TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040038-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: September 15, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~IIIIIIIIIIII~~~~IIIIIIIIIIII~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
Illlliimu~uumllllllll
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
15 SEPTEMBER 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 37)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP 1
[eluded Lem eulemelie
derrnpredinp end
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 SEPTEMBER 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INDOCHINA
Propaganda Continues to Reflect Concern over Floods in DRV . .
1
Hanoi Links U.S. Strikes at DRV with Action in Quang Tri . . .
3
Japanese CP Delegation in DRV After Visits to USSR, Romania . .
6
Paris Talks: Ambassador Porter First Mentioned in VNA Account.
7
Podgornyy, Propagandists Assail U.S. "Aggression" in Indochina.
10
FUNK Delegation Meets with USSR Party, Government Officials . .
11
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
NCNA Denounces T4SS-Reported Account of Kissinger-Chou Talk . .
14
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
USSR Silent on Reported Accord at SALT, Incidents-at-Sea Talks. 17
GERMANY AND BERLIN
Abrasimov: Accord Is De Facto Recognition of GDR by West . . .
18
Moscow, East Berlin React Cautiou3ly to Finnish Proposal . . .
20
Soviet Broadcasts in Mandarin Answer NCNA Charge of Sellout . .
21
ROMANIA
Bucharest Defends Pursuit of Independent Balkan Policy . . .
22
KHRUSHCHEV'S DEATH
Announced "With Sorrow" A Day and A Half After Demise . . . . .
24
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Continuing PLA Control over Civil Affairs Is Indicated . . . .
26
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
15 SEPTEMBER 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 6 - 12 SEPTEMBER 1971
Moscow (3331 items)
Peking (1288 items)
West Berlin Accord
(5%)
11%
Domestic Issues
(25%)
31%
China
(7%)
10%
DPRK
(3%)
31%
[Aleksandrov in
(3%)
7%]
[National Day
(--)
18%]
PRAVDA
[Military Delega-
(--)
9%]
DPRK National Day
(--)
6%
tion in PRC
Bulgarian National
(--)
5%
Indochina
(42%)
10%
Day
TASS Account of
(--)
3%
Indochina
(17%)
3%
Kissinger PRC Trip
Gromyko Letter to
(--)
2%
UN on World
Disarmament Conference
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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INDOCHINA
The gravity of the recent floods in North Vietnam, acknowledged
by Pham Van Dong in his national day address, is pointed up again
in an 11 September Hanoi report quoting Vice Premier Nguyen Duy
Trinh as stating that the North has not experienced such a "great
flood" in "nearly a hundred years." Hanoi continues to publicize
little specific information on the flood damage, but the nature
of some of the most pressing problems is suggested in the
propaganda. Concern over food losses in flooded areas, for
example, is underscored in a 10 September report on decisions
by DRV party and government organs, including a promise that
the state will provide allotments of rice to families which have
lost their food supplies.
A 12 September Liberation Radio commentary promptly scored
President Thieu's 11 September speech in which he explained that
the voters in the 3 October election can indicate whether or not
they have confidence in him and that he will resign if a majority
fails to support him. The commentary said that compatriots in the
southern cities do not believe "Thieu's boasts" about insuring a
free and democratic election and that they are demanding that
Thieu resign, the elections be canceled, and new elections "be
organized democratically." Hanoi has reported briefly and
without comment Senator Jackson's 10 September statement calling
for postponement of the election if a legitimate contest cannot
be assured.
Moscow presses routine charges that the United States is blocking
the Paris talks and planning further aggression in Indochina.
Commentators continue to claim that Peking wants to discuss the
Indochina problem with President Nixon "behind the backs" of the
peoples concerned. But Podgornyy, speaking on the 14th, said
only that "the United States continues to maneuver" on a
Vietnamese settlement.
TASS and VNA report the arrival in Moscow of a DRV National
Aseembly delegation led by Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan on
13 September fo'- a 10-day visit. The DRV group has already visited
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania on a tour which began on
18 August and included stopovers in both Peking and Moscow.
PROPAGANDA CONTINUES TO REFLECT CONCERN OVER FLOODS IN DRV
Serious concern over the damage causea by the recent floods is
underscored in an 11 September Hanoi report that North Vietnamese
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Politburo and Secretariat members are visiting flooded areas--
the second such report within three days. Hanoi reported on
the 9th that Le DuLn, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong had
toured the stricken areas.* No such tours by top DRV
officials were publicized during 1968 and 1969, the most
recent previous years in which serious flooding occurred.
The 11 September report highlight^d the activities of Foreign
Minister and Politburo member Nguyen Duy Trinh and noted his
acknowledgment, in remarks to villagers, that "North Vietnam
has not experienced such a great flood in nearly a hundred
years." Trinh assured the villagers, according to the
report, that the regime was able to mobilize the strength and
efforts of the people, party, and army and successfully
restrict the damage from the floods. The broadcast also
noted that Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi and Secretariat
members To Huu, Hoang I nh, and Nguyen Van Tran had visited
local areas affected by the flooding.
On the 10th a Hanoi broadcast reported that the party
Secretariat and the Standing Committee of the Council of
Ministers had "recently" decided on a number of "policy
matters concerning compatriots in the flooded areas."**
The radio said the two organs decided that it was necessary
to "expeditiously solve" a number of problems, including the
provision of food and housing for the people and treatment
of diseases. Listing "urgent, immediate tasks," the "decision"
led off with a pledge that the state would provide rice to
people who had lost food supplies in flooded areas, insuring
* The peak of Hanoi radio's attention to the floods was
reached on the 9th with broadcasts including the account of the
leaders' tours and a NHAN DAN editorial. Radio attention to
the floods has since continued at a reduced volume; no further
editorials on the floods have been broadcast, although press
articles on the subject continue to be publicized.
** This is not the first action by the Secretariat and Standing
Committee. On 1 September Hanoi carried an account of an
undated joint resolution from the two organs on overcoming the
floods and restoring production. Although subsequent comment
referred to this single joint resolution, it is not clear
whether it was the only pronouncement issued. A Hanoi broad-
cast on 7 September referred to two resolutions by the two
organs dated 25 and 27 August.
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that each person has at least 13 kilograms of rice. It also
noted the responsibility of the state to supply other
commodities, including clothing, fuel, roofing materials,
seed, and fertilizers. The decision urged the people to be
as self-reliant as possible and asked for help from areas
which had not suffered flood losses. There were no high-level
party-government directives on coping with the floods in 1968
and 1969; instructions were, however, issued by the Premier's
office, as has also been the case this year.
MOSCOW Soviet aid to the DRV in connection with the floods
was publicized in a,13 September TASS report on the
landing of three Soviet cargo planes in Hanoi that day with
medicines, food, and clothes sent by the Soviet Red Cross
Society. The aid was accepted by Minister of the Pr#Ai?erfivi.o#'fice
of the DRV Tran Huu Duc, who expressed gratitude for the Soviet
Union's "constant assistance" and for this new manifestation
of friendship and solidarity.
PEKING Normally more reticent than Moscow in regard to
specific aid, Peking has made no mention of flood
assistance to the DRV sine it publicized the 2 September
message from Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai which promised
that the Chinese people would "do everything possible to give
all-out support and assistance to the fraternal Vietnamese
people in overcoming the floods."
HANOI LINKS U,S. STRIKES AT DRV WITH ACTION IN QUANG TRI
Hanoi propagandists have used the reported downing of a U.S.
F-4 plane on 7 September over DRV territory to denounce
alleged U.S. attacks against Vinh Linh and Quang Binh during
recent weeks and connect;- these "attacks" with current military
activity in northern Quang Tri in South Vietnam. This
comment contains Hanoi's only known comment on the Lam Son 810
operation in northern Quang Tri; communist reports on current
fighting in Quang Tri make no reference to the allied
operation.
In first reporting On 9 September the alleged downing of a
U.S. F-4 aircraft on the 7th "by the Ha Tinh armed forces
and peoplry" Hanoi claimed that this brought the total of
U.S. planes downed over North Vietnam to 3,397. (The two
most recent previous claimed downings occurred on 31 July and
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-4-
6 June.) Comment pegged to the downing includes two Hanoi radio
commentaries on the 9th anc? articles in both NHAN DAN and QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN on the 10th. The comment uniformly protests what
it calls stepped-up U.S. attacks against Vinh Linh and Quang
Binh in recent weeks, but the NHAN DAN article, at least as
briefly summarized by VNA, differs from the other three items
in failing to mention action in Quang Tri. Instiad it refers
to the allies' "critical political and military situation" in
South Vietnam.
One of the radio commentaries of the 9th says that the U.S.
military command "has continued to arrogantly defend its
provocative acts, pretending that they are aimed at reducing
the military pressure of the North on its defensive frontline
along Route 9, northern Quang Tri." It adds that "no one is
fooled by such slander" and that the Pentagon papers proved
that "all U.S. excuses" to strike at the North are aimed at
coping with public opinion. The commentary charges that
"realities have proven" that when the allies are badly hit in
South Vietnam the United States uses its planes and artillery to
strike at the North. Noting the launching of operation Lam Son
810, it says that "such violence cannot conceal the enemy's
confusion and passiveness on this battlefront."
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 10t%, claiming that the allies have
been "dealt heavy blows" by the forces in northern Quang Tri,
charges that the allies are "frenziedly countering these blows
in addition to indiscriminately bombing the southern side.: of the
DMZ," launching operation Lan: Son 810, and attacking Vinh Linh
and Quang Binh. This is the only known Hanoi allusion to U.S.
bombing of DRV positions in the southern part of the
demilitarized zone which began in early August. However, U.S.
attacks in the southern paxt of the zone had been protested in
a 19 August PRG Foreign MinistrS spokesman's statement.
Hanoi does not always comment on alleged downings of planes,
although it did so in two instances this year--at the time of
the large-scale attacks in March and in April.* The only
comment on strikes in the DRV since then came on two occasions
following spokesmen's protests in August. Most recently, a
radio commentary on 17 August and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article
the next day, like the current comment, went beyond a
* See the TRENDS of 28 April, pages 11-12, and 2 March,
pages 9-11.
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16 August protest to suggest that U.S. attacks on the North
were prompted by "painful blows" suffered in the South.
SPOKESMAN'S PROTESTS The latest in the series of DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements
on alleged U.S. attacks in the North and against the DMZ make no
mention of strikes in the southern part of the DMZ. The
statements, issued on 9 and 15 September, both charge that U.S.
planes bombed areas of Quang Binh Province. The protest of the
15th says U.S. planes "bombed and strafed a number of
localities" in Quang Binh on 12 September, while the one of
the 9th says U.S. planes bombed many places in Bo Trach and
Minh Hoa districts, Quang Binh on 6 and 7 September. In
addition, the protest of the 15th claims that U.S. planes,
including B-52's, bombed a number of areas in Vinh Linh on the
14th. And the 9 September spokesman's protest charges that
from 5 to 7 September U.S. planes, including B-52's, and
artillery based south of the 17th parallel attacked Vinh Giang,
Vinh Thanh, Vinh 0, Vinh Son, and Huong Lap villages--described
as being north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ--and Vinh Thuy
village.
Like four out of five of Hanoi's protests in August, both of
the current statements claim that the alleged attacks caused
casualties.* The 15 September protest says human lives and
property were lost, and the one of the 9th specifies "serious
losses" to the population.
* See the 1 September TRENDS, page 16, for background on protests
in August and earlier this year.
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JAPANESE CP DELEGATION IN DRV AFTER VISITS TO USSR. ROMANIA
The 10 September arrival in Hanoi of a Japanese Communist Party
(JCP) delegation led by Kenji Miyamoto, party chairman, is
reported by VNA on the 11th. Among the officials welcoming
the delegation at the airport, according to VNA, were VWP
First Secretary Le Duan, as well as Truong Chinh and Nguyen
Duy Trinh. VNA also mentions th9.t the Soviet and Romanian
charges d'affaires were at the airport. (The JCP delegation
had visited the USSR 19-20 August, Romania 20 August-1 September,
and Rome immediately before coming to Hanoi.)
On i1 September VNA reports that a "grand banquet" was held
for the delegation on the 11th and party talks were held on the
12th, with Le Duan leading the VWP side. While noting that the
talks "proceeded in a cordial and friendly atmosphere," VNA
reveals nothing of the substance.
The VNA report of the banquet does, however, report some of
the remarks by Le Duan and Kenji Miyamoto. Le Duan
reportedly "warmly welcomed" the delegation which he said brought
to the Vietnamese people "the solidarity of comrades-in-arms
against the common enemy, the U.S. imperialists, greatly
encouraging the Vietnamese people to advance towards complete
victory." He expressed the Vietnamese party's and people's
"sincere gratitude" to the JCP and the Japanese people for
their "previous support and assistance" and expressed the wish
that the "militant solidarity and close friendship" between
the VWP and JCP strengthen and develop. Miyamoto tek,'tedly
said the visit "will contribute o developing the friendship
of the two parties and enhance the militant solidarity"
between the Japanese and Vietnamese peoples.
Attention to the visit also included brief reports on other
activities of the delegation, such as a wreath-laying ceremony
at the Hanoi war cemetery. The party organ NHAN DAN--in a
15 September article which VNA described as "filling almost
three entire columns"--discussed the role of the JCP in
Japan and its assistance to the Vietnam resistance. A
Hanoi radio broadcast on the 12th also expressed appreciation
for the Japanese people's assistance to Vietnam.
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PARIS TALKS: AMBASSADOR PORTER FIRST MENTIONED IN VNA ACCOUNT
The VNA account of the 8 September Paris session for the fifth
consecutive time dismisses the allies' statements in a single
sentence when it says: "The Saigon puppet administration's
delegate rehashed his previous fallacious allegations, while the
new U.S. chief negot4.ator William Porter said nothing new but
only repeated the proposal for restricted meetings made by
his predecessor, David K. Bruce." This is the first reference
to Ambassador Porter in Hanoi media, which ignored his appointment
to succeed Ambassador Bruce and his arrival in Paris on
30 August.* VNA accounts of the Paris sessions after Bruce's
final appearance on 29 July referred only to the "U.S.
representative," never mentioning Ambassador Habib by name or
indicating that he was acting delegation head pending
Ambassador Porte-'s arrival.
The VNA account gives an unusually detailed account of the
give-and-take portior of the e September session, however, and
in the course of reporting DRV delegate Xuan Thuy's remarks
it reflects some of the substance of Porter's statement.
Noting the impromptu remarks by the PRG's Dinh Ba Thi** first,
VNA says he :tressed that the Nixon Administration must change
its policy, withdraw all U.S. and allied troops in 1971, and
discard the Thieu "clique." He added that if the U.S. head
delegate "wishes to meet the PRG delegation privately for
further clarifications on the seven-point peace plan, then the
PRG representatives will readily receive him and give him the
necessary explanations."
According to VNA, Xuan Thuy noted that "the new head delegate
of the United States expressed the wish that his presence at
this conference would be an opportunity to settle the Vietnam
problem peacefully and said that President Nixon had entrusted
him with that goal." Replying to Porter, Thuy said that "at
* TASS on the 10th, reporting that Ambassador Porter
participated for the first time at the Paris session the
previous day, said that "the change of diplomats did not change
the U.S. position at the talks."
** Thi was substituting for Mme. Binh, who visited Poland from
6 to 11 September. Soviet media, but not Vietnamese communist
media to date, reported that she stopped in Moscow on the 11th
"en route home."
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the first words of your statement, I thought you were going
to say something new. But it turned out that you followed up
by just repeating Ambassador Bruce's proposal of 8 July for
restricted sessions." Emphasizing that "we have already
criticized that proposal" and thought it had "followed
Ambassador Bruce in leaving the Paris conference," Thuy
supported the PRG proposal with regard to the form of the
conference as "reasonable." This means, Thuy said, that the
Paris talks would continue to meet each Thursday as usual
and "if the U.S. delegate wants further explanations about
the seven points, the PRG will be ready to receive him
privately and give the necessary clarifications."
The VNA account of the session contains no acknowledgment that
GVN Ambassador Lam recalled GVN willingness to talk directly
with the NFLSV--first offered on 25 March 1969--as well as
with the DRV and to meet either or both privately or in
restricted sessiozis. VNA similarly ignores GVN support for
expanding the four-party conference.
Both Vietnamese communist delegates in their formal statements
again criticized the President for not responding to the PRG's
1 July peace proposal. Both also spelled out points one and
two of the proposal--on a U.S. troop withdrawal and release of
prisoners in 1971, and the formation of a government of
national concord in South Vietnam. The two delegates also
again scored Vietnamization, the Saigon elections, and U.S.
"intensification" of the war against Laos, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam and increased "war acts" against the DRV.
MCGOVERN, BAYH The meetings of Senators Bayh and McGovern
PARIS VISITS "at their request" with PRG deputy delegation
head Dinh Ba Thi on 7 and 10 September were
reported in virtually identical broadcasts on the 12th by
Liberation Radio in Vietnamese and Hanoi radio in nglish. The
broadcasts stated that "in an atmosphere of understanding," Thi
exchanged views with the senators "on matters concerning the
ending of the war and the restoration of peace in Vietnam."
They also said Thi explained that the PRG's "correct stand and
attitude" had been clearly expressed in its seven-point proposal
and blamed the Nixon Administration's "negative attitude" for
the current deadlock at Paris.
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The only available mention of McGovern's meeting with DRV
delegate Xuan Thuy on 11 September was in a Liberation Radio
broadcast in English to U.S. servicemen on the 13th. The
broadcast said that in "telling newsmen about the talk"
McGo?rern conceded that it was "fruitful and Mr. Xuan Thuy very
open-hearted and sincere."* Liberation Radio also noted that
the meeting was held at McGovern's request.
* TASS on the 12th also ignored the prisoner issue in
reporting McGovern's press conference that day, quoting him
as saying only that setting a date for the withdrawal of
U.S. troops before the end of the year and stopping military
operations by American troops is a "key" to solving the
Vietnam problem.
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PODGORNYY, PROPAGANDISTS ASSAIL U.S. "AGGRESSION" IN INDOCHINA
Moscow's pervasive attacks on U.S. "aggression" in Indochina and
obstruction of the Paris talks were carried forward on an
authoritative level in Podgornyy's 14+ September speech at a
dinner for the visiting King of Afghanistan. According to TASS,
he said that the situation is not in the "aggressors'" favor,
with the Indochinese peoples determined to uphold their
independence and sovereignty and. the U.S. Administration facing
growing opposition both at home and abroad. Observing that
"real preconditions" now exist for a just settlement in
Southeast Asia, Podgornyy expressed support for the DRV stand
and the PRG's seven-point proposal, as well as the proposals
made by the "patriotic forces" of Laos and Cambodia. He
criticized the United States for its "unconstructive" position
at the Paris talks and for not responding to the PRG proposals.
Podgornyy did not mention the President in saying that "the
United States continues to maneuver on the question of a
settlement in Vietnam, trying to solve this problem to the
detriment of the Vietnamese people's interests." But other
Moscow p:?opaganda continues to claim that Peking's invitation
to President Nixon to visit the PRC has enabled him to avoid
answering the PRG proposal. A 10 September Moscow domestic
service broadcast, for example, warning the socialist countries
against Peking's splittist policies, makes this claim along with
the charge that Peking wants to discuss the Indochina problem with
the President "behind the backs" of the people of the region.
In the domestic service roundtable discussion on the 12th, PRAVDA
correspondent Shchedrov--said to have just returned from Vietnam
"via Peking"--observed that he had talked about the President's
planned trip with "eminent figures" in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia
who say they will not allow anyone to solve the problems of the
Indochinese countries "behind their backs." Shcnedrov named only
PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, whom he said he had "recently
interviewed." The interview was published in PRAVDA on the 10th
and summarized by TASS and Moscow radio in foreign languages,
including Vi=tnamese and Mandarin. In the interview Phat routinely
criticized the U.S. failure to respond to the PRG initiative and
said the Vietnamese are inflicting defeats on U.S. military plans
"thanks to a correct political and military policy" along with the
assistance and support of the "compatriots in the North" and
friends on all continents. He concluded by specifically thanking
the USSR for its "great support and assistance."
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FUNK DELEGATION MEETS WITH USSR PARTY, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
The delegation of Sihanouk's National United Front of Kampuchea
(FUNK), led by Politburo member Gen. Duong Sam 01, which arrived
in the USSR on 1 September at the invitation of the Soviet
Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, departed on the 10th after
having talks with CPSU Secretary Katushev and Soviet Government
officials. Reports on the visit, carried by TASS on the 10th
and published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 11th, note that
the delegation had been recieved by Katushev, and also "at the
Foreign Ministry, and at the State Committee for Foreign
Economic Relations."* These reports do not name any of the
Soviet officials, but according to a Moscow broadcast in
Cambodian on the 11th, Duong Sam 01 in a speech on Soviet
television said that he had been received by Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Firyubin.
Consistent with Moscow's general avoidance of references to
Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU), Soviet
media during the visit did not mention Duong Sam 01's RGNU
post as Minister of Military Equipment and Armament but
identified him only in his Front role. There was an atypical
reference to Sihanouk as FUNK Chairman and Cambodian "head of
state" in the reports on the conclusion of the visit. And
during the visit Sihanouk was so identified in at least one
Moscow broadcast in Cambodian quoting Duong Sam 01. But TASS
and PRAVDA avoided such identification on their own and deleted
Duong Sam Ol's remarks in reporting his statements. Moscow's
general practice has been to refer to Sihanouk as "Prince" or
"Samdech."
* This is the first Sihanouk delegation to officially visit
the USSR for bilateral contacts. In October 1970 a FUNK
delegation had taken part in a Moscow meeting marking a
solidarity week with the Indochinese peoples. Thiounn Mumm--
FUNK Politburo member and RGNU Minister of Economy and Finance--
paid what Western press agencies described as a private visit to
Moscow in June 1970, though he did meet with Deputy Foreign
Minister Firyubin. On 29 December 1970 PRAVDA reported that
Thiounn Mumm had been received by Deputy Foreign Minister
Kozyrev during what was apparently a brief stopover in Moscow.
See the TRENDS of 9 September 1971, pages 11-13, for further
background as well as a discussion of initial propaganda on
Duong Sam Ol's visit.
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The FUNK radio in its first announcement of the visit on
2 September had said that one of the delegation's aims was
"to create favorable conditions to obtain Soviet recognition
of the RGNU." There was no further mention of this in
available FUNK propaganda on the visit, which has been confined
to reportage. But it was probably not coincidental that an
8 September AKI commentary, reviewing Cambodian developments,
once again listed all the countries which have recognized the
RGNU and called upon peace-loving governments all over the
world--unnamed--to support the Cambodian people's struggle, the
"most effective support" being to recognize the RGNU. And
remarko by RGNU Premier Penn Nouth, in a speech on 12 September
in Urumchi, seemed even more pointed. As reported by NCNA on
the 13th and FUNK media on the 11th, he once again complained
that "there are some countries that claim to be friends of our
people but refuse to recognize the RGNU." He went on, in
unusually strong language, to charge that "on the pretext that
the Royal Government is a 'government in exile' or dividing the
government of the Kingdom into a government at home and a
government abroad, they have done serious harm to the struggle
of our people, subverting and interfering with our country's
internal affairs. This is intolerable."
It may have been with the issue of diplomatic recognition in
mind that a 12 September Moscow Cambodian-language radio
report of the departure ceremony quotes Kudryavtsev--whom it
identifies both as IZVESTIYA commentator and deputy chairman
of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee--as saying that "we
desire close militant relations, for this will help to
promote other kinds of relations."
Despite the fact that the delegation was received by the
State Committee for Foreign Econo^nic Relations and that Duong
Sam 01 is Minister of Military Equipment and Armament, the
issue of aid was generally avoided in Moscow propaganda on
the visit. The only available mention was in the Moscow
Cambodian-language broadcast on the 12th reporting the
departure ceremony at the airport on the 10th. It quoted the
executive secretary of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee as
having expressed the readiness of Soviet public organizations
to "expand relations" with the FUNK and to give "all-out
assistance to the Cambodian people by sending them goods and
equipment." The official added that the committee had
"considered" the FUNK proposal for the training of Cambodian
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experts. The reports on the conclusion of the visit carried by
TASS and the press referred only to Soviet "support" for the
struggle of the Cambodian "patriots."
No communist media are known to have publicized Sihanouk's
remarks to AFP's Peking correspondent on the 11th criticizing
Soviet policy toward his government. AFP quoted him as saying
that Soviet proposals during the FUNK delegation's visit
included a suggestion that aid, particularly economic aid,
be given. But in denigrating this, Sihanouk said that what was
needed was weapons and ammunition. According to AFP, Sihanouk
also said that Kim Il-song had told him, during his visit to
Pyongyang last month, that the USSR would never recognize him
unless he retook Phnom Penh. Sihanouk added sardonically,
AFP said, that on that day the United States would also
recognize him.
C 0 R R E C T I 0 N TO THE TRENDS OF 9 SEPTEMBER 1971:
In the article on the DRV floods, page 6, third paragraph under
the heading "Extent of Disaster," the third line should read
x x x as soon as the flood waters recede, states that "the
greater part of the flooded areas consists of ricefields."
(Correcting the translation of the quoted passage.)
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-14-
S I NO-SOVIET RELATIONS
NCNA DENOUNCES TASS-REPORTED ACCOUNT OF KISSINGER-CHOU TALK
A TASS report on a Japanese paper's account of the Kissinger
mission to the PRC has elicited a prompt NCNA retort accusing
"the desperate Soviet revisionist leading clique" of hostility
toward the Chinese. An NCNA report on 8 September, reacting tj
a Tokyo-datelined TASS dispatch of the 6th, denounced the
account originally appearing in -;he TOKYO SHIMBUN as "full of
most odious fabrications and 1ie3." Taking exception to
"rumors" that Kissinger had offered U.S. cooperation in exploit-
ing offshore oil deposits and building an aircraft factory,
NCNA derided the Soviets for their recent economic dealings
with the United States and Japan. It also got in a jab at the
recent Berlin agreement, Peking's first comment on that
development. The NCNA report has been given domestic and
international dissemination.
NCNA's reaction to the TASS dispatch represents Peking's
first--and limited--response to the vigorous Soviet polemical
campaign against the Chinese that has developed since the
announcement of President Nixon's projected visit to the PRC.
NCNA managed to discuss the Kissinger mission without mentioning
the invitation to the President. While Peking has presented an
ideological rationale for its invitation, it has not directly
broached the subject since the original announcement except in
comment attributed to foreign sources. Most recently, a
31 August NCNA account of a Japan-China friendship association
meeting cited a statement calling the visit a sign of "U.S.
imperialism's bankruptcy." In line with earlier comment from
Prince Sihanouk and the North Koreans which Peking had
publicized, the statement was quoted as saying "the victory in
China's consistent foreign policy" of supporting revolutionary
struggles and opposing imperialist policies "is of great
strategic significance" for the world anti-U.S. struggle. In
its own name, Peking has implied rather that flexibility
toward the United States is required in order to isolate the
Soviet Union as the main enemy.*
* Peking's comment is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August,
pages 19-22, and 1 September, pages 17-19.
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TASS DISPATCH As NCNA pointed out, TASS obscured the fact
that the Japanese paper's account was based
on material attributed to "an authoritative source" in Taipei.
TASS said the Japanese paper had published "information it
possesses," neglecting to mention the source. The TASS
dispatch cited the Japanese account as saying Chou En-lai
agreed in principle to the alleged Kissinger proposals on oil
exploration and an aircraft factory and that the two sides
agreed to establish a "hot '.ine" and to increase trade and
travel exchanges. In discussing the alleged Kissinger-Chou
exchange on the Taiwan question--"the most difficult question"--
the TASS dispatch omitted the Japanese paper's report to the
effect that Kissinger defended dual representation in the United
Nations by citing the precedent of the USSR's three seats.
Mentioning President Nixon's projected visit, TASS quoted the
Japanese article as saying he would be welcome at any time and
that Mao himself would meet him at the Peking airport.
NCNA REACTION In addition to omitting the reference to the
President's visit, NCNA ignored the TASS
dispatch's discussion of Taiwan and UN representation. It also
passed over the parts on a hot line and expanded trade and
travel between the United States and the PRC. NCNA chose rather
to hit back at the Soviets for implying that the Chinese were
ready to "sell the dignity and sovereignty" of their country for
"a few U.S. dollars" by accepting the alleged U.S. offers of aid
in oil exploration and aircraft manufacturing. Without naming
Moscow, NCNAturned the accusation back on the Soviets by
pointing out that "certain people in the world who style them-
selves as builders(-Of 'communism"' did not hesitate to "beg
obsequiously" for funds from capitalist countries to build a
truck plant and "do not scruple to invite robbers in and
auction off their country's natural resources" for a loan from
the Japanese to exploit oil deposits.
In Peking's first comment on the four-power agreement on Berlin,
NCNA charged that those unnamed "certain people" had
"unscrupulously" sold out the GDR's sovereignty through the
Berlin accord in order to induce West Germany to ratify a treaty
and to extend economic aid. Peking had heretofore maintained a
total silence on the agreement, announced 23 August and signed
on 3 September, failing even to carry Albanian comment
castigating Moscow for selling out to the West.
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Peking had waited over a month before commenting on the Soviet-FRG
treaty signed last August. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article
on 13 September 1970 denounced the treaty as a betrayal of the
GDR, an encouragement of West German "militarism," and a part of
"the diabolic 'global Munich' scheme" of the Soviet Union and the
United States. Peking's one-month delay last year and its limited
reaction to the Berlin agreement now suggest sensitivity to the
interests of European countries which the Chinese have carefully
cultivated and which have special interests in European detente.
Thus, Peking has shown in the course of its growing relations
with the Romanians in the past two years that it is now inclined
to take their interests into account in reacting to European
developments. Moreover, Peking may be hesitant about pressing a
line opposed to European detente at a time when it is undertaking
flexible diplomatic initiatives itself and is seeking to accent
the positive rather than appear to be an obstructionist element
in the international community.
Peking's thrust at the Soviets on the Berlin question in
responding to TASS' account of the Kissinger-Chou meeting seems
to have been a riposte to Moscow's polemics accusing Peking of
selling out the Vietnamese. Moscow has sought to discredit
Peking's recent initiatives, particularly the invitation to
President Nixon, by suggesting that these moves undercut the
Vietnamese communists' position. (Moscow's comment on NCNA's
criticism of the Berlin agreement is discussed in the Germany
and Berlin section of this TRENDS.)
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U. S, - SOVIET R ELATIONS
FBIS TRENDS
15 SEPTEMBER 1971
USSR SILENT ON REPORTED ACCORD AT SALT, INCIDENTS-AT-SEA TALKS
Moscow has not acknowledged Western press reports of an agreement
between the United States and the USSR regarding the handling of
nuclear accidents through use of a new communications satellite
hotline. According to the New York TIMES report of 13 September,
the agreement was reached in late August following meetings of
experts working in parallel with the delegations at the strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT) in Vienna and Helsinki. There has
been no public Soviet complaint about the press leak, in keeping
with Moscow's correct and very low-keyed treatment of the SALT
proceedings. Soviet media had similarly ignored the New York
TIMES' disclosure on 23 July of the U.S. proposal at SALT to
halt construction of both land-based missiles and missile
submarines.
There have been no known reports of the meetings on the Moscow-
Washington hotline in Soviet media since early this spring. On
31 March TASS noted briefly that experts were meeting in Vienna
under the direction of the SALT delegations, and on 7 April
TASS said "another meeting" had been held to discuss the
improvement of the hotline but did not indicate that the
meeting was under the aegis of SALT. Soviet comment on SALT
has ignored the question of nuclear accidents.
The U.S.-Soviet agreement to open discussions in Moscow on
12 October on incidents at sea, announced by State Department
spokesman Bray on 8 September, has not been mentioned in
available Moscow propaganda.
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GERMANY AND BERLIN
ABRASIMOV: ACCORD IS DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF GDR BY WEST
In remarks publicized by East Germany but unmentioned in Soviet
media, Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Abrasimov used an interview
with the organ of the GDR Society for German-Soviet Friendship,
FREIE WELT, to make the first authoritative public Soviet
statement of support for East Berlin's contention that in
signing the four-power agreement on "West Berlin" the West
has in effect recognized the sovereignty of the GDR. East German
spokesmen at all levels have emphasized this claim insistently
since the signing of the four-power accord on 3 September.
Moscow has publicized the East German statements but has made
the claim on its own authority only in a scattering of commentaries
at the routine propaganda level.
In the interview with the weekly FREIE WELT, carried in full by
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and the East Berlin radio on 13 September,
Abrasimov declared that the signing "of the quadripartite
agreement on West Berlin is evidence of the de facto [faktisch]
recognition of the sovereign competence of the socialist German
state by all four participants in the negotiations, that is,
including the Western powers." Rejecting in advance any Big
Three repudiation of this interpretation, the Soviet envoy
added: "Whether it pleases the GDR's opponents or not, no
one can alter this fact." In an apparent allusion to the
difficulties arising over the German translation of the
agreement in the followup talks between FRG State Secretary
Bahr and GDR State Secretary Kohl and between West Berlin
Senat representative Mueller and GDR State Secretary Kohrt,
Abrasimov added--somewhat ambiguously, as rendered in the
East German text--that it is equally "impossible to interpret
individual provisions of the agreement differently from the
way in which it was, signed by the representatives of the
four powers."
Abrasimov also gave support to the GDR position that the
agreement does not affect "the integrity of Berlin" as the
capital of the GDR. While consistently referring to the
agreement as "on West Berlin," Moscow has been chary of
pressing this view; as in its treatment of the theme of
alleged Western recognition of GDR sovereignty, it has
publicized East German statements on "Berlin" as the GDR
capital and on the "special political status" of West Berlin
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aid has now echoed these statements in some routine propaganda,
but it has avoided the issue in editorial comment and official
statements.
Telling FREIE WELT that the positions of the four powers during
the negotiations "in many ways did not correspond and were
contradictory," Abrasimov remarked, according to the East
German text: "I am not betraying a great secret when I say
that some of our negotiating partners attempted to conduct
talks on Berlin as a whole, refusing to take into account the
sovereign rights and legitimate interests of the GDR, and put
forward other unrealistic demands." He hastened to add that
"a sensible approach," taking "all the realities" into account,
prevailed. At a 12 September East Berlin ceremony granting
him "freedom of the city," in remarks similarly publicized in
East German media but unmentioned by Moscow, Abrasimov denied
that the four-power agreement affects the GDR capital and
asserted that "socialist Berlin" was never a subject of
negotiations.
MESSAGES FROM The issue of Big Three recognition of GDR
SOVIET LEADERS sovereignty and the GDR capital was skirted
in replies from Brezhnev and Kosygin to
messages from Honecker and Stoph welcoming the four-power
agreement. In a message to Brezhnev on 9 September, Honecker
had said the Big Three "have for the first time confirmed the
sovereignty of the GDR's relations with the other German state
and with West Berlin." Brezhnev on the 10th simply replied
that the agreement "on West Berlin" is based on the "territorial
and political realities" in Europe and "fully takes into account
the sovereign rights and interests of the GDR," adding that the
GDR's "international authority and its role and influence in
international affairs" have been raised.
Although Stoph did not specifically raise the sovereignty issue
in his message to Kosygin on the 8th, Kosygin came a shade
closer to broaching it than Brezhnev did but still avoided
explicit language: He stated that the agreement "on questions
relating to West Berlin" is, together with the Moscow and Warsaw
treaties with Bonn, "intended to become an essential part of a
system of international agreements based on recognition of the
territorial and political realities" in Europe. Both Soviet
leaders said the agreement creates favorable preconditions for
solving other "urgent" European and world problems.
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MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN REACT CAUTIOUSLY TO FINNISH PROPOSAL
Soviet and East German media have reacted cautiously to the
Finnish Government's 10 September proposal to establish full
diplomatic relations with both German states. Although the
proposal could give a psychological lift to the GDR campaign
for international recognition on an equal footing with the
Federal Reoublic and could serve as another recognition of
"territorial and political realities" in Europe, the selective
reporting of it by both Moscow and East Berlin pointed up
countervailing aspects of the Finnish demarche.
Thus the media neglected to mention that the proposal calls
for negotiations on claims advanced by Finland for settlement
of damages caused in 1944-45 by troops of the Third Reich and
that it stipulates that the treaties with both German states
must come into force simultaneously. The first proviso
could oblige East Germany to accept partial responsibility
for damages inflicted on Finland by the Germans in World War
II, and the second would in effect give Bonn power to delay
a third country's recognition of the GDR until its own
conditions are met.
The identical draft treaties with the FRG and GDR proposed by
the Finnish Government stipulate that both German states must
recognize Finland's "policy of neutrality" and must renounce
the use of force or threat of force in relations with Helsinki.
TASS's report of the Finnish proposal on the 11th ignored the
stipulation on recognition of Finland's neutrality as well as
the provisos on reparations and on the treaties' coming into
force simultaneously. ADN's report on the same day said the
Finns proposed to both German governments a "comprehensive"
draft providing "among other things for diplomatic recognition
and the establishment of diplomatic relations"; it also noted
that the Finnish Government saw a "positive trend" in European
political life leading to a lessening of tension and "a stable
new order," and it mentioned that the proposal "is based on"
Finnish neutrality.
Later on the 11th, ADN quoted a GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman
as saying the GDR Government "welcomes the decision of the
Government of Finland" and, without mentioning that the FRG
is involved, expressed GDR "willingness to enter into negotiations
on the conclusion of a state treaty for the regulation of all
relations and the establishment in this connection of diplomatic
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relations between the GDR L,1 Finland, according to the Finnish
proposal." PRAVDA briefly reported the GDR spokesman's comment
in a brief TASS item the next day, citing ADN.
Both TASS and ADN on 12 September reported President Kekkonen's
explanatory speec:, to the Finnish people the preceding day,
ignoring his discussion of the proviso in the Finnish proposal
on negotiation of Finland's reparations claims as well as his
remarks on Finland's desire for a "package deal" with both :erman
states. There has been no further publicity for the proposal in
Soviet or East German media.
SOVIET BROADCASTS IN MANDARIN ANSWER NCNA CHARGE OF SELLOUT
Moscow radi.o reacted promptly to the NCNA charge of 8 September
that the Soviet Union, in signing the agreement "on West Berlin,"
has "unscrupulously" sold out the GDR to obtain ratification of
the Moscow treaty and FRG economic and technical aid. Anticipating
the charge before it was made, a Moscow radio commentary in
Mandarin on the 7th had observed that Peking's propaganda "has
always chimed in with" the "imperialists" in attacking Soviet
foreign policy, including an "all-out" attack on the signing
of the Bonn-Moscow treaty and an attempt to "sow seeds of
dissension between the Soviet Union and the GDR." On the 9th,
saying that the agreement "explicitly stipulated" that West
Berlin does not belong to West Germany and that it took account
of the "actual political situation" in Europe and the sovereignty
of the GDR and the FRG, another broadcast in Mandarin denied
the NCNA charge of a "brazen sellout" of GDR sovereignty as
"slanderous" and in total disregard of "the facts, logic, and
co_rect thinking." Citing statements by Honecker and Stoph
welcoming the agreement, the radio placed the N"NA charge in
the context of Peking's foreign policy of "aggravating world
tension and splitting the socialist community."
Moscow pursued the counterattack in a broadcast in Mandarin on
the 13th concluding that the Peking "propaganda machine opposed
the agreement in collusion with the West German revanchists and
neonazi forces," thereby exposing "the Chinese leaders'
unprincipled foreign policy."
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ROMANIA
BUCHAREST DEFENDS PURSUIT OF INDEPENDENT BALKAN POLICY
Against the background of Soviet propaganda pressing for a
European security conference and recent Soviet bloc psychological
pressures on the Romanians, Bucharest's AGERPRES transmitted a
rare unsigned commentary on 114 September which defended Romania's
Balkan policy are. in effect rejected the view that there can be
one policy for the Balkan socialist countries and another for
Central Europe--that is, the Brezhnev doctrine for Moscow's East
European sphere and a policy of noninterference and sovereignty
for the portion of Europe outside the Soviet orbit. Defending
Romania's Balkan policy as a "realistic" and integral part of
its "consistent" foreign policy, the AGERPRES commentary argued
that the development of a peaceful atmosphere in the Balkans is
"an inseparable component of the fight for security in Europe
aid in the world, and that is why all the Balkan countries are
duty-bound to take initiatives and actions with the objective
of improving the climate in that zone."
In effect rejecting East European charges exemplified by a
13 August article in Budapest's MAGYAR HIRLAP, which speculated
on the possibility that a pro-Peking "Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest
axis" was being formed in opposition to the Soviet Union,
AGERPRES declared that Romania's Balkan policy stems from the
concrete situation in the region: "the fact that four countries--
Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania are socialist countries
and that the geographical closeness has created objective condi-
tions for and mutual interests in economic, political, and
cultural cooperation with a regional character." Stating that
"large possibilities exist" for the development of closer
economic cooperation, AGERPRES concluded that the evolution
of inter-Balkan relations is aimed at "erecting the edifice of
peace upon the only possible sound basis, sine it is a moral
one: to help each other without harming anyone."
Romania's defense of its developing contacts with its Balkan
neighbcrs--particularly its special relationship with Yugoslavia--
outside the framework of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA follows closely
on the 10 September announcement that Brezhnev will pay "an
unofficial, friendly visit" to Belgrade in the second half of
September. The visit, in response to a long-standing Yugoslav
invitation, will serve Soviet efforts to counter growing
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Chinese influence in the Balkans and to weaken Tito's support
for Romania. Brezhnev may be expected to press the Soviet line
on European security during the visit; Soviet comment welcoming
the 3 September signing of the four-power agreement on Berlin
has played the theme that the West now has no reason to delay
a conference on European security, and some comment has gone on
to discern an improved atmosphere for talks on arms and force
reductions in Central Europe--proposed by Brezhnev at the CPSU
Congress on 30 March.
Yugoslav comment anticipates a united front with the Romanians
at a European security conference on the issues of Balkan detente
and adherence to principles of sovereignty and noninterference
in the region. Answering a question about East European press
comment on tensions in the Balkans, Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat
spokesman Vujica declared pointedly at his 2 September press
conference: "European peace and security are indivisible, and
they concern Europe as a whole." He added that Yugoslavia's
Balkan policy is based on well-known principles: "all-embracing
cooperation based on respect for sovereignty, territorial
integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, and the settling
of disputed questions through peaceful means."
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15 SEPTEMBER 1971
KHRUSHCHEV'S DEATH
ANNOUNCED "WITH SORROW" A DAY AND A HALF AFTER DEMISE
Moscow media began to report Khrushchev's death some 36 hours
after it occurred. At about midnight Moscow time on 12-13
September, TASS transmitted in English and Russian the one-
sentence announcement of the CPSU Central Committee and the
Council of Ministers. The announcement was first broadcast
by Radio Moscow's domestic service at 2 a.m. on the 13th, as
the 11th item in the newscast. It was repeated on subsequent
newscasts until 8 a.m., never as the lead news item but ranging
from fifth to ninth place.
PRAVDA published the announcement on the 13th, at the lower
righthand corner of the front page as is usual for such notices;
but the makeup and format were markedly less prominent than
usual, even than for two oblast first secretaries who died last
July. The announcement was also published by IZVESTIYA and
perhaps other papers, but there has been no further word from
Moscow media.
The announcement was issued "with sorrow" rather than "with
deep sorro'-," the formulation almost invariably utilized in
such instances. The failure to incluac the Supreme Soviet
Presidium as one of the organs issuing the announcement, and
PRAVDA's failure to publish even the briefest obituary or
report on funeral plans, are further departures from normal
practice.
The Yugoslav, Hungarian, and Polish radios briefly reported
Khrushchev's death on the 11th, citing Western news agency
dispatches. The Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East German radios
waited for Moscow's account and merely repeated it. Messages
of condolence were sent to the widow by Tito, Kadar, and
Ceausescu. The Hungarian news agency transmitted a brief
summation of Khrushchev's life, in favorable terms, noting his
work in behalf of socialism, peace, and friendship between the
Soviet and Hungarian peoples. In publishing this item on the
loth, the Budapest morning papers inserted a counterbalancing
phrase to the effect that Khrushchev's activity along these
lines had been "not devoid of contradictions."
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Albania, which also reported the death in advance of Moscow,
observed that the deceased had "led the Soviet revisionist
treacherous clique" for a period of 11 years. Peking limited
itself to repeating, for domestic and foreign audiences, the
one-sentence announcement from Moscow.
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15 SEI'7'L;MBlaR 1.9'(7.
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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONTINUING PLA CONTROL OVER CIVIL AFFAIRS IS INDICATED
The triangular relationship between the CCP, the PLA, and the
revolutionary committees is still not being elucidated to any
marked degree in the propaganda, despite the successful con-
clusion of the provincial party-building campaign. Several
local broadcasts have recently skirted around the issue, how-
ever, and in doing so have furnished additional evidence of
the dominant role of PLA representatives.
A 29 August Harbin radio broadcast was unusually frank in
indicating that th, party in the army is in a position to
dominate the civilian party. The broadcast discussed the role
of the party branch of a municipal PLA "support-the-left" team.,
pointing out that the military representatives are under the
control of the party in the army. At the same time the broad-
cast noted that the military team members "are assuming leading
positions in party organizations and revolutionary committees at
all levels."
Problems in PLA party branch control over the scattered PLA
representatives are admitted, but such problems are said to have
been solved through tightened up organizational control by the
party branch. Party "teams" have been established below the
branch level to exercise more direct control over the represen-
tatives' "thinking, work, work style, and daily life." And in
a departure from the usual admonitions about reducing bureaucracy,
the item stated that "the positions of full-time secretary and
deputy secretary were added to the party organization" tu insure
better control.
The primacy of the support-the-left personnel within local civil
organs was illustrated by a 31 August Kwangsi broadcast, which
noted that local cadres say "the PLA cadres stand high and see
far, and had better make all the decisions." Such a view is
erroneous, the article said, but the examples it furnished of
PLA humility only serve to enhance the prestige of PLA cadres,
who are said to become more humble and to learn more from the
masses the more they are praised. The local armed forces
department political commissar was shown to be a model in learn-
ing from the masses. Cn one occasion, a group meeting wrote a
paper when he was not available and sent it to him for approval.
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He avoided dimply malting a decision on his own and called a
meeting of the county party committee, where "sitting as an
ordinary member of the standing committee" he put forward his
views, "with the result that the document was altered. to
better suit actual conditions in the county."
The guiding role of the military on a provincial level was
illustrated by an Anhwei article broadcast on 14 September.
It showed how "under the guidance of the Anhwei provincial
CCP committee, the provincial revolutionary committee, and
the support-the-left leading group of the PLA units," mili-
tary units at the regiment level and above were called in to
directly lead the agricultural effort in 29 counties. Again,
in giving local examples, the article indicated that the PLA
teams operated under the overall leadership of the PLA party
committee. Genuflecting in the direction of civil control,
the article pointed out that the PLA teams worked locally
under "the unified leadership of the county party and revo-
lutionary committees."
The united leadership of local party and revolutionary
committees has also been an issue, with the experience of
Tungkuan county in Kwangtung reported both by the local radio
and by NCNA. The more detailed 31 August Canton broadcast
noted that some members possessed only "a vaguo understanding"
of the relationship between the county CCP committee and the
county revolutionary committee." They felt that because "the
majority of the standing committee members of the county CCP
committee are also standing committee members of the revolu-
tionary committee," any problems arising between the groups
can easily be decided at a meeting. But the article denounces
this view as one that would weaken party leadership. The
party committee must lead the revolutionary committee, and
meetings making policy decisions evidently must be held solely
in the party context. The NCNA release on 30 August gave
a general :.dea of the division of function: The party
committee decided on the targets and on how to carry out the
learn-frori-Tachai ideological movement, while the revolution-
ary committee "followed up with overall planning and full
implementation of those measures." The real divisions of
power are left shrouded in vagueness, perhaps because the PLA
representatives actually still dominate both bodies.
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