TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 15, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
T
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~
H
E1V
s
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
1s ru~xcx 1972
(VOL. XXIZI, N0. 11)
58000300050011-8
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analyals report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIlB without coordination with other U.$.
Ciavernment components.
WARNING
This document contains informaCioii aSecting
the national defense of the United 8tti.tea,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections. 793
and 794, of the U8 Code, as amended. Its
transmlagion or revelation of its contents to ..
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited ? by ?law.
6lOU- 1
luleded Irsw euNM~k
ds.n~rsdiM end
-- dedeaMteltee
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 MARCH 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Mayor Attention
INDOCHINA
i
DRV, PRG Continue Indirect Attacks on President's China Visit .
1
Hanoi, Front Assail Further U.S. Intensification of Air War
3
References to PRG Proposal Gloss Over 2 February Elaboration
4
Pathet Lao, Hanoi Denounce U.S. Widening of War in Laos
6
Peking Mildly Censures U.S. "Aggression" in Indochina
8
Propaganda Lauds Communist Attacks in Laos, Cambodia
CHINA
10
Peking Reports Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Meeting in Paris
12
PRC Pressures Japan, Reaches Agreement with U.K. on Taiwan
13
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Soviet Articles Stress Need for "Common" IdEOlogical Position
17
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Praises Arab-Soviet Friendship, Urges Arab Unity
22
USSR Endorses Arab Fronts, Affirms Y'reaty Plans With Iraq
25
U.S. BASES
Soviet Admiral, Other Propagandists Continue Critical Comment
28
FRG TREATIES WITti USSR, POLAND
"Reverse Linkage" of Pacts With Berlin Accord Made Explicit
30
CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Further Tempering of Higher Ed~3cational Reforms Revealed
34
Revised Peking Operas Reflect C~irrent Propaganda Themes
36
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Ukrainian Dissident Pens Letter of Ab~ecC Confession
38
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
15 MARCH 1972
TO?ICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTIOII 6 - 12 MARCH 1972
b~oecow (2697 items)
Peking (1623 iteme)
International Women's
(l%)
10%
Domestic Issues
(43%)
46%
Day
Indochina
(3%)
23%
China
(12%)
8%
[Sihanouk in DRV
(0.3%)
9%1
[Nixon Vieit
(7%)
4%]
[Laos
(1%)
5%]
Indochina
(6%)
8%
[U.S. Bombing of
(--)
4%]
Bangladesh Prime
(9X)
4%
DRV
Mini.sle~ Rahman
in USSR
International Women's
Day
(--)
9;;
Middle East
(2X)
3%
UN Seabed Committee
(2%)
4%
Libyan Goverdment
(--)
3%
Meetings
Delegation in USSR
C~~ilean Socialist Party
(--)
3~e
Delegation in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
PYgures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given mayor attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi media have continued the pattern-of quoting and criticizing
' statements made by President Nixon in China without so identifying
them. In the wake of the Commentator articles in NHAN DAN on
3 March and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 8th,.two more Commentator
articles on the President appeared. in the party paper on the 10th
and 13th. Hanoi has cited continued U.S. air strikes against
the DRV as further evidence of .*.he President's "hypocrisy"
regarding a peaceful. settlement. .And.a 12 March KHAN DAN editor ia1
following ur the DRV Foreign.Ministry.protest against the strikes
also disparages some. of the. statements made by. the President in
China. The continuation of the propaganda attacks at this
authoritative level suggests that Peking has as yet been unable to
placate the DRV.
Peking seconded the 6 March DRV protest. with a foreign ministry
statement on the 10th, marking.Peking's.first off icial criticism
of U.S. actions in Indochina. since. President. Nixon's visit.. The
Chinese statement, which does.not.go.beyond.the.minimum in
backing the DRV, also came in. the. wake. of. the. rumored briefing of
the North Vietnamese by. Chou En-tai, who on 11 March made his first
officially reported appearance.since.he returned to Peking on
29 February after seeing. the. President off in Shanghai. Two days
after the PRC Foreign Min-'stry.statement, a PEOPLE'S D~+.ILY
Commentator article used similarly mild terms to support an
8 March NLHS statement condemning 'J.S. actions in Laos.
Moscow's continued critical comment on the.President's China trip
includes passages in a 13 March. Yuriy Zhukov PRAVDA article, peg.~ed
to the usual WPC-sponsored mid-March."week of solidarity with the
Indochinese peoples." .Zhukov observed that the Sino-U .S. communique
showed that the United States continues. to insist on the "notorious"
eight-point Peace p1a.^^. which,. he noted, the.Vietnamese communists
have rejected. Soviet Politburo member Griehin.at the Italian CP
Congress, fudging by the l4 March.TASS summary of his speech, merely
voiced hope for the "speediest ending" of U.S. "aggression" in
Indochina and promised the Vietnamese "the assistance and support
they need."
DRV. PRG CONTINUE INDIRECT ATTACKS ON PRESIDENT'S CHINA VISIT
Vietnamese communis*_ media show no signs of ceasing their indirect
sniping at the President's visit to China. Hanoi's studied
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avoidance of any explicit mention of the President's visit was?
demonstrated most pointedly in the NHAN DAN Commentator. article
on the 10th: Commentator explained that Assistant Secretary
of State Marshall Green was reassuring Asian countries regarding
U.S. commitments beccuse "in recent days Nixon has made a number
of statements in unusual circumstances" concerning peace,
negotiations, and the right. of self-determination for the Asian
peoples. The article, entitled. :'Satan's Commitments," echoed
earlier propaganda when. it.ridiculed?the nledges.in the Sino-U.S.
communique to base international. relations on such principles
as respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity,.
nonaggression, and nonintervention.
Commentator on the 10th repeated personally abusiva epithets
when asking rhetorically:. "How. can.these.few deceitful words
of Nixon cover up the bloody crimes--piled as. high as a
mountain--of the warlike imperialists, among whom~Nixon is a
war maniac?" An LPA commentary on the 11th said that "Nixon
remains obdurate, bellicose, and perfidious in intensifying the
war of aggression ." And it ridiculed, among others, the
President's remarks in China on the removal of. walls between
nations.
The sensitive issue of unity among the communist countries has not
been brought up i.i the current. propaganda.. However, the NHAN DAN
Corm~entator article on the 13th,.entitled."U.S. tmperialism Is
the Most Dangerous Enemy of: the Asian. People," in the course of a
historical review claimed. that "U.S. imperialist acts" have been
aimed at "encircling and. eventually attacking.Che sociali3t
countries and any other countries refusing to. accept the ?J.S.-type
colonial regime." That article concluded. by ridiculing the
President's professed. desire to build a new world order and.
structure: It claimed that "U.S. acts of aggression and Nixon's
recent deceitful allegations" show that this new order is U.S.
neocolonialism.
Commentator on the 13th routinely lauded the. Vietnamese contribution
to the struggle to def~_at the Nixon Doctrine. .The Commentator
article cn the 10th, assailing the Vietnamization policy in
standard terms, observed that the Presidents 9 February foreign
policy report had again said the United States world continue to
maintain its forces in Asia. The "U.S. lackeys," Commentator
remarked, are worried not about being "forsaken" by the Americana
but about the "~-igorous" development of the revolutionary movement.
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HANOI, FRONT ASSAIL FURTHER U.S. INTENSIFICATIOfv OF AIR WAR
The spate of protests over the U.S. air strikes against the DRV
continued with statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman
on 9 and 10 March. A NHAN DAN editorial on the 12th recrlled
that the early-March strikes. had. been protested in a DRV
Foreign Ministry statement on the.6th* as well as in a PRG
Foreign Ministry statement on the 10th. The series of protests,
which began with two spokesman's statements on the 4th,
condemned strikes in the Vinh Linh area.and in Ha Tinh and
Nghe An as well as Quang Binh provinces. .Hanoi had earlier
claimed that five planes. had been downed from.l through 6 March,
and a broadcast on the 9th belatedly reported that another
unmanned plane had been downed on the 6th, bringing Hanoi's
total to 3,446.
A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary.on the 12th as well as the
NHAN DAN editorial castigated the United States for "threatening'
to intensify the use of-air power. .The army paper cited UPI as
saying that the. strikes which.began.against the North on 1 March
were carried out for a longer. period than any. since. November 1968.
Both papers cited AP as reporting. on the 10th that Che
Administration had said it: would. utilize the air force to attack
any rime, anywhere if this were.~udged necessary. Both press
articles and a domestic service. radio commentary on the 11th
repeated the frequently voiced. reminder that it had been
demonstrated during the Johnson Administration Chat the Vietr.~mese
cannot be deterred from their struggle by~air strikes.
To further document the charge of.U.S. hypocrisy, the comment
on the air strikes cited the.President's statements in China,
without identifying them as: such.. Thus, NHAN DAN's editorial
said that tl~e "aggressive".U.S.. actions cast doubt on the
President's expressions of support for self-determination. And
a Hanoi radio commentary on the 9th pointed to. Che. coincidence
of the bombings throughout Indochina and his remarks on concern
for future generations, on ending the war quickly through
negotiations, and on respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of other corntries::
* Moscow duly reported the DRV Foreign Ministry statement buC,
unlike Pekinb, issued no official statement of its own. This
pattern accords with Moscow's reaci:ion.to the mid-February
strikes, although the year-end sustained U.S. bombing had prompted
a 30 December Soviet Government statement.
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POW ISSIiE Both the NHA.N DAN. editorial and the QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN commentary, in. their attacks on the
President, saw evidence of further."hypocrisy" in the LO March
announcement designating the.week 25 March to 1 April as
"national week of concern for prisoners of war or those missing
in action." Declaring that this acC c~ae aimed at diverting
U.S. concern "for the White. House leaders' new crimes," the
army paper said it is because of the President's "be111cose
and stubborn aggressive policy".that POW's have not returned
home and that American military.men.have continued to be
captured. QUAN DOI NHAN~DAN'claimed that U.S. newspapers have
realized that the President has. merely used the POW problem
as a pretext for intensifying the:war,~and it. cited the New
York TIMES as saying that he has used the prisoners to justify
the bombings and the decision to maintain U.S. forces in
South Vietnam.
The NHAN DAN editorial repeated. in this context the standard
line that "if Ni:con really wants to bring the captured U.S.
military men Home," he must~end the war.
FRONT SUPPORT The PRG Foreign Ministry.stat~ment on the 10th,
in addition to noting the sustained strikes
aga?nst the North beginning on l March, charged that the United
Staten has also intensified E-52 raic:s against "many populous
areas" in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces and in the western
highlands of South Vietrsm: In the pattern of the 6 March DRV
Foreign Ministry stat~nent, the PRG said that the strikes
against the North "brazenly violate" the U.S. commitment to end
the bombing of the DRV. Also following Hanoi's lead, Che PRG
statement said the strikes "constitute a~ insolent challenge to
the people of the world and the United States" who a?e demanding
an end r; the war. This line is echoed in a 7 March L":-
commentary and in a Liberation Radio commentary on the 9th.
REFERENCES TO PRG PROPOSAL GLOSS OVER 2 FEBRUARY ELABORATION
Vietnamese communist propaganda has continued to cite the PRG
proposal of 1 July and the 2 February. elaboration as the proper
basis for a political settlement, but in the past month the
detailed demands of that elaboration have not been spelled out
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in full except in the DRV-Sihanouk communique of 5 March.*
The omission may be traceable merely to the concentration on
attacks on the President and his policy and to the fact that
there has not been a full session of the Paris talks since
10 February. But there have been occasions when it would have
seemed appropriate to repeat the specific demands in both
points elaborated on 2 February.
The 12 March VWP Central Committea's message to the 13th Italian
CP Congress essentially repeated the elaboration on U.S.
withdrawal--demanding that the United States set a precise date
for complete witl-.drawal of all troops, advisers, military
peiaonnel, weapons, and~war materials. But it dig! not detail
the demFnd in the second point that President Thieu "resign
imr+ediately" so that steps can be taken toward forming a
a_overnment of "national concord" and organizing general elections.
LRV Politburo member Le Thsnh Nghi, speaking at a 13 March
reception honoring the visiting Romanian delegation, outlined the
communist negotiating position only in general terms when he
declared that the DRV "fully supported" the PRG's seven points a_;id
its "elaboration'' on tha two key problems. He called for an
end to the war and to Vietnamization, a complete U.S. withdrawal
and an end to U.S. support for the Thieu administration, and
respect for the South Vietnamese peoples' right to self -determination.
Nghi also scored the U.S. negotiating position as presented in the
President's eight-point proposal, which he said is intended to
secure U.S. troop withdrawals and the return of POW's while
continuing the war through Vietnamization and while "stubbornly"
supporting the Thieu regime. Asserting that "peace- and
justice-loving people in the world" have spoken out against "this
perfidious pla.~," Nghi Atated that .the DRV Government "categorically
rejects" the eight-point plan.
A statement by the DRS National Assembly's National Reunification
Committee publicized on 15 March, scoring air strikes against the
tJorth as well as "new attacks" against the South, went back to
the old formula when it demanded.that~the U:S. Government "seriously
* Prior to the communique, the two-point elaboration had been
spelled out in full in Pham Van.Dong's 10 February message to the
4ersailles assembly on Indochina and by PRG delega~e Nguyen Van
Tien at the Paris session the same day.
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respond" to the PRG seven-point solution without even mentioning
that there had been an ''elaboration" on 2 February. It said the
"two key points" of the seven-point proposal are thaC the U.S.
Government must (1) stop the~air war and all military acts in
Vietnam, withdraw quickly and. totally the troops, advisers,
military men, weapons, and war. materials of the U.S. camp from
South Vietnam an3 dismantle U.S. bases there, and (2) respect
the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and
stop all interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.
PARIS TA!KS The U.S. decision not to attend the 9 March
session of the Paris talks--due to the communists'
walkout from the 24 February session and the "tone and content
of recent official announcements from Hanoi"--was scored in
statements issued by the PRG and DRV delegations in Paris on
the 8th and 9th, respectively.. (Earlier, the two communist
delegations had scored the similar U.S. refusal to~attend the
2 March session in statements issued on the lst.) Both statements
noted that the U.S. refusal to attend the. session--made known to
the communists on 7 Marcn,~in a statement which also proposed that
the next session be held on 16 March--took place at the same time
as heightened U.S. war activities in Indochina, especially the
strikes against the DRV. Both delegations condemned the "acts of
war" and U.S. actions aimed at "sabotaging"the Paris talks.
The charge that the United States is "sabotaging" the talks teas
also appeared in some of the comment. For example, a 9 March
Hanoi radio commentary charged. that while-the President was saying
that the primary objective of the United States is to settle the
Vietnam issue through negotiations, the Americans."unreasonably
called off the scheduled 2 and 9 March sessions" of the Paris talks.
And Liberation Radio on the 10th said that on the President's
orders, Ambassador Porter "sabotaged the Paris conf e;:ence on
Vietnam." It said that "last week the U.S.-puppet clique
unreasonably refused to attend the 146th session scheduled for
2 March," and this week it continues to delay the conference.
PATHET ILO. HANOI DENOUNCE U ~ S ~ W. I DEN I NG OF V~'AR I N IJ~OS
An 8 March NLHS Central Committee statement assailed what it
described as the intensification.and widening of the "war of
aggression" in Laos by the "obdurate, bellicose,.and reckless ~.5.
imperialists." The statement charged that there are now moxe than
2C battalions of Thai forces in Laos and that "large numbers of
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other Thai troops are massing along the Thai--Lao border areas,
ready to break into Laos:" It wenC on to claim that "the United
States and its henchmen" are steppinr~ up~aiz attscks "to prepare
for ground assaults in Paksong; Bolovens, and other parts of
southern Laos." In addition to assailing bombings b?- B-52's and
other aircraft, the statement cited the New Yor!: TIMES as
reporting that the United States has 14,000 U.S. advisers in Laos
including 400 to 500 now in Vientiane, most of them CIA agent8
and Air Force or Army officers: It~complained that "ultra-
reactionaries" in Vientiane are "slandering" the NLHS and the
DRV in order to "incite the puppet army" and serve the U.S.
"scheme" to intensify the war, and it asserted that Souvanna
Phouma had asked for more military aid at a meeting with U.S.
envoy Marshall Green on 7 March.
The statement called the U:~. activities "brazen sabotage" of the
1962 Genera agreement which recognized Che independence,
sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Laos.
It repeated demands that~the United States unconditionally stop
the bombing so that the"Lao parties concerned" may meet to
settle their internal affairs~on~the~basis of the NLHS five-point
solution and the proposals of April and June 1971, "consistent
with the spirit of the 1962 Geneva agreement and the realities in
Laos." ~~~
DRV SUPPORT Hanoi supported the NLHS statement in the usual
manner with a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on
the 14th. Hanoi's statement charged that~the "Nixon Administration"
has ta!cen the~war in Laos to "a new serious degree." Like the NLHS
statement, it denounced the~U.S: bombings=-especially the "doubling"
of B-52 raids--and the dispatch~of Thai troops as well as the mas4ing
of more Thai forces on the border: It explicitly scored Souvanna
Phouma and his administration (rather than "ultrareactionaries")
for speeding "vile slanders"'against the DRV and the NLHS, commenting
that neither these slanders nor President Nixon's "fallacious
allegations on 'peace' and 'goodwill "' can cover up the aggressive
nature of U.S. imperialism and its "extremely savave crimes" to Laos:
Hanoi's statement did~not mention Marshall Green's meeting with
Souvanna PhcuMa, but a 15 March NHAN DAN article praising the victory
of the Lao Patriotic Forces~at Sam Thong said Green promised at that
meeting to increase aid to-Vientiane and to intensify U.S. bombings.
The DRV statement seconded the t~LHS demand that the United States
stop the bombings so?that the~Lao pa?cties concerned r_an meet and
settle their affairs on the basis of the 1962 Geneva agreement
and the present situation in Laos.
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PEKING MILDLY CENSURES U.S. "AGGRESSION " IN 1tJDOCHINA
The 10 March PRC Foreign Ministr?,~ statement, seconding the DRV
statement of the 6th condemning U.S. air strikes, represents Peking's
first official critici3m of U.S..action s in Indochina since
President Nixon's visit. The Chinese statement also comes fn
the wake of Chou En-lai's rumored Brief ing of Che North Vietnamese
leadership on the Presidents visit. .Having last been reported
appearing on 29 February when-he.return ed to Peking after seeing
the President off is Shanghai, .Chows first reported appearance
since was on 11 March when he was present at the Peking airport to
receive the remains of a Chinese. provincial leader. On the next
day he saw the Romanian economic-delegation in Peking on .i!:s way to
Hanoi. Also at this time the DRV ambassador reappeared in Peking
after not having been reported there since January. On l3 March
he was at the Peking airport to see the Romanians o#f an their way
to Hanoi.
Just as Hanoi's persistent sniping at the President's visit suggests
continuing pique despir.e whatever brief ings the Chinese may have
given, so Peking's response.to.the U.S. bombing implies. that it is
reluctant to go beyond the miaimum in backing the DRV.. ThA four -day
interval between the DRV and Chinese.st atements may also reflect
d?fficulties between the two allies. There was a two-day interval
between the last previous DRV. Foreign. Ministry statement on U.S.
air strikes and a supporting Chinese statement on 19 February.
Before that, a 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement had
seconded a DRV statement of 26.December.
On substantive issues, the 10 March Cb.ir~ese statement is notable
For its failure to attack U.S. professions of- interest in a peac e
settlement, though the DRV.statement.it seconds. charged. that the
bombings exposed the Nixon Administration's "fake allegations
about peace." The 19 February PRC statement had.mentioned.the
U.S. eight-point proposal in.charging.t hat the bombings uncovered
the "disguise of sham peace'.' and. the "aggressive features" of the
United States. Also unlike.the February statement, the one on
10 March does not denounce Vietnamization. Making no mention of
specific peace plane, the statement demands. that the United States
stop itE attacks in Indochina, withdraw U.S. and "vassal" troops
before "a set terminal date," ?.r, "c ease to support the puppat
cliques" i_n Indochina.
The statement includes the routine affirmation. that the Chinese
Government and people 'resolutely support" the Vietnamese and
other Indochinese peoples in "their war against U.S. aggression
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and for national salvation." (The Sino-U.S. communique had
sof tened this formulation to support for the Indochinese peoples'
efforts to attain "their goal.") The statement concludes with a
routine pledge Chat the Chinese people "will do their utmoEt to
give all-out support and assistance to the Vietnamese and other
Indochinese peoples," an assertion slightly more emphatic thin
the pledge of "f firm support" in the February statement.
Hanoi's VNA summarized the PRC statement on .the 12th in a report
which lumped it with statements by Sihanouk's government and the
East German acting foreign minister. Hanoi media had waited
until 1 March to report the 19 February PRC statement, thereby
delaying until after the conclusion of the President's trip to
the PRC; VNA summarized it along with several other communist
protests, in a departure from Hanoi's normal practice of .reporting
Peking's statements immediately and by themselves. The current
VNA report omits the PkC statement's demands for a U.S. withdrawal
and end to support for the "puppet regimes," although VNA had
reported a similar passage in its summary of the earlier statement.
COMMENTATOR ARTICLE The PRC Foreign Ministry :statemert.was not
ON LAOS accompanied by a PEOPLE'S DASLY Commentator
article as had been the case at the time
of the 19 February Chinese statement. On 12 March, however, a
Commentator article supported in the customary way an.NLHS Central
Committee statement.~f.8 I4arch denouncing U.S. actions. in Laos.
The most recent previous Commentator articles on Laos.had.been
on 18 January, supporting an.NLHS Rtate-nent condemning the dispatch
of Thai troops to Laos;.on.15 January, celebrating the "victory"
at Long Tieng; and on 3 January, supporting an NLHS denunciation
of B-52 strikes in the Plain of~Jars: ~ ~ ..
The 12 March .article, like the foreign ministry statement.of two
days earlier, does not.seem to offer more than minimal backing
to Peking's Indochinese allies. It says the Chinese "f firmly.
support" the'"dust struggle of the Lao people against.U:S.
imperial'.st aggression," but it does not elaborate on.the alleged
plans for offensives in Laos as does the NLHS statement...
Instead it stresses the military exploits of the Lao "patriots,"
saying that the latter are "marching forward on the crest of
victory." Commentator demands that the U.S. Government."stop its
interference and-aggression" in Laos so that the Lao question may
be settled by the Lao people themselves without outside interference,
but there is no reference to the Lao peace proposals which are
reiterated in the NLHS statement.
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While the Commentator article was restrained in its treatment of the
United States, NCNA's report of the Ni,HS statement included such
critical passages as its denunciation of the "obdurate, bellicose,
and reckless" nature of the "Nixon Administration." On the other
hand, in reporting the Pathet Lao's.chargef of planned offensives
in Laus by Thai ~trd "puppet troops,!' NCNA omitted its most
explicit charges of the presence.of American military personnel.
It also omitted the NLHS statement's reference to a meeting
between Marshall Green and Sout~anna Phouma. (Peking has not
mentioned the Green tour of Asian capitals.)
Although the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator avoided mentioning the
Pathet :.ao peace plans, the NCNA account or the NLHS statement
duly reported its demands that the United States respect Lao
independence, sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity
"as recognizec? by the 1962 Geneva agreement." NCNA also
reported the call for the United Staten to stop bombing so that
the Lao parties concerned can meet to settle their own affairs
on the basis of the NLHS five-point solution and proposals of
April and June 1971.
PROPAGANDA LAUDS COMMUNIST ATTACKS IN LAOS. CAMBODIA
IJ~1US Pathet Lao and Hanoi media acclaim ?scent successes
scored by the communist forces in Luos, praising their
"smashing" of operations southwest. of Xieng Khouang town and
the capture of Vang Pao positions at Sam Thong. A Pathet Lao
broadcast on li *~arch reviewed the fighting since.December,
noting that after co~ununist attacks in the Sam Thong-Long Tieng
area in December and January, Laotian. and Thai re?~nforcements
had been brought intc+ the area. It.detailed actions against the
allied counterattack launched-in early February southwest of
Xieng Khouang, claiming that from 12 February to 3 March the
"armed forces and people" of Xieng Khouang Province put out of
action rare than 3,000 troops and !'smashed" the allied operations.
Pathet Lao accounts of the. 11 March assault.on positions at Sam
Thong have claimed Chat the.Lao.liberation army (LPLA) killed,
wounded, or captured more. than 600 troop s. in that action. A news
agency report on the 14th noted that Long Tieng was shelled on the
day the attack took.place,.and a report on the 1Sth said that the
LPLA is now tightening its siege. of. Long Tieng. Hanoi hailed the
LPLA's "exploit" at Sam Thong in articles in both KHAN DAN and
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 15th. The par .y paper commented Chat the
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recent "victories" in Laos have "seriously foiled the U.S.-puppets'
scheme to use the Thai and Vang Pao troops as shock forces in
their plan,a to Laoize the war" and are "severe warnings to the
Thanom-Praphat clique, the lackeys of the U.S. imperialists."
CAMBODIA The radio and news. agency (AKZ) of Sihanouk's
government continue. to publicize fighting around the
provincial capital of Kompong Thom and to advise the population
of that city to evacuate. Rounding. up alleged military successes
from the start of the communist offensive in the Kompong Thom area
on 21 February until 5 March, AKZ on the l2tn claimed that the
Cambodian liberation forces (CPNLAF) have. already put more Chan
1,500 troops out of action. AKZ and tY.e radio alleged that on
5 March the CPNLAF "liberated" two of the government's biggest
and moat important positions, including the outpost at Panhachi
whicr. AKZ on the 29th had said was encircled and under continuous
attack.*
The news agency reported Chat the CPNLAF is pursuing the remnants
of government forces and. attacking remaining positions around
Kompong Thom in order to "totally liberate" the city. Zt
described the troops in Kompong. Thom as "in a state of panic"
end "lacking rice and drinking. water." .The radio. appealing to
"compatriots" to leave the city, similarly declared that "we are
pursuing the enemy until his last den in Kompong Thom town is
destroyed."
Communist media have also called for the."liberation" of the
provincial capital of Siem Reap.. Just as AKZ on 29 February had
released afour-day-old appeal from the CNPLAF co-.nmand on the
Kompong Thom front for the "liberation" of that city, so on
14 March the news agency issued. a.5 March. appeal from the army's
command on the Siem Reap-Angkor.frant which. calla for redoubled
efforts to ''annihilate" the government's operation Angkor Chey
and to liberate Siem Reap. The appeal cited military developments
which it claimed demonstrated. that the government operation was
already "defeated and routed";. it alleged that the CPNLAF is
now attacking west, east, and north of Siem Reap and that the
government forces on that front have been "driven into a stars
of disorder."
* Earlier propaganda on thn fighting around Kompong Thom is,
reported in the 8 March TRENDS, page 33.
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15 MARCH 1972
CHINA
PEKING REPORTS SING-U.S. AMBASSADORIAL MEETING IN PARIS
In Peking's first report on Sino-U.S. contacts as envisaged in
the joint communique on President Nixon's trip, NCNA on l3 March
reported the meeting in Paris that day between the PRC and
American ambassadors. Citing the 28 February joint communique's
provision that the *.wo aides would stay in contact through various
channels, the brief, factual NCNA dispatch noted that the two
governments had decided that Paris is to be "a channel" for this
purpose.
Peking has not followed up the President's visit with comment of
its own or reports of comment from foreign sources, such as the
4 March North Korean editorial praising the visit. Peking has
also ignured Marshall Green's tour of Asian capitals as well se
statements by U.S. officials discussing American policy in the
wake of the visit. In addition to the announcement on the
ambassadors' meeting in Paris, however, Peking's interest in
further Sino-U.S. e~:c:hanges was reflected in a 13 March NCNA
report on the previous day's NBC telecast of the Chinese ballet
"The Red Detachment of Women." NCNA noted Chat Huang Hua, the
Chinese permanent reprea~~rtative at the United Nations, was
invited to see the televised film at the NBC studio and that at
least several million people throughout the United States viewed
the show. At the same time, Chinese television viewers were
seeing reruns of film on the President's visit. At least the
Canton TV station, which 19 monitored by FBIS, began rerunning
this ,reportage for several days on 9 March; previously it had
been rerun for several days after the President's departure.
The parade of unofficial American visitors resumed for the first
time since the President's visit when a 81ack Panther delegFtion
arrived in Peking on 8 March at the levitation of the Chinese
People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries.
According to an NCNA report on the 9th, the 20-member group came
for "a friendly visit."
Peking has continued its low-level critical reports on U.S.
developments while avoiding personal invective directed at
American leaders. Thus an 8 March NCNA report, timed for
International Women's Day, recounted U.S. women's "struggle for
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15 MARCH 1972
equal rights and ianinst. aggressive war" as part of "the revolu-
ti.onary struggle of the rapidly awakening people" in tt~e United
States. NCNA 11nkPd the Americar women's movement with opposition
to the Indochina war as contributing to "the common struggle
against U.S. imperialism," a:~d it applauded the women for becoming
more militAnt in oppoFing "the reactionary domestic and foreign
policies of the U.S. ruling circles." However, NCNA defined the
goal of the women's mo~~ement ae "emancipation" rather Chan overthrow
of the U.S. Government.
Peking's only authoritative comment on U.S. policy since the
President's visit has dealt with Indochina (discussed in the
Indochina section o# this TRENDS).
PRC PRESSURES JAPAN. REACHES AGREEMENT WITW U. K. ON TAIWAN
In the aftermath of the President's visit, Peking has been exerting
pressure on Japan and has reached an accord with Britain on the
Taiwan issue. Peking at the same time has put on record its
position on other territorial questions. Thus it has forcefully
reasserted its claim to the disputed Scnkaku Islands and more
quietly reminded the United Nations that it regards Hong Kong
and Macao as belonging to the PRC. During this period Pelcing has
not discussed the status of the Paracel* and Spratley Islands,
which in the past have also been the sub~ecC of Chinese territorial
claims.
TAIWAN Having signed the point communique in which the United
States said it does not challenge the position that
Taiwan i~a a part of China, Peking has largely ignored the U.S.
role in the Taiwan question while focusing its comment on the stand
of the Sato government. Peking's most authoritative recent
criticism was contained in a 3 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article denouncing Sato for having stii.l "not acknowledged that
Taiwan had long been re~urned to China." Chiding Sato #or making
inconsistent statements d~~ring Diet questioning following
publication of the Sino-U.S. communique, Commmentator accused the
prime minister of adhering to his position that the status of
Taiwan remains to be determined as well as persisting in other
"schemes" ob~cctionable to Peking.
? * The last, 497th "serious warning" by Peking over an alleged
U.S. intrusion in the Paracels appeared on 24 December.
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The Commentator article reflected Peking's attempt to keep
strung pre~eure on Tokyo to accede to Peking's terms on Taiwan.
Commentator excoriated Sato's Diet performance as "an act of
flagrant hostility" Coward the Chinese chat "cannot but arouse
their greatest fury." With an eye to pro-Peking sentiment in
Japan, Commentator also claimed Chat Sato aroused indignation
among the opposition parries and "far-sighted personages" in
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
Peking returned to the attack on 11 March with a disparaging
NCNA appraisal of Tokyo's "unified view" on the Taiwan question
as embodied in a 6 March government statement saying Chat Japan
would take no position on the status of Taiwan although it finds
Peking's claim "fu11y understandable." According to NCNA, this
is essentially the same as saying the status of Taiwan remains
to be determined and "once again reveals the Sato government's
reactionary stand of insisting on being hostile toward China."
Also taking exreption to Foreign Minister Fukuda's reference
in the Diet on 6 March to the Nationalist government and to the
Japan-RCC treaty, NCNA interpreted Fukuda's remarks as
demonstrating an effort to pursue the formulas of "two
Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan."
While exerting pressure on Ja~:an to acknowledge that Taiwan is
a part of the PRC, Peking has ma:~aRec! co break the impasse with
Britain on this question, thus permitting the two sides to raise
their relations from the charge d'affaires to the ambassadorial
7eve1. Using s key term from the 28 February Sino-U.S. point
communique, a 13 March Sino-British communique (in the English
version) says the British Government, "acknowle~~ging" Peking's
position that Taiwan is a province of the PRC, had decided to
remove its offirial representation on Taiwan. In the Sino-U.S.
communique, the United States "acknowledges that all Chinese on
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China
and that Taiwan is a part of China," a position Chat the United
States "does not challenge." In "acknowledging" Peking's
position, the British went beyond the noncommittal "takes
note" formula on Taiwan which was introduced when Canada and
the i'RC established diplomatic relations in October 1970 and
which has been used often since then, most recently in the
PRC-Argentine agreement signed on 16 February. The Sino-British
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15 MARCH 1972
communique otherwise follows the pattern of the agreements
using the "takes note" formula in. saying the British "recognize"
the PRC Government ae "the sole legal government of China."*
In another aspect of the Taiwan question, Pekin; has served
notice of its claim to all assets held by two banks that
transferred operations from the mainl~{nd to Taiwan after the
communist takeover. A statement by the spokesman of the
People's Bank of China head office, carried by NCNA on
13 March, charges that the ROC Government was illegally
attempting to undermine Peking'8 claims to the assets of the
former Bank of China and the Bank of Communications by a
bank reorganization act of 15 December. The statement declares
that any sale or transfer of these bank a,esets in Taiwan or
abroad is "illega.l and null and void," adding Chat the Peking
head offices "reserve every right to recover them."
SENKAKUS, In addition to the Taiwan question, the dispute
HONG KONG over the Senkaku Islands has also served as a peg
for Peking's polemical a ~:acks on the Japanesa.
Iii his 3 March address to the UN Commi..tee on the Peaceful Uses
of the Seabed, Chinese delegate An Ch ih-yuan assailed both
Japan and the United States for allegedly colluding to include
the Senkakus as part of the Okinawa reversion agreement and to
exploit the seabed resources in the area. The Chinese delegate
presented Peking's claim as comprising not only the seabed
resources around the Senkakus but also resources of "the shallow
sea adjacent to other parts of China." He did not, however, tip
Peking's hand regarding its precise stand on territorial sea
limits and jurisdiction over offshore resources.
* In the Chinese version of the Sino-British communique, the
same term, "cheng den" (0015 6126), :t_s used both for Britain's
"acknowledgment" of Peking's position that Taiwan is a part of
the PRC and for British "recognition" of the PRC Government as
the sole government of China. The Chinese thereby avoided the
term, "den shih tao" (6126 6221 0451), that had been used for
the U.S. "acknowledgment" in the Sino -American communique; thus
the Chinese version gives the impression of a less equivocal
British accession to Peking's terms. By the .3ame token,
Peking avoided disclosing to the Chinese people that the
British made use of a key--and equivocal--term appearing in
the Sino-U.S. communique on a mayor issue on which the PRC
and the United States remain divided.
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15 MARCH 1972
At a .l0 March meeting of the UN committee, the Chinese delegate
delivered a scathing retort to the Japanese repres?ntative's
statement a week earlier reasserting Japan'r~ claim to the
Senkakue. The Chinese rejoinder was couch~J in sharply
hostile terms, portraying "Japanese militarism" as "a
dangerous force of aggression in the Asian and Pacific
region." The U.S. role again figured in the Chinese state-
ment, though in a distinctly secondary manner; An declared
that the Chinese wou1~1 not permit the U.S. and Japanese
governments to make a deal on the disputed islands and "sow
discord" between the Chinese and Japanese peoples.
Peking widely publicized An's speeches of 3 and 10 March.
Also on the lAth, but not reported in PFC media, Chinese
permanent delegate Huang Hua made public a letter he sent to
the chairman of the UN Committee on Decolonization arguing
Chat Hong Kong and Macao are not colonies and thus do coot
fall within the committee's ~uriadiction. When Peking fudges
that "conditions are right," Huang asserted, the status of
these areas will be settled by the PRC without outai.de
interference. The lack of urgency in Huang's language and
Pelting's failure to publicize the letter suggest that it was
intended only as a quiet move to ob3ect to what Huang termed
the "erroneous categorization of Hong Kong and Macao as
colonial territories in UN documents" rather than to raise
a political issue that could disturb a tranquil and profitable
status quo.
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COMMUNIST RELATIONS
SOVIET ARTICLES STRESS NEED FOR '~COP1h'ION" IDEOLOGICAL POSITION
Morrow's concern to shore up the Soviet wing of the international
communist movement, againsC the backdrop of the complications
posed by Peking's new flexibility, has been registered at
authoritative levels in recent Soviet press articles focused
in notably pointed fashion on a need for better coordination
to achieve common ideological positions:
~ PRAVDA on 10 March carried an article by an authoritative
proxy spokesman, SED Politburo member and Secretary Hermann
Axen, which underscored the primacy of international over
national interests and the urgent need to work out "common"
ideological positions among the socialist countries in view
of the "new" situation in the world communist movement.
? In the international affairs weekly MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZH.LZN
(issue No. 3, signed to the press 22 February) Doctor of
Philosophical Sciences A. Sobolev, head of the se~Lion
responsible for History of the International Communist Movement
in the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism,
pointe3 to a need for the communist part'_es to consolidate their
ranYe ideologically, politically, and "organizationally."
Sor~olev's broad subject was "The CPSU's Struggle for the Unity
of the International Communist Movement and Against Opportunism
and Revisionism."*
* In the weekly NEW TIMI:;S (No. 8, signed to the press 18 February),
Sobolev discoursed on the need to combat "opportunism of all kinds?'
in international communist ranks and approvingly recalled. past
purges of "revisionists" such as Garaudy from the French Communist
Party, Fischer and Marek from the Austr.lan party, the "Manifesto
group" from the Italian party, and the Petkov group from the
Venezuelan CP. All were guilty, h~~ said, of "ranegadism, anti-
communism, and anti-Sovietism." See FBIS Special Report No. 305
of 7 March 1972, "Spanish Communists Reestablish Ties with
Peking: Background and Ramif9.cations," pages 16-17.
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+ Sensitivity to ~.he reaction on the part of nonruling parties
in particular to the spectre of a new Comintern or Cominform
type of organization was reflected in a strong defense of the
Comintern in issue No. l for 1972 of the ~ourna'. VOPROSY
ISTORII KPSS, in the form of a rebuttal to criticism of Chia
Comintern by former Netherlands Communist Party Chairman
de Groot. Th~~ thrust of the article was to debunk charges
by de Grooc--also leveled publicly by Romania's Ceausescu--
that the Comintern served Moscow first and foremust at the
expense of the interests of the maiority of she allied
patties. Normal Soviet treatment of tr,e Comintern has
acknowledged shortcomings along with merits; this article
contained no criticism of the organization.
The appearance of Sobolev's and Axen'.s articles coincided
with a flurry of travels by key. East European party leaders:
Hungary's Kadar visited Moscow and Bucharest in mid-- and 1ACe
February, respectively, and Bulgaria's Zhivkov visited Warsaw
in late February and arrived in Prague for an "official,
friendly" visit on 13 March. Axen left on the 12th for r:ilan
at the head of the SED delegation to the 13th congress of
the Italian Communist Party.
AXEN ON CONWIUNIST UNITY Entitled "Proletarian Inter-
nationalism and National Interests,"
Axen's PRAVDA article invoked the judgments of the June 1969
Moscow international party conference and the 24th CPSU
Congress of March-April 1971 to posit a "new situation" in
the world communist movement that requires appropriate
counteraction by the socialist countries. The fact that
"new forma of the point struggle by broad anti-imperialist
forces are being elaborated," he declared, means that "the
col~.ective formulation of strategy and tactics and point
actions by the communist and workers parties of the socialist
community in the international arena have become an objective
necessity."
Citing the judgment of the 24th CPSU Congress that the socialist
community "is at a new stage of development," Axen said the
congresses of the other East European parties last year had
"demonstrated the unanimity .of these pa.~ties on the main
questions of ideology. policy, and theory," insp,.:d and
influenced by the CPSU. These parties, he added, ''are rallying
increasingly around the CPSU" and, under the specific conditions
of their countries' development, are applying "common theoretical
conclusions and experience ''
CONFIDENTIAL
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Emphasizing that th:~ formulation of "point foreign policy"
under the Warsaw Pact and socialist economic integration under
CEMA represent "a completely new type of international
relations," Axen left open the question whether the next
logical step would be the formation of new, additional
machinery for coordination but suggested .that.intensified
bilateral and multilateral meetings and international party
conferences would be in order.* Citing Brezhnev's reference
at the 24th congress to "common-law-governed patterns which
are inherent in Che development of all t:1e socialist countries,"
over and above "the diversity of specific national conditions ,'?
he concluded that bilateral and multilateral meetings, "the
collective theoretical generalization of experience, and above
all the formulation at international conferences of a common
line and a common program of action are acquiring increasingly
great importance." i- remark in .the same vein had been made by
Hungarian First Secretary Kadar at a Hungarian-Romanian r
friendship rally in Bucharest on 25 February, when he delivered
a pointer', lecture to the Romanians on the importance of unity.
Recalling that the 1969 international party conference had
served to consolidate unity within the communist movement,
Kadar added: "One can say Chat an overwhelming majority of the
communist and workers parties is ready for action for the sake
of Lnity."
Underscoring tl~~ primacy of international interests under
proletarian internationalism, Axen leveled a veiled attack
at the Romanians' concept of sovereignty and an open attack
on Peking`s "deviation." Recalling that the 1969 Moscow
conference had rejected "national narrow-mindedness" and
"hegemonism," he declared that "the class interests of the
proletariat are predominant in the dialectical unity of the
national and international, and superiority here belongs
to the general-law-governed patterns and international
obligations"
Pointedly noting Chat the SED had never "isolated" itself
from the international communist movement's experience, Axen
stressed that socialist internationalism gives "independence
and sovereignty a new and higher class content"--the stock
*A KOMMUIJIST article reported by Western news media as calling
for "organizational unity" in the .communist movement to cope
;with deviations, giving r.ise.to speculation about Soviet plans
for a new Cominform-type coordi:lating center, is not available
at this writing.
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15 MARCH 1972
Soviet line also enunciated by Czechoslovakia's Husak at
the 1169 Moscow conference in his plea to the other parties
to refrain from any open discussion of a violation of the
USSR's sovereignty in August 1968. In a forthright linkage
of "sovereignty" to fealty to the Soviet Union, Axen declared
that "the independence, sovereignty, and equalit..y of the
socialist states is insured .primarily by their high
responsibility for the common work of the socialist community,
the strengthening of the dower of these states, and their
fires cohesion around their nucleus--the USSR." In a swipe
at Romania in particular, he warned that "the .view that the
international duty of a socialist state's communist party
is fulfilled to a sufficient degree by strengthening only
its own country fs, to put it mildly, one-sided."
Axen stated explicitly.that "China's development shows that
the main danger for a socialist country lies in deviation
from Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."
The documents of the 1957 and 196.0 Mosccw conf.eiences had
identified revisionism as "the main danger,." and Soviet
comment in recent years has aporadically called nationalism
the main danger, with Peking in mind; the main document of
the 1969 conference did not .identify any "main danger" in
its recitation of ideoXogical deviations. Axen's srticle
went on to declare that "the ideology and policy of Maoism
seriously harm the cause of socialism."
In the Politburo report which he read to the 16 September 1971
SED plenum, Axen had been the first to register Soviet blac
concern, at the party leadership level, over Peking's contacts
with the United States and over Chinese efforts to penetrate
the Balkans.
THE COM1ivTERN Soviet 'propaganda has been selective and
ambivalent in its treatment of the Comintern,
dissolved by Stalin during World War LI; it has avoided
discussing the Cominform--successor to the Comintern--which
expelled Yugoslavia in 1948 and was disbanded by Khrushchev
in 1956. An international meeting was held in Prague in October
1965 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Seventh
Comintern Congress of 1935--an occasion used by CPSU Secretary
Ponomarev to highlight that congress' denunciation of "leftist"
deviation, against the backdrop of worsening Moscow relations
with Peking.
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. Another international meeting .was .held in ~~Ioscow in March 1969
to mark the 50th anniversary of the Comintern. Used as a
forum for a display of ideological unity prior to the June
international party conference, that meeting featured speeches
by Suslov and Ponomarev, who offered an apologia for the
defunct organization in stressing its ideological legacy
of "proletarian internati~nalisd." At the same time, the
Soviet speakers also dwelt on the ''mistakes" of the Comintern,
presumably to reassure the foreign CP's that there was no plan
to establish another Qtich organization at the impending
international party conference.
The article on the Comintern in this year's first issue of
VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS--by Dmitriyev and Shirinya, entitled "Against
Historical Truth"--took issue, among other things, with
~-hargas by former Netherlands Communist Party Chairman
de Groot to the effect "that alleged.Ly the Comintern's only
line was coordinated with the State intere~*s of the Soviet
Union and hence contradicted" the interests ~~f a maiority
of world communist parties. A similar charge was leveled
against the Comintern by Romania's Ceausescu ire a 7 May 1966
speech in which h~ denounced the organizat~~?.; L:.r "arbitrarily
putting fascist Germany on the side of the ~'':SR" via the 1939
Soviet-German pact and for failing to support Romania's
resistance to the cession of northern Transylvania to Hungary
to August 1940.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
l5 MARCH 1972
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW PRAISES ARAB-SOVIET ~RIEImSHIP. URGES ARAB UNITY
Moscow propagandists recently have given marked attention to the
long-standing theme of Soviet-Arab friendship and cooperation and
the need to consolidate "anti-imperialist" Arab ?lnity in the face
of alleged divisive attempts by Israel, imperialism, and local
reaction. Particularly notable in this contex+: is the stress
that has been placed on the need to rally "progressive" forces
in the Arab countries- The renewed focus on these themes, not
pressed by M~~scow since late summer and early fall last year,
comes at a time ??hen the Soviet Union h.a been having a running
series of high-level talks with Arab leaders--first Egyptian
as-Sadat, and then officials of Iraq, Syria, and Libya
A PRAVDA Observer article of 12 February seems to have initiated
the new stress on these themes While ostensibly concerned with
the problem of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the
article also reacted to Western "conjecture and slander" on
Soviet-Egyptian relations in connection with as-Sadat's
2-4 February visit and underscored the two countries' "tradi-
tional friendship," Subsequent propaganda has a?.3o seemed to
display sensitivity to U.S. official statements about the Soviet
role in the region, Western press speculation about friction in
Moscow's relations with Cairo, and questions about Soviet policies
from the Arabs themselves.
The attention to "progressive" Arab forces comes against the
background of the establishment in. Syria and projected~formatdon
in Iraq of national fronts including the local communists, a
development which Moscow naturally would welcome< Moscow con-
cu~rently has t'~~een emphasizing the need to strengLher the domestic
forces in the Arab countries, in line with Cairo's current policy
of building the domestic front.
For example, Demchenko, in PRAVDA on 11 March, declared that
political developments in the Arab world "give added urgency
to the need for unity of action of the progressive democratic
forces in each country and throughout the Arab world." He men-
tioned new measures in Egypt to strengthen the domestic front,
the establishment of Syria's National Progressive Front,. and
a "serious political evolution" in Iraq "also developing toward
the consolidation of the democratic forces." And NOVOSTI
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15 MARCH 192
commenCaCor KaCin, in a Moscow domestic service Calk on 12 ~!srch,
saw "notable importance" in points in Che 17 and 26 Februacy
communiques wiCh Iraq and Syria stressing the "urgency of Che
cohesion of Arab countries on a democratic, anti-imperialist
foundation" and Che importance of sCrengthening friendship and
cooperation with Che socialist countries. NEW TIMES (No. 9,
February) had called it no secret ChaC "lack of complete unity"
?.~eakena the Arab countries in the face of intrigues by Israel,
imperialism, and reaction, and declared it was "imperative" for
Chem to "agree on unify of action"* as well as Co expand their
cooperation with the socialisC countries.
HIGH-LEVEL The recent Arab-Soviet meetings generated few
COIW~IENT remarks by Soviet leaders other than brief, and
widely reported, comments by Brezhnev to the
Iraqis and speeches by Mazurov in Syria. The communiques all
Couched, in varying degrees, on Soviet-Arab friendship, with
only the Iraqis going on record wiCh their Soviet hosts in con-
demning anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, as Che Soviet-Egyptian
communique had done last October. In Brezhnev's 15 February
meeting with Che Iraqis, the sides reportedly stressed the need
to include all Arab "progressive and democratic forces" in the
struggle against Israel and to strengthen Arab unity of action.
Similarly, Mazurov in speeches in Syria on 22 and 2~ February
welcomed any steps leading to unity of action by the Arab states
as well as the unity of "all progressive forces," praised Arab-
Soviet frienddship, and denounced imperialist anti-Soviet propaganda.
The 12 February PRAVDA Observer article seemed to have set the
sCage for the recent comment. Observer warned of alleged Israeli
attempts to undermine the progressive regimes in the Arab coun-
tries from within and to alCer their political orientation."**
And he also charged that Tel Aviv and "reactionary propaganda in
the West" are not abandoning attempts to sow mistrust of the
Soviet Union, its policy, and "even" its assistance to the Arab
countries, apparently hoping to find support "in the Arab countries'
* In Cairo's AL-ARRAN on 4 February, chief editor Haykal, writing
about as-SadaC's Moscow talks, said that at times the USSR "seemed
lost in Che ocean of Arab disputes." As he had earlier reported
in January 1970, Haykal recalled that Kosygin once told an Iraqi
official: "I don'C know what you want, Arab friends. Agree on
the minimum. Agree on the maximum. BuC for heaven's sake, agree
on some~hing."
** The Observer article is discussed in the 16 February TRENDS,
pages 33-35.
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15 MA12C11 1972
most reaction:ary circles." The Observer article declared that
the Arab countries cannot wAtch the "intrigubs of hoe~tile forces"
with indifference, and cited Egypt as implementing measures to
strengthen the domestic front and providing for mobilization for
;.he struggle against Israel
An article by R. Petrov* in the 24 February IZVESTIYA Cook a
similar tack in accusing forces hostile to the Arabs of spreading
anticommunist and anti-Soviet vi ewe to "undermine Arab-Soviet
friendship and split the do~.aestic fronts." He singled out Egypt,
Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and the People'e Democratic Republic of
Yemen as aodels of Arab countries successfully combining their
struggle against Israel and imperialism with socio-economic
reforms. Petrov urged the consolidation of all progressive and
anti-imperialist forces and pointed approvingly to "a process
of establishment and consolidation undor way in the vangucrd
political parties and organizations in power" in these countries.
He added that cooperation is gradually being established between
these parties and organizations "and communist parties, where
they exist." In h!.s IZVESTIYA article--as in an article authored
by him in NEW TIMES (No~ 8, February) praising Arab-Soviet friend-
ship--Petrov called it of vast political significance that, thanks
to Soviet arms deliveries and "the assistance of Soviet military
experts," many Arab countries now are in a position to create
their own modern armed forces.
PROPAGANDA The last flurry of attention to the Arab unity
BACKGROUND theme occurred late last summer and early fall,
at the time of another round of Arab-Soviet talks
and as Egypt, Syria, and Libya. held the 1 September referendum
on the establisY~ ant of the Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR).
While Moscow has long been on record as a supporter of Arab unity
* Petrov seems to be emerging as a Soviet expert on Arab unity:
His critical and detailed assessment of the "extremely complex"
problems facing Arab unity, in a N'sW TIMES article last August.
was broadcast in installments to A;-ab audiences on the eve of
the CAR referendum in Egypt, Syria, and Libya. In that article,
he warned that any attempt to exclude the communists and their
parties from the common struggle could only weaken the united
front. See the 9 September 1971 TRENDS, pages 29-31.
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.i~ MAI~L'll L97l
on an "anCi-imperialisC" bueie,* iC hus given only lukdwur.ui
support Co actual Arab Caderation experiments. '1'I-ue the
communique on as-SadaC's Hioo~ow Calks lasC OcCober noted Chut
he "informed" Che SovieC aide abouC Cho esCabllnh,ient of CAR.
(In the current series of Calks with CAR members, tine subJecC
of Che confederaCi.on was noC mentioned in the ~"gypCian and
Libyan communiques, but Che Chird member, Syria, did "inform"
the Soviets of the CAR's importance.)
The importance of rallying Che Arab "patrioCic progressive forces"
had been stressed by Brezhnev 1ac+t May in Che wake of the Egyptian
purge of 'Ali Sabri and hie aeeociaCee, and was picked up by
Koeygin and Podgornyy in the fall in speeches made during Arab-
Soviet meetings. Podgornyy, for ins~;ance, at a lur,:heon for the
visiting Egyptian president, had aer~ailed an alleged imperialist
"anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaign" aimed at dieuniCing the
"revolutionary Atab patriotic fighters" and disrupting Arab-
Soviet friendship.
USSR EfmORSES ARAB FRONTS, AFFIRMS TRfJ4TY PIJWS WITH IRAI,1
Soviet propaganda has welcomed the 7 Marsh esta~lishment in Syria
of the National Progressive FronC, which includes Che Syrian
Communist Party, and has encouraged the Iraqis to get on wiCh
their own front organization, outlined in Baghdad's National
Charts- last November, which wo~.~1d include Che Iraqi CP and the
Kurdish Demo.ratic Party.**
Presumably the Soviets would like Co see the Iraqi organization
established before f in~lizing the Soviet-Iraqi treaty, mentioned
in the 17 February communique un Saddam Husayn's visiC. Moscow's
apparent neglect in referring to Che treaty in immediate poet-
communique comment would seem to suggest some Soviet hesiCation,
* Khrushchev publicly debated the unity question with tlasir
during his May 1964 visit to Cairo, arguing the Soviet concept
of unity on a class, as opposed to national, br.~~is, and declaring
that the USSR was not helping the Arabs "in general" but the
people of Egypt who were fighting imperialism.
** Cairo does not subscribe to Moscow's view that political evolu-
tion is taking place in Iraq: AL-JUMHURIYAH or. 28 February accused
the Iraqi regime of failing to achieve tangible political progress
or solve important issues such as the Kurdish question, and charged
that its attempts at cooperation with other parties, such as the
communist and the Kurdish, have failed.
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1~ MARCII 1972
porhupr until thn g,ruunJ liud bmnn prepared with ruck probnblm
critics ar I;ran. Comment: on tht visit in NLW TtMLH (No. 9,
Mobruary) and in Morcow'r "Republic of Iraq Connor" broadcart
in Arabic on tha 2Sth failed to mtntion rho treaty in arrorring
eht Ir.egi taller. Tht Iraqi Connor broadcart merely rtrorrod
that "in the taller" Lt war underlined Chat unity of "all or~-
grottive and democratic forcer" in ?vory Arab country and unity
of action botwetn Arab countries ara nocortary in the confronta-
tion with Itraol and imperialism.
Tho frosty was finally brought up again by NOVOSTI observer Katin
in his 12 March commentary on Moacow'o domestic rtrvice. Ha fore-
cast that Iraq and the U53R would "take additional statures in
the ne;~r future" to put their relations on a higher plane, and
that "these measures will be put together in the form of a treaty."
Italian CP leader Giancarlo Panetta, interviewed in the Italian
party organ L'UNITA on 27 February after he had recently led a
PCI delegation to Iraq, pleaded diplomatic discretion when asked
if there were to be an Iraqi-Soviet pact similar to thole with
Egypt and India? The Italians were told, he said, that the Moscow
meeting was considered "fundamental" for Iraq's economic and
political prospects. Panetta observed Chat the PCI delegation
encountered "caution and prudenca with regard to relations with
other Arab countries," adding that "we have heard (and we were in
a way unable not to share) a certain concern about manifestations
of conservatism and a possible backsliding to the right in the
Arab countries which call themselves progressive and are alined
in the anti-imperialist camp." It must be remembered, Panetta
said, that relations between Iraq and Syria are ''also" tense
partly because there exist two Bath parties. While Panetta
seemed to be referring to Iraq's relations with Syria, he may
also have had Egypt in mind.
Moscow has intimated disapproval of certain segments of Egyptian
society while at the same time affirming that the Egypti+~
authorities are correctly seeking to strengthen the interni~l front
ae well ae solidarity with all progressive forces. Thus M~~yevskiy
approved this course in the 5 March commentators' roundtable on
Moscow's domestic service, noting that Egypt is struggling against
"subversive imperialist propaganda." Moscow has gone to pains to
rebut Western press speculation abut strained Egyptian-Soviet
relations, a 9 March PRAVDA article by 3ablin--also broadcast in
Arabic--assailing a "misinforming story" by NEWSWEEK's de BorcYigrave.
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Uc~N tlrN'C f AL f~llf N 'f'IIfENf1N
,f. 5 MAilGll 19 y 2
JubJ,J,n claimed tl-ut uccor.~ding to do liorchgruvd~ th? onv topic o(.'
pr;Lvute L~gyptiun conv~+rautione i~ "chilline~n in Novi?C~LBYptiun
relatione~" and that "Soviet Coreign policy ullogedly giv?? ri?e
to mJ,utruaC and exasperation among c?rtain anonymous Aral,o."
PIIAVDA's Cairo corrospondent (ilukhov Cook comCort~ in an article
on 10 fdarch~ .From some new L~gyptian films "exposing the apathy
and indif'Perenco of certain propertied elaesae" of L~gyptiun
society which ;ry to distract public attention from the Zeraeli
occupation and wi~i~h "cultivate ?entimenta of helpleesneee~
de#eatiem~ and despair."
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15 MARCII .1972
U, S, BASES
SOVIET ApMI RAI.. OTi~R PRGPAv/WDI STS CONTINUE CRITICAL COMMENT
In the wake of the 15 February Soviet Government statement, USSR
merlin have continued tea attack the U.S. home-port arrangements
tc~r. the Sixth Fleet in Piraeus, Greece, and have utilized this
project a? a peg to criticize U.S.. bases worldwide. Most rot:ably,
an art.ir.le i.n the 8 Matr.h IZVESTIYA by Admiral V. Alekeeyev did
eo In assailing U,S. efforts to "encircle" the USSR and the other
ec~r~.ial?i.st countries with a "continuous chair, of military bases."
.fin earlier article, by Mayor Geraral R. Simonyan in NEW T?MES
(No. 9, Fe.bt?uary 1912), had preesPd much the same line, observing
that the Pi.raeue project has "highlighted anew the problem of
American bases ae a whole."* Neither article has been broadcast
by Radio Moscow, but TASS on the 8th summarized the Alekeeyev
pier..e .
The atticlee are noteworthy for their authoritative ring and for
their timing--within a month of the scheduled 28 Mt~rch resumption
of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) 1n Helsinki. While
neither of the authors mentioned SALT, their comprehensive treat-
ment of the base issue at this time could presage a renewe3 Soviet
effort to include the question of U.S. overseas bases as an agenda
item at Helsinki. The first broaching of the base issue in the
context of SALT came in a PRAVDA article by V. Shestov on
3 February 1971, and it was raised again in a mid-July RED STAR
article by Colonel V. Kharich and Engineer-Captain 2d Rank G.
Koloskov.** Since the appearance of the July article, Moscow's
continuing low-volume propaganda on ;SALT has not discussed the
bases issue.
* RED STAR on 2 February 1972 carried an article by Simonyan
assailing U.S~ efforts to "encircle" the states of the socialiE?t
community by a "system of hostile military-political blocs and
3roupings" and Identified the author as professor and doctor of
military sciences The Admiral V. Alekseyev writing in
IZVESTIYA may be Admiral Vladimir Nikolayevich Alekseyev, First
Deputy Chief of Staff of Soviet Naval Forces.
** The two articles complained that the United Staten was
seeking one-sided advantages in keeping the base issue off the
ager.Ja at SALT. For a discussion, see the TRENDS of 10 February
1?./1, pages 22-23,and of 21 July 1971, pages 33-34.
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CUNUCULN'1'CAL UD1S 'C'RLNUS
7.5 MARCH 1912
Th? Alekeeyev nrtic.lo declared that'the "Pentagon's bases
strategy" dated back to tha early postwar years when Washington
"decided to encircle the Soviet Union and the socialist countries
friendly toward it with a continuous chain of military bases
along the perimeter of the socialist camp's borders." Accor~ting
to Alekseyev, U.S. naval forces and "the aggressive military
bloc of NATO were to complete the fu11 encirclement of
oar country from the sea, uniting all their armed forces in the
continuous ring of the nuclear blockade, deploying them in good
time, and preparing Chem for attack." He concluded with the
observation tnat, with its reliance on foreign bases, the
Pentagon bargains on using with the greatest success "even those
means of attack which possess a ema11 range of action but which
car,i threaten from the bases vitally important regions of the
socialist community."
The Simonyan article saiu that the bases--"most of which are
concentrated in Western Europe"--represent 8 "mayor instrument
of Washington's global strategy" and are "intended first and
foremost for aggression aga:.net the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries." Citing Hanson Baldwin, Simonyan stated
that the United States needs its foreign bases "as a springboard
for attack on the Russian interior."
CGi~FIDENTIAL
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Cf)NIrCDLN'I'1.AL, FBIS 'C'RL~NDS
.1.5 MARC11 .1.972
FRG TREATIES WITW USSR, POLAND
'REVERSE LINKAGE" OF PACTS WITH BERLIN ACCORD MADE EXPLICIT
Against the background of the continuing Waet ~~erman parliamentary
debate over ratification of the FRG treaties with the USSR and
Poland, Moscow media have weighed in with the first authoritative
public Soviet expression of the "reverse linkage" concept--the
demand for ratification of the two treaties before the USSR will
sign the final protocol implementing the four-power agreement
on Berlin, reversing Bonn's prior ca.Ll for a Ber11n settlement
as a precondition for ratification of the treaties. Moscow media
never publici.:ed reports, appearing in the Western press last
fall, that Gromyko had advised FRG Foreign Minister Scheel of
t.hia Soviet position during a conversation at the United Nations.
IZVL'S'TIYA's senior political observer Matveyev voiced the first
unequivocal statement ~f the linkage position in Moscow media in
the course of the weekly ~.:omestic radio roundtable program on
12 March. The implementation of the "West Berlin" agreement,
Matveyev c~id, "depends directly on the fate of the Creaties
signed by West Germany with the Soviet Union and Poland." An
article in the ev^.ning edition of IZVESTIYA the next day by
Mikhaylov, reported by TASS, followed up with a more elaborate
but equally clear presentation of the same point. In general,
Mikhaylov said, ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties
is inseparable from other agz.eements recently concluded in
Europe; "it is natural" that continued improvement in the
European political situation and the FRG's "involvement" in
this process "are directly linked to the ratification" of the
two treaties, "after which the Weser Berlin settlement comes
into force"; and "without these treaties, the four-power
agreement on West Berlin will not come into force and talks
with the GDR cannot be continued successfully."
The notion of reverse linkage had surfaced in Warsaw and East
Berlin media before Moscow spelled it out. During the 23-25
February reading of the ratification bills in the Bundestag,
the Polish party daily TRYBUNA LUDU declared on the 24th that
implementation of the Big Four accord on Berlin "will nit take
place until the FRG parliament ratifies" the treaties. East
German party leader Honecker addressed himself directly to
the subject on 10 March in a speech at the Leipzig Fair:
Lecturing the Bundestag deputies on the importance of the
treaties for European detente, he stated that "only the
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COIVFiDL;N'i'IAL FBi5 'I'KCNDS
15 MARCH 1972
ratification of the treatise will make it possible to
implement the agreements between the GDR and the FRG ~ind
between the GDR and Weat Berlin."
Underscoring the GDR stance of readiness to meet Weat Germany
halfway, Honecker pointed to the "constructive step"
represented by the GDR's unilateral "goodwill" decision
announced on 22 February--the day before the reading of tl~e
ratification bil).s began in the Bundestag--to temporarily
implement the inter-German accords fn order to allow West
Berliners and West Germans to visit the GDR over ti.e faster
(29 March - 5 April) and Pentecost (17-24 May) holidays.
"NABLYUDATEL" ARTICLES Two articles over the author+tative
signature of "Observer" (nablyudatel)
in PRAVDA argued the case for ratification of the two treaties
dust before and duet after the reading of the bills in the
Bundestag--on 20 February and 4 March- The latter brought up
the reverse linkage concept indirectl;?.
"Nablyudatel" is one of two terms used for "Observer" in the
past, but the other, more common term "obozrevatel" has been
used consistently for the past eight years. The last
"nablyudatel" article on record appeared in PRAVDA on
2 January 1964, discussing Cambodia. The identities of the
authors writing under the "obozrevatel" and "nablyudatel"
labels is u:.::~own, although some "obozrevatel" articles in
the fifties contained stylistic idiosyncrasies not unlike
those identified with PRAVDA's senior commentator Yuriy
Zhukov. The Observer articles of both varieties served
traditionally as vehicles for authoritative comment below
the editorial-article level but a'.~e the level of routine
signed articles, although the rely*.ivaly infrequent
"nablyudatel" articles in the fifties seemed to have a
somewhat less authoritative cast than those signed
"obozrevatel."
The "nablyudatel" articles of 20 February and 4 March are
the first Observer articles of any kind on Germany in more
than six years: The last one, signed "obozrevatel," appeared
in PRAVDA on 30 December 1965 and discussed the dangers posed
by possible FRG access to nuclear weapons through vATO. The
two articles under the revived "nablyudatel" signature both
carry an authoritative ring. The first one, on 20 February..
was devoted to a rebuttal of arguments advanced by "opponents"
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CUNFIllLNTIAL FDIS TRENDS
15 MARCH 1972
o! the Moscow-Donn treaty to the effect that "there are some
differences between. the Russian and Garman texts of the
treaty." Potl~ the W.adt German and Soviet governments had
confirmed the authenticity of the text in both languages,
Observer said, and there ie no reason to contend that there
are differences.
The 4 March article presented a review of the Bundestag
debates. It alluded to reverse linkage in observing that
the path to the "West Derlin" agreement ~~as opened by the
signing of the two treaties, but it went no further. At a
later point it skirted the issue again in commenting that
the treaties constitute the only possible basis, under pre.aent
conditions, for establishing peaceful cooperation between the
FRG and the socialist countries.
The 4 March article constituted Moscow media's moat authoritative
suggestion to the Soviet people that ratification of the Moscow-
Bonn treaty cannot be taken for granted, although there have
been routine-level references to opposition elements in the
Bundestag. The article denounced the IIonn opl::,sition parties
for "coarse attacks" on the Soviet Union, "blatantly aimed at
kindling nationalist and .anticommunist passions." Observer
asserted that the "hackneyed pseudoarguments" of the West
German opponents o the treaties were "unconvincing."
Maintaining that tl~e CDU/CSU has "no realistic alternative"
to the Brandt-Scheel government's policy toward thy, socialist
countries, he went on to ridicule the CDU/CSU contention that
the USSR would launch a process of cooperation with the FRG
even without the Moscow treaty. While admonishing the FRG
tl-.at if it were to "return to the past" it would bring upon
itself "the most serious and, possibly, irreparable damage"
in the present period of progress toward European cooperation,
Observer did not. spell out the consequences for Moscow-isonn
relations if ratification fails. He stated only that the
"next few months will show whether the leaders of the
CDU/CSU realize the extent of the responsibility
invested 'n them" in connection with the ratification of
the treaties.
POLYA{VOV TO GERMAN IZVESTIYA's first deputy chief editor
RADIO AUDIEf~~CES and German expert Nikolay Polyanov was
less circumspect in A Moscow radio
interview beamed to German listeners repeatedly at the
beginning of March. Quoting a West German new3paper as
saying the USSR "cannot maintain the same good relations
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15 MARCH 1972
with a country such as the FRG" if the Moscow treaty ie not
ratified. Polyanov added Chat he must "stress that the entira
situation in Europe would be affected." The treaty "affects
not only the relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG
but the general political atmosphere on our continent," he
said, warning that if it is not ratified, "danger will be
created. The FRG press today deals with this danger, stating
that Europe might again return to a cold war period, with
all its negative consequences for Europeans in East and West."
To the accompaniment of :his kind of propaganda, TASS reported
on 4 March that the USSR Supreme Soviet Pres~tdium had "examined"
the USSR Council of Ministers' "presentation for the ratifica-
tion" of the treaty and passed it on to the foreign affairs
committees of the two houses of the Supreme Soviet for
consideration.
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CONFLDEN'PIAL
- 34 -
CH I (VA I IdTERIyAL AFFAIRS
FbIS TRENDS
15 MARCH 1972
FURTHt:R TEMPERING OF WIGWER EDUCATIONAL REFORMS REVEALED
Unusually detailed provincial radio reports on the status of
educational ref c._::i indicate thst, although cultural revolution
instructions on the reorganization of higher education are
still to serve as general guidelines for all educational work,
considerable leeway is currently being allowed in an apparent
attempt to complete the rebuilding of the higher educational
apparatu8. A 7 March Changchun radio report on enrollment
procedures for admission to colleges and universities within
Kirin, for example, spoke of an "examination on the cultural
level and physical condition of the students" to be conducted
by county-level party committees and revolutionary committees.
Previously issued guidelines had stated that students seeking
a higher education should have at least a junior middle school
education, but had not indicated that an examination would
test their knowledge. The old examination system--formally
abolished at the start of the cultural revolution--was
condemned as unfair to children of poor and lower-middle
peasants.
Departing from earlier indications that the poor and lower-
middle peasants would play a central role its the selection of
students for admission to higher educational institutions,
the Changchun broadcast indicated that, after the prospective
students have taken the examination, county-level party and
revolutionary commit*_ee members are to make preliminary
selections and send a report up to the regional officials,
who will conduct an additional "screening" and submit
recommendations "to the province for evaluation and approval."
It was specifically declared that all school admission work
throughout the province is "under the centralized leadership
of the provincial. party and revolutionary committees."
Judging by a 21 February Hofei broadcast, university students
with ourstanding academic records will receive special
consideration when the time 4omes for their first job
assignment. (Mao's July 1968 instruction on higher
educational reform had declared that students "should
return to production after a few year's study.") The
Hofei broadcast stated that "immediately following
grad;.ration" most of the "5,000 students" admitted for the
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15 MARCH 1972
" current spring term "will generally go back to their original
units to work there"; work assignments for some "exceptional
cases," however, "will be made by the state."
The almost total "rehabilitation" of the precultural revolution
teaching staff in Kwangsi was revealed in a Nanning broadcast
on 10 March. In accordance with "the party's policy on
intellectuals," several Kwangsi institutes of higher education
have "patiently" helped the original teaching staff "to
o~;ercome their ideological shortcomings while "boldly making
good use of them." Providing a unusuri percentage figure on
"rehabilitated" teachers, the broadcast stated that "over 90
percent of the former teachers have been appointed to poste
in the institutes" within Kwangsi.
Presumably, the decision to restore most of the original
teachers within Kwangsi was motivated by the unsatisfactory
performance of the worker-peasant teachers who, according
to Mao's August 1968 instruction, were to enter and "manage"
ali schools and colleges. A recently received l4 Janua*y
KWANGMING DAILY article, written by a commune-level part-time
peasant teacher, was unusually frank in revealing that soon
after the poor and lower-middle peasants look their position
on the teaching rostrum and gave "a few lectures, we ran out
of te~~ching materials." This problem was compounded by the
fact that some of the part-time teachers, "noted only for
their great enthusiasm, did little to improve their poor
speech" and thus their "lectures became quite pointless and
were of little educational value." To remedy this problem,
the local commune party branch "convened meetings for us
part-time teachers to exchange experiences and for the full-
time teachers to help us prepare our lectures."
Standards were also raised by reducing the total contact
time between part-time teachers and the students. Teaching
schedules at the commune were rearranged so that "part-time
teachers might deliver lectures without adversely affecting
the academic progress of the students when they were taught
? by full-time teachers." Full-time teachers had complained,
it was reported, that part-time teachers--with "no textbook
to follow"--were meeting "so often with the students" that
"we full-time teachers, who must follow our textbooks, will
have to sacrifice our lecturing hours" in order "to get
through our textbooks according to schedule."
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The contin4ed moderation of cultural revolutionary higher
educational reforms--a trend noted since the July 1970 RED
FLAG educational guidelines--appears aimed at removing those
obstacles which apparently still prevent the resumption of
higher education at all locations. Although many universities
and colleges located in mayor eastern cities accepted new
students for technical training in the fall of 1970, and
several of the more remote institutions o,~ened the followinb
year, some higher educational institutions have only recently
reopened. Sian radio on 7 March, for example, reported that
"all colleges and schools in Shensi are now engaged in
enrollment" and that "this is the first time since the
cultural revolution that colleges and schools i:. the province
have bznerally engaged in enrollment."
REVISED PEKING OPERAS REFLECT CURRENT PROPAGANAA THEI~1ES
Nearly all the operas and ballets widely performed and publicized
during the cultural revolution were set in periods of armed
struggle. But the two moat recent opera revivals, "On the Docks"
and "Ode to Dragon n~~er," are set in the decade of the 1960's
and more closely reflect current themes and problems. Both
operas were revised in Shanghai, with final librettos approved
in January after "experimental" performances in Peking on
National Day last October. Both feature heroines, reflecting
recent efforts to raise women's status.
Revisions made in "On the Docks" (the new text was published
in RED FLAG No. 2, 1972) clearly reflected tie Lin Piao affair
and apparent efforts being made to accuse Lin .f collusion
with foreign countries. References to Lin in the 1969 version
have begin dropped, and the villain is now remade in the image
of Lin, a saboteur who unsuccessfully tries to flee to a
foreign country when discovered. In the earlier script, the
villain was ideologically impure, but his sabotage was nut
deliberate. The current version not only portrays him as a
total villain and active saboteur, but indicates that he was
guilty of crimes as far back as the Korean war--in effect a
warning that class enemies are always lurking Pnd that eternal
vigilance is necessary.
The text of "Ode to Dragon River" is not yet available, but
details revealed by media accounts indicate that its release
was timed to add emphasis to the annual propaganda coverage
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for women's day and for the start of Che spring farming season.
A point WEN HUI PAU-LIBERATION DAILY editorial, on ll March
noted Chat the opera "displays the glorious images of female
party cs~!res." During the period surrounding the 8 March
women's day festival this year extensive propaganda has
stressed the ability of women to hold responsible posts and
to work as effectively as men. The plot of the opera concerns
11ne struggle in the rural areas, stressing the need for
cooperation and coorcYination and warning. against the plots of
hidden capitalist-roaders. Similar themes have been aired in
the numerous commentaries tied to current agricultural efforts,
including the annual PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on spring farming
which appeared on 9 March.
While a 4 February point WFN HUI PAO-LIBERATION DAILY editorial
greeting the new version ~~f "On the Docks" noted that the
revision was accomplished "under the specific guidance of
Chiang Ching," the point editorial by the same papers on
11 March hailing "Ode to Dragon River" makes no reference to
Cbtang. Perhaps she took little. part. in preparing the
libretto; in regard to "On the. Docks," she had been publicly
identified with the earlier, discredited version, and it may
have been thought advisable to associate her with the revisions.
Chiang's cultural role seems to have greatly diminished, and
after the Lin affair began to. surface she was not mentioned. in
the media in any cultural context.urtil mid-winter, when there
were scattered references to her from provinces in East China,
especially Chekiang. Central media again noted her cultural
role in an article discussing "On thr Docks" which appeared in
RED FLAG no. 2. A 2 March Peking broadcast on films made from
model operas also noted her cultural leadership position.
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CUNFII)LN7.'1A1~ 1' B l S 'l'RI:NUS
15 MARCII 1972
- 38 -
USSR INTER~~AL AFFAIRS
UKRAINIAN DISSIDENT PENS LETTER OF ABJECT CONFESSION
Zlnoviya 'C. I~'ranko, a leading Ukrainian dissident and a grand-
daughter of Tvan Franko, one of the Ukraine's most illustrious
writers, has been forced to write a public letter of confession
following her alleged transmittal of "slanderous and anti-
Soviet" material. to visiting tourist Jaroslav Dobosh, whose
arrest was announced by the KGB on 1.5 January In a letter to
RADYANSKA UKRAINA published on 2 March, she makes the most
abject confession to appear in the Ukrainian prase in recent
years.
According to her letter, Dobosh, apparently a Ul~rainian-born
Belgian citizen, was caught "red-handed" receiving information
from her. Claiming that Dobosh's arrest and exposure as an
enemy agent had "opened my eyes," ahe confesses to engaging in
"anti-Soviet activity" and being on "the path which could lead
to treason," renounces her "incorrect and distorted" interpreta-
tions of "shortcomings and difficulties" in Soviet life,
condemns her past actions, and denounces foreign report;, of
persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals as "invented." The
letter stresses repeatedly her special regret that hostile
foreigners were able to use her famous name for anti-Soviet
propaganda.
Fier public recantation represents a .radical reversal of position,
r~ince she has stubbornly resisted the authorities during the
past decade and has been one of the central figures in the
movement to defend Ukrainian culture. She was closely involved
in the two most notorious recent conflicts between the KGB and
the dissidents. At the November 1970 Moroz trial she harassed
Ukrainian SSR Prosecutor F. K. Gluklt in the :~allway, protesting
the r_losed trial and the harsh verdict and threatening to appeal
to the United Nations (ironically, the trial was held in Ivano-
rrankovsk, the city n:.med after her grandfather), and she was
also one of the main organizers of the funeral of the murdered
Alla Horska. Her confession apparently sets the stage for the
case that is being prepared against her friends Vyacheslav
Chornovil, Yevhen Sversty~' and others in connection with
Dobosh's arrest.
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(;l)Nh L DISN'I' I AI, I'll l N 'I'ItI;NDIi
I'i MARCII 1972
EXPUL;;IGJ lvnn M. Dzyubn, Lira bust knc+wn c+f tha Ukrainian
OF OZYUIJA nutlon+-ll.et d.Lee.Ldente, wur+ f.l.nul..l.y av,p~slled from
t?h~ writors union on 2 March. bzyubn was among
those ur.r.eBtad ~~n l2-.13 Jununry~ but ho nppneent.l.y was one oC
the Live Kiev dissidents r.eleaeod later in January. The
l1 February announcement of criminal proceedlnKs agna.nst Ivan
Svitlichnyy, Vyncheslav Chornovil, Yevhen Sverstyuk, "and
others" in connection with the arrest of Jaroelav Doboeh
failed to mention Dzyubn, the moat prominent of those arrested--
euggesting that the evidence at hand was too weak to bring
Dzyubn to trial.
LITLRATURNA UKRAINA on 3 March announced that a 2 March meeting
of the Ukrainian Writers Union presidium had diocuesed "the
case of I. M. Dzyubn, who spoke at the meeting." The presidium
unanimously expelled him from the union "for gross violations"
of its statute and "for preparation and distribution of materials
which have an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist character, express
nationalistic views, slander the Soviet system and the party's
nationality policy, and are used by our class enemies ."
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