TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050019-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 10, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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h J Pp pct el ash 8+~ 1' "exttwrely gravy tpeponmlbtllty" with him
mllitaty Move, noted that it in an elecIiots year In the unit .I
HtateN and that "Kutnpe is the scene of encautagifill davvl(1l?+,ant?
and Nixon hlmnelt has been preparing to visit the fir)Viet 11ntim
this May." Accotding to MTI, the President sought to give the
impression that peace and rapprochement continue to be him ata,,
but him words "carried not much conviction." A dispatch trn,i,
Nov Yotk broadcast by the Budapest domestic service on Ilia gth,
citing ccwsment on the speech in the United States, noted that
"while he did not even mention Peking, Nixon's speech and the
measures announced vote aimed 4Katnst the goviat Untonl open
provocation and deliberate risks ere mentioned." The correspondpnl
concluded that "it seems probable that Nixon has reduced the
chances of his Moscow visit to a minimum."
A Prague radio commentary on the 9th, while not directly
discussing Moscow's interests in tha development, said that the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries will continue to
support the Vietnamese people and recalled that Urechko's VF:
Day order of the day repeated that the Soviet Union will render
support and assistance.
ALBANIA In routine comment on the President's announcement,
Tirana has again played the theme of Soviet-U.S.
collusion. A domestic service commentary on the 9th and one by
ATA on the following day denounced the mining and asserted that
the President is presenting a "humiliating ultimatum" to the
Vietnamese. They cited the President's remarks on Kissinger's
meeting with Broshnev and other Soviet leaders, quoting the
President as saying the Soviets showed an interest in ending
the war on a basis just to both sides and indicated that they
would use their "constructive influence." The ATA commentary
also noted the President's reference to a "new relationship"
with the Soviet Union.
DPRK Pyongyang reacted promptly with a foreign ministry
spokesman's .tatement on the 9th which assailed the
U.S. "blockade" as a "very grave criminal act violating the
sovereignty and security of the Vietnamese people" and "an
insolent challenge to tho world people." Pyongyang does not
normally comment at this level or this promptly on Presidential
statements on Vietnam, and internal evidence suggests that the
statement was initially prepared as one of the DPRK's standard
expressions of support for DRV Foreign Ministry statements
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CONp111p,N'TIAI, ltitlH TIiKNIH
10 MAY 1Ul1
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rout Ina al sitpmpnl anpport 11111 "trpcant" 0111V y0 atamattl s r_ondamn Ittg
11.14. I"ttnltItIg.
A 10 May NOfUNII !1 NMt-N odltorial awwassad the 1'rooldant'M spaaeh
in more .Ipta1I and with typical vitriol. Tho editorial called
flip blorkftig of Ilia UNV porgy "a now criminal act expanding t'iu
wqr of aggrpwulon In Vietnam to aft extremely grave Otago," a
""
.gravy tapnarp to peace in Indochina and Asia and the world," and
a vicious challenge to the world peace-loving people." it
attacked the President personally ism "a truculent warmonger,
murderer, and vicious enemy of peace." Claiming that the now
measures demonstrate the bankruptcy or the U.S. talk of peace
and of the Vtotnamiration plan, the editorial. concluded with
a routine afrirmation of "active support" for the Vietnamese
people.
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CONY tDICNTIAl. VDIH TKItNUH
10 MAY 1972
PRC PROTESTS U,S, ATTACKS ON CHINESE SHIPS OFF NORTH VIETNIbl
Consistent with its normal reaction time, Peking has not yet
reported ProoLdent Nixon's 8 Hay announcement on mining North
Vietnamese ports, but a foreign ministry statement L4suod Less
than 15 hours after the President's speech protested alleged
U.J. eholling of two Chinese merchant ships during the period
6 to H May. The statement, dated the 9th, charged that U.S.
warships and aircraft repeatedly attacked the Chiness ships
anchored near Vinh .net th*t Chinese crew members and Vietnamese
civilians were wounded and the ships seriously damaged. Calling
this "a grave provocation" against: the Chinese people and
expressing "great indignation," the statement lodged "a strong
protest" and demanded that the U.S. Government prevent the
recurrence of such incidents..
While thus putting a protest on record, Peking's reaction to
the alleged shelling exhibits the restraint which has marked its
approach to recant developments in Vietnam and reflects its
interests in the improved Sinn-U.S. relationship. In contrast
to the last previous protests over similar incidents, in late
1967 and early 1968,* the statement made no reference to Chinese
aid to the Vietnamese. The previous statements had charged that
the United States was attempting to prevent Chinese aid and to
blockade Vietnam, and had reaffirmed Chinese determination to
continue providing aid. Also absent from the current statement
was any mention of Sino-U.S. relations, apart from a pro forma
warning that the U.S. Government must bear full responsibility
for "all the grave consequences" of such incidents. In place
of the politically charged elements present in past protests,
the current statement reserved the right to demand compensation
for losses--a new element twat seems also to defuse the
incident.
DRV REACTION Immediately on the heels of the Chinese
protest the DRV Chamber of Commerce issued a
statement candeoviing the alleged bombing of Chinese ships and
pointedly linking the incident with alleged attacks on Soviet
* The comparable previous foreign ministry statements were
on 1 February 1968, 7 January 1968, and 2 December 1967. There
were subsequent, less authoritative statements--by spokesmen of
the foreign ministry or of "the department concerned"--charging
provocations against Chinese fishing vessels on the high seas.
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0W.'0ENTIAL V1118 TRENDS
10 MAY 19%2
and other IEast European whips durJng tiro 10 Apr l i ra lAs un
Ilalphong. UnIlku the Chlnesu statement, the DRV one donouncod
thu Nixon Adminlitration by name. 't'he URV statement also made
a point of cllrlming that U.J. moves could not undormino the
nuiritlma and trade rolatlons bro woon the DRV anti other countries,
tl.ouglr there wr no refoironco to the President's 8 May
announcement. NCNA promptly reported the DRV statement, duly
Including Its reforoncus to previous attacks on Soviet ships
and to shipping between the DRV and other countries.
CHINESE CAUTION Prior to the foreign min4.stry protest Poking
had conspicuously avoided issuing official.
statementz on Vietnam developments. Until. last month Poking had
regularly seconded official statements by ;lnnoi, but an 11 April
DRV Government statement and subsequent statements--including
party-government appeals by both the DRV and the PRG--did not
elicit Chinese statements on a comparable level.* Even Peking's
practice of textually replaying official Vietnamese communist
statements was breached in the case of a 6 May DRV Foreign
Ministry statement on U.S. air strikes. NCNA's account omitted
the charge that the striker had "the express purpose" of killing
civilians and that "the utterly obdurate, bellicose, and ruthless
nature of U.S. imperialism" nas proven to be "even more savage
than Hitlerite fascism."
Peking's caution has also been exhibited in PRC media's coverage
of battle developments, consisting of pickups of Vietnamese
communist reports and commentary. In editing these accounts
Peking has skirted some of the more optimistic communist
appraisals of the situation, and the only acknowledgment in 1'RC
media of the communists' claim to have eatablisLed a "provisional
people's revolutionary committee" in Quang Tri Province was an
LPA report carried by NCNA on the 9th which mentioned the office
of such a committee for Quang Tri town.
In general, Chinese leaders have continued to avoid commenting
on Vietnam even as visiting speakers have raised the subject.
As to be expected, however, rolitburo member Chen Hai-lien
ieferred to the Indochina war in speaking at a banquet on the
8th welcoming Sihanouk to Shenyang. Excerpts of Chen's remarks
disseminated by NCNA contained no specific reference to the
* Peking's most recent statement seconding one by Hanoi was a
10 April PRC Foreign Ministry statement in support of a
comparable DRV statement of 6 April protesting U.S. air strikes.
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CONK I DICNi' I Al, 101118 TRENDS
10 MAY 1912
currant, ol'I'undIvu In NnUlh Vielnran. Chan rurtinaly pludltad
(;Maude dupporl fur the Cambodian "and thu other Indochfnadu
pauplu" In their war against "U.S. aggraddinn."
DRV All) OFFICIAL Puking has publicized the praddncu of 1)1W
Vice F ruign Trade Minister Ly ::in "to
discuss" the PRC's 1972 .economic all,' Military "oupp iumuntary
adsidtancn" to Viatnum. 'rho 1.972 suppiamuntary aid protocol
was signed in Poking on 1.1 January by the DRV ambassador and it
PLA deputy chief of staff. NCNA's announcement on Ban's
arrival on 3 May deported from past practice in noting speci-
fically that the official had come to discuss aid and that he
had becn sent by the party central committee as well as by the
DRV Government. Hanoi has not thus far reported the visit.
NCNA reported on the 6th that Chou Ln-lei and Li 11sien-nien
met Ban that day in "a very cordial and friendly atmosphere"--
a characterization used by Peking for meetings with close
allies and one u,ed for Chou's previous meeting with a DRV
aid delegation last July. Other Chinese officials present
included Communications Minister Yang Chieh, who had returned
to Peking by air that day after an extended tour of North
Vietnam in the wake of the U.S. raids on Hanoi and Haiphong
in mid-April, and the head of the armament section of the PLA
logistics dnpartmer%t.
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CONI'IDIO.N'1'IAI 1PBIS '1'RIrNDH
I:0 MAY 1972
.
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT SCORES STRIKES AT NAM DINH CITY
A 6 May DRV I'oruign Ministry statement protesting the air strLkus
at Nam Dinh city to the first protest against, the U.S. strikes to
be Issued at that lovol. since early April. A DRV Foreign Ministry
statement had appeared on 6 April., and a government statement on
the 11th had condemned the President's decision to step up air
and naval. attacks In the face of the communist offensive in the
South. But since the 16 April DRV party-government appeal
pegged to that day's strikes against Haiphong harbor and the
Hanoi area, the DRV had been issuing itc frequent official
protests at the level of the foreign ministry spokesman.
After protesting the Nam Dinh city strikes in the foreign
ministry statement of 6 May, Hanoi reverted to the spokesmAn's
level on 7 and 6 May, even though one such protest on the 8th
broke new ground in saying the United States had "deliberately
struck" at the dike system and a second scored strikes near
Hanoi that day. Although a 10 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary
charged that by the "intentional" bombing of the dike system
President Nixon "had sullied U.S. honor and offended the American
people's conscience," other available comment has not echoed that
charge.
The reported U.S. shelling of populated areas of Haiphong by U.S.
ships on the 9th and U.S. raids on Hanoi, Haiphong, and Yen Bai
and Hai Hung provinces on the 10th have not yet drawn protests,
although Hanoi media reported that two U.S. destroyers were
damaged on the 9th and one on thv 10th by Haiphong forces. Also on the
10th, the media reported that 16 planes had been downed in that
day's actions--nine over Hanoi, three in Haiphong and two each
in Yen Bai and Hai Hung. The reports on the plane downings over
Hanoi charged that U.S. planes "attacked many residential quarters,
hospitals, and other places" in the city and damaged "a number of
historical relics." It said "many" U.S. pilots were captured.
Those downings brought Hanoi's total of claimed U.S. planes to
3,558, with 112 allegedly downed since 1 April.
Hanoi's protest against the 6 May raids on Nam Dinh city at the
level of a foreign ministry statement indicated that it viewed those
strikes as a serious escalation. The statement called them "a new
step of war escalation, a very serious one and an utterly blatant
act of aggression" against the DRV, characterizations somewhat
harsher than the spokesman-level descriptions of U.S. strikes as
"barbarous acts of war" or "criminal" or "frantic war escalation
acts."
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CONK I I) tN'I' LAL hll I S TAKND8
10 MAY 1972
Underscoring charges that the U.S. tMrgets wend aunmllitnry, thu
foreign ministry statement used language common to other rucdnt
protests when it said the strikqis were "for the express purpose
of killing the civilian population and destroying dcon"lc,
cultural, and social establishments"; specifically, it charged
that in Nam Dinh, the United States "mobilized a grant number of
aircraft in successive attacks" to "indiscriminately" bomb
areas of "heavy population, factories, and public facilities,"
and it claimed that many civilians were killed or wounded and
many houses and other property were destroyed. But a VNA report
on the 7th suggested another possible reason for the level of the
protest when it pointed out that Nam Dinh In "the textile city
and third largest" in North Vietnam and that the strikes took
place while the population was taking its "noon siesta." That
report also vaguely mentioned "many" deaths and injuries, but
no precise statistics have been issued. (The VNA report claimed
that the Nam Dinh antiaircraft unite "shot down two Phantom jets.")
Unlike recent protests by the spokesman, the foreign ministry
statement asserted that U.S. "sabotaging" of the Paris talks
"in a serious manner" and the "frantic increase" of U.S. air,
naval, and marine forces off the coast of Vietnam as well as the
escalation allegedly represented by the Nam Dinh raids constitute
"proof" that the Administration "is sticking to its scheme to u-'e
armed violence to salvage the 'Vietnamization' policy." The
11 April government statement had similarly suggested that the
Administration had embarked on "new military adventures against
the DRV" in hopes of salvaging Vietnamization. Like that statement,
the 6 May foreign ministry statement affirmed the Vietnamese
people's will to continue the war. It warned that "for all its
bombs, its insolent threats, and its perfidious schemes," the
United Staten cannot "shake the iron-like determination" of the
Vietnamese to fight.
Stating that "we will smash all its military adventures against
North Vietnam and will bring to naught its 'Vietnamization' plan
in South Vietnam," the statement said the DRV Government "most
vehemently denounced to the world public this crazy, savage war
escalation." It appealed to the "governments and peoples of the
fraternal socialist countries, the countries cherishing peace
and justice, international organizations, the world people and the
people of the United States to act even more resolutely and more
forcefully to stay the blood-stained hands of the U.S. aggressors."
Appeals to the socialist countries have been formulated in various
ways since the 6 April foreign ministry statement, which called on
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CON VI.l)I;N'I'IAt, FHi9 TRENDS
10 MAY 1.972
the "governments and poop.l.ue of the fraternal. socialist countries"
and others to check the "new military adventures" of the United
States and demand that it and Vietnam ization and respond to the
PRG's seven points, Including the two-point elaboration. The
29 April foreign ministry statement on President Nixon's
26 April. TV speech repeated this formulation. The 11 April
government utatement called on the "governments and peoples of the
fraternal, socialist countries" and others to "stay the hands" of
the United States and increase support and assistance to Vietnam
as well. as to Laos and Cambodia. This formula recurred in a
foreign ministry spokesman's statement on he 13th, although
much appeals have normally not appeared at the spokesman's level.
CHARGES IN SPOKES- A 4 May spokesman's statement charged that
MAN'S PROTESTS U.S. planes on the 3d "kept barbarously
attacking many populous areas" in Nghe An,
tin Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area, "causing
many civilian casualties including 10 pupils of the primary school
of Ky Lam village, Ky An district," and that U.S. ships "shelled
a number of coastal villages in Thanh Hoa and Quang Binh provinces."
Three planes were reportedly downed.
A 5 May protest charged that on the 4th U.S. planes "savagely
struck at many populated areas" in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang
Binh and that U.S. ships "wantonly struck at populated areas of
Nghe An and Ha Tinh."
The spokesman charged on 7 May that "elung with barbarously attacking
Nam Dinh city," U.S. planes and ships on 5 and 6 flay attacked "many
densely populated areas" in Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and
Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh. It said five planes were
downed and three ships "set afire."
The first of the two spokesman's protests on the 8th said that on the
previous day U.S. planes and ships "barbarously bombarded many
populous areas" in Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and
Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh. It charged that U.S. planes "Also
deliberately struck at the dike system in Nam Ha." It said two planes
were downed and one ship "set afire."
In the second protest on the 8th, the spokesman said the United States
continued on that day to "bomb and strafe many localities in Ninh Binh,
Nghe An, Ha Tinh" and Vinh Linh and "to strike aL a cumber ci
populated areas in Ha Tay, west of Hanoi." It claimed that two planes
were downed, and a VNA report specified that they were downed in Ha Tay.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 MAY 1972
DRV, PRG LAUD MONTH OF "VICTORIES.." EXPANDED "LIBERATED AREAS"
Communist achievements in the first month of the "offensive and
uprising" in South Vietnam were highlighted in a 6 May communique
of the South Vietnam PLAF command which claimed that "brilliant
victories" have dealt "a very hard blow" at Vietnamization and
brought a "quick change" in the balance of forces on the battle-
field, creating major changes in the war situation. listing
specific achievements, the communique claimed that during the
past month the "armed forces and people" had killed, wounded,
or captured more than 90,000 allied troops, of whom 10,000
were captured. This claim duplicates the communists' allega-
tion at the time of the 1968 To,t offensive that 90,000 troops
were put out of action in the first 30 days of fighting.
The PLAF communique listed numerous South Vietnamese Government
military units allegedly eliminated or badly damaged in the
offensive, stating among other things that the ARVN 3d and 22d
divisions were "wiped out." The communists also claim to have
destroyed or captured 750 tanks and armored vehicles, 2,300
military trucks, and 460 cannon of 105-mm and 175-mm caliber,
as well as "tens of thousands" of guns. The communique said
530 aircraft were downed or destroyed. In addition, according
to the communique, 40 major allied bases were destroyed, 19
military sectors, subsectors, and installations in district
c'pitals "wiped out," and "thousands of other positions"
either overrun or abandoned.
A 7 May NHAN DAN editorial, pegged to the PLAF communique,
underlined the alleged scope of allied losses when it observed
that "almost half" of the 13 ARVN regular divisions had been
"annihilated or heavily decimated"* and that the ARVN had lost
almost half its tanks and armored vehicles and almost one-
third of its artillery." The impact of the attacks on the
ARVN has been stressed in other comment, including an 8 May
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article which compared the current period
* Summing up ARVN losses by division, VNA on the 9th claimed
that--in addition to the 3d and 22d divisions, which were
"taken out of the roll-call"--the 1st, 5th, 18th, 21st, 23d,
and 25th divisions and the airborne and marine forces each
lost from one to three brigades or regiments. The 2d, 7th,
and 9th divisions each allegedly lost from one to four
battalions.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 MAY 1972
to 1965, when the ARVN was "attacked and disintegrated . . .
chunk by chunk," and to the 1968 Tet offensive when the ARVN
was dealt "a stunning blow," The army paper commented that
in these prior cases "U.S. expeditionary troops were deployed
to provide a military shield and morals: prop and to create
conditions for the puppet troops to consolidate themselves."
The article observed that "the situation has now changed"
since the bulk of U.S. troops have withdrawn and the ARVN
has "no protective shield, no stable rear base, and no peace-
ful time to consolidate."
LIBERATED AREAS The PLAF communique, like other propaganda,
stressed the importance of the expansion of
communist control in South Vietnam. It asserted th&t "uprisings"
have been coordinated with the armed attacks and claimed that
"two more million of our people have seized control and liberated
their native lands."* Describing the "newly liberated areas" as
being "linked to one another and to the old ones to form a com-
prehensive, organic system," the communique said that these areas
are being built and consolidated and are "serving the front in
an active manner by contributing, in terms of manpower and
wealth, to the victory of the resistance war." The role of
the newly controlled territory had been pointed out for
example, by the North Vietnamese military commentator "Chien
Thang" (Victor) in an article published in the 3 May issues
of NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.** Chien Thang asserted
that "the enlarged liberated areas are serving as extended
offensive springboards" and added that "the source of our
strength has been extended, whereas the enemy's replenishment
sources have been increasingly limited."
* As a result of the Tet offensive, the PLAF command communique
at the end of 1968 similarly claimed that "uprisings" that year
had "liberated" an additional 1,000 hamlets containing more than
two million "compatriots." At the end of 1968, the communists
were claiming control over 11 million people in South Vietnam.
Vietnamese communist propaganda has avoided mentioning figures
on total population control in South Vietnam since 1969, and
the current communique similarly contains no such figure.
** The Chien Thang article is discussed in the 3 May TRENDS,
pages 4-6.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 MAY 1972
Also on the 3d, a Liberation Radio commentary noted that
"the creation of many large, firmly interdependent liberated
areas not only contributes toward splitting the enemy's
strategic posture, but also is of great significance because
these lib sated areas serve as springboards for extending
our offend ve and uprising" and "bring into existence a vast
rear base directly providing human resources for the frontline
struggle." The commentary went on to stress the ".argent and
major task" of "consolidating" these areas, both to serve the
offensive and to demonstrate "the superiority of a genuinely
revolutionary regime that real'.y cares for the livelihood of
the masses." Among other things, the commentary urged
normalization of the economy and produc.ion, indoc-ination
of the newly "liberated" people, and the formation of
guerrilla and militia forces and combat villages and hamlets.
In a similar vein, a 6 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial hailed
"the liberation of many additional large, densely poptlated
areas" and claimed that "the expansion of the liberated areas
is one of the important factors in changing the balance of
forces and the war situation to our aide's advantage and to
the enemy's disadvantage." It echoed other comment in noting
the role of these localities as a rear area, a springboard
for attacks, and a source of men and materials. Citing the
tasks of liberated areas, the editorial highlighted the need
to carry out combat-related construction and to "build nucleus
leading forces," strengthening those "loyal to the revolution"
and consolidating the "contingent of cadres." The editorial
claimed that many locations have set up "popularly elected
revolutionary administrations" and that, "on the basis of
positively building political forces, the newly liberated
areas have concentrated on building the armed forces" in
their regions. "Each liberated area," according to the
editorial, "must possess forces ready to fight immediately
and forces prepared for long-term activities in order to
keep the initiative under all circumstances." QUAN DOI KHAN
DAN called upon youths in these areas to join the army and
"compatriots" to "serve as civilian laborers on the firing
line and support combat."
S'.ITEMENT ON A 7 May PRG Foreign Ministry statement
ALLIED "CFIMES" accused the United States of committing
"genocidal crimes" against "newly liberated
provincial capitals and district towns in Sou;.h Vietnam." The
statement alleged that the United States has attacked urban
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10 MAY 1972
areas controlled by the communists with planes, including B-52's,
and warships. "More serious still," it charged, "the Nixon
Administration has ordered aircraft to carry out sature.iGU
bombing" on various townships and the provincial capitals of An Loc
and Quang Tri "with the extremely inhuman purpose of wiping away
everything, including the wounded puppet troops left behind in
their flight, destroying all houses, pagodas and churches, and all
the ecology in these areas." The statement maintained that these
"criminal acts" have caused "serious losses in life and property."
It called upon the socialist people and governments and others to
"condemn in time and take resolute actions to stay the bloody hand,
of the Nixon Administration and intensify support anal assistance
to the South Vietnamese people's struggle."
QUANG TRI Propaganda in the wake of the communists' cipture
of Quang Tri Province is predictably jubilant, with
comment pointing out that this is the first time in nearly 20 years
of fighting in South Vietnam that a province hat been totally
"Liberated." Discussing the military significance of the fall of
Quang Tri, both Front and Hanoi media, including a 4 May QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN article, claim that the communist forces smashed a major
allied defense system and thereby undermined the allies' tactic of
relying on strong fortifications, armored forces, strong artillery
fire, and air power.
The prcpiganda called attention to alleged support of the Quang Tri
population for the "liberation forces" and noted at the outset that
efforts were being made to organize the people--to build
"adminin?.rations," strengthen "combat villages," and so on. Finally;
on 4 May, Hanoi and Front media announced that a "people's
provisional revolutionary committee" had been set up in Quang Tri
city and released a communique from the committee. This document
proclaimed the abolition of the previous administration. It called
on officers and soldiers of the Saigon army and police and
employees of the former administration to "report to the
revolutionary power," bringing with them weapons and documents;
demanded that order and security be preserved and property
respected; and underlined the need to "keep military secrecy and
assist the PLAF and the revolutionary power."
IUE Communist media are not, for the most part, discussing the
military situation around Hue, although an 8 May LPA
roundup of fighting in the South recalled the fall of ;ire Base
Bastogne (designated Done :rank base by the communists) on the
night of 28 April and observed that the liberation armed forces
were "putting pressure on the enemy southwest of Hue city."
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Approved For Release 200P
10 MAY 191)
On 4 May Liberation Radio publlclaud an lrppuul, datad tha 3d,
from the '11,i:a Thien-flue LlburnIIon Front and I'nopIa'a
Revolutionary Commtttue and the Ilue Alliance of National,
Democratic, and Peace Forces which called on "compatriots" In
Hue and in district capitals to "Join the offensive and
uprising movements" and to "take tc the streets," fl-mly
"refusing to follow the cruel puppets in their retreats
and struggling to overthrow Thieu and "regain control of the
city." Declaring that "the hour of firm action has struck,"
the appeal called for the launching of attacks and uprisings
to commemorate 19 May (Ho Chi Minh's birthday), to implement
[lots testament, and to "repay the kindness of our northern
compatriots who have aided and are aiding us to the fullest
extent." It warned of allied efforts to use civilians as a
"shield" against attacks, to muster people to help defend Rue,
and to bomb and shell areas so as to "force our compatriots
to follow the remnant troops in their retreat:." The people were
urged to oppoae these measures, which were labeled "the frenzied
reaction of the enemy in his death throes." They were also
asked to help refugees from Quang Tri and to "persuade" them t-
return home.
BINH DINH The capture on 2-3 May of T..nd1og Zone English--the
last government position in northern Binh Dinh
Province--and other communist achievements in the central Trung Bo
delta provinces of South Vietnam have prompted Hanoi press comment
noting the significance of the liberation of these "densely
pcpulated and wealthy" areas. A 4 May NHAN D~.N editorial, hailing
the fall of Landing Zone English (designated De Duc Base by the
communists), summed up alleged achievements in the province,
claiming, for example, that from 9 to 29 April 11,000 allied troops
had been put out of action, including 2,500 captives and defectors.
According to the editorial, the liberation forces 'gave also
capt'%red the district capitals of Hoai An, Hoai Nhon, and Tam Quan,
and the military subsector of Vinh Thanh. In addition, it said,
these forces have "liberated" Hoai An and 'Dinh Thanh districts,*
part of Hoai Nhon district, and "many arer.s" of Phu My, Phu Cat,
An Nhon, and Binh Khe districts.
The editorial commended the Binh Dinh "armed forces and people"
for "smashing" the allied pacification plan "in an important area,
liberating many densely-populated areas linking one district with
Or Vinh Thanh is a district designated by the communists which
includes a portion of the GVN district of Binh Khe.
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t,nNV I hr,NT i Al, VN I N Tpt:,hitta
10 NAY ibt7
anolhor, and crpat ini{ oxt t snoly ravnral+lo now oppottunit loll"
ror this raMINtanro. NotltI this appllratInn In Minh hitili it flip
r.onmtunlata' 10-point prosoly(InK policy which )l1courdlipm flip
aNNimilatlun (it brcyact pi amontof or the pcipulatinn, the odiflit ial
ranaaertad flip Ifne that "exr.ppt: fur to minority and to anta1I
number or erual hoollgani, the majority" or those in the Hotgon
army have boon "torcad to remain In the ranks." It claimed
that "almost all the civil Belt-detansp rorres and scorON tit
civil guard and gait-datanse units had laid down their weaponN
or turned them on the "hooligan commdnnders" and "returned to the
poop p1-0 ."
A QUAN DOI NVAN DAN editorial on 5 May reviewed alleged communist
advances throughout the central Trung Ho dolts area, highlighting
action in Binh Dinh but also claiming that in Quang Nam (roughly
corresponding to the GVN province of Quang Tin), for example, the
district of Iliep Duc had boon "liberated" along with a "Largo
area" from the outskirts of Tam Ky city to fliep Duc. Underlining
the "strategic importance" of "initial victories" in the central
delta area, the editorial said the allies are being deprived of
sources of manpower to help the AItVN recover its strength. It
claimed that "with the densely populated and interdependent
liberated areas and with the weapons seized from the enemy, the
revolution has acquired new conditions for further stepping up the
local people's war, developing its offensive position, and
extending its offensive springboard." The army paper maintained
that, in the current phase of fighting aimed at defeating
Vietnamization, the "acceleration of the people's regional war
is of great strategic significance."
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I9114MIJitNIIAI, i'14114 I"O'Nnr:
In MAY 1141)
PLKIN1i h1fWK1 9!C(14b /WN1VCk5NiY Or 511UW(1UK"i 0G'A Nt
PekinK matkp+I flip mp-(-nd an,,Ivotaaty of flip fntmat ion of imianonk'a
g(lvpttltaotll III PKIlo (OGN1i) (]it It May, as if 11141 loaf yogi, with a
Krppt itiKa mpaaaKp rtinn Churl P,n-141 to UWltI PramI t )'$#It1 North,
There wass no 11,011LI','N (JAILY a411t(1r1aI, as there wag 1gal year,
a I though wimp I nw- l pva l 1'ak i fig (?ummpttt eta l gad flip N(lNU' a
accompllahmpnta, (;hoil'a mpaaage, 1111IIk' (lip n110 lnst ypat.
Inc11141O41 all Implicitly 41111-Nnvia( jail When it oftaaaa(I that
(lie NCUIJ to (hp '' all I p I pK 1 t imat p govortimpn t" of flip Cambodian
people that has bean rarogttln,pd by "sits Incroaning number of
counI. tIpis."
An NCNA commentary on the anniversary warned that "certain pnwera"
are trying to not up a "Khmer third torc.p" to "split" Slhanouk'a
front (PUNK) and governmel'.t and to undermine relations lit'twern thr
Cambodians and the North Vietnampse. It recalled that Sihanouk
gave a "powerful response" on 1.9 March when lie rejected any
compromise with the Phnom Penh regime and refused to negotiatr
with it third force. Sihanouk had made these remarks at n Peking
banquet marking the second anniversary of his arrival In the
('RC capital and of the formation of the PUNK and Cambodian
liberation army. On the name occasc_on, Chou had nluo nuanilc'd
"certain powers" for trying to net up a "Khmer third force,"
an appn~-ent denunciation of the Soviets and possibly the French
no would-be medintore.*
As in 1971, Moscow Ignored the RGNU anniversary, connistenk
with its failure to recognize Sihnnouk'n government. Moscow
had given the FUNK anniversary moderate attention, in line
with its public support for the struggle of the Cambodian
"patriots," but it did not mention either Sihanouk or his
government.
* Peking used the earlier anniversaries to put on a mn.jor
show of support for Sihunouk's movement. See the 22 March
TRENDS, pages 23-25.
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(A INN 11-1-,N1 1 Al, V111 H '1'$1 NtN
10 MAY 1917
SALT AND DISARMAMLNI
MOSCOW CONTINUES WINE COMMENT PEKING REAFFIRMS STAND
MoMCUw comment on 14ALT continueM at it routine and minimal. lava],
totally ignoring the optimiMtic remarks reportedly made by
Secretary kogars during hiM foreMhortened ruropean tour. Two
commantarirn in Moscow a I+,ngliMh-language service on 5 and 6 May--
befora i'ruuident. Nixon's speech on Vietnam--discussed SALT
within the broad context of the Soviet "peace program." Citing
statements by Breshnov, the commentaries routinely affirmed
that the Soviet Union to In favor of a "mutually acceptable"
SALT agreement on the basis of the principle of equality
between the USSR and the United States without either side
seeking unilateral advantage over the other. The plenary
meeting of the SALT delegations in Helsinki on 9 May went
unreported in Soviet central media, as is often the case.
Spanking at the third UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), PRC delegation deputy head Lin Ping on 4 May
reaffirmed Peking's standard line on disarmament. Lin
denounced the "two superpowers" for their "stepped-up arms
expansion and war preparations . . . and their strife for
world hegemony," declaring that in this context the question
of disarmament "cannot possibly be settled." He also reiterated
Peking's call for a world summit conference to discuss the
complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and,
as a first step, "to reach an agreement on the non-use of
nuclear weapons." Lin's statements in effect update Peking's
refusal to participate in the five-power nuclear conference
and the world disarmament conference proposed by the USSR or
to take its seat at the Geneva disarmament conference when it
reconvenes on 20 June. They also represent a rejection of the
Soviet invitation, made authoritatively by Brezhnev in his
20 March speech, to have "other" nuclear powers become
"participants" in such arrangements as the September 1971
Soviet-U.S. accords on measures to lessen the risk of nuclear
war.
Lin's speech--made against the background of public speculation
about a forthcoming Soviet-U.S. SALT accord and Just two weeks
prior to the scheduled Presidential visit to Moscow--also
included an oblique denunciation of any agreement to be reached
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111 11AY IV/J
by the two pcrwera. Noting that this "auporpu,wora" are "talking
abouft disarmament every day" but dCtcl?hly engaglt'g dally "in
arms expane ton," Lin duc fared that "ti - eu-ca l tad nuclear d is-
armament which they are supposed to reek 10 entirel.yr for the
purpose or monupolit-,ing nuclear weapons in order to~ carry out
nuclear threats and blackmail."
Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio i'nacu and Progress on the
8th predictably took Lin to task for his "bewitching but empty
talk about the disarmament .issue." Thu radio pointedly suggested
that if I'uking wants disarmament it "should adopt a posit Eva
attitude toward di.aarnuununt" at either the Geneva talks or thin
UN General Assembly, adding that "the Chinese leaders completely
ignore" the Geneva talks and take a "negative attitude" at tho
United Nations toward the Soviet call for a world disarmament
conference.
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(JUN It I I)I0,N'I' I Al. It81 H 'I'RINI)N
10 MAY 1172
MIDDLE LAST
GOLDA MEIR IN RUMANIA: BUCWARFST CAUTIOUS, MOSCOW COOL
Novlut mudl.n virtually Ignored Israeli Prime Minister Golda Muir's
4-7 Mny oil'lc.lal visit to Romania, reflecting Moscow's evident
coolnusa toward Bucharest's initiative. Romania's publicity for
thu visit was correct but carefully measured, reflecting sensi-
tivity to thu Soviet reaction and to the delicate nature of
Bucharest's position in the tangled area of Middle East diplomacy.
SOVIET REACTION Thu Moscow central press--with the exception
of PRAVDA--carried a one-line TASS report
from Bucharest noting Mrs. Heir's arrival. Not until the 8th
did PRAVDA mention the visit, briefly reporting her departure and
carrying a short item, broadcast the day before by Radio Moscow's
Arabic service, noting doubts expressed by Cairo's AL-AHRAM that
the visit had brought tangible results.* The only other moni-
tored Soviet report was a two-line item carried in Moscow's,
domestic service on the 8th observing that the communique on
the visit said the talks were held in a cordial atmosphere and
that the two sides exchanged views on bilateral relations and
"a number of international problems."
Radio Moscow commentaries on 3 and 4 May, broadcast only in
Romanian, reiterated Soviet charges that "imperialist and
Zionist circles" were trying to disrupt Soviet-Arab relations,
pointed to the USSR's economic and military support for the
Arabs, and cited Cairo sources as praising Soviet-Egyptian
friendship and cooperation.
ROMANIAN COVERAGE Mrs. Meir was given somewhat less attention
than Romania usually accords visitors of her
rank from noncommunist countries. Bucharest media reported that
official talks with Prime Minister Maurer o;jened on the 4th, and
AGERPRES summarized speeches at a dinner given by Maurer that
evening. The news agency quoted Maurer as saying Romania supports
* The Romanians apparently have taken pains to reassure Cairo
about the visit: The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 7th reported
Romanian embassy sources in Cairo as telling MENA that Ceausescu
stressed to Mrs. Meir the need to implement Resolution 242. He
also emphasized, MENA said, that Bucharest will not recognize any
form of foreign occupation and that it advocates an end to "the
policy of expansion by force."
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CON It I UI',N'I' I AI, VIII N TN14NI)N
10 MAY 191)
it Middle ISawt Mattlamunt on I.Iita haNIM of IIN Nocurity Council
Resolution 242, presupposing IMrac?II withdrawaI I'rum the
ocruplad trrrftorius; In n notably briar, two-paragraph aummary
or Mrs. M&'Ir'o rrmcirks, It mrntlonvd that shr "outlined"
[ w r n v I ' N pow I t ion on tha conf I Ict and axprtdMMltd igracintunI with
the Roman Inn view that problems between Mt11t4&s must bit solved
puncufuI.Iy.
Bucharest nw d[a did not report more explicit stntumuntw by MrM.
Meit, publicized by Jerusalem radio, on the passibility that
Romania might use its influence to facilitate an Arab-Idrnull
settlement. Jerusalem radio on the 5th reported her as spying
Israel believes Romania could "use its influence on the Middle
East countries in leading them to open negotiations." A
similar remark was said to have been made by Mrs. Meir in talks
with Ceausescu, and Jerusalem radio on the 6th cited "Romanian
Government sources" as saying Ceausescu had tried in those talks
to find a formula that would make it possible to bring the Arabs
and Israelis to the negotiating table. Ceausescu, according to
the Israeli radio, did not suggest Romanian mediation.
Bucharest reported no details of Ceausescu's 5 May meeting with
Mrs. Meir or of the "short toasts" at his luncheon for her that
day. It reported their "continued" talks on the 6th without
explaining, as Jerusalem radio did, that the second round of
talks with Ceausescu necessitated cancellation of a scheduled
second meeting between Mrs. Meir and Maurer.
The bland communique, as carried by AGERPRES on the 7th, says
the talks were held in a "cordial atmosphere" and that bilateral
relations are developing normally. In the only specific
reference to the Middle East conflict, the two sides merely
support continued efforts toward a peaceful settlement. The
communique notes Meir's invitation to Maurer to pay a return
visit; in addition, according to a Jerusalem radio account
on the 6th, she invited Ceausescu to visit Israel, an invitation
not publicized in monitored Romanian media. Reporting Mrs.
Meir's return to Israel on the 7th, Jerusalem radio said that
details of Ceausescu's visit "have not yet been decided."
'NIN' INTERVIEW On the day of Mrs. Meir's departure, AGERPRES
WITH CEAUSESCU reported an interview Ceausescu granted to
the Yugoslav weekly NIN in which the Romanian
leader repeated Bucharest's position on a political settlement
of the Middle East conflict based on Resolution 242, leading to
Israeli withdrawal and to a peace in which the integrity and
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CON It II)I NTIA1. pllI14 TREN011
U) MAY 1911
0ocurlty nr onrlt atato wnuld ha guarantpod.* Ile Mldaatappod a
qupat hill oil l ud i ng (o (lip Ma I r vi M i t to Ni-matt l e i AMkad ' ' I t it.
In a tnnttor or tti dI t Ion" or nr a Rnmanlan arfnrt to oxplaln
the Egypt inn stand to 1-4raal, lip rapt lad vaguely that Romania
pxpInina Its pealtlrnt nod vlpwpolntu nn pntl%M of a polItIral
MVitt lumpnt.
Agalni t the I irkgrnunel of npparent Soviet dirrplanMitre wl.th
Rcmnnlct'a recent dlplomatlc offor.ts. Ceausescu reasserted his
country's right to Independently "elaborate its political line."
Ile remarked that "attempts are being made to return to a
certain negntlve state of affairs" in the world communist
movement--an apparent allusion to the Soviet Union's efforts
to get its nibs" to "coordinate" their foreign policy with
Moscow. Ceausescu underlined the need for "equality" among
parties as wel.1 ns for "recognition that the existence of a
lending center In no longer possible."
MOSCOW DECRIES CRITICISM OF ITS AID TO ARABS. MIDEAST POLICIES
Soviet comment in the wake of Egyptian President as-Sadat's
recent talks in Moscow suggests continued sensitivity to Arab
criticism of the USSR's aid to Egypt and of Soviet policies in
the Middle East. In addition to the stock complaints about
"imperialist and Zio'tist intrigues" aimed at discrediting
Soviet policies, a 5 May PRAVDA article by P. Demchenko deplored
the activities of "openly rightist, anti-Soviet elements" in
"certain Arab countries." These elements, he charged, seek to
undermine the internal social reforms and the foreign policy
orientation of. "the progressive Arab countries" and try to "smear"
Soviet=Arab relations by describing them as temporary or "by
alleging that Soviet aid is insufficient." Demchenko asserted
that such allegations became more widespread on the eve of
as-Sadat's Moscow visit, requiring "Egypt's statesmen and the
progressive Arab press" to deal a "decisive rebuff to the
* Jerusalem radio reported on the 8th that the Israeli Foreign
Ministry had investigated reports that Bucharest radio that day
had broadcast a statement by Ceausescu saying a Mideast solution
involving Israeli withdrawal will be achieved through Resolution
242. The foreign ministry ascertained, the radio said, that
"no additional communique" from the Romanian president concerning
the Middle East had been published in Bucharest.
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CIINVIDEN'I'IAI, I'IlIN '1101NI)!U
10 MAY 1 9 / )
huwt.I IV aLt sock w." Dame hc?nkois tutus nn aI Iamacl attempt a i u
Introducu dimeord, tlta rant Inuing urrortm In utltnr colimiPllt.ttrlt+a
to dufund 1kwIvt-Egyptian ralatlons, and a marked wtruwa on
HovIat pulp In wtrongthaning Calro'N ntttttary-dufonM' potatttlal
wuggu:ct thnt Moscow [of not ronvinrud that the Egypt Ian Ivadur-
whip has quallud thu critlclsm.*
GRECHKO VISITS TO The Cairo AL-AHIZAM'is 9 May announcctmunt of
SYRIA AND EGYPT Soviet Defense Miniwtur Gr&tchko'w forth-
coming visit to Egypt, no yet unmenttonrd by
Moscow, was forewltndowctd by Egypt tan minister Fun'd MurMI in it
statement broadcast by Radio Moscow in Arabic on the 4th and
repented on the 8th. He said that as-Sadat's talks In Moscow
gave rime to the hope that "other meetings will take place, in
Egypt this time," which will decisively end "rumors and
attempts to cause disunity and discord" bet??aen the two
countries. AL-AIIRAM, according to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY,
said Grechko would visit Cairo after his current talks in
Syria. Quoting a "Soviet source," the paper said his
discussions would be a continuation of the recent as-Sadat-
Brezhnev talks in Moscow. (Grechko was last in Cairo in
February, two weeks after as-Sadat's 2-4 February visit to
Moscow.) Suggestive of preparations for the Grechko visit,
MENA, reported on the 8th and the 9th that Hafiz Ismail,
presidential adviser for national security affairs, had
received Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov on both those days.
Grechko's 10-14 May Damascus visit, announced by TASS on the
6th, is presumably designed to make up for his scheduled
December visit, canceled when he reportedly became ill while
visiting Iraq. His itinerary at that time was also to have
Included Somalia, which he visited in February prior to his
talks in Cairo. AL-AHRAM's 9 May report said Grechko's Syrian
visit "might be extended for some time depending on the progress
of the Syrian-Soviet discussions"--a possible allusion to
strong Soviet pressure to obtain Syrian consent to a Syrian-
Soviet treaty, which Arab press reports say Damascus has been
* An analysis of Egypt's situation by the Hungarian party organ
NEPSZABADSAG's foreign political editor, reported by Radio
Budapest on 4 May, said the Egyptian leadership was concentrating
on consolidating the domestic front and holding down the
"extremists"--which he identified as reactionary elements as
well as "impatient leftists who would push Egypt into action
for which it is unprepared."
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CONP I I)hNT I Al. PHI N l k NI1N
U) MAY 191).
romIwtIng, 1)amamcum radlu ravualad on i May that. the Nyrian
army rhlal' of mtaft had bean In Mnmrow when It rapurtad,
wlthrnct alaboratIon, that ha had roturnod to Hyria from the
Novlat Unlntt that day.
A5-SADAT TOUR In line with Itw truatment of as-Sadat'm
previous vlsits to oth rr Arab countries,
Moscow ham glvon meager publicity to the Egyptian president's
4-6 May talks in Algeria, also attended by Libya's al-Qadhdhafi,
and film 6-H May visit to Tunisia; Soviet media apparently have
not yet mentioned his 8-10 May stay in Libya. TABS did briefly
report the communique on the tripartite talks In Algiers, as
well an the Tunisian-Egyptian communique. Predictably, TASS'
account of the second document failed to include the passage in
which the two presidents expressed their belief that the United
States and the Soviet Union "should intervene now to find a
satisfactory solution as soon as possible" in order to prevent
further exacerbation of the Middle East conflict.
Belyayev, participating in the Moscow domestic service commentators'
roundtable on 7 May, spoke approvingly of the rapprocheme.ct among
the three Arab countries at the Algiers meetings, assessing the
relationship between Egypt and Algeria as "particularly important."
A Moscow broadcast on 6 May in Arabic and in French to Africa,
pegged to the tripartite talks, recalled that during as-Sadat's
Moscow visit "special emphasis" was laid on the fact that "the
most important prerequisite" for a just settlement of the Middle
East dispute is consolidation of the unity of all Arab peoples
on an anti-imperialist basis. The broadcast added that every
Arab delegation visiting the Soviet Union has understood Moscow's
attitude on this "very important question." It conceded that
there are obstacles to unity, such as "the differences between
various parties and movements and between some Arab countries,"
but it maintained that conditions are suitable for the unifica-
tion of the "anti-imperialist, progressive forces" in the Arab
east.
USSR PRESSES POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. PLAYS DOWN "OTHER MEANS"
After initial hesitation, Soviet commentators are now making
more frequent reference to the new formula in the 2y Aprii
Soviet-Egyptian communique asserting the Arabs' right to use
"other means," as well as political methods, to regain their
land. But Moscow also continues to pursue its line on a
political settlement, maintaining that the Soviet Union is
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(()NleIDU:NTIA1, I-NIH '1'I(1?N111I
10 MAY 1912
cirmrnl t Lucl to this courau and tlu+t Lhu ArahM are Nt I I I try big
to achiavu it puacuful PO IILI(,al. wnlutIon. Thum a RnwwudIn
forul.gn-Innguug,u communLnry on 4 May m uINted Lhat. Lhu USSR
"Iuulw duty-bound" to help bring about such it Nut.tl.umunt.
Calls for I nip I t'ffltu Lit IL on of Security Council RUNOIuLIon 242
4$INo conLlnuu Lo appear. KudryuvLNUV argued 1n I.ZVESTTYA
on Lite 5th that it "totuIl.y practicable plan for it political
wattlumunt" ttx1NLN In that rusolutEon.
While womu Sovl.ut comment has cited Egyptian sources or
merely reiterated the language of the communique In referring
to "other manna," the formula has been used in various Instances
in conjunction with the idea of a political settlement. The
most pointed example came from Belyayev, in the domestic
service commentators' roundtable on tl,a 7th, when he declared
that the Soviet-Egyptian approach to the crisis is characterized
first of all by a resolve to press for a political settlement.
Belyayev went on to define qualifications for the use of other
means, remarking that when Israeli-U.S. actions "threaten the
cause of peace in the Middle East" the Arab countries, primarily
Egypt, may use other means to liberate the occupied territories.
Demchenko, in PRAVDA on the 5th, similarly defined the right to
use other means "under conditionE" where "hostile forces are not
abandoning their plans to thwart a political settlement" and
make the Arabs capitulate.
A unique definition of "other means" as pertaining to economic
sanctions came in a 4 May domestic service commentary by Ryzhikov
which explained that "one such means" contemplated by the Arabs
is "economic sanctions against Israel and its allies."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 MAY 1972
KOREA
PYONGYANG MARKS MILITARY ANNIVERSARY, KIM'S 60TH BIRTHfl Y
Pyongyang has turned a formerly obscure military anniversary into
a major occasion, taking the opportunity to play host to numerous
foreign delegations and to embellish the personality cult of
Kim I1-song still further. The 40th anniversary of the "Korean
People's Revolutionary Army" (KPRA), marked on 25 April,
previously had been observed in a minor way* as the anniversary
of the founding by Kim of the Korean "anti-Japanese guerrillas."
Peking also gave the anniversary considerable publicity,
consistent with its generous treatment of similar Korean occasions
since the return to normal relations two years ago. Moscow, also
consistent with usual practice, marked the anniversary much more
mudestly.
It is unclear why this anniversary has suddenly been brought into
prominence, but it seems to have served several purposes for
Pyongyang, with Peking displaying strong support. The Kim Il-song
personality cult figured prominently in the celebrations, which
came 10 days after the observance of the leader's 60th birthday.
The anniversary also seemed designed to reinforce North Korea's
international prestige as well as to complement its current drive
to open political contacts with South Korea.
PERSONALITY CULT The KPRA anniversary was marked by an unusual
number of personal appearances by Kim Il-song
at major functions, including a Pyongyang "grand report meeting,"
a military parade, and a banquet. Kim also personally received
the foreign delegations. Surrounding propaganda was replete with
praise for the genius of Kim as the founder of the KPRA, the fore-
runner of today's KPA. A wreath-laying ceremony at the tombs of
Kim's parents and grandparents, and a ceremony unveiling a statue
of the leader and opening a museum commemorating his "immortal
* The last decennial observance, in 1962, while receiving more
attention thin the routine annual occasions, was on a lesser scale
than this year's. The only prominent foreign delegation
participating was a PRC National People's Congress delegation led
by Peng Chen which did not come specifically for the anniversary
but for a "friendship visit" that coincided with the event. There
was a Pyongyang rally attended by Kim Il-song and a military
parade, but little other surrounding publicity.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 MAY 1972
exploits" were also reported. The latter ceremony was said to
mark both the military anniversary and Kim's birthday.
The 60th birthday itself, however, received somewhat less
elaborate publicity than might have been expected for an event
marking a traditional milestone in the life of a Korean. It
may have been thought to be more seemly, for international
purposes, to glorify Kim in connection with a reputed feat
rather than an ancient custom (the fact that Mao's birthday is
never celebrated may have been a consideration). And, in fact,
Kim's birthday was observed more as a domestic affair than as
an international one. Though numerous foreign messages were
received, including from the PRC's and the USSR's top leaders,
there were no significant foreign delegations in Pyongyang for
the occasion other than one led by the exiled Sihanouk. A
"twice-hero of the DPRK" award was granted to Kim by the Supreme
People's Assembly; the party, parliament, and cabinet sent a
congratulatory message; and a special issue of the party journal
KULLOJA was devoted to articles by top DPRK leaders effusively
praising the genius of their leader. Kim was alto lauded at a
"lecture meeting" attended by Politburo members.*
INTERNATIONAL The KPRA anniversary seemed aimed, at least in
ASPECT part, at reinforcing North Korea's international
prestige--no doubt with an eye to the forthcoming
UNGA debate on the "Korean question," a more opfn issue this year
with the presence of the PRC in the world body. The KPRA
anniversary was played as a major international event, with the
participation of some 30 military delegations from all of the
communist countries except Albania and from many third world
countries.
Peking's high-level treatment included the dispatch to Pycngyang
of a delegation led by Chen Hsi-lien, Politburo member and
commander of the military region adjacent to Korea. The Chinese
delegation, along with a Romanian delegation also led by a
Politburo-level official, received preferential treatment in
Pyongyang consistent with their rank. In Peking, the observance
* Kim's 50th birthday, as might be expected, had been observed
on a more modest scale. In addition to foreign greetings there
was a party-government message and a NODONG SINMUN editorial, but
no special KULLOJA article, award, statue, or meeting were
reported.
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1.0 MAY 1.972
included a great-.+.ngs message to the Korean leaders from Mao
and Chou I:n-lai, a PEOPLE'S DAILY;/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY joint
editorial, and a banquet hosted by the DPRK ambassador,
attended by Chou and addressed by Yoh Chien-ying, Politburo
member and vice chairman of the CCP Military Commission. The
PRC leaders' message had been preceded by a message from the
same leaders on Kim's birthday, but Peking's observancd of the
birthday was otherwise not comparable to that of the military
anniversary. Reports in PRC media of low-level events in Peking,
including an exhibit of Kim's works and photos, Korean film
showings, an announcement of the publication in Peking of some
Kim speeches, and commentaries praising the DPRK'r. achievements,
were obviously timed for the birthday but were not explicitly
linked to it.
Moscow sent a greetings message to Kim on his birthday from
Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin, but there war no other known
Soviet publicity for the occasion. Unlike Peking, it did not
send a message from the top leaders on the KPRA anniversary,
restricting itself to a message from Defense Minister Grechko.
The Soviet delegation to Pyongyang was also lower-ranking than
the PRC's, being headed by Marshal Moskalenko, a parts central
committee member and deputy defense minister, a level comparable
to that of most of the other communist delegations. Pyongyang
followed protocol in according the Soviet delegation the same
treatment as it gave the other communist groups not headed by a
Politburo-level leader. The KPRA anniversary was marked -:)destly
in Moscow with a DPRK embassy reception addressed by Grechko
and a Moscow rally receiving a brief notice.
RELATIONS The treatment of the KPRA anniver.;,ary may also be
WITH SOUTH related to Pyongyang's drive to open political
contacts with South Korea and to capitalize on
growing sentiments favoring unification of the country. Observance
of the fc""nding of an anti-Japanese guerrilla force in 1932,
emphasizing the efforts of all Koreans at that time to expel
foreign occupiers, may have been considered more conducive to this
-ampaign than celebrating the anniversary of the KPA, an army which
South Koreans fought during the Korean War.* Concern for the
* The KPA anniversary is marked on 8 February. The most recent one,
the 24th, was observed on a somewhat less elaborate scale than in
previous years. It is conceivable that henceforward the DPRK will
hold its main military observance on 25 April rather than on
8 February.
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10 MAY 191)
Impact on the South would accord with I'ynngynng'Pi currant II no
calling for a "peace agreement" with the HOK in order to ruawwiira
the South that It need not Iuur all Invasion from the North and
thus can accept the withdrawal of" U.S. troops. Speeches on the
anniversary were notabIu for their lack of' anti-11.8. and anti-140K
vituperation. Charges attributing an aggrawal.va intent to the
United Status and Its "puppet" were cast In routine, pro forma
terms.
Peking used the occasion to weigh in with support for Pyongyang's
moves aimed at "peaceful. unification" of Korea. High-level
Chinese comment again endorsed Pyongyang's proposals, "especially
the important proposal" advanced by Kim In January for a peace
agreement and political nagotiationa between North and South
Korea. Apart from chiding the United States for still "occupying"
South Kcrea and "obstructing" unification, Peking did not engage
in harsh anti-U.S. attacks and ignored other int'rnational. subjects
such as Indochina.
The treatment of Kim's birthday as mainly a domestic event may also
be related to the DPRK's policy toward the South. I.ports had
recurred ii the past that Kim had promised to reunify the country
by his 60th birthday. Such a pledge was never attributed to Kim
in available North Korean propaganda, but Pyongyang had, In late
1969 and early 1970, quoted South Koreans as expressing a hcpe
that they would celebrate Kim's 60th birthday in a unified homeland.
To softpedal the birthday would be consistent %ith the current
realities and Pyongyang's effort to project a more flexible, leas
provo,.ative image to the South.
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CON If IDKNTIAI, PAIN 'I'NINI)N
lit MAY 191)
- '19 -
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
LITERARY GAZETTE RESLKS FEUD WITH NEO-STALINIST WRITERS
The longstnnd(ng feud between the moderately conaer.vattva Ll'rISRARY
GAZI!'t'TE and the neo-Stalinist wing of the Soviet literary community
hie again erupted into the open as a result or the recent publica-
tion of it new edition of Ivan Droadov's novel "Underground Meridian"
by the Moscow Workers Publishing House. When the original edition
of Drozdov's novel appearad to 1968, it was favorably reviawad by
the reactionary novelist Ivan Shavtsov and the journal. 0k?'VAItR's
lftarary critics. The now edition of Drozdov's novel iu accused of
slandering Soviet society because of its negative portrayal or the
entire Soviet intelligentsia, and the publishing hours is under attack
for serving as an outlet for similtr anti-intellectual works.
The current feud was sparked by a 29 March LITERARY GAZETTE review
of Drozdov's novel by Feliks Kuznetsov, chairman of the Moscow
Writers Union bureau for literary criticism and a long time critic
of the Moscow Workers Publishing House and its bevy of reactionary
writers. Focusing on the novv,l's anti-intellectual bias.
Kuznetsov complained that it is aimed at "figures of science,
literature, art and journalism" and is an example of the crude
"bourgeois" genre of novel (that is, patterned after the anti-
intellectual novels of Siievtsov and OKTYABR editor Vyacheslav
Kochetov). According to Kuznetsov, Drc:dov conveyed his contempt
for learning "with extreme frankness," choosing an his hero a
factory worker without higher education and with little use for
books who outdoes scientists and "creates the most complex
electronic computers." 'e charged that the novel's heroes are
"surrounded on all sides" and "suffocated" by "'the educated
petty bourgeoisie' who, if you believe I. Drozdov, 'run the
show' in our life. According to Ivan Drozdov, they comprise
the real basis of the spiritual life of our scientific and
creative intelligentsia." Kuznetsov claimed that Dro:;dov
"blackens our real life" and presents "primitive" types as
heroes. Noting that the 1968 edition of the novel had been
criticized at that time, he assailed the Moscow Workers
Publishing House and editor B. Orlov for issuing the new
edition.
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CONYIUKN'I'IAL VIIIN TIIHNUt4
IU MAY 1917
I,I'ftKAKY c3AXt,'1"I'v rollowed up KuvnptsoV'N criticism with a 17 April
artlrlt, mignad by "LItt.artitaur"__a psouclonym for the adItorial
boards It rrftlrired the pub] I '' nu housti for releasing tilt,
"Ideologtca.lly-artlstlcall.y bankrupt" naval and for serving aw
till outlet for similar reactionary works, citing ItM publicatIoil
oI such crIt1.c'i.zad booka as Ivan Slim vtsov'a "I.n tlia Name or tht,
Rather and the Son," Vladimir Rotanov's novelette "The Dovv
Vanishes In the Fog," and Viktor Yakovchanko's collection of
poems "The Get-'1'ogethar". The article charged that the publish Ing
house is guided by a "nar-ow circle of people" and that it INSuaN
many books written by its own staff, "Jaspits the various
ideological-artistic defects" in them. It noted that the Moeeow
Writers Union bureau of critics and prose writers had recently
Invited leaders of the publishing house to a discussion of 1tN
publications in 1970-71, but that the officials In question were
"Intolerant of any criticism" and had refused to change their
ways. LITERARY GAZETTE concluded that the situation at the
publishing house "can no longer be tolerated."
Nevertheless, Drozdov struck back in a letter assailing LITERARY
GAZETTE and Kuznetsov for their criticism of his book and their
charge that it "blackens all scientists." Published in the
26 April LITERARY GAZETTE, the letter accused Kuznetsov of
"open slander" in declaring the "ideological harmfulness and
artistic bankruptcy" of the novel and the "irresponsibility" of
the publishing house for printing it. LITERARY GAZETTE's
editors responded with a long attack upholding Kuznetsov and
reiterating their criticism of the publishing house. The
editors also noted the "unjustifiably enthusiastic" reviews
of the first version of Drozdov's book by Shevtsov in the
1.2 July 1968 SOVIET RUSSIA, V. Marchenko in the January 1969
OKTYABR, and A. Vlasenko in the August 1969 OKTYABR.
Both LITERARY GAZETTE and Kuznetsov have long been critical
of neo-Stalinist writers. The intensification of LITERARY
GAZETTE's feud with OKTYABR last year prompted PRAVDA to
intervene on behalf of LITERARY GAZETTE (18 May 1971).
Kuznetsov complained as far back as 1965 that the Moscow
Workers Publishing House had issued Shevtsov's novel "The
World Is Not Without Good People" in 100,000 copies and
had followed up with "three massive reprintings in one year"
(IZVESTIYA, 23 September 1965). In 1968 he sharply criticized
Kochetov, Shevtsov, and Rozanov (ZHURNALIST, April 1968),
and in 1971 he pointed to the "direct ideological-political
harm" caused by Shevtsov's novels (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA,
20 May 1971).
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