TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: June 7, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
7 JUNE 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 23)
T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONt II)I:N'1'IAI,
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBVI without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning o: Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by P.n unauthorized person Is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
helud.d from euleieelk
dew" redley eRd
duleo1Rmllee
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
DRV Attacks President's Moscow Visit Without Reporting Event .
1
USSR Pledges Support to Vietnamese Following President's Trip .
4
DRV Protests U.S. Air Strikes, Accuses Nixon of "War Crimes" .
6
Offensive Lauded in Hanoi, Front Comment on PRG Anniversary . .
8
Moscow Marks PRG Anniversary in Standard Fashion . . . . . . .
10
Peking Hails PRG Anniversary, Shows Restraint Toward U.S. . . .
11
Eastern Nam Bo PLAF Command Praises "Victories" in Offensive .
13
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
Soviet Media Play Up Tito Visit, Sanitize His TV Remarks . . .
15
PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO POLAND
Warsaw Media Hail Visit as By-product of Moscow Summit . . . .
19
CHINA
Peking Takes Brief Note of Moscow Summit, Various Accords . . .
21
MIDDLE EAST
Arab-Israeli June 1967 War Anniversary Marked by USSR, PRC . .
23
Moscow, Peking Indicate Disapproval of Lod Airport Incident . .
25
Masherov Lauds Brezhnev for Summit Talks and FRG Treaty . . . .
27
Economics Institute Forced to Adopt Mathematical Economics . .
27
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 MAY - 4 JUNE 1972
Moscow (2803 items)
Peking (1125 items
Nixon USSR Visit
(16%)
25%
Domestic Issues
(34%)
53%
(Party-Government
(--)
5%)
Indochina
(13%)
12%
Bodies' Approval
(Sihanouk PRC Tour
(4%)
4%]
of Summit
UNESCO Sessions
(0.5%)
5%
Brussels Conference on (0.L%) 7%
Tunisian National Day
(--)
3%
European Security
Chilean Economic
(--)
3%
[Brezhnev Message
(--)
5%]
Delegation in PRC
West Berlin Agreement
(--)
4%
Nixon USSR Visit
(--)
1%
Supreme Soviet
(--)
3%
Ratification of
USSR-FRG Treaty
Indochina
(2%)
3%
China
(2%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecaat commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses Indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior Issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
INDOCHINA
Hanoi has continued to avoid any explicit mention of President
Nixon's Moscow trip, but North Vietnamese disapproval has been
shown in articles which criticize, without identification, some
of the President's statements in the USSR. Hanoi followed a
similar pattern regarding the President's February visit to China.
Commentator articles it: both the party paper NHAN DAN and the army
organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN argue that the hypocrisy of the President's
assertions about peace and negotiations is shown by his decision
to mine North Vietnam's ports and to continue the massive use of air
power. The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman has continued to issue
daily protests over the ai_ strikes, with those on 2 and 4 June
charging that U.S. planes have continued to drop mines.
In the wake of the President's visit, Moscow has continued to
insist that its policy of coexistence and detente is compatible with
support for the Vietnamese struggle. Sensitivity on this issue was
shown, however, in Soviet media's truncation of President Tito's
remarks in an interview for Moscow TV--in which he expressed concern
ovir escalation of the Vietnam war and stressed the socialist
countries' international duties in aiding the Vietnamese.
Vietnamese communist prop+!Randa marking the ta_;-d anniversary of the
founding of the South Vie':namese Provisional Revolutionary
Government uniformly praises the communist offensive in the South.
While neither North nor South Vietnam held the usual meetings in
observance of the anniversary, the occasion was marked by a visit
to the PRG representation in Hanoi by a delegation headed by
Truong Chinh. Both Chinh and the PRG representative seemed to
allude obliquely to the President's summit trips in expressing
confidence in socialist support. Moscow marked the anniversary in
a low key, much as it did last year, with a Soviet leaders' message
and a meeting in Moscow. The Chinese again, as in 1971, treated
the anniversary ai3 a major e,,nt, though the intervening improvement
in Sino-U.S. relations was clearly evident and was made all the more
apparent by the PRG envoy's harsh attack on the Nixon Administration.
DRV ATTACKS PRESIDENT'S MOSCOW VISIT WITHOUT REPORTING EVENT
Two days after Hanoi radio had mentioned the President's visit to
Iran, North Vietnamese media's rhetorical charade regarding his Moscow
trip was continued when Hanoi radio and VNA carried the 2 June
NHAN DAN Commentator article quoting from his remarks in Moscow
0 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
without identifying them. Hanoi's studied avoidance of any
explicit reference to his visit to he Soviet Union was again
evidenced in an English-language broadcast later on the 2d
which referred to the President's 1 June report to Congress
without explanation. Mention of Moscow was also avoided in
Commentator articles attacking the President in NHAN DAN on the
3d and in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 4th. -1FAN DAN said that the
President's "newest gift of deceit" to the American people was
advanced on l June "in the form of a boastful speech to the U.S.
Congress after a long trip abroad." And QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said
that "Nixon ballyhooed the success of his trips" before the U.S.
Congress. The failure to mention the Moscow trip was even more
pointed in & Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese on 4 June which said:
"According to U.S. news agencies, on the night of 1 Ju.ie in
Washington, half ar., hour after he returned from a visit to a
number of countries in Europe and to Iran, Nixon hurriedly went
to the U.S. Congress to report on this trip in order to utter
boasts and to seek congressional support and votes in the race for
the presidency later this year."
The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 2d said that once again
the President's "deceitful" arguments "have been ballyhooed in an
attempt to deceive public opinion." Commentator differentiated
between his remarks at a 22 May dinner and in his Moscow TV
speech on the 29th, by explaining that "at a banquet" he "boasted
about creating a more peaceful world for all nations," and that
in a statement Nixon ballyhooed at length that
there can be real peace only when the weak are
as safe as the strong countries, that U.S.
strength will be used only to defend peace and
never to undermine it, and to safeguard freedom
and never to destroy it, that the only healthy
basis for international peace and progress is
equality of sovereignty and mutual respect, and
that the United States is struggling for a
world free from fear.
Commentator said the President "imagined" that a number of people
would believe these "boasts" and waded: "The more beaurifui his
statements are, the more his deceitful arguments are drowned out
by U.S. bombs and shells that explode continuously, day and
night, on Vietnamese territory." The article also took sharp
issue with some of the President's remarks on the role of the big
powers. Thus Commentator labeled as a "shopworn and very vicious
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
argument" the President's assertion that big powers should set
examples for small countries and not let themselver be dragged
into wars initiated by small countries. And he asked
rhetorically whether the President wand big countries to
set examples in the same way the United States has in Vietnam.
The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 3d, as broadcast in
Hanoi radio's domestic service, obliquely alluded to the Peking
as well as Moscow trip when it sa1d that pursuing his election
campaign, the President "has gone to the East and West aboard
his plane the Spirit of '76." As in the article on the 2d,
Commentator cited and ridiculed the President's remarks in the
Soviet Union as part of his general policy of "deceit."
Referring to the President's "frequent" talk about shifting
from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation, the article
said that "for more than three years--on the battlefield, at
the Paris conference and in many diplomatic activities--Nixon's
objective has always been aimed at seeking a military solution
to the Vietnam problem." But, it added, the U.S. air and naval
forces' "destructive, threatening and pressure-creating measures
and the blockade of DRV ports . . . can in no wa; shake our
determination."
Reiterating Hanoi's stress on the need to return tu the Paris
talks, Commentator said: The United States "must not sabotage
the Paris conference as it is doing; traveling here and there
and knocking on doors everywhere will. definitely fail to help
solve any problems." (The Vietnamese communist delegations in
Paris again this week issued statements "demanding" that that
Thursday session be held.)
The NHAN DAN article seemed to display some concern to reassure
the North Vietnamese when it set out to demonstrate that the
President allegedly is facing widespread opposition to his
policies and will hive great difficulties in his 'ampaign for
reelection. Commentator said:
Following his fairly sensational diplomatic moves,
Nixon is showing a semblance of opt::mism, considering
his remaining in the White House for another four
years to be beyond discussion. This is another
farce to fool U.S. public opinion. At the bottom of
his heart this crafty President most clearly
realizes that his race to stay in the White House
will be very difficult and fierce. It is not by
accident that on 1 June less than one-half of the
U.S. Congressmen were present to welcome Nixon
following his long trip abroad.
Approved For Release 2000/08/0JT - 85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
Neither of the NHAN DAN Commentator articles explicitly mentioned
the President's alleged attempts to divide the socialist countries,
but QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's Commentator on the 4th said that none of
his "machinations" can "divide or prevent friendly countries from
supporting our anti-U.S. national salvation resistance, a struggle
of national and great international significance. The peoples of
the socialist countries and other revolutionary peoples . . . are
strongly supporting our people who are fighting the stubborn and
warlike Nixon clique."*
USSR PLEDGES SUPPORT TO VIETNAMESE FOLLOWING PRESIDENTS TRIP
Moscow propaganda following President Nixon's visit has continued
to juxtapose reiterations of Soviet adherence to a policy of
coexistence and negotiations with reaffirmations of support for
the Vietnamese and other peoples of Indochina. Some defensiveness
seemed evident, however, in Brezhnev's remarks at a Kremlin
dinner for President Tito on 5 June. Brezhnev described the
talks with the President as an event "of great international
importance," lauded the statement on basic principles and the
agreements on SALT and other issues, and explained that the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union "was, is, and will remain a
socialist, class, internationalist one." He added that this is
why the Soviet Union is "against acts of aggression, against
any attempts to suppress the liberation struggle of the peoples,
to interfere in their affairs, to violate their rights," and went
on to reaffirm Soviet assistance and support to the peoples of
Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries.
Soviet sensitivity to some of Tito's remarks was apparent in
Moscow reports of his 31 May interview for Soviet TV, prior to
his departure for Moscow. As reported by the Yugoslav news
agency TANJUG, Tito had expressed concern over U.S. mining of DRV
ports and the possibility that the war might assume "even wider
proportions," and he had stressed "the duty of all socialist
countries" to assist the Vietnamese. Reports of the interview
carried by TASS on the 3d and published in PRAVDA on the 4th
* The army paper in a Commentator article on 21 May--on the eve
of the President's arrival in Moscow--had charged that the
President "is sowing disunity and sabotaging the socialist camp"
and a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 20th had referred to
the President's "divisive schemes and deceits" and "wicked
political intrigues." See the 24 May TRENDS, pages 10-12.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
truncated these remarks, although Soviet media did echo TANJUG
in reporting that "we are all obliged to do all we can to help
the Vietnamese people." (On 5 June TANJUG briefly reported
that at a session that day of the Yugoslav coordinating committee
for aid to Vietnam it was decided to send "substantial
consignments" of aid to Vietnam. The report added that the
session "conigdcred measures for further support and aid to the
people of Vietnam in the light of recent developments and
further escalation of the war by the United States.")
Other propaganda on Tito's visit has further indicated some
strains between the two sides in connection with the U.S.-Soviet
summit and Vietnam. For example, TANJUG in reporting Tito's
talks with Soviet leaders on the 6th cited unnamed sources for
the opinion that "there exist some differences in views and
interpretations of various world events."*
Moscow press and radio comment on President Nixon's trip has
stressed the Soviet Union's "principled internationalist position"
on such questions as Indochina and the Middle East, with a 3 June
IZVESTIYA international review by Mikhaylov asserting that
during the talks the Soviet side "con"'irmed its unshakable
solidarity" with the Vietnamese people's struggle. A Druzhinin
Moscow domestic service commentary on .he 2d, observing that
there is displeasure in the West that no agreement was reached
on Vietnam, declared that "true to its internationalist duty
and to its principles of ever firmly supporting the anti-
Imperialist struggle," the Soviet Union could never conclude
a "deal" on Vietnam.
Accounts of the President's address to the joint session of
Congress on thz evening of 1 June, carried by TASS and published
in PRAVDA, noted his remark that the problem of ending the
Vietnam war was one of the most extensively discussed subjects
during the summit. The accounts also reported that the President
said that each side had its own point f.,f view and approach "to
this very difficult issue." But, of course, there was no
acknowledgment of his assertion that a full review of all that
was said on the subject would only jeopardize the search for
peace.
TASS on the lot, in reporting the approval of Brezhnev's report
on the summit by party and government bodies, said that full
* For a detailed discussion of Tito's visit see the USSR-Yugoslavia
section of this TRENDS.
COP?FIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
support was expressed for "the consistent, firm position" set
forth at the talks by the Soviet delegation "on the question of
the continuing U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the other countries
of Indochina." And it added that "t:hr USSR's solidarity with the
Vietnamese peoples' heroic struggle was and remains firm."
DRV PROTESTS U.S. AIR STRIKES. ACCUSES NIXON OF "WAR CRIMES"
Hanoi has continued to publicize daily protests over U.S. air
strikes from the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. The targets are
described in general terms and allegedly include farms, factories,
economic and cultural establishments and water conservancy
projects. There is little supporting comment on the strikes,
but VNa,'s press review on 7 June quoted a NHAN DAN editorial as
charging that alleged U.S. bombing of irrigation and dike systems
in North Vietnam is aiw.,Ld at destroying its economic and defense
potential. The editorial reportedly went on to say that the
"enemy's scheme may cause certain difficulties, but decidedly
cannot prevent North Vietnam from maintaining and developing her
agricultural production."*
Continuing the series of radio broadcasts, inititted on 31 May,
charging the President with war crimes, Hanoi on 3 June focused
on the President's decision to mine DRV ports. It said that this
action, which "is entirely contrary to international law," is "all
the more wicked in view of a secret 1969 report by Henry Kissinger
which was made public by Senator Gravel." Hanoi cited the report
as noting that goods arriving in Haiphong are essentially goods
shipped under economic aid programs, and added that, therefore,
the U.S. blockade is preventing such supplies as medicine and
medical in.:truments from reaching Vietnam. The broadcast also
observed th"Z the 1969 report pointed our that there is no way
to effectively prevent the transport of military supplies from
China's mainland to North Vietnam by rail and road. And it added
that since the President knows this it can only be concluded that
he in fact is advocating attacks against civilians.
* AP on 5 June reported that a Hanoi broadcast monitored in
Hong Kong quoted NHAN DAN as saying that North Vietnam is having
"very difficult" economic problems because of the bombing but
that the enemy "can never prevent ou: survival and our ability
to supply the South." FBIS has monitored no such broadcast.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
A broadcast in the series on the 4th focused on alleged U.S.
schemes to attach North Vietnam's dikes. It claimed that it
is evident that "the Nixon clique" has not ruled out such
bombing since both Secretary Laird and Secretary Rogers have
said that the only actions they would exclude are the use of
nuclear weapons and the return of U.S. combat troops to South
Vietnam. Hanoi charged that President Nixon "cunningly advocates
the destruction of dikes before the flood season," since then
"a crack even if mended will become a weak point that cannot
hold back flash floods."
FOREIGN MINISTRY Specific charges levied in the series
SPOKESMAN PROTESTS of protests by the foreign ministry
spokesman during the past week include
the following:
+ The 2 June statement charged that on the 1st, U.S. planes
were sent "to drop mines to blockade North Vietnamese harbors
and to barbarously bomb and strafe Haiphong, Nam Dinh, Vinh
and Viet Tri cities and many populous areas" in Lang Son, Vinh
Phu, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe
An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and in the Vinh Linh
area. It said the targets included villages, hamlets,
factories, farms, water conservancy projects and economic and
cultural establishments, and it claimed the destruction of
"many" homes and the Giao Chau church in Giao Thu; district,
Nam Ha Province, and the killing or wounding of "many civilians."
+ The statement or. the 3d said that on the previous day, U.S.
planes "barbarously bombed and strafed Yen Bai provincial
capital, the Phu Ly township of Nam Ha Province and many
populous areas" of Yen Bai, Lang Son, Ha Bac, Ha Tay, Nam Iia,
Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces
as well as Vinh Linh. U.S. ships also were said to have
"indiscriminately shelled many coastal areas of Queng Xuong
and Tinh Gia districts, Thanh Hoa province." Giving the same
general list of targets as in the 2 June protest, it went on to
cite the destruction of the Van Xa pagoda in Thanh Liem
district, Nam Ha province, and to claim that "many" civilians
were ;.illed or injured.
+ The statement of the 4th charged that on the 3d, aircraft
continued to mine North Vietnam's ports and "to savagely bomb
and strafe Haiphong port city, Phu Tho provincial city and many
densely populated areas" in Yen Bai, Thanh Hoa, Son La, Nghe An,
Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
+ The statement on the 5th charged that cn the previous day
the United States continued to bomb and strafe "many" populous
areas in Lang Son, Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa., Nghe An, Ha Tinh and
Quang Binh provinces, "killing or wounding many civilians, mostly
women and children, and destroying many homes and economic and
cultural establishments." A VNA report of the 4 June raids
charged that "many waves" of U.S. planes "stealthily attacked
Luy Dong hamlet, Dong Hai village, in the vicinity of Haiphong
city with thousands of steel pellet bombs, killing or wounding
some dozen civilians in bed." According to the VNA press
review on the 6th, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN scored those raids as a
"new savage crime."
+ The foreign ministry spokesman on the 6th charged that the
day before U.S. aircraft hit "many populated areas" of Lang Son,
Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam ka, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa,
Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh
area. And he claimed that among the targets were "the Cac and
Phuong Dong sluices and d'&%es in Nam Ha Province and many
villages, district towns and factories," and that "many"
civilians were killed or wounded.
+ The protest on the 7th said that on the 6th bombing was
carried out in Hanoi's outskirts and in Haiphong as well as in
Yen BM_i, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An,
Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area.
Targets allegedly included "many" villages, hamlets, cities,
factories, dikes, dams and water conservancy projects, "including
dike sections in Hung Nguyen district, Nghe An Province, and
in Tyong Hai district, Thai Binh Province." The spokesman's
protest claimed that "many civilians, mostly old people, women
and children, were killed or wounded."
OFFENSIVE LAUDED IN HANOI. FRONT COMMENT ON PRG ANNIVERSARY
Hanoi's message of greetings on the 6 June anniversary of the
1969 founding of the Provisional Revolutionary Government in
South Vietnam typifies other comment in its optimistic appraisal
of the alleged achievements of the communist offensive in the
South and its promise of continued North Vietnamese support.
The message--as usual sent from Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh and
Pharr Van Dong to NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President
Huynh Tan Phat--said that Vietnamization "is falling apart," and
it predicted that "on the crest of victory" the people will move
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
forward to defeat Vietnamization completely. It pointed to
the folly of the Nixon Administration's thinking it could
redress the critical situation in South Vietnam by "sabotaging"
the Paris talks and escalating attacks on the North. And in a
possible allusion to ithe President's summitry, it reaffirmed
that "neither bombs and, shells nor any deceptive political
and diplomatic maneuver" can shake dietnamese determination to
fight on.
While neither North nor. South Vietnam held the usual meetings to
mark the anniversary, the occasion did prompt a visit to the
PRG representation in Hanoi by a delegation headed by Truong
Chinh. VNA reported that during his 5 June visit Truong Chinh
reaffirmed the Nurth's intention to fulfill its obligations to
the South and expressed the conviction that the resistance war,
"though still facing many difficulties and hardships, will
certainly end in complete victory." Chinh may also have had
the President's trips in mind when he rejected the notion that
a "blockade" of the DRV or "perfidious diplomatic moves can
deny the DRV the aid from her brother countries," adding that
"the patriotism and proletarian internationalism of our people
and our brothers and friends shall triumph over the aggressors'
modern technology."
Nguyen Phu Soai, the acting head of the PRG's rep.esentation in
Hanoi, in his statement read over Hanoi radio, also remarked
that "none of the enemy's cunning schemes and tricks" can
divide the Vietnamese from the socialist countries. Soai had
prefaced this by citing "the great, comprehensive, and
effective material assistance and vigorous political and moral
support" of the USSR, China, and other socialist countries.
Consistent with other propaganda, he described the current
communist offensive as a "stunning blow" at the Saigon
government and yet another blow at the Vietnamization policy,
"driving it rapidly toward total collapse."
The PRG'a policy of "national concord" to unite diverse elements
in South Vietnam was reiterated by Soai and he reported that
"PRG representatives have sought by all means to establish broad
contact with all strata of the people and with all patriotic
forces and individuals at home and abroad in order to discuss
with them urgent problems facing the country in the short as
well as in the long run." The "national concord" policy was
also discussed in a 1 June NHAN DAN article Yvhich recalled the,
formation of the Vietnam Alliance and the PRG and held that
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL PHIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
"the revolutionaries have proved ready to shake hands and take
joint actions with all those who cherish national independence
and freedom." The article maintained that the national concord
policy was being applied in the "newly-lLberated areas," and it
claimed that "realities" in these areas have "smashed" the
allies' "misleading claim" that "the revolution would engage in
retaliatory terrorism when 1t is successful."
MOSCOW MARKS PRG ANNIVERSARY IN STANDARD FASHION
Moscow marked the third anniversary of the PRG in a low key, much
as it did last year. The observance included the usual Soviet
leaders' message and a Moscow meeting. The Moscow domestic
service on the 6th said that the meeting was attended by Politb?lro
alternate member Ponomarev, as well as the PRG and DRV
ambassadors, and that it adopted a resolution condemning American
aggression in Vietnam and pledging continued "support" to the
Vietnamese people. A similar meeting last year was attended by
Party Secretary Solomentsev and addressed by a deputy chairman
of the Soviet Committee to Support Vietnam. The PRG ambassador
gave his customary reception in Moscow, attended by alternate
member of the Politburo Solomentsev and Party secretary Kapitonov.
Last year Politburo member Grishin had attended, as he had in
1970 when he was a Politburo alternate member. An additional
feature this year was a "campaign of solidarity" with the
Vietnamese "patriots" which has occasioned low-level meetings and
rallies.
The message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to Chairman Tho
and President Phat praised the South Vietnamese patriots' military,
political, and diplomatic victories and, like last year's, lauded
the growing international prestige of the PRG. It added an
expression of Soviet support for the PRG's "well-known position
on a political settlement" as a "sensible and constructive basis
for reestablishing a just peace in Vietnam." Like last year's,
the current message promised continued Soviet "support" to the
Vietnamese people, now adding the assertion that this is the
Soviet Union's "international duty." The message concluded with
an expression of hope that Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and
solidarity will "grow in strength." Last year the message had
praised the friendship and solidarity without indicating that
there was room for improvement.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDEN'T'IAL PBTS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
At his reception, as reported by TABS on the 5th, the PRG
ambassador thanked the Soviet Union and "all countries of the
socialist community" for their "assistance," but Solomentsov
referred only to the "support" from the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries which helped frustrate U.S. attempts
to impose a "diktat" on South Vietnam.
Comment, including a PRAVDA article reported by TASS on the 6th,
also lauded the PRO's growing international prestige and
reiterated support for the South Vietnamese struggle and for
the PRG's program for a political settlement. The President's
visit to the USSR was mentioned in anniversary material only
on some Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts. A broadcast in
English to Asia on l June recalled the Soviet side's
expression in the joint communique of support for the
Indochinese people's struggle and for the DRV and PRG stands
on a political settlement. A broadcast in Mandarin to China
on the 2d, refuting what it called recently increased charges
in Chinese propaganda of "collusion between two superpowers,"
recalled that the Soviet-U.S. talks showed the Soviet policy
of "firm rebuff" to U.S. aggression and devotion to the
"Leninist principle of proletarian internationalism," again
citing the Soviet side's stand on Vietnam expressed in the
communique.
PEKING HAILS PRG ANNIVERSARY. SHOWS RESTRAINT TOWARD U.S.
Peking has again treated the anniversary of the PRG's founding
as a major event, though the intervening improvement in
Sino-U.S. relations since last year's second anniversary was
reflected in Peking's muted criticism of the United States.
As in last year's coverage, Peking's observance of the third
anniversary was highlighted by a leadership message on the
5th signed by PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Premier Chou
.En-lai (c. 1y Chou signed last year's), a PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial on the W. and a reception given that day by the
PRG ambassador which occasioned d major Chinese leadership
turnout. Notwithstanding this show of solidarity, however,
Peking's current restraint was thrown into sharp relief by
the PRG ambassador's stinging attaci: on the Nixon Administration.
During a period when top Chinese leaders have been conspicuous
by their absence, suggesting the possibility of high-level
meetings, the PRG ambassador's reception drew the attendance
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL PSIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
of Chou, Yeh Ch4Len-ying, Chang Chun-chiao, Li Hsien-nien, and
two Politburo alternates. Yeh delivered a speech, given on
this occasion last year by the purged Huang Yung-sheng, whose
leadership role is being p..ayed by Yeh. Also present was DRV
Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who arrived on 3 May
"to discuss" the PRC's "supplementary assistance" to Vietnam
but was absent during the late-May stopovers of DRV Politburo
member Hoang Van Hoan. an also attended an anniversary
reception given by Chinese friendship societies on 5 June,
his first reported appearance since 16 May.
Both Yeh's speech and the editorial briefly criticized the
mining of DRV ports by "the U.S. Government"--the closest the
Chinese came to referring to the Nixon Administration and their
first authoritative reference to the mining in two weeks. Both
expressed confidence that the U.S. moves would not subdue the
Vietnamese, making no mention of Chinese interests. The PRG
ambassador, in contrast, attributed the mining directly to the
President, called the action "a quite serious new aggressive step
of escalation showing clearly the warmongering and bloody nature
of the Nixon Administration," and said it "defies insolently the
socialist countries" and others. The ambassador also mentioned
the Vietnam war as a factor in the U.S. election, a subject which
Peking has been scrupulously avoiding. Also missing from Peking's
comment were its claims on this occasion last year that Vietnam
developments were inspiring tine "revolutionary mass mcvement"
in the United States.
The Chinese took the occasion to hail the current communist
offensive in South Vietnam, but they stopped short of last year's
claims--regarding actions during the Lam Son 719 operation--that
communist victories were of "strategic importance." As in
criticism of the United States, it was left to the PRG
representative to make such claim in the face of Chinese caution.
On the score of aid, Peking reiterated standard pledges to its
"close brothers and comrades-in-arms" to provide "all-out support
and assistance" in the war effort "no matter what forms the war
may assume." While the leaders' message and the editorial called
this Peking's "bounden !.nternatioi.alist duty," and Yeh stressed
that this stand is "unswerving, no matter what happens," this
year's reaffirmation of support was bland compared with Huang's
reference last year to Peking's "unshirkable proletarian
internationalist duty" and his invocation of the Mao "instruction"
which says that failure to aid the Vietnamese would be "betrayal
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
of the revolution."* The PRG ambassador repeated his expression
of gratitude to the Chinese last year in saying this time that
the PRC provides "big, precious, and effective aid," but a hint
of less than full satisfaction with Peking's recent support is
suggested by his failure to describe its aid as '?timely," as he
had done last year.
The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial spelled out the Chinese position on a
settlement in demanding that the United States withdraw its troops
unconditionally and totally, put an end to the Vietnamization
program and to support for the "Thieu puppet clique," and give
"serious consideration and positive response" to the PRG's
seven-point plan and its two key points. Peking had not previously
supported the Vietr-rese communist peace terms in its authoritative
comment since before President Nixon's 8 May address** in which he
proposed an internationally supervised cease-fire--a proposal
that the Chinese have not as yet criticized. There was no
Chinese reference on the anniversary to Washington's negotiating
position, but the PRG ambassador, in calling on the United States
to accept the seven-point plan and to resume the Paris talks, took
the occasion to dismiss the President's 25 January eight-point
proposal as "only a bluff." Last year the Chinese speaker had
criticized the United States for "talking glibly" about ending
the war while refusing to agree to withdraw its troops by a set
date. In recent months Peking and its Vietnamese allies have
diverged in their appraisals of the Nixon Administration as a
negotiating partner.
EASTERN NAM BO PLAF CO +1AND HAILS "VICTORIES" IN OFFENSIVE
Communist propaganda focuses attention on the fighting ; rovinces
near Saigon with a flurry of comment accompanying the release, on
2 June, of a communique from the PLAF command for eastern Nam Bo.
The communique, dated 30 May, praised "great victories" in the
past two, months and claimed that its armed forces and people had
* The Mao instruction, which had been introduced by Chou in Hanoi
in March 1971, was last invoked by Peking during DRV Premier Pham
Van Dong's visit last November.
** Peking had last expressed support for the communist peace plan
in a 30 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article denouncing the
President's 26 April address on Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
"breached the defense line north and northwest of Saigon," It
cited specific allege:l achievements in fighting in Binh Long,
Tay N:#'.nh, and Gia Dinh provinces. In addition, the communique
made an apparent allusion to recent fighting in Phoc Tuy when it
claimed that "northea:it of Saigon, the liberation armed forces
and people surrounded and assaulted three military subsectors,
broke the enemy coercive machine in many hsiulet', And villages
close to the militar?' subsectorb, and seized control of
Highway 23." A 3 June NHAN VAN editorial, pegged to the
communique, was more specific when it claimed that in Ba Ria
(the communist designation for Phoc Tuy) and Long Khanh "armed
forces and people in recent days have managed to use their
on-the-spot forces to crack the enemy's eastern Saigon defense
line." The editorial asserted: "Our regional troops decimated
many puppet battalions and companies in the Dat Do area, beseiged
and attacked the Xuyen Moe, Long Le, and Due Thanh military
subsectors, cut Enemy movements and supply operations on
Highway 23, and broke many enemy columns on rescue or.arazions."
Listing statistics on alleged allied losses in eastern Nam no since
the beginning of the offensive, the communique claimed that over
20,000 "enemy personnel" were put out of action, including 3,000
taken prisoner. It said that .he ARVN 5th Division had been "badly
mauled" and that the 25th, 18th, and 21st divisions, the 15th
Regiment of the 9th Division, and the airborne brigade were among
units "heavily trounced." The claims to have inflicted severe losses
on Saigon units were underlined elsewhere in the communique when it
generalized that four infantry diviaions were "struck from the rolls
or suffered heavy casualties"; that all out of the 14 multibattalion
units and brigades of the ARVN mobile force of the 3d Corps and the
strategic general reserve were "put out of combat or heavily
decimated"; and that over one-half of the armored units were
"knocked out."
The communique also alleged that the PLAF in eastern Nam Bo shot down
or destroyed on the ground nearly 200 aircraft and captured or
destroyed some 700 military vehicles. The 3 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial on the communique specified that 250 of the vehicles
destroyed or captured were tanks and armored vehicles. According
to the communique, the PLAF also "liberated" a "vast area"
including "most" of Binh Long, two districts of Phuoc Long, part
of Tay Ninh, and many areas and villages in northern Gia Dinh, Ba
Ria, and Thu Dau Mot provinces.
The significance of the alleged successes in eastern Nam Bo was
stressed in the QUAN DOI KHAN DAN editorial which declared that "the
struggle on this battlefield directly affects the Saigon-Cholon area
and directly supports the development of the offensive positions in
the Mekong Delta."
Approved For Release 200 /R~TdX-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FRIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
SOVIET MEDIA PLAY UP TITO VISIT1 SANITIZE HIS TV REMARKS
Soviet media are devoting extensive coverage to Yugoslav President
Tito's five-day official visit to Moscow, which began on 5 June,
playing up the warmth of hts reception and the prospect of further
Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation. Despite such efforts, however,
differences between the two sides on "some international questions"
were openly acknowledged by the Yugoslav news agency, TANJUG.
These differences were also reflected in the exchange of toasts
between Tito and Brezhnev at a Jtnner on the 5th at which the
Yugoslav president received the Order of Lenin. While Brezhnev
used the occaiion to hail "the great significance". of the U.S.-
Soviet summit, he seemed notably defensive on Vietnam and in his
insistence on the "internationalist" thrust of Soviet foreign
policy. In. contrast, Tito waa less enthusiastic in assessing
the summit results, pointing to "the paradox" that such "positive"
developments should occur while "the aggression against North
Vietnam continues."
In an interview prepared for Soviet television on 31 May, Tito
made one o` his strongest attacks to date on U.S. Vietnam policy,
and he pointedly lectured "all the socialist countries" on the need
to aid the DRV. The interview was heavily sanitized in the TASS
summary published in PRAVDA on the 4th. Although the Yugoslavs
obviously do not wish to exacerbate relations with Moscow, which
have greatly improved since 1968, Tito's remarks were nevertheless
intended to lecture Moscow on its international obligations.
TITO TV President Tito's 31 May prerecorded interview with a
INTERVIEW Soviet correspondent,which reportedly was shown on
Soviet TV on 3 June, was given varying treatment by
Yugoslav and Soviet media, reflecting differing political
sensitivities. According to the text of the interview pLwvided
by TANJUG on 3 June, Tito--asked for his assessment of the
international situation, including Vietnam--expressed "great
abhorrence" at "the horror" of the destruction of property and
human life allegedly caused by the U.S. bombing and shelling
of the North, as well as concern that "this tragedy may assume
even wider proportions." In the TANJUG account, Tito declared:
"I ask myself how the people who should be responsible for
peace in the world and who are responsible--let's mention, for
example, some leading U.S. figures and circles--can think they
can subjugate a nation which has demonstrated so clearly that
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
it is ready to fight for its freedom and independence to the
last drop of its blood." In effect lecturing Moscow on its
obligations to Fanoi, Tito Bedded:
it is the duty of all socialist countries, and not only
of socialist countries but of all progressive forces in
the world, to do all they can to help the Vietnamese
people in their struggle against invasion and against the
efforts to bring them to their knees. We are all obliged
to help these people, both materially and politically,
wherever it is possible to do so, to infuse them with
even more moral strength so that they ma) endure to the
end in this struggle.
On 3 June TASS issued a heavily censored summary of the interview
which was published in PRAVDA on the 4th. The TASS summary,
which did not indicate the date of the interview, deleted Tito's
expression of "great abhorrence" at "the horrors" of the U.S.
actions, his references to those responsible for peace, and
his comments un the duty of "all socialist countries." TASS
merely rendered the latter passage: "We are all obliged to do
all we can to help the Vietnamese people both materially and
politically. . . ."
CORDIAL Tito's arrival at Vnukovo airport was carried live
RECEPTION by Moscow radio and television, and PRAVDA on the
5th published a frontpage picture and biography
of the Yugoslav president. In accord with protocol--the CPSU
as well as the Soviet Government had issued the invitation to
Tito at the conclusion of Brezhnev's September 1971 visit to
Belgrade--the Yugoslav president was greeted by Brezhnev,
Podgornyy, and Kosygin. The TASS account-of the arrival noted
that Tito was "warmly welcomed" by "representatives of the
working people of Moscow" who were present at the airport.
It noted that flags of the two countries as well as streamers
lined the streets from the airport to the Kremlin hailing "the
fraternal friendship between the peoples of the two countries"
and that crowds lining the streets greeted Tito.
BREZHNEV, TITO Symbolizing the rapprochement that has occurred
SPEECHES since Soviet-Yugoslav relations were strained
over the intervention in Czechoslovakia,
President Podgornyy presented the Order of Lenin to Tito at a
dinner in his honor on the 5th. The honor had been granted
Tito on his 80th birthday a week earlier.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
Speaking at the dinner, Brezhnev, according to TASS, expressed
appreciation for the Yugoslav president's "friendly attitude"
toward the USSR and called for cooperation between the two
countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationali.- Brezhnev made reference to "the strength
and viability" the principles of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation -Af formulated in the September 1971 Belgrade statement, but he
made no mention of the accords signed in Belgrade in 1955 and
in Moscow in 1956. The 1971 Belgrade statement had emerged as
a cc romise in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia which fell
short of giving unqualified approval to various "forms" of
socialism and to equality in party relations--assurances
spelled out in the earlier declarations.
In line with the continuing Soviet efforts to play up the
results of the Moscow summit, Brezhnev used the occasion to
hail the "great significance" of the summit for the cause
of world peace--"the high stake of all people." Against the
background of Tito's television lecture on Vietnam and
international "duty," Brezhnev was manifestly defensive in
his insistence that "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union
has been, is, and will continue to be a socialist, class,
and internationalist one." He noted in this context that
the Soviet support and aid to the Indochinese have been
"invariable."
In response, Tito reaffirmed Yugoslav readiness for "all-round
development" of relations with the Soviet Union, but made
clear that such relations could not be at the expense of
Yugoslav sovereignty and nonalinement. Recent fruitful
cooperation and the long-term basis for relations between
the two states and "parties," he noted, are based on "the
consistent impicmentation of the Belgrade declaration, the
Moscow statement, and the Yugoslav-Soviet statemenc of
September 1971." In another passage, Tit,: cited the need for
international relations based on "respect for the principles
of equality"; he also stressed the importance of "the
nonalined countries" as "a substantial factor" in promoting
world peace--in effect underscoring the standard Yugoslav
line that peace is not the responsibility of the superpowers
alone.
Tito assessed the Moscow summit "positively"; but using a
formula that could encompass the President's visit to Peking,
he also characterized as "positive" other meetings of
"statesmen that took place of late." Although taking a
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE '02
more restrainci line ou Vietnam than he had in his 31 May
interview, Tito i,evertheless perceived "a paradox" in the fact
.that such "positive processes" as the summit are taking place
"while some peoples are denied the inalienable rights to
independence and free dsvelopment through the use of force
and crude pressure." On the latter score he noted: "The
aggression against the Vietnamese peoples continues;
occupation of territories of some peoples, as for instance,
in the Middle East, is being tolerated."
REPORTS ON A TASS account of Tito's talks with Brezhnev,
TALKS Kosygin, and Podgornyy on the 6th stated that
"they discussed topical international questions
and mutual cooperation in the interests of consolidating
socialism and peace." A more informative TANJUG dispatch
from Moscow on the same day reported that Brezhnev briefed
Tito on the results of the U.S.-Soviet summit and that Brezhnev
had characte'ized the summit documents as "a constructive
development of Soviet-American relations." The dispatch added:
"Brezhnev emphasized, it is being gathered, i.hat the Soviet
Union had the full support and understanding of the socialist
countries, including Vietnam, for these talks." Noting that
the Yugoslav side "presented its views" on the international
situation, TANJUG quoted unnamed sources for the opinion that
"there exist some differences in views and interpretations of
various world events," but than "basically there was a
similarity in views on international questions."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENJ3
7 JUNE 1972
- 19 -
PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO POLAND
WARC.4W MEDIA HAIL VISIT AS BY-PRODUCT OF MOSCOW SUMMIT
President Nixon's 31 May-1 June visit to the Polish capital has
been accorded warm, enthusiastic treatment by Warsaw media.
However, apparently out of official concern not to offend Moscow,
Polish media have not carried anything comparable to the volume
of comment that appeared in So''{et media on the Moscow talks.
TASS and PRAVDA carried prompt reports of the President's visit
to Warsaw, including a summary of the 1 June communique. TASS
on the 5th took the unusual step of reporting a Polish party
Politburo meeting that day, a session which it noted "heard
information" from the Polish leaders "on the Polish-American
talks" and approved the results.
"CONSTRUCTIVE" TALKS After the President had been duly
welcomed with biographies and cordial
articles in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU, the government daily
ZYCIE WARSZAWY, and other Warsaw papers on the 31st, the media
carried reports of his -:rival and subsequent activities,
including the texts of r.is and the Polish leaders' speeches.
Following the issuance o.' the final communique on the 1st, the
news agency PAP carried a con.mentaty warmly endorsing the visit
as "needed and useful" and a report of worldwide reaction to
the visit featuring the "frank, businesslike, and constructive"
nature of the Warsaw talks. On the 2d, TRYBUNA LUDU carried
another roundup of favorable world comment on the visit,
extensively summarized by PAP, and a Pawlak commentary in the
Warsaw domestic service concluded that the visit's results "are
beyond any doubt useful and augur well for the future."
On the 3d, two days after the President's departure, authoritative
articles appeared in the two principal dailies under the signatures
of a leading TRYBUNA LUDU commentator, Adam Stanek, and ZYCIE
WARSZAWY's chief editor, Ryszard Wojna, respectively. ,'Both
articles were extensively summarized in English by PAP, which
called them "editorials." PAP had called Stanek's 31 May
TRYBUNA LUDU commentary welcoming the President an "article"
but gave no designation to Wojna's 31 May commentary in ZYCIE
WARSZAWY. On both dates, the articles appeared in the papers
in the same format, without designation.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
COIJFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
The 3 June TRYBUNA LUDU article by Stanek, entitled "After the
Polish-American Talks--Constructive and Useful," stressed that
"the weighty results" of the President's talks in Moscow and the
agreements signed there "were of basic import for the course and
results of the Warsaw talks." Underscoring the primacy of the
Moscow summit, it observed that "the Moscow agreements were hailed
in Poland as a great success of the common political line of the
socialist countries" and "have given rise to the essential
assumptions and conditions of the Polish-American talks." The
main result of the Moscow talks, it said, was the acceptance by
both sides of the principle of peaceful coexistence, a principle
prominently feArtired in the Polish-American communique.
The Stanek article welcomed "the acceptance by the United States
leaders of the principles of realism," in both the Moscow aad
Warsaw talks, with regard to the convocation of a European security
conference and the conclusion of the Soviet and Polish treaties
with the FRG. Dealing at length wit': bilateral relations, the
article welcomed the establishment of a joint Polish-American
trade commission and the signing of a consular convention by
Secretary Rogers and Foreign 1O.Hister Ols.owski on 31 May. The
article brief.y alluded to the two sides' "divergent" views on
Indochina and called on the United States to end the mining of
DRV ports and return to the Paris talks. And it summed up the
Warsaw talks as "fruitful, to put it simply."
The shorter article by Wojna in ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 3d, entitled
"Along the Lines of the Moscow Accords," hailed the principle of
peaceful coexistence contained in the "Basic Principles" document
signed in Moscov and stressed that the Warsaw talks "are the first
test that fully confirms the possibility and purposefulness of
moving along the road set by the Moscow agreements." It also
highlighted favorable results of the talks in Warsaw on bilateral
relations and European security and cited the continued divergencies
on Vietnam.
Editorial comments along similar lines also appeared in other Warsaw
dailies on 3-4 June--the Catholic paper SLOWO POWSZECHNE, the trade
union paper GLOS PRACY, and the youth paper SZTANDAR MLODYCH.
TRYBUNA LUDU on the 3d carried an extensive summary of the
President's 3 June address to the joint session of Congress--
including his reference to relations with the People's Republic
of China.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBLS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
? CHIN A
PEKING TAKES BRIEF NOTE OF MOSCOW SUMMIT. VARIOUS ACCORDS
Peking thus far has given the Soviet-U.S. summit 'nly minimal
coverage, in the form of a factual NCNA dispatch dated 2 June
covering President Nixon's entire itinerary. This has been
the only break in PRC media's silence on the President's trip
to the Soviet Union since NCINA reported the original announcement
last October. Unlike that report, which was carried only in
NCNA's domestic service, the 2 June report was disseminated by
NCNA in both its domestic and international services an.! Saab
broadcast in Radio Peking's international services. Having
taken note in the 2 June dispatch of the Soviet-U.S. agreements
signed during the summit talks, Peking subsequently reported--
in another factual NCNA dispatch, dated 5 June--the signing of
the quadrilateral Berlin accord and the exchange of instruments
of ratification of the FRG's treaties with the USSR and Poland.
The 2 June NCNA report, which avoided any comment on the President's
trip, noted that the Soviet Union and the United States issued
a Joint communique and a document on principles governing their
mutual relations, and that they signed seven agreements and agreed
to establish a trade commission. NCNA specified the subjects of
the agreements, including those limiting strategic arms. However,
apart from noting that the talks covered both bilateral relations
"and the current international situation," NCNA made no mention
of international issues, thereby avoiding acknowledgment of the
differences registered on Vietnam and the Middle East, areas
where the Chinese seek influence at the expense of the superpowers.
The dispatch noted the President's return to Washington on 1 June
but made no mention of his address to Congress that night, which
included references to relations with the PKG.
Peking's noncommittal reaction to the Moscow summit and the other
agreements, which might be viewed as adversely affecting Chinese
interests by reducing the "contradictions" between the two super-
pc:aers and strengthening Moscow's hand to cope with China, may
have been a calculated show of restraint in accord with its effort
to accent the positive in place of its former role as an
obstructionist element in international affairs. Peking's disquiet
over moves toward Soviet-U.S. and European detente has long been
a matter of record, as in the authoritative joint editorial on
New Year's Day which denounced Moscow for having "colluded" with
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
the United States "in nuclear deals" and for "selling out the
sovereignty" of the GDR.by signing the Berlin agreement. In
another expression of its misgivings, Peking's favorable account
of the Tito-Ceausescu talks last month pointedly ignored the
joint communique's endorsements of the Soviet and Polish treaties
with West Germany and of an early convocation of a European
security conference.
Peking's reaction to the Moscow eummit may also have been shaped
by its own interests in the triangular relationship, particularly
its newly emerging relations with the United States. The New
Year's Day joint editorial had invoked Mao's authority for the
view that international affairs "must be settled by all concerned
through consultation" and "must not be decided by the two big
powers." According to the editorial, "gone are the days when
representatives of the two superpowers couid decide the destinies
of other countries at will by sitting down together and making
deals behind their backs." Having subsequently sat down for
summit talks with the leader of one of the superpowers, Peking's
own reaction to world developments has become complicated by now
constraints.
These constraints seemed reflected in Peking's muted treatment of
May Day and the anniversary of Mao's 20 May 1970 anti-U.S.
statement, events which last year occasioned major policy
statements but this year were marked with conspicuous restraint.
In both cases the United States was the beneficiary of Peking's
more guarded approach at the expense of proletarian internationalist
interests. On the day of the President's departure on his trip,
Peking marked the anniversary of Mao's 20 May statement with a low-
level commentary in PEOPLE'S DAILY portraying an emerging united
front against the two superpowers. The major celebration of the
anniversary last year had included a joint editorial calling for
an international united front to "isolate and strike at the chief
enemy," identified as the United States.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/0%dQ ERQ05T00875F QPP3WQ?0023-5
7 JUNE 1972
MIDDLE EAST
ARAB-ISRAELI JUNE 1967 WAR ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY USSR. PRC
MOSCOW Soviet media gave only meager attention to the fifth
anniversary of the June 1967 war. Articles in the
5 June IZVESTIYA, reviewed by TASS, and PRAVDA, summarized by
TASS and in the Arabic service, as well as a Moscow domestic
service commentary the same day mention the anniversary only in
passing, while unanimously blaming Israel for the failure to
achieve a settlement. 0.:l emphasize the November 1967 Security
Council resolution as a 6oaie for a solution, with the domestic
service commentary additionally emphasizing that successful
implementation of the Jarring mission is the "only alternative"
to war. Only the PRAVDA article, as rendered in Arabic, specifi-
cally mentions the United States in referring to U.S. "bribes" to
Israel. Moscow's treatment of the anniversary last year was
generally low key, but there was a 5 June PRAVDA article by one
of the paper's former Middle East specialists, Yevgeniy Primakov,
and a three-part interview with him was broadcast in the Arabic-
language service to mark the anniversary. Primakov had focused
largely on the U.S. role in the Middle East, in the wake of
Secretary Rogers' Middle East tour the previous morth.
This year IZVESTIYA's Cairo correspondent Koryavin dealt. chiefly
with the damages caused by the closure of the Suez Canal,
judging from TASS' review of the article. PRAVDA's Cairo
correspondent Glukhov took as his text Brezhnev's remark, in
his 20 March AUCCTU speech, on long-term factors in the Middle
East and the eventual alignment of forces there; Glukhov argued
that time had introduced "fundamental adjustments" in the Middle
East balance of power. Using Egypt as an example, he conceded
that the country's development was taking place under "complicated
circumstances" and that the failure to find a solution to the
Arab-Israeli dispute provided a suitable atmosphere for
"activating domestic and foreign reaction." But he maintained
that "reactionary intrigues" had been repelled. Drawing on the
pt,raseology in the 29 April communique on President as-Sadat's
latest Moscow visit, Glukhov affirmed the Arabs' right to "look
for various means" to establish peace in the region, adding
that the Arab countries now have "other potentialities" compared
with their situation in June 1967.
Prefacing the Ryzhikov commentary on the domestic service, the
announcer recalled not the June war anniversary but the third
anniversary of the Moscow conference of communist and workers
parties which had adopted a statement on the Middle East.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000 gNgA RDP85TO%7?F QRQA00050023-5
7 JUIJI4 1972
Ryzhikov, like Glukhov, stressed the change in the balance of
forces and asserted that the Arabs have the right "to use not
just peaceful means, but any available means" to restore
justice. But he carefully added that the Arab countries "are
still prepared" to take advantage of any opportunity to find
a peaceful settlement.
TASS on the 6th briefly reported Egyptian President as-Sadat's
speech the previous day "in connection with the fifth anniversary
of the Israeli aggression," citing him as saying Egypt is
resolved "to fight for the liberation" of the occupied territories.
TASS said he recalled Egypt's main demands "related to the
complete withdrawal" of Israeli forces. The Egyptian president
in fact said that he told the Soviet leaders in April of
Egypt's views "so that they could be communicated" during the
U.S.-Soviet summit meeting. He added that he had summed up
Cairo's stand in three points: rejection of any agreement
whatsoever "to restrict our freedom to obtain 1rms" before
complete Israeli withdrawal, rejection of the 'status quo,"
and rejection of any negotiations over borders.
PEKING The PRC, marking the fifth anniversary with a
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 5th, added emphasis
to its previous advice to the Arabs in urging them "in the
first place" to maintain independence, keep the initiative
in their own hands, and rely on their own efforts and give
"second place" to foreign aid. In thus outlining priorities
designed to reduce Soviet influence, Peking underscored the
point made by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei at a 26 March
banquet in Peking given by Egyptian President as-Sadat's special
envoy Mahmud Riyad. Chi on that occasion had said that any
country could increase its national strength and defeat foreign
aggressive forces by "pursuing a policy of maintaining
independence and relying mainly or its own strength and
regarding foreign assistance as supplementary."
PEOPLE'S DAILY routinely referred to U.S. backing for tha
"Israeli Zionists" and the "reactionary Jordanian forces"
represented by King Husayn. Along the lines of Chiao Kuan-hua's
8 December UNGA speech on the Middle East, the editorial
asserted that the "superpowers"--taking advantage of "temporary
difficulties" of the Palestinians and other Arabs--tried to
make political deals at the Arabs' expense. Against the back-
ground of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty concluded in April and
Moscow's assistance tr Iraq and Libya in developing their oil
resources, PEOPLE'S DAILY accused the superpowers of trying
to "seize strategic areas and oil resources" in the Middle East.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/0e(}NF1PR85T00875IRM~P0023-5
7 JUNE 1972
The paper optimistically welcomr,d strengthened unity "among the
Palestinian guerrillas" and between the Palestinians and other
Arab peoples and urged pursuit of unity and protracted struggle
to assure final victory.
MOSCOW, PEKING INDICATE DISAPPROVAL OF LOD AIRPORT INCIDENT
In keeping with Moscow's past guarded treatment of airline
hijackings staged by Palestinian fedayeen, Soviet media obscure
any fedayeen connection with the 30 May incident at Lod airport
in Tel Aviv when, as TASS reported, "three armed Japanese
neationals opened fire on the passengers, killing and wounding
many people." Moscow's first report, a domestic service account
on the 31st, merely said that correspondents were trying to find
out more about this "rather obscure and complicated affair."
Moscow has subsequently stressed Israel's "threats" and
"unfounded accusations" linking Lebanon with the "terrorist
actions" at Lod airport, and has cited Lebanese officials as
condemning the incident and denying any responsibility. A
commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 4th provided the only
implicit connection between the Palestinians and the airport
episode, observing that "Zionist propaganda" accused the
Lebanese Government of "assisting the Palestinian patriots to
wage the struggle against the aggressor," and adding that Israel
seeks to end such support. In reporting as-Sadat's anniversary
speech, TASS ignored his remark on "Israeli threats to the area
following the Lod airport incident," merely noting that he
called attention to Israel's "policy of terror and reprisals."
Peking, normally full of praise for Palestinian exploits but
cautious about adventurist actions, was even more cryptic than
Moscow. Conveying PRC displeasure, NCNA in a 4 June dispatch
from Damascus made no mention of tho Lod incident in reporting
that the Lebanese premier had declared that "whenever an
attack took place inside Israel," that country started making
threats and accusations against Lebanon. Another NCNA dispatch
the same day, recounting the "heroic" feats of Palestinian
guerrillas in "repulsing" Israel's February intrusions into
southern Lebanon, charged Israel with again building up its
forces along the Lebanese border but did not connect this with
the Lod attack.
Peking's effort to strike a balance between its support for the
Palestinian struggle and its relations with the Arab governments
was strikingly demonstrated by the absence of any PRC observances
of "Palestine Day" in May, generally held on the anniversary of
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/0&(b fjll4nIaDP85T008Agpq R 050023-5
7 JUNE 1972
Israel's 1948 proclamation of independence. This year NCNA
merely noted DRS' and DPRK press support of the Palestinians,
whereas in 1971 a "Palestine international week" was marked
by a rally addressed by Kiuo Mo-jo, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial,
and publicity for the activities of a visiting Palestine
Liberation Organization delegation. The occasion was observed
in various fashions in previous years. The current PEOPLE'S
DAILY editorial on the June war anniversary also pointed up
Peking's stress on its relations with the Arab states as well
as with the Palestinians in repeatedly referring to the
"Egyptian, Syrian, and other Arab" peoples as well as the
Palestinians; the previous formula had affirmed support for
"the T'alestinian and other Arab" peoples.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
CONFIDENnAl, FBIS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
USSR I N T E R N A L AFFAIRS
MASHEROV LAUDS BREZHNEV FOR SINvIIT TALKS AND FRG TREATY
Beloruosian First Secretary and Politburo candidate member
Masherov used the occasion of the 31 May Supreme Soviet
Presidium session to praise Brezhnev personally for his role
in organizing the summit talks and the treity with West
Germany. Although Masherov has not been among Brezhnev's
more ardent supporters in the past, he becomes the first
official to portray Brezhnev as the prime mo?,er behind the
summit meeting, and he was the only one of the nine speakers
(including Podgornyy, Suslov and Leningrad Secretary G. V.
Romanov) at the 31 May session to have done so. Masherov's
praise is particularly noteworthy in view of his antipathy
toward the domestic welfare goals advanced b3 Brezhnev at the
24th Congress.
Masherov declared that the treaty's ratification "and also the
just successfully-concluded Moscow Soviet-American negotiations
on the highest level are the 1?)gical and natural result of the
tireless, consistent and Leninist farsighted activity of the
Politburo of our party's Central Committee, the Soviet Government
and L. I. Brezhnev personally, and also of N. V. Podgornyy,
A. N. Kosygin and other members of the Politburo . . . ." He
further declared, "the role and merits of comrade L. I..Brezhnev
i.' this great matter are truly outstanding" (IZVESTIYA, 1 June).
Masherov's statement clearly goes beyond other authcritative
pronouncements; for example, the 2 June PRAVDA editorial called
the ratification of the West German treaty "the natural result
of the tireless and consistent activity r4 the Central Committee
of our party and the Politburo . . . ."
ECONOMICS INSTITUTE FORCED TO ADOPT MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
In the wake of criticism by the Central Committee and the removal
of its director, the conservative Institute of Economics has
dropped its long-time hostility toward mathematical economic
methods. In a May QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article on the "main
orientations" of the institute's scien!:ific work, new director
Ye. I. Kapustin declared that the institute will henceforth use
"modern mathematical economic methods" and the "positive results"
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5
COLIFIIIEtYTIAL P11IS TRENDS
7 JUNE 1972
of the work of its arch-rival, the Central Mathematical Economics
Institute, and that the new methods will be introduced into the
work of all departments and sectors of the institute "without
exception."
Kapustin, former director of the Scientific Research Institute
of Labor, replaced long-time institute director L. M. Gatovskiy
in the fall of 1971, and in December the Central Committee adopted
a decree criticizing the Economics Institute for devoting "extremely
little attention" Lo the introduction of mathematical economic
methods. Such methods had been pioneered by the Central Mathematical
Economics Institute under director N. P. Fedorenko, a computer
enthusiast, but resisted by the political economists of the
Economics Institute. The long-time struggle between innovators
and conservatives in this field was noted in a November 1971
QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article by PRAVDA first deputy editor
V. G. Afanasyev, which criticized both the "conservatives" who
cling to "traditional methods" and oppose the "cybernetic boom"
and the all-out enthusiasts of computerization in management.
Criticizing the Economics Institute for poor leadership of economic
debates, the Central Committee decree ordered the USSR Academy
of Sciences Presidium to prepare new guidelines for the institute
and to reorganize its structure. Kapustin's article reveals the
new guidelines established by the academy and the now structure
of the institute. The same issue of QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS
reports a 29 February meeting of the Economics Branch of the
academy at which Fedorenko, who became its acade:.iic secretary
last year, reported on the Central Committee's criticism of
the Economics Institute.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050023-5