TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 9, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
~ SERVICE
~~IIII!Ill~~~~ii~~~l~lllllllll~
EI~II~S
in Communist propaganda
Confidential
9 FEBRUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, N0. 6)
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CONFIDCNTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by P'BI8 without coordinatipn with other U.6.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information afiecting
the national defense of the United 8tatea,
within the merning of Title 18, sections 799
and 795, of the U8 Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
dour i _ -
[~deded IreM amswe~k
dernpredinp eed ~
deetsulRestlee
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
CONTENT
Topics and Events Given Mayor Attention .
INDOCHINA
i
DRV Statement, Comment Contrast PRG Proposal With U.S. Plan
1
Truong Chinh December Remarks-on U.S. World.Policy Released-.
6
Pathet Lao S1:atement~Supports~PRG,.DRV.Plans.Lor Settlement.,
7
Sihanouk's "Government" Rejects U.S, "Compromise-Formulas='. -. ..
8
PRC Statement Reaffirms "Unshakable"-Policy on Indochina.War
9
Kosygin, Moscow Coeunentators Support.PRG, DRV Stands
11
PRG's 10-Point Policy on Defectors Continues to Be Pressed
14
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
Chou Raises Taiwan issue; Comment AssaiJ.s Nixon Messages
15
USSR-U.S.-PRG
KOMM1JNiST Reassures World Movement on SovieC Detente Policy..
19
TASS Links "New Purges" to Mao's Anti-Soviet, Pro-U.S. Line....
21
PR'~VDA Hits A1sop Portrayal of U.S.-as Peking's "Savior"
23
JAPAN
Peking Condemns Gromyko Visit as a Move.Against China
24
PRC-PAKISTAN
Peking Offers Limited Support During Bhutto's Visit . .
26
CHINA
Politburo Member Hsu Shih~yu Reappears.After.8-Month.Absence.
29
East China Provinces Cite Chiang Ching's-Cultural Role ~ .
MIDDLE EAST
29
Moscow, Cairo Urge Jarring Talks, Discuss Egyptian "Defenbe"
31
East Europeans View Cairo Pressures, French CP Sco;.es as-Sadat
36
(Continued)
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CONFIDENTIAL FBZS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
CONTENT S (ConL?nued)
FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE
Low-Volume Soviet Comment Blames West for Delay in Talks
39
SOVIET-FRG TREATY
Moscow Notes Start of Ratif ication~ Decries.Strauss "Draft"
41
TOPIC iN BRIEF; Salt Communique ...
43
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FOR OFa ~~tAL U8E ONLY FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 31 JANUARY - 6 FEBRUARY 1972
Moscow (2806 items)
Peking (1660 items)
Indochina
(4%)
12%
Indochina
(23%)
28%
[U.S., PRG Proposals
(2%)
6%]
[U.S., PRG
(8%)
21%]
Warsaw Pact PCC Meeting
(23%)
12%
Proposals
Ulster Siruation
(--)
5%
Pakistani President
(--)
20%
China
(4%)
4%
Bhutto in PRC
Rgyptian President
(--)
3%
Domestic Issues
(36%)
20%
as-Sadst in USSR
UN Security Council
(7%)
11%
UN Secur~.ty Council
Special Session in
Africa
(--)
2%
Special Session in
Africa
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given mayor attentio?~ i:. terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. 8on.e may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY :.972
I iJDOCH I hA
In the wake of the PRG'd 2 February statement elaborating on the first
two points of its 1 July propcszl and rejecting the U.S. eight-point
peace plan, Hanoi and Front propaganda has stressed alleged U.S.
duplicity in negotiations and Vietnamese resolve to defeat the PJixon
Doctrine and the Vietnamization policy. A supporting DRV Government
statement came only belatedly on the 5th, the day after a PRC
Government statement, although DRV Premier Pham Van Dong had promptly
endorsed the PRG statement at a banquet on the 2d and DRV delegate
Xuan Thuy had done so at the Paris session on the 3d. The delay in
issuance of the DT.V Government statement may have merely been a
function of Nanui's effort to return the PRG to the forefront of the
negotiations. The statement echoed earlier propaganda in castigating
President Nixon for having unilaterally, in his 25 January TV speech,
disclosed a "distorted version" of the substance of the U.S.-DRV
private meetings.
Not unexpectedly, Hanoi as well as Front media merely repeat without
amplification the "reasonable" elaborated demands of the PRG Char the
United States set a date for total withdrawal from South Vietnam a-~d
Chat Thieu resign immediately. While Hanoi propaganda following
President Nixon's speech was largely devoid of personal abuse, a
NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 7th reverted to more standard
invective when it called the President an "utterly reactionary and
ferocious hawk" who "only wants to settle the Vietnam problem by an
aggressive war."
Peking was prompt in weighing in with authoritative support for the
2 February PRG statement in the form of a government statement and a
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 4th. In addition to supporting the
PRG's position, the Chinese statement extended the demand for
unconditional U.S. and allied withdrawal to apply to all of Indochina.
Possibly with an eye on President Nixon's visit, the statement
reassured Peking's Indochinese allies thaC its "unshakable established
policy" is to support them in their war effur~.
Unlike Peking, Moscow did not endorse the PRG statement with an official
statement of its own. Bur Soviet media reported that Kosygin expressed
support for the Vietnamese struggle and peace proposals when he received
the DRV and PRG representatives in Moscow on the 4th.
DRV STATEMENT, COMMENT CONTRAST PRG PROPOSAL WITH U.S. PLAN
Vietnamese communist propaganda since the President's 25 January
speech and the PRG's 2 February statement has insisted that the U.S.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
eight-point proposal is merely a device to continue Vietnamization
while the PRG's "elaboration" of its 1 July propoc~al is further
evidence of good will and a desire to reach a political settlement.
Although the DRV Government statement endorsing the PRG elaboration
was delayed, surprisingly, until 5 February, the PRG initiative
had been welcomed--and repeated--by DRV delegate Xuan Thuy at the
Paris session on the 3d. DRV Premier Pham Van Dong had "warmly
welcomed the PRG stand in a banquet speech for the Hungarian
delegation on the 2d without acknowledging the substance of the
proposal. NHAN DAN gave editorial support to the PRG o!: the 4th;
and Pham Van Dong, speaking on that day a4 a meeting for the
Hungarians, spelled out the PRG's elaboration and called 1C a
"rebuttal" to the U.S. eight points. The editorial said that the
PRG statement "has put into sharp contras:. the U.S. imperialists'
stand and that of our people on the Vietnam issue" and that "our
people resolutely expose and denounce the deceitful measures of
the eight-point plan."
VNA's account of the 3 February Paris session quotes Thuy as
saying that the DRV delegation "fully agrees wi?i:h and backs the
PRG's elaborations on the two key problems in the seven-point
solution, which fully conforms with the DRV stand." Thuy in
his formal speech had gone on to explain that the DRV stand was
that outlined in the nine-point proposal "which was handed
to the United States privately on 26 June and made public on
31 January." (While the PRG has referred to the DRV's nine-point
proposal, it has been reluctant to refer to the privata DRV-U.S.
talks. Thus, both the PRG statement on ~:ie 2d and PRG delegate
Nguyen Van Tien at Paris on the 3d said only that the "reasonable
and logical" negotiating position of the communists is shown by
the DRV's nine-point proposal "made on 26 June" as well as by
the PRG's seven points.)
Both PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien and Xuan Thuy assailed the
eight-point plan for failing to set a terminal date far U.S.
withdrawal and for the suggestion that President Thieu resign
dust a month before new presidential elections would be held.
Thuy went into more detail regarding the U.S. plan, seeking to
show that it makes U.S. withdrawal "conditional." He ridiculed
the notion of withdrawing U.S. troops six months after an
agreement, stating that this time period has no more significance
than the 12-month period which the President had suggested in
his May 1969 proposal. Thuy also claimed that the United States
has put troop withdrawal in the framework of an overall
settlement, including "such absurd points" as mutual withdrawal
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(;~NFIDENTIAI, FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
and a cease-fire* that were mentioned in the U.S. October 1970
five-point plan--a plan, he said, which "we rejected."
After assessing the U.S. plan as one serving the continuation of
Vietnamization and the perpetration of numerous new "crimes,"
Thuy did not go on to refer to the assertion in the PRG statement
of the 2d, repeated by Tien at the session, that the PRG "does not
accept" the U.S. peace plan. Instead he said that "of course
such a plan is not acceptable to honest, peace- and freedom-loving
people." The NHAN DAN editorial on the 4th said that the
President's "" plan for peace' definitely cannot be accepted."
And the DRV Government statement on the 5th said: "In complete
agreement with the 2 February PRG statement, the DRV firmly
declares it does not accept President Nixon's deceptive 'peace
plan' and unreservedly supports the seven-point solution of the
PRG, whose two key problems have been elaborated."
The DRV statement closely followed the language of the PRG
statement in saying that in his eight-point peace plan the
President "still refuses to set a spec if is terminal date for
the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from South Vietnam and continues
to pose conditions for the withdrawal of troops for the purpose
of maintaining the U.S. stooge regime in South Vietnam. In
suggesting the holding of elections within the framework of the
present puppet administration and in the grip of its oppression
and coercion, President Nixon has attempted to compel the South
Vietnamese to accept the present U.S. puppet regime, to negate
the PRG, the genuine and legal representative of the South
Vietnamese people."
While other portions of the DRV statement also closely paralleled
the PRG statement, the DRV statement did contain additional
passages touching on Hanoi's nine points. After referring to
the DRV's consistent support for the "struggle" and peaceful
proposals of the Pathet Lao and Sihanouk's government, it
observed that the DRV position had been made clear in the nine
points and specified the call for "U.S." respect for the 1954
and 1962 Geneva agreements, an end to U.S. aggression and
intervention in the Indochina countries, and the opportunity
* Point six of the U.S. plan calls for a general cease-fire
throughout Indochina, ~o begin when the agreement '_.s signed, and
says that as part of the cease-fire there will be no further
infiltration of outside forces into any of the countries of
Indochina.
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9 FEBRUARY 1972
for the Indochinese peoples to settle their own affairs. Except
in publicizing the text of the nine-point plan, Hanoi had
mentioned its substance only in a 2 February NHAN DAN Commentator
article.
Hanoi had publicized the U.S. eight-point proposal as well as the
DRV's n{.ne points* in the series of documents it released on
31 Januaey, but criticism of the U.S. stand has focused almost
exclusively on point one on U.S. and allied troop withdrawal
and point three on the political situation in South Vietnam.
Initial comment on the President's speech had made passing
acknowledgment that the proposal included provisions for POW
release and cease-f ire and had mentioned the matter of U.S. aid
to Indochina. But available propaganda since Xuan Thuy's
statement at the Paris session on the 3d has not brought up
any of the other points.
PRG ELABORATIONS Hanoi seconds the Front in stating that if
the PRG's elaborations are accepted, all
other issues will be settled quickly. At the Paris session
Tien said the elaborations demonstrated his s ide''e good will
and flexibility. In one of Hanoi media's occasional departures
from the practice of not reporting the post-session briefings,
Hanoi radio's Mandarin and English services on the 7th carried
some of the remarks made by PRG press spokeAman Ly Van Sau.
The radio quoted Sau as explaining on the 3d that since
President Nixon had objected to suggestions of a withdrawal
date, "we do not set any date this time, but leave it to
President Nixon to choose himself a terminal date without posing
any conditions. We will discuss this matter with him." Hanoi
also quoted Sau on the issue of power in South Vietnam: He
noted that in view of President Nixon's "flagrant argument" that
he could not overthrow his ally, "we have asked" that President
Thieu resign and that his "bellicose policy be ended."
* The general categorieR of the DRV's proposals are very
similar to those of the U.S. plan. The additional point on the
DRV side (No. 4) is the one calling for reparations. Otherwise
the order is parallel: withdrawal, prisoner release, South
Vietnamese settlement, respect for the 1954 and 1962 Geneva
agreements, Indochinese settlement of their own problems,
cease-fire, international supervision, and international
guarantees.
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ATTACKS ON U.S. POLICY, Along with its deprecation of the U.S.
PRESIDENT NIXON peace plan as a device to pursue
Vietnamization, Hanoi has continued
to ridicule the President for describing it as a generous and
fair offer. Such ridicule was interjected at the beginning of a
4 February NHAN DAN Commentator article which cited the Pentagon
papers in setting out to document the charge that the Nixon
Doctrine is a continuation of consistent "aggressive" U.S. policy
in Indochina. The article did not acknowledge any of the recent
developments in negotiations, mentioning neither the President's
disclosures in his 25 January speech nor the PRG's elaborations
of its proposal. Commentator began by saying that "when Nixon
argues about U.S. policy toward Vietnam, many people recall the
Pentagon secret documents" published last summer. He added that
"Nixon resorts to all means to show that he is right, strong,
and generous, but daily events expose his acts ." The
article reached back to 1954 to demonstrate the President's
consistent "hawkish" attitude L-oward the war.
An article also signed Commentator in NHAN DAtJ on the 7th, as
reviewed by VNA, similarly failed to explicitly mention recent
developments related to negotiations when it scathingly attacked
the President. As reviewed by VNA, it said that the President
"cannot, by whatever tortuous and truculent pleas, whitewash
his crimes of prolonging and expanding the aggressive war." It
added that he "has leaked out his design to maintain indefinitely
in South Vietnam several scores of thousands of U.S. troops to
carry on its war role, to bargain at the negotiations, and as a
pretext for 'protective reaction' for every attack on North
Vietnam." Commentator concluded: "Richard Nixon--utterly
reactionary and ferocious hawk--only wants to settle the Vietnam
problem by an aggressive war."
As he had done on 27 January, Xuan Thuy at the Paris session on
the 3d spoke of the President's "threats." Thuy took issue with
the President for having "threatened" in his speech on 25 January
"that in case the Vietnamese people pursued their dust struggle,
he would fully meet his responsibility as commander-ia-chief of
the U.S. armed forces."
Comment on the President's speech, including the 31 January
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article, had observed that the
President's "threats" expose the "deceitfulness" of the U.S.
peace proposals.
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TRU~,~ CWINW DECEhIBER REMARKS ON U~S~ WORLD POLICY RELEASED
VNA's press review on 1 February announced that Hanoi's papers
that day devoted most of their space to- publishing the "important
report" by Politburo member Truong Chinh, delivered aC the "recent"
congress of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF). Hanoi radio on
the 1st and VNA on the 3d carried accounts of the report, which had
been presented at the closing session of the VFF congress on
17 December and was briefly summarized by the radio on 21 December.
It is not unusual for Hanoi to belatedly release mayor pronouncements
in this fashion,* but it is possible that the timing of the release:
in this case was influenced by the imminence of President` Nixon's
visit tc Peking and the current state of Sino-DRV relations. Some.
of Truong Chinh's remarks were obviously made with the President's
trip in mind. Truong Chinh not only repeated the charge prominent in
Hanoi's polemical propaganda last summer that the United States
is scheming to split the "socialist bloc," but he also made an
unusual, explicit ref e:.ance to the Soviet Union and China in
warning against Che duplicity of the U.S. policy of negotiations.**
Analyzing U.S. foreign policy since World War II, Truong Chinh
held that from 1961 to 1968 the United States had attempted to
take advantage of contradictions in the socialist camp--"especially .
between the Soviet Union and China"--in order to "seek a temporary
detente with the Soviet Union." Since 1969, according to Truong
Chinh, U.S. policy has been guided by the Nixon Doctrine which holds,
among other things, that the United States is "'ready to negotia_e'
with a number of countries, especially with the Soviet Union and
China, with a view to 'deterring' and 'containing' these biggest
socialist countries ." In addition, Truong Chinh charged, the
United States "makes the fullest use of contradictions between these
* Truong Chinh's mayor 1968 Marx anniversary report, for example,
was treated in this typical fashion in the media. The report was
delivered at a congress some time in August 1968 and was summarized
by VNA on 23 August, but the full text was not released until
mid-September.
** Hanoi had studiously avoided direct mention of President Nixon's
trip to Peking in its vitriolic anti-Chinese polemic during July and
August. The only known explicit mention of the President's planned
visits to Peking and Moscow in any DRV media appeared in the
November issue of a journal of the Central Committee's propaganda
department THOI SU PHO THONG (CURRENT EVENTS), in an article which
charged the President with "Laing vague hints to create the illusion
that those trips will help the United States to resolve the Vietnam
problem." (See the 5 January TRENDS, page 4.)
0 ?"
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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two countries and sows discord among the socialist countries
in general in a bid to create favorable conditions for the United
States, strives for 'detente' among the big powers, and continues
to bully the smaller countries."
Truong Chinh's formula for defeating the Nixon Doctrine included
the prescription that "the spearhead of the world revolution"
be directed at the United States as the "number one enemy;'that
U.S. forces not be overestimated, and that opponents of the
United States "strengthen their unity" and "be ready for united
actions and foil by every means old perfidious plots and
adventurous plans of U.S. imperialism." Truong Chinh went on,
at another point, to propose that there be "three united fronts"
to oppose the United States--fronts in Vietnam, in Indochina, and in
the world.
PATHET LAO STATEMENT SUPPORTS PRG. DRV PLANS FOR SETTLEMENT
The Pathet I,ao scored President Nixon's eight-point plan and supported
the PRG and DRV Govexatnent statements with an NLHS Central Committee
statement on 6 February, having previously limited its reaction to
routine-level radio and press agency comment scoring the eight points
as "shopworn proposals." NLHS Central Committee statements have
been the customary vehicle for Pathet Lao reactions to past initiatives,
including the PRG's seven-point proposal of l July 1971 and President
Nixon's 7 October 1970 five-point plan.
The 6 February statement scored the U.S. proposal as a "plan to
negotiate from a position of strength" and drag out the war, hoodwink
the public, and "further Nixon's plan for another term in office."
As in the earlier routine-level comment, it criticized the points on
troop withdrawal and South Vietnam elections and ignored the points
on respect for the Geneva agreements, international guarantees, and
an international conference. "Only the seven-point political solution
of which the two key points were elaborated" in the PRG statement and
which was "fully approved" by the DRV Government, it said, is the
"correct basis" for a Vietnam solution. The NLHS statement went on
to describe the content of the PRG "elaboration." It concluded with
the stock warning that "true to the point declaration of the
Indochinese Peoples' Summit Conference," the Lao people ;ai11
cooperate wit's the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia to "completely
defeat" U.S. aggression in Indochina.
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S I HANOUK' S "G0VERi~1ENT" REJECTS U , S ~ "COMPROMISE PORMUI.AS''
Sihanouk's government, the RGNU, continues to denounce President
Nixon's eight-point plan in a flurry of official comment, including
a S February RGNU statement and an 8 February RGNU Foreign Ministry
statement. These docuMents follow the initial reaction to the
President's 25 January speech which iiad come in a 28 January
statement by the RGNU Minister ~f Information and Propaganda,
taking issue with the propoeal~: on a cease-fire and elections in
South Vietnam. Earlier, a 26 January statement by the "interiot
part" of the RGNU had not specif ically mentioned the President's
speech when it ambiguously complained of U.S. "diplomatic"
trickery regarding Cambodia.*
The 5 February RGNU statement, reported by NCNA that day and by
the radio of Sihanouk's front (FUNK) on the 9th, charged that the
United estates, trying to find a way out of the military def~~uts
being inflicted on it in Cambodia, is "doggedly inventing such
deceitful tricks as 'on-the-spot cease-fire,` 'peace negotiations,'
'partition of Car,~bodia,' 'referendum,' 'international conference,'
'government of national reconciliation,' and other fraud~~.lent
formulas of compromise." It claimed that President Nixon resorted
once again to }'some of these formulas" in his eight-point proposal.
All these attempts are "nothing new" in Cambodia, it said, adding
that "in conformity with the directives" of the FUNK Political
Bureau which met "recently" under the chairmanship of Sihanouk,
the RGNU "categorically rejects" the parts of the eight-point
proposal which relate to Cambodia.
The statement reaffirmed the Cambodian people's resolve to struggle
without retreat or compromise to drive out the U.S. force8 and
their "lackeys," overthrow the Phnom Penh "clique," and build a
new Cambodia. It sPid that this "dust stand" had been repeated
many times, especially in thy: 76 January statement by the "interior
part" of the RGNU and in the 28 January statement by the RGNU
Ministry of Information and Propaganda. The language of the current
statement echoed that used in the ambiguous 26 January statement,
which alleged that President Nixon had "lately" advanced various
schemes 'rsuch as a cease-fire on the spot, peace talks, partition
* Sihanouk's RGNU also reacted officially to previous peace
initiatives. President Nixon's five-point proposal of 7 October
1970 was scored in a number of statements both in the nr~.ne of the
RGNU and Sihanouk personally, and a RGNU "spokesman's" statement
supported the PRG'e seven-point plan of 1 July 1971.
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9 FCIIRUARiI 1972
of Cambodia, settlement between the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son
Ng~c Thanh traitors and the FUNK, and many other formulae."
Sihanouk has long registered opposition to such proposals as
an "international conference on Cambodia" and a "partition of
Cambodia," as in his reaction to the President's l0 October
1970 proposal for an Indochina conference. But the current
statements came at a time when the DRV, in a 1 February foreign
ministry spokesman's statement, was dismissing "Labri .~ted
reports" that it .had engaged in indirect approaches to Phnom
Penh concerning "a separate peace in Cambodia."
Other current propaganda by Sihanouk's government and front
similarly scores alleged U.S. proposals for a Cambodian settlement.
Introducing a statement by Khieu Samphan--the RGNU minister said
to be leading the struggle in the "liberated zone"--which
denounced the "crimes of the Phnom Penh traitors," a FUNK radio
announcer on7 February explained that the statement e~aborates the
reasons for the RGNU's "categorical refection" of "aJ.l the
formulas of compromise" with the United States and the "Lon
Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh clique." The announc~~~ claimed
that the President's eight-point plan "includes a part relating
to Cambodia and especially shamelessly suggesting a settlement
between the Phnom Penh traitors and the FUNK."
A FUNK radio commentary on 4 February asserted that on 29 January
the "U.S. military radio" reported that when General Westmoreland
met the Phnom Penh leaders on the 28th, he was assured that the
"clique's" support for Nixon's eight-point proposal "meant that
certain regions in Kampuchea would remain under communist control,"
Assailing this "plan to partition Cambodia," the commentary
expressed the "patriots"' determination not to yield or compromise.
SUPPORT FOR RGNU support for the 2 February PRG statement
PRG STATEMENT thus far has been minimal. It was hailed in
the 8 February RGNU Foreign Ministry statement,
which also condemned the U.S. eight points but discussed the
content of neither. Failing to acknowledge that the PRG statement
"elaborated" on the seven points, the RGNU foreign ministry
statement merely demanded that the United State. "seriously
respond" to the PRG seven-point proposal. LPA on the 6th
briefly reported that Sihanouk, receiving the PRG Ambassador
on 3 February, expressed support for the PRG statement, again
without mentioning its contents. Sihanouk's meeting with the
ambassador has not been reported by NCNA or by FUNK media.
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CUNT! LDI~N'I'.T.AI, CDIS TRI~,NDB
9 L'IsllRUARY 1971
PRC S'- ATENIENT REAFF I RN15 '~IJNSWAKABI.E" P(YL I CY ON I NDOCW I NA WAR
Peking weighed in promptly with authoritative support for the
2 February PRG statement reJecting President Nixon's eight-point
proposal and "elaborating" on the PRG's seven-point plan. On
the 4th a PRC Government statement and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
expressed support for the PRG's position and reaffirmed unwavering
Chinese backing for the war effort in Zndochina. This represents
the first government-1ave1 statement on Zndochina since the Lam
Son 719 operation last winter. In July, Peking had issued
the 4 July 1971 PEOPLE'S DAILY edi.Lorial endorsing the PRG's
seven-point plan issued on 1 Jury.
Peking's response may have been shaped with an eye on the
President's visit to China this month. The government statement,
extending the demands on the United States to apply to the whole
of Indochina, declared it to be Peking's "unshakable established
policy" and "an unshirkable internationalist duty" to support
"the Vietnamese and the other Indochinese peoples" in their war
effort. This sort of pledge, with its implicit reassurance to
Peking's allies that their interests are not jeopardized by the
forthcoming Sino-U.S. negotiations, has marked Peking's effort
to allay any disquiet over the effects of the President's visit
on Peking's position on Indochina. Thus, in~the point communique
on DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's visit to the PRC last November,
the Chinese reaffirmed their "unshirkable internationalist duty"
to support the war effort to the end. At that time, however, the
Chinese had further dramatized their commitment by declaring their
readiness to undertake "the greatest national sacrifices"--a pledge
not reiterated in the current statements.
In addition to demanding withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from
all of Indochina,.the government statement called for the United
States to end support for "the Nguyen Van Thieu puppet clique,
the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak treacherous clique, and the rightists in
Laos." .Indicating that the way to a settlement in Indochina does
not run. through Peking, the statement reiterated Peking's position
Chat the questions of the three Indochinese countries "can only
be settled" by their peoples themselves "free from any foreign
interference." In the absence of a settlement, the statement
pledged "all-out support and assistance" to the peoples of the
three countries until complete victory in their war.
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Cl)Nb' I I)I~~N'I' I AI, I'll I h 'I'Itl?NI);I
~) I~'IslfltllAl(Y 1971.
I'L/1CE Si:TTI_I:Mi:N'f The govc~rnmc~nt ytntument and thu ucl I tc~r. l.+i I.
situ on.l.y thu PR(;'c~ NUVOn-point h.inn nncl
.itsl rohr.uur.y oLciborution uu tho busa.s Eor. a dottlcmont whl.l.c
C:CitiCiZl.n~ tho "decept.ive" eight-polnl- prc~posu.l udvuncod L)y
Pr.es.ldent Nlxon on l5 Junuury. '1.'haugh the statoment didm.issed
Wuehington's peace proposuas us "nothing but deceitful empty
folk" so Long us the United States does not uncondit.lonally
withdraw its troops and and support Cor 'i'I)ieu, none o.f Pek.ing's
comment has cited the i'RG's ussertaon that at "does not accept"
the President's proposal. (however, Peking has curried the
texts of the PRG statement and the llltV's 5 February statement
containing this assertion.) Peking's comment. has also ignored
the PRG's reference to the POW quest:on and to folks with the
Saigon administration on formation of u government of notional
concord.
While duly acknowledging the PRG's elaboration on "two key
points" in its peace plan, Peking's supporting comment does
not spell out all of the elements contained in the PRG's
elaboration. Thus, on the matter of U.S. withdrawal, Peking's
comment does not n)ention the withdrawal of advisors, weapons,
and war mater.ials,. as demanded in the PRG statement. And on
the political question, Peking has not echoed the PRG's
demand for Thieu's immediate resignation though it calla for
the United States to "stop supporting the Vietnamese traitor
Nguyen Van Thieu."
KOSYGIN, MOSCOW COrT~ENTATORS SUPPORT PRG, DRV STANDS
Moscow has faiied.to support the PRG's 2 February statement
with an official statement of its own, or to denounce President
Nixon's eighC-point plan authoritatively. While Moscow has not
issued official statements on Vietnamese communicc peace
initiatives in the past, it did endorse the PRG's 1 July
proposal in a PRAVDA editorial on 5 July--the day after Peking's
editorial support in PEOPLE'S DAILY.*
* A PRAVDA Observer article greeted the NFLSV's 10 points in
May 1969, and the 8-point "elaboration" of 17 September 1y70
drew low-level comment although Podgornyy briefly praised it in
a 23 September luncheon speech for the visiting Indian president.
President Nixon's 7 October 1970 five-point plan drew only low-
level Moscow comment.
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CUNI~' LI)I~;N'I' LAI, 1!'11[1 'L'I(ISNUti
9 l~'I~;IIRIIAI(Y 1971
Kosygln rrecwlvod the URV and PRC rrmbassadore on 4 February who
tnCormed him of thc~ PRG etutomant and the Ut(V "eland" on tho
U.S. o4ght-point plan, according to a 'PASS report that Jay which
wad also publ:4etrod .4n I'RAVDA on tli? Stlr. According to 'PASS,
Koeyg4n expr.eeeod Soviet support L?or "the duet btruggle of tho
Vietnamese peop.lo and the proposals of the DRV and PRG almc~d
at a political settlement of the problems of Indochina." liut
TASS d?ld not report, ae did VNA, that he promised that the
USSR will "increase its political support as well as military
assistance to the Vietnamese people." VNA also quoted him as
saying that "although they have sustained heavy setbacks
in Indochina, the U.S. imperialists are still stubborn and
refuse to give up their aggressive designs in this region."
TASS omitted this remark but reported that the Vietnamese
envoys "resolutely rejected" the U.S. proposals as "nothing
but an attempt to impose a solution of the Vietnam problem on
an American pattern."
As usual, Moscow duly reported the PRG and DRV statements.
An initial factual report of the PRG statement inexplicably
was not disseminated by TASS but a TASS-attributed summary
which included the text of the "elaboration" was printed in
PRAVDA on the 3d and IZVESTIYA on the 4th. The DRV Government
statement of the 5th was promptly reported in a TASS item tine
following day which included both the critici~ru of the
President for having revealed the secret meetings and the DRV's
declaration that "it does not accept" the U.S. peace plan and
supports the PRG's seven-pcinC proposal. There were also the
usual brief TASS reports of the statements at the 3 February
Paris session and the post-session press briefings, which note
that the delegates presented the PRG's "elaborations" on the
seven points.
Routine comment on the PRG's "elaboration" of its stand included
a 4 February Shakhov commentary broadcast in foreign languages
which reviewed the contents of the two points put forward by
the delegation at Paris and commented that their acceptance would
"facilitate the solution of other problems that stand in the way
of ending the war and establishing peace in South Vietnam."
Shakhov went on to criticize President Nixon for failing to
mention an end to the air war or a date for troop withdrawal
in hie eight-point plan, and added that it was also evident
that the United States intends to preserve the Thieu
administration "which is the main obstacle to solving the
political problem in South Vietnam." A Kozyakov commentary
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CUNIrI;UI;N'1'tAl~ Ir1iI~ 'I'RI~NI);~
9 IrI~;BRUAItY L~~72
broadcast in t;nglleh to North Amar:lca on the :)d, ecoring U.S.
efCorte to exploit the POW issue, said that tho PRG "has dust
restatod its peaco proposals" and it is clear that there would
b? "no problom" of roleasing the prisoners if Washington would
only %~rop its "aggraseive policy" in the South.
Yuriy T.hukov, in a 5 February PIU1'/UA article on growl.ng U.S.
public diseatiefaction with the Administration's polic'as oC?
"protracting" the war, ignored the PRG'e "elaboration" in the course
of a criticism of President Nixon's eight-point plan. Attacking
characterizations of the President's program as "generous," Zhukov
cited the DRV representative at Paris on 26 January as calling it
a "treacherous maneuver aimed at deceiving the American electorate."
Zhukov said chat Nixon's 25 January speech and Kiseinger's "verbose"
press conference the next day "failed to satisfy sober-minded
American figures," and he cited critical remarks made by several
congressmen, including Representative McCloskey's remarks on
elections in South Vietnam.
In contrast to DRV media, TASS on the 7th briefly reported that in his
interview with CBS the day before, Xuan Thuy reviewed the Vietnamese
peace program and said that the demand for an end to U.S. oupport to
the Saigon regime is "a very important element of the settlement."
TASS added that Secretary Rogers, also interviewed by CBS? "implied"
that the United States intends to continue supporting the South
Vietnam regime and that he blamed "the other aide" for the failure
to reach a peace settlement.
ATTACKS ON Moscow has continued to point to the President's
PEKING announcement of hla peace plan on the eve of hi.s
visit to China as an example of Peking's
"collaborationist" policies. Some commentators once again have
sought to play on Vietnamese fears of a Sino-U.S. backstage deal
on Vietnam. A Moscow domestic service commentary on 3 February
cited "observers" as speculating that one reason for the
President's announcement of the peace plan was to prepare "some
initial positions for possible discussion of the In~'ochina
problem with the Peking leaders during the forthcoming visit by
the U.S. President to China." It added that "American ruling
circles" apparently still hope to achieve "some kind of deal behind
the backs of the struggling people of Indochina." A similar point
was made in a Mandarin-language broadcast on 3 February, which
went on to cite a NHAN DAN article as warning that "no brutal acts
o# war or cunning and fanciful schemes" of the United Staten can
dissuade the Vietnamese from their struggle.
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(:ONI'' I UI:N9' IAL D'U f.;3 'L'ItI~NpB
9 Lr1~JBItUAItY .1.972
PRG'S to-POINT POLICY ON DEFECTORS CONTINUES TO BE PRESSED
Vietnamese, comnwnlet media cuntLnue to givo publicity to the appeal
to personnel. of the Saigon government and army in?ltiated in tho
LO-point statement of I'RG policy roleaeed on 25 January* and lator
reiterated :Ln other authoritative comment, including th? 2 I~'ebruary
PRG statement elaborating on the 1 July proposal and re~ecting the
U.S. eight-point proposal. Routine comment, like the 2 February
PRG statement, calla on armymen to re?pond to the 10-point statement
and loin in forcing a U.S. withdrawal and the overthrow of Thieu.
In hie 4 February speech at a meeting for the I~ungarian delegation,
Pham Van Dong claimed that the "movement" in youth Vietnam to attain
these communist goa~.s has been extended because of the PRG's
"new policies."
The practical application of she 10 policies ie pointed up in
propaganda urging increased proselyting efforts. Thus, for
example, an editorial in QUAN GLAL PRONG (LIBERATION ARMY),
broadcast by Liberation Radio~on the 6th, maintained that the Front
has "an extremely favorable opportunity to launch a vigorous and
timely proselyting attack into the enemy's ranks." The
dissemination of the PRG's policies among Chose "in the enemy's
ranks" was seen by the editorial as a contribution toward the
disintegration of the Saigon government and army and thus toward
the frustration of Vietnamization. Ln addition to promoting the
PRG's policies in routine comment, Liberation Radio has also
begun broadcasting statements attributed to captured ARVN officers
who acclaim the policies and appeal for Saigon servicemen to defect.
A commentary in the 7 February QUAN DOI NNAN DAN hailed the
communists' proselyting efforts in 1971, claiming Chat they
"contributed significantly to gradually disintegrating" the Saigon
army and were a "strong blow" at Vietnamization. Highly
evaluating the impact of the new PRG policies, the army paper
held that men in 3sigon's armed forces who "have clearly understood
this mayor PRG policy" will "certainly not allow the U.S. aggressors
to continue to coerce and deceive them" but will, "depending on
their circumstances, contribute to the struggle to save the
country and their families."
* The 10-point PRG statement of policies toward elements
associated with the Saigon government was discussed in the 2 February
TRENDS, pages 20-23.
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CUNI~'LDLN'L'.T.AL I~IiT.S '1'RI;NDS
~ FI.rili~~nRY 1.972
S I iV0-U, S, RELATIONS
CWGJ RAISES TAIWAN ISSWE: COMMENT ASSAILS NIXON MESSAGES
At a time when Peking has been taking care to leave the negotiating
door open on Sino-U.S, issues, Chou En-lai Cook the occasion of a
banquet for visiting Pakistani President Bhutto on 1 February to
reaffirm Peking's deCermination to recover Taiwan. Rut while
raising the issue, Chou'8 remarks on Taiwan avoided any mention
of President Nixon's China policy, conveyed no sense of urgency
on the issue, and were not echoed in hie formal speech at the
banquet. Also during this period, Peking has directed a spate
of criticism at U.S. policy on a range of issues outside the
sensitive area of Sino-U.S. relations, focusing in particular
on the President's Vietnam position* and his policy reports to
Congress. Comment on these annual messages, including a 30
January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on r_he State of the
Union and Budget messages, has been more authori`ative and
thorough than the sparse NCNA accounts last year, t}iough Peking
has discreetly avoided the personal invective Chat pervaded
last year's comment.
In keeping with this carefully tailored comment, Chou was
cautiously tactful regarding U.S. leaders during a private
conversation on 31 January with a group of visiting /.'+mericans.
(In line ~~ith past Chinese coverage of such sesf~ions, NCNA
merely reported those present at the meeting, providing no
details on Chou's comments or on the topics of the conversation.)
Judging from REUTER accounts of the session, in the course of a
two-hour talk Chou reflected Peking's public p~~sition on the
President's eight-point peace plan for Indochina, stating that
he thought "it would not be possible" to end the conflict on
this basis, bur he added a favorable comparison of U.S. leaders
with Soviet officials by observing that the Americans, unlike tits
Soviets, had not attempted to ridicule Peking at last fall's
General Assembly session. Making a bow to Kissinger as ~. "man
with whom one can argue," Chou reportedly refused to be drawn
in when one of the visitors described the Presidential advisor
as "Nixon's Metternich," rejoining that it would be impossible
for such a figure to appear today.
* See the Indochina section of the TRENDS this week and last
week.
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Along with Chou, the Chinese offici.ale meeting the American groupr-
which included several members of nn organization advocating the
rapid establishment of relations between Washington and Peking--
included Vice 1!oreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and several of the
foreign ministry experts on American affairs who were in Peking's
delegation to the United Nations last fall. This turn~~ut of
officials was consistent with previous occasions when the Chinese
practiced "people's diplomacy" with visiting Americana.
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES Following its initia]. reaction to the
President's State of tie Union message in
an NCNA acco+~nt of 24 ,~anuary,* Peking has directed a volley of
criticism--highlighted by the 30 January PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article--against the foreign policy and domestic programs put forth
in the annual messages to Congress. The overall thrust of the
criticism is similar to last year's commwnt in depicting the United
States as a declining power beset by internal and foreign problems
and _;x assailing the President for making "empty promises" in his
policy si:atemente. Peking may have offered more esxtensive and
authoritative comment this year to demonstrate that its invitation
to the President dose not imply approval of hie policies.
In line with the 24 January NCNA account of the State of the Union
message, the Commentator article focused on U.S. foreign policy,
attacking the President on a number of issues while avoiding any
gratuitous comment on issues directly involving Sino-U .S. relations.
The article discussed in some detail the President's pledge to honor
existing treaty commitments, commenting that this demonstrated U.S.
persistence in infringing on the sovereign rights of various
countries, but it refrained from citing the Taiwan question as a
case in point. Calling attention to the President's discussion of
defense needs, Commentator viewed this as directed chiefly against
the Soviet Union, making no attempt to draw implications concerning
Chinese interests. Comment on U.S. domestic problems repeated familiar
claims that the U.S. trade ir.~balance, expanding national debt, and
deficit budget underlined the decline of the American economy and the
weakening of American power abroad.
Supporting this portrayal of U.S. decline, a 3 February NCNA account
of the President's 27 January economic report echoed the keynote of the
New Year's point editorial--that the world is undergoing a propitious
"upheaval"--in predicting that the present "turbulent world situation"
will soon develop into "ever greater upheaval." NCNA elaborated on the
editorial's claim that the United States is facing growing competition
from other capitalist countries and must intensify "its scramble for
world hegemony" with the Soviet Union, thereby sharpening "the basic
contradictions" in the world today. The notions of an "upheaval" and
sharpening "contradictions" have been key elements in Peking's rationale
for the invitation -o the President and its flexible mouse in the
international community.
* See the TRENDS of 26 January 1972, pages 17-18.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
TAIWAN ISSU~ Chou En-tai's pointed reminder on 1 February
of Peking's resolve to recover Taiwan may have
been intended more for the PRC's allies than for the United
Stater,. Chou made his refe.-ence to Taiwan in a tonal addressed
both to the Pakistani guests and to Prince Sihanouk and other
Cambodians present. Observing that Cambodia, Pakistan, and
China have common aims because their territories have been
inva3ed and split, Chou declared in pro forma terms that the
Chinese must strive to "liberate" Taiwan. In raising the
Taiwan issue in this aetti.ng, Chou may have been indicating
that the PRC-U.S. alinement on the Indian-Pakistani conflict and
Peking's invitation to the President do not imply a willingness
to compromise basic ob~ectivea.
Chows message may also have been intended for the North Koreans
and the North Vietnamese, who have linked their unfulfilled
revolutionary goals with Peking's claim to Taiwan. This claim,
:Cn fzct, was moat recently voiced by a Chinese spokesman at a
reception markl.ng the North Korean army's snniversary on
7 February, when PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Chang Tsai-chun
accused :-he United States of continuing its military "occupat-ion"
of Taiwan and underscored Peking's determination to gai~~ control
of the island.
The most authoritative recent Chinese comment on the Taiwan issue
was contained in an unusually lengthy passage it- the New Year's
point editorial reiterating Peking's demand for a withdrawal of
U.S. forces from the island and straits. The editorial reaffirmed
opposition to any resolution of the issue that would dilute
Peking's claim to sovereignty over the island. The editorial
specifically denounced formulas advocating a solution on the
basis of "one China-one Taiwan," "one China-two governments,"
the status of Taiwan remains to be determined, or an independent
Taiwan.
Peking has occasionally added or omitte~ formulas in commenting
on this issue, attempting to clarify or underline its claim in
the light of ongoing international developments affecting the
Taiwan question. Thus, in response to publicity for a movement
demanding Taiwan independence at a rime when the ROC's inter-
national statue was being eroded, Peking initiated polemical
attacks on the notion of Taiwan independence and incorporated
it as one of t:ie formula8 found objectionable. Similarly, in
response to .a Japanese shift from full support for the ROC to
a position that .there is only one China but two regimes in
control of different territories, Peking included the formula
"one China-two governments" among its polemical targets.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
Peking's propaganda attention to these formulas and the views
they encapsulate has been notably strong in the past year,
reflecting concern over a possible tendency within the inter-
national community to accept a permanent alienation of Taiwan
from PRC sovereignty. Peking's uneasiness on this score was
most sharply demonstrated last spring in reaction to a press
briefing on U.S. policy Coward Taiwan by State Department
spokesman Charles Bray.* Taking forcef u1 issue with Bray's
statement that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined"
and is aub~ect to future international resolution, Peking did
no mire than acknowledge that Bray also suggested that the
Taiwan question should be resolved by agreements arrived at
between the two rival Chinese sides.
Peking has since given much polemical attention to the unseCtled-
status formulation, grouping it in the list of formulae regularly
denounced. The notion of an international resolution of the
Taiwan problem raised in the Bray brief ing kas also been
denounced in Chinese attacks an the Taiwan independence movement.
In addition, Peking has voiced indirect criticism of thib
position by persistently emphasizing that the Taiwan problem
is an internal Chinese affair that "brooks no foreign interference."
In notable contrast to this extensive attack on the notion that
Taiwan's statue remains unsettled, Peking has remained s1~.ent on
the suggestion floated in thr_ Bray brief ing that the Taiwan issue
should be resolved by agreement between Peking and Taipei,.
failing to take note of subsequent speculation along this line.
This silence suggests Chat Peking may be deliberately leaving
open the .possibility of an +.ccommodation with the rival regime
that would protect the interests of those on Taiwan without
compromising Peking's claim to sovereignty. Against the back-
ground of indicAtions in the past that Peking would be willing
to engage in direct talks with the Chinese Nationalists, and
given such mayor recent developments as the seating of the PRC
in the United Nations, it may be signif icant that Peking has
been softening its criticism of the Taipei regime. While
maintaining the basic position that Chiang Kai-shek's regime
is not a legitimate government and continuing to characterize
it as a "clique" and a "gang," authoritative Chinese comment
no longer refers to the regime, or to Chiang himself, in Ruch
terms as "traitor," "political mummy," or "political corpse"--
terms that remained in currency until early 1971.
* Peking's reaction is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 May 1971,
pages 11-14.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
USSR-U, S,-PRC
KANMUNIST REASSURES WORLD MOVEMENT ON SOVIET DETENTE POLICY
Against the background of a rising crescendo of Soviet bloc
attacks on the development of Sino-U.S. relations as the dates
of Preaidei:t tdixon'e tripe to Peking and Moscow draw nearer, a
lengthy editorial in the year's rirst issue of KOMMUNIST offers
an elaborate defense of Brezhnav's detente line and is at pains
to distinguish it from the Maoist leadership's "intrigues."
The editorial, in the issue of the CPSU theoretical ~ourrial
signed to the press 4 January, seems addressed both to domestic
part; cadres and to allied communist states whose interests
could be affected by the course of Moscow's "peace program."
Thus KOMMUNIST assures its readers that Soviet foreign policy
moves are both "completely in keeping with the Soviet people's
fundamental interests" and have already led to "an indisputable
strengthening of the national liberation movement." It
pictures Moscow, in the pursuit of "peaceful cooperation and
negotiation" with the West, ae eschewing any "unprincipled,
unstable foreign policy compromises" at the expense of either
Soviet national interests or the interests of the national
liberation movement. And the thrust of the point is sharpened
by the editorial's specific denigration of Peking's current
diplomatic ventures as self-serving politicking, motivated by
"hegemonistic" ambitions and "anti-Sovietism."
Elaborating the ideological rationale for Soviet foreign
policy initiatives since the 24th CPSU Congress, the editorial
invokes Lenin on the need to "exploit differences between
opponents"--but "only the profound differences explained by
the most deep-seated economic causes," for "if we attempt to
exploit petty chance differences we shall end up in the
position of a petty politicker and cheap-skate diplomat."*
KOMMUNIST argues that "contradictions" in the capitalist
world, particularly 1n the economic and political area, are
more ripe for exploitation than in the past when
capitalism was essentially "monolithic." It goes on to replay
a theme that has been prominent in Soviet comment making the
* Accusing Peking of following a non-class foreign policy,
Moscow has taken the Chinese to task for extending the
invitation to President Nixon as part of an effort to isolate
the Soviet Union as the main enemy.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
case for improved 11.S~-Soviet relations, stating that those
"imperialist politicians" who resort to threats againsC socialism
are today counterbalanced in some states by proponents of
coexistence who proceed from "a more sober assessment of the
present balance of forces." The editorial cites Soviet relations
with France, Italy, Canada, and the FRG as good examples of the
successful development of relations on this bas:~s. It brings
up the SALT negotiations in the same context as evidence of the
CPSU's efforts to "implement disarmament," and in the same vein
it observes that President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May "could
open up more favorable prospects 1n relations with the United
States, too."
At pales to demonstrate that there is "no disparity between the
CPSU's words and deeds," between its peace offensive and its
support for its socialist allies and the national liberation
movement, the editorial pledges Soviet loyalty to proletarian
internationalism and specifically reiterates Soviet resolve to
support thy: DRV and to back the Arab states against Israel. To
buttress tine case for Soviet detente policy as serving the best
interests of the world communist movement, in essence the
dictum that what is good for the Soviet Union is good for the
world movement, it contends that since Soviet foreign policy is
Marxist-Leninist it organically combines the best interests of
the Soviet people with those of the national liberation
movement. With such allies as the DRV and GDR evidently in
mind, and perhaps hardlining elements in the Soviet Union as
well, it argues that
consolidating peace and the people's securi*_~
represents a gain for everybody and cannot be coc.-
sldered a loss for anybody but the inveterate
enemies of ~.ankind. For world socialism, 1t
constitutes the direct implementation of its very
important foreign policy objectives and a direct
guarantee of its peaceful development. Therefore,
successes for the cause of peace are primarily
successes for the world socialist community, a
decisive factor in world politics. And in this
sense the implementation of the foreign policy
program advanced by the CPSU signifies the further
consolidation of socialism's positions in the
struggle against world imperialism and a further
shift in the balance of world class forces in favor
of soclalism~
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
? KOMIrIUNIST declares that Soviet foreign policy "has the complete
support of the communists and of all the Soviet people" and is
in "keeping with their fundamental interests, aspirations, and
hopes." Communists, it says, "are realists" and understand that
many "urgent questions still remain unresolved in U.S.-Soviet
relations"--hence the need to pursue the policy of coexistence
and to try to "resolve problems through negotiations." It is
here that KOMMUNIST adds the caveat, for the benefit of the
doubters, that
our country does not seek unprincipled, unstable
foreign policy compromises with the capitalist
countries. Loyal to the Leninist approach, the
USSR deals a firm rebuff to imperialist encroach-
ments and resolutely supports the liberation movement
and revolutionary forces.
The implied invidious comparison is made explicit in ensuing
passages contrasting Moscow's principled support for the national
liberation struggle worldwide with "the flagrant disparity
between Peking's practical politics" and its pretensions to
leadership of world communism. The editorial does not
specifically mention President Nixon's impending trip to
Peking, but it points to Chinese "intrigues" with the West
and to alleged U.S.-PRC collusion in the India-Pakistan conflict
as evidence that "the Maoists are ready to sacrifice the national
liberation movement" for their own "hegemonist aims."
The editorial winds up with the stock call for heightened
vigilance against "anticommunist ideological subversion."
It calls on foreign policy, ideological, and propaganda organs
"to raise their standard of effectiveness" in combatting
Western "bridgebuilding" efforts and in countering "the ideas
of military blackmail [a Chinese ;,barge against the Soviets],
'convergence,' the 'two superpowers' [Peking's label for the
United States and the USSR], nationalism, and anti-Sovietism."
TASS LINKS ~~NEW PURGES" TO MAO'S ANTI-SOVIET. PRO-U.S. LINE
? On the eve of President Nixon's viRit to the PRC, Moscow has
intensified its efforts to discredit the Chinese leadership
and to portray an ongoing internal crisis in the country linked
to dissension over Maoist policies toward the Soviet Union and
the United States. And it has unearthed an early quotation
from Mao to indirectly warn Peking against forming an alliance
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9 FEDRUARY 1912
with the United States that would inevitably be directed against
the Soviet Union and amount to an end of the Chinese revolution.
A TASS comQ-entary on internal developments in the PRC--published
in the central press on 8 February and subsequently broadcast in
abridged form in Mandarin to China--said that "a wave of mass
purges" has spread from Peking to othtlr parts of the country.
Citing Western press reports and "informed Peking sources," it
alleged that Mao'e group, having won the latest round of internal
strife, is now trying to rebuild the greatly depleted Chinese
leadership with Its own supporters and has entrusted to a special
team the Cask of preparing "black lists" of Lin Piao followers.
Quoting "well-informed sources close to the Peking leadership,"
TASS said many people, fearful of being purged, are trying to
leave the country Illegally. Stating that "high-ranking"
Chinese officers who had attempted to flee the country last
September and October had been arrested, Cried by a tribunal, and
in most cases sentenced to death, TASS claimed Chat such
"executions" have already beer,. carried out in several Chinese
cities., It made no reference to the reported crash of a Chinese
plane in Mongolia last September.
Implying that Mao's "anti-Soviet" line and rapprochement with
the United States are mayor factors in the Chinese internal
struggle, TASS commented that the "wholesale purges and arrests
are accompanied by the stepping up of anti-Sovietism in the
PRC." At the same time, it said, Peking 1s curbing its t~nti-
American propaganda "in all places where the J.S. President is
going to visit 1n February."
In effect warning Peking against a Sino-American deal that would
redound against Soviet lntcrests and underscoring the charge
that M.ao has abandoned anti-imperialism, TASS quotes the
Chairman as saying at an unspecified date in the past:
"Imperialists are going to fight against the Soviet Union,
against the communists. If you form an alliance with the
imperialists, they will urge you to go fighting to tl~e north
and nothing will remain of your revolution. The situation is
now clear: it is either the policy, of union. with Russia,. union
with the socialist state, or the policy of union with imperialists,
union with imperialism."
Radio Moscow's Chinese audiences have also-heard continuing
comment calculated to fan party-military tensions in the PRC,
including an 8 February broadcast targeted at the PLti which
pictured "the new purge in the PLA" as a tragedy both for the
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~I ;1~'I'ItI~;NI)h
9 1~'I:IiItlIAIZY 19%2
ranks." Lt is apparent from last October.'s Sov:lot-I~gyptlan
communique, Budapest said, that the Soviet Government 1H
ready to oL?fer every assistance to "eliminate the consequonces
of Israeli aggrese:Lon" but, ae Moscow continues to etr.ese, the
solution must be a peaceful settlement on the basis of Security
Council Resolution 242. An MTL commentary on the 3d regarded
Washington's latest arms commitments to Is>:ael as causing
as-Sadat domestic political difficulties because they provided
ammunition to "those circles pressing for war without delay."
MTI asserted that as-Sadat with difficulty opposed this pressure
and insisted on a settlement bayed on Resolution 242; it was to
that end, MTI added, "that he applied the means of military
pressure a8 well."
A commentary broadcast by Budapest in English to Europe on the
3d advanced f?.he idea Chat a Middle East solution lies in
guaranteeing the existence of the state of Israel "to avoid
the possibility of any repetition of the aggression and the
aggressive seizure o,: territory." Also noting Soviet orienta-
tion toward a political solution, the commentary declared that
while Soviet support ha8 made it possible for Egypt to
increase its defense capabilities, the "Egyptian defense zone. .
does not represent any threat to Israel."
FRENCH CP While Poland and Hungary profess an understanding
of as-Sadat's domestic pressures, a L'HUMANITE
article by Jacques Caubard on 25 January, in the wake of the
student sit-ins and demonstrations in Egypt, assailed the
Egyptian president for a variety of policy mistakes. The
Cairo University incidents, it began, revealed the unrest
brewing in Egypt ever since an "ambiguous policy" was embarked.
upon following Nasir's death. Ticking off the errors,
L'HUMANITE took as-Sadat to task for trying to win Washington's
gocd will in the matter of a partial settlement an reopening
the Suez Canal, and claimed that the "concessions thereby
implied" constituted one of the reasons for the break last May
between the president and former Arab Socialist Union leaders.
Furthermore, L'HUMANITE complained of "the participation of the
Egyptian army" in the "bloody opera*_ion" to reinstall Sudan's
president last summer which it said increased the unrest in
Egypt.
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UUNh I UU;N'I' 1 AI, Irlf LN 'I'IthNU4
9 NISBItUAI(Y I y Jl
As for I~Ls dumustlc pul.lcy, L'IIUMANt'l'L point?d crltdcully
to as-Sadac's abrogatJon of a number of measures dlrectvd
ugnlnst h[g landownar.s and the Moslem Brotherhood and other.
measures boncfiting members of the Ca.lro bourgeoisie. AN
lE that worun't enough, L'NUMANiT.E added, the "polir,ica.1.
organization of the 'home front'--a weak point even under.
Nnsir--was making no progress." M y solution to this tense
situation, the paper concluded would depend on answers to
questions being asked ~y fire majority o1` the Egyptian people:
With whom and how can the struggle for the survival of
independence ba waged in 1972?
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!) I~'I~,IIIt11AItY L'J%2
.,'!9-
FORCC fZFllUC1'IONS IN CUROf
LOW VOLUME SOVIET COf~'WIEPIT DLAM~ES WEST FOR DELAY IN TALKS
Moscow contl.nuas routinely to hull L?he dacl.uraL?ion on I;uropeun
security and cooperation adopted by the participants in the
25-26 January Prague meeting of the Warsuw 1?act'e Political Con-
sultative Crmmltteo. Propaganda focuses on the call for o
European security conference to tl~e vireuul exclusion of tl~s
document's passage on force and armaments reductions in Europe.
'Chus the 28 January statement by the CPSU Central Committee
Politburo and the USSR Council of Ministers in support of the
activities of the Soviet delegation at the Prague melting ignored
the force-reduction issue entirely whits taking note of the call
for a security conference. >3ditorials in IZV)rSTIYA on 28 January
and in PRAVDA on 28 January and 3 February followed suit in their
treatment of the Prague meeting
The low-level propaganda touching on the force-reduction issue
seams clearly aimed at placing the blame for a delay in the
talks on the West. Aforeign-language commentary on 31 January,
for example, charged that the forces opposing detente in Europe
"cannot conceive of a European policy that is not defined in
terms of blocs." These same elements, according to the commen-
tary, seek to strengthen NATO and "apply a brake to the solution
of the problems of reduction of arms and armed forces in Europe,"
Dealing with the force-reduction issue at greater length, a
Moscow radio talk for Italian listeners on 2 February complained
that the West has limited itself to "general phrases o?a.the
desirability of reductions but has given no concrete reply--if
it has replied at all--about opening real negotiations." The
West's proposals "to take preliminary soundings.do.not promote
the solution of the question," the commentary said. While
chiding the "Western countries," presumably NATO, for failure
to respond to proposals for talks on .force reductions, the
commentary stres3ed, as did the Prague declaration, that-the
matter "must not be the prerogative of the political-military
alliances."
The commentary's reference to the West's "preliminary soundings"
is presumably an allusion to NATO's designation of former
Secretary General Brosio as the emissary to meet with Soviet
officials in Moscow to explore the force-reduction issue. Moscow
propaganda in early October 1971 had acknowledged that Brosio had
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CIJNIICllI;N'I'LAL FBI4 '1'RENUS
9 IrILIiRUARY 1972
been e8loctoJ Cox this to?k, but hao since maintained a virtual
silenc? on hie so far fruitles? mi?sion. Zrr g rare recent mention
of tha Broeio aseigcuaent, a.Commentator article in the December
1971 issue of MEZHDllNARODNAYA ZHZZN (?igned to .the preps on
22 November) noted in passing that Brosio had~been selected to
conduct "probing coneultatione"~on the quostion of force and
armaments cute.
Consistent with this reticence, available.Mc+ecow propaganda on
the l February National Press Club speech of tho current. NATO.
secretary general, Joseph Lune, hap not acknowlodged.his reference
to the Aroeio mission, instead focusing on.the~elements in. the
address wi~ich "reek of the cold war." A PRAVDA article reviewed
by TASS on the Sth, for example, said Luna urged that preparations
for a European security conference ''be dragged out. for a long..
period." And TASS commentator Kornilov on. the 2d, noting Lune'
remarks on the need for increased military.oponding by the
alliance's members, concluded that.the epeecb pounded."in
especially sharp dissonRnce"'in the wake of ::be Warsaw Pact's
Political Consultative Committe~s~neeting.
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CONI~'.LUIaN's'LA1. l.~Bl:B '1'Itls'NDS
9 I!I~aiRUAIZY J.972
SOVI FT-FIG Tl~ ATY
MOSCOW NOTES START OF RATIFICATION. DECRIES STRAUSS "DRO~T"
In a one-sentence announcement, Moscow media on 2 February
reported that the USSR Council of Ministers had approvers the
Soviet-West German treaty, signed on 12 August 1970, any pre-
sented it for ratification to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
This Soviet action comes against the background of intensified.
West German debate in connection with the beginning of the
parliamentary ratification process for the Moscow and Warsaw
treaties, with CDU Chairman Barzel visiting Washington to
present the Bonn Opposition's~views~on the Sovie~ treaty and
CSU Chairma~t Strauss offering his~own~alternative "drafC treaty."
The USSR Council of Ministers' approval followed by two days
the publication of what Moscow radio commentator.Zholkver
described on the 3d as Strauss' "absurd proposal." In a
vitriolic attack on the "revanchist" Strauss, PRAVDA's Mikhaylov
on the 4th declared that this "draft treaty," among other.
,things, views the FRG-GDR and GDR-Polish borders as "'demarca-
`tion lines,' the settlement of which should be postponed
Moscow media note, but discount, the possibility that the
Br.3ndt-Scheel coalition may not auccet.a in obtaining p.~rlia-
meni:ary ratification of the two treaties.
Propaganda continues to carefully avoid explicit discussion. of
the "reverse linkage" issue--the notion that Bonn must now
ratify the Moscow treaty before the USSR signs the final quad-.-
ripartite protocol on the Big Four Berlin agreement, turning .
around Bonn's prior insistence on a.Berlin settlement before
the treaty can be ratif ied, However, Zholkver's widely broad-.
cast commentary on the 3d made one of.Moscow's moat direct
public allusions yet to the reverse linka;;e issue. Pointing.
out that the "basic," "all-European" importance of the Moscow
treaty is the most unequivocal confirmation-.o#-the inviolability
of the current European borders--that is, recognition of.the .
postwar status quo in Central and Eas:. Europe--Zholkver declared
that the treaty is already exerting.a "f avorable influence" on
the course of European affairs even before its ratification,
reflected, for example, in the Big Four agreement on "West
Berlin." Zholkver cited an explicit cause-and-effect relation;--.
ship between the USSR-FRG treaty and.the agreement on Berlin,
implying that without the former the latter cannot. be fulfillred:
"Everyone now recognizes that this [agreement] became possible .
as a result of the conclusion of the treaty between the Soviet
Union and the FRG."
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Cf~NlriDl;N'l':~AL 1~'B15 TiiBNDS
9 FEBRUARY 1972
Dier.ussing tho internal Weat German debate.ou th? ratification
~~f the treritioe, routine Sovier propaganda.hae stressed that an .
ever-increasing majority of~the~West.G?rman population, as
reflected in Woat German public opinion polls, favore.ratifi-
~~ation. Tho comment has also cited reF3ated-public.reaesurances...
'oy leaders of the Brandt-Scheel coalition that ratification will
be successful, has pointed out that Barzel return?d empty-handed .
i~om hie week-long visit to the United States at the end of.
January in an attempt to get Washi.:gton's s~upp art for the Bonn
Opposition's stAnd, and has noted that even the CDU/CSU Opposition
is not united in opposing tha treaties.
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CON)! ZpCNTZAL FBZS T1tEivi~S
9 FCBRUARY 1972
TOPIC IiV BRiFF
SALT CONNhJN I QUE
Consistent with Moscow's current low-keyed treatment of the
strategic arms limitation talks (SAINT), no Soviet propaganda.
fanfare has accompanied the windup of the sixth session of
t:he negotiations in Vienna on 4 February. TASK and Moscow
radio on the 4th promptly carried the text of the communique,
which appeared in the central press the next day. The
communique notes that in accord with the 20 May agreement
between the United States and the USSR, the two sides continued
discussing questions concerning a treaty on the limitation of
ABM systems and "tnterim agreement on some measures in the
field of limitati~~n of strategic offensive weapons." It says
that "I~rogrese has been made on some questions" and that the
delegations "express resoluteness to continue efforts for
ru Ching an agreement." The talks are to resume in Helsinki
on 28 March, according to th~ communique. To date, there has
been no followup comment fr~~~: Moscow. The last two SALT
sessions--which ended on 24 September and 20 May 1971--
occasioned a low volume of comment hailing the progress at
the talks.
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