TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 12, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~Illllllluumiu~lllllllll~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~IIIIIIIIIIII~~~IIIIIIIIIIII~~
'CREIV~S
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
12 JANUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, N0. 2)
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CON~'TT~TCNTTALI
This propaganda analysis report !s based ex-
clusively on material carried 1n communist
broadcast and press media. It la publlahed
by P'BIB without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNINC3
This document contains information aRecting
the national defense of the Vnlted Btates,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the UB Code, as amended. Its
transmisslor. or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
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1^dud^,1 6~w ~uruurk
dl^~gr~d{q ~^d
dgbr^iW~ris^
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CONFIDIN'1'IAL GlIIB 7'RI~NDS
12 JANUA[tY, 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and ~vonts Given MuJor Attention
INDOCIIINA
i
Delegates at Pnris, NIUN DAN Assail President's TV Interview
l
Poking Notes President's Interview, Reports Parie.Seesion
6
USSR Continues to Score Bombing of DRV, President's "Threats"
7
DRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman Routinely Protests Air Strikes .
lp
DRV Premier's Office Issues Instructions on Tat Observance
10
Communist Media Condemn U.S. B-52 Bombings in Laoe
11
DRV's "Chien Thang" on War, President's "Travel Diplomacy" .
14
ilanoi, Moscow Hail Raising of DRV-Indian Diplomatic Relations
15
SING-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Accords 1?ligh-Level Attention to U.S. Advance Party
19
CIIINA
Mao, Other Leaders Appear For Chen I Funeral Ceremony
21
PRC NUCLEAR TEST
Announcement Intimates Flexibility on Disarmament Conference
22
DISARMAMENT
IZVESTIYA Pleadm for U.S. Restraint in Military Preparations ~
25
ALBANIA
Tirana Def ends PRC on South Asia But Warns of U.S. Plots
26
INDIA-PAKISTAN
Moscow Exploits Anderson Papers; A11ies Recognize Bangladesh
29
Declining Peking JPropaganda Cites Naga Insurgency in India
31
URUGUAY
Havana Denounces Vote, Supports Broad Front and Tupamaros .
33
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIttS
Kirilenko's Visit Draws Unusual Publicity in Moldavia .
38
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FOR OFFICIAL UC~E ONLY FI1IS TR1riJDS
l2 JANUARY 1972
'1.'OPICS AND I:VCNTS GIV1~1` NIAJCR ATTI:N7.'ION 3 - 9 JANUARY 1.972
Moscow ~ 779 item, eZ
'elcin
g~1555 items)
.,
Indochina
(l4X)
l4%
Domestic Issues
(35%)
39%
[U.S. Air Raids
(1:3X)
l0%J
Indochina
(l4%)
l9X
Indian-Pakistani
Conflict
(3Y)
9%*
[16th Anniversary
of Lao Patriotic
(--)
7%J
("Anderson
(--~)
7%J
Front
Papers"
[U.S. Air Raids
(7%)
2%J
China
(6X)
8%*
New Year's Joint
(5%)
5%
Mara 2 & 3 Pro>:es
(2X)
2%
>ditorial
Chilean CP
Anniversary
(4%)
2%
Indian-Pakistani
Conflict
(l4%)
3%
Middle Isast
(lX)
2%
PRC Nuclear Test
(--)
2%
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive repor~age are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered !n prior issues;
!n other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* The China figure excludes commentaries on China's role in the
Tndian-Pakistani conflict. These commentaries are included in the
figure on India-Pakistan and amount to 2% of total Moscow comment.
FOR OFFICIAL U8E ONLY
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CONC.T.Dl~N1'IAL FRIS 7'Rhi~l)9
l.2 JANUARY .1.972
INDOCWINA
The Paris talks on 6 January--the first session since 9 December--
provided a forum for further criticism of the concentrated U.S.
air strikes against the DRV and of the President's 2 January TV
interview, and for restatement of the hardened negotiating terms
spelled out by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong during hie November
visit to Peking. However, VNA typically cnly selectively reports
the communist delegates' Statements at the cession. The only
additional, substantial comment on the President's TV interview
came in a NNAN DAN item on the 7th--described by VNA Engllah as
"a signed commentary" but called a "Commentator" article in
excerpts broadcast by Hanoi radio in Mandarin on the loth. The
Mandarin-language version, among other things, contains an
apparent indirect reference to the President's remarks on hie
forthcoming trips to Peking and Moscow when it says: "Nixon
has vainly attempted to use diplomatic maneuvers to cover up
and overcome his difficulties in other spheres."
Peking first acknowledged the President's remarks on Indochina
in his TV interview in 6 January NCNA reports of LPA and QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN commentar.'_es. It belatedly commented on its own
authority in an NCNA item on the 8th which complained that both
the President and Secretary Rogers in his TV interview on the 5th
had justified the bombings of the DRV on the basis of the "so-called"
prisoner of war problem. In a departure from its general practice,
Peking reported the Paris session of the 6th at which the communist
delegates took sharp issue with the President's remarks--an action
presumably aimed at reassuring Hanoi regarding the President'c
visit to Peking.
Moscow's continued criticism of the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam
persists 1n the line that Sino-American developments had
encouraged the Unitud States to carry out the strikes. And some
commentators again raise the specter of a behind-the- scenes
deal on Vietnam to be made during the President's visit to Peking
next month.
DELEGATES AT PARIS. NWAN DAN AS:~AIL PRESIDENT'S N INTERVIEW
The VNA account of the Paris session on the 6th says cryptically
that PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien "completely refuted" the
President's "allegations" in his TV interview "as a prize
deception and a bellicose challenge to war." The account thus
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CONIr.1D!?NTIAL Fl3IS TRENDS
l2 JANUARY 1972
['Wile to report the details of Tien'8 remarks in which he ea id
that the President "continued to repeat deceitful allegations,
dietorti_ng the truth and hr~lding the Vietnamese people responsible
for the prolongation of th,e war, the deadlock of the Paris
conference, and tho fact 'chat raptured U.S. militarymen cannot
yet go home." VN,I also omits Tien's charge that the President
"made arrogant threats that the United States would continue
to 'Vietnamize' they war, maintain U.S. troops for a prolonged
occupation of South Vietnam, and intensify bombings as long
as the Vietnamese people havE not accepted the U.S. conditions
for negotiations."
The VNA account does acknowledge the passage in Tien's
statement in which he affirmed the correctness of the 1 July
PRG peace initiative, and spelled out the harsher demands under
points une and two: a complete U.S. withdrawal and end to
aggression would include an end to all acts of war against
the Vietnamese people "under any form and any place" and an end
to "a11 U~S. support and commitments" to the Thieu administration.
Calling the Cwo points "the main ones," Tien said they are
"closely related points," and added that "only if the Nixon
Administration responds to these points can peace be restored and
car- all 'I.S. military personnel, including those captured during
the war in Vietnam, return to their families at an early date."
DRV delegate head Xuan Thuy also spelled out the first two points
of the PRG peace initiative, but VNA inexplicably does not
report this.* It says that Thuy "reiterated full support" for
the proposal, "the two main and closely related points of which
had been explained" by the PRG delegate.
AIR STRIKES Xuan Thuy took issue with the President'8 2 January
AND POWS interview in some detail, but the VNA account
reports his remarks only briefly. For example,
Thuy took exception to the President's ~uatification of the
U.S. air strikes on the basis that the DRV had violated the
1968 bombing understanding. Thuy reiterated the standard argument
that the United States had "unconditionally" agreed to the 1968
bombing halt, and said that a 2 November 1968 DRV .^-overnment
statement had reaffirmed this fact.
* The evolution of the hardened negotiating terms in statements by
DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh and Premier Pham Van Dong is
discussed in the TRENDS of 3 November 1971, pages 11-13, 20 November,
pages 5-8, and 8 December, pages 14-16.
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CONI~:IDEN'CIAL C'DIS TRENDS
L2 JANUARY 1972
As earlier propaganda on the interview had Bono, Thuy also toolc
exception to the President's claim that the U.S. strikes against
the North were "very effective" and were aimed at "selected
military targets." Thuy repeated the claim Chat U.S. planes
bombed hospitals, schools, and populated areas and that from
l7 to 30 December the North Vietnamese armed forces and people
had do~n~ed 24 planes and captured a "number of pilots and
wiped out a good number of others." He said that U.S. military
circles "themselves" called the strikes "a failure."
Like the initial comment on the President's interview, the
communist delegates at Paris ignored the exchange with CBS
correspondent Dan Rather in which the President asserted that
in Paris "the communists had totally rejected" the notion of a
prisoner release if the United States set a withdrawal deadline,*
Thuy did argue, and VNA reports, that it is U.S. policy that has
caused U.S. militarymen to be captured, that the Nixon
Administration's refusal to set ~- deadline for troop withdrawal
and to stop backing the Thieu administration is the reason U.S.
prisoners could not return to the United States in 1971, and
that tho United States is using the prisoner issue as a "pretext"
to continue the war and cover up its crimes.
NHAN DAN ON The first substantial Hanoi press comment on
THE PRESIDENT the President's 2 January interview came
belatedly on the 7th in NHAN DAN** and there
is some confusion in the media as to the exact nature of the
article. A brief VNA English-language summary on the 7th
described it as "a signed commentary", and VNA's review of thy:
Hanoi press that day referred to it as a "lengthy" article.
But Hanoi radio in its Mandarin-language bervice on the 10th
uniquely identified it as a NHAN DAN Commentator*** article--in
* VNA did note on the 5th Senator McGovern's assertion that
the President knew it was not true that U.S. negotiat~is in Paris
had discussed with the North Vietnamese the question of total
withdrawal in conjunction with prisoner release. See the 5 January
TRENDS, pages 3-4.
** There was a passage on the interview in NHAN DAN's 4 January
editorial which rounded up worldwide protests against the U.S. air
strikes.
*** Commentator articles in NHAN DAN are normally broadcast by Hanoi
radio in Vietnamese. A notable exception was the 22 August Commentator
which reached a new level of venom in its anti-Chinese polemic. It was
summarized by VNA and excerpted by Hanoi radio in Mandarin. See the
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CONF ID ENT, IAL F13I S TRENDS
l2 JANUARY 1972
fact the form in which press comment on Presidential pronouncements
have normally come. Other available references to the article,
however, in flanoi'8 English-language broadcasts and in VNA'e
Vietnamese-language service for cadres, did not attribute it to
Commentator.
~'.ccording to the available versions of the article, it takes sharp
issue wir.h the President's statement in hie interview that he
always does more than he promises. As a counY~. argument it
recalls that during his campaign for the Presidency he had
promised to end the war promptly but in fact has intensified it
during the past three years. And it said that his latest
interview is connected with his desire to be President for
another term.
Hanoi radio's Mandarin-language version of the article--also
carried in VNA Vietnamese--reiterates the standard line that
if the United States really wants to end the war of aggression,
it must set a terminal date for the complete withdrawal of
troops from So~ith Vietnam. And it goes on to claim that the
President in hie interview revealed his intention to permanently
keep a residual U.S. force in South Vietnam.
As broadcast in Mandarin. the article says flatly that on the
night of the interview "many Americana were shocked by the pact
that their own President had become a liar." But it then goes
on to add only that he talked again and again about the same
old prisoner of war issue, but that it is he who is responsible
for the continued increase in the number of prisoners: "While
talking loudly about peaceful deeds, he remaii:ed completely
silent about when the last U.S. soldier would withdraw from
Vietnam." Observing that the President glossed over such
problems as the economy and social problems and concentrated on
foreign policy, the article--as heard in Mandarin--stops short
of mentioning the President's trip to Peking. It says:
In point of fact Nixon has vainly attempted to
use diplomatic maneuvers to cover up and over-
come his difficulties in other spheres. What
is more important is the fact that the U.S.
.imperialists are still entertaining illusions
about using the Nixon Doctrine to continue
to play the role of international gendarme at
lower costs.
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CONFZDCNTZAL FBZS TRCNDS
12 JANUARY 1972
The version carried by VNA in Vietnamese to cadres then adds:
"Zn addition, Neople also heard Nixon hail the summit conferences
which in the past few years were opposed by him." The VNA
Vietnamese account of the article then quotes passages on
the Nixon Doctrine reminiscent of Hanoi's anti-Chinese polemic
last summer in the wake of the l5 July announcement of the
President's planned Peking trip. Most notably it revives
the charge unique at that time Chat a maJ.n aim of the Nixon
Doctrine is to split the socialist countries. According to
VNA Vietnamese, the article says:
One of the most contradictory points in the Nixon
Doctrine is the fact that the United States
continues to want to force other countries to
yield and to comply with its requests, while the
United States itself has becor~.e weaker with each
passing day. The United States continues to
plan to expand its interventionist actions in
the world and to step up its activities aimed
at sowing dissension among socialist countries
and at opposing the steadily growing strength
of the socialist camp and the national
liberation movement.
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CONFIDENT.LAL Z''DI5 TRENLS
12 JANUARY 1972
PEKING NOTES PRESIDENTS INTERVIEW. REPORTS PARIS SESSION
Peking first acknowledged President Nixon's remarks on Indochina
in his 2 .lanuary TV interview in two NCNA reports on the 6th
of LPA and JUAN DOt NHAN DAN commentaries. (Previously Peking
had noted his remarks on the Middle Eaet in NCNA reports on the
4th,) Peking commented on its own authority belatedly on
8 January with an NCNA commentary on both Che President's
statements and Secretary Rogers' 5 January TV interview, focusinfy
on their justification of the bombings on the basis of the
"so-called 'prisoners of war' problem."
In a notable departure from past practice, NCNA on the Sth
reported the proceedings of the Paris session held two days
earller,* citing the communist delegates' criticisms of the
"deceptive allegations" made by the President in his TV
interview. Without indicating what the President said on the
aub~ect, the NCNA account quoted Xuan Thuy as charging that
the Nixon Administration has misused the POW question in order
to continue the war and to keep the Thieu regime in power.
Thuy was quoted as saying Chat the U.S. troops and prisoners
could not return home in 1971 because the Administration refused
to respond to the PRG's seven points. NCNA also quoted the PRG
delegate's statement that the seven-point plan is "fully correct."
The S January NCNA report on the President's and Secretary Rogers'
interviews dismissed their arguments on the POW issue as "very
preposterous" and pointed to the seven points as the basis for
a settlement including the prisoner problem. The report
predictably ignored the President's disclosure that the prisoner
issue had been discussed with Chou En-lai. In addition to the
POW questfon, NCNA's account of the secretary's interview also
dealt with his remarks on continuing U.S. support for Saigon.
Charging that the United States has emphasized the POW question
for the sole purpose of "making it a pretext," NCNA said the
essence of the question is U.S. unwillingness to give up support
for the Saigon regime, as "admitted" by Rogers when he reaffirmed
that the American purpose is to provide South Vietnam the
opportunity to determine its own future.
* In the past Peking has reported statements by the communist
delegates canceling forthcoming sessions of the Paris talks, but
the only known precedent for the current report on a session's
proceedings was Peking's coverage of the exceptional l July 1971
session at which the PRG's seven points were presented. NCNA
reported that session and carried the text of the PRG statement.
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12 JANUARY 1972
The NCNA commentary concluded by saying that the "Nixon
Administration" came to power with promises to end the war
and withdraw U.S. troops but that it has now demonstrated Chat
it "has no intention of keeping its promises." But Peking's
continuing avoidance of the strongest personal attacks on the
President 1s illustrated by NCNA's failure to ueP language
like that which it quoted the Vietnamese communist commentaries
as having used when they condemned the President's "deceitful
tricks" and "obdurate and bellicose stand."
Peking's reaction to the President's remarks on Indochina,
including its account of the communist delegates' statements
in Paris, reflects its concern to stress that the POW issue--
and the Indochina question in general--must be settled with
the Vietnamese communists and their allies in Indochina. By
again citing the seven-point plan as the basis for a settle-
ment and giving unusual publicity to the Paris forum, Peking
has implicitly sought to reassure Hanoi over the effects of
the President's visit to Peking--a reassurance especially r:imely
in view of the President's reference to the POW issue in
connection with the Kissinger-Chou talks.
USSR CONTINUES TO SOORE BOMBING OF DRV. PRESIDENT'S "THREATS"
Moscow's continuing condemnation of the 26-30 December heavy
U.S. air strikes against the DRV is typified by a 4 January
Mayevskiy PRAVDA article which cites various Western press
commentaries to the effect that the United States is resorting
to old, discredited methods of expanding the aggression to
compensate for military failures, and points out that the
gamble on "illusory" military victories has led Washington
to "virtually sabotage" the Paris negotiations in an attempt
to "pressure" Hanoi.
Commenting similarly on the bombings as an effort to compensate
for the failure of Vietnamization, Col. Aleksey Leontyev in
RID STAR on the 6th says that this effort to bring Hanoi to
its knees also failed. The U.S. press itself admitted,
Leontyev adds, Chat no significant damage was inflicted on
the DRV, and the Americans encountered an unexpectedly strong
rebuff from the DRV air defense forces. Leontyev says that
there are no signs in Washington, however, of any intention
to draw "realistic conclusions" from the defeats, with even
Nixon's 2 January TV interview containing "threats" to resume
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12 JANUARY 1972
the bombing. Leontyev cites the New York TIMES as saying that
the captured pilots are the pretext for maintaining a "residual"
force in Vietnam and the Safety of.the residual force ie the
pretext for continuing the bombing, ?but that the Thieu regime
cannot survive without the bombings.
A 6 January TASS report of Secretary Rogers' 'l'V interview the
day before notes that he said that the United States would
continue military and economic aid to the Saigon regime and that
he tied the problem of U.S. troop withdrawal, among other things,
with the preservation of the Saigon regime. Claiming that
President Nixon in hie TV interview failed to "justify" U.S.
bombing, TASS' commentator Kharkov on the 6th ridicules as a
mere "pretext" arguments regarding "defensive reaction."
Kharkov says that Secretary Rogers clarified the President's
statement when he connected the withdrawal of American troops
with the preservation of the present regime in Saigon.
ATTACKS ON Moscow continues to charge that Sino-American
PEKING developments encouraged the United States to
make the bombing raids agsinst the DRV and to
point to Peking's "restrained" reaction to the attacks. Moscow
has continued to ignore the PRC Foreign Ministry statement on
the strikes except in Mandarin-language radio broadcasts.
Commentators point out that the bombings coincided with the
arrival in the PRC of the U.S. advance delegation preparing for
President Nixon's visit. Leontyev, in his 6 January RED STAR
article, cites comment from the U.S. press to document charges
.that Peking's "silence" encouraged the United States in the
bombing. According to the New York POST, says Leontyev,
Chou En-lai could have stopped the raids "by hinting that their
initiator would not have recei~-ed a hospitable reception in
Peking."
Some comment again raises the specter of a behind-the-scenes
deal on Vietnam to be made during the President'3 visit in Peking.
The 6 January TASS report of Secretary Rogers' TV interview
as well as a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on the 7th note that
in reply to a question, Rogers expressed the opinion that the
resumption of the bombing of the. DRV would not adversely affect
the President's forthcoming trip to Peking.
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CONt~l:D1~.N7'TAL FP.;I,S 7.'It1~NDS
1.2 JANUARY 1,972
A Kharkov TASS commentary on the 11th 1?lnke tlio U.S. "reL?ueal
to hold serious talks" in Paris with h:lnts in the U.S. prase
of "poseibilit:lee" opening up in connection with the President's
visit to Pek:Lng. The New York TIMES on 7 January, says Kharkov,
linked Nlxon's trip with the poswibility of the emergence of
"chances" for compromise on the battlefield and at the Pa~ie
talks, and Kharkov interprets this to mean that the impression
is being croated that "certain quarters" are trying to discuss
the Vietnam problem behind the backs of the Vietnamese. A
brief Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on the
8th says Chat some facts indicate a Sino-U.S. attempt to make a
backstage deal on Vietnam, citing the Washington P05T ae
pointing out that in hie 2 January TV interview President Nixon
"admitted" that Kissinger had Calked with Chou about U.S.
prisoners during his two visits to Peking. (The initial TASS
report of President Nixon's interview had noted that he
declared his intention to raise the question of American POWs
during his visit to Peking, but did not, of course, acknowledge
Chat he also said he had talked to Gromyko about the question
and intended to discuss it during hie visit to Moscow as well.)
Another Radio Peace and Progress Mandarin-language commentary
on the 7th observes that the President "arrogantly" told the
Vietnamese about "the do's-and-don'ts" in the treatment of
U.S. prisoners and pointed to the example of the PRC which
released two U.S. prisoners. A Radio Moscow commentary in
Mandarin on the 5th, similarly referrin;; to the PRC's release
of two TJ.S. prisoners, speculates that Washington hopes Peking
wi11 "pressure" Hanoi to change its present stand on the POWs.
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CONBLDLNTI,AL I,PISLH TIIIEM)H
Ll JANIJARY 1972
DRV FOFtE[GN MINISTRY SPOKESr1MJ ROUTINELY PROTESTS AIR STRIKES
Tho DRV Foreign Ministry's iirpt official prof?st against U.S.
aLr etrikee in the DMZ and North Vietnam in 1972 comoe in the
form of a spokesman's statam?nt on 7 January which does nut
mention the sustained late December etrikee against North Vietnam.
Th~~ spokesman charges that "since 31 December to the present"
U.B. planes, including 8-528, were sent "to repeat?dly bomb and
strafe" W~~ong Lap village and that U.S. artillery "from positions
south of the demilitar'zed zone" and from U.S. ships was used
in attacks against a "certain number of villages belonging to
Vinh Linh area." The pro~;est, oddly, dose not identify the
villages, but does asenrt, in routine fashion, Chat they are
situated north of the 17th parallel inside the DMZ "belonging to
DRV territory." (The U.S. command in Saigon announced on the
7th that heavy 8-52 raids had been conducted in the DMZ the
previous day, particularly in the southwestern portion,)
The protest also charges Chat U.S. planes "again bombed and
strafed a certain number of localities belonging to Quang
Binh Province" on 2 and S January and that on tiie 5th, U.S.
planes "fired rockets at a locality belonging to Hoa Binh
Province." (The U.S. Command on the 7th disclosed Chat two
stc~ikes had been made inside i~orth Vietnam this year--both
reportedly on the 5th. One strike was said to have been made
45 miles north of the DMZ, while the other "wee within three
flying minutes of Hanoi.")
The protest uses routine formulations in "sternly condemning
the above acts of war" and demanding an end to all actions
"grossly encroaching" upon the DRV's sovereignty and security.
DRV PREMIERS OFFICE ISSUES INSTRUCTIONS ON TET OBSERVANCE
Hanoi radio on 8 January reported that the DRV premier's
office had issued instructions on the celebration of the
"Nham Ty" lunar new year (Tet). The broadcast said the
instructions were to imbue the Tet festivities with "the
anti-U.S. national salvation resistance spirit" in the face
of the continued "bellicosity" of the United States,
particularly the heavy air strikes against the DRV in December.
Tl~e instructions call on all the northern armed forces and
people to heighten their vigilance and "be ready to fight and
CONFIDENTIAL
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CUNIrIUI~N'P1AL V}IL}1 'PItI~NUfI
12 JANl1AllY I x)12
dai'ant the enemy In al:l circwnatancpa and aatiafactur.lly parfc~rtn
the g,rtrat roar duty toward the gr.aat frunt.l f.na wh l.la at:rf.v lag
tr, build and consul ldata tie auc ln.l.i.at Nnrth."
Appenl-; for v.lgi.l.anca Nava linen a atapl.a uC the annual 7'nt
lnutructJ.ona, taut the currant lnatr.uctluna differ from
pr.avloua oaten in giving attention to the antiaircraft teak.
'Pliny ctr11 on "adm:lnistrativa cummi.ttana at all achnlona
to intensity the people's antinlrcrafe task and aaeisfnctorr.ly
or.gan:lza nlcrrt un.lts" so that "n.lghe and day" they can
maintain security and order, protect important buildi.nga,
maintain communications, and ba constantly combat ragdy.
In recent years she premier's instructions on 'Tat have
specified the number of days workers will have off to calabrnta
the occasion, but no meneion of such holidays is contained in
this year's instructions.
COMMIJN I ST MEDIA COf~EMN U ~ S ~ I~-5 2 P,OP1B I NGS i N I AOS
The use of B-52s to bomb the Plain of Jars was condemned in nn
NLNS Central Committee spokesman's statement as well as in a
letter to the Geneva conference cochairman from NL}1S Secretary
General Phoumi Vongvichlt on 3 Januacy, and in an 8 January
Souphanouvong letter to the Laotian king. The most recent
official statement specifically protecting B-52 strikes was an
NLNS Central Committee statement dated 28 September which
condemned intensified bombings ol: southern Laos. Sruphanouvong's
letter to the king protested the "massive" dispatch of Vang Pa~~
and Thai troops into the Sam Thong-Long Cheng area as well as the
B-52 bombings, and said that there had been a similar offensive
in late 1969.*
* In view of the intensive communist attacks in the area of Long
Cheng, it is notable that Souphanouvong's letter presses the claim
that: "the whole of Xieng fChouang Province" has been controlled by
the Lao Front and "Patriotic Neutralist" forces since 1961 and
that the Sam Thong-Long Cheng region was "illegally" raided and
captured "by the United States and its henchmen" after the signing
of the 1962 Geneva agreements. This point was not made in a
Souphanouvong letter to the king released on 20 April 1971--also
at the time of communist military pressure in the area--which
similarly scored the dispatch of Thai troops to the Sam Thong-Long
Cheng region.
ONF IpENT S~AAL
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CUNIriU1tN'I'lAL plt}ti 'i'Iti~:,bti
Il JANItAIIY I yy7.
'Chp Cpntrat. Cur~nlittan attitmm~nt and the letter tr- the t7annva
, ochalrman charged that the bosrbinga showed U.H, dismay over the
rr:traat c, f. Vang }'ao, Vinntidnn, and `t'ha.l [otCna tram the "1.aln,
and polntrtd out that the raids tr+uk place after. a vistt to
Viranttann of Adml.rai McCain, U.H. }'aclfir hotr
fipeklhK to cr-tthtf?t ltuviet ahd iaat 1'.utrcpeatt cl-at~-ea of Il.f;.-
Citiheae "coll-talr+h" r+h the -ttdiati=l'aklatatti cnhfllct, the
edltrrtlal calla aunt allegatiotta "11Pa" and gnea ott tr+ cr-nttlvv
a tnttuut.ta arqutnpnt that the United f3tatea uqa actually
ccrlltulihq uitlr the lioviet hhinh dutittq the crmfl ic-t and c+ttly
"[sighed" support [ur 1'akiatan as ah aid to ittdia and Moacr+W.
1'hua, t;~e editorial says, the U.l1, atahd enabled yoviet
propagand;ata to claith that the United fltatea attd the 1'110 hart
taken a cotttmrm stand ern the igaue. (NCWA tnpotted the yL?'Rl 1
I't)I'ULLIt editorial on the 9t-t, but it deleted the passage on
U. 9.~Chitteae collusion.)
Againrt the background of Soviet bloc charges that 1'ekinq has
abandoned the class .approach to foreign policy by its
rappr~7chement with the United 5tar.rgordaborry
and suggested that, if elected,"ho will procoad much moro ably
and dangerousty~" Claborating, PRCNSA LATINA said that he will
"op~~~:ate a repressive apparatus that is more selective" and "try
to a,ntroduce certain reforms--including a capitalist agrarian
reform--to modernize government structures and allay popular
discontont?,"
l~lavana view: the Broad Front as a continuing. political force in
Uruguay. A Havana television commentator on 2 December suggested
that "everything seems to indicate that there.will be a polariza-
tion of political forces and an intensification of the problems"
of t~rug+aay and that the Front "could.become.a.deciding political
force supported by the combative action of.tlae-people in the
streets" Announcing a Broad Front decision to "regroup to
continue its struggle," Havana radio on 18 December opined that
the Front's "speed in undertaking new political tasks is a blow
to the rightist sectors, which considered that the Broad Front
was a transitory union of forces to win political poets."
PRCNSA LATINA on 8 January transmitted a Broad.Front.plenary
message of the 7th declaring that the Front-has "begun a new
stage, more committed than ever to.permanent_political action
aimed at reaching the ob~ectivee of the.program.of profound
transformation which is our raison d'etre. We.are committed to
beginning a new political life in our country."
In parallel with the continuation of Broad _Front.activit:ies,
Havana predicted a resumption of antigovernmeat.activities.by.
the Tupamaros. Noting that the Tupamaros_-were.now "without
limitations of any kind" since their.self-imposed truce ended
with the 28 November elections, PRENSA LATINA.?on 6 December
said that "the Tupamaros will doubtless make a rapid reappearance
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(;UNFCDI!,'N'1'fAL trll;CN TIZ1rNUy
l2 ,1ANUARY ,10 7 2
with actlvna that will apued up th?~maaa politicization pro-
c?ar and heat?n the undermining of the system." After report-
ing on ~2 U?camb?r that the 't'upamaro? had resumed their activities
by virtually destroying "the biggaot golf club" in Montevideo,
t'RLrNSA LATINA on 27 Uecemher eai~~1 there is "no doubt that the
'Pupamaroo have th?ir eights tra,y.na,d on metabere of parapolice
groups," but added that "theta ~..v, obvioi,sly no way of knowing
where or when they will strike next."
With the continuation of Broad Front activities sad the resumption
of the Tupamaros' efforts, PRENSA LATINA on 6 December said Chat
the role of the Uruguayan people was "clear: Continue to resist
to reconquer their rights." And tlavana radio-on the 21st contended
Chat the peoples' resists:+~e to."reactionary violence'.' in Uruguay
"is growing into a strugga~~ for complete liberation that the
exploiters of out America will not be able to contain "
CASTRO Asked at hie 4 December Guayaquil prase conference for
his postelection opinion of the Tupamaroe, Castro
replied, "I admire teem and t support them, although this is nvt
our business"--according to AFP. Accordiag_to Guayaquil'8 EL
UNIVERSO, he said, "I sympathize greatly with the Tupamaros,"
adding that aid to Chem was "a private matter for Cubans to
consider." PRENSA LATINA's Lima correspondent reported to Havana
on the 4th that during his stopover at .the Luna airport Castro
said that he had "great respect for t'ae Broad .Front and the
Uruguayan Tupamaros."
Available Cuban media did.not cazry.any..of_these repvrted.remar.ks
on Uruguay and have not acknowledged.. the Chile-Uruguayan incident.
provoked by Caetro's alleged remark in Chile, publicized by
* PRENSA LATINA has not yet transmitted-.the text of a recent
Tupamaro communique, filed to Havana on l0 January by its Santiago
correspondent, in which the Tupamaros announced .the end of .their
unilaterally-established election truce and thair.determinat.ion
' "to spare no effort to bring peace to the.. country." Stating that
"we are again taking this path because the government has not
come up with or does not wish to come ~~p with another. solution,"
the communique warned that "during this war you, .the rich, will
tremble in your boots and will sleep uneasily" because "we are
going to enter your mansions, break.into.your.pantries and
safes We are many and we want a fatherland."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBZS TRENDS
12 JANUARY 1972
several Latin American media, Chat "violence is the only road
left in Uruguay for gaining power." Buenos Aires' LATIN on
2 December quoted Castro use adding that the Tupamaros "will know
how to ad~uet to the new circumstances.". Castro reportedly made
these romarke in a private meeting .with a. group .of priests on
29 November at the Cuban Embassy in~Chile< Available Havana
media did not publicize the meeting,.although..a report .filed
on 29 November by PRENSA LATZNA's Santiago..correapondent L?o hie
Havana off ice quoted Castro ae telling the priest:e that..the
Uruguayan elections "imposed 'the most reactionary and the moat
proimperialist' elements" and suggesting "the possibility
of fradulent manipulations in the elections,," Castro added, the
correspondent repoz~ted, that during the elections "even fear hat
been used, the citizens having been threatened.with.the mobiliza-
tion of Brazilian troops on~the border " The correspondent did
not cite his alleged comment on violence..as.the.ouly path left
in Uruguay nor his reference to the Tupamaros.
Background: Although Cuban spokesmen had in. the past cited
Uruguay along with Chile as a possible exception.. to.the.dictum
that armed struggle is .the .sole ultimately effective road. to
power, Castro in a 1 August 1970 interview withdrew the distinc-
tion, discounting the efficacy of an electoral path. to revolu-
tionary rower in Uruguay while applauding the- effectiveness of
the Tupamaros. Further elaborating the Cuban;positioa in an
11 November 1910 press conference, Cuban CP Secretariat member .
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez asserted that-.with .the develo~?uent of
conditions "contrary to Uruguay's democratic...traditioas" that
country could no longer be viewed as an "exception" to the
continental pattern. Throughout this period Cub2.n media.
enthusiastically publicized the exploits of .the Tupamaros,
with Castro as late as 14 January 1971 describing them as
"revolutionaries with a great political brain~who..undoubtedly
have plenty of support among the masses".and who "act with
responsibility."
Following the creation in February 1971. of_the.Broad_Front,
however, Cuban media began to report without-comment develop-
ments in the evolution of the Front. Cuban .skepticism about
the coalition was reflected in its publicizing~of the Tupamaros'
own lukewarm support for the tactics but not-the strategy of
the Broad Front. Castro in his 19 April .speech .mentioned
neither the Tupamaros nor the Broad Front.
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CUNI~'iUl~N'1'J:AL l~'1li4 'i'Itl~,'NI)9
12 JANUARY 1J72
By hiw ZG July epuuch, howuvur, Castro oxtoadod support to both
thn 'i'upumurun and thr~ Brood Front, noting that "tho armed struggJ.o
of thu Uruguayans ie growing ntrongor ~usL? un thu Brood Front of
tho Uruguayans ie grow:Lng etrongor" and picturing the two ae
uporut.ing in condom. llo doclarod that "chore is no rea?on to
r.oJoct tho poseibiliL?y t'riut by the and of tho year in Uruguay,
too, thorn may bo a popular government" in powor. llo took
ossnntially tho eamo lino in h~.s 27 August spooch, observing that
tho Uruguayan popular torcoo were using an."inte111gent.combination"
oC forms of struggle "on two levols, on tho lovol vi' armed struggle
Find on tho loyal of mass movc+ments and legal struggle." More
opt:tmistic about tl~o Broad Front's chancoe of.victory than in
July, Castro in August credited the Front with "great posaibilitioe"
of defeating the Uruguayan "oligarchy" ir. the 28 November elections.
Castro, in Chile during the filial stage of the Uruguayan electoral
campaign and at the time of tl~e 28 November elections and there-
fore reluctant to discuss either internati,oaal issues or domestic
~ffaire of other Latin American countries, offered only minimal.
c~~mmenC on the Uruguayan situation.+~ For instance, in an
ll November interview carried by Buenos Aires LATIN Castro
responded to a question on armed revolutioa.by.doclaring that
"we do not exclude the .electoral course." He .subsequently
declined to answer a question concerning urban guerrillas,
explaining that "L CanAQt speak about that hero, I am a guest.
I wi1J. talk to you about Chat in Havana." Later on the 11th,
however, Bogota's Cadena National radio quoted him.as praising
the Broad Front candidate and declaring that. i# he were a voter
in Uruguay he would vote for the Broad Front.
Declining to be drawn out further on tae Uruguayan situation in
his dialog with students at Concepcion..University~.on the 18th,
Castro responded to a request that he analyze the liberation
struggle in Latin America with the declaration that "phenomena
of a positive nature have arisen" in Latin America. He pointed
out that in addition to the Chilean. experience."the.Broad Front
exists in Uruguay" where it "is fighting.an.electoral.battle in
which all the leftist organizations are participating."
Havana s PRENSA LATINA reported on 12 November:.that Uruguayan.
Communist Party Secretary General Rodney.Arismendi~had came to
Chile to meet with Castro and that.Castro had ..:'taken-the oppor-
tunity to send greetings to the Uruguayan Communist Party, the
Broad Front, and the Uruguayan people." Buenos Aires' LATIN on
3 December carried a report that Castro.had..extended his visit
to Chile "dust in case the Broad Front won tae elections."
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CUNi~I 1)I;N'I' 1 A1,
- 'S Fl -
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1rU1N 'I'111!NUU
1 'L ,IANIIAItY 1 y ll_
KIR[LENKO~S VISIT DRAWS UNUSUAL PUBLICITY IN MOLDAVIA
'l'I~u v1 Ni t of ['o l .lt,bur.~o mnmbar K.Lr i.l s~nko to K lph lncv, C rom 15 to
17 December., attracted unuNUrr.l. publicity l.n the Moldnv.iun presg.
Kf.rllunko and other top leudars have been tr.uvet.ing nbout the
cou-tiry to deJ.iver. reglonul r.eporL'y un th? Novcambar. Cenernl.
Committee plenum, and Soviet press trantment of the visLtW and
speeches has been low-keyed. 'Che Moidnvinn prase ig the only
one tr deviate from a pattern of routing and very limited
publ.iclty fcr the loaders' visil?s by the local papers.
A1r.hough ICirilenko has no pest connection with Mo.dnviu, his
press treatment outshone the Ukraine's for its former. first
secretary Podgornyy, Latvia's for its former first secretary
Pelsl-c, and even Leningrad's for General Secretary Brezhnev
during hl.s 5-day visit to that city.
Kirllenko dominated she Moldavian press for tha duration of
his vi.t~it. On 17 D~ ;ember SOVE1'SKAYA MOLDAVIYA carried n photo
showing him at a factory and devoted moat of its front page to
deta~lle of his visit. Referring to him ff:miliarly as Mdrey
Pavlovich, the paper directly quoted hie conversations with
workers and officials. A1`ter a local production association
chief praised the advantages of his aseociario.-, KLri2enko
was quoted as endorsing the creating of associations. (According
to speakers at the Leningrad aktiv meeting, Brezhnev in his
Leningrad speech also urged a speedup in forming associations--
PRAVDA, 29 December).
On 18 December S~J`IETSKAYA MOLDAVIYI: published a photo of
Kirilenko addressing the Moldavian aktiv; Brezhnev's and
Pelahe's aktiv addresses were also accompanied by photos--
but not the addresses of any other leaders. While Brezhnev
was Greeted with "warmth and cordiality" in Leningrad, the
Leningrad press coverage was brief and routine, with no
excerpts from his aktiv speech or his informal remarks to
workers nor any other display of unusual attention, despite
IS~s StatUS.
From middle to late December nearly every P~~litburo member
and secretary traveled to one or two provincial cities to
report at aktiv meetings on the November plenum results.
Although neither the central nor local press carr~::d any
CONFIDENTIAL
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1.(-irr I I-htrl I hI, inn I a l uhl,Irr;
1 J :IAJ;IIAIIV I'~1 l1
PA! Prpt a f Y[-m Aily apPP('IIPp, 1[t~ Al prPAA CalllmPnt a l 11[111 Al P I llal
( l1P a11PPChPa (l i aC1laaPll t 11P f i Ve?yPAr pl ah And the rP( P_nt fi(tV 1 P(
[1ip117mat1C (IffenAiVe.'' 'I-Ile CentrAl press trP_Atmeht was PVPn-
11At1lIP[l, (1PaCril7ing All 1'allthura members and aefrPtAr1PA AA
hPirlg "wArmly gteeted" by their a~diencea, And little Pffott
WAA mAIIP t(t Aet IirezhnPV mUCh AhaVe hia c[71l.eagUPS? ItrP-.hnvv'a
appeat.ancea in Moac.oa and l~eningrad naturAlly received fuller
[overage, artd the frequent applAUSe during hia epeerhPS was
noted, but no excetpta from hia speeches sere puhliahe(1 either,
Central an(i local press repotts of the resolutions and apepcheH
by local. figures at these aktiv meetings gave reedit to the
Central Committee and Pol.itburu and usually mentioned the trips
of Yodgornyy and Kosygin slang with Brerhnevls. Judging from
these press accounts, llrezhnev received special Attention from
only [our mi~tor speakers A wotker at the Maldavian aktiv meet inE;
and a raykam eecCetAry at a Volyn Oblast aktiv meeting spoke of
the 1'oli.buro "headed by" Brezhnev (SOVF'1'SKAYA MULUAViYA,
18 Uecember, and kMYANSKA UKRAINA, 25 becember), an Azerbayd~hani
kolkhoznik praised the role of the Central Cammittee and Urevhnev
"personally" in conducting foreign policy (BAKIN5KIY RAlIOCiIIY,
ll Uecember), and a 1(~cal Moldavian Kamsamal secretary praised
the Central. Cotllt>littee and Brez{mev "personally" for their concern
for Kishinev (5OVLTSKAYA MOLUAVIYA, 1.7 Uecember).
REASON FOR REMOVAL OF PSKAV (LAST LEADER REVEALED
1'he 4 January issue of E'IU!l1hA reveals the apparent rearJOn behin(1
the removal Last November o. the first secretary of Pskov ohlaHt,
I. 5. Gustov. Custov is i~,plicitly accused or failing to cake >
"party approach" it deali~lg with a corrupt eubordin~atc.
Ironically, Gustov was t-~lnsferred to the position of deputy
chairman of the Party Control Conlnlitc.ee, the body that is
apsigrled the task of safeguarding morality and discipline wit}ltn
ctle party.
* Moat of the speeches were delivered in provincial areas of the
RSFSR from which local papers arc unavailable. Local press
accounts are available for the reports of Brezhnev (Morc:ow and
Leningrad), Podgornyy (Ukraine), Kirilenko (Moldavia), Polyanskiy
(Kirgizia) Pelshe (Latvia), Shelest and Shcherbitskiy (Ukraine),
Kunayev (Kazakhstan), Grishin (Moscow), Masherov (Belorussia),
Mzhavanadze (Georgia), and Rashidov (Uzbekistan).
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t;nNarl,l7,r,~r-nl, unl~l ~fui,NU~;
1 Z ,IANIInitY I U !1
1'ItAVI)n on 6 'ippternber 1.971 exposed t. he Cfnancra) abuses of the
~ hivf of Lho 1'akov lu~uatttg cottatrurl lot[ Cotnbtite, Cl. i), Menlyuknv.
nlth~cugh the matt[ target of tits Neptemher article Was Metttytrkov'a
i-r~~tc+ctora In the Lentngradybaaed Mairt Ad-niniatration fur
C~mst rust l~Ytt in the Weatertt lieglnna, llte 1'akov gurkum was
~rttl~?ired for having lung i.gnured rompl.afnta about Mentyukov
before re~ ?,ving hl~n.
~ihp king ~, January i'kAVUA followup is haralter ort the 1'akov leaders,
~cmplalning that only the intervention o[ rentrnl_ organs hnd
"furred" the I'akov r;orkom to demote the of[icinl and tltnt the
I'gkcw obkom bureau sad limited itself to rebuking the gor.kom
flrst secretary, 1'. ['. Kudryavtaev, for poor cadre work and
-n sending a terse unswar to Pli