TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 24, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
IIIIIIIII~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIII
OREIGN111
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE ~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
24 FEBRUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 8)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national d- :nse of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP 1
Estlud.d (rain auiemelic
downpredlnp and
d!tle~tirtelien
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
PRESIDENT'S CH:ZNA TRIP
Peking Gives Visit Ample Coverage Without Commentary . . . . . 1
PRC Assesses U.S. China Policy Before President's Arrival . . 6
Moscow Exhibits Restraint, Uses Proxies to Stress Concerns . . 10
PRAVDA Defends CPSU's China Policy on Eve of Nixon Trip . . . 13
Radio Moscow Seeks to Fan Albanian Anxieties over Visit . . . 13
East European Allies Stress "Anti-Soviet" Aspect of Trip . . . 14
DRV, PRG Attach. President, Maintain Silence on Peking Visit . 18
Moscow Links Bombing with Nixon Trip, Scores Eight Points . . 21
PRC Offers Pro Forma Support to DRV on U.S. Air Strikes . . . 23
DRV Claims Seven U.S. Planes Downed, Displays Captured Pilots. 24
DRV, PRG Protest U.S. Postponement, Walk Out of Paris Session. 28
Le Duc Tho Meets U.S. Visitor; Other Leaders' Moves Reported . 29
Hanoi Army Paper Reviews Indochinese Military Situation . . . 30
PRC FOREIGN AFYAIRS
New Approach Shown in One of Two New Recognition Agreements. . 31
USSR-ARAB RELATIONS
Iraqi-Soviet Communique Suggests Future Treaty Relationship . 34
Visit of Libya's Jallud Given Minimal Publicity by Moscow . . 37
Grechko, Egyptians "Exchange Views" on Military Cooperation . 38
MEDITERRANEAN
Moscow Sees Peace Threat in Greek Home-Port, Cyprus Issues . . 41
ECUADOR
Cuba Adopts Wait-and-See Stance Toward New Military Regime . . 44
CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Second Liaoning Party Plenum Denounces "Swindlers" . . . . . . 46
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Crackdown on Cultural Figures in Ukraine Continues . . . . . . 48
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FB I S TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 14 - 20 FEBRUARY
Moscow (3118 items)
Peking (1595 items)
China
(8%)
12%
Domestic Issues
(46%)
36%
[Nixon Visit
(1%)
5%]
Indochina
(26%)
25%
Indochina
(21%)
11%
[U.S. Bombing
(---)
7%]
[World Assembly
(13%)
7%]
of DRV
Meeting,
Edgar Snow Death
(--)
11%
Versailles
PRC-Mexico Diplomatic
(--)
5%
Greece, Cyprus
(--)
7%
Relations
[Soviet Go,, arnraent
(--)
5%]
PRC-Argentina Diplomatic
(--)
3%
Statement on Greek
Home Ports
Relations
Nixon Foreign Policy
(--)
3%
Iraqi Delegation in
(1%)
6%
Report
USSR
Hungarian Leader Kadar
(--)
4%
in USSR
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been 'overed in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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- 1 -
PRESIDENT'S CHIN A TRIP
PEKING GIVES VISIT AMPLE COVERAGE WITHOUT COMIENTARY
Peking has provided extensive coverage tA President Nixon's visit
while observing a virtual standdown In polemical propaganda on
U.S. policies and act.ton .generally since the P.resident's arrival
on 21 February. With Mao's extraordinary meeting with the
President on the very fj.tst day signaling the major attention
to be accorded the visit, Pek..in 's coverage seems designed to
set the stage for what Chou En-lai on the 21st said could be
"a new start" in Sino-Amer.icari relations. While providing this
coverage, highlighted by a generous spread in PEOPLE'S DAILY on
the 22d, Peking has latgalyavoided anti-U.S. polemics. It has
originated no comment on U.S. activities since the PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article on the 200 supporting the DRV protest
against the U.S. bombings,* and i.` has mentioned the United
States only in passing or indirectly in news items on Indochina.
Reflecting the anomaly of a visit by the }rief of state of a
country with which the PRC does not have diplomatic relations,
Peking reported that the visit was at the invitation of the PRC
Government but offered no other characterizativn.** Nor was
there any explicit characterization of the atmosphere at the
Peking airport, the banquet .on the first day, or the various
meetings. Peking did, however, note that the fl&gs of the two
countries were flown and .their national anthems played at the
* See the Indochina section of this TRENDS.
** Haile Selassie paid "a state visit" last October. Chinese
reports on the arrival and subsequent ceremonies explicitly
depicted a "warm" atmosphere. In other types of recent visits,
Burmese Premier Ne Win--a target during the Chinese cultural
revolution of virulent .propaganda attacks--made a "friendly and
informal" visit last August; Paki.atan's Bhutto arrived for a
"fr.i.endly visit" at the invitation of the PRC Government last
November, when he represented a political party rather than the
Pakistani Government; and .DRV Premier Pham Van Dong made an
"official friendly visit" at the invitation of the Chinese party
and government, also in November.
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airport and the banquet. Taken together with the fact that
Mao's meeting with the President took place on the first day,
the characterization of their conversation as "serious and frank"
would seem to indicate,. frum Peking's standpoint, that the visit
should be viewed by the world as a serious attempt to address
the differences dividing the two countries and to seek areas of
common interest.
PRC MEDIA COVERAGE Reportage on the activities of the
President's group has been disseminated
broadly in PRC domestic and international media, giving Chinese
and foreign audiences factual accounts of the arrival, the
banquet on the 21st, the various meetings, and sightseeing and
other activities. The mast extensive coverage appeared in the
press and broadcasts on the 22d reporting the meeting with Mao
and other events of the .ftrst day. Thus, for example, the
main evening newscast in Radio Peking's domestic service on the
22d opened by reporting that PEOPLE'S DAILY devoted extensive
space to the meeting with Mao and followed with reports on the
banquet of the 21st, including the toasts, and on the talks
between the President and Chou and between Secretary Rogers and
the Chinese foreign minister.
The photographic display in the 22 February PEOPLE'S DAILY was
more generous than the coverage given other visiting noncommunist
chiefs of state since the cultural revolution. Previous visitors,
including two Pakistani presidents, Die Win, and Emperor Haile
Selassie, were each accorded two trunt-page pictures in PEOPLE'S
DAILY and one or two pictures an inside pages after they had met
Mao. President Nixon was pictured three times on the front
page and four times on inside pages. This is comparable to
the treatment accorded .Romanian Pretn.dent Ceausescu after meeting
Mao, when there were also three front-page photographs plus six
additional ones on inside pages. But the President was not granted
an honor given to Ceausescu and other communist leaders--a front-
page photograph of the leader alone, with no one else, on the
day of his arrival. Like other chiefs of state, Ceausescu did
not meet Mao until later in the visit rather than on the first
day, and met Mao only once.
first filmed reports came on the evening ui the 22d, leading
off the transmission for that day and being repeated at the
close. The two-mi.nu' a official film ''f the meeting with Mao came
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first, followed by 10-minute films of the arrival in Peking
and the banquet, including portions of both the President's
and Chou's toasts, and finally a two-minute film of the
afternoon meeting with Chou. On the 23d, the initial 17
minutes of the transmission were devoted to filmed reports
of the preceding day's activities, including the second
meeting with Chou and the ballet performance.
So far the TV coverage parallels that given to Haile Selassie's
visit last October. The emperor arrived on the morning of
6 October, and there was no TV reportage that evening; on the
7th, 8th, and 9th, filmed reports of his activities lasting
28, 9, and 22 minutes respectively led off the TV transmissions.
A five-minute film of Mao's meeting with the emperor was shown
on the 9th.
Peking made a point of providing the "compatriots" on Taiwan
with coverage of the President's visit. A broadcast by the PLA
Fukien Front radio to Taiwan on the 22d was wholly devoted to
the events of the first day of the visit. A broadcast on the
same day by Radio Peking to Taiwan devoted the first seven of
eight items to the visit.
As part of its worldwide dissemination of reportage on the visit,
Peking has beamed reports to Southeast Asia in various languages,
including Vietnamese. Radio Peking has also kept its Russian
listeners informed on the visit.
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE Peking's coverage has consisted solely
of of reportage without. commentary, but
the five principles of peaceful coexistence"--capping the front-
page of the 22 February PEOPLE'S DAILY and enunciated by Chou
at the banquet he gave on the 21st--have provided a leitmotif.
Chou :.alled the President's visit "a positive move" affording the
leaders of the two countries an opportunity of meeting in person
to seek the normalization of relations and to exchange views on
questions of concern to the two sides. Noting that contacts
between the two countries were suspended for more than 20 years
for "reasons known fully to all," Chou said "the gate to friendly
contacts has finally been opened,'` and he expressed confidence
that the day "will surely come" when the common desire of the
two peoples to promote the normalization of relations and to work
for the relaxation of tensions "will be realized."
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-4-
Acknowledging that the twc countries' social systems are
"fundamentally different" and. that "great differences" exist
between their governments, Chou declared that these differences
should not hinder China and the United States from establishing
"normal state relations". on the basis of the five principles
of peaceful coexistence, and "still less should they lead to
war."* Though Chou claimed that Peking had "consistently"
pursued a policy of seeking, negotiations with the United States
since 1955, his invocation of the principles of coexistence on
the day of the President's arrival represents another milestone
in a development that dates back to late 1968. At that time,
when Peking was taking a notably more flexible ideological and
political stance in the wake of the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in August 1968, a PRC Foreign Ministry statement
in 26 November had called for a resumption of the Sino-U.S.
ambassadorial talks in Warsaw after the President took office
and revived the proposal for a Sino-U.S. agreement based on
the principles of peaceful coexistence. Peking's revival of
this approach marked a striking shift in its strategy of
pursuing the rivalry with the Soviets by attacking their policy
of detente. (At the time of the Sino-Soviet treaty anniversary
in February 1965, for example, Foreign Minister Chen I said
peaceful coexistence with the United States was "out of the
question.") The November 1968 statement claimed that Peking
had "consistently" followed the line of coexistence in Sino-U.S.
relations for the past 13 years--thus dating this policy back
to the same point Chou did in his toast.
In the passage in his toast calling for peaceful coexistence, Chou
said that as early as 1955 the PRC Government publicly stated that
"the Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United
States and that the Chinese Government is willing to sit down
and enter into negotiations with the United States Government."
This wording appeared in .a statement issued by Chou at the Bandung
conference in 1955--where Chou became prominently associated with
espousal of a negotiated approach to Sino-U.S. tension--and in
formal reports that -year to the National People's Congress.
Chou'a toast contained no reference to a specific issue, but
the 1955 statement he recalled had expressed a readiness for
negotiations on relaxing tension in the Far East and specifically
* The 7 October 1969 PRC Government statement agreeing to open
border negotiations with the USSR said that "irreconcilable
differences of principle" should not prevent them from "maintaining
normal state relations" on the basis of the five principles of
peaceful coexistence. The statement said there was "no reason
whatsoever for China and the Soviet Union to fight a war" over
the border issue.
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in the Taiwan area. At that time Peking had explicitly expressed
an interest in the "peaceful liberation" of Taiwan and professed
a willingness to enter into negotiations with "the responsible
local authorities of Taiwan" to prepare this resolution of the
problem.
"A NEW START" Chou concluded his toast with an expression of
hope that through "a frank exchange of views"
to gain "a clearer notion of our differences and make efforts
to find common ground," a "new start" can be made in relations
between the two countries. He took not of the President's
remark before dan,"t, Washington 25X1
at "what we must o Is tind a way
La see Lnar we can Ave aranraa .vi Y1,.,...- U-4-- .....-t __ a _
In a reflection of Peking's evident sensitivity to charges that
its invitation to the President may enhance his electoral
prospects, the NCNA account of the 17 November departure cited
reports that the visit has the support of "a number" of U.S.
senators--quoting Senator Humphrey by name--and that both houses
of Congress had approved a resolution supporting the trip. In
contrast to other communist sources, Peking's recent comment on
the President's Vietnam peace initiative avoided citing the U.S.
election in denigrating his move.
LEADERSHIP So far the leadership turnouts for the President
TURNOUT have been mostly confined to those active leaders
thought to be close associates of Chou En-lai,
and none of the older, semiretired leaders has made an appearance.
Except for Chiang Ching's appearance at the ballet performance on
22 February, the Politburo members generally regarded as "leftist"
in orientation, such as Shanghai leaders Chang Chun-chiao and Yao
Wen-yuan, have not met the President.
The President has not yet-seen Tung Pi-wu or Soong Ching-ling, one
of whom usually functions as chief of state. Tung, who sometimes
acts as a host during formal state visits when diplomatic relations
exist, had appeared for the visits of Yahya Khan, Ceausescu, and
Haile Selassie. In a departure from the usual practice, Tung was
formally designated "acting" PRC chairman in a 24 February message
to Kuwait on its national day. He had previously been identified
as acting chairman in October 1969, in a message to the DRV, but
he is normally termed deputy chairman.
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In a similar departure-from normal practice, Wu Te was identified
as "acting" chairman of the Peking revolutionary committee in the
first NCNA English transmission reporting the President's arrival.
In a subsequent, fuller account of the arrival and in reports of
other events, however, he has been identified by his usual title
of vice chairman. Wu has served as Peking chief since Hsieh
Fu-chih dropped from an active public role in 1969, but he has
not previously been identified as "acting." The Chinese do not
normally use the "acting" designator unless the absent holder of
an office is not expected.to return. (Chi Peng-fei was designated
acting foreign minister while Chen I was still alive but presumably
not expected to be able to resume office.)
PEKING ASSESSES U.S. CHINA-POLICY BEFORE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL
Coinciding with the President's departure for the trip, Peking
offered an appraisal of U.S. China policy in a polemical account
of the President's foreign policy report to Congress. Peking's
assessment, an 18 February NCNA account providing the first
direct Chinese comment on the message, included the first
substantive discussion.of.the.President's China visit since
the invitation was announced last July. The NONA account also
discussed Secretary Laird's 15 February defense report, observing
that the two reports complement each other as evidence that U.S.
foreign policy remains "one of global aggression and power
politics backed by strength.'
In addressing sensitive issues of Sino-U.S. relations and the
President's visit, NCNA.took a firm but balanced approach
centering on the Taiwan.problemwhile implicitly leaving the
door open for improving-relations-between the PRC and the United
States. NCNA cited the President's observation that China is a
"dedicated opponent".of.the United States as indicating that
"U.S. imperialism has no wish to change its hostile policy"
toward China. As if to document-this claim, the account quoted
the President's statements that the dialog with the PRC would not
be at the expense of friends and..that diplomatic and defense ties
with the ROC would be maintained.. This showed, according to NCNA,
that the Nixon Administration has "not yet relinquished" its idea
of "one China, two governments."
The formula cited in the.NCNA.acco.unt as objectionable is one that
was added last year to Peking's list of offensive formulas. Attacks
on it, reflecting Peking's. sensitivity over any tendency within the
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international community to accept an accommodation that would
confer legitimacy on the Chiang regime, prominent after
the seating of the P.RC in the United Nations, figuring particularly
in reaction to Japanese efforts to straddle the Taiwan question.
The statement quoted-by NCNA on Washington's commitments to the
ROC is followed immediately in the President's foreign policy report
by the assertion thatthe.ultimate relationship between Taiwan and
the mainland is not a matter for the United States to decide and
that a peaceful resolution of this problem by the parties would
help reduce tension. NCNA's failure to cite this assertion is
consistent with Peking's virtual silence on U.S. suggestions that
the Taiwan question might be resolved between the contending
Chinese parties. Last spring, in reaction to a State Department
spokesman's suggestion.to.this effect along with his assertion
that the status of Taiwan remains to be determined and is subject
to future international resolution, Peki-:g did no more than
acknowledge and subsequently ignored the former suggestion while
directing its fire at the notion of Taiwan's status remaining
undetermined.
Further elaborating on the Taiwan issue, the NCNA account claimed
that the President is in the "grip of insuperable self-
contradiction" in talking about relations with the PRC while
saying that the United States would not turn -;:s back on its old
friend in Taiwan. It added, however, that the PRC "Government
and people"have "always been friendly toward the American people"
while opposing the "policies of war and aggression of U.S.
imperialism." This carefully balanced formulation, while failing
to strike the hopeful note of a new opening that marked last
spring's ping-pong diplomacy, was notable for associating both
the government and people of China in. expressing friendship,
and it avoided an invidiov_ 4istinction between the U.S. Government
and the American people.
Rounding out its comment on Taiwan, NCNA reiterated the demand--
termed an "unswerving position"--that the United States withdraw
its forces from the island as well as from Indochina, Korea, and
elsewhere. When voicing a similar. demand in the context of an
authoritative discussion of Sino-U.S. relations in mid-1970, a
Chinese leader had declared that a relaxation of relations was
"oi'. of the question" .so long as. the United States refused to
withdraw from Taiwan.. The NCNA account of the foreign policy
report avoided any such categorical statement.
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Underlining Peking's, more flexible approach with an implicit
justification for receiving the President despite the differences
recounted by NCNA, the account concluded by stating that affairs
between countries must be settled-by the countries concerned
through consultation--a dictum. attributed to Mao in the
authoritative New Year's Day editordal. In contrast, Peking's
assessment of the President's foreign policy report last year
ended with the forecast.that "a storm of real people's revolution
will arise" in the United States and sweep him into "the garbage
heap of history."
OTHER ISSUES Apart from the notable discussion of Sino-U.S.
issues, the NCNA account followed routine lines
in commenting on other.issues covered in the President's report.
As part of Peking's effort to reassure its Indochinese allies of
support, NCNA endorsed the PRG's seven-point peace plan and its
elaboration of "two key problems," said the questions of the
Indochinese countries can be settled only by their peoples
themselves, and claimed that the recent step-up in U.S. air
activity gave the Lie to the peace talks "fraud" propounded by
the President on 25 January.
On other Asian issues, NCNA registered special concern over alleged
U.S. encouragement of Japanese military expansion, drawing
implications for Chinese security interests. Citing the Laird
report as supporting the modernization of Japan's forces, NCNA
said Washington's policy would arouse "high vigilance and
firm opposition" by the Chinese and other Asian peoples.
Dwelling on plans in the foreign and defense reports calling for
an expansion of U.S. arms. expenditures, NCNA echoed earlier
assessments of the same issue in comment on the State of the
Union message last month, viewing tha military buildup as
directed chiefly against the USSR -while making no direct
reference to China's security. In contrast to Peking's
treatment of the 1971 foreign policy report as an indication
of alleged Soviet-American collusion to divide up the world,
this year's account concentrated mainly on Washington's
increased competition with Moscow,.parricularly in regard to
Europe, the Middle East, -and arms development. NCNA made
only passing mention of the President's discussion of
negotiations with the USSR on Berlin, SALT, and other issues
and avoided altogether his comments on the trip to Moscow this
spring.
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In line with last year's treatment, Peking's own assessment of
the President's report was preceded by pickups of hostile foreign
reaction, including authoritative comment from Hanoi, Tirana, and
Pyongyang. But in using this proxy comment Peking took care to
avoid spoiling the atmosphere surrounding the President's China
trip, muting the sharp personal invective against the President
contained in the foreign comment and omitting passages that
could be read as criticism of the visit.
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MOSCOW EXHIBITS RESTRAINT, USES PROXIES TO STRESS CONCERNS
Soviet media have handled President Nixon's arrival and activities
in Peking with the same restraint that marked their anticipatory
comment, reflecting concern not to jeopardize ongoing U.S.-Soviet
negotiations or spoil. the atmosphere for the Presider 's impending
visit to the USSR. Registering concern over the implications of
a Sino-U.S. rapproachement, they have continued to impugn Peking's
motives in particular and to avoid direct censure of the President
by picturing him as under pressure from "circles" in Washington.
Scant, slanted cov3rage of the trip in dcmestic media betrays
Moscow's sensitivity about publicizing the President's summitry
in Peking to Soviet audiences. The official attitude was spelled
out by Yuriy Zhukov in PRAVDA on the eve of President Nixon's
departure, in a 17 February article belatedly conveying Moscow's
first authoritative reaction to the President's 9 February report
to Congress on U.S. foreign policy: Zhukov wrote that a judgment
of the trip must await its concrtAo results, while pointing with
foreboding to signs that the Peking ',adership and "certain
circles" in the United States harbor motives detrimental to Soviet
bloc interests.
Broadcasts chiefly for foreign consumption have drawn heavily on
proxy comment from friendly sources and from the Western press to
sharpen the portrayal of the U.S.-Chinese contacts as anti-Soviet
in essence and prejudicial to the national liberation movement.
In broadcasts in Mandarin, Moscow has intensified its efforts to
fan domestic opposition to the trip. A broadcast in Mandarin on
the 22d, not mentioning the trip directly, aired a strong attack
on the PRC leadership by Polish First Secretary Gierck, including
an expression of hope that "the Chinese people and the Chinese
ccrninunists will manage to reject Mao's dangerous line and restore
socialist principles in China's policy."
NEWS COVERAGE TASS' initial report of the President's arrival
on the 21st read in full: "U.S. President
Richard Nixon arrived in Peking for an official visit* today at
the invitation of the PRC." This single-sentence report was
published on the inside pages of the central dailies, where routine
foreign news items normally appear. Radio Moscow's announcer, after
* As noted above, Peking itself did not attach any such label to
the visit.
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reading the brief report in the domestic service, went on to cite
an AFP report that "on the eve of the President's arrival in Peking,
U.S. B-52's stepped up bombing the entire tf!rritory of Indochina."
Moscow's only comment so far on the reception accorded the President
came in a domestic service newscast on the 21st, when the announcer
observed that the "reserved" welcome at the airport was only
"a sham" staged for Chinese domestic consumption and that "the real
action takes place in the wings, . . . where the Chinese leaders
offered words of welcome to the White House boss."
TASS reported later on the 21st that the President met with
Mao Tse-tung and that "according to R. Ziegler, they had a serious
and frank talk." On the 22d, briefly reporting the preceding day's
banquet, TASS said the speeches delivered by the President and Chou
indicated that "not only Sino-American relations but also international
problems are being discussed at the talks." TASS noted that the
President "stressed that the sides had common interests that
outweighed all the differences," and it singled out from Chou's toast
the statement that bilateral differences "should not prevent China
and the United States from establishing normal state relations."
TASS concluded by quoting the New York TIMES to the effect that at
the banquet the Chinese leadership extended "a heartfelt reception
to the President, whose traops are still staying in ."aiwan and
whose armed forces are continuing military operations in Vietnam."
On the 23d, reporting that the President had his third round of
talks with Chou and that Secretary Rogers met with Foreign Minister
Chi Peng-fei, TASS said newsmen in Peking had noted "a sharp step-up
in the Chinese press coverage of R. Nixon's visit," with pictures
of the President, Chou, and Chiang Ching attending the ballet. TASS
got in a dig at the end: "Local observers," it said, noticed that
Peking media were making no references to "American imperialism" and
that the Peking press has also "sharply reduced reports about
American air raids on the DRV and the bombings of South Vietnam."
TASS added that two articles on Vietnam in that day's issue of
PEOPLE'S DAILY "speak about the struggle of the Vietnamese
patriots against nameless enemies."
SOVIET COMMENT Zhukov's PRAVDA article on the 17th, examining
the President's foreign policy report, reiterated
the now standard Soviet position keynoted by Gromyko in the UN
General Assembly on 28 September: The USSR regards steps to
normalize relations between Washington and Peking as "natural" so
long as "this is not done at the expense of other states' interests."
Zhukov added suspiciously that "the President considered it necessary
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to point out that while certain U.S. political circles are exert-
ing pressure in favor of utilizing the new U.S. approach to
Peking to exploit Sino-Soviet tension, U.S. policy is not
directed against Moscow." On the matter of U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions, the widely broadcast Zhukov article deplored the
President's "unjustified accusations" against the USSR but
concluded by citing Brezhnev on the importance of improving
relations between the two countries.*
Reasserting the official wait-and-see line on the President's
China visit, Zhukov went on to state that "the perfectly logical
thing will be to determine the political essence of this visit
by its real content and result." But again the caveat: "It is
impossible to ignore the evidence of the desire of both the
Peking l6ddership and of certain circles in Washington to
utilize the process of development of Sino-U.S. contacts to
the detriment of international detente and against the interests
of the socialist community."
While Zhukov's article raid not spell out Moscow's specific con-
cerns, a panelist in Radio Moscow's weetcly roundtable discussion
on the 20th said that from a close reading of the views of
"American political. observers" one could infer that the aim
of U.S.-Chinese contacts, "though it is not discussed openly,
is to try to divide Asia into spheres of influence--a Chinese
and an American one." More pervasively, in some domestic
comment as well as in propaganda for foreign audiences, Moscow
has continued to air suggestions that a deal on Indochina,
behind the backs of the Indochinese, may be in the making in
Peking. Kondrashov in IZVESTIYA on 19 February attributed the
charge to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT.** There has been wide
play in this context for U.S. Communist Party leader Gus Hall's
remark, at the CPUSA congress, that "if the Peking leaders make
a deal with the ruling circles of the United States, this will
be a serious threat to peace and the interests of the peoples."
* Soviet propaganda on the 54th anniversary of the Soviet army
and navy, 23 February, treats the United States routinely. In
pro forma language which has characterized propaganda on this
occasion in recent years, Moscow has repledged the USSR to a
policy of peace, warned against the threat of "imperialism"
headed by the United States, and affirmed the USSR's intent
to maintain an adequate defense posture.
** See the Indochina section of this TRENDS for documentation
of this propaganda line.
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PRAVDA DEFENDS CPSU'S CHINA POLICY ON EVE OF NIXON TRIP
Concern to offset the notion that Soviet intransigence toward
the PRC had exacerbated Sino-Soviet tensions and thereby
spurred Peking to turn toward the United States seemed
reflected in a PRAVDA article by 0. Borisov on 18 February,
expounding a gratuitous defense of the CPSU's China policy
on the day after the President began his journey to Poking.
Widely broadcast to communist audiences in particular, the
article, entitled "The CPSU's Foreign Policy and the Further
Consolidation of the World Socialist System," sought to absolve
the Soviet leadership of blame for the current low estate of
relations with Peking and to put the onus for current tension
squarely on the Chinese leaders. Elaborating the stock Soviet
argument on this score, Borisov maintained that while the Soviet
party and government have been pursuing "a principled, con-
sistent" course toward normalization of relations with the
PRC, "this course has encountered stubborn resistance from the
Peking leaders, who stand on positions of anti-Sovietism,
great-power chauvinism, and nationalism." Moreover, Borisov
charged, Peking's policy of "anti-Sovietism" has "intensified"
in connection with the President's trip to the PRC.
Setting out to document a portrayal of failures in Chinese
foreign policy, Borisov cited the PRC's support for Pakistan
in the conflict with India and added that in general Peking's
leaders have been "unmasked as supporters of the aggravation
of international tension." In the same vein, he said the
Chinese leadership's efforts to make Peking the center of the
world movement have failed, as have their attempts to create
a pro-Peking bloc among the socialist countries and to "torpedo
CEMA and the Warsaw Pact." In sharp contrast, Borisov main-
tained, communist unity has been enhanced by the "tireless
efforts" of the CPSU and the Soviet state, and "the peace-loving
policy of the Soviet Union has borne fruit."
RADIO MOSCOW SEEKS TO FAN ALBANIAN ANXIETIES OVER VISIT
In a blatant effort to play on Tirana's suspicions about the
President's talks with its principal ally, a Radio Moscow
broadcast to Albania on 20 February observed that "Peking's
turn toward Washington has created a very dangerous situation
for Albania." The broadcast explained that since Albania is
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depundent on the PRC politically, economically, and militarily,
it cannot openly criticize the President's trip to Peking; but
neither can it decrease its criticism of Washington, because"this
would have a negative influence on the prestige of Albanian
leaders." The broadcast went on to say that Washington is
interested in improving relations only with Peking--"a policy
based on anti-Sovietism"--and "has no intention of recogni.-ing
the Albanian People's Republic," against which it has been
pursuing a hostile policy since the end of World War It.
Another Moscow broadcast to Albania on the 22d, bemoaning Tirana's
estrangement from the Warsaw Pact, concluded that "historical
experience shows that Albania, as a poor socialist state, can
develop comprehensively only under conditions of equal coopera-
tion with all the socialist countries."
So far, Tirana's coverage of the President's visit to Peking has
been limited to very brief reports, attributed to NCNA, of the
President's arrival, his talks with Chou, and his attendance at
the banquet.
EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES STRESS "ANTI-SOVIET" ASPECT OF TRIP
Moscow's hardlining allies in Eastern Europe have followed its
thematic lead but not--with the notable exceptions of Budapest
and East Berlin--its restraint. There have been pro forma
echoes of the official Soviet position that normalization of
Peking-Washington relations is a "natural" development which
can only be welcomed if it contributes to peace and does not
adversely affect other countries. The Czechoslovak party organ
RUDE PRAVO, reasserting this line on 21 February, noted that
it was shared by "our allies." But the dominant line is that
the two conditions are not likely to be met. Czechoslovak,
Polish, and Bulgarian comment is pervaded by charges that anti-
Soviet motives underlie the Siro-U.S. contacts, as well as by
suggestions that the Chinese leaders are prepared to sell out
Hanoi in a deal with Washington. Prague's comment has been
notable for recollections of the Sino-Soviet border clashes
in an effort to dramatize the portrayal of a U.S. exploitation
of a bellicose Chinese stance toward the Soviet Union.
East Germany, by contrast, has refrained so far from any original
comment, although the party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and the East
Berlin radio have aired a few commentaries on the trip from
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other Soviet bloc sources stressing the alleged anti-Soviet
aspect. Hungarian comment has been measured in tone and so
far devoid of charges of anti-Sovietism.
Romania gave the President's trip predictably ample news coverage
from the outset, prudently holding off until the 23d before
welcoming the visit in an authoritative article in SCINTEIA.
Yugoslav media have registered enthusiastic applause for the
trip, calling the Mao-Nixon meeting an augury of "serious possi-
bilities for a rapprochement."
PRAGUE ON PRC Czechoslovak comment prior to and during the
MILITARY STANCE trip has been unique in elaborating on U.S.
use of the Chinese military stance vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union. Thus RUDE PRAVO commented in an article on
the 12th that "the murderous volleys" fired by Chinese soldiers
at the Ussuri River in 1969 "awakened Nixon and his 'China'
policy" to the opportunity to secure Chinese "cooperation"
against the Soviet Union. On the 17th the paper seized on a
statement by Secretary Laird to the effect "that Chinese guided
missilesare threatening the majority of cities and other targets"
in south and east Asia "and a substantial part of the Soviet
Union." In thus "setting one socialist country against another,"
it added, the Secretary was spurred by the policy of the PRC
leadership "with its anti-Soviet orientation." On the 22d,
RUDE PRAVO reported an "extensive campaign" by Chinese authori-
ties to "explain" the President's visit to the Chinese people,
in which Chinese soldiers were "reminded of the recent clashes
on the Sino-Soviet borders" and told that "the Russians were
worse than the Americans."
GIEREK ON MAO PZPR First Secretary Gierek, rumored to be at
odds with the Soviets over some aspects of his
domestic reforms, delivered one of the most vigorous attacks
against Mao's leadership by any East European party leader to
date, in a Katowice election speech on the 21st. Without mention-
ing the President's visit directly, Gierek said China "is now
turning against its natural and infallible allies, the socialist
countries," adding that the course of "the Maoist Chinese leader-
ship is aimed against the interests of the entire socialist
community, including the vital interests of Poland." He came
close to calling for the overthrow of Mao in voicing a "hope
that the Chinese people and the Chinese communists will find
enough strength to discard the dangerous Maoist course . . . ."
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A fairly heavy volume of Polish comment on the President's trip
has emphasized the alleged anti-Soviet aspects. An article in
the 24-:.lJFebruary issue of the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY,
entitled "Nixon's Chinese Gambit." argued that despite alleged
assurances by the President and his aides that "their Chinese
gambit is not directed against the Soviet Union at all," other
statements in U.S. media "leave no doubt" that the move is
designed as "a trump card in the anti-Soviet game."
BUDAPEST A relatively small volume of comment in Budapest
media so far has treated the visit with some detach-
ment and in language largely free of invective. Thus the Hungarian
Government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 21st "approved" the
resumed U.S.-Chinese contacts and added only that it was "diffi-
cult" to say whether eased tensions would result. In low-keyed
terms, it commented that "the press of the socialist countries
considers the escalation of the U.S. air war in Indochina the
most regrettable prelude to Nixon's Peking visit."
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Starting on the mornj.ng of the 21st, the Bucharest
radio carried factuat reports on the President's
arrival in Peking and subsequent activities, including his
"serious and frank" talks with Mao and summaries of the toasts
exchanged by the President and Chou En-lai. All the reports
cited NCNA as the source.
The first original commentary in Bucharest media appeared on the
23d--a SCINTEIA article by one of the paper's leading inter-
national commentators, V. Iliescu, summarized at length by
AGERPRES. Entitled "A Positive Event in International Life,"
the article welcomed the U.S. break with a long-standing policy
of "ignoring the existence of the People's Republic of China"
and hailed the trip as "proof of a realistic stand." Predictably,
SCINTEIA took the occasion to press Romania's advocacy of
"negotiations and direct contacts" among all states, declaring
that the President's China visit and his planned journey to the
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Soviet Union "are fresh proofs of the universal validity of this
method." Reiterating Bucharest's line on the need for "active
participation of. R11" states in the solution of international
problems, Iliepcu concluded that "public opinion" in Romania
is following the Sino-American dialog "with interest" and
believes it will "stimulate the positive course of events
towards detente" and world peace.
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INDOCHINA
Vietnamese communist media have continued to ignore President Nixon's
trip to Peking while pressing their vitriolic attack on the Fresident
and his policies. The recent series of articles by NHAN LAN's
Commentator included one on the 19th which observed pointedly that the
Vietnamese are victoriously fighting against U.S. "aggressive
imperialism, the number one enemy of all nations." On 22 February,
the day after the President arrived in Peking, VNA announced that
the People's Army Publishing House has put out a took entitled
"Nixon's Criminal Records" which documents "crimes" perpetrated
under the Vietnamization policy.
The U.S. air strikes against the North on the 16th and 17th, during
which Hanoi claimed seven planes were downed, prompted a DRV Foreign
Ministry statement--the first issued at that level rather than by
the ministry spokesman since the flurry of statements during the
sustained strikes at the end of December. The air strikes and other
U.S. "escalation" moves are called further proof of the "hypocrisy"
of the President's eight points. Propagandists continue to demand a
positive response to the PRG's seven-point proposal, particularly to
the "two key points" elaborated on 2 February.
On the eve of President Nixon's arrival in Peking, the PRC went on
record as officially supporting the DRV's protest against the
16-17 February U.S. bombings with a 19 February PRC Foreign Ministry
statement followed by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article the next
day. Peking normally supports DRV Foreign Ministry statements in
this manner, and had done so during the December strikes.
Thus far Moscow has failed to react officially to the recent U.S.
bombings of the DRV, although TASS as usual promptly reported the
DRV Foreign Ministry statement. The strikes at the end of last
yea- had occasioned a 30 December Soviet Government statement.
Moscow comment has pointed out that the recent escalated bombings
took place on the eve of the President's trip to Peking and has
continued to warp of a backstage Sino-U.S. deal on Indochina.
DRV. PRG ATTACK PRESIDENT. MAINTAIN SILENCE ON PEKING VISIT
On the eve of the President's trip to Peking, Hanoi and Front media
sustained their sharp attacks on U.S. policy. Particularly noteworthy
is a 19 February NRAN DAN Commentator article which discusses the
unchanging nature of imperialism in orthodox terms, saying President
Nixon "has revealed" that Vietnam is to be used as "a major springboard
for attacks on the world socialist system." The article also continues
CONFIDENTIAL
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Hanoi's personal abuse of the President when it says he "speaks
of peace tirelessly, but the more he does so, the more affirmatively
the world public, thinking of his acts, brands him a loathsome,
bloodthirsty hawk. He fervently calls for an end to the war
while actually prolonging and expanding it. He publicizes his
readiness for negotiations, E'tt keeps blocking all progress at the
Paris conference."
While the Commentator article, like other Vietnamese communist
propaganda, avoids any explicit mention of the President's visit
to Peking,* it is presumably with the visit in mind that the
article says that "while trotting around the globe to peddle his
peace philter," the President continues to escalate the war. The
article was initially carried only by VNA in English and in
Vietnamese, but Hanoi radio broadcast it belatedly in the domestic
service on 24 February--at a time when P#.king was giving ample
publicity to the President's visit.
The Commentator article does not repeat Hanoi's charge that a prime
aim of U.S. policy is to split the socialist countries, but this
charge recurs in a Liberation Radio commentary broadcast in
Vietamese on the 22d, the day after the President arrived in Peking.
The commentary echoes earlier Hanoi propaganda when it says that
at the beginning of his career the President "revealed his frenzied
opposition to communism, to the sccialist countries, and to the
world national liberation movement." It adds: "After the Chinese
revolution triumphed in 1949 Nixon was deeply embi~tered and
nurtured an unabated grudge . . . . He sought by all means to
capitalize on the internal disagreements of the socialist camp in
order to further his interests, split countries in the socialist
camp and the world communist movement, and perform the trick of
'peaceful evolution' through economic cooperation and other
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maneuvers." The commentary concludes that no matter how frequently
the President may today insist "that he is eaber for peace and is
opening an era of negotiations, ho can in no way conceal his crimes
and his extremely reactionary nature."
Hanoi had most recently repeated the charge of U.S. attempts to
divide the socialist countries in the NHAN DAN Commentator
article of 13 February which accused the President of professing a
"readiness to negotiate" in order to divide the gocialist camp.
Similar charges had appeared in the 10 February NHAN DAN
Commentator article and in broadcasts early this month of
Truong Chinh's speech delivered at the Vietnam Fatherland Front
congress in December. The alleged maneuvers of the President to
divide the socialist countries had also been cited in an article
by Thanh Tin in the January issue of the DRV party journal
HOC TAP. Thanh Tin has analyzed U.S. policy in articles in
HOC TAP in January or February of each year since 1969. This
year's article, labeling the President an "archimperialist,"
echoed the tone of Tin's January 1971 article, which said the
President had "achieved records for his stubbornness, brazenness,
and brutality."
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MOSCOW! LINKS BOMBINGS WITH NIXON TRIP, SCORES EIGHT POINTS
Thus far Moscow has failed to react officially to the 16-17 February
U.S. bombings of the DRV,* although TASS as usual promptly reported
the DRV Foreign Ministry and Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements
as well as the 19 February Hanoi press conference at which five
captured American pilots were presented.
ATTACKS Moscow's comment has pointed out repeatedly that the
ON PEKING escalated bombings took place on the eve of President
Nixon's trip to Peking, continuing at the same time
to play on Vietnamese fears of a backstage Sino-U.S. deal on
Indochina. Commentators say the timing of the bombings is designed
to show Peking that the United States intends to maintain its
influence in Asia, and they again say that Washington has been
gratified at Peking's restrained reaction to the bombings of the
past few months. A Kuznetsov domestic service commentary on the
21st described as a "stage play" both "certain pronouncements in
Peking propaganda" criticizing U.S. Vietnam policy on the eve of
President Nixon's arrival and Peking's "reserved" airport reception
of the President. TASS and Moscow radio reports on the 23d,
citing "local observers" on the absence of references to "U.S.
imperialism" in the Peking press while the President is in China,
noted that two PEOPLE'S DAILY articles that day referred to the
Vietnamese patriots' struggle against "nameless enemies."
A Kondrashov article in IZVESTIYA on the 19th typified Moscow's
comment raising the spectre of a backstage deal on Indochina,
generally using the proxy of Western press observers or East
European communist media. Kondrashov quoted U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT as saying the President evidently hopes that "as signs of
agreement with the United States grow, Peking will make use of
its influence in Hanoi to arrange an acceptable settlement of the
conflict in Indochina." Ukraintsev picked up the same quotation
in a domestic service commentary on the same day and claimed that
"U.S. Administration spokesmen have repeatedly said they hope to
reach some kind of agreement with Peking on matters linked to the
Indochina war." The Americans are relieved at Peking's "restrained
reaction" to the U.S. bombing, Ukraintsev said, repeating the
* Moscow had waited until the end of the sustained 26-30 December
bombings of the DRV to react officially, but it reacted then at a
higher level than either Hanoi or Peking--with a 30 December
statement at the government rather than the foreign ministry level.
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frequent charge that the bombings are aimed at inducing an
Indochina settlement advantageous to the United States.
The charge of a Sino-U.S. deal on Indochina was elaborated in a
broadcast in Mandarin on the 18th over the purportedly unofficial
Radio Peace and Progress, which called the "premeditated" bombing
a prelude to the talks in Peking--a demonstration that the U.S.
stand on the Vietnam issue is "still stiff." The broadc::st cited
"American observers" as saying President Nixon will try to make
the Chinese leaders agree to a "compromising settlement" behind
the backs of the Vietnamese. It went on to charge that Washington
has hinted that U.S. economic aid to China and Sino-U.S.
trade will depend on "China's patticipation in the collusion
behind the Vietnamese people's backs."
U.S. EIGHT POINTS Some commentators say President Nixon's
peace plan is merely a "smokescreen of
peace rhetoric" to cover up intensified aggression. Alexey
Leontyev said i.n a 21 February English-language talk, for example,
that by making proposals which the other side cannot accept,
Washington is "trying to justify continued military operations
ratb^r than promote negotiations."
While Moscow has followed Hanoi's lead in focusing on the U.S.
proposals for U.S. troop withdrawal and elections in South Vietnam,
an IZVESTIYA article by Mikheyev on the 16th also brought up a
cease-fire and prisoner exchange. Mikheyev complained that the
U.S. plan makes withdrawal conditional n't only on the release
of captured U.S. pilots but also on a cease-fire throughout
Indochina, calling this a demand that the communists lay down
their arms and reconcile themselves to "U.S.-supported regimes."
The commentator also observed that the eight points speak only
of the withdrawal of U.S. "troops," not of U.S. "advisers," nor
of the cessation of U.S. military aid to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and
Vientiane or the liquidation of U.S. bases in Indochina and
Thailand. He commented that the proposal on the South Vietnamese
elections is merely an effort to preserve the Saigon army, police,
and administrative apparatus and that Thieu's "retirement" would
thus be meaningless and the election a "farce" like his election
in October 1971. Mikheyev concluded with an expression of support
for the PRG's 2 February "elaboration" of its seven points, citing
the substance of the proposals including the new demands for a
deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal and Thieu's resignation.
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PRC OFFERS PRO FORMA SUPPORT TO DRV ON U.S, AIR STRIKES
On the eve of President Nixon's arrival in Peking, the PRC went
on record as officially supporting the DRV Foreign Ministry
statement protesting the 16-17 February U.S. bombings in the usual
manner, with a PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the 19th and a
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 20th. While the state-
ment assails Secretary Laird by name for making "truculent war
threats" in asserting that such "so-called 'protective reaction'
raids" will continue, it does not mention President Nixon or the
"Nixon Administration." The most recent previous PRC Foreign
Ministry statement on the bombing, on 29 December, made a passing
reference to the Nixor_ Administration.
The current statement complains that "the 'eight-point proposal'
recently dished up by the U.S. Government was camouflaged with
the cloak of 'ending the war"' and says that the current actions
"shed the disguise of sham peace and laid bare the aggressive
features of the U.S. aggressors," but unlike the December state-
ment it does not take the United States to task for failing to
respond to the PRG's seven-point proposal or for having
"obstructed" the Paris talks. It does, however, conclude with the
demand that the "U.S. Government" stop its war of aggression in
Indochina, "cease to support the puppet regimes in the Indochinese
countries," and withdraw U.S. and "vassal" troops totally,
unconditionally, and by a set date. The statement scores "U.S.
imperialism" for attempting to bolster its "Vietnamization" plan
by air war in order to perpetuate its "forcible occupation" of
South Vietnam, but it does not mention "Laoization" or "Khmerization"
as the December statement did.
The statement concludes with the affirmation that the Chinese
Government and people "firmly support" the Vietnamese and other
Indochinese peoples in their war against "U.S. aggression" but
does not add the warning, contained in the December statement,
that the Chinese Government and people are "closely watching"
U.S. moves in Indochina. It says that U.S. imperialism "cannot
shake the Vietnamese people's determination to fight their war
of resistance to the end," but it avoids expressions of
gratification, which appeared in the December statement, over
U.S. "disastrous defeats" in Indochina and the "exciting victories"
of the people in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article similarly avoided mentioning
the President by name while scoring Secretary Laird's warning of the
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possibility of continued "protective reaction" raids. The
article complained that while the "U.S. Government" professes
a desire to "end the war" in Vietnam, "its acts are contrary
to its professions." Commentator went on to assail the "war
provocations and blackmail" of "U.S. imperialism." Expressing
the "full support" of the Chinese Government and people for
the DRV stand in the 17 February DRV statement, the article
added--unlike the PRC Foreign Ministry statement--that the U.S.
Government "must accept" the PRG's seven-point proposal but dio
not mention the PRG's 2 February "elaboration." PEOPLE'S
DAILY expressed the conviction that the Vietnamese and other
Indochinese peopl-se, "fighting in unity," will win final victory.
DRV CLAIMS SEVEN PLANES DOWNED, DISPLAYS CAPTURED PILOTS
The heavy U.S. air strikes on 16-17 February just above the
demilitarized zone in Vinh Linh area and Quang Binh Province
were first protested in a routine DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement on 16 February. A DRV Foreign Ministry statement
appeared the next day--the first at that level since the 26 and
29 December 1971 foreign ministry statements issued during the
intensive 26-30 December raids against North Vietnam.*
In its initial report on the 16th, Hanoi mentioned strikr'q "at a
number of populated areas in Quang Binh Province and Vinh "inh
zone" and claimed that two ilanes were downed and "a number of
aggressor pilots annihilated or captured." The foreign ministry
spokesman's statement issued later in the day repeated the
claim of downed planes and charged that the United States had
sent "many fighter aircraft to repeatedly strike at many areas"
in Vinh Linh and Le Thug district, Quang Binh Province. On the
17th a radio report said that U.S. planes had "attacked a number
of populated areas in Quang Binh" that day and that four planes
were downed and "many aggressor pilots wiped out or captured."
It claimed that in addition to the two planes downed the
preceding day, "the Vinh Linh armed forces and people downed
one more planethat was not previously reported," making a total
of seven for the two days and bringing Hanoi's grand total to
3,440.
* See the TRENDS of 29 December 1971, pages 1-7, and
5 January 1972, pages 6-8.
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CONl I DINT IAI, FII I H TRENDS
24 F'I;IIIMAItY 1972
On the 24th, Ilanoa. lasued another 1)IWV Forel.gn NI.n1.str.y spokesman's
statement condemning U.S. "will- acts" from 1.8 to 23 February.
During that period, the spokesman charged, U.S. planes including
B-52's bombed 1' )ng Lap village and U.S. artillery "from south
of the demi.l.itLiilzed zone" and U.S. ships shelled the villages
of Vinh Son, Vinh Gl.ang, Vinh 0, -ivid Vinh Quang, located "north
of the 17th parallel in the DMZ." He also charged that U.S.
aircraft "daily strafed a number of positions" in Quang B.Lnh
Province from 18 to 22 February.
The foreign ministry statement of the 17th charged that the United
States on the .,6th and 17th had "repeatedly" sent many aircraft
against heavily populated areas in the Vinh Linh area and Quang
Binh Province, and it "strongly condemned this new extremely
serious U.S. military adventure" against the DRV. The spokesman's
statement the day before had called the strikes on the 16th
"extremely serious acts of war"--a more usual description. The
foreign ministry statement paralleled earlier ones in calling
the strikes a challenge to U.S. and world public opinion and a
"gross encroachment upon the sovereignty and security of the
DRV." But it stopped short of the harsh 29 December statement,
which had called on the governments and peoples of the "fraternal
and peace- and justice-loving nations" to struggle to stay the
hands of the "U.S. aggressors" and had pointedly noted that the
DRV is a "socialist country and a sovereign and independent
nation."
The 17 February foreign ministry statement inexplicably did not
include the charge that the strikes violate the U.S. pledge to
cease bombing of the North--a charge contained in all seven of
the previous DRJ Foreign Ministry statements on U.S. actions
against the North issued during the Nixon Administration. But
U.S. statements on continued bombing so long as the U.S.
prisoners are held are again scored in a 24 February DRV War
Crimes Commission memorandum on the Nixon Administration's three
years of "crimes" against he DRV.* The memorandum says that
the President, in announcing his eight-point peace plan on
* Earlier this month, alleged allied crimes in South Vietnam in the
past three years were documented in a "white book" released on
12 February by the PRG at a Hanoi press conference. The white boot:,
which sought to demonstrate that the Administration's Vietnamization
policies are prolonging and expanding the war and causing more
"crimes," was reportedly sent to the antiwar assembly held in
Versailles from 11 to 13 February.
CONFIDENTIAL
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24 I-'l:BRIIARY 1.972
25 January, 'rcynically declared that 'the United ;states reserves
the right to resume bombing North Vietnam us long as our men are
detained."' Thu document cites the periods of bombings in 1.970
and 1971 which had prompted DRV Foreign Ministry statements. It
does not mention the 1.6-1.7 February itrikem specifically, but
4, seems to allude to them when it arns that as long as the
United States persists In its Vietnamization policy and bombing
of the North, captured U.3. military men will continue to be
detained "and the list will be made still longer, as was shown
by the outcome of the U.S. air strikes .aunched against North
Vietnam in late 1971 and early 1972."
The spokesman's protest on the 1.6th said that the U.S. "seriouj
acts of war" had unmasked "the fraudulent peace allegations of
the Nixon Administration." The foreign ministry statement similarly
said that the Administration's "deceitful protestation of peace"
had been exposed. In cataloging alleged U.S. provocations, the
statement assailed the dispatch of additional aircraft carriers
and B-52's to the area and U.S. "threats" to use air power against
the DRV. And it noted that the United States had "arbitrarily
postponed for an indefinite period of time the 145th session of
the Paris conference." While neither of the protests mentioned the
U.S. eight-point proposal, it has been brought up in other comment
on the air strikes. For example, a NHAN DAN editorial on the 19th
said that the air strikes, coming on the heels of the "brazen
undermining" of the Paris talks, show that the eight points "are
obviously for deceitful purposes."
Hanoi did not reveal the exact number of
pilots captured until they were presented at
a press conference on the 19th by Ngo Dien, chief of the Information
and Press Department of the DRV Foreign Ministry. Dien recalled
two similar press conferences last December* as he introduced the
five captured pilots and charged that they afforded further evidence
of the Nixon Administration's "crimes." The pilots, according to
Ha-'oi's radio report, were photographed and allowed to speak
briefly. They were identified as Ralph W. Galati, William R.
Schwertfeger, Kenneth J. Fraser, James D. Cutter, and Edwin A. Hawley.
Dien asserted at the press conference that the U.S. bombings in the
latter part of 1971 had been "severely condemned" by public opinion
* For background on the earlier press conferences, on 20 and
31 December, see the TRENDS of 5 January, pages 6-8 and
22 December, pages 3-4.
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CONI?LDI:NTIAL, F'B1.4 TRENDS
24 F'EBIIUARY 1972
.
and that the now strikes "clearly prove that the Nixon Administration
is a warlike and stubborn administration," lie derided the
Administration for "boasting about peace" and its eight-point plan
while engaging in actions that contradict irs words. Dien also
charged that contrary to U.S. statements announcing the end of the
bombing of the North, on the 18th "many aircraft" were again sent
to bomb many regions in Quang Binh and "warships close to the
shore opened fire on the Vinh Linh zone."
Dien referred disparagingly to the Administration's concern about
U.S. prisoners of war, ztating that the only way to secure their
release is to end the war and respect the basic national rights of
the Vietnamese people as set forth by the PRG in its seven-point
proposal and the two-point clarification of 2 February.
VIGILANCE The claimed downing of the seven planes and the
capture of the pilots prompted immediate praise from
the VPA High Command and the press as evidence of heightened
vigilance in Quang Binh and Vinh Linh. On the 17th a VPA High
Command congratulatory message* applauded the downings, as did
NHAN DAN and Hanoi radio ;ommentakies. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial followed on the 18th, and a NHAN DAN editorial on the
19th. The VPA High Command message commended the armed forces
and people of Quang Binh and Vinh Linh for "scoring outstanding
early-spring feats of arms" in "heightening vigilance and fighting
well." Asserting that the United States "will resort to many more
reckless schemes and moves to intensify the war in order to
avert their inevitable failure," it warned that the people and
armed forces "must therefore be very vigilant and stand combat-ready."
There are routine calls for heightened vigilance and combat
readiness, particularly in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's editorial of the
18th. The editorial registers confidence, claiming that throughout
the North he people and armed forces "were prepared to spot,
intercept, and destroy the U.S. aggressors if they dared attack us."
But it urges further efforts to emulate Quang Binh and Vinh Linh
and notes that those exemplary areas are not "subjective" or
complacent over their achievements.
The 19 February NHAN DAN editorial says that "for nearly two months,
implementing the High Command's combat order," Quang Binh and
Vinh Linh "have made every effort to enhance combat-readiness
and increase their fighting strength." It points to the preparedness
* The VPA High Command had also issued congratulations on 20 and
30 December 1971.
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24 FEBRUARY .1.972
of soldiers and compatriots in Quang Binh and Vinh Llnh, even while
celebrating Tot, and calla the downings proof of the "new progress"
of the armed forces in these areas and "a stern reply . . . to the
bellicose, stubborn Nixon clique's military adventures and insolent
threats."
DRV, PRG PROTEST U,S, POSTPONEMENT, WALK OUT OF PARIS SESSION
The U.S. postponement of the 145th Paris session scheduled for
17 February was protested by the DRV and PRG delegations in
statements issued in Paris on the 16th and carried in Vietnamese
communist media the following day. On the 17th both delegations
sent messages to the allied delegations--publicized by VNA on the
18th and by LPA on the 19th--again protesting the unilateral
decision to cancel the session and proposing that the 145th session
be held on the 24th.
On 24 February LPA and VNA, within an hour of each other, reported the
developments at the 145th session that day--with the DRV and the PRG
reading separate statements on suspension of the meeting and proposing
that the 146th session be held on 2 March. VNA, but not LPA, reported
that the two communist delegations walked out after reading their
statements.
The DRV statement, read by Xuan Thuy, said the decision to suspend the
145th session was a manifestation of the DRV Foreign Ministry's
"vigorous protest" over the 16-17 February U.S. air strikes against
North Vietnam. Thuy did not mention the Versailles gathering explicitly
when he accused "the U.S. delegate" of using "gross" language with
z-.gard to"peace-loving people of the world, including the American
people." And he said that in its 23 February message to the DRV, the
U.S. delegation "implied that it would continue to sabotage the Paris
conference." Thuy's statement repeated the claim that the U.S.
"escalation" of the air war further exposed the "fallacious"
character of the Nixon Administration's words about peace. The PRG's
statement on the 16th, protesting the U.S. postponement of the
session, had specifically mentioned the eight-point plan in saying
its nature was exposed by the stepped-up military action and the
increase in B-52 sorties.
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CONFIDENT I Al, Ffl:r.S TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY .1.972
LE DUC TWO MEETS U.S. VISITOR; OTHER LEADERS' MOVES REPORTED
VNA announced on 22 February that the American scientist George Wald
had recently visited the DRV and, while there, had met a number of
captured U.S. pilots and talked with Le Duc Tho. The report
identified Tho in his position as special advisor to the DRV
delegation to the Paris conference and said that the meeting, on
21 February, was "cordial." VNA said that Tho "further explained"
to Wald the "serious stand and well-wishing attitude of Vietrsm"
and stressed that the Vietnamese would fight "until complete victory."
Le Duc Tho has not normally met with Americans visiting the DRV,
although he--along with Pham Van Dong and Nguyen Duy Trinh--received
Cyrus Eaton and his wife in December 1969. Dung is the leader who
most frequently meets visiting Americansi when they are received at
a high-level; Hanoi reported his meetings with at least three U.S.
antiwar delegations last year. It is possible that Dong did not meet
with Wald during his week-long stay in Hanoi because the Premier has
been occupied with activities surrounding the visit of Sihanouk, who
arri?.~ed in Hanoi on 12 February. On the 23d VNA announced that Dong
had accompanied Sihanouk on a trip to Haiphong and the Quang Ninh
coal mining area from 19 to 21 February. Hanoi's reports on
Sihanouk's public activities have also noted that on 14 February,
on the eve of the lunar new year (Tet), he was received by Le Duan,
Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh.
Hanoi media reported that Dong accompanied Sihanouk during his
activities on the 15th, but there have been no reports on what
Sihanouk did from 16 through 18 February.
Consistent with past practice, Hanoi media during the week since Tet
have been publicizing various holiday activities by the DRV leadership,
but without providing precise dates. For example, as late as
23 February VNA noted that "on the occasion of the lunar new year"
Le Duc Tho had visited medical facilities trevting "cadres back from
the front." Similarly, a 21 February domestic broadcast noted
that Truong Chinh had "recently" visited a foreign trade branch
exhibit, and a broadcast on the 20th said Le Duan had paid a Tet
visit to a publishing house.* Other low-level activities of Le Duc Tho
in Hanoi were noted on 24 February in a VNA report that on the 22d he
had visited an art museum.
* For a report on earlier Tet activities by the DRV leaders, see
the 16 February TRENDS, page 19.
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HANOI ARMY PAPER REVIEWS INDOCHINESE MILITARY SITUATION
Hanoi comment on the military situation includes an article in the
17 February QUAN DOI NUAN DAN, broadcast to the domestic audience,
which offers some new analysis of allied military Strategy while
reflecting the standard optimism that the Indochinese "peoples"
are in an advantageous war situation. Reviewing the fighting
throughout Indochina, the article turns first to Laos where, it
routinely claims, the "enemy" in late 1971 was "dealt a staggering
blow on the Plain of Jars." In a seeming allusion to allied
speculation about the likelihood of an offensive in South Vietnam
this winter, the article notes that the action on the Plain of
Jars took place "while the Nixon clique was fearfully making
preparations to cope with the eventual attacks by the PLAF
on various battlefields in South Vietnam." The allies' "strategic"
defeat, according to QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, not only worsened their
military position in Laos but also "had a strong effect on the
general situation" in Indochina and undermined "the Americans'
big scheme to attract and disperse their adversary's forces on
the northern Laos front in order to shield their lackeys' troops
in South Vietnam."
Also surveying the fighting in Cambodia, the article maintains
that the balance of forces in that country is "very unfavorable
for the Americans and their lackeys." Arguing that South
Vietnamese troops can no longer assist the Phnom Penh forces,
the article notes the recent pullback of ARVN forces from Cambodia,
adding that their "defens.Lve position in northeastern Saigon, in
the high plateau, and in the Mekong Delta has obviously worsened."
It cites action in various parts of South Vietnam, asserting among
other things, that Saigon troops have been "strongly attacked" in
the highlands and that "the Kontum and Pleiku provincial capitals
have been under pressure and on permanent alert."
QTTAN DOI NHAN DAN maintains that the allies have failed in their
effort to "attract and disperse their adversary's forces" and that
"the Americans' setbacks in Laos and Cambodia have affected their
war situation on the South Vietnamese battlefield, causing the
Saigon puppet troops to become more passive." It concludes,
routinely, with the prediction that the Indochinese peoples will
continue to deal "new painful blows on all battlefields."
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CONFIDENTIAL
- 31 -
PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS
FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1972
NEW APPROAC;i SHOWN IN ONE OF TWO NEW RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
Peking has sustained its diplomatic momentum with announcements
on 15 and 19 February on the establishment of diplomatic relations
with Mexico and Argentina, representing the 21st and 22d such
accords in the series of agreements beginning with the one with
Canada in October 1970. In addressing the Taiwan issue, the
agreement with Argentina followed the Canadian formula--
Argentina recognized the PRC Government as the "sole legal
government of China" and added noncommittally that it "takes
note" of Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. In line
with the recognition agreement with Peru late last year,,the
Chinese expressed support for Argentina's claim to jurisdictio<
over adjacent waters to a limit of 200 miles. The communique
also recorded agreement to adopt "active measures for the
development of trade."
In contrast to this unexceptional treatment of the Taiwan and
other issues in a recognition agreement, the agreement with
Mexico and the followup PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 17 February
notably departed from Peking's practice since October 197n by
passing up all prior formulas for dealing with the PRC's claim
to be the sole government of China. The Sino-Mexican communique
made no mention of this claim or of Taiwan, stating simply that
the two sides had decided to establish relations on the basis
of what amounts to four of the five principles of peaceful
coexistence.* In Peking's only allusion to the Taiwan problem
in connection with this recognition agreement, the PEOPLE'S
DAILY editorial cited Mexican President Echeverria's speech
in support of seating the PRC in the United Nations last fall
for the statement that "the sovereignty and territorial
integrity" of the PRC are "juridically indivisible"; PEOPLE'S
DAILY noted that Mexico had subsequently undertaken the
"courageous" step of breaking its relations with the Chiang
Kai-shek government.
* The fifth of the principles, the one specifically dealing with
"peaceful coexistence," was omitted. The use of the five principles
of coexistence in the series of recognition agreements has
followed no regular pattern. The principles of "nonaggression"
and "peaceful coexistence" were omitted in the agreements with
Canada, Italy, Chile, Austria, Turkey, Belgium, Lebanon, and
Iceland. The principle of "nonaggression" was omitted in the
agreements with Cyprus and Cameroon. None of the five principles
were cited in communiques with Kuwait, San Marino Iran and Rwanda.
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In addition to the Canadian formula now repeated again in the
case of Argentina, Peking has accepted two other formulas for
acknowledging its claim to be the sole legal government of
China. In Peking's preferred formula, the other side rerogr,izes
thn PRC as "the sole legal government of the entire Chinese
people," thus implicitly recognizing Peking's claim to Taiwan.
The most accommodating tormula used prior to the Mexican agree-
ment provides recognition of the PRC Government as "the sole
legal government of China" without any reference to the Taiwan
question.
Peking's approach in the Mexican case suggests a more confident
attitude now that the PRC has been seated in .he United Nations
and Sino-U.S. and other developments have greatly enhanced its
international standing. Thus, provided the other country will
take the initiative shown by Mexico--acknowledging on its own
that China is "Juridically indivisible" and breaking off diplo-
matic relations with the ROC-Peking may be even more flexible
in the recognition negotiations than it showed in the series of
agreements dating back to the compromise with Canada.* Apart
from tougher cases in which the Taiwan question has acquired
special importance, as with the United States, Japan, and
possibly Britain, Peking may wish to appear less defensive
and more accommodating on this issue while broadening its diplo-
matic standing across as wide a front as possible.
* Before this series of agreements, Peking had not always
demanded a formal statement on its legitimacy as the sole
government of China. Thus, the Sino-French recognition agree-
ment of 27 January 1964 contained only a declaration of intent
to establish relations and ignored the question of representa-
tio< of China. A Chinese statement on the following day,
however, defensively and vigorously reiterated Peking's claim
to Taiwan.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1972
NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES The Chinese followed past practice by
extending support to the recognizing
government on an issue important to that government, in the
Mexican case going on record in the communique in support of
the Mexican-backed proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Latin
America. PEOPLE'S DAILY widened this endorsement by noting
that the PRC gives "active support" to the "Just stand of
all peace-loving countries for the establishment of nuclear-
free zones or peace zones."
Notwithstanding this expression of support, Peking has not
formally signed the protocol on a nuclear-free zone in Latin
America. In the last Chinese pronouncement on this subject,
the PRC's UN delegate Chen Chu addressed a First Committee
session on 10 December discussing a protocol to be added to
an earlier treaty on such a zone. Annommcing that the PRC
would not take part in the vote, Chen pointed out that the
PRC has no soldiers stationed abroad, has no military bases
on foreign soil, and has pledged not to be the first to use
nuclear weapons. Fe declared that this "p.lncipled" stand,
which he contrasted with that of the two superpowers, is
"the best support to the good wishes of many countries fo:
the establishment of nuclear-free zones and peace zones."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
USSR -ARAB RELATIONS
24 FEBRUARY 1972
On the heels of Egyptian President as-Sadat's 2-4 February talks
in Moscow, Soviet-Arab contacts have stepped up with the
10-17 February "official friendly" visit to the USSR of an
Iraqi party-government delegation led by Revolution Command
Council Deputy Chairman and Ba'th Party Regional Command
Deputy Secretary Saddam Husayn. On the 23d, a Libyan
Government delegation led by Economy and Industry Minister
'Abd as-Salam Jallud arrived in Moscow on what Cairo media
described as the first visit of an official high-level
Libyan delegation to the USSR. In the Middle East, Soviet
Defense Minister Grechko was in Cairo for talks 18-21 February
after visiting Somalia. And a Soviet party-government
delegation led by CPSU Central Committee Politburo member
and First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
Kirill Mazurov arrived in Damascus on the 21st for a six-day
visit to Syria.
IRAQI-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE SUGGESTS FUTURE TREATY RELATIONSHIP
The communique on Saddam Husayn's visit is marked by a much
more cordial tone than that on his previous Moscow talks, in
August 1970. Most significantly, it seems to foreshadow another
Soviet-Arab treaty in recording the sides' agreement to study
the question of "what supplementary measures can be taken in
the near futuri to appropriately consolidate and embody in
treaties" the two states' relations and "raise them to a new
and higher level." Saddam Husayn, in his 11 February luncheon
speech as reported by Baghdad radio, spoke of the need for
"developing relations between cur countries to the level of a
firm strategic alliance." The version in the 12 February PRAVDA
reduced this to "strengthening the ties between our countries,"
although it did record his further statement that "we look toward
the day when qualitative progress is effected in the character of
relations between us," as well as his remark that the "firm
strategic alliance" between "our peoples, parties, and governments"
is the foundation on which relations are and will be based.
The communique notes that Saddam Husayn was received by Brezhnev
and by Podgornyy and held talks with Kosygin. Moscow had notably
failed to report Brezhnev's meeting with Egypt's as-Sadat, but,
in contrast, gave wide publicity to the Brezhnev-Saddam Husayn
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24 FEBRUARY 1972
meeting: Broadcast reports of the latter meeting, beamed
world-wide, accounted for over half the total publicity on
the Iraqi visit, and exceeded the attention given to as-Sadat's
stay in Moscow. The report on the 15 February meeting, held in
a "frank and friendly atmosphere," noted that the sides
"exchanged views"on the Middle East and condemned "Israeli
aggression." Questions of the further development of bilateral
relations were discussed, the report added, as well as "examina-
tion of the question of strengthening friendly ties" between
the CPSU and the Iraqi Ba'th. The communique expresses satisfac-
tion with the state of "friendly links" between the parties and a
"mutual desire" to develop them further. The 1970 communique had
mentioned only that "useful meetings" were held between party
representatives.
The current communique records the sides' desire to further
develop political, economic, and "military" cooperation--the 1970
document expressed Iraq's appreciation of Soviet assistance in
strengthening Iraq's "defense power"--as well as cooperation
in creation of an Iraqi national oil industry. According to
the communique, the Soviets support Iraq's oil policy, while
the Iraqis express appreciation for Soviet aid in developing
and exploiting oil resources. The communique--like that in
1970--notes Soviet acceptance of an invitation to Brezhnev,
Podgornyy, and Kosygin to visit Iraq.
While the Middle East crisis was dismissed in the 1970 communique
with the observation that the sides "exchanged views" on the
subject, the problem is currently addressed in routine language
blaming the tense situation on "Israeli imperialist aggression"
supported by assistance from U.S. "imperialist circles and
international Zionism." The sides state that a just and
durable peace cannot be established without "liberation of all"
occupied Arab territories and.securing the "legitimate rights"
of the Palestinian people. The communique includes stress on
the need for '..,ity of action of the Arab states. Howe'er,
Baghdad radio in reporting Kosygin's 11 February luncheon
speech omitted or altered all his specific references to other
Arab countries, and in the communique substituted "Iraq" for
"the Arab countries" in a reference to "the Arab countries'
anti-imperialist course" in foreign policy and successes in
"progressive social-economic changes."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
24 FEBRUARY 1972
Along the lines of the Soviet-Egyptian communique on as-Sadat's
Moscow visit last October, the Iraqi and Soviet sides "resolutely
condemned" attempts by international imperialism to spread
"anticommunist and anti-Soviet feelings" aimed at breaking up
Arab solidarity and Arab cooperation with the socialist countries.
PRAVDA carefully edited out Saddam Husayn's accusations against
Iran in his luncheon speech, merely noting that he "touched on
the question of Iraq-Iran relations, setting out his government's
position." The communique strikes a compromise in condemning
"imperialist" intrigues in the gulf and calling, as did the 1970
communique, for liquidation of "imperialist domination" in the
area and abolition of foreign military bases.
INTERNAL Propa`?rnda surrounding the visit -seems to suggest
AFFAIRS the Soviets are hopeful that the Iraqi. regime intends
to im?ilement its "Nationrl Action Charter" of last
November and open the door to political activity in Iraq by
other "progressive, anti-imperialist forces"--specifically,
the Iraqi Communist Party and the Kurds. Thus Brezhnev, in his
15 February meeting with Saddam Husayn, was reported by Moscow's
domestic service to have welcomed the Ba'th Party leadership's
desire to "unitq all anti-imperialist and progressive forces"
in he country to strengthen the country's national independence.
And Kosygin in his 11 February luncheon speech pointed to
"important changes" in Iraq, citing efforts by the Ba'th and
"other progressive parties and oi.ganizations" to set up a
national front of all progressive forces in the country,
which he said would undoubtedly facilitate Iraqi advancement
"along the path of progressive socio-economic reforms." And
he expressed confidence that this would be furthered by steps
by the Ba'th Party and the government such as nationwide
discussion of the N tional Action Charter and "further
implementation" of the 11 March 1970 statement on a "peaceful
democratic settlement" of the Kurdish problem.
Koryavin, in the 10 February IZVESTIYA, assessed the charter
as ranking "among the most important political events" occurring
in Iraq. He pointed out that there had been no "nationwide
action program of any sort" in Iraq in the last few years, and
no cooperation between the country's main progressive forces--
the Ba'th, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the Iraqi CP.
Explaining the "transitional period" in Baghdad, Koryavin
pointed to Iraqi CP support for the dratt charter and the
charter's provision for Kurdish participation in state affairs,
remarking that peace in Iraq has opened up broad prospects for
the Kurds.
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A more dubious assessment of the state of affairs had appeared
in a NEW TIMES article (No. 49, December 1971) by R. Petrov.
While regarding the charter as a "major positive step," he
noted a struggle within the Ba'th between progressive 'ices
and elements "tied to moribund social relationships" c to
the foreign oil monopolies, and concluded that only the
future wot:ld show to what extent the proclaimed progressive
aims could actually be achieved. In the course of analyzing
the "two key political problems" facing Iraq--the Kurdish
question and the problem of establishing a "national democratic
front of progressive forces"--Petrov not only ticked off the
former fr-:Zings of the Iraqi Ba'th, but noted that the Iraqi
CP and the Kurdish Democratic Party had also engaged in self-
criticism of past faults--"leftist' deviations" in past CPI
activity and "extremist elements' activities" in the Kurdish
movement.
VISIT OF LIBYA'S JALLUD GIVEN MINIMAL PUBLICITY BY MOSCOW
Thus far Moscow has only briefly acknowledged the arrival of a
Libyan Government delegation headed by Economy and Industry
Minister Jallud on the 23d "at the invitation of the Soviet
Government." TASS the same day carried a two-sentence announcement
that Novikov, vice chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, had
received the deleg.--tion. On the 24th TASS reported that Novikov
and the Libyans began talks that day "in a friendly atmosphere"
and "exchanged views" on questions of mutual interest. The only
monitored Libyan report has been a 21 February LIBYAN NEWS AGENCY
item that Jallud had left for Cairo en route to Moscow at the
head of ~-n official delegation for talks with Soviet officials.
But Libya takes the occasion Lo warn Iraq of the dangers of
concluding a treaty with the Soviet Union. Bayda radio on the
23d cited an "authoritative source" at the foreign ministry as
saying "it is almost confirmed" that Iraq is about to conclude
a treaty with the USSR, and expressing Libya's "extreme concern"
over this trend "which the fraternal Arab countries have begun
to follow." Declaring that this trend takes the Arabs back to
the days of the Baghdad Pact and "Western imperialist countries'
treaties," the statement adds that Libya views this attitude as
a "serious violation" of the Arab League Charter.
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Moscow's limited propaganda attention to Libya In the past
two months has included commentaries in Arabic, one in late
January and one in early February, hailing the termination of
Libyan agreements with Britain and the United States. The
second commentary praised Libya's struggle to eradicate
imperialist influence and to establish cooperation with
"progressive states" sucii as Egypt and Syria. It pointed
noted that the latter countries' successes along the roar of
independent national development have "depended more and more
on the support and help" of the Soviet Union and other
socialist states. In December, Moscow had indirectly responded
to Libyan criticism of the Soviet role in the Indian-Pakistani
conflict with a TASS pickup of an article in the Lebanese CP
daily AN-NIDA' condemning "the anti-Soviet campaign in the
Libyan press."
GRECHKO, EGYPTIANS "EXCHANGE VIEWS" ON MILITARY COOPERATION
In line with Moscow's propaganda treatment of recent Grechko
visits to Iraq and Somalia, the Soviet defense minister's
18-21 February "friendly official" visit to Cairo was given
limited publicity.* (Grechko's Somali visit, originally
scheduled for December, was postponed due to his reported
illness in Baghdad.. Iraq.was the first leg of that trip
which, according to Moscow in early December, was also to
have included Syria.) Soviet and Egyptian media briefly
reported his activities, TASS noting on the 19th that
Grechko, accompanied by the Soviet ambassador and "the
chief military adviser," Col. Gen. V. Okunev, was received
by President as-Sadat on the 19th. Another TASS dispatch
on the 19th reported that Grechko that day inspected troops
of the Third Field Army. And it added-that at a luncheon given
by the army commander, Grechko affirmed that the USSR "will
be giving all kinds of assistance" to the Egyptian people,
and charged the United States and Israel with trying to "sow
seeds of mistrust" between the Soviet and Egyptian peoples
and between the armed forces of the two states. A one-sentence
TASS item on the 20th said that Grechko and War Minister Sadiq
"continued talks" that day..
* There was little monitored Moscow or Cairo Leportage on a
previoLs Grechko visit to Egypt, from 30 March to 3 April 1968.
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According to ii short commt.nt lque I8NUed on the 2.I.14t, the sides
"exchanged views" on f.ur.ther str.engthen.l.ng Soviet-Egypt I.an
military cooperation in the :Interests of enhancing the "defense
capacity" of Egypt. (Cairo r.ad.lo's version said "enhancing
the fighting capabl.l..l.tles.") And the Egyptians expressed
gratitude for the Soviet Union's "great support and assistance"
In strengthening the armed forces and the country's "defense
capacity"--or what the Cairo version called Egypt's "combat
ability."
(Similarly,a "Joint statement" on Grechko's official friendly
visit to Iraq last December, according to TASS, said the sides
"exchanged views" on strengthening and further developing military
cooperation, and the Iraqi side expressed appreciation for the
"big help and assistance in strengthening the defense capacity"
of Iraq. The IRAQI NEWS AGENCY's version additionally said the
two sides "reached agreement on further developing military
cooperation.")
A Moscow commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 18th, heralding
the Grechko visit, asserted that Article 8 of the Soviet-Egyptian
treaty, on military cooperation, "has gravely perturbed" Tel Aviv
and Washington. It added that this military cooperation "serves
the cause of establishing peace and security" in the Arab East
as well as the consolidation of Egypt's ability to repel the
"Israeli invaders." The commentary went on routinely to recall
that in the communique on as-Sadat's recent Moscow visit the
sides confirmed their determination to seek a "Just settlement"
in the Middle East on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242.
An Arabic-language commentary on the 22d, noting the "exchange of
views" on military cooperation during Grechko's visit, assailed
"dirty attempts" by the Arabs' enemies to distort the nature of
this cooperation and isolate the Arab peoples from the support
and help of the socialist cowltries.
ZHUKOV IN Discussing President Nixon's foreign policy report
PRAVDA in a 17 February PRAVDA article, Yuriy Zhukov claimed
that the "slanderous inventions" in the report with
regard to Soviet intentions in the Middle East were aimed at sowing
anti-Soviet feelings in the Arab countries, but that the Arab
peoples know their friends. Zhukov took issue with the statement
in the report "that allegedly 'the Soviet Union's attempts to
consolidate and expand its own military position in Egypt are a
subject of alarm in the United States."' He complained that the
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report presumes to advise the USSR "'to show restraint in its
arms deliveries' to the Arab countries" at a tim8 when U.S.
arms are pouring into Israel. Zhukov expressed astonishment
at the U.S. politicians' "impudence" in believing that the
aggressor is allowed to do anything while his victims do not
even have the right to acquire defensive weapons to protect
their own homes.
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MEDITERRANEAN
MOSCOW SEES PEACE THREAT IN GREEK HOME-PORT, C')7JRUS ISSUES
Moscow comment echoes the 15 February Soviet Government statement
on the U.S.-Greek home-port arrangements, charging that the U.S.
naval presence constitutes a threat to peace in the Mediterranean.
And propagandists claim that Greece, at American behest, is
pressuring Cyprus in fulfillment of a NATO plan to turn the
island into "a major NATO base." Focusing on the bruader as''ct
of the U.S. naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, Moscow
repeatedly points out that the Greek "bases" are located in direct
proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries. A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA review on the 20th by i'onomarev
and Malyshkin summed up the propaganda charges in declaring that
the Pentagon leaders intend to switch a proportion of U.S. ships
to Greece from bases in Spain and Italy to control the entire
eastern Mediterranean, "threaten the southern borders" of the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries, support Israel's
"aggressive aspirations," and pressure the Arab states.
Moscow also rebuts the "old grating arguments" of "an allegedly
'growing Soviet threat' in the Mediterranean," a PRAVDA article
by Ivanov on the 18th calling this Greek "ballyhoo" which was
used in the past to Justify implementation of the Truman Doctrine
and the Marshall Plan. A Volskiy article in IZVESTIYA on the
17th/, protested that Soviet intentions in the Mediterranean are
only peaceful. In `r.. is connection Volskiy recalled Brezhnev's
statement, in his 30 March CPSU Congress report, that after a
political settlement in the Middle East it would be possible to
consider further steps aimed at a military detente in the
region, particularly at turning the Mediterranean into a sea of
peace. Volskiy insisted that normalization of the situation
in the Mediterranean is "linked primarily" with a Middle East
settlement. Citing Soviet foreign policy actions representing
"Lhe USSR's 'peace offensive' in the Mediterranean," he listed
Brezhnev's visits to France and Yugoslavia, Kosygin's Algerian
and Moroccan visits, and Egyptian President as-Sadat's recent
talks in Moscow.
Volskiy recalled that Brezhnev in his 11 June election speech
last year had stated that the USSR die' not consider it an ideal
situation when navies of the great powers cruise for long periods
miles away from their own shor.:s, and "we are prepared to solve
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this problem, but . . . on an equal basis." Since early fall.,
Moscow media have largely ignored the issue of naval talks.
Among other items, the KOMMUNIST editorial for January, reviewing
the Soviet peace program, noted without comment that the USSR
"has advanced a proposal on solving on an equal basis the
problem of naval forces operating far from their native -l;.,res."
A Dobrov commentary in Italian on the 23ri, deploring the silence
in official circles in Rome over developments in the Mediterranean,
is notable for the observation that "in Spain there is talk about
a plan for a Mediterranean security system based on agreements
between the countries concerned." Moscow has rarely, if ever,
addressed itself publicly to Spanish initiatives, promoted from time
to time, on Mediterranean security.
TREATMENT Highlighting Soviet propaganda attention to
OF CYPRUS Cyprus in the wake of the 11 February Greek
Government "ultimatum" to Nicosia, a PRAVDA
article by Yuriy Yasnev on the 17th entitled "Hands Off Cyprus!"
asserted that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries
"cannot remain indifferent" tJ developments around Cyprus. PRAVDA
routinely added that the Soviet Union supports Cyprus'
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, the
dismantling of "war bases" on the island, and a peaceful solution
to the Cyprus question without any outside interference.
Propagandists note support in Cyprus for the government's
policy and cite President Makarios as declaring at a rally that
various plans for imposing a solution on the Cypriot people against
their will cannot succeed. Moscow has publicized statements by
some Soviet public organizations in support of Cyprus, as well as
statements by Cypriot, Greek, and Lebanese communist parties on the
situation. But it apparently has not replayed a Turkish Cr appal,
broadcast on the 18th by the Turkish-language clandestine "Our
Radio," which charged both the Greek and Turkish "juntas" with
delivering ultimatums to Cyprus and preparing to invade the island
and noted that the Makarios government has the support of the
socialist countries.
CYPRUS The propaganda furor over tl'z Greek "ultimatum" and
TALKS the ensuing Greek-NATO "threat" to Cyprus' independence
has contained re'atively few references to the fate of
the intercommunal talks. A Mirkov article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on
the 15th alleged that "NATO agents" broke up the talks to create a
pretext for foreign interferen~?e. Taking up the standard theme that
a plot against Cyprus was concocted at the NATO Council session in
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Lisbon on 3-4 June 1971, Markov claimed that the wrecking of the
intercommunal talks was part of Lice plan formulated in Lisbon.
And a Chirkov commentary in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the 16th accused
NATO agents of spreading the "provocative story" that the Greek
and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together in the same state. He
went on to charge that NATO, taking advantage of "the disagreements
that have arisen in the process of official negotiations" between
representatives of the "Greek and Turkish communities," was trying
to tie the island to NATO.
The fullest discussion c;f the status of the talks appeared in an
unattributed article in NEW TIMES (No. 7, 11 February 1972) which
claimed again that frustration of the dialog between the communities
was part of the Lisbon plan, and that the interruption of the
negotiations last September was "primarily the handiwork of NATO
agents." Soviet propaganda on Cyprus in the past several months
focused on the usual allegations of NATO plots with only a few
passing references to the discussions on widening the intercommunal
talks to include UN, Greek, and Turkish representatives. Now
NEW TIMES has explained that President Makarios, countering "this
NATO maneuver," asked the United Nations to appoint a representative
of the UN secretary general as an observer at the negotiations.
Greece and Turkey in turn, the article went on, proposed increasing
the number of participants by adding their own representatives
acting as legal advisers on constitutional matters. NEW TIMES
noted that in October the UN secretary general sent Cyprus,
Greece, and Turkey a memorandum proposing, an increase in the number
of participants in the negotiations, which was accepted by the
Cyprus Government. And in late January UN official Guyer held
discussions in ''costa with the government "and community leaders"
about negotiations with the participation of the United Nations
and representatives of Athens and Ankara. NEW TIMES added that
"even this decision, which is to some extent a compromise," was
not to NATO's liking, and charged "NATO agents" in Cyprus with
stepping up subversive actions to frustrate the new phase of
negotiations.
CONFIDENTIAL
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ECUADOR
CUBA ADOPTS WAIT-!X,-SEE STANCE TOWARD NEW MILITARY REGIME
Attentive but noncommittal Cuban reportage of events surrounding
the successful 15 February military coup in Ecuador reflects an
inclination to defer a judgment of the new regime until its
policies and intentions become clearer, The coup thus shelves,
at least for the time being, the warming trend in Cuban-Ecuadorean
relations--highlighted by Castro's 4 December talks in Guayaquil
with now-ousted President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra on the return
leg of his extended visit to Chile. But Havana's ample publicity
for the new leaders' promises of reform and its citation of a
Chilean comment on their apparently "progressive" leanings
suggest an initial judgment that the new military regime is
likely to carry forward the trend Castro had viewed w:.th favor
in Velasco Ibarra's.
NEWS COVERAGE The Cuban Communist Party organ GRANMA has
carried daily without comment "the latest
news reports on EcuadoL," including pronouncements of the new
military leaders, recognition of the new government by various
countries, and appointments of high-ranking government officials,
with many of the reports credited to news agency dispatches.
Havana radio and PRENSA LATINA reportage of developments touched
off by the "quick, bloodless coup" F--trayed the new military
government headed by Brig. Gen. Guillermo Rodriguez Lara as
an independent, nationalist-oriented regime. PRENSA LATINA
reported Velasco ibarra's arrival in Panama and quoted him as
saying he as not sad about the military coup but was "through
with politics." Quoting Santiago's PURO CHILE on 17 February,
PRENSA LATINA said that "something about this coup makes us feel
that this has not been 'Just another coup"' and that, considered
as a whole, the first decisions taken by the military government
in Ecuador " how a progressive mentality."
PRENSA LATINA dispatches on the 19th and 20th reported announce-
ments by the new government that it "will carry out wide reforms
in the country's education system," that its road construction
policy "will not be guided by private interests but will be
based on technical criteria," and that it will "carry out a
complete revision of its oil agreements." PRENSA LATINA also
reported that the co'xpists had cancelled the elections scheduled
for 4 June and had ar-ounced "a plan of structural changes which
will benefit the maj _ity."
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In contrast to its coverage of the Bolivian coup last August,
Cuban media conveyed no suggestion that outside elements had
been involved either in the planning or the execution of the
coup. PRENSA LATINA duly carried Rodriguez' denial that the
military leaders "had used other revolutions as an example
and model" and his claim that the revolution "is strictly
Ecuadorean in spirit--an Ecuadorean intention, an Ecuadorean
yearning." It quoted his comment that "our movement" is neither
fascist nor socialist and that "we speak of a nationalist
revolution . . . because someone had to change the structures
that were outdated for the life of a modern state,"
BACKGROUND Recent Cuban comment on Ecuador has stressed
the Velasco Ibarra government's stand in the
"tuna war" with the United States and its resistance to various
acts of U.S. "economic aggression" against Latin American nations.
In early December Castro indicated a favorable view of the
Ecuadorean Government, associating it for the first time with
the governments of Peru and Chile, particularly in view of its
voting record in the United Nations on the China representation
question. In his 3 December farewell press conference in
Santiago, Chile, Castro defended the Ecuadorean Government
against a reporter's allegation that it was "fascist":
Although the Ecuadorean Government was "not a revolutionary
government," Castro declared, it had nevertheless demonstrated
its "absolute independence" of the United States by voting
with Cuba, Chile, and Peru for the expulsion of Taiwan from
the United Nations. Reiterating the line that Cuba's reestab-
lishment of diplomatic relations with other Latin American
nations hinges on their demonstration of independence from the
United States, Castro asserted that "there are no contradictions"
in his visit to Ecuador and that "there would be no contradiction
if the Ecuadorean Government were to wish to establish diplo-
matic relations with Cuba,"
In a 4 December interview in Guayaquil, replying to a question
on his talks with the Ecuadorean president, Castro described
Velasco Ibarra as "a vigorous, likable person" who had made
"some thought-provoking statements in regard to Cuba." Stating
that his brief visit to Guayaquil was "merely to greet" the
Ecuadorean president and to "make his acquaintance and excharge
views," the Cuban prime minister expressed Cuba's appreciatii,n
for the "gestures" represented by Ecuador's votes on the UN
China representation question.
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CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SECOND LIAONING PARTY PLENUM DENOUNCES "SWINDLERS"
On 20 February Shenyang radio reported that the second "enlarged"
plenary session of the Liaoning provincial party committee
was held from 1 to 13 February. Nearly 300 persons attended
the session, including an unspecified number of the full and
alternate member9 of the provincial party committee and
"responsible comrades" of party committees at the municipal,
regional and county level. The session was presided over by
Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, Liaoning's first secretary,
and Tseng Shao-shan, second secretary. Although no other
members of the provincial party committee were mentioned in
the report, all but one have made relatively recent public
appearances; Deputy Secretary Mao Yuan-'sin, nephew of Mao
and a former Red Guard leader, has not appeared publicly since
April 1971.
Although the need to strengthen party unity to overcome the
harm done by "swin"'lers"--a term that has become identified
with Lin and his followers--has been a common theme in all
other recently reported provincial party plenums, the reportage
on the Liaoning plenum is more explicit in indicating that the
Lin Piao affair has hindered the rebuilding of party units
within the province. The radio report, for example, linked
the failure to complete the total rebuilding of the provincial
party apparatus with the negative influence of "swindlers who
had illicit relations with foreign countries and attempted
to change the line and policies of the party."
Indicating that gaps still exist within the provincial party
apparatus, more than one year after the formation ofitthe
provincial party committee, the report was able to claim only
that "party committees at various levels have mainly been
established." Calling for speeding up the work of "party
building, criticism of revisionism, and rectification of work
styles," the session stressed the need to strengthen party
building as well as the party's centralized leadership, and
concluded that "all party members, in particular the members
of party committees at various levels, should strengthen
their party concept and place themselves under the party's
absolute leadership." Party members were told to "improve the
party committee system" and to "conscientiously implement
democratic centralism and strengthen the party's collective
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leadership." New party members are to be accepted "actively
and prudently," and it was reiterated that party committees
should strengthen their leadership over revolutionary committees
and mass organizations and "grasp firmly and well the work of
improving and building the Young Communist League, particularly
the strengthening of YCL work in schools."
A 20 February LIAONING DAILY editorial greeting the conclusion
of the plenary session revealed that in the past year "the
work in some areas was not done well" and stressed that "it is
necessary to further expose and criticize the criminal activities
of Liu Shao-chi and other swindlers." Asserting that this
task is a "question concerning not only a certain single
individual," the editorial stated that it is "imperative" to
make "full use of these people as teachers by negative examples
and mobilize the masses in depth to criticize them and wipe
out their pernicious influence." The editorial argued that
"this is a task of prime importance at the present time and
it should be grasped firmly, meticulously, and successfully."
The concern for increasing party control over all social
organs expressed in the reports on the Liaoning plenum--an
intensified theme in PRC propaganda since the purge of
Lin Piao and several other top military leaders last fall--
was echoed in an unusually frank HOPEI DAILY editorial
broadcast by the Hopei radio on 21 February. Declaring that
the quest.io.i of "whetcier to consolidate and strengthen the
party leadership or weaken and destroy it" is an "important
criterion for distinguishing between genuine and sham Marxism,"
the editorial condemned those "swindlers" who "opposed the
leadership of the party w-thout restraint" and "deliberately
destroyed the organizational principles of the party." Without
centralized party leadership, it was asserted, "there will
inevitably appear a state of either dual leadership or plural
leadership--a state of anarchy."
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CRACKDOWN ON CULTURAL FIGURES IN UKRAINE CONTINUES
The Ukrainian cultural crackdown begun in early January has
continued to gain momentum. At a 1/ January meeting of the
Kiev writers organization chairman Yuriy Zbanatskiy denounced
"poisonous weeds" like Anatoliy Kuznetsov, Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn and Vyacheslav Chornovil for providing "spiritual
food for Munich radio stations" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA,
8 February). He declared that such facts must not be
overlooked and that youth and "our inexperienced comrades"
must be more actively protected from harmful influences. He
complained that the writers union had been too lax in
admitting young writers and evaluating their work. Among
those criticized by Zbanatskiy was former writers union
secretary Vitaliy Korotych, whose latest work was alleged
to contain "non-class" poems.
The 21 January CPSU Central Committee decree prompted editorials
in the two leading party papers (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 29 January,
and PRAVDA UKRAINY, 1 February) criticizing a variety of authors,
literary journals, publishing houses, film studios and
institutes. Similar editorials appeared in the Komsomol
papers (MOLOD UKRAINY, 8 February, and KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA,
11 February) criticizing ideological defects in the literary
work of the Komsomol press. The writers union paper
LITERATURNA UKRAINA ran two editorials on the decree
(28 January and 8 February); in the second editorial the
editors conceded that they had committed errors similar to
those condemned by the decree. On 10 February the writers
union presidium met to discuss the decree (LITERATURNA
UKRAINA, 15 February), and on 11 February the Ukrainian
Central Committee convened a conference of leaders of
creative unions, literary institutes, newspapers, journals
and publishing houses to hear a still unpublished speech
by Ukrainian culture secretary F. D. Ovcharenko (RADYANSKA
UKRAINA, 12 February).
Interestingly, among those participating in the discussion
at the 10 February presidium meeting was the notable
dissenter B. D. Antonenko-Davidovich, who along with the
recently arrested dissidents Ivan Dzyuba and Vyacheslav
Chornovil, refused to testify at the November 1970 Moroz
trial and co-authored an open protest against the court's
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lawlessness. He was singled out for attack in the 8 February
MOLOD UKRAINY editorial on literary criticism which censured
Dnepropetrovsk's youth paper for printing an enthusiastic
review of his recent book "even though the literary critics
and public had greeted the book's appearance negatively."
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