to affirm his
ideological credentials before his Soviet and Cuban audience,
Brezhnev declared: "Marxist-Leninists have no illusions about
the antipopular essence of imperialism and its aggressive
intentions."*
An article by USA Institute Director Arbatov in IZVESTIYA on
21 June, largely devoted to hailing the strategic arms limitation
agreements, expressed concern over the possibility that "right
extremist circles" in the United States might try to "emasculate"
the new arms accords by attempting to "compensate" for their
restrictions by calling for a new arms race in areas not covered
in the agreements. While TASS had ignored Secretary Laird's
testimony before the congressional appropriations committees
on 5 and 6 June, a prompt TASS report on his appearance before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 21st asserted that
his emphasis on "poe tions of strength" contradicted the Basic
Principles document signed by Brezhnev and the President in
Moscow. And an article on SALT in PRAVDA on the 22d, signed by
* The formula disclaiming "illusions" about "imperialism" has
been used by other members of the leadership--for example, by
Andropov at a Murmansk awards ceremony last December and by
Suslov in a 20 June Moscow speech to propagandists.
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0. Grinev and V. Pavlov, conveyed assurances that the USSR
"has taken and will take all necessary measures to safeguard
its own security and that of its allies." While summaries
of the Arbatov article were broadcast mainly to audiences
outside the Soviet bloc, including North America, the Grinev-
Pavlov article was publicized chiefly in broadcasts to
Moscow's East European allies. Both articles were summarized
in Mandarin, and neither was carried in Radio Moscow's
domestic service.
ARBAfOV IN Entitled "The Power of a Realistic Policy," the
IZVESTIYA Arbatov article, while playing the stock theme
that the United States was forced to alter its
"cold war" policy under the pressure of "new realities,"
credited the United States with having taken "a positive
and realistic stand on many of the questions discussed" at
the summit. After hailing the SALT agreements, along familiar
lines, Arbatov notably took to task those unnamed "skeptics"
who say that the new accords do not yet signify disarmament.
In rebuttal he emphasized that not long ago such negotiations
"concerning the very essence of national security" would have
seemed "inconceivable." Granting that the new accor.:s are
only a first step, he added they s& a "an extremely important
first step." What the summit amounted to, he insisted, "is a
considerable achievement in limiting arms, normalizing Soviet-
U.S. relations, and strengthening peace and international
security."
At the same time, Arbatov's positive appraisal was tempered
by reminders that the class struggla would continue and that
current world tensions could adversely affect U.S.-Soviet
relations. In a passage apparently designed mainly for
domestic consumption, Arbatov said that the USSR and the
United States "are going to -be involved in a principled
ideological struggle" and warned the Soviet people to beware
of "subversive propaganda, ideological subversion, and
psychological warfare"--"forme not compatible with peaceful
coexistence, which the United Statec has used as part of its
armory for a long time now."
Shifting to a broader perspective, Arbatov commented ou t'ie
different forms in which the class struggle could evolve, "Will
it be the form of armed clashes,, the arms race, acute and
dangerous political crisis? Or will it be in the form of
peaceful coexistence in which ideological differences between
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the two systems and their rivalry in various spheres are
combined with joint efforts in the sphere of peace and
security?" This difference in form, he emphasized, "can
mean the difference between war and peace."
In passages outlining how the "positive changes" in Soviet-
U.S. relations could be altered by events, Arbatov registered
concern about conflicting pressures in the United States that
could "emasculate" the essence of the SALT agreements. Noting
that "right extremist groupings" have launched a campaign
against the SALT agreements, he said that although they have
failed to prevent the new accords, the debate over the U.S.
military budget "demonstrates the path which could be explored--
the path of 'compensating' for the restrictions imposed by the
treaties by urging on the arms race in other spheres without
actually expressing direct opposition to the treaties and
agreements." (On 25 June, a participant in Radio Moscow's
weekly commentators' roundtable program pointed out that the
debate on strategic arms is developing "essentially over
whether ratification of the agreements should be accompanied
by the adoption of new armament programs in certain fields.")
Pointing to other issues that could affect U.S.-Soviet relations,
Arbatov cited continuing tensions in the Middle East and
Southeast Asia. He declared in summation: "In brief, the
struggle to improve the international situation, including to
normalize Soviet-U.S. relations, is by no means at an end;
it will continue, demanding a great deal of effort, persistence,
and vigilance."
GRINEV, PAVLOV The Grinev-Pavlov article is the second since
IN PRAVDA the summit to appear under an apparent
pseudonym.* While Pavlov's identity is
not known, "0. Grinev" was identified in 1966 as the apparent
pen-name of Foreign Ministry disarmament expert Grinevskiy.
Among other articles signed by Grinev in 1966 was one in
IZVESTIYA in August of that year commemorating the third
anniversary of the signing of the nuclear test-ban treaty.
Clearly designed to reassure the Soviet defense establishment
as well the USSR's communist allies that the strategic arms
limitation accords will not compromise Soviet military strength,
* See the TRENDS of 21 June 1972, pages 19-20, for a discussion
of the 15 June PRAVDA article by "Yu. Chernov."
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the Grinev-Pavlov article developed a lengthy defense of the
agreements along the lines of the 29 May PRAVDA editorial that
offered Moscow's first authoritative appraisal of the summit
results: "The SALT agreements will undoubtedly go down in
history as a major achievement along the path to curbing the
arms race and reducing the threat of nuclear war, and as an
important measure facilitating progress toward general and
complete disarmament." The commentators went on to discuss
the ABM treaty and the interim agreement in standard fashion,
still suppressing the details of the protocol which outlined
the allotment of ballistic missiles for each side. The article
was notable, however, for a more pointed reassurance that the
Soviet Union will continue to take unspecified measures to
insure its security:
Of course, the limitation of strategic weapons does not
yet eliminate the danger of nuclear war, although it does
move in this direction. Until such time as this danger
is liquidated, the Soviet Union has taken and will take
all necessary measures to safeguard its own security and
that of its allies. This circumstance is taken into
consideration by the Moscow agreements. They in no way
weaken the defense capability of the Soviet Union and
its allies.
TASS ON U.S. In the same issue of PkAVDA that carried the
STATEMENTS Grinev-Pavlov article, a Washington-datelined
TASS dispatch cited Secretary Laird's ~:& timony
on 21 June before the Senate Armed Services Committee in which
Laird linked his support for the new accords with congressional
approval of funding for new weapons systems. Quoting the
Secretary as stating that the United States should negotiate
with the Soviet Union "from a position of strength," the
dispatch added: "This contradicts the Basic Principles of
relations between the USSR and the United States that was
signed in Moscow--a document that proceeds from a recognition
of the security interests of the sides based on the principle
of equality and renunciation of the use of force or the
threat to use it."
TASS' account of President Nixon's 23 June press conference
was markedly more cautious. It played up the President's call
for congressional approval of the SALT accords but obscured his
remarks on the need for a continuing offensive nuclear weapons
program. TASS said the President "strongly urged" Congress
to approve the accords "on their merits." Noting that
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reporters drew the President's attention to Secretary Laird's
linkage of the SALT accords to the financing of new strategic
arms, the Soviet news agency cited the President's comment to
the effect that they are "different matters." It added:
"but referring to the fact that the programs were recommended
by the government prior to the signing of the arms limitation
agreements, the President went on record for solving the
question of their financing after the congress completes
discussing the ARM treaty and the interim agreement." 'rASS
did not mention the President's statement that Secretary
Laird's position is "a sound one," or his remark that
"without a continuing offensive program, we can be sure that
the security interests of the United States would be
jeopardized and the chances for a permanent offensive
agreement will be totally destroyed."
Soviet media likewise obscured Secretary Rogers' support
foe funding of new strategic weapons. A PRAVDA account of
his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on the 19th merely noted his support for the Moscow
agreements and his request for early ratification. The
report ignored the Secretary's assertions that the new
arms programs would strengthen U.S. security and provide
"bargaining chips" for the next round of arms talks.
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28 JUNE 1972
DIMITROV ANNIVERSARY
INTERNATIONAL MEETING IN SOFIA STRESSES SOVIET LEADING ROLE
The 90th anniversary of the birth of Georgi Dimitrov on 18 June
was used by the USSR and its hardcore East European allies to
hold up the Bulgarian communist and Comintern leader as the
prototype of a leader correctly blending national patriotism
and socialist internationalism with awareness of the CPSU's
key role in the world communist movement. The event was played
up in a sizeable three percent of Radio Moscow's commentary
output in the week ending on the 18th. The occasion was
observed at commemorative meetings in Moscow, Prague., and
Leipzig, addressed by Pelehe, Bilak, and Verner, respectively,
and at a 13-17 June international conference in Sofia attended
by 48 ruling and nonruling communist party delegates--including
CPSU Secretary Ponomarev--and representatives of some 66 -1ther
parties and organizations.
The Sofia conference heard a letter of greeting to the Bulgarian
party Central Committee from Tito, who had just returned from
the USSR and was preparing to leave for Warsaw. Conference
speakers from the Yugoslav League of Communists and from such
other independently oriented parties as the Romanian and Italian
CP's focused selectively on such aspects as Dimitrov's "creative"
approach and his promotion of the united front strategy of class
struggle.
The Chinese took minimal notice of the Dimitrov anniversary and
ignored the Sofia ceremonies, which afforded a platform for
direct and indirect attacks on the Peking leadership by Soviet
bloc speakers. NCNA reported on 17 June that an exhibition of
books and photographs marking the anniversary was opened in
Peking that day under the sponsorship of Chinese friendship
societies. The day before, NCNA reported that the Bulgarian
ambassador had given a film show on the 16th to mark the
occasion, with a vice foreign minister leading the Chinese
officials in attendance. Reflecting Peking's sensitivity
regarding the Comintern as symbolizing Moscow's hegemony in
the international communist movement, NCNA referred to "the
Bulgarian people's leader Georgi Dimitrov" and made no mention
of his Comintern association.
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28 JUNE 1972
PONOMAREV'S SPE(fCH In his speech to the Sofia conclave
as reported in the Bulgarian party daily
RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 14 Jura, Ponomarev characterized Dimitrov
as "a great internationalist and great patriot, profoundly aware
of the tremendous significance of the correct combination of
international and national aspects" in the activity of both
ruling and nonruling communist parties. Underscoring Dimitrov's
devotion to the unity of the international working class and
the united front strategy, Ponomarev noted the late leader's
striving for "the alinement and rallying of all progressive
revolutionary forces: the international workers class, the
Soviet Union, the people's democracies, the peoples of
colonial and independent countries, and the antifascist
democratic movements throughout the world." He observed that
Moscow's strategy of a unified anti-imperialist struggle,
spelled out at the 1969 Moscow international party conference
and at the 24th CPSU Congress, had borne fruit in, among other
things, President Nixon's visit to the USSR.
Ponomarev repeatedly held up Dimitrov's irreconcilability toward
ideological "deviations" as a model for communist parties today
in opposing "all kinds of rightist and 'leftist' opportunism
and revisionism and all manifestations of nationalism and
national restrictiveness." He denounced the Chinesa by name
in a historical context: Recalling that Dimitrov and the
Comintern had contributed to the creation of "a united national
anti-Japanese front in China" in the 1930's, Ponomarev added
that "even at that time he declared himself against the
erroneous trends which, as became clear later on, expressed
the nationalistic positions of Mao Tse-tung's group."
VELCHEV The keynote address by Bulgarian
Politburo member and Secretary Velchev,
which preceded Ponomarev's relatively moderate speech on the
13th, prefaced a strong denunciation of the Chinese with the
assertion that "anti-Sovietism is the poisonous bait with
which imperialist propaganda strives to tempt some circles of
the communist, socialist, trade union, and national liberation
movements." Such anti-Sovietism, Velchev said, "is particularly
obviously manifested by the policy of the present Chinese
leadership, which has taken the road of dissidence, setting
the CCP in opposition to the CPSU" and the world communist
movement and the PRC at odds with the socialist community.
He added that this line is "used by international imperialism
to weaken the positions of socialism and peace."
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Scoring nationalism, Velchev stressed that the Bulgarian party
and state "sacredly observe Dimitrov's behest: always and in
everything to combine patriotism with internationalism."
Avowals of loyalty to the CPSU and the Soviet Union pervaded
the speech. "Dimttrov's stipulations on the Soviet Union as
the mainstay 3f the working people all over the world,"
Velchev declared, "have acquired renewed strength today."
He also underscored the present-day validity of "Dimitrov's
conclusion on the attitude toward the USSR and the CPSU as
the 'touchstone' for proletarian internationalism,"
OTHER EAST EUROPE Speakers representing the parties of
PARTY SPOKESMEN Moscow's other orthodox East European
allies generally emulated Ponomarev's
moderate tone and refrained from combining their protestations
of loyalty to the USSR with direct attacks on Peking. Dimitrov's
correct combining of patriotism and internationalism was
stressed by Czechoslovakia's Svestka and Poland's Lukaszewicz,
though not in so many words by Hungary's Nemes. The latter,
however, quoted Dimitrov to the effect that "any deviation"
from the principle of alliance with the Soviet Union "is
intolerable and harmful." Similarly, the GDR's Norden declared
that fulfillment of Dimitrov's legacy demands "irreconcilably
struggling against bourgeois ideology, anticommunism, and anti-
Sovietism in all its forms."
ROMANIA'S RAUTU Romanian Communist Party Executive
Committee member Rautu avoided any mention
of the Soviet Union, judging by the lengthy report of his
conference speech in RABOTNICHESKO DELO on the 15th. Focusing
instead on Dimitrov's contribution to good relations between
Bulgaria and Romania, he called relations between Sofia and
Bucharest "a valuable model of permanent comradely and
fraternal relations between two socialist countries." In
this context, Rautu reiterated the standard Bucharest line
on observar.ce of "fully equal rights, sovereignty, and the
principle of comradely mutual assistance" in :socialist inter-
state relations. He explicitly recalled Dimi.trov's call
for a united front at the Seventh Comintern Congress of
1935, but stuck to generalities in the present-day context.
Thus he observe? that the communist parties "have a reliable
guiding star in Marxism-Leninism" and--alluding to the May
1972 Moscow summit--noted that "the recent developments are
evidence of growing positive processes and realistic trends
in international life toward detente."
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CONFIDENTIAL PHIS TRENDS
28 JUNE 1972
TITO'S LETTER The letter from Tito to the Bulgarian Ceatral
Committee on the occasion of the Dimitrov
conference, like the conference speeches of the Yugoslav and
Romanian delegates, did not mention the USSR. As carried by
TANJUG on the 14th, the letter dwelt on Dimitrov's promotion
of friendship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Tito praised
Dimitrov's "breadth of political understanding of the complex
international trends and concrete conditions in different
countries." He also recalled the late leader's "affirmation
of people's national identity and self-determination," as
well as his opposition to "all forms of nationalism and
chauvinism.
Tito recalled "with great pleasure" his meeting with Dimitrov
at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935 and "the last meetings
in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in 1947"--the year before iselgrade's
break with the Cominform. In 1'49, the year of Dimitrov's death
in Moscow, Bulgarian Politburo member Kostov was purged and
executed for, among other sins, "Titoism." He was posthumously
rehabilitated at the Bulgarian plenum of April 1956, and the
Sofia dailies of 17 June 1972 carried commemorative articles
on his 75th birth anniversary.
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P0 LAI4D- VU G Os LAV IA
CORDIAL COM4JN I (JE CAF TIM ' S FIVE-DAY VISIT TO WARSAW
The communique issued at the end of President Tito's 3.9-23 June
visit to Poland registers anmewhat closer agreement in the
talks between the Yugoslav leader and Gierek than had emerged
from Tito's talks with Brezhnev in Moscow earlier this month.
While both communiques described the atmosphere of the
respective talks as one of "friendship, cordiality, and ft?.nk-
ness," the Warsaw document added "full mutual understanding '1
trust" where the 10 June Moscow communique added only "mutual
respect and equality." And where the Moscow document failed to
record any overall meeting of minds, the Warsaw communique said
the two sides "noted with satisfaction the identity or similarity
of their views" on topical international questions,and on
relations between the communist parties and "progressive and
liberation movements." The Warsaw communique also reported the
signing of a bilateral supplementary trade agreement for 1971-75,
while the document on Tito's Moscow visit merely referred to
previously agreed measures for long-term economic cooperation.
Tito's visit to Warsaw broke new ground in bilateral relations.
The last Polish-Yugoslav summit meeting had taken place when
Tito visited Warsaw in 1964, while Tito's recent Moscow talks
amounted to a followup of Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade last
September.
The latest Warsaw communique, like the 10 Jr-e communique on
Tito's talks n Moscow, recorded an "exchang, of views" and
"mutual informing" by the two leaders from still disparate
ideological vantage points. Thus in asserting that ;ielgrade-
Warsaw relations "are becoming more and more comprehensive,
stable, and long-term," it noted that the two leaders do not
consider "the differences in the ways of building socialism in
the two countries" to be an obstacle to successful development
of -elations. Accompanying comment in Warsaw media was franker
than Moscow's had been on the basic difference between Poland
as a Warsaw Pact member and Yugoslavia as a nonalined country.
Like the Moscow communique, the Warsaw communique recorded both
sides' renunciation of "the use or threat of force" in solving
international disputes. It also noted the "significance" of
President Nixon's visits to Moscow and Warsaw and of Tito's
visit to the USSR.
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FOLLOWUP CONNIENT Warmer interstate relations with residual
differences on the party level were
reflected in comment in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU and in a
more enthusiastic appraisal on the visit in the government daily
ZYCIE WARSZAWY. The party paper observed on the 25th that the
results of the talks "should be assessed as a positive contribu-
tion of our two countries to the cause of security, peace, and
socialist progress." It focused heavily on the improvement of
economic relations between the two states, highlighting the
supplemental trade agreement signed during Tito's visit. ZYCIE
WARSZAWY commented more effusively on the same day that "never
before have the two countries been so close to one another as
at present, and never did cooperation between our governments,
our parties, and our nations have such optimistic prospects for
development." It added that "the final communique leaves no
doubts that convergence or identity of views encompasses today
more domains than ever before." Predicting that bilateral
cooperation "will now become still more dynamic," the government
paper observed that "for us, it is very important that-the circle
of our friends and allies in our common struggle is gettirg
stronger and wider."
Comment in Yugoslav media has been more restrained. A Belgrade
domestic service commentator remarked on the 24th that "no
exceptional efforts" in Warsaw were required "to find a common
language on all problems of common interest and to leave aside
the differences which exist and are natural." Noting that "some
circles, West as well as East," are speculating "whether
Yugoslavia is crossing over to the East," the commentator
emphasized that "nonalined socialist Yugoslavia goes along its
well-known internal and international paths."
The Belgrade radio's program in Russian to the USSR on the 23d,
in positively appraising the Tito-Gierek talks, noted at ..ac
same time that "there were some subtle differences in their
views." The broadcast snidely remarked that "it is obviously
not as clear to Poland as it is to Yugoslavia that the situation
in the Mediterranean region has an effect on the state of
relations in Europe," based on the Yugoslav view of the
"indivisibility of peace."
MOSCOW COVERAGE TASS on the 23d carried a terse account of
the Tito-Gierek communique, touching on its
main points and citing its praise for President Nixon's Moscow
and Warsaw visits while omitting all the passages indicating the
degree of agreement reached in the Polish-Yugoslav talks.
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IZVESTIYA on the 25th carried a TASS correspondent's dispatch
from Belgr'de on Yugoslavia's relations with CEMA--a subject
absent from both the Moscow and Warsaw communiques. Entitled
"TANJUG on Yugoslavia's Cooperation with the CEMA countries,"
the dispatch quoted the Yugoslav news agency on Belgrade's
"interest" in intensifying its relations with the Soviet bloc
economic organization "in accordance with its national nd
economic interests, sociopolitical system, and nonalinement
policy." The dispatch was evidently occasioned by Belgrade's
announcement on 19 June that Yugoslavia would send Premier
Bijedic--its highest ranking delegate to a CEMA parley to
date--to the 26th CEMA Council session slated to open in
Moscow on 29 June.
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MIDDLE EAST
BREZFNEV ASKS ISRAELI WITFORAWAL; USSkk bCURES RAIDS ON LEBANON
Brezhnev touched on the "couplex end dangerous" Middle East
situation in a scant three sentences in his 27 June speech at
the dinner for Fidel Castro. The problem, he said, "can and
must be" dealt with on the basis of Arab demands for withdrawal
of the "aggressor's troops"--he did not specify withdrawal frog.
"all" occupied territory--and fulfillment of Security Council
Resolution 242. Brezhnev made ao mention of the Jarring mission,
supported in the Soviet-American communique on the Moscow summit.
Nor did he offer the customary assurance of Moscow's "invariable
assistance and support" to the Arabs, as he had done in his
5 June dinner speech during Tito's visit. .He routinely accused
Israel of persisting in its "policy of conquest" but did not
refer to the Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon beginning on
the 21st.
Soviet propaganda has denounced Israel's military operations,
charging Tel Aviv with trying to sow discord between the Lebanese
and the Palestinian fedayeen and with seeking to thwart any
efforts leading toward a peaceful solution. Noting reports of
future U.S. military deliveries to Israel, Moscow claimed that
Israel marks new arms deliveries by "increasing its anti-Arab
action." Speaking in the Security Council debate, Soviet
representative Malik, according to TASS on the 24th, complained
of Israel's new "acts of aggression at a time when in '?'ie
international situation as a whole, positive phenomena" conducive
to relaxation of international tensions have begun to appear.
Malik added that this atmosphere might contribute to resumption
of the Jarring mission aimed at a peaceful political settlement
of the Middle East dispute. Explaining the Soviet vote on the
Security Council resolution adopted on the 26th, Malik said the
USSR would have liked a "tougher" resolution but voted for the
draft "despite its shortcomings" in view of the urgency of the
question.
PEKING'S POSITION NCNA on 28 June reported PRC representative
Huang Hua's explanation in the Security
Council of Chinese reservations regarding "unsatisfactory"
phrases in the resolution adopted on the 26th, as well an his
assertion that Israel's "premeditated act of aggression" should
"logically" be condemned whereas "it is perfectly just" for the
Palestinian and other Arab peoples to take up arms to resist
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aggression and defend their national rights. Noting that the
resolution was adopted with two abstentions, by the United
States and Panama, NCNA observed that U.S. delegate Bush had
tabled a draft resolution which was "seemingly fair" but in fact
favored Israel. TABS described the U.S. draft as reflecting a
fish, "if not to exonerate Israel," at least to equate the
aggressor with its victims.
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28 JUNE 1972
CUBA-PERU
CUBA WELCOMES PERUVIAN MOVE TO RESTORE RELATIONS
An official statement declaring that the Cuban Government is
"most gratified and receptive to the noble and worthy initiative
of the Peruvian Government and its president, General Velasco
Alvarado," keynoted Havana's prompt and enthusiastic welcome of
President Velasco's 20 June announcement that Peru "will soon
initiate direct negotiations with the Cuban Government leading
to the prompt reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the
two countries." The Peruvian initiative came in the wake of the
adverse vote on 8 June in the Organization of American States (OAS)
on Peru's proposal to repeal the 1964 anti-Cuban OAS resolution
and allow each member nation to establish the kind of relationship
it desires with Cuba. Both Cuba and Peru have interpreted the
U.S. failure to obtain a two-thirds vote against the Peruvian
resolution as an indication that the 1964 resolution--which
required a two-thirds vote for adoption--no longer has sufficient
support within the OAS to be sustained.
GOVERNMENT STATEMENT Following initial publicity for Velasco's
20 June announcement, frontpaged in the
party organ GRANMA and further publicized in reports of Latin
American reaction, Havana radio on the 23d broadcast the text
of the government statement praising the Peruvian decision and
emphasizing that Cuban receptivity to the resumption of diplomatic
relations with Peru was fully in keeping with the stated Cuban
position on "normalization" of relations with individual hemisphere
governments. Castro has repeatedly declared that the nature of
Cuba's relationships with other Latin American governments is a
function of their demonstration of independence from the United
States. Accordingly, the Cuban Government statement expressed
Cuba's "deservedly high esteem" of the Peruvian initiative,
"particularly inasmuch as it is in keeping with that country's
sovereignty and thus constitutes a conduct of total national
independence, removed from any foreign pressure." The statement
went on to recall Peruvian actions aimed at asserting control
over the country's natural resources and at achieving economic
independence; it singled out for special praise Velasco's
contention that "the struggle for sovereignty is equivalent to
the struggle against foreign economic domination."
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While noting that Cuba's support for measures designed to enhance
Peru's national independence 'has not been conditioned by the
existence of formal diplomatic relations," the Cuban statement
asserted that "the development of fraternal relations of
solidarity" among the Latin American people and nations never-
theless "can take place more closely and fully within the
framework of official diplomatic relations." It declared that
"we shall respect Peru's position as Peru has respected ours"
and that "the Cuban people extend their hand to shake Peru's
extended fraternal hand."
In a restatement of Cuban policy that can be construed as an
invita..ion to other "revolutionary" and "independent" Latin
American governments to follow Peru's lead, the statement
affirmed that Cuba will "be consistent with our policy of
absolute respect for those Latin American governments that
have maintained toward Cuba a position of mutual respect for
the development of the Cuban revolution without complicity with
the policy of imperialism." GRANMA on 12 June, in an editorial
on the OAS vote on the Peruvian resolution, had recalled the
Cuban Government's "clearcut policy" of readiness "to establish
relations with those governments which are independent and
ready to express and demonstrate their conduct in accordance
with authentic expressions of national sovereignty and independence."
For 'dell over a year, Cuban spokesmen have pictured the Peruvian
Government as one in which positive revolutionary processes were
occurring. In his 10th Bay of Pigs anniversary speech on 19 April
1971, Castro cited specific nationalistic actions of the Peruvian
Government and declared that "a real change in that country's
structures" was taking place; although "one cannot speak about a
Marxist-Leninist revolution in Peru," he said, "from the viewpoint
of revolutionary theory one can speak objectively about a
revolutionary process in Peru." He characterized the Peruvian
process in virtually identical terms in his 26 July 1971 speech
marking the 18th anniversary of the assault on the Moncada barracks,
adding that "the Peruvian revolutionary movement is in full swing."
And at a press conference on 4 December during his brief stopover
in Lima on his return trip from Chile, Castro asserted--as reported
by Lima's EXPRESO--that "we esteem our relations with Peru, because
we realize that it has a truly sovereign, independent government."
On the question of formal relations, he said "we shall await the
time when the Peruvian Government deems it feasible and useful to
the interests of the nation to establish relations with Cuba."
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28 JUNE 1972
OAS VOTE Reacting to the 8 June OAS vote on the Peruvian
resolution to allow member states to reestablish
relations with Cuba at the level they desire, Havana's reportage
and comment combined continued denunciations of the "U.S.-
controlled" OAS and further disclaimers of Cuban interest in
rejoining the organization with applause for the "independence"
shown by the seven nations which voted for the resolution.
Cuban media interpreted the 7-13-3 vote as a victory for the
pro-Cuban forces, constituting in affect a renunciation of the
1964 resolution applying sanctions to Cuba. Thus a 12 June
GRANMA editorial noted that "from a judicial point of view . . .
it is proper to point out that the stability of the two-thirds
of the votes--essentially required in order to ratify the
sanctions adopted against Cuba in 1964--has ceased to exist
in the OAS, because 23 governments now constitute its membership."
While denouncing the OAS, the editorial declared that the Cuban
Government "nevertheless respects the initiative of the Peruvian
Government because it finds this to be an act of good faith,
taken independently"; it added that "the same thing can be said"
of the other governments voting for the Peruvian proposal.
The same interpretation of the OAS vote was suggested in PRENSA
LATINA's reports of reaction to the ballotting. Quoting the
Communist Party of Argentina's organ NUESTRA PALABRA, PRENSA
LATINA on the 13th reported that the vote "did not result in
the ratification of the diplomatic and commercial isolation
of Cuba ordered by the inter-American organization in 1964
under U.S. pressure." And a PRENSA LATINA disratch from
Caracas on the same day cited the Venezuelan Communist Party
organ TRIBUNA POPULAR for the conclusion that as a result of
the vote "any country that wishes to maintain full ties with
the socialist island may do so," since "currently the OAS does
not have a two-thirds majority--16 votes--to sustain the
diplomatic boycott applied against Cuba in 1964."
In a similar vein, domestic service commentator Guido Garcia
Inclan declared on the 13th that the United States "did not
realize that as a result of that vote, the most honorable
nations would be free to do as they please with their
independence." He added: "All this means that our sister
nations will begin to reestablish relations with Cuba . .
of their own free will."
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-38-
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
GOSPLAN OFFICIAL URGES REORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL ORGANS
In the June issue of PLANNED ECONOMY, Gosplan first deputy chair-
man for agriculture T.Z. Sokolov criticizes the agriculture
ministry as incapable of leading farms and proposes a reorganiza-
tion based on specialized associations, a national system of
sovkhozes, and kolkhoz councils equipped with administrative
powers. Though somewhat vague, Sokolov's proposals are the most
explicit indication of current official thinking on agriculture,
and they are notably in accord with PRAVDA's 5 June editorial
praise of sovkhoz ministries, kolkhoz councils, and specialized
trusts and associations.
Sokolov's proposals are in many respects reminiscent of Khrushchev's
controversial initiatives. They appear to threaten the powers of
the agriculture ministry which were reduced by Khrushchev and
partially restored after his fall. Although Sokolov points out
that the agriculture ministry is currently incapable of effective
leadership, his solution is not to strengthen the ministry but to
further reduce its power by transferring all sovkhozes to a national
system of sovkhozes. He also favors granting kolkhoz councils
some of the executive powers currently exercized by the agriculture
ministry and once envisaged for the abortive kolkhoz unions
advocti~.ed by Khrushchev and his proteges.
Sokolov was appointed first deputy chairman of Gosplan in the
spring of 1970 when Brezhnev was pressing for increased allocations
to agriculture. He entered his new job with a notable warning
against attempts to divert money from agriculture (PLANNED ECONOMY,
September 1970). Since his appointment, as his current article
indicates, Gosplan has altered its planning procedures to improve
rural construction and give preference to manufanture of agricul-
tural equipment and fertilizer.
CENSURE OF MINISTRY Sokolov states that "it is quite difficult
for the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and
its local organs in their present form to concretely lead the
complicated, multibranch kolkhoz-sovkhoz production and the huge
network of various kinds of organizations, establishments and
enterprises." While calling the rayon agriculture administration
the "main link in agricultural leadership," Sokolov criticizes its
handling of the planning and organization of production, use of
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new equipment, material-technical supply, and financing. And
he goes on to assert that the oblas. agriculture administration
as well "does not have the necessary rights and opportunities
for proper leadership of production activities of sovkhozes and
kolkhozes."
As one remedy Sokolov proposes the establishment of a national
system of sovkhozes. Noting that sovkhozes are administered by
republic sovkhoz ministries in five republics, Sokolov writes
that "apparently, one should attentively study their experience
in order to more correctly decide the question of administering
sovkhoz production from bottom to top." Sokolov's proposal
reinforces earlier indications of effo-ts to weaken the agricul-
ture ministry through the creation of union-republic ministries
of sovkhozes. In August 1970 an Azerbaydzhan Ministry of
Sovkhozes was established, and Azerbaydzhan First Secretary
G.A. Aliyev said that it would be "subordinated to the Azerbaydzhan
Council of Ministers and USSR Ministry of Agriculture" (BAKINSKIY
RABOCHIY, 13 August 1970). However, on 23 December 1970 the
ministry was changed to a union-republic ministry (BAKINSKIY
RABOCHIY, 25 December 1970), suggesting that .t would eventually
be subordinated to a similar USSR ministry rather than to the
USSR Ministry of Agriculture. Similar union-republic sovkhoz
ministries were subsequently established in Georgia in December
1970, Uzbekistan in January 1971, and the RSFSR in February 1972.
A 17 February 1972 Moscow radio broadcast revealed that the 9,700
sovkhozes in the RSFSR, then mostly under the jurisdiction of the
agriculture ministry and its local organs, would be transferred
to the new sovkhoz ministry.
KOLKHOZ COUNCILS As another remedy Sokolov favors empowering
the kolkhoz councils formed in 1969 with
administrative powers similar to those envisaged by advocates of
the abortive kolkhoz unions. He notes that the kolkhoz councils
now have only a "consultative character and do not possess the
rights of administration" and observes that "competent kolkhoz
organs could more efficiently plan production, dispose of material-
technical and financial resources, ensure observance of the
Kolkhoz Charter, and decide all questions of organization of
production." Although Sokolov has never publicly endorsed
kolkhoz unions, he was a member of the USSR Council on Kolkhoz
Affairs, which administered kolkhozes independently of the
agriculture ministry from 1946 until Stalin's death.
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USSR Minister of Agriculture V.V. Matekevich "as o-ienly opposed
the creation of kolkhoz unions with administrative powers--a
move that would weaken the power, of his ministry. His opposition
prevailed during the debates of the 1950's and 1960'a, and when a
system of kolkhoz councils was eventually established in 1969, it
was stipulated that the new organs would have no administrative
or even coordinating powers. Moreover, Matekevich was made
chairman of the All-Union Council of Kolkhozes and the councils
were placed under the control of the agriculture ministry and
its local organs.
Since the formation of the kolkhoz councils, grass-roots complaints
about their limited powers have appeared from time to time--by
I. Vinnichenko in LITERARY RUSSIA, 10 July and 18 September 1970;
M. Kovalenko in KOMMUNIST, March 1971; kolk!:oz chairmen in
IZVESTIYA, 23 January 1971; aid Yu. I. Krasnopoyas in the ECONOMIC
SERIES OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, No. 1, 1971. On the other
hand, the councils have been criticized by officials in the agri-
culture ministry for "issuing orders to kolkhozes"--by V. Filimonov
in AGRICULTURE OF RUSSIA, March 1971, and L. Zaytsev and A. Ivanov
in ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, June 1971. The agriculture ministry
tightened its control over the council in March 1971 by the
adoption of a new statute even more specifically defining the
consultative functions of the councils (ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE,
June 1971).
SPECIALIZED Sokolov has high praise for "specialized adminis-
ASSOCIATIONS tration of agricultural enterprises" and in this
connection cites the work of the USSR Main
Administration for the Poultry Industry (Ptitseprom), the RSFSR
Main Administration for Meat Sovkhozes and Livestock Production
(Skotoprom), and intersovkhoz and interkolkhoz production associa-
tions. He states that the experience of such associations should
be studied with an eye toward "a transition in the future to
administration through specialized organs operating on principles
of cost accounting." The 5 June PRAVDA editorial on "New Forms
of Agricultural Administration" also praised sovkhoz ministries,
kolkhoz councils, and specialized trusts and singled out Ptitseprom
in particular. The status of the latter may have been enhanced by
the recent appointment of RSFSR deputy agriculture minister
I.A. Bakhtin to head it (identified in the 16 June PRAVDA).
This proposal, like the others, represents a revival of a
Khrushchev initiative. Khrushchev's last proposed reform
involved the reorganization of agriculture into specialized
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nationill administrations. Despite objections that this would
split agriculture up into narrow incoordinated branches,
Khrushchev publicly stated that his proposal would be discussed
at a plenum in November 1964 (PRAVDA, 10 August 1964). Ptitseprom,
which now is winning high praise, is the only specialized associa-
tion Khrushchev managed to create before his overthrow. Skotoprom
is the creation of former RSFSR Premier Voronov, who established
it in late 1969 to administer his meat cattle program.
PRAVDA ARTICLE JUSTIFIES UNEQUAL INVESTMENTS IN REPUBLICS
An unusually defensive article on nationality policy in PRAVDA on 22
June arg:ces that union republics must not insist on obtaining
equal shape;: of investment funds and must allow Moscow to develop
some areas Aister than others, thus implying that there have been
complaints of this matter. The author of the article, E. Bagramov,
explains that while "all republics possess equal rights," some
have varying natural resources and opportunities and produce
unequal national income, and that "such differences are unavoidable."
Under present conditions, Bagramov writes, no republic can use the
"advantages of its geographical position or more significant
economic potential" for itself; by means of central planning and
the all-union budget, the national income is distributed to ensure
development in the interests of "the entire Soviet people."
"This feature of nationality policy," Bagramov points out, is
reflected in the 1972 budget, which returns to Uzbekistan,
Lithuania, Tadzhikistan, Armenia, and Turkmenia almost the full
share of tax revenue produced by their repubics, while Kazakhstan
is the most favored, receiving its entire tax revenue plus an
additional 456-millicn-ruble subsidy from the national government.
Eagramov does not mention the more advanced republics which
presumably are less favored by the budget. At the same time,
however, he declares that allocation of investments is no longer
determined by the need to "overcome the economic backwardness of
particular republics or regions because this problem is already
resolved" and that state interests may dictate preferential
investment in the formerly backward nationality areas or other
regions.
The most notable recent complaint about regional investment
distribution came from the Ukrainian leaders in 1971. At the
24th Congress, then Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest complained
that the Donets Basin coal industry was being developed at
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"extremely low rates," with only two new mines opened in the
last five years; he also attacked those who had reduced coal
industry development in favor of gas and oil (PRAVDA, I April
1971). Donetsk First Secretary V.I. Degtyarev eagerly backed
Shalest's demand for accelerated development (PRAVDA, 6 April
1971). Subsequc tly, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR
Council of Minis, ru adopted a decree "On Measures to Further
Develop the Coal Industry of the Donets Basin" providing for
doubling of investments in order to rebuild present mines and
open new mines (Degtyarev in the 18 April 1972 PRAVDA UKRAINY
and Ukrainian Coal Minister M.M. Khudosovtsev in the 18 September
RADYANSKA UKRAINA).
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PRC AND ENVIRONMENT
PEKING ELABORATES VIEWS ON ENVIRONMENT AT LIV CONFERENCE
Peking used the occasion of the first UN Conference on the Human
Environment in Stockholm on 5-16 June to make its most com?re-
hensive. statement on world environment problems. As elaborated
by chief PRC delegate Tang Ke in a major address on 10 June,
Peking's approach demonstrated an intention to tailor its
environment policy to meet its political needs as a leading
spokesman of the third world and its pressing economic needs as
an underdeveloped nation for relatively unrestricted industrial
development. At the same time Peking sought to place the onus
for damage to the world environment on the developed nations,
particularly adapting this line to its campaign against tie two
ouperpowers. The Stockholm conference also served as a forum
for Peking to defend its nuclear weapons program in an attempt
to neutralize criticism of China's continued atmospheric tests.
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES The PRC delegation at Stockholm placed
the major responsibility for the
"increasingly serious pollution and damage of the human environ-
ment" on the superpowers while defending the interests of
underdeveloped countries in rapid industrial development. Stating
that countries damaged by big-power policies of "plunder,
aggression, and war" have the right to apply sanctions and demand
compensation, Tang cited in particular the "barbarous atrocities"
.ommitted by the United States in Indochina, including its
bombing, the alleged use of "toxic chemicals and poisonous gas,"
the mining of DRV ports, and the alleged bombing of Red River
dikes "to make a man-made flood catastrophe."
Moving to the broader question of how international environmental
safeguards should be formulated, the Chinese delegate made a
pitch to the large third-world group at the conference by defending
the right of all developing nations--including China--to relatively
unrestricted industrial and economic development and by opposing
any international environmental restraints that would limit these
states' national sovereignty. Thus, emphasizing that "only by
building an independent national industry" can a country become
strong and prosperous, he acknowledged that a certain amount of
environmental damage will result but that the problem can be
solved as stays advance in wealth and technology. Attacking
what he called the pessimistic view of the world environment
situation, Tang stated that developing nations must not refrain
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-44=
from developing industry for fear of ecological damage; so long
as states are independent of the interference of "imperialism,
colonialism, and neocolonialism" and their governments
"genuinely service the people," he asserted, problems arising
from industrial development can be solved because mankind's
ability to transform the environment will "grow continuously"
as nations progress.
Tang strongly warned against any efforts by the superpowers to
subject other countries to their control under the guise of
protecting the environment. While not ruling out all inter-
national restrictions, he emphasized that world environment
measures should "respect the sovereignty and economic interests"
of all countries, adling that each country has the right to
determine its own standards in light of its own conditions.
Turning to China's population problem, Tang attempted to justify
the rapid growth since the communist takeover while explaining
Peking's present approach to this vexing question. Citing the
improvement in Chinese living standards over the past two decades
as proof for the Marxist thesis that mankind will create "ever
greater quantities of wealth" to meet its needs, Tang also struck
a pragmatic note by cautioning that the Chinese by no means
approve of unch.:e_,'ad population growth but have advocated and
implemented family planning measures that have produced "some
effects."
NUCLEAR WEAPONS The consensus among participating nations
in favor of a halt to nuclear testing posed
the major problem for the Chinese at the conference. The Chinese
defensively and at length reaffirmed Peking's line on the need
to develop nuclear weapons to counter the "nuclear blackmail"
of the two superpowers. Repeating Peking's call for a world
summit conference to discuss the complete prohibition of nuclear
weapons and, as a first step, "to reach agreement on the nonuse
of nuclear weapons," Tang stressed Peking's pledge never to be
the first to use nuclear weapons and called attention to the
superpowers' refusal to undertake such a commitment. Showing
irritation over criticism of PRC atmospheric tests, he expressed
regret that "some people" oppose all nuclear tests while
ignoring the fact that the superpowers have stockpiled large
quantities of nuclear weapons and "threaten the small and
medium countries."
NCNA reported on 14 June that the conference on that day adopted
a resolution on the prohibition and condemnation of nuclear
tests but that the PRC voted against the resolution. A Chinese
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delegate reiterated Peking's line at the meeting that day. Chief
delegate Tang returned to the subject yet again on 16 June in
connection with the discussion of the "declaration on the human
environment." Tang deplored the fact that the Chinese proposal
on a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons was not written into
the declaration "owing to the stubborn opposition and obstruction
on the part of the superpowers and their extremely few followers."
He singled out Japan and New Zealand for harboring "ulterior
motives" in directing "the spearhead against China under the pre-
text of preventing nuclear pollution," thereby "confusing public
opinion and shielding the superpowers." The PRC delegation
announced that it would not take part in the voting on the
declaration.
In addition to parrying criticism of Chinese nuclear testing, the
approach taken by the PRC at the conference had the effect of
updating Peking's refusal to participate in the Soviet-proposed
world disarmament conference or five-power nuclear conference as
well as the Geneva disa'-iament talks. The Chinese speakers
made no reference to the agreements on limiting strategic arms
reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit, a subject which Peking has
mentioned directly only in a factual NCNA report on 2 June
covering President Nixon's trip. In rejecting calls for an end
to nuclear tests and demanding a non-first-use agreement, Peking
has sought to justify its continuing nuclear development program
as well as its refusal to accede to partial disarmament measures
which in its view leave the superpowers' nuclear strength intact
vis-a-vis the PRC.*
* Peking's attitude toward the Moscow summit seems reflected
in a recent article in RED FLAG (No. 6), the third of a series
of articles discussing world history as a means of understanding
the current international situation. The article discussed
efforts to limit the British-German naval arms race earlier
this century and drew the conclusion that a temporary detent:z
today will bring about an even greater rivalry tomorrow.
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CHINA
RED FLAG STRESSES ATTENTION TO AGRICULTURE. LIGHT INDUSTRY
An article in RED FLAG No. 6, broadcast by Radio Peking on
22 June, firmly and unequivocally criticizes the view that
most economic efforts and resources should be fed into heavy
industry. With reference perhaps to the views of the purged
military leadership, the article gets in a dig at the military-
industrial complex in criticiving "imperialist and social
imperialist" countries where "industry, especially military
industry, has developed abnormally" while agriculture has
lagged behind.
Carrying forward a line formulated by Mao in his "Contradictions"
speech in 1957 but only recently revived in the wake of the
purge of Lin Piao, the article stresses the interdependence of
the three economic sectors of agriculture, light and heavy
industry: each supplies essential outputs to the others and
one should not be developed at the expense of the others. In an
at.ampt to explain current policy to cadres who "view this situa-
tion from a certain isolated case" and feel that more efforts
to develop agriculture and light industry would adversely affect
heavy industry, the article notes that in the short term in a
particular instance the diversion of "manpower, funds, equipment,
and materials" may cause apparent slowdowns in heavy industry but
argues that in fact "this is not the case." The article claims
that once agriculture and light industry have developed, heavy
industry can "develop better and at a quicker pace."
That problems are being encountered in getting full compliance
with the new line is evident in a warning to local industries
that "funds, steel products, and other materials, which are to
be used on agriculture according to plans, must be guaranteed
and must not be misused or reduced." The article states that
"contrary to one's subjective wishes," shifting funds to heavy
industry will not cause it to develop more quickly. On the
contrary, according to the article, "the development of agricul-
ture and light industry will slow down, which in turn will
result in a slower development of heavy industry." Thus the
slogan "give first priority to developing heavy industry" is
now interpreted as giving "adequate" attention to agriculture
and light industry.
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The f3undation role of agriculture is repeatedly stressed, to
the extc^t that the article states that "only after agriculture
develops in a comprehensive way can industry, especially light
industry, develop in a comprehensive way." Calling the labor
force the "most important productive `nrce," the article
justifies a continuation of the movement of sending people
to the countryside, arguing that production will be affected
"if the increase in the industrial labor force and among the
urban population has surpassed the limit permissible for the
development of agriculture." Therefore, population distribution
planning must "consider first the needs of agricultural develop-
ment, and then the needs of industrial development."
The future path apparently envisaged by the article calls for
increasing industrial development primarily through enhancing
the quality, not quantity, of labor and equipment, thereby
"supplying more industrial products to the state while not
increasing investments or increasing investments to a lesser
extent and not increasing the burden on agriculture." The
article concedes that in the long run production cannot be
expanded without capital construction, and it seems to admit
that some of the "contradictions" of resource allocation are
real. It states that "for a certain period, the scale of
capital construction cannot . . . go beyond the permissible
level of the development of agricultural production because
of certain limits on manpower, materials, and funds."
Criticizing "some comrades" who "invariably go after bigger
projects," the article indicates that big projects which do
not bear quick rewards must be discouraged, for they "inevitably
consume manpower, funds, equipment, and materials" which are
needed for developing agriculture. This injunction may well
not apply, however, to large state projects but onl:,,7 to local
endeavors.
In support of the theory that heavy industry-must not be
allowed to crowd out agriculture and light industry, a SZECHW..N
DAILY Commintator's article broadcast on 18 June revealed some
details of the province's industrial development. Criticizing
the view of "some comrades" that "if heavy industry is not done
well, then the whole situation will be affected," the article
advocates more attention to light industry, which "not only
meets the ,;:.;" irements of the people's daily life, but also
? provides more accumulation more quickly." According to the
broadcast, past policies have resulted in light industrial
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development lagging "considerably behind" that of heavy industry
even though funds accumulated by light industry over the past
20 years have been 550 percent of the state investment in light
industry and the surplus has supported heavy industry.
The article also provides a further rationale for Szechwan to
produce its own light industrial products in noting that since
+echwan's population is great it has a "vast consumption."
Sup~lying consumer products from otheb provinces places a burden
not only on them but on the transportation system, "affecting
the transport and supply of materials for heavy industrial con-
struction and materials for agricultural production." In addition,
the article points out, long distance transport causes losses in
quality and increases in cost. And for any further doubters the
article notes that self-sufficiency is an integral part of obeying
Mao's dictum to "be prepared against war and famine."
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