EARLY REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S USSR VISIT:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 24, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

?
?
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Confidential
V11111111111111111111111111111111111
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE,
11111111111111111110111111100011
T EN IS
in Communist Propaganda
EARLY REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S USSR VISIT:
Soviet treatment of the visit - page 1
East European comment - page 6
Hanoi's indirect polemics - page 10
Peking's behavior - page 26 STATSP EC
Confidential
24 MAY 1977
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 21)
75R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CI NTIAL
01;
This propaganda analysis report ts based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by MIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 799
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
CIIIOUP I I
froludod from fortmooflo
ihromorodlo und
olotIonlIkofloo
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
0
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL
CONTENTS
FBS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
Topics and Events Given Major Attentior
U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT
Moscow Underscores "Businesslike, Realistic" Nature of Talks ? 1
East European Media Greet Summit With Restrained Optimism . . 6
INDOCHINA
Hanoi Attacks President, Maintains Silence on Moscow Visit . . 10
DRV, PRG Press for Resumprion of Paris Talks, Assail UN Role . 13
DRV Foreign Ministry Continues Protests Over U.S. Action . . . 14
Truong Chinh, Hoang Quoc Viet Address Fatherland Front Session. 17
Little Moscow Commenc on Eve of President's Visit to USSR . . . 19
Peking Mutes Commemoration of Mao's 1970 Anti-U.S. Statement . 21
DRV Party Journal Cites Politburo Decree on Press Criticism . . 23
CHINA
Low-level Commentary Hits Superpowers on Eve of Moscow Summit . 26
Cultural Thaw, Attacks on Lin Mark Yenan Talks Anniversary . 28
Mao Fails to Greet Visiting Somali President Siad 29
PRC Raises Relations with Netherlands, Pressures UN Bodies . 00
EGYPT-USSR
Cairo, Moscow Produce Differing Communiques on Grechko Visit 32
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Shelest's Demotion Underscores Brezhnev's Power 37
Conservative Takes Over Social Research Institute 38
OKINAWA REVERSION
Terms of Agreement Sharply Denounced in Communist Media . ? ? . 41
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : GIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
4
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 MAX 1972
Moscow 2914 items)
Peking (1290 items).
Soviet Pioneers 50th
(--)
9%
Domestic Issues
(28%)
39%
Anniversary
Indochina
(45%)
26%
CPSU Central Committee
(--)
6%
[Strikes on DRV &
(25%)
12%]
Plenum
Mining of Ports
Indochina
(152)
6%
[2d Anniversary of
(--)
4%J
[Strikes on DRV &
(12%)
3%]
Mao Statement on
Mining of Ports
Cambodian Revolution
FRG Ratification of
(2%)
4%
[Sihanouk North China
(7%)
3%]
Treaties
Tour
Grechko in Egypt
(--)
3%
[Ho Chi Minh Birthday
(--)
2%]
Nixon USSR Visit
(--)
2%
Somali President in PRC
(3%)
10%
China
(2%)
2%
Okinawa Reversion
(0.1%)
5%
PRC-Netherlands Diplomatic
(--)
3%
Relations
These statisbics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of eattensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT
FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
MOSCOW UNDERSCORES "BUSINESSLIKE, REALISTIC" NATURE OF TAUS
Extensive Soviet coverage of the initial stages of the Preaident's
visit has focused attention on the top-level Soviet-U.S. talks
while relegating Vietnam to the background. Pervasive stress
has been on the "businesslike, realistic" character of the visit
and on the "substantive" nature of negotiations on key issues
on which Soviet-U.S. cooperation serves the interests of world
peace and security. Au optimistic prognosis for the summit
came from the head of the press center, Leonid Zamyatin, in the
course of his joint press conference with White House press
secretar; Ziegler on 23 May: Soviet media publicized his
statement that "the peoplea of our country, the people of the
United States, and the peoples of the whole world expect
positive results from the current Soviet-American meeting."
The President's arrival at Vnukovo airport on the 22d was
carried live by Moscow radio and television, and PRAVDA
published a frontpage pic.ore and biography of Mr. Nixon.
Recounting the cordial but restrained, strictly correct
airport ceremony, TASS noted that the President was
"welcomed" by President Podgornyy aid Premier Kosygin but
offered no characterization of the atmosphere. Brezhnevts
absence from the airport--manirestly because of the curmat
U.S. actions in Vietnam, and in the wake of a CPSU Central Com-
mittee plenum which endorsed the Brezhnev leadership's restrained
reaction to the U.S. moves--was in accord with a protocol that
has not invariably been observed. Thus Brezhnev had personally
greeted French President Pompidou on his arrival at the Moscow
airport in October 1970. He was also present to greet Egyptian
President as-Sadat in October 1971, although protocol was not
waived in that instance: the CPSU as well as the Soviet
Government had issued the invitation to as-Sadat, as head of
the Arab Socialist Union as well as the government.
TASS, in recovnting Pompidou's arrival in 1970, noted that
flags of the two countries lined the streets from the airport
to the Kremlin "hailing the friendship" between the French
and Soviet peoples. TASS this time mentioned the flags but said
nothing about friendship. It noted that "representatives of the
working people of Moscow were present" at the airport, but it
saie nothing about crowds along the streets.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL
2
FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
Publicity for Brezhnev's meeting with the President little
more than two hours aftur his arrtval underscored Moscow's
portrayal of the businesslike character of the visit. TASS
said the "businesslike and frank" conversation opened "the
discussion of problems of fundamental importance for the
development of Soviet-American relations as well as vital
international problems."
In line with protocol, President Podgornyy hosted the dinner
La the President's honor in the Kremlin palace on the 22d,
attended by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and the other Moscow-based
Politburo members.* Podgornyy has regularly hosted such
functions. He gave the initial dinner and made the initial
toast during Pompidou's visit, as during as-Sadat's visit
last October.
TASS and PRAVDA carried the texts of the speeches by Podgornyy
and the President at the official dinner. Podgornyy's remarks
were in keeping with Moscow's general effort to underscore
the overriding importance attached to the Summit--its pivotal
importance for world peLce as well as for U.S.-Soviet relations.
Describing the top-level U.S.-Soviet talks as "a momentous
event," the Soviet president said the results "will predetermine
in many ways the prospects for relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States . . . and will have an effect on
the further development of the international situation either
toward lasting peace and stronget universal security or toward
greater tension." He hewed closely to anticipatory authoritative
Soviet comment in reaffirming the USSR's conviction that improved
Soviet-U.S. relations are both "possible" and "desirable"--with
the stock qualifying assurance to client countries that this
would not be at the expense of "any third countries or peoples."
In the same vein, in the course of a reiteration of the need
for political settlement of international problems, he reasserted
the proviso that "due account should be taken of the aspirations
and right of peoples to decide their destinies themselves without
interference and pressure from outside."
* Kazakhstan's Kunayev and the Ukraine's Shcherbitskiy were
absent along with Shelest, according to TASS. For background
on Shelest, see the USSR Internal Affairs section of this
TRENDS.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL
3
FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
Podgornyy recognized "principled differences" between the
Soviet Union and the United States but pointed pragmatically
to the "objective factors that determine similarity of
interests" and dictate that the United States and the USSR
act "in such a way as to ward off the danger of global war."
Repeating the pervasive line that the USSR approaches the
talks from "realistic positions," he pledged that "it will
make every effort in accordance with the principles of our
poticy to achieve positive results." The first substantive
outcome was publicized early in the visit, when TASS
announced on the day after the President's arrival that. a
decision had been reached on signing agreements on cooperation
in the protection of the environment and in medical science and
services. On the 24th TASS reported that President Nixon and
Premier Kosygin had signed an agreement on U.S.-Soviet cooperation
in space aad that Secretary Rogers and Chairman of the Soviet
Committee for Science and Technology Kirillin had signed a
pact on cooperation in science and technology. TASS noted that
Brezhnev and Podgornyy were present at both signings.
PREPARATORY As part of the political preparation for the
COMMENT summit, the CPSU Central Committee meeting on
the 19th in effect gave the Brezhnev leadership
a mandate for its policy on 7ietnam as well as its negotiaticrs
with President Nixon. TASS reported that Brezhnev delivered a
report on foreign policy at the plenum and that it was
? 'unanimously approved." Brezhnev's report was not published
and the plenum resolution was publicized only in abridged form,
but authoritative interpretations of the plenum decision were
provided in editorials in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 21st.
Both weneat pains to portray Brezhnev's foreign policy as a
consistent implementation of the line set at the 24th CPSU
Congress and to emphasize that it has the united support of
the party and "all" the people.
Both editorials gave reassurance, for both domestic and foreign
consumption, that Moscow's "principled" policy had not altered--
a theme that has permeated Moscow's authoritative comment on
the President's visit since the plans were originally announced.
PRAVDA pledged that the Soviet Union would pursue its efforts
to observe the principles of coexistence among nations, while
at the same time "rebuffing imperialism's aggressive policy."
Advocating improved relations with the United States along
familiar lines, the IZVESTIYA editorial declared: "It would
be wrong to close our eyes to the great divergences existing
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-4
between the two states. But it is also beyond all question
that with a sobe: and realistic approach and good will it is
possible to achieve much with regard to mutual interests and,
of course, not at the expense of the rights and interests of
third countries. It is precisely from such positions that
the Soviet public approaches the arrival of US. President
Nixon in our country." In the ncxt paragraph the editorial
stated that the party's foreign policy "enjoys the undivided
support of all the people," citing the plenum resolution as
evidence that the Central Committee entrusted the Politburo
with the task of continuing to implement the 24th congress
detente line.
In'a broad-ranging review of Soviet foreign policy, the PRAVDA
editorial restated the USSR's positions on major world issues
and in the process reassured its allies that their interests
would not be damaged at the summit. Pledging loyalty to the
principles of proletarian internationalism, the editorial
thus reaffirmed that the USSR is "giving aid and is defending
the DRV's freedom and independence." But the cautiously framed
passage on Vietnam made n, mention of the United States, merely
registering the Soviet people's demand that "the interventionists"
leave Indochina. And with regard to the Middle East conflict,
the editorial merely reiterated Soviet support for the Arabs'
"just struggle" and for a political settlement of the dispute.*
WORLD SUPPORT As part of the general effort to rationalize
the Soviet decision to proceed with the summit,
Soviet media have played up worldwide support for U.S.-Soviet
detente, particularly from the USSR's allies and from the American
public. In a typical cormentary, a 21 May Moscow domestic
service commentary stressed that "the fraternal socialist
countries" had unanimously accepted the Soviet peace program
formulated by the 24th CPSU Congress. As evidence of this
unanimity," the broadcast cited Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov
for the view that the Bulgarian people "fully support the
USSR's principled and realistic proposals aimed at strengthening
world peace." It also unearthed general statements supporting
Soviet detente policy by East Germany's Honecker and Romania's
Ceausescu, without providing the dates or the context of their
statements.
* See the Indochina and Middle East sections of this TRENDS
for fuller discussion of Moscow's treatment of those issues in
comment pegged to the President's visit, underscoring the
importance of political settlement.
Approved For Release 2062NRWY&IA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL
5
FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
The theme of American public support for detente with Moscow
was highlighted in an article by Kolesnichenko in PRAVDA on
the 20th. Entitled "The Wish of the Majority of Americans,"
it cited U.S. press reports pointing to the significance or.
the summit and commented: "This testifigs to the profound
interest among broad strata of American society in the relaxa-
tion of international tension and the inprovement and
development of Soviet-American relations." References to
elements favoring a retl7n to the cold vr have emphasi%ed
that such dissenters are in the minority. Kolesnichenko
observed that "broad circles of the U.S. public hope the
mutual interests nf our peoples in the solution of urgent
problems will prevail over the aspirations of those American
politicians who would like to freeze Soviet-American relations
in the trenches of the cold war." In a similar vein, TAF".;
commentator Kornilov on the 22d, portraying a groundswell
of Western support for detente, noted that a public opinion
poll recently taken in the United States showed that "almost
75 percent of the Americans favored the development of
Soviet-American relations." The same poll has been cited
repeatedly in Soviet comment.
THE CHINA DIMENSION At this sensitive juncture in the
triangular relationship, the PRAVDA
editorial of the 21st was notable for a reaffirmation of the
24th CPSU Congress line on China, quoting from the congress
resolution on Peking's "splitting" efforts withir the inter-
national communist movement as well as on the USSR's willingness
to normalize relations with the PRC.
Soviet central media had avoided references to Peking's splitting
line in comment preparatory to the Moscow summit. The PRAVDA
editorial on the 17th, for example, made no mention of China
in its general foreign policy review. And Brezhnev's comments
on the President's China trip in his 20 March speech did not
recall the party congress resolution's attack on Peking's
ideological line or Chinese "splitting" tactics. Thus PRAVDA's
reminder of Peking's "splitting line" suggests that the China
question may have figured prominently in Moscow's decision
not to abort the summit over Vietnam developments. A 22 May
Radio Moscow broadcast in Mandarin by MulatolF, peggsd to the
party plenum, stated that the gathering "attached great
importance to Soviet policy toward the Asian continent and
discussed the USSR's policy toward China." The broadcast
added that while Moscow pursues a policy of notmalization of
relations with Peking, the Soviet Union also "actively
opposes the Chinese leaders' splittist policy, which
ApproveladMilea etahsee R-zuuaul/uw asrict aT AI'
-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL PHIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1.972
- 6 -
Soviet broadcasts in Mandarin have kept Chinese audiences abreast
of the progress of the summit. A broadcast in Mandarin on the
22d reported the President's meeting with Brezhnev and quoted
Podgornyy's remark at the Kremlin dinner that "we stand for a
radical turn toward relaxation of existing tensions on all
continents of the world." On the 23d Moscow reported in
Mandarin that President Nixon and the Soviet leaders had dis-
cussed questions involving the development of Soviet-U.S.
relations "in a cordial atmosphere and according to reality,"
and the tangible results were publicized in prompt reports of
the signing of bilateral agreemenrs.
Moscow used its purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress
to draw an inviaious comparison between the USSR's attitude
toward coexistence and the PRC's. A broadcast on the 20th,
reporting on the CPSU Central Committee plenum, contrasted
Moscow's "steadfast" line on coexistence with the Peking's
leadership's "expediency." Charging the Chinese with merely
paying "lip service to peaceful coexistence," the broadcast
cited Peking's "frenzied attacks on the Soviet Union's peace-
loving meaoures" and its alleged opposition to a political
settiement of the Middle East crisis as evidence of Cir.:nese
hyrocrisy.
EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA GREET SUMMIT WITH RESTRAINED OPTIMISM
Following a month-long hiatus, East European media resumed
commentary on the President's visit in mid-May--after Moscow
had signaled that the summit would proceed as planned. There
has been a moderate volume of restrained but optimistic
comment on the President's arrival and the early stages of the
talks. Authoritative comment from Prague and Budapest has
explicitly called the summit a significant and desirable event
despite U.S. actions in Vietnam. Tirana has predictably
denounced the meeting of the leaders of "the imperialist-
revisionist holy alliance."
CZECHOSLOVAKIA Prague has provided the heaviest volume of
comment, treating the President's visit as
a fruition of Soviet peace initiatives. Husak, in an 18 May
speech to a Czechoslovak Journalists Union congress which TASS
picked up on the 19th, described the summit as "part of the
great peace initiative of the Soviet Union aimed at easing world
tensions" and voiced "full support" for Soviet peace efforts.
TASS also reported his remark to the effect that "political
talks are always better than confrontation and clashes," if
CONFIDENXIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
- 7 -
conducted on the basis of "principle." Husak stated unequivocally
what Moscow has avoided saying in itc own comment--that "despite
the escalation which the U.S. Government has effncted in Vietnam,
we regard it as correct that there should be negotiations." TASS
omitted this passage, which appeared in the Pragve domestic service
version.
On the date of the President's arrival in Moscow, the Bratislava
PRAVDA ntressed that "Soviet policy provides Nixon with an
opportunity to take advantage of this meeting for further progress
in the field rf detente, pursued by the Soviet Union for more than
EO years." The party daily RUDE PRAVO on the 24th interjected
a tougher note when it remarked, in connection with the Presi-
dent's call for peace in his Kremlin dinner speech on the 22d,
that "if such a wish is being pronounced at a time when Indochina
is in the fire of American bombs, then it should be precisely the
United States which should confirm its verbal statement by actual
deeds"--withdrawal from Indochina.
POLAND, HUNGARY In a smaller volume of comment than that of
Czechoslovakia, Polish and Hungarian media
offered optimistic appraisals of the prospects for success at
the summit. PAP on the 21st reported ZYCIE WARSZAWY's Moscow
correspondent as noting that "Moscow political and journalist
circles speak of the prospect of the Soviet-American relatisuls
in a businesslike tone tinged with a sober optimism" and that
the President "can be certain about the success of the talks if he
comes with good will and w!th constructive prOponr" " The paper
viewed the 19 May CPSU plepum.as "one more evidence uf the
seriousness" with which the Soviet party and government leader-
ship is approaching the talks. TRYBUNA LUDU's Washington corre-
spondent on the 2Cth said U.S. observers and political circles
were predicting that the talks would deal not only with
disarmament but with the 'difficult and tangled" Vietnam and
Middle East situations and would "create a chance of understanding"
and strengthened detente.
A tone of hopeful optimism has marked Budapest comment on the
summit. A Budapest radio commentator observed on the 17th, fot
example, that "the very fact that in the current international
situation this aummit meeting can take place is a significant
result of the diplomatic efforts aimed at the easing of
international tension." He added that the socialist countries
adhere to minciples of peaceful coexistence and "do not yield
to the pressure of varinus circles whose interents are to
maintain tension throughout the world." Th s coumentator
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
- 8 -
applauded the 17 May PRAVDA editorial's stress on peaceful
coexistence and its assertion that improved Soviet-U.S.
relations cannot be achieved at the expense of other countries.
On the 16th, the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG's leading
foreign affairs commentator, Vernal., noted that the President
had "risked" his Moscow visit by his recent Vietnam measures
and that the Soviet leaders had acted with "tremendous responsi-
bility and circumspection" in refraining from a "confrontation"
end allowing the visit to go on as scheduled. Varnai took a
swipe at the Chinese in remarking that the present Vietnam
situation "would not have arisen if the Chinese Government
had been prepared to jointly help the Indochinese patriots,
if it had not based its policy on pitting the Soviet Union
and the United States against each other."
BULGARIA, EAST GERMANY Sofia and East Berlin have been notably
restrained in meager comment thus far.
The Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT on the 20th, in an article entitled
"Reality and Responsibility," said the visit resulted from a
"realistic evaluation of certain international facts" and "certain
trends towards changes" in U.S. foreign policy which are, however,
not "decisive changes." In this connection, as reported by BTA,
the article criticized "the understanding reached of late between
the United States and China on the basis of anti-Sovietism" and
the "escalation" of the Indochina war.
The GDR domestic radio's Moscow correspondent Seybold on the 23d,
after recounting the events of the President's first day in the
Soviet carital, commented that "the Soviet people appreciate the
good and mutually successful tradition of past Soviet-
U.S. relations," and "it is also known that the U.S. people
remember this fact despite the cold war" waged against the USSR
by "imperialism." The visit, the correspondent added, results
from "the growing realization in the West that it is of great
advantage" to have peaceful relations with the Soviet Union and
the other socialist countries.
ROMANIA Bucharest made its first original comment on the
President's visit in an article in the party daily
SCINTELA by the authoritative foreign affairs commentator
Caplescu on 23 May. Similarly, its first comment on the
President's Peking trip had been made in a SCINTEIA artinle by
prominent foreign affairs commentator Iliescu on 23 February,
two days after the President's arrival in the PRC capital.
Caplescu's article expressed "satisfaction" that the meeting of
the heads of "two states with such dimensions and potentials"
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL PSIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
was taking place despite "the deep differences of views and
of stands determined by the very nature of the soclal systems."
Capleseu described the President's trip to Moscow as an event
in harmony with Romania's awn "Undoes" promotion of peacefu/
coexistence, although it was "too early to anticipate the
outcome" of his talks with the Soviet leaders. As gummarized
by AGERPRES, the article made no mention of Vietnam and did
not recall the Peking summit.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-1.0-
INDOCHINA
The Hanoi radio and press have continued studiously to avoid any
explicit mention of President Nixon's visit to Moscow, but as at '
the time of his Peking visit in February Hanoi currently has leveled
vitriolic attacks at the President and his policies. Commentator
articles in the party organ NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN on 20 and 21 May, respectively, condemned the Present's
"divisive schemes" and "deceit and wooing," and the army paper
specifically accused him of "sowing disunity and sabotaging the
socialist camp." At the same time, Hanoi has reasserted its
confidence that additional aid and support will be forthcoming from
the socialist countries.
The determination of the Vietnamese to persist in their struggle was
voiced by both Truong Chinh and Hoang Quoc Viet at a meetine of the
Vietnam Fatherland Front, with Viet declaring that the Vietnamese
would persist in their independent line but also would strengthen
solidarity with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist
countries. Hanoi has repeated the assertion that neither the mining
of its ports nor the sustained U.S. air strikes can stop its support
of the South. Both Hanoi and the Front insist that the way to settle
the issue is to resume the Paris talks, and the PRO promptly endorsed
the Mr '7 May statement rejecting a UN role or an international
coact: .
Moscow has continued to ohow restraint on Vietnam in the face of the
President's visit and, unlike Hanoi, has avoided mentioning such
sensitive issues as damages to Soviet ships in DRV ports. Meager
comment on Indochina was highlighted by Ratiani's remarks in his
PRAVDA review of Soviet foreign policy on 21 Mr? the eve of the
President's arrival. Ratiani prefaced a passage on Vietnam with
the statement that "the path of negotiations and political settle-
ment of acute international problems is the sole rational and
acceptable course" in international relations.
Adhering to its cautious line of emphasizing Vietnamese communist
resolve to carry on the struggle while minimizing Chinese involve-
ment, Peking muted its commemoration of Mao's 20 May 1970 call for
an anti-U.S. front in reaction to the Cambodian incursion. The
Chinese have lent support to Hanoi's opposition to moves to
internationalize the Vietnam question, and a reference to "accomplices"
in U.S. "political schemes" may have been directed at the Soviets.
HANOI ATTACKS PRESIDENT. MAINTAINS SILENCE ON MOSCOW VISIT
The Hanoi radio and press have totally ignored the President's trip
to. Moscow. The only known mentions in Hanoi media have been in a VNA
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-11-
FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
Vietnamese-language Morse transmission which consists largely
of foreign press pickups and is assumed to be an information
service for select cadres.* This Morse transmission also was
the sole Hanoi medium to carry reports of the President's
Peking visit last February. An item transmitted on 22 May cited
a BBC news report to the effect that neither the Soviet nor the
U.S. side has mentioned Vietnam as an agenda item for the Moscow
meetings but that it is likely to be discussed though not referred
to in the communique. Most of the items have been drawn from
Western sources, but on the 23d TASS was cited in reporting that
two Soviet-U.S. agreements had been signed that day.
Hanoi's avoidance of any reference to the visit in it regular
media has been most blatant in brief items carried by thr domestic
radio which reported cryptically on the demonstrations against
the President upon his arrival in Austria and on Kissinger's
"warlike statement" there that the United States intends to
continue the bombings of the DRV as well as the mining of its
ports. VNA's press review on 23 May said QUAN DOI NHAN DAN had
commented that Kissinger's statement in Austria again revealed
the "extremely stubborn and bellicose" U.S. attitude, but it too
failed to explain Kissinger's presence in Austria. Hanoi radio's
domestic service review of the army paper that day, without further
elaboration, reported that an article said: "In his trip aimed at
pushing the Nixon DL:trine, the U.S. President on 21 May had his
* An article in the April issue of the party journal HOC TAP had
stopped short of mentioning the visits to Peking and Moscow when
it set out to put the President's diplomacy in perspective. It
referred to "visits to socialist couutries" and said that by
relaxing tensions with the Soviet Union and China the Americans
"can hardly find an oppoltunity to solve their difficult problems"
in a way favorable to them, "especially as long as they are still
unable to solve their core problem, the Vietnam problem." Hanoi
domestic media's first and only known explicit mention of the
President's planned visits to China and the USSR had come in the
November issue of THOI SU PHO THONG (CURRENT EVENTS), a journal of
the party central committee's Propaganda and Training Department.
The department's main journal TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING),
in an article in its January-February 1972 issue, clearly reflected
concern over the impact of the President's moves on North Vietnamese
cadres and party members but did not mention the trips explicitly.
See the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, pages 18-20.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
- 12 -
security affairs adviwer Kissinger hold a press conference in
Salzburg, Austria" at which he said the United States would
continue bombing and blockading North Vietnam,
On 20 and 21 May, with the President's arrival in Moscow imminent,
Hanoi radio broadcast Commentator articles from NHAN ')AN and QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN which amounted to lectures to the DRY'. Jig allies
on the proper way to deal with the United States. Referring to
U.S. "imperialism" as the number one enemy of mankind, QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN said that "quickly denouncing and resolutely smashing"
the U.S. "counterrevolutionary attack" in Vietrqm "is the best
and most correct way to defend world peace at present as well as in
the future." It said that "communists always consider the
revolution of each nation as an inseparable part of the world
revolution," and it warned against tolerhting "imperialist crimes"
or showing weakness. The article added that the Vietnamese are
determined to defeat U.S. escalation, "thus making worthy contri-
butions to the defense of the socialist camp and to the promotion
of the national liberation movement and the defense of world peace."
While avoiding any mention of the President's Moscow trip, the
QUAN DO! NHAN DAN article said pointedly that the President "is
sowing disunity and sabotaging the socialist camp" and that together
with the mining of DRV harbors he has "resorted to many dark
schemes--threats, disunity, and wooing--in an attempt to undermine
the revolutionary battleground." The NHAN DAN Commentator article
on the 20th also referred to the President's "divisive schemes
and deceits" and "wicked political intriguer." Like QUAN DOI NHAN
DAN, it warned against any sign of weakness.
Both Hnnoi press article' resorted to extremely vitriolic
language in attacking the President: QUAN DOI NHAN DAN said
he has been called "a fun -ted anticommunist fighter," "a famous
leader of the cold war," t'a double-faced gambler," and "a cruel
fascist." NHAN DAN described him as "an extremely bellicose
aggressor, an international pirate, a loathsome bloodthirsty man,
and a dangerous plotter." NHAN DAN stressed communist and worldwide
protests over U.S. mining and other encalation of the war and claimed
that in the course of condemning the President, people in the United
States and throughout the world are shouting: "Drop Nixon on
Haiphong, put him in the electric chair, and bring him to court
and try him as a war criminal."
As reported by Hanoi radio's domestic service, Hoang Quoc Viet, at
the session of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee, also
seemed to allude to the President's trips. After reiterating
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL PHIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
- 13 -
Vietnamese determination to combine an independent line with
strengthening of unity with the USSR, China, and other brotherly
countries, Viet said: "We vehemently denounce all serious war
escalation steps of the Nixon Administration, which is using
insidious political and diplomatic tricks to sow division among
the world people's front that is supporting the Vietnamese
people . . . ."
DRV. PRG PRESS FOR RESUMPTION OF PARIS TALKS. ASSAIL UN ROLE
The 17 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesnAn's statement which rejected
the notion of an international conference or a UN role in Vietnam*
was followed up on the 19th by a NHAN DAN Commentator article and a
supporting statement from the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman.
MAN DAN echoed the DRV spokesman's statement in claiming that the
United States was trying to promote a UN-sponsored Asian peace
conference which would be aimed at bringing about an internationally
supervised cease-fire "as proposed in the President's 8 May speech."
The PRG statement stopped short of mentioning the President's call
for a cease-fire, saying only that in his 8 May statement he had
"set arrogant conditions which are actually aimed at forcing the
Vietnamese to give up their just struggle for independence and
freedom." Hanoi as well as the Front has obscured the President's
assertion that after an internationally supervised cease-fire and
the return of POW's, the United States would cease all military
action in Indochina and withdraw all U.S. troops from Vietnam
within four months.
The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 19th also echoed the DRV
spokesman's statement in assailing UN Secretary General Waldheim's
"moves" to bring the Vietnam issue before the United Nations and
in scoring the British for calling for a new Geneva conference.
The party paper in an article on the 18th, which stressed the need
to resume the Paris talks, had failed to mention the spokesman's
statement when it referred vaguely to "clamors" for a UN
discussion of Vietnam, the holding of an Asian peace conference,
a cease-fire, and the "internationalization" of the Vietnam issue.
On 24 May VNA reported that the DRV and PRG delegations in Paris had
again pressed for resumption of the Paris sessions, proposing that the
150th session be held on 25 May. Both statements recalled that the
delegations had called for a session on the 18th but that "the U.S.
delegation had refused."
* See the TRENDS of 17 May 1972, pages 1-4.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-1.4-
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY CONTINUES PROTESTS OVER U1S1 ACTION
Hanoi has sustained its pattern of official protests, with six
statements by the DRV Foreign Mtnistry spokesman and one higher-
level foreign ministry statement during the past week. The 18 May
foreign ministry statement--the first at that level since 11 May*
protested raids that day on populated areas in Haiphong and Hanoi.
Typical of the higher-level protests, it expressed the conviction
that the governments and peoples of the socialist countries "will
support and assist still more strongly the Vietnamese people's
just struggle." (According to U.S. spokesmen, a major petroleum-
storage area near Hanoi was destroyed on the 18th.) Protests by
the ministry spokesman on the 17th and 20th claimed that strikes
had hit dike networks, an allegation last made in an 8 May
spokesman's protest.
Two recent editorials reflected Hanoi's expectation that the
air strikes are likely to continue at the accelerated pace. The
army's WAN DO! NHAN DAN on the 24th, editorially hailing the
alleged downing of eight planes the day before, said: "From the
provinces of the 4th military region to the cities, towns, and
localities deep in the northern mainland, all the people have
followed a martial way of life and prepared for a protracted fight;
they are determined to defeat the enemy in the North and, together
with the kith-and-kin South, to smash the Vietnamization policy
of the U.S. aggressors." Declaring that the North cannot be
intimidated, it reaffirmed that thm Vietnamese people will not
waver "even if they have tn fight for five or 10 years or more."
An editorial in NHAN DAN on the 22d also seemed to anticipate a
prolonged struggle when it lectured militia and self-defense forces
on shooting down low-flying planes. It recalled numerous feats of
various forces at the time of the air strikes during the Johnson
Administration and stressed that rifles and machine guns can shoot
down modern jets. It suggested that the defense against low-flying
planes may have been less than satisfactory when it said that
developing "a very strong antiaircraft fire net . . . constitutes a
very important task for all party committee echelons, administrative
machinery, and military organs in all localities." The editorial
* At the time of the release of the 11 May statement, there was oome
confusion in the propaganda over whether it was a spokesman's
or a foreign ministry state:Ont. The 12 May NHAN DAN identified it
as being issued at the higher foreign ministry level.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
- 15 -
stated that all localities "must activate a great many aircraft-
hunting militia and self-defense units, thus dealing low-flying
enemy aircraft, wherever they come, fierce counterblows."
The succession of protests during the past week leveled the
following specific charges:
+ The 17 May foreign ministry spokesman's statement said that on
the 16th U.S. aircraft made "savage attacks on many heavily
populated areas on the periphery of Haiphong and Vinh citieu and
in Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces
and Vinh Linh area," while ships "shelled a coastal village in Ha
Tinh Province." "Many" civilians were said to have been killed or
wounded, dwellings destroyed and "a portion of the dike along the
La River in Duc Tho district, Ha Tinh Province" damaged.
+ The foreign ministry statement on the 18th said air raids that
day "on many heavily populated areas" in Haiphong and Hanoi were
aimed at "many residential quarters" in order to "massacre the
civilian population and destroy economic establishments.."
+ The spokesman's statement on the 19th charged that on 17 and
18 May, "along with the mining and blockade of the DRV ports and
air attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong," air strikes hit "many
populous areas" of Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh,
Thanb. Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh
Linh area. It said that "a large number of civilians" were killed
and "many" houses and economic, social, and cultural establishments
destroyed and that 12 U.S. planes were downed. The statement added
that ships also "wantonly shelled many populated coastal areas" in
Thai Binh, Nam Ha, and Thanh Hoa provinces.
+ The spokesman charged on the 20th that "along with the mining and
blockading" on the 19th, "many" planes "barbarously" bombed and
strafed "many populated areas" in Haiphong, in Thai Binh, Ninh Birth,
Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces, and in Vinh
Linh. Ships were said to have shelled many coastal villages in Thai
Binh and Nam Ha provinces and the islands of Hon Ne and Hon Ngu, in
ThadhHoa and Nghe An provinces, respectively. The statement charged
that on the 20th planes "savagely attacked a number of populated
areas in the outskirts of Hanoi," hitting villages, hamlets, schools,
dikes, factories and farms, "killing or wounding many civilians,
including many women and children, and destroying many houses and
economic and cultural installation:. of the Vietnamese people."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-16-
A VNA item on the 20th reported that U.S. planes on the 19th
"ferociously attacked culverts and sea dikes in village D, in
Tien Hal district, Thai Binh Province, causing many casualties
and subStantial material losses to the population." The item
added that U.S. ships have "hammered" at populous coastal
villages for nearly a month now.
+ The spokesman's statement on the 22d uniquely charged that
on the 21st the United States continued to send airplanes "to
drop mines to blockade Haiphong harbor" as well as to "barbarously
strike" at Ninh Binh city and many oppopulous areas on the outskirts
of Haiphong and in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces. It
claimed that two pla es were downed, and VNA credited the downing.
to anti-aircraft uni s. The 22 May protest was the only one in the
current series to charge that the U.S. "frenzied acts of war"
encroached on the right of free navigation and free trade on the
part of various countries of the world--perhaps because of its
charge of new mining in the Haiphong area.
+ The spoketman's statement cn the 23d charged that the United
States, "continuing to take illegal and criminal escalation steps
against the DRV," on 22 May sent "mime' planei to "barbarously
bomb and strafe many ,populous areas in Yen Bei, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh,
Nghe An, Ha Tit*, and Quang Binh provinces, killing or wounding
a number of civilians and destroying many holies and economic,
cultural, and social establishments of our people."
+ In his statement on the 24th, the spokesman charged that on the
23d the United States "barbarously bombed and strafed" many urban
wards, factories, and schools in Haiphong and Nam Dinh and that
planes "indiscriminately rained bombs and shells", on many populous
areas in Yen Bai, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, and Quang
Binh provinces and in Vinh Linh area. He claimed that "many" homes
and economic and cultural establishments were destroyed. Eight U.S.
planes were allegedly downed and "many aggressor pilots captured or
annihilated." (A Hanoi radio broadcast on 23 May Ipd claimed the
downing of the eight 'genes but did not mention the fate of the
airmen.)
DOWNED PLANES, Hanoi's claims of downed planes since 1 April total
PRISONERS 163, 36 of them claimed since 18 May, for a total
of 3,609 since 1964. Five ;lanes were allegedly
downed on the 18th by the "antiaircraft, air force, and other armed
services"--one in Hanoi, one in Thanh Hoa Province, and three in
Ha Bac Province. One plane was claimed to have been downed in Thanh
Hoa on the 17th. Reports on the 19th said that one plane het been
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
auk
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-17-
downed in Ha Tinh on the 14th, one in Nghe An on the 16th, and
two in Haiphong and one in Quang Ninh on the 18th. A subsequent
broadcast on the 19th claimed that two planes were downed in Ha
Tinh that day and that U.S. "pilots were captured." A VNA report
on the 21st specified that two pilots were 'captured. Hanoi
claimed on the 20th that two planes we e downed by "air defense and
air force units" the): day, and on the 21st VNA said two planes were
downed that day over Ninh Biat:i and Nghe An. On the 23d Hanoi radio
reported the downing of eight planes that day--one each in Quang
Binh, Quang Ninh, Ninh Binh, and Nam Ha and four in Ha Bac--by the
antiaircraft troops and air force in coordination with the army and
people. The broadcast on the 23d also reported one plane downed in
Nam Ha on the 14th, one in Nzhe Am on the 19th, one in Quang Binh
on the 20th, and one each in Nam Ha and Ninh Binh *a the 22d. On the
24th a Hanoi broadcast reported three planes dawned that day, one
each in Quang Ninh and Hai Hung provinces and in Haiphong. It
claimed that U.S. pilots were taken prisoner. The broadcast
also cited three earlier downings, two in Quang Binh on the 20th
and 23d and one in'Vinh Linh on the 23d. U.S. pilots were
allegedly captured in the Quang Binh action.
VNA on 17 May carried an atypical item describing the alleged capture
of two U.S. airmen on 11 May. The report said that pursuit began
on the afternoon of the 11th, described U.S. rescue attompts, and
reported that one of the pilots eluded capture until the morning
of 13 May. However, no prisoners have been identified since 17 April.
TRUnNG CHINH, HANG QUM VIET ADDRESS FATHERLAND FRONT SESSION
Expressions of Vietnamese determination to carry on their struggle
until final victory no matter how protracted the war were highlighted
in reports of a conference of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF)
Central Committee and in editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DO! NHAN DAN
pegged to the 19 May birth anniversary of Ho Chi Minh. Hanoi's first
reports, on 22 May, of the VFF meeting described it only as having
been held "recently," but a 23 May NHAN DAN editorial specified that
it was held on the 20th to mark Ho's 82d birth anniversary.* The
* Following Ho's death in September 1969, Hanoi had marked his birth
anniversary in 1970 and 1971 with a meeting jointly sponsored by the
VIR Central Committee, the National Assembly Standing Committee, the
Council of Ministers, and the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central
Committee. See the 26 May 1971 TRENDS. pages 1-4, and the 20 May
1970 TRENDS, pages 13-15.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL PUS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-18-
meeting was said to by the second conference of the VFFCC,
third term.* In keeping with standard practice, the opening
remarks at the conlerence were made by Politburo member
Truong Chinh and a political report was given by Hoang Quoc
Viet on behalf of the Front's presidium. In addition, Truong
Chinh delivered a regular speech to.the session, and there was
a report on the military situation by Maj. Gen. Le Hien Mai
and an address by Xuan Thuy, head of the DRV delegation to the
Paris talks. Xuan Thuy reportedly discussed DRV policies on
reaching a political solution and condemned the U.S. stand and
"lack of good will." A btatement issued by the conference was
carried by VNA on the 23d.
A 23 May NHAN DAN editorial on the VFF conference said the gathering
reflected the determination of all the people to persevere in
resistance until total victory. The editorial also noted that
Hoang Quoc Viet's report, the conference statement, and statements
from other delegates, including "Comrade Truong Chinh," focused
on the "main task" of the revolution--"to concentrate all forces
on completely defeating the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys,
completely eliminating neocolonialism" in the South, "smashing"
all war escalation, and protecting the North. Both Viet and the
conference statement reaffirmed that "Vietnam is one, the
Vietnamese nation is one," and that "it is an inalienable right of
the nearly 40 million Vietnamese people to resist foreign
aggressors and their henchmen, to unite to resist the U.S.
aggression and to save our country."
Spelling out the North's current tasks, Viet cited the need to
promptly and adequately supply the frontline, to sharpen
vigilance and readiness to fight, to boost production and
practice economy, and to strengthen friendship and solidarity with
the world's peo?le. He restated Hanoi's demand that the United
States respond to the PRG's seven-point solution and asserted that
as long as the United States refuses to recognize the basic rights
of the Vietnamese, they are determined to step up their resistance.
Underlining this resolve, Viet recalled the 10 May DRV Government
statement which repeated the pledge that the Vietnamese people will
fight for five or 10 years or longer.
* The date of the first conference of the VFF Central Committee
is not known, but it may have been convened in December following
the election of the Central Committee by the VP? Third Congress.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-19-
LITTLE MOSCOW COMMENT ON EVE OF PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO USSR
The 21 May Ratiani PRAVDA International Review on Soviet foreign
policy contains the only current substantial Moscow comment on
Vietnam. Consistent with other propaganda on the Soviet policy of
peaceful coexistence and support for negotiated settlements,
Ratiani prefaced his remarks on Vietnam by declaring that "the
path of negotiations and political settlement of acute
international problems is the sole rational and acceptable
course" in international relations.* He added: "However,
recognition of this fact is still forcing its way into practice
with difficulty in a number of cases," and he went directly on
to camplaiu that the U.S.-Saigon side had refused to hold the
150th session of the Paris talks last week.
Ratiani said that the Paris talks had not progressed because
"Washington" is attempting to preserve its domination in South
Vietnam "and the thoroughly rotten Thieu regime." And he quoted
the Belgian Minister of State as having said "in the press a few
days ago" that "military actions could have ceased long since if
the Washington administration had not aspired to stubbornly
maintain President Thieu in power and had permitted the formation
of a coalition government." Ratiani also argued that the path to
ending the war is through talks, since "it is not possible nor
will it be possible to frighten the Vietnamese people or isolate
them from the assistance of true friends."
While Moscow has continued to support the Vietnamese communists in
their insistence that the Paris talks be resumed, it has remained
silent regarding attempts to "internationalize" the issue.
Typically, Moscow did not mention that following the President's
8 May speech Britain had made overtures to the USSR?and to China--
in its role as 1954 Geneva conference cochairman. Moscow ignored
the 17 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement assailing
efforts by the UN Secretary General as well as Britain and the
United States for trying in various ways to internationalize the
issue. TASS on 22 May did briefly report the PRG Foreign Minietry
* Soviet elite statements on the importance of negotiations have not
normally been couched in such forceful terms in recent years. However,
Gromyko, addressing the 24th CPSU Congress on 3 April 1971, did say:
"The Soviet Union and its allies propose that all international matters
of dispute be eolved by peaceful means, by means of negotiation . . .
This is the only realistic way to look at this, and is a method which
has always been in the arsenal of our party, the CPSU Central
Committee, and the Politburo and Soviet Government."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL PSIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
- 20 -
spokesman's endorsement of the DRV statement, but in such a
fashion as to obscure its substance. Thus TASS noted that the
PRG "confirmed its serious attitude toward the Paris talks" but
ignored the PRG's references to efforts fet a peace conference.
Ratiani's cIrcumspection toward the United States and his avoidance
of direct reference to the Nixon Administration was apparent in his
remark that "the American reactionary press" has recently "kicked
up a provocative ballyhoo" regarding the South Vietnamese "liberation"
forces having modern arms supplied by the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries. He went on to say that "these same press
organs" regard the "colossal American military arsenal in Indochina
as something to be taken for granted." Other propaganda currently
has reiterated Soviet determination to continue giving aid. Thus
the 21 May PRAVDA editorial on r's 19 May CPSU Central Committee
plenum, like the 17 May editorial on Soviet foreign policy. reiterated
Moscow's loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism
regarding aid to the Lao and Cambodian "patriots" as well as the
Vietnamese people.
SOVIET SHIPS MOSCOW/8 concern to avoid sensitive issues during
the President's visit is illustrated by its continued
silence regarding U.S. damage to Soviet ships in Haiphong since the
President's announcement of the mining there, although the subject
has been given continuing publicity by Hanoi. Moscow media had
ignored incidents on 9 and 10 May, protested by Hisnol, in which
Soviet ships were damaged.atd Soviet crewmen injured and killed.
On 20 May VNA reported that DRV President Ton Duc Thang signed a
decision on the 16th to confer a posthumous award on a Soviet
crewman killed in the incident of the 10th. On the 21st NHAN DAN
commented on the award, praising Soviet assistance. NHAN DAN said
U.S. aggression had aroused the indignation of the Soviet Union,
China, and other socialist countries and pointed out that the sailors
of the ships in DRV ports are "3oing ahead with their plans of
unloading goods."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-21-
PEKING MUTES COMMEMORATION OF MAO'S 1970 ANTI-U.S. STATEMENT
Peking's comment in the wake of its authoritative reaction to
President Nixon's 8 May announcemlnt on the interdiction of DRV
supply routes has adhered to the cautious line of stressing the
VietnaLese communists' resolve to persist in the struggle while
avoiding any portrayal of a challenge to Chinese interests. In
significant contrast to last year, Peking muted its commemoration
of Mao's major 20 May 1970 statement calling for an anti-U.S.
united front in reaction to the incursion into Cambodia. Peking
chose to mark the occasion this year, coming on the eve of the
President's visit to the USSR, by pressing its line of competition
with "the two superpowers."* Ia what might also be read as a jab
at the Soviets ar well as at the United States, Vice Premier
Li Hsien-nien on the 21st criticized "the military blackmail and
political schemes" of the United States "and its accomplices."**
Li's speech contained no explicit reference to the measures
announced by the President, but these were attacked by several
lower-level Chinese officials in recent speeches as a "grave
escalation" of the war, the charge made in earlier authoritative
reaction. Li and the other Chinese speakers emphasized that the
Vietnamese cannot be intimidated and routinely promised continuing
Chinese support until the war's end. On the same occasion as Li's
speech, the visiting Syrian foreign minister went beyond the
cautious Chinese formulations by condemning the U.S. "blockade" of
the DRV as "a grave threat to world peace."
Chinese officials speaking during Prince Sihanouk's tour of
Northeast China have briefly 3nvoked Mao's 20 May statement in
reaffirming support to the Indochinese, but the restraint shown by
the Chinese contrasted with Sihanouk's more urgent tone. At a
banquet in Changchun on the 18th, Sihanouk assailed the President's
archcriminal decisions" to bomb the DRV and impose "a complete
blockade" of its coasts, adding that "our brothers of North Vietnam
have already made arrangements several months in advance to deal"
* Peking's treatment of the anniversary is di3cussed further in
the China section of this TRENDS.
** Recent authoritative Chinese comment has avoided references to
"accomplices" in criticizing U.S. "political ochemes" in Vietnam.
In the past, Peking has used this formulation to accuse Moscow and
others of improperly meddling in the Vietnam question, and at times
references to a single "accomplice" or "collaborator" of the United
States clearly meant the Soviet Union.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL RBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-22-
with these measures. Seeking to associate the Chinese with the
fate of the Indochinese, Sihanouk cited Mao's 20 May statement
as "the point of departure" for the "joint victories" over the
United States of the three Indochinese peoples "and the great
Chinese people." Similarly, speaking in Harbin on the 23d, he
spoke of China and Cambodia fighting "side by side . . . in our
common struggle against U.S. imperialism." NCNA on 20 May
carried messages to Chou En-lai from Sihanouk and the premier
of his government greeting the anniversary of Mao's statement.
The messages effusively praised the PRC's "mighty support and
immense aid."
The anniversary was also marked by an NCNA correspondent's rceort--
dated the 20th and quoting a dictum from the statement without
actually naming the source--which recounted the military 4evelop-
ments during the 1971-72 "dry season offensive" in Indoch...na,
including "the powerful spring offensive" launched in South
Vietnam on 30 March. Offering an assessment of tile situation ol
the Indochina battlefields now "linked as one," NCNA claimed that
victories "of strategic impo:tance" have brought about "a new
change in the balance of forces" and have created "favorable
conditions for ti' attainment of ultimate victory" in the war.
While this assessment goes beyond what Peking has been saying
about the offensive in South Vietnam, it is qualified by being
applied tl the whole of Indochina for a period of half a year and
by a closing prescrl.ption for the Indochinese to persevere in "a
protracted people's war." An NCNA report on this occasion last
year had similarly referred to victories the previous year of
"enormous stratejic significance" and called for protracted war.
The revival on this year's anniversary of the formula on
protracted war, which was discarded in mid-1971 as Sino-U.S.
relations mproved and Peking took an optimistic view of the
Vietnam situation, suggests that Peking is talking the long view
and does not regard the current offensive in South Vietnam as a
decisive breakthrough.
In what might also be rclated to the anniversary of Mao's
statement, the Canton television on the 19th and 20th devoted
extensive time to documentary films on the Vietnam war, incbding
an hour-long film pegged to DRV Premier Pham Van Doug's visit to
Pe%ing last November.
INTERNATIONAL Li Hsien-nien's reference on the 21st to
CONFERENCE "political schemes" by the United States and
its "accomplices" came in the wake of
statements by Hanoi attacking moves by the United Nations, the
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08calipiltirP85TOOMMEV20050021-7
24 MAY 1972
-23-
British, and the United States to internationalize the Vietnam
question. The Chinese UN representative formally registered
Peking's opposition to a UN role in a letter on 11 May, and
Peking has carried the DRV and PRLi Foreign Ministry spokesmen's
statements, on the 17th arl 19th respectively, and a Hanoi radio
commentary on the 16th rajecting a UN role and the convocation
of a new international conference. Peking's opposition to
internationalizing the Vietnam question is consistent with the
attention it has devoted to the Paris negotiating forum and with
its aversion to an enhanced Soviet role in the Vietnam situation.
Li's remark may have been intended to reinforce Hanoi's position
and to warn others--including Moscow at the time of the President's
visit--against seeking to get a hand in the bargaining.
Peking has acknowledgeu the President's proposal for an
internationally supervised cease-fire in Vietnam by publishing the
text of his 8 May speech and carrying the DRV statements attacking
the proposal. However, Peking has offered no copment on a cease-fire,
in contrast to its attacks on such a proposal advanced in the
President's 25 January address, and it has not reported the 19 May
NHAN DAN Commentator article assailing the notion.
DRV PARTY JOURNAL CITES POLITBURO DECREE ON PRESS CRITICISM
An editorial in the April issue of the North Vietnamese party's
theoretical journal, HOC TAP revealed that the party Political
Bureau had "recently" issued a directive "on the role of the press
in publicizing criticism and self-criticism." Attention had been
focused on the press the month before when on 4 March Hanoi radio
and NHAN DAN publicized a 24 February party Secretariat circular on
improving the distribution of the press.* The HOC TAP editorial did
not indicate when the Political Bureau adopted its directive, but it
may well have been drafted at the same time as the February circular
from the Secretariat. A Political Bureau resolution on the press in
December 1958 was followed five days later by a Secretariat circular on
press distribution.
The HOC TAP editorial underlined the role of the press as a watchdog
for the party and administration by quoting from the 8 Decewber 1958
Political Bureau resolution. It cited the resolution's assertion
that criticism and celf-criticism in the press is a "very important
task" and its observation that: "Our party has become the leader of
* The Secretariat circular is discussed in the 8 March TRENDS,
page 22.
Approved For Release 2000/00WDERINDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 201:600M,LiRA-RDP851Tag8,17M0300050021-7
24 MAY 1972
-24-
the state and the administration, the mistakes of party and
administration echelons, economic agencies, and people's
organizations will be harmful to the masses' interests if they are
not spotted and corrected in time." HOC TAP did not cite the
resolution's further statement that "criticism and self-criticism
in the press is an extremely good method for promptly discovering
and correcting these shortcomings in order to strenvzhen the
relationship between the party and the masses and to correct
bureaucratism."* .
The HOC TAP editorial maintained that "only by publishing public
criticism and self-criticism in the press can we vigorously
motivate cadres, party members, and the masses to carry out most
satisfactorily all political tasks entrusted to them by the party
and state." It added that the publication of criticism slut
self-criticism "is one of the most effective ways to struggle to
persevere and thoroughly understand the party's lines and views in
all fields of activity and daily life and to protect and enforce the
socialist legal system." The role of the press is usually not
raised in this regard, although the party rouLlnely advocates
criticism by the "masses."
The current directive, according to HOC TAP, called upon all
publications at all levels to "constantly carry out mass criticism
and self-criticism on activities of party and administrative organs,
organizations, specialized branches, cadres, party members, and the
state's personnel in implementing political tasks." All cadres,
party members, and citizens were enjoined by the directive to
partictpate in criticism and self-criticism; and it warned that
"obstruction of criticism and self-criticism is a violation of party
discipline and state law." HOC TAP indicated that efforts have, in
fact, been made to obstruct such criticism. It noted that some
persons have not only failed to respond to criticism in the press
but have also "sought to create difficulties for those criticizing
them or for the publications publishing the articles critical of
them and, worse still, have committed improper reprisals against
those criticizing them." Offering guidance to the press, the HOC TAP
editorial warned against "malicious 'criticism' aimed at attacking
individuals, sowing disunity, fabricating stories, distorting facts,
defaming our regime, maligning others, using 'double talk,' or
disclosing state secrets." Listing the primary targets for criticism,
* The text of the 1958 resolution is not known to have been released,
but was summarized in NHAN DAN on 24 December 1958.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875ROMQ0050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIB TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-25-
the editorial called upon publications to concentrate on
criticizing problems of economic management, on stepping up the
patriotic emulation movement, and on heightening the sense of
responsibility and behavior of cadres and party members.
The editorial noted that the press has been implementing the 1958
resolution and has been publicizing the lines and policies of
the party by citing good examples and criticizing deviations.
"However," the editorial cautioned, because of the war and "inherent
weaknesses of the press, criticism in the press has revealed many
shortcomings and has not been able to meet requirements arising
from the performance of revolutionary tasks." Citing specific
shortcomings, the editorial noted in general terms the failure
of the press to focus promptly on the major issues and failure
to correctly analyze reasons for outstanding successes and the
nature and causes of errors.
BACKGROUND Much more serious problems with the press were
decried at the time of the December 1958 Political
Bureau resolution. The NHAN DAY account of the 1958 resolution
indicated that it attackcd "the rightist behavior and lack of a
serious stand by a number of our newspapers and magazines during
the first period after the restoration of peace." And a 24 December
1958 NHAN DAN editorial reported that the Political Bureau had
charged that "a Marxist-Leninist view of the press" was not
"understood, by either journalists or readers, while bourgeois and
unproletarian views of the press still prevail among some of them
and have proved hcrmfule" A two-part article by Luu Quy Ky, now
secretary general of the Vietnam Journalists Association, discussed
the 1958 resolution in the context of the regime's earlier struggle
against "reactionary" publications. The article, published in 26 and
27 December 1958 NHAN DAN, accused the press of "misrepresenting the
ideological viewpoint" and "failures in late 1956." It quoted the
Political Bureau as declaring that "this must be regarded as a
bitter lesson for journalists" and called upon journalists to
"criticize themselves severely to heighten their ideological
viewpoint, spirit of struggle, and awareness."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 200@trkeifilwrEflik-RDP85TIAN51140300050021-7
24 MAY 1972
- 26 -
CHINA
LOW-LEVEL COMMENTARY HITS SUPERPOWERS ON EVE OF MOSCOW SUMMIT
On the eve of President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, Peking
took the occasion of the anniversary of Mked 20 May 1970 statement
to reiterate its strategy in the triangular relationship by pressing
the line of opposition to hegemony by the two superpowers. A low-
level commentary in PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 20th by "a group of workers"
marked the anniversary of Mao's statement, which called for an
anti-U.S. international united front in reaction to the intutsion
into Cambodia, by portraying an emerging united front against the
power politics and expansion of "U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist
social imperialism." Playing on Peking's favorite themes of the
common interests of "mad/tun-sized and small countries" and the third
world, the commentary condemned the two superpowers as "the arch
criminals of today" seeking to dominate the weaker nations.*
The commentary's harsh indictment of the superpowers is less
notable than the fact that Peking chose to mute the anniversary
of Mao's major statement, the occasion last year for no less than
a joint editorial in Peking's three main organs. Taken together
with the appearance of a joint editorial on 13 May marking the 30th
anniversary of Mao's Yenan Talks, the low-level treatment of the
20 May anniversery lends further support to the view that international
considerations rather than internal troubles accounted for the regime's
frilure to produce the customary editorial on May Day this year.
While muting the May Day and 20 May occasions, which would call for
pronouncements on world affairs, Peking was able to produce an
authoritative statement on the Yenan Talks anniversary, involving
internal issues raised in the ideological campaign surrounding the
Lin Piao affair and including pointed anti-Lin references.
* Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien also may have had the Soviet-U.S.
summit in mind when he attacked the Asperpowers at a 21 May banquet
for the visiting Syrian foreign minister. Li warned that the super-
powers are attempting to "decide the destiny of the Arab peoples
and divide spheres of influence." He lectured the Arabs that the
only reliable way to achieve their goals is to "rely on their own
strength and persist in a protracted struggle." Peking has not
directly mentioned the President's USSR trip since NCNA on
14 October reportod the original announcement.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/1A4pfilfrfflaP85T0087MOMM50021-7
24 MAY 1972
-27-
The more complex setting of Chinese foreign affairs stemming from
improved Sino-U.S. relations and the recent phase of Vietnam
developments may have constrained Peking to avoid a major policy
statement on May Day and the 20 May anniversary. Joint editorials
on both occasions last year had promoted an anti-U.S. international
united front, and the one commemorating Mao's statement had called
Indochin the main battlefield in the anti-U.S. struggle. That
editorial had also criticized the Nixon Administration by name,
referred to "fascist rule" and revolutionary struggle in the
United States, and alluded to Moecow only in passing as "the
other superpower."
The changed context of Peking's international role is thrown into
sharp relief against the background of the call in last year's
20 May editorial for an international united front to "isolate
and strike at the chief enemy," the United States. Last August,
following the announcement of Peking's invitation to President
Nixon, the Chinese sought to justify this demarche by elaborating
a flexible strategy directed implicitly at isolating the Soviet
Union as the chief enemy.* Peking argued at that time that a
distinction must be made between adversaries "now committing
aggression against China" and those "not doing so now," the
context indicating that the Soviets are the former and the United
States the latter. An ideological article in RED FLAG No. 5 this
month, continuing a subject from the previous issue on Peking's
strategy for coping with the two superpowers, pointedly referred
to Russian occupation of "vast tracts" of Chinese territory--
the subject of the protracted border dispute--but failed to
mention American actions in China, not even the U.S. "occupation"
of Taiwan.
That the change of strategy may have been a subject of debate is
suggested by a passage in the 20 May 1971 joint editorial stressing
a need for "high vigilance." After claiming that the United States
"will inevitably counterattack" and "even embark on a hazardous
adventure," the editorial conveyed a warning in notably polemical
terms: "It is dangerous if we see only the raging revolutionary
flames but not the enemy who is sharpening his knife, and think that
in view of the excellent situation we can lay our heady' on our
pillows and just drop off to sleep."
* See the TRENDS of 18 August 1971, pages 19-22.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/g -7
24 MAY 1972
- 28 -
CULTURAL THAW, ATTACKS ON LIN MARK YENAN TALKS ANNIVERSARY
The 3(th anniversary of Mao's Yenan Talks on literature and
art has occasioned the first PEOPLE'S DAILY/RED FLAG/LIBERATION
ARMY DAILY joint editorial since 1 January. On the more important
25th anniversary in 1967, at the height of the cultural revolutiou,
there were separate editoriall in all of Ow national dailied,
a special issue of RED FLAG, and public rallies and speeches.
The occasion then was used to stress the need for struggle and
criticism on the cultural front and to attack recently purged
cultural leaders. This year's editorial has called for "deepening
the criticism of and struggle against...political swindlers," but
it also reaffirmed the current relaxed policy on the need to
"allow people to make mistakes and correct them." The editorial
indicated that so long as artists followed guidelines set by the
party leadership they would be able to exercise "socialist
initiative" in the spirit of "let a hundred flowers bloom."
It quoted from the Yenan Talks to make its point that Lin Piao
must be criticized but that artistic controls must be loosened.
It repeated Mao's instruction at Yenan to adopt as "our motto"
Lu Hsun's cluplet:
Fierce-Browed, I cooly defy a thousand pointing fingers,
Head-bowed like a willing ox I serve the children.
The latter point, service to the people, has been taken further by
several of the provincial commentaries on the Yenan Talks
anniversary, which indicated a new concern that revolutionary
dramas have popular appeal. The provincial comment suggests that
more variety will be allowed, including a shift toward more
regional artistic expression deriving from the different regional
traditions. During the cultural revolution, central authorities
kept a firm baud over art and drama, and there seemed to be no
officially sanctioned variation from the few model works acclaimed
by the center. A movement away from this position has been evident
for some time, especially after many provinces called for the
creation of new works to celebrate the Talks.
A Hunan article, broadcast on 19 May, called for "adapting revolutionary
model operas to local opera forms." The article indirectly indicated
that one reason for changing the once-rigid injunction against
tampering with model operas is that popular opinion is not satisfied
by a pure diet of revolutionary Peking operas. The article noted
that there are many local provincial operas and "they are liked by ..he
local masses," even though they contain "a large quantity of dregs."
The article called for adapting model operas to local forms in order
to better understand how to convertlocal operas so that they will be.
"suitable."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/82thatTINP85T0087M90,Raail50021-7
24 MAY 1.972
-29-
A 15 May Canton broadcast of a NANFANG DAILY editorial also cited
the validity of local art forms. Perhaps reflecting traditional
Cantonese pride in their own cultural heritage, the editorial
noted that "local plays and folk songs have their own special
features" producing "rich and colorful forms and styles" which
would be liked by the workers, peasants, and soldiers. The
editorial openly criticized cultural revolution excesses by those
who "cut off history and negate inheritance." To adopt the
viewpoint of "national nihilism" in treating the artistic heritage
was said to go aginst the wishes of the masses as well as against
Mao's line. In calling for rapid growth of literary and art
forces the editorial even suggested that it would be wise to
"have the old lead the new."
A Tsinghai article broadcast on 21 May also came out strongly
for variety in art, though recognizing the dangers of relaxing
controls. As the policy of a hundred flowers is carried out, the
editorial rhetorically asked, "are the poisonous weeds reappearing?"
"Is the reactionary trend ..... repudiated during the cultural
revolution emerging in a new disguise?" The article concluded,.
that "this is entirely possible," but that poisonous weeds should
never be feared to the extent "that we dare not approve of fragrant
flowers." Stating that the "rich, colorful life" of the masses
must be represented by a variety of forms, the article firmly
criticized the "left" policies of the swindlers who called for
"liquidation of literature and art."
MAO FAILS TO GREET VISITING SOMALI PRESIDENT SMD
For the first time since the cultural revolution, Mao failed to
appear to greet a visiting chief of state during the visit of
Somali President Siad from 13 to 18 May. Mao's failure to
appear did not seem to reflect disagreements with the Somalis, who
were seen off from Peking by Chou En-lai and "well-wishers" who
"hailed their successful visit." Presumably the Somalis were given
a reason for what seemed a slight by Mao; it is difficult to
conceive any reason other than ill-health which would suffice.
Mao's last appearance in public was at the Chen I funeral ir
January, but he received both Pakistani President Bhutto and President
Nixon privately in February. Chiang Ching '8 appearance in Canton
on May Day, the first May Day since the cultural revolution which
Mao did not attend in Peking, suggested the possibility that Mao
was in South China too. Chiang has now returned to Peking, on
23 May attending a banquet given for the widow of Edgar Snow.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/0SeanECIAIRDP85T00eifeffigne0050021-7
24 May 1972
- 30 -
PRC RAISES RELATIONS WITH NETHERLANDS, PRESSURES UN BODIES
Peking has further enhanced its international position vis-a-vis
the ROC by concluding an agreement with the Netherlands raising
their relations to the ambassadorial lemel. At the same time
Peking has been seeking to consolidate its position in the inter-
national community by insisting that only its representatives
can represent China in agencies associated with the United
Nations. In tha PRC-Netherlands communique on 16 May raising
relations from the level of charge d'affaires to that of
ambassador, the Netherlands followed a standard formula in recog-
aizing the PRC as "the sole legal government of China." On
the key question of Taiwan, the two sides settled on a new
compromise term in which the Netherlands "respects" Peking's
stand that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. This compromise
stands somewhere between the noncommittal "take note" formula--
introduced at the time of Canada's breakthrough in October 1970--
and the one in the Sino-British communique on 13 March quoting
London as "acknowledging" Peking's claim to Taiwan.*
Consistent with earlier recognition agreements in which the other
side put forth its position on an international issue and the
Chinese expressed support, the Netherlands explicitly interpreted
the principles of peaceful coexistence as implying noninterference
in internal affairs not only between countries of different systems
but "equally between countries belonging to an alliance and having
identical or similar socio-political systems." Peking stated it
"appreciates this stand." Whatever The Hague's motivation, this
interpretation directly contradicts both Moscow's orthodox
doctrine that peaceful coexistence applies only to countries
having different political systems and the "Brezhnev doctrine"
according to which countries in the Soviet bloc have limited
sovereignty and at subject to Soviet intervention as in the
case of Czechoslovakia. Voicing the sentiments of small countries,
the Netherlands may have wished to go on record on this matter
during this period of negotiations on a European security conference
involving relations both between and within the two blocs.
* The Chinese version of the communique used even stronger
language on this issue, in effect saying London recognized Peking's
claim. Theft was no such divergence between the Chinese and
English texts of the PRC-Netherlands communique.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09c41m9Z85T008751WWW021-7
24 MAY 1972
-31-
There is no problem for the Chinese in accepting the interpretation
advanced by the Netherlands. As early as 1970, in the context
of improving Sino-Yugoslav relations, Peking declared that the
principles of peaceful coexistence shonld apply whether countries
have the same or different political systems. Peking had
enunciated a similar doctrine in the 1950's when it played a
mediating role in intrabloc conflict resolution.
UN AGENCIES Peking has recently focused attention on the China
representation issue in the numerous intergovern-
mental organizations associated with the United Nations, stressing
that these bodies must be purged of all ties with the ROC. The
PRC representative to the UN Economic and Social Council summed
up the Chinese position in a speech on 13 May that criticized
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization for
continued association with the Taipei government and went on to
demand immediate expulsion of ROC representatives from all such
UN organizations. Peking has also been devoting considerable
attention to its recent successes in this regard, as reflected
in an NCNA account on the 10th which applauded the expulsion
of the ROC and the seating of Peking's representatives by the
World 112a1th Organization and took note of eight other inter-
governmental organizations that had earlier taken similar action.
Peking is even pressing for the removal of the RPC from those
bodies in which the PRC does not seek participation. Thus, PRC
representative Lin Chi-hain at the UNCTAD conference in Santiago
on 21 May denounced the Znternational Monetary Fund as an
unworkable organization that cannot achieve equality between
large and small states, but he went on to assert that ROC
participation in the IMF is "illegal and invalid."
In a related move, Peking on 5-7 May hosted the founding meeting
of the Asian Table Tennis Union, devoting great attention to the
event including a speech by Chou En-lai on the 7th and a PEOPLE'S
DAILY editorial on the 9th. As described in Peking's comment,
the new, "truly representative" organization will enhance Peking's
unity with the rest of Asia, in contrast to the existing Asian
Table Tennis Federation, which includes the ROC and other pariah
states and which PEOPLE'S DAILY described as "under the control
of a handful of persons" and "an obstacle to friendly contacts."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-32-
EGYPT- USSR
CAIRO/ MOSCOW PRODUCE DIFFERING COMMUNIQUES ON GRECHKO VISIT
Moscow and Cairo media carried markedly different versions of
the communique on Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's 14-17 May
visit to Egypt. While the differences do not fall into a
clearcut pattern, and many of them alone seem meaningless, their
scope and number are remarkable, and the general explanation
appears to lie in disarray stemming from strains between Moscow
and Cairo on the eve of the U.S.-Soviet summit. The two sides'
versions of such joint documents normally contain only minor
discrepancies, most of them traceable to translation. The chief
difference between the two versions of the communique on
Grechko's last previous visit to Egypt, 18-21 February, was in
Cairo's use of the phrase "combat ability" where Moscow used
"defense capacity." This time, unaccountably, a version of
the commuaique Llacribed as "text" by Cairo radio on 18 May,
and also carried by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) and
AL-AHRAM, differed on several substantive counts from various
Soviet reports--the fullest, and ostensibly complete, one in
the military piper KRASNAYA VEZDA on the 18th* and two shorter
accounts carried by TASS and PRANDA.
Grechko's visit was described by Cairo as "official and
friendly" where Moscow called it only "friendly"; yet Moscow
said talks were held in an atmosphere of "full mutual under-
standing, trust, and friendship," while Cairo described the
atmosphere less effusively as one of "understanding and mutual
friendship." At the same time, Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister
and War Minister Sadiq waa reported by Cairo radio w, saying,
after his talks with Grechko on the 15th, that "views on the
militcry situation were exchanged" during the meeting in an
atmosphere of "friendship, full cordiality, and mutual under-
standing." Grechko was received by as-Sadat on 14 May and had
talks with Sadiq in Cairo on the 15th and in Alexandria on the
16th and '1.
* The Soviet military paper did not specifically identify its
version as a "text" but prefaced it with: A communique
published here states*
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved or Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-33-
FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
In the most notable of the discrepancies, Moscow went further
than Cairo in describing the results of the military talks,
but balanced its references to Soviet-Egyptian military
cooperation with a reference to Security Council Resolution
242 which was absent from the Egyptian version. Moscow also
recalled the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, which Cairo did not mention;
but it failed to cite the 29 April communique on as-Sadat's
last visit to Moscow, while Cairo pointedly reiterated that
document's assertion of what Egypt calls the Arabs' "right" to
use "varioug means" to retrieve the occupied territories. (The
Soviet version of the April communique, as rendered by TASS in
English, used the phrase "have every reason to use other means."
Moscow has since used a variety of similar formulations, including
references to Egypt's "right" to resort to "different means" or
"other measures.")
?
POLITICAL There were differing overall appraisals of the
SETTLEMENT Middle East situation. Moscow hewed to its
established line, with its version of the
communique declaring that "both sides reaffirmed their
governments' determination" to seek a just settlement on the
basis of fulfillment of all ciriuses of Resolution 242,
particllarly of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all
Arab territories occupied in 1967. Although Cairo had
subscribed to a reference to the Security Council resolutjon
In the 29 April communique, the Egyptian version of the
current document failed to include this passage. Instead,
Cairo said that the views of both sides were in agreement"
in their appraisal of the situation in which Israel's
"aggressive policy," backed by "U.S. political, military,
and economic support," is still the main cause of exacerbation
of the grave situation. A similar assertion had appeared in
the 29 April communique.
The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and TASS versions carried a watered-down
version of this assertion, truncating and thereby in effect
moderating the reference to the U.S. role: These versions
thus ascribed the continuing tense situation simply to "the
U.S.-supported Israeli aggression" against the Aruba. PRAVDA's
version on 18 May, otherwise virtually identical to TASS',
deleted the reference altogether, thereby divesting it--on the
eve of the U.S.-Soviet summit--of any mention of the United
States in any context. In a roundabout fashion, a Demchenko
article in the 5 May PRAVDA had also seemed to softpedal past
charges against the United States. Like other commentators,
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL PSIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-34-
Demchenko referred routinely to U.S. assistance to Israel, but
he also went to some lengths to recall, but not identify, a
Soviet Government statement "warning Israel" of the responsibility
it incurred by thwarting a political settlement. The statement
in question--long unmentioned in Soviet propaganda--was that of
22 March 1968. Demchenko skipped over the subsequent, and most
recent, government statement of 28 February 1971 which had held
that the U.S. Government "shares responsibility" with Israel
for the Middle East situation.
In general comment associated with President Nixon's visit,
inclut:ing PRAVDA'e 21 May editorial, Moscow has again insisted
on the need for a political settlement in the Middle East. And
a Rntiani international review in the same issue of PRAVDA,
calling the path of negotiation and political settlement of
acute international problems the "sole rational and acceptable
course," saw "an ir.creasingly obvious need for a political
settlement" of the Middle East conflict. A Ryzhikov domestic
service commentary on the 10th in effect cautioned the Arabs
not to take any rash decisions. The situation in the region,
he said, "is.too serious for any decisions and actions capable
of sharply chLnging the state cf affairs in that region not
to be thought out and weighed in all the capitals concerned."
Conveying Egyptian apprehension over the results of the Moscow
summit for the Middle East, AL-AHRAM on 19 May reported a
seminar held under its auspices at which speakers displayed
concern lest Moscow, as well as Washington, continue to be
content with the "no war, no peace" situation. Two participants
called for a "new dialog" with the Soviets which foreign ministry
official Isma'il Fahmi said "must be of a new and special type,
free of any threats." And AL-AHRAM on the 24th, according to
MENA, revealed a Soviet-Egyptian "agreement" that Cairo be
informed of all developments in the summit talks regarding the
Middle East issue. Agreement was reached during as-Sadat's
April visit to Moscow, the paper said, on "full coordination"
between Cairo and Moscow with respect to President Nixon's
visit.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-35-
FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
MILITARY TALKS Both the Soviet and Egyptian versions of
the communique on Grechko's visit noted the
two sides' "satisfaction" with their military cooperation, but
only Moscow claimed that it was developing successfully in
accordance with the Soviet-Egyptian treaty.* Both reported
"an'exchange of opinions" on strengthening and further
developing military cooperation, but only Cairo explained that
this was in order to enhance the Egyptian armed forces'
"fighting capabilities" in accordance with the 29 April
communique, which asserted the Arabs' right "to use various
means" to regain the occupied Arab territories. But Radio
Moscow's Arab listeners were assured, in a commentary
broadcast on the 18th, of their right to use "other means."
And a 21 May KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article reflected Arab pressures
on this point, taking note of Arab impatience with the
stalemated situation in terms reminiscent of Brezhnev's
remark, in his 20 March trade union congress speech, that
"sober-minded politicians" could hardly hope the Arabs
would put up indefinitely with the occupation of their
territories. The Soviet military paper observed that the
Arabs' patience was not unlimited and said they had every
reason to "make use of other methods" to regain their lands.
Moscow's version of the communique added that the two sides
"coordinated practical steps aimed at implementing the
agreement on further increasing Egypt's military potential
reached during President as-Sadat's last visit" to the USSR.**
* A CPSU delegation now on a two-week visit to Egypt, returning
a two-week visit to the USSR in March by an Arab Socialist
Union (ASU) delegation, will attend an ASU celebration on the
27th markiug the first anniversary of the treaty, according to
MENA. TASS on the 23d reported a meeting at Friendship House
in Moscow in honor of the occasion.
** The corresponding passage in the 29 April communique was
couched in vague language, declaring that the two sides "found
it necessary to study again" measures directed at protecting
the Arab peoples' lawful rights and interests, particularly "by
way of further increasing Egypt's military potential." It
added that the sides "reached agreement on a further strengthening
of military cooperation between them. The implementation of
appropriate measures in this direction was arranged."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL
-36?
FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1.972
MILITARY Other variations occurred ie the respective
INSPECTIONS reports of military inspections during the
visit. The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA account of the
communique noted that Grechko, accompanied by as-Sadat, visited
an Egyptian air force unit and that in connection with "the
presence in Alexandric. of a detachment of Soviet warships on
a friendly visit," Grcchko and Sadiq "toured these ships."
Cairo's rendering of the communique mentioned only the visit
to the Egyptian air force base, although Egyptian news reports
did note the inspecti.m of the warships.
Reporting the air base visit, TASS on the 16th said Grechko
and as-Sadat "viewed military equipment" and expressed
satisfaction with the Egyptian pilots' successes in mastering
up-to-date equipment." President as-Sadat, TASS said,
expressed confidence that the Egyptian air force would
fulfill its duty "in case of need" and "defend the Egyptian
people's legitimate rights" against imperialist aggressors.
MENA, however, a,iid as-Sadat and Grechko expressed great
admiration both for the pilots' ability to absorb the "complex
modern equipment" and "for the great combat skill they
displayed."
Moscow apparently made no mention of honors awarded to Grechko
and members of his delegation by the Egyptians: MENA said that
as-Sadat on the 15th awarded Egypt's highest military medals to
Grechko and Marshal Kutakhov, commander in chief of the USSR
Air Force, and that after the final round of talks in Alexandria
Sadiq presented medals on behalf of as-Sadat to Grechko and
Kutakhov as well as to Admiral Gorshkov, commander in chief
of the Sovilt Navy.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/080,irgilipP85T008MME0050021-7
24 MAY 1972
-37-
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SHELESTIS DEMOTION UNDERSCORES BREZHNEV'S POWER
The 21 May TASS announcement that Ukrainian party First Secretary Shelest
has been appointed Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
provided a dramatic disp70 of Brezhhev's power on the eve of the summit.
Like the removal of Voronov as RSFSR Premier last July, the demotion
of Shelest represents a major blow to Brezhnev's opponents, though not
a fatal one since the latter remain on the CPSU Politburo. Although
the nature of Shelest's challenge to Brezhnev is unclear from the
public record, the timing of the move against him--on the heels of a
CPSU plenum that endorsed Brezhnev's "peace" program--will no doubt
be read in party circles as a sign that the issues in dispute related
to foreign rather than domestic affairs.
As Ukrainian patty boss since 1963, Shelest gained prominence as an
uncompromising hardliner, particularly on foreign affairs--a reputation
that owes much to his bellicose stand during the 1968 Czech crisis.
More recently, however, Shelost's pronouucements on foreign affairs
have been in line with the prevailing consensus. For example, while
continuing to refer to "imperialists" in bellicose terms, Shelest
as recently as last October ln East Berlin supported Brezhnev's
moves toward detente with West Germany, explicitly endorsing the
Soviet-FRG treaty, the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, and the
Brandt-Brezhnev talks.
On the domestic side, Shelest has on more than one occasion shown
coolness toward Brezhnev personally, as well as reservations toward
the latter's consumer welfare program. More importantly, he has
vied intensively with Brezhnev's Ukrainian proteges over control of
the Ukrainian apparatus. Though apparently not faced with any
imminent threat to his position, Shelest seemed to have lost ground
in this fight after mid-1970, as his rivals gained control over key
Ukrainian posts. The influence of Brezhnev's proteges, led by
Premier Shcherbitskiy, reached a high point in 1971 when Shcherbitskiy
attained a status of virtual equality with Shelest by virtue of his
promotion to full membership in the Politburo at the 24th congress.
In recent years Shelest appears to have been particularly vulnerable
to criticism of his handling of nationalities and cultural problems.
This vulnerability was evidenced by the transfer of a KGB official
from Moscow to head the Ukrainian KGB in mid 1970 and by the subsequent
crackdown on nationalist dissidents, which culminated in a wave of
arrests early this year. Criticism of Shelest was also implicit in the
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000N/AtiNclil-RDP85TCAMIER300050021-7
24 MAY 1972
-38-
repeated attacks on his proteges and cohorts in the Ukrainian
cultural apparatus for laxity in enforclng ideological discipline
among writers. As a result of these attacks, Shelest launched a
cultural crackdown last year which led to the ouster of the
liberal leadership of the Ukrainian writers union.
CONSERVATIVE TAKES OVER SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
PRAVDA on 16 May identified Sverdlovsk philosophy professor
M.N. Rutkevich as new director of the Institute for Concrete Social
Research, replacing the liberal A.M. Rumyantsev who headed the
controversial institute from its foundation in mid-1968 until last
year. The institute was established as a center for empirical
sociological studies, but its unorthodox works have been under
constant attack by doctrinaire party ideologists in rival
institutions. The appointment of Rutkevich appears to signify a
downgrading of the institute, since he lacks Rumyantsev's
prestigious credentialn as a member of the CPSU Central Committee
and an academic leader. The appointment coincides with other
indications of a general tightening of ideological controls in
the social sciences.
Rumyantsev's removal was revealed in the 1971 yearbook of the
LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA (signed to press on 6 October 1971), which
listed him as director of the institute in 1963-71 and a member of
the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences from August 1971 on.
Although Rumyantsev was re-elected to the Central Committee at the
24th CPSU Congress in April 1971, his removal from the institute
was foreshadowed by his failure to gain re-election as Vice
President of the USSR Academy of Sciences at the May 1971 general
meeting of the academy (he was retained on its 41-man presidium).
Although the yearbook failed to identify Rumyantsev's replacement,
it carried a brief biography of Rutkevich, which identified him as
a professor at Ural University and the Ural scientific center.
The inclusion of this biography in a publication normally reserved
for prominent officials was the first sign that Rutkevich was
being groomed for higher office.
The elevation of a conservative and relatively obscure philosopher
over the heads of the liberal deputy directors of the institute,
F.M. Burlatskiy and G.V. Osipav, clearly represents a setback for
the forces of enlightenment in the social sciences. Rutkevich's
orthodox leanings were revealed shortly after the formation of
the institute, when he sided with other conservatives in warning
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBI S TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
-39-
against attempts to create a sociology independent of Marxist
philosophy (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 3 August 1968). At the age
of 55, Rutkevich has been a professor at Ural University in
Sverdlovsk since 1953 and head of its dialectical materialism
department and dean of its philosophy faculty since 1966. In
the latter capacity, he instituted a course in sociology,
began training sociologists, and sponsored the publication of
a sociological journal (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 19 December 1969).
He may owe his recent advancement to acquaintance with CPSU
Politburo member Kirilenko, who headed the Sverdlovsk party
organization from 1955 to 1962.
CONTROVERSIAL The Institute for Concrete Social Research
RESEARCH CENTER was organized in mid-1968 following the
publication of the August 1967 Central Committee
decree on improving work in the sociAl sciences. The appointment of
Rumyantoev as director clearly enhanced the prestige of the new
institution. A former chief editor of PRAVDA and KOMMUNIST and a
member of the Central Committee, Rumyantsev had gained renown
as a liberal spokesman. In an 8 June 1968 INESTIYA article
Rumyantsev, Burlatskiy, and Onipov indicated that the pioneer
institute would aspire to leadership in sociology, coordinating
all Soviet research in this field and employing empirical and
mathematical-statistical methods not previonsly used ir the USSR.
From the outset the new institute encountered hostility from
the rival institutions in the social sciences. For instance,
P.N. Fedoseyev, soon after becoming director of the Institute of
Marxism-Leninism in 1967, warned ;.n an October 1967 PARTY LIFE
article against efforts to "separate sociology from historical
materialism" or even set the first above the second. "Thus,"
he wrote, "certain scientists think that mociology rests on
quantitative methods, while general theory deals with analysis
of qualitative changes." Rutkevich, in the above-noted article,
echoed Fedoseyev's warnings, observing that the recent "attempts
to create some kind of 'new' Mawist sociology outside historical
materialism, without it, above it, etc." are based on "misunderstanding
of the basic fact that theoretical sociology was created by Marx and
Engels and that it is called historical materialism and is a special
philosophical science."
The conservative attacks on the institute were accompanied by
organizational and personnel changes in the social sciences. In
November 1970 a Central Committee decree reorganized the Academy
of Social Sciences; a new director, M.T. Iovchuk, was installed
and several new department.) (party construction, theory of state
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/h9 -7
24 MAY 1C72
-40-
and law, and theory of methods of ideological work) were created.
The academy's deputy director, G. Ye. Glezerman, warned in a March
1971 KOMMUNIST article against setting concrete social research
against historical materialism and declared that social research
could be effective only within the framewoa of historical
meterialism. At the May 1971 session of th. USSR Academy of
Sciences Fedoseyev replaced Rumyantsev as vice president of the
academy.
At the 21-23 December 1971 Moscow conference of heads of university
social science departments, Fedoseyev said ic is "wall known" that
methodological "errors" had been committed in sociological research--
namely. "copying of schemes and modeis originated in bourgeois
sociology, underrating of the general theoretical role of historical
materialism, narrowness of statistical-empirical base" (KOMMUNIST,
No. 1, 1972). But he cautioned against the adoption of a
"nihilistic attitude toward concrete sociological research" and
called for "serious, deep concrete sociological research based on
Marxist-Leninist theory."
On 24 December 1971 a USSR Philosophy Society was formed, with the
aging neo-Stalinist philosopher F.V. Konstantinov as president and
Rutkevich ae one of seven vice preeidents. The new society's goals,
defined by Fednseyev in his opening speech at the formative congress,
called for intensification of the influence of Marxism-Leninism in
the humanities (QUESTIONS OF rHILOSOPHY, No. 1, 1972).
Other changes affecting the Institute for Concrete Social Research
were later announced. The April 1972 HERALD OF THE ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES (signed to press 4 April) revealed that the scientific
council for problems of concrete social research which supervised
the institute had been merged with the scientific council for
economic problems of scientific-technical progress and renamed the
scientific council for socio-economic and ideological problams of
the scientific-technical revolution, with Kosygin's son-in-law
D.M. Gvishiani as chairman. Moreover, the scientific council for
information in the field of social sciences was abolished at this
time and its functions were transferred to the Institute for Scientific
Information on Social Sciences, created in 1968.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
- 41. -
OKINAWA REVERSION
TERMS OF AGREEMENT SHARPLY DENOUNCED IN COMMUNIST MEDIA
The reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administrative control on
15 May has drawn hostile comment from Peking, Moscow, and the
Japan CP. In condemning the terms of the reversion agreement,
Peking has used the occasion to reiterate its claim to sovec-
eignty over the Senkakus. Moscow denounced the Okinawan agree-
ment for failing to provide for a complete U.S. military
withdrawal from the island and warned of deepening Japanese
involvement "in the struggle in the Far East and Southeast
Asia under U.S. leadership for U.S. intereats." The Japan CP
faulted the agreement for "violating the 4ational demand of
unconditional and full return of Okinawa" and called for
"abolishment of the treasonous and aggressive clauses of
the agreement."
PEKING , While minimizing the U.S. role, Peking has seized
upon the reversion of Okinawa to Japan to breathe new
life into its longstanding polemical campaign against the Sato
Government. The main thrust of an 18 May PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article, for example, was that aince several U.S.
m:litary base,.. still remain on the island the Japanese Govern-
ment could not rightfully claim that it had achieved "reversion
of Okinawa to the fatherland." Avoiding any reference to the
Nixon Doctrine, which once figured prominently in Chinese
comment on U.S.-Japanese relations, Commentator claimed that
"Okinawa continues to be an irportant bridgehead of U.S.
imperialism for its aggression in Asia" and that the "propaganda
of the reactionary Sato Government that Okinawa would become an
'island of peace' can fool nobody."
Commentator took sharp issue with the reversion agreement for
including the Senkakus in the area of reversion. Terming this
part of the agreement "a serious encroachment on China's
territory and sovereignty," the article warned that "the
plot of anyone to occupy and annex China's territory will
never succeed." Reflecting Peking's sensitivity on this
issue, the article specifically castigated the Sato Government
for "declaring that ships of its maritime security force will
be sent to 'patrol' these islands." Like last December's PRC
Foreign Ministry statement which authoritatively asserted
Peking's claim to sovereignty over the Senkakus, however, the
article did not outline any Chinese course of action and linked
recovery of the disputed islands to the eventual incorp,"tion
of Taiwan.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/0pahiAIMDP85T0087BN0NSIE0050021-7
24 MAY 1912
-42-
Peking's current interest in assuming a more flexible posture
toward Japan--a tactical move aimed at influencing the China
policy of Sato's eventual successor--was reflected in the
article's failure to follow the usual line of connecting
Okinawa's reversion to a portrayal of Japan as an expanding
military threat. Last June's agreement formalizing plans
for the reversion of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands
to Japanese administrative control had triggered, for example,
a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentate:a article which speculated that
the signing of the reversion agreement "by the U.S. and
Japanese reactionaries" has brought "their military collusion
the new stage of building up a joirt operational system in
preparation for an aggressive war."
MOSCOW Soviet commentaries have sought to focus attention
on alleged shortcomings in the terms of the reversion
agreement in an apparent effort t: provide more fuel for the
ongoing campaign, originally launched during Foreign Minister
Gromyko's January visit to Japan, aimed at stimulating Japanese
interest in closer economic cooperation with the USSR. An
Afonin commentary broadcrst in Japanese by Radio Moscow on
15 May, for example, asserted that as a result of the return
of Okinawa to Japan "the number of foreign bases in Japan has
drastically increased" and "the scale of military operations
to ba carried out from them has been enlarged." Afonin portrayed
the terms of reversion as "an important factor in materializing
Nixon's 'Guam Doctrine" which "is aimed at making Washington's
allies in Asia participate more postively in the imperialists'
aggressive strategy in this area." Touching on an extremely
sensitive Japanese domestic issue, Afonin claimed that Japan
has no means of confirming the removal of nuclear weapons on
Okinawa and forcefully argued that "recent developments in
U.S.-Japanese relations show that the United States does not
consider it necessary to inform Japan, its ally, in advance of
any decision which is very important to its foreign policy."
"If the same method is adopted in connection with U.S. nuclear
weapons on Okinawa," Afonin continued, "there is a danger that
Japan will be turned into a U.S. nuclear base."
Afonin sounded similar themes on 13 May when he told his Japanese
audience that "what Japan is to obtain on 15 May is not just
Okinawa Prefecture" but that "about 100 new military bases will
accompany it." This fact, according to the commentator, "will
involve Japan more and more in cooperation and complicity in
the barbarous U.S. aggression." Rubbing in the point that "the
CONF/D?:NT FAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 MAY 1972
- 43 -
Japanese people learned more than once last year that the United
States does not bother to consult with Japan even on important
economic, political, and other problems which directly concern
Japan's interests," Afonin asserted "that there are aspects in
the Okinawa problem which are hidden from public opinion both
at home and abroad" and predicted that the "prior consultation
arrangements under the Japan-U.S. security treaty" will not
effectively control the activities of U.S. forces within Japan.
JAPAN CP Reiterating familiar propaganda themes on Okinawan
reversion, the JCP issued a formal statement on
15 May which pointed to recent U.S. moves in Vietnam as evidence
of the "treasonous and aggressive nature" of the reversion
agreement. Denouncing Washington for "intensifying the bombing
of North Vietnam and challenging the world's peace and nations'
sovereignty by blockading the DRV," the statement portrayed the
terms of the agreement as "going along with the Nixon Doctrine"
and as "forcing Japan to accept the continuous presence of huge
U.S. military baces on Okinawa and closer collaboration with
the U.S. war program in the Far East."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050021-7