TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040035-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: August 25, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

2 i? ' ,ti Approved FQr' Release 1899/0$5 GIA-RDP85.T00875R~QD300040Q35-3 p
 Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORNYAIION
SERVICE
~~IIIIIIIII~~~~~~~~~IIIIIIIII~~)
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
25 AUGUST 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 34)
Approved For Release
 This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP 1
[eluded from ew..werlc
dewsOredt: end
dabuiB.,iee
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ID NT AL FBIS TRENDS
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Hanoi Says U.S. Uses PRC "Oppportunism" to Divide Communists .
1
DRV Anniversary: Stress on "Correct" Independent Policies . . .
it
Front Anniversary Message Soft-pedals Party Ties with DRV . . .
5
DRV, PRG Endorse Peking Position on UN Representation . . . . .
7
DRV Delegation Stops in Peking, Moscow En Route to Europe . . .
8
Moscow Publicizes Supplementary Aid to DRV, Attacks Peking . .
9
Paris Delegates Assail U.S. Policy; Media Note Economic Moves .
11
Minh, Ky Withdrawal Said to Expose Saigon Election "Farce" . .
13
DRV, PRG Spokesmea Score U.S. Strikes in DMZ, at North . . . .
15
Ceausescu Flaunts Domestic Support for Maverick Policies . . .
16
Soviet Leaders, Commentators Remind Romania of Debt to USSR . .
18
Peking Plays up Ties with Bucharest, Warns of Pressures . . . .
20
Moscow's Allies Discourse on Chinese Maneuvers in Balkans . . .
21
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
PRAVDA Article Attacks Peking's "Collusion with Imperialism" .
25
CHINA UN SEAT
Peking Rules Out Two-Chinas Formula for UN Representation . . .
28
USSR Reports Developments, Reaffirms Support for PRC Seat . . .
30
MIDDLE EAST
Soviet Media Mark Time on Mideast Issue, Arab Developments
32
BOLIVIA
Havana Views Bolivian "Setback" as Predictable but Revertible .
36
Reassertion of Cuban Role in Hemisphere-wide Confrontation . .
38
KOREA
DPRK Hopes Red Cross Contacts Will Pave Way for Unification . .
40
(Continued)
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C O N T E N T S (Continued)
New Party Committees Announced for Szechwan and Tibet . . . . .
43
RED FLAG Signals an End to Dearth of Reading Materials . . . .
45
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
25 AUGUST 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 16 - 22 AUGUST 1971
Moscow (2757 items)
Peking (1488 items)
U.S. Economic Measures
(--)
9%
Domestic Issues
(32%)
21%
Indochina
(4%)
8%
Indochina
(25%)
16%
China
(6%)
6%
PRC Military Delega-
(--)
10%
Soviet Aviation Day
(--)
5%
tion in East Europe
CEMA Council Session
(14%)
4%
PRC UN Seat
(2%)
8%
USSR-Indian Treaty
(12%)
3%
[Foreign ministry
(--)
4%]
Middle East
(2%)
2%
Statement
PRC-Iran Diplomatic
Relations
(--)
5%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major Attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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25 AUGUST 1971
INDOCHINA
Hanoi's continuing polemical propaganda in the wake of Peking's
moves to improve relations with the United States includes a
22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article entitled "Nixon--The Man
and His Doctrine," which reaches a new level of fury and. venom
against China when in the course of assailing U.S. splitting
tactics it says: "A very perfidious move of the President's is
to spray the toxic gas of chauvinism into opportunist heads in a
bid to play off socialist countries against one another and sow
schism among the communist and workers' parties." Hanoi's concern
over Peking's attitude toward the United States is also reflected,
less directly, in propaganda marking the 26th anniversary of the
August Revolution. Editorials in both the party organ NHAN DAN and
the party paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN give marked stress to the
"independence" and "correctness" of the Vietnam Workers Party's
policies and state firmly that the United States is the "number one
enemy.,"
At she same tL..e, Hanoi has moved quickly to applaud a Peking
position with which it is in sympathy: A DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement on the 23d says that the Vietnamese fully
support the Chinese Foreign Ministry statement of the 20th which
rejected the U.S. move for representation of both the PRC and ROC
in the United Nations.
Peking has continued to ignore Hanoi's polemicizing, and publicity
for the DRV National Assembly delegation's stopover in Peking en
route to Europe stresses close relations. NCNA lauds the
"revolutionary friendship" between the two peoples and reports that
toasts were exchanged at a banquet at which the two sides said their
peoples "would always unite, fight, and win victory together."
VNA's cryptic reports of the stopover say nothing of this, although
VNA cues say that Chou En-lai "received and had a cordial talk"
with 4elegation head Hoang Van Hoan.
Routine Soviet propaganda continues to charge that the President,
by his planned trip to Peking, hopes to take advantage of Peking's
"splittist" attitude and settle the issue "behind the back of the
Vietnamese people." And Moscow continues its reports of polemical
Hanoi material with radio broadcasts--including broadcasts in
Mandarin and Vietnamese--of the August HOC TAP editorial.
HANOI SAYS U.S. USES PRC "OPPORTUNISM" TO DIVIDE COMMUNISTS
The 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article, as reviewed by VNA
that day, goes beyond other propaganda in making it clear that
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Hanoi feels the Chinese are allowing their nationalism to lead
them to policies which undermine the unity of socialist countries.
While Hanoi propaganda in recent weeks has repeatedly stressed the
main thesis of the article--that the Nixon Doctrine seeks to
divide revolutionary forces--Commentator offers the most venlmous
characterization of China to date when he refers to the President's
ploy of "spraying the toxic gas of chauvinism into opportunist
heads" in order to sow disunity among communists.
There is no indication of the length of the article as published
in NHAi1 DAN; this is the only polemical article that has not been
broadcast by Hanoi's domestic radio except for the 3 August NHAN
DAN article by "Chien Thang" which VNA belatedly excerpted on
the llth.* However, evidence that VNA truncated Commentator's
attack ou the President comes in Hanoi's broadcast in Mandarin on
the 25th** of what it called "the first half" of the article,
containing passages not included in VNA's account. At the same
time, the broadcast on the 25th did not contain the most caustic
references to China that appear in the VNA account; it remains
to be seen whether these references will appear in a broadcast
of the second half of the article.
The version in Mandarin, in the course of tracing the President's
career for the past 25 years, observes that in his "global strategy"
he has made many trips around the wo_'d. Beginning by saying that
shortly after he was elected to Congress in 19.7 he went to
Europe, the broadcast version proceeds to trace his travels, saying
amon, other things that shortly after his assumption of the
Presidency "he set out for Europe before he could propose any
effective measures for dealing with the domestic situation. He
then crossed the Pacific and came to Asia." It also mentions
his travels to Africa and Latin America, but although it says
that since 1947 he has "treated ..Europe as the most formidable
rival to the United States," it does not mention his visit to the
Soviet Union or his subsequ:nt trips to Romania and Yugoslavia after
he became President.
* See the TRENDS of 18 August 1971, pages 1-4.
** FBIS did not begin monitoring the Hanoi Mandarin programs until
the 19th; hence there is no way of knowing whether they may have
carried some version of the Chieng Thang article.
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reassessing the China danger:'
"Recently, the U.S. ruling circles have occasionally spoken of
referred to moves to improve Sino-U.S. relations when it said:
to the President's having talked about "the division of the
The broadcast's installment of the article refers only cryptically
unity of "the revolutionary forces" and of the people of the
conclude that no "force or devilish maneuver" can break the
unity of communist countries cannot be sabotaged, but it does
in Asia. * Ju ging from VNA, the article fails to state that the
point leading to new undertakings in the U.S. foreign policy
that the President "disclosed that this was an important starting
cohesion through the use of "nationalism" and adds pointedly
claims that the United States aims at undermining communist
discussion in the VNA version. According to VNA, Commentator,
after charging the President with exploiting "opportunists,"
seen whether the next installment will include the extensive
* A NHAN DAN Commentator articl' on 1 August had less obliquely
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DRV ANNIVERSARY: STRESS ON "CORRECT" INDEPENDENT POLICIES
The 19 August NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials marking
the 26th anniversary of the August Revolution both dwell on the
development of Vietnam's "correct" and "independent" policies
and strategies--a subject which was also a central concern of
the earlier HGC TAP editorial pegged to the August Revolution
anniversary and DRV National Day.* Hanoi's continuing
assertions about the correctness of its stand are undoubtedly
prompted in part by concern over Sino-U.S. relations. But
it is possible that this preoccupation also reflects a debate
in Hanoi over future policies. Questions of strategy were
discussed in the 19 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial last
year, but this issue was not broached in last year's NHAN DAN
anniversary editorial or in recent HOC TAP anniversary editorials.
Both the NHAN DAN and the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials, in the
course of lauding Vietnamese strategies, express high praise
for the party's leadership. Asserting that correct leadership
is a "basic condition" for success, NHAN DAN goes on to claim
that the Vietnamese party has "correctly solved the problems
of strategy and tactics and problems related to the methods
and form of revolutionary struggle." The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial similarly stresses the role of the party's
leadership; it holds that a revolution cannot succeed
without creative leadership and that the party's creativeness
in the August Revolution was a manifestation of its
independence, acute political vision, and great organizational
capabilities. The editorial observes that the present
resistance struggle is also "an irrefutable proof of the
invincible strength of our party's correct line-- toward
independence and sovereignty." It lauds the southern
people's "proper" revolutionary lines, "versatile" methods,
and "excellent military art," and it also notes that "the
strategic methods and ideology that have guided the
fighting in the revolutionary war in the South have
undergone changes through new discoveries."
NKAN DAN refers only in general terms to victories in
defeating Vietnamization; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN goes beyond
this, seeming to refer to Lam Son 719 and the fighting in
* See 18 August TRENDS, pages 4-7, for a discussion of the
HOC TAP editorial.
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Cambodia when it makes passing mention of "strong blows by
the main force troops" at the beginning of the year. But
like the HOC TAP anniversary editorial, it fails to describe
these actions as "strategic victories." On the other hand,
both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN echo the atypical theme--
played earlier in the 5 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on
the anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf incident--that the worst
part of the struggle is over. Thus, NHAN DAN claims that the
Vietnamese revolution is facing basic advantages and that
"the biggest difficulties and trials have been overcome."
And QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, noting progress over the past 26
years, observes that "the darkest hours are things of the
past."
FRONT ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE SOFT-PEDALS PARTY TIES WITH DRV
The Front marked the August Revolution anniversary with a
message from NFLSV Central Committee Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho
and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, an NFLSV "circular" calling
for determination in the continued struggle, and editorial
comment. Like Hanoi, the Fr-at stressed the independence
theme, saying that the spirit of the August Revolution which
achieved the independence and freedom of the northern half
of the country is still alive today in the South, which is
determined to reach the same goals. An editorial published
in a special issue of the Front organ GIAI PHONG, broadcast
by Liberation Radio on the 19th, says that each victory of
the anti-U.S. struggle "has originated from the most important
cause--our proper and creative revolutionary lines of
independence and self-government."
GIAI PHONG also charges that President Nixon "still resorts
to many deceitful, evasive moves" to avoid responding to the
PRG's 1 July initiative. And a radio editorial broadcast on
the 20th seems to allude to the President's China policy even
more directly when it claims he "has resorted to many
perfi;ious diplomatic maneuvers in the hope of deceiving
public opinion about the so-called 'pressure' upon our people
in order to avoid responding to the 1 July" PRG peace
initiative. It adds that he "stupidly refuses to admit the
powerful strength and endless capabilities of a small but
independent people." An LPA editorial of the 19th comments
in a similar vein.
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-6-
Although the 18 August message of greetings is signed by Nguyen
Huu Tho in his capacity as NFLSV Central Committer Chairman as
well as by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, VWP First Secretary
Le Duan is not among the addressees. The message is addressed
only to DRV President Ton Duc Thang, National Assembly Standing
Committee Chairman Truong Chinh, and Premier Van Dong, where
last year's joint NFLSV-PRG message--not sent until September--
had been addressed to all four leaders.* Le Duan's name may
have been dropped this year in order to avoid identifying the
NFLSV with the communist party and to play up its character
as a "front." The message asks that best wishes be conveyed
to the people and army in the North, where last year's
message had also extended greetings to the Central Committee
of the Vietnam Workers Party, the National Assembly and DRV
Government, and the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland
Front.
These departures from the norm follow another recent departure
from past practice: The VWP slogans issued on 5 August for
the anniversaries echoed earlier ones in praising the "valor
and glorious victories of the heroic South Vietnam PLAF and
people," but omitted the additional phrase "under the
clearsighted leadership of the NFLSV and PRG."
* Two messages were sent in 1969, one from Phat addressed
to Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and Phan Van Dong, and an
NFLSV message from Tho to Ho.
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DRV, PRG ENDORSE PEKING POSITION ON UN REPRESENTATION
Hanoi media on 23 August and Liberation Radio on the 24th,
respectively, carried statements by the DRV and PRG foreign
ministry spokesmen endorsing the 20 August PRC Foreign
Ministry statement outlining Peking's stand on the UN
representation issue. (NCNA reported the DRV statement
promptly on the 2lth.) Both statements duly note the rejection
of "two Chinas" and observe that Taiwan is an "inseparable"
part of China.
Prior to the release of the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement, Hanoi's last known reference to the Taiwan-UN
issue came in t1 19 June joint DRV-Romanian communique
concluding Ceausescu's visit. The communique said: "The
two sides resolutely support the Chinese people's struggle
for the liberation of Taiwan, an inalienable territory
of the PRC, for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the
liquidation of U.S. military bases in Taiwan; they demand
restoration to the PRC of its rights in the United Nations
and in other international organizations."
During Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi in March this year,
Premier Pham Van Dong in two separate speeches also
reiterated Vietnamese support of the Chinese "in their
resolve to liberate Taiwan" and declared that "it is
imperative that the PRC should have her rightful seat in
the United Nations."
Hanoi media are not known to have explicitly discussed a
two-Chinas policy since last fall, when there were articles
in NHAN DAN.
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DRV DELEGATION STOPS IN PEKING, MOSCOW EN ROUTE TO EUROPE
The DRV National Assembly delegation led by Politburo member
Hoang Van Hoan, which Hanoi on 18 August announced would visit
the USSR, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia, arrived in Warsaw
on 23 August after stopovers in Peking and Moscow. On the
24th VNA--but apparently not Moscow--briefly reported that the
delegation had made a stopover on 22-23 August in the Soviet
capital, where it was met at the airport and hosted at a
banquet by Central Committee member and chairman of the Soviet
of the Union Shitikov. VNA said that after visiting East
Europe, the delegation would return to the USSR for an "official
friendship visit." During its 27-30 June Moscow stopover last
year, the DRV National Assembly delegation had been hosted by
Chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group Spiridonov and had
gone sightseeing in the capital.
The delegation's arrival in Peking on the 18th was promptly
reported by NCNA, which noted that it was welcomed by Politburo
member Chiu Hui-Tao; Kuo Mo-Jo, Central Committee member and
vice chairman of the National People's Congress Standing
Committee; and Keng Piao, head of the Central Committee's
International Liaison Department. NCNA noted that the delegation
was "on its way to Europe" and reported that officials of the
Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Soviet embassies were present,
without specifying that these are the countries it will visit.
On the 19th NCNA reported a meeting between the delegation and
Chou Fn-lai at which there was "a very cordial and friendly
conversation." Another NCNA item that day reported that
Chiu Hui-Tso and Kuo Mo-Jo held a banquet that evening which
"was permeated with an atmosphere of revolutionary friendship
between the people of China and Vietnam, 'who are both comrades
and brothers.'" In their toasts, according to NCNA, Chiu
and Hoan said that the Ch9.nese and Vietnamese people "would
always unite, fight, and win victiry together." On 22 August
Peking reported the group's departure that day "for a visit to
Europe," again noting that officials of the same four embassies
were present at the airport and again failing to spell out the
itinerary. The delegation was seen off by Chiu and Kuo Mo-Jo.
VNA has reported less detail than. NCNA did about the Hoan
delegation's stopover in Peking and has not echoed NCNA's
warmest descriptions of the atmosphere of the visit. The DRV
news agency noted briefly on 22 August that Chou had "received
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and had a cordial ta1':" with Hoan and that the delegation was
honored at a banquet. But it gave no details of he banquet
and thus did not echo references by NCNA to "revolutionary
friendship" and comradeship between the two peoples. Coming
in the midst of Hanoi's polemic with Peking over Sino-U.S.
relations, the relative coolness of Hanoi's reports on Hoan's
reception in the Chinese capital does not seem accidental.
It should be noted, however, that the DRV accounts of l'oan's
stopover in Peking were also less effusive than the Chinese
accounts last year--perhaps reflecting Hanoi's desire to
maintain its balance between Peking and Moscow.
MOSCOW PUBLICIZES SUPPLEMENTARY AID TO DRV. ATTACKS PEKING
Further publicity for the recently signed USSR-DRV agreement
"to strengthen the DRV defense potentialities," tersely
reported by TASS on 18 August, sheds no further light on the
officials involved or the precise date it was signed.* On the
20th VNA specified that the agreement was for "Soviet nonrefund
supplementary military aid to Vietnam for 1971." Like TASS, it
said Vice Premier Novikov "attended" the signing ceremony.
Moscow radio and PRAVDA on 21 August, in reporting briefly that
Novikov had received a vice chairman of the DRV State Planning
Commission and a DRV deputy minister of foreign trade on the
20th for a discussion of the development of trade and economic
cooperation, noted only that the aid agreement had been signed
"earlier."
Followup Moscow comment gives no further information on the nature
of the aid agreement but does review Soviet economic and military
aid to the DRV over past ye&rs. Commentators stress DRV leaders'
expressions of gratitude, and some once again take the opportunity
to attack Peking's stand. A 20 August Radio Peace and Progress
commentary in Mandarin contrasted the USSR's military aid to the DRV
with Chinese verbal support. It renewed charges that the PRC not
only failed to aid the Vietnamese but also obstructed the passage
of Soviet aid through Chinese territory, recalling that the
Chinese had even attacked and insulted Soviet experts who were
on their way to aid the Vietnamese. On the same day as the
* The initial TASS announcement is discussed in the 18 August
TRENDS, page 12.
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broadcast, a PRAVDA article by Tikhvinskiy reviewing a
history of Sino-Soviet relations included a reference to
Chinese obstruction of Soviet aid to Vietnam in a passage on
Red Guard antics in the 1966-69 period of the Cultural
Revolution. The Red Guards were said to have harassed
crews of Soviet ships and aircraft transporting cargoes to
Vietnam.*
Another Radio Peace and Progress Mandarin-languE a commentary
on Soviet aid on the 22d reiterated that Peking is trying to
discredit the USSR's "internationalist stand" and "sabotage"
the friendly relations between the Indochinese and Soviet
peoples. It said Peking's policies have "caused great losses"
to the national liberation movements in Indochina and serve
the interests of the imperialists and their puppets.
BROADCASTS Continuing its nick-up of polemical Hanoi
OF HOC TAP material, Moscow on 19 and 20 August broadcast
summaries of the editorial in the August issue
of the DRV party journal HOC TAP to domestic and foreign
audiences. Accounts of the editorial in Vietnamese and Mandarin
included its charges that the United States is the number one
enemy and that the Nixon Administration is attempting to sow
disunity among socialist countries. Nctably, it did not include
the editorial's strongest statements of Vietnamese independence--
omitting, for example, its contention that the Vietnam problem is
one between the Vietnamese and the United States and its assertion
that "only those who are fighting the Americans can raise the
decisive voice regarding the future of their own country."
The accounts also include HOC TAP's references to socialist aid
and the importance of international unity to the Vietnam struggle.
Moscow did not repeat the editorial's assertion that "many"
parties have held that their attitude toward the Vietnamese
resistance is a "touchstone of proletarian internationalism."
This formula has been used in the past by Moscow in its attacks
on Peking: For example, the 28 November 1965 PRAVDA editorial
on communist unity maintained that "support rendered to the
Vietnamese people's just struggle is the touchstone of how this
or that communist party fulfills its international duty."
* See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS for a
discussion of this article.
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PARIS DELEGATES ASSAIL U.S, POLICY; MEDIA NOTE ECON'-MIC MOVES
Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to provide only abbreviated
coverage of the Paris talks, along with routine, low-key publicity
for world support for the 1 July PRG peace proposal. At the 19 August
Paris session, the DRV and PRG delegates again asserted that the
seven-point proposal provides a way out for the United States. And
both again levied the familiar charge that the Nixon Administration
continues to seek a military victory in Vietnam in order to
"'negotiate from strength." They stressed that as long ac the
Administration "clings" to Vietnamization, all its "professions of
'active negotiations' are only empty words." Both delegates
denounced U.S. action throughout Indochina, including that
against the DRV; DRV delegate Xuan Thuy--back at the talks after
his absence last week--cited the 16 August DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statement condemning "war crimes" agai:.at
the North.
PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi, standing in for Mme. Binh, also
pressed the persistent charges against the conduct of the elections
in South Vietnam. VNA's account of the session said that he
"unmasked" U.S. claims of neutrality in the elections and charged
that "everyone knows" that the United States allows President
Thieu "to use all measures to eliminate his opponents, terrorize
voters, and repress leaders of anti-fraudulent election
organizations."
The VNA account of the session failed to note PRG delegate Mme.
Binh's absence this week, although it had mentioned Xuan Thuy's
absence the previous week. In neither case is it clear whether
or not the absence stemmed from the fact that there is no chief
U.S. negotiator in Paris (the communist delegations still have
not acknowledged the appointment of Ambassador Porter, who is to
assume his duties as head of the delegation on 30 August).
Asked about Mme. Binh's absence, the PRG press spokesman at the
post-session press briefing explained that she "needs a rest."
But two days after the session she addressed a U.S. anti-war
national convention in Michigan by telephone, according to VNA
on the 25th, which reported that she "exposed" the Administration's
Vietnamization policy, "developed in detail" the seven-point peace
initiative, and "called on the participants to take actions" to
urge the Administration to respond seriously to the proposals.
For the third straight week VNA dismissed the allies' statements
in one sentence, claiming that the U.S. and GVN delegates
"again exerted themselves to plead for their policy of prolonging
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and intensifying the war." Thus the account made no mention of
U.S. Ambassador Habib's charge that the communist forces, not
the United States, are the cause of the recent step-up of military
action near the DMZ, and VNA also failed to record his reiteration
of the call for a cease-fire.
NIXON MEASURES Both the communist delegates made passing
ON U.S. ECONOMY references to the "economic difficulties"
of the United States. Xuan Thuy, in a remark
VNA did not report, charged that the war is the "major cause of
the serious U.S. economic and monetary crisis and of the growing
difficulties the American people have to face in their daily life."
Thi said that U.S. defeats in Indochina in addition to the
"inc.-easing difficulties encountered by the U.S. economy and
finance . . . represent concrete proof of U.S. failure."
Hanoi media responded to the President's 15 August announcement
of economic measures with a flurry of propaganda which highlights
their discrimination against the working man. In citing the
international implications, Hanoi points out the cavalier U.S.
attitude toward its allies and trading partners. There has been
little effort to date to connect the economic measures with
U.S. Vietnam war policy. However, an article in NHAN DAN on
21 August by Nguyen Huu Chinh* does say that the President in
his speech "tacitly admitted" that the war "is still weighing
heavily" on the economy, but tried "to make his listeners think
that the many present economic and financial difficulties stemmed
from the fact that the United States is ending the war." The
article, which is broadcast on the 22d by Hanoi radio in Vietnamese
to South Vietnam, scores this as one of the President's "commonl~-
used deceitful tricks." Chinh, who has written articles on the
1968 presidential election and the President's role in the 1970
congressional election, charges that the President's measures
were made with an eye toward the 1972 elections.
* Nguyen Huu Chinh has been identified in the past as "an editor"
of NHAN DAN.
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MEDIA SAY MINH, KY WITHDRAWALS EXPOSE SAIGON ELECTION "FARCE"
Vietnamese communist media, sustaining their close attention to
the South Vietnamese elections,'E duly reported and commented on
the major political events of '.,iie week: Duong Vun Minh's
20 August announcement of his withdrawal from the presidential
race, the 21 August reversal by the Supreme Court in approving
Vice President Ky's candidacy, and Ky's 23 August announcement
that he will not participate in the presidential election
campaign.
The most authoritative communist reaction was a 23 August state-
ment by the spokesman for the PRG delegation in Paris, reported
by LPA on the 24th and by VNA on the 25th. The statement maintained
that "happenings in recent days have fully unmasked the stage-setting
and crude maneuvers of the Nixon Administration" and have exposed
as "brazen and odious lies" the President's "allegations" about
respect for the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese
people, nonintervention in their internal affairs, and a neutral
position in the elections. Like other comment, the statement
said he elections are aimed at "maintaining the bellicose Thieu
clique as a tool to realize" Vietnamization.
Minh's announcement on 20 August that he was withdrawing from the
presidential race prompted a Hanoi radio commentary that day
claiming that his a,c;,.Lon more clearly exposed the "deceitful and
perfidious" nature of the elections. A 21 August NHAN DAN
commentary went further to assert that his withdrawal represented
a "slap on Nixon's face." It charged that the United States had
given "covert blessing and sympathy" to Thieu's "brazen and
fraudulent tricks" which had caused Minh to withdraw. The
article's attack on President Nixon included a seeming reference
to Sino-U.S. developments when it charged that the President's
"insidious intent" to use the Saigon government's power
apparatus for Vietnamization "was revealed even more clearly by
the fact that Nixon deliberately carried out crafty diplomatic
maneuvers to avoid responding" to the PRG's seven-point proposal.
* Hanoi's domestic service in the past two weeks devoted about
15 percent of its news and comment to the South Vietnam elections;
about one-fourth of Liberation Radio's broadcasts during this
period dealt with the elections.
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The South Vietnamese Supreme Court's 21 August decision to
accept Ky's candidacy in the presidential election was dismissed
by a Hanoi broadcast on the same day as "a new trick by Bunker
and Thieu in their attempt to save the puppet presidential
election . . . from becoming an extremely ridiculous and
shameless farce with Thieu as the only candidate." The radio
said Thieu only wished to use Ky as a "stepping stone" to
his own reelection. The possibility that Ky might not run
was noted, for example, in a 22 August Hanoi broadcast to the
South which commented: "Surely Ky will realize more than
anyone else that Nixon and Bunker only want him to play a
subordinate role in the coming elections." A Hanoi broadcast
on the 23d characterized Ky's withdrawal announcement that day
as "another setback for the Americans and Thieu in their
attempt to make arrangements so that the election farce may
have two presidential candidates" in order to "daub a layer of
fake democracy" on it.
Comment on Ky's action so far has not mentioned his proposal
that both he and President Thieu resign and that the election
be held in three months, with the president of the South
Vietnamese Senate acting as head of government in the interim.
LOWER HOUSE Liberation Radio commentaries on 20 and 22 August
ELErTIONS echoed earlier communist comment on South Vietnam's
29 August elections to the lower house when they
charged that the voting will be rigged but called on the people
to try to use the election to oust Thieu's supporters in the
assembly.* The commentary on the 20th also repeated the communist
view that a minority among the deputies favors the people's
interests while the majority is controlled by President Thieu.
The 22 August Liberation Radio commentary went into unusual
detail on methods of identifying good candidates and exposing
Thieu's supporters among contestants for lower house seats.
It told listeners to investigate the candidates' backgrounds
and observe their attitudes toward the Thieu administration, and
it spelled out the criteria: "Thieu's opponents are those who
have refused to join the Thieu clique and who, in one way or
another, have supported and struggled for peace, independence,
and national concord," have joined or supported the urban people's
* See the 18 August TRENDS, page 15, for earlier comment along
these lines.
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struggle, and "have been subjected to repression and terrorism."
The broadcast predicted that "our compatriots," once they have
been "forced" to vote, will "resolutely try to gain complete
mastership over their ballots." It concluded that "if Thieu's
servants are again elected to the Saigon lower house, it will
be entirely because of the Nixon-Bunker--Thieu clique's election
frauds and absolutely not because of the consent of various
strata of the people in urban areas and in areas under temporary
Enemy control."
DRV. PRG SPOKESMEN SCORE U.S. STRIKES IN DMZ, AT NORTH
0
The only hint in Vietnamese communist propaganda of increased U.S.
bombing activity in and near the demilitarized zone comes in the
release of a 19 August PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement. While the Front statement largely echoes the
16 August DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest,* it goes on
to charge that the United States is bombing the southern part of
the DMZ as w_ .1 as the northern portion. PRG protests at the
spokesman's level against U.S. activity in the DMZ and the DRV
are unusual, although PRG Foreign Ministry statements have been
issued in the past in response to major military action against
the North. The PRG protest makes no mention of the 16 August
protest from the DRV, but repeats its assertion that the U.S.
Command in Saigon "has tried with utterly arrogant arguments to
plead for such serious acts of war."
For its part, the DRV Foreign Ministry on 23 August issued another
in its series of routine spokesman's protests which "sternly
condemns" the United States for attacking Quang Binh Province and
Vinh Linh areas. The spokesman said that on 16 and 17 August,
U.S. aircraft struck a number of places in Quang Binh Province and
that on 18-20 August U.S. aircraft, incluiing B-52s, bombed Huong
Lap village. In addition, he charged that from 16 to 21 August
U.S. artillery guns installed south of the DMZ and aboard ships
shelled the villages of Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang, Vinh Son, and
Huong Lap, described as 'oeing north of the 17th parallel and
inside the DMZ. The statement says that these strikes "inflicted
extensive human and material losses on the local people" and it
"vehemently denounced and sternly condemned" them, demanding that
the United States immediately and permanently end all encroachments
upon DRV sovereignty and security.
* See the 18 August TRENDS, pages 17-18.
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ROMANIA-USSR-PRC
Romania's tactical approach coupling a display of national unity
with defiance 1 tbe face of Soviet bloc pressures was sharply
in evidence in publicity for the "unanimous" endorsement of
Ceausescu's independent foreign policy course at a joint meeting
of top party '1nd government bodies on 19 August, followed the next
day by a mil/.tantly patriotic speech in which the Romanian leader
rejected the. concept of any "center" in the communist movement and
defended his country's right to develop relations--including
military--outside the framework of the Soviet bloc.
Ceausescu's defiant speech came against the background of
continuing expressions of suspicion and distrust of Chinese
maneuvering in the Balkans as well as pointed warnings to
the Romanians from Moscow's hardcore allies. The agitation
from theee quarters coincided with the visit of a high-level
Chinese military delegation to Tirana and Bucharest, where it
arrived on 22 August for an "official visit."
Soviet-Romanian tensions were reflected in a terse Bucharest
radio report on the 18th of Ceausescu's meeting %:'ith Soviet
Ambassador Drozenko that day "at the latter's request." The
report telegraphed the apparently unsatisfactory results in
noting that the talks took place in "a comradely atmosphere."
It was on the f)llowing day that the unheralded party-govern-
ment meeting took place to endorse Ceausescu's policies,
including his June visit to the PRC. PRAVDA, briefly report-
ing the joint session on the 21st, noted only that the sesr&on
had approved the new CEMA program.
While Moscow has relied on its proxy spokesmen in East Europe
to bring open propaganda pressure to bear on the Romanians,
its own greetings to Romania on the 23 August anniversary of
its liberation from the Nazis was markedly cooler in tone than
on past anniversaries. An insistent stress on Romania's debt
to the USSR had not been present in last year's message.
CEAUSESCU FLAUNTS DONESTIC.SUPPORT FOR MAVERICK POLICIES
United, popular support for Ceausescu's policies was underscored
in Bucharest's publicity for the 19 August meeting of the
Romanian Communist Party Central Committee, the State Council,
the Council of Ministers, and other party and government bodies--
down to the level of chief editors of the central press.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The national unity theme was expressed in resolutions paused
"unanimously" by the meeting supporting the Romanian delega-
tion's activity at the July CEMA Council meeting and Ceausescu's
Asian tour. The first resolution described the delegation's
stand at the CEMA meeting as "fully in keeping with the political
line established by the 10th party congress" for the development
of economic relations both in CEMA and with "all the socialist
states," a point underscored in Romania's earlier propaganda
expressing satiafaction's,t the compromise-'program adopted at
the meeting. The second resolution hailed Ceausescu's trip to Asia
as a contribution not only to bilateral interests but to the
interests of the peoples of "all the socialist countries."
Ceausescu used a military occasion, the ceremony conferring
officers' ranks on military school graduates, and an anniver-
sary carrying a patriotic national thrust, the 150th anniver-
sary of the 1821 uprising against the Ottoman empire, to deliver
his blatantly nationalistic speech on the 20th. Stressing. the
need for military preparedness, he invoked Romania's revolution-
ary traditions in calling upon youth and "the broad people's
masses"--in a speech broadcast live by Radio Bucharest--to be
ready to "defend their revolutionary conquests" in Vio event of
"imperialist aggression."
The Romanian leader followed a pro forma, obligatory pledge to
strengthen cooperation within the Warsaw Pact with a --statement
of Romania's resolve to develop "cooperation and friendship with
the armies of all socialist countries," underscoring the specific
assertion of intent to broaden military contac~,s outside the Pact:
"The development of cooperation with all socialist states as set
forth by the 10th congress," he added, "involves all economic
and social bodies, and the army as well." This policy was flaunted
in practice by Romania's cordial reception of the Chinese military
delegation lea by Li Te-sheng, an alternate Politburo member and
chief of the PLA's political department, on its 15 August stopover
en route to Tirana and upon its return a week later for an "official
visit of friendship" to Rcmarla at the defense minister's invita-
tion.
Setting forth Romania's view of "proletarian internationalism,"
Ceausescu described tendencies toward "isolation or national
narrowmindedness as alien to our party, to the Marxist-Leninist
policy of developing ties with all socialist countries, . . .
which is the profoundly internationalist spirit inspiring our
party." Dwelling on the need for the autonomy of parties, he
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stated that the dissolution of the Comintern had shown that
"the communist movement cannot be led any more from any center,
that it is necessary for each party to act independently, and
that the communist movement does not need any center in any
part of the world."*
Bucharest's special relationship with Yugoslavia was clearly
the main point of Ceausescu's avowal that Romania is striving
to develop good relations with its neighbors, "the Soviet
Union, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary"--placing nonalined
Yugoslavia on a par with the USSR and two of its loyal allies.
In the same vein, Ceausescu added--this time with Bucharest-
Peking cordiality the main point--that the Romanians do not
for one moment forget that "the socialist system comprises
lk countries in Europe, Asia, and America, and thus it is our
international duty to the cause of socialism and our own
people to develop cooperation and friendship with all the
socialist countries." In another passage he replayed a ver-
sion of a pervasive Peking propaganda theme in noting the
historical lesson that "the amr-`. and medium-sized countries"
have always been victimized by imperialist power politics:
"That is why we believe that these countries must act firmly,
together with all the anti-imperialist forces, for the defense
of their national sovereignty, the right to develop freely
and independently." Ceausescu has pointed in the past to the
important role of the smaller countries, in pressing for the
abolition of blocs and criticizing policies of imperialist
"diktat." But his references to the "small and medium-size
countries"--whose ranks Peking has sought to rally in opposi-
tion to the two "superpowers"--has a particularly provocative
ring at this juncture and in this context.
SOVIET LEADERS, COI4IENTATORS REMIND ROMANIA OF DEBT TO USSR
The message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to Ceausescu
and Maurer on the 27th ani,.iversary of Romania's liberation
from the Nazis, published in PRAVDA on 23 August, is notable
for a reminder--not present in last year's message--that the
defeat of the Nazis "by the Soviet army" and the armed uprising
"carried out under these conditions" in Romania "created the
* Monitors noted that Ceausescu emphasized this passage by
reading it in a particularly forceful manner.
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necessary preconditions for the transition to fundamental
revolutionary reforms." The same theme dominated Moscow radio
comment to Romania on the anniversary. Where last year's
message referred to the Romanian oacp.Le's "selfless labor"
under the tutelage of their communist party "and in close
cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries," the
current one emphasizes that the Romanians had achieved
successes "by relying on all-round cooperation with the
socialist community countries and making use of their
experiences." This theme, too, has been prominent in
Moscow's comment in Romanian.
Last year's message, in a relatively euphoric period follow-
ing the conclusion of the Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty,
vowed that the Soviet party and government would continue to
exert all efforts to consolidate "the relations of fraternal
friendship" with socialist Romania and to promote the develop-
ment of "comradely cooperation" within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA,
with a view to "even closer cohesion" of the socialist community.
This year the Soviets merely promise "to pursue the line of
5Lrengthening friendship" (it is no longer "fraternal") and does
not characterize Romanian-Soviet cooperation. And it delivers
what is in effect a lecture to the Romanians, to the effect
that the deepening of cooperation in the Pact and CEMA--tthich
"were reflected" in the treaty signed last year--"constitute
a stable foundation for the development of Soviet-Romanian
relations."
Where last year's message wished the Romanians new successes
in building socialism "and in the struggle for peace and
friendship between the peoples," this one wishes them success
only in building socialism.
In line with Moscow's avoidance ofvditeet1pol,emical-6attacks on
the Romanians, its comment on the liberation anniversary
presents an ostensible picture of harmonious relations. But
by playing up the Soviet role in the liberation and by issuing
more pointed reminders than usual of the Romanians' close
treaty ties to the Soviet bloc, Moscow has in effect reasserted
its right to monitor the status of socialism in Romania. PRAVDA
reported on the 21st that CPSU Central Committee Secretary
Katushev, in charge of relations with ruling communist parties,
attended a Romanian-Soviet friendship meeting marking the anni-
versary. The Soviet speaker at the meeting, deputy chairman of
the friendship society, delivered what amounted to a lecture on
the major Soviet role in Romania's liberation and on the inipor-
CONFIDENTIAL
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tance now of "fraternal cooperation" and "united efforts in the
struggle for common aims" in the successful building of Social-
ism and in "defense of the working people's gains."
An article in RED STAR on 23 August recalled the price the
Soviets had paid in blood for Romania's liberation ana the
role the presence of Soviet troops on Romanian soil had
played in helping the Romanian party attain and consolidate
its leadership. Underscoring the point that Romania's future
lies in close cooperation with the Soviet bloc, the article
stressed that Bucharest's economic successes have been
achieved through the labor of the Romanian people and the
"cooperation with the socialist countries" in CEMA and the
Warsaw Pact. A Radio Moscow broadcast to Romania on the
19th emphasized the contribution made by the presence of
Soviet troops on Romanian soil "to the development of the
revolution and the prevention of civil war" during the period
following the Nazi defeat.
An East Berlin radio commentary on the Romanian anniversary
on the 23d spelled out the message to the Romanians more
sharply. Noting that speakers at the Bucharest anniversary
celebrations had referred to Romania's expanding relations
with the PRC as well as cooperation with Moscow, the commenta-
tor went on to state that "Romania's future and its safe pro-
spects ultimately are based on cooperation" with the Soviet
Union, "from which it obtained its full sovereignty through
the sacrificial and liberating deed of the Soviets."
PEKING PLAYS UP TIES WITH BUCHAREST. WARNS OF PRESSURES
Peking has used the occasion of Romania's liberation anniversary
to express support for the Rcmanians and to call attention to
Soviet pressures against the maverick Balkan communist coun-
tries. An anniversary message signed by Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou
En-lai praises the Romanians for their "firm opposition to power
politics and thrpnts of aggression and for bravely defending
their national independence and state sovereignty." In the
struggle to build their respective countries and oppose imperial-
ism, the message adds, "the Chinese and Romanian people will,
as always, sympathize with, help, and support each other."
Last year's message, also signed by Mao, Lin, and Chou, pledged
that the Chinese people "will, as always, resolutely support the
just struggle of the Romanian people."
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NCNA repc::ted that Chou and other high-level Chinese officials
participated in an anniversrjry celebration hosted by the
Romanian ambassador on the 23d. In remarks at the gathering,
Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei praised Romania for
"persisting on its road of independence and displaying the
revolutionary spirit of self-reliance." He added, in an
allusion to the Soviets, that "of late, those who pursue a
policy of hegemony are again creating tension in the Balkans;
they have repeatedly carried out military maneuvers, making
a show of force and bringing pressure to bear on other coun-
tries, in a wild attempt to achieve their ulterior aims."
Taking note of the Chinese military delegation now in
Bucharest, Chi called it another expression of Sino-Romanian
friendship and added: "Our Romanian comrades may rest assured
that in their case of building and defending their motherland,
the Chinese people . . . will forever remain their reliable
friends and firmly support their just struggle."
BACKGROUND Chinese pledges of support for Romania date
back to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At a
Romanian embassy reception in Peking on 23 August 1968, Chou
En-lai wounded ur a bitter condemnation of the Warsaw Five's
action with the remark that Romania "is now facing the danger
of foreign intervention and aggression." Noting that the
Romanian Government was mobilizing its people to defend the
country's indepdence, he- Added:
:"~hehineaecyptr~~~trpp~srt
you." Chou and other Chinese officials have since made similar
pledges. At a Peking rally honoring the Ceausescu delegation
during its r;icent Asian tour, Chou promised that "the Chinese
people will fo: ever remain your reliable friends in your
struggle against imperialist interference and aggression and
in defense of national independence and state sovereignty
and in your cause of building socialism. We firmly support
your just struggle."
MOSCOW'S ALLIES DISCOURSE ON CHINESE MANEUVERS IN BALKANS
Moscow's proxy spokesmen in Eastern Europe have issued further
pointed warnings against alleged Bucharest efforts to abet.
Chinese maneuvers in the Balkans. One such commentary, from
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, was picked up in the Soviet weekly ZA RUBEZHOH,
signed to the press on 18 August and issued on the 20th.
Entitled "Peking Maneuvers," the commentary stated that "the
splittist policy of the Chinese leaders must be decisively
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25 AUGUST 1971
rejected" and added that "the struggle against all forms of
opportunism and against anti-Sovietism and nationalism remains
an iuipor t'ont condition for the further advance of socialism."
CZECHOSLOVAKIA For the second time in a week, the Slovak
youth paper SMEN.;. on 17 August directly
accused Romania of adopting Q. pro-Peking stance in its foreign
policy, charging that the Rcmeni.ul party-government delegation's
Asian trip in June "suited the foreign policy plans of the
Chinese leadership." SMENA explained that if Romania were fully
won over to Peking's policy, the PRC would be able "to intensify
its attacks against the unity of the countries of the Warsaw
Pact and CEMA," of which Romania "is still a member"; such a
gain in Europe would provide the PRC "with a new starting point
in Europe of far greater significance than the one held by the
presently isolated Albania."
SMENA charged that Romania has already shifted its policy to
the "Chinese platform on several questions," citing as evidence
the communique is?ued at the conclusion of the Romanian delega-
tion's visit to Peking and "the course of the visit itself."
Equating such a shift to "a deviation from the principle of
proletarian internationalism as it was interpreted and under-
lined" at the 1969 international communist conference in Moscow,
SMENA remarked that "it is scarcely possible to avoid the
question of the realism of such a course."
Endorsing the conclusions reached at the 2 August Crimea
meeting, the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium on the 20th
we:it a step beyond the Crimea communique in warning specifically
against the sin of "nationalism"--a warning unequivocally aimed
at Romania. According to a Frague radio report, the Presidium
affirmed that "present world developments bear witness to the
absolute correctness of the evaluations and conclusions" of the
1969 international communist conference and "confirm that, in
the interest of the unified procedure of the forces of world
communism and the entire anti-imperialist front, it is necessary
to wage a determined struggle against the manifestations of
right- and leftwing opportu:..ism, against nationalism and anti-
Sovietism." The Crimea communique had called only for a struggle
against right and left opportunism.
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GDR, HUNGARY Echoing the warning first leveled in the
13 August Budapest government daily MAGYAR
HIRLAP about formation of a Peking-inspired "anti-Soviet
axis" in the Balkans, East Berlin's second largest daily
BERLINER ZEITUNG, charged on the 20th that "the recent
activities of the PRC serve the goal of forging in the
Balkans a bloc against the socialist countries and its
center, the Soviet Union." BERLINER ZEITUNG took a swipe
at Ceausescu in remarking on the "unpleasant spectacle of
people who year after year have been tF.lking glibly of inde-
pendence and sovereignty but who are obviously incapable
of recognizing how they have become dependent upon Pexing's
politics."
Arguing that it was only after the liberation of the Balkans
by the Soviets in world war II that the Balkan peoples received
their full sovereignty, BERLINER ZEITUNG also lectured unnamed
Balkan leaders who would be prepared to assume before their
peoples "the responsibility for pushing them into a contradic-
tion with their liberators, helpers, and friends, into an
anti-Soviet position . . . ," In a similar vein, an East
Berlin radio c,,respondent 's account of the Bucharest liberation
anniversary celebrations on the 23d pointed to two factors
Romania must take into account if it is to continue celebrating
its advancement under socialism: 1) it is possible to remain
free of imperialist aggression only by attaching oneself closely
to the USSR, and 2) "all development takes place under complex
conditions of a severe international class struggle," which make;
unity of the socialist community both "logical and necessary."
Picking up the theme of international class struggle, the
Hungarian trade union organ NEPSZAVA on the 21st rejected the
"bourgeois and nonbourgeois" idea of an "independent bloc"
of small countries in a broadside against theses expounded
variously by Peking, Bucharest, and Belgrade. "Those who
preach "the solidarity of small countries' without any consid-
eration of the class view and class interest," it said, "are
only trying to cover up their real intentiod'to lessen the
class struggle and do not "realistically" understand the inter-
nat-ional role of small countries. Noting that attempts to
develop a separate platform for small countries reflect 11
great-power policy or an ambition for extreme national isola-
tion, NEPSZAVA went on to assert that "those who insist on
an 'autonomous and independent role' for small countries" are
in fact speaking up against these countries, not for them.
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BULGARIA Sofia's contribution to the concerted propaganda
campaign includes a 22 August article in the party
organ RABOTNICHESKO DELO assailing Chinese divisive tactics and
those who abet them. Drawing on the Crimea communique, the
paper charged tr'; the enemies of communist unity and cohesion
are helped in their "subversive activity by the 'leftist' and
rightist opportunists, especially in countries where they are
in power." The article cemarked that "emissaries of imperialism
and revisionism travel all over the world, play the middleman,
attempt to disunite the socialist states, hatch conspiracies
with the most reactionary circle of imperialism, and slander the
socialist states and mainly the Soviet Union..., [attempting] to
separate the socialist countries from their mother protector,
the Soviet Union."
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
PRAVDA ARTICLE ATTACKS PEKING'S "COLLUSION '11TH IMPERIALISM"
Having previously offered an authoritative assessment of the
implications for Soviet-U.S. relations of President Nixon's
projected visit to the PRC, Moscow has sought to put recent
developments affecting the triangular relationship in a
long-term perspective of Sino-Soviet relations. A 20 August
PRAVDA article by S. Tikhvinskiy, an original member of the
Soviet negotiating team at the Peking border talks, explains
how a reduction in China's ties with the Soviet Union has
historically led to "collusion with imperialism" and betrayal
of Chinese national interests. Using a favorite device for
Soviet comment discrediting Peking in the wake of its
invitation to the President, Tikhvinskiy's article is
ostensibly a review of a book by 0. B. Borisov and
B. T. Koloskov on the past 25 years of Sino-Soviet
relations.
While not addressed directly to recent Sino-U.S. developments,
the article seems to complement the 10 August PRAVDA article
by G. Arbatov which viewed President Nixon's plan to visit
Peking in the context of Soviet-U.S. relations. Arbatov,
like Tikhvinskiy an academician with access to the party
daily for significant comment on major issues, is a specialist
on the United States. Tikhvinskiy, a sinologist, has long
been concerned with Chinese affairs. On 15 February 1970,
at a time when Moscow was expressing concern over the
development of the border talks, Tikhvinskiy authored a
PRAVDA article which discussed Sino-Soviet relations in
terms of the triangular relationship, taking special note
of suggestions to Peking to turn to the United States
as a counterweight to the Soviets.
The current Tikhvinskiy article is notable for its several
references to the sensitive subject of Sino-Soviet border
troubles--a subject which had been treated delicately in
conciliatory Soviet comment on the occasion of the CCP's
50th anniversary on 1 July, before the announcement on
Peking's invitation to President Nixon. In addition to
citing various periods of border troubles, including the
incidents in 1969, the article contains a passage on the
PRC's expenditure of "enormous" funds on "total
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milituri%ation," one aspect of which hus been "the erection
of fortifications along the whole length of the border" with
the USSR. Citing Chou En-lai's recent interview with James
Heston of the New York TIMES as showing that Peking has taken
up "U.S. propaganda" on a Soviet threat to China, the article
claims that this anti-Soviet stew serves the Chinese loaders'
purpose of "Justifying their flirtution with the imperialist
powers." At another point, marking 1960 as the beginning of
Peking's "great-power, chauvinist" approach, the article
says the Chinese began border provocations and advanced
territorial claims against the USSR that summer in order
to prepare a turnabout in foreign affairs toward "close
cooperation with the imperialist powers."
The appearance of a new article by Tikhvinskiy, in view of
his past association with tl`e border talks and his February
1970 artic-e on the triangular dimensions of the China
problem, suggests a toughening of Moscow's approach to
Sino-Soviet relations following the announcement on
President Nixon's v4sit to the PRC. A major PRAVDA article
marking the CCP's 50th anniversary on 1 July, carried over
the authoritative signature of I. Aleksandrov,* took a
notably conciliatory line in putting on record for the
first time a Soviet willingness to negotiate a comprehensive
new border treaty with the Chinese and in blunting the
edges of Moscow's thrusts against Peking. Regarding border
tensions, for example, the Aleksandrov article limited itself
to an implicit historical parallel in recalling that Chiang
Kai-shek had developed an anti-Soviet campaign accompanied
by armed provocations along the border. The 20 August
Tikhvinskiy article, in contrast, is explicit in bringing
up the border troubles of two years ago as "continuing the
inglorious traditions of the Chinese militarists" in the
period before the establishment of the PRC.
At the same time, the Tikhvinskiy article reaffirms Moscow's
line, as enunciated at the 24th CPSU Congress, calling for
normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. The article seems
designed to serve Moscow's current campaign of discrediting
Peking in the international community; as such, it appears
aimed at isolating Peking rather than signaling a major shift
in Moscow's line on bilateral relations.
* The Aleksandrov article is discussed in the TRENDS of
8 July 1971, pages 16-21.
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Thus, it places complete responsibility for the present state
of those relations on "Mao Tse-tung and his circle," citing
in this connection "numerous letters" from Chinese expressing
their friendship for the Soviet Union despite the anti-Soviet
atmosphere in China. It also attempts to capitalize on the
strained relations between Hanoi and Peking in the wake of
the announcement on President Nixon's visit. In a passage
on the 1966-69 period of the cultural revolution, the article
resurrects the charge of Red Guard hostility directed against
crews of Soviet ships and aircraft "transporting vitally
important cargoes to fighting Vietnam."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CH I N A UN SEAT
PEKING RULES OUT TWO-CHINAS FORMULA FOR UN REPRESENTATION
Peking has officially put on record its firm rejection of any
dual representation formula for seating the PRC in the United
Nations without expelling the ROC. Reacting to U.S. Ambassador
Bush's formal request on 17 August for inclusion of an item on
China's representation on the agenda for the coming General
Assembly session, a 20 August PRC Foreign Ministry statement
declares categorically that the PRC "will absolutely have
nothing to do with the United Nations" unless Chiang Kai-shek's
representatives are expelled. In thus reaffirming its
long-standing opposition to dual representation, Peking has
served notice on the international community that it is not
agreeable to a compromise on this issue and that its recent
diplomatic flexibility does not indicate any relaxation of its
claim to Taiwan.
The foreign ministry statement and a companion NCNA report on
the 20th are confined to the narrow issue of UN representation,
limiting comment on the Nixon Administration's policies to its
"scheme of creating 'two Chinas' in the United Nations." The
only comment appearing in PRC media on broader issues affecting
Sino-U.S. relations is contained in supporting statements from
its allies.
Peking on the 20th disseminated the full texts of a 15 July
letter to U Thant from Albania, Algeria, and 16 other UN
members, an explanatory memorandum from these same naticis,
and their draft resolution "for the restoration of the lawful
rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations."
On 17 Ju..j, Peking had begun its publicity for documents
relating to the China representation question by first carrying
the draft resolution of Albania and Algeria. The PRC statement
and the related documents have been given wide international
dissemination by Peking; the texts of U.S. documents--Secretary
Rogers' 2 August statement and Ambassador Bush's 17 August
letter and memorandum to U Thant--have been carried only in
NCNA's domestic service, on 4 and 20 August respectively.
The PRC statement reaffirms the fundamentals of Peking's
position on the China representation question, insisting that
"restoration of the legitimate rights" of the PRC in the United
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Nations and expulsion of the ROC are "-two inseparable aspects
of the same question." Declaring that the PRC's position is
"unshakable," the statement indicates that Peking is prepared
to take the long view by expressing confidence that the
demands advanced in the Albanian-Algerian resolution "will
eventually be victorious."
Without commenting on the question of the Chinese seat in the
Security Council, the statement takes note briefly of the
passage in the 15 July draft resolution calling the PRC
"one of the five permanent members" of that body. Until
recently, explicit reverences to a Security Council seat for
the PRC have been rare in authoritative Peking propaganda,
although reportage on last year's General Assembly debate on
the representation issue had noted that both the French and
Algerian delegates mentioned permanent membership of the
Chinese in the Security Council.
In apparent anticipation of the introduction of a passage on
the Security Council in the 15 July draft resolution,* the
9 June communique between the PRC and Romania.--one of the
cosponsors of the resolution--noted that the Romanian side
reaffirmed its support for the restoration of the legitimate
rights of the PRC in the United Nations, the Security Council,
and other international organizations. Subsequent references
to a Security Council seat appeared on 2 July, in the
communique of the China-Japan Friendship Association and a
visiting delegation of the opposition Komeito Party of Japan,
and in the 1 August communique following the visit of a high-
level Algerian delegation to the PRC.
FOREIGN SUPPORT Peking has followed up its statement with
supporting comment from such allies as
Albania, the DPRK, the DRV;*and Sihanouk's government. An
editorial in the Albanian party paper ZERI I POPULLIT on
24 August, disseminated by NCNA internationally, is notable
for its discussion of the UN representation question in the
broader context of Peking's rivalry with the United States and
the Soviet Union. Going far beyond what Peking has been willing
* The Albanian resolution in 1970 had contained no passage
characterizing the PRC as one of the permanent members of the
Security Council.
** For a report on a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the PRC
statement, see the Indochina section of this TRENDS.
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to say in its own naive, the editorial claims that the Nixon
Administration's policy on the representation question is
rooted in "the counterrevolutionary global strategy of U.S.
imperialism," which has "incessantly hatched all kinds of
plots" and committed "a series of provocations" against China.
The editorial aleo claims that seating of the PRC in the
United Nations would be an important step toward "the
liberation of this organization from the domination of the
two imperialist superpowers."
The explanatory memorandum introducing the 15 July Albanian-
Algerian draft resolution is noteworthy for its characterization
of the PRC as "a great nuclear and space power" which cannot
be excluded from decisions on important internatiorle.l problems.
Peking has long sought to dissociate itself from the ranks of
the "superpowers." In this vein, the 30 July PRC Government
statement--released on 7 August--rejecting the Soviet proposal
for a five-power nuclear conference had asserted that Chinese
nuclear weapons are still in the "experimental" stage and
declared that the PRC will never be "a 'nuclear superpower'
practicing the policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats,
and nuclear blackmail."
USSR REPORTS DEVELOPMENTS. REAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR PRC SEAT
Having reaffirmed its support for the seating of the PRC in
the United Nations in a 13 July letter to U Thant,* Moscow has
given low-keyed propaganda attention to the representation issue
over the past month. TASS dispatches have briefly reported
Secretary Rogers' 2 August statement and Ambassador Bush's
17 August letter to U Thant. TASS also promptly reported NCNA's
4 August criticism of the Rogers statement and the PRC Foreign
Ministry statement of 20 August. While these dispatches have
underscored Peking's public rejection of a two-Chinas policy,
the one reporting NCNA's criticism of the Rogers statement noted
a New York TIMES observation that "behind the cover of tough
polemics and propaganda" on the membership issue, "the Chinese
leaders are formulating a flexible policy for their meeting with
President Nixon."
* For a report on the letter and background on Moscow's
position, see the FBIS TRENDS of 21 July 1971, page 27.
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A Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 19 August cited the Bush letter
to U Thant as evidence that Washington is still pursuing a
two-Chine- policy. Since Washington and Peking are drawing
closer to each other, the commentary added, the Nixon Administration
"has agreed to vote for the seating of the PRC in the United Nations
in an attempt to use this concession to the Chinese leaders in
exchange for a Chinese concession which will benefit "-he United
States." The commentary concluded that the USSR, for its part,
has consistently opposed a two-Chinas policy and stands for the
restoration to the PRC of its "legitimate rights" in the world
body and expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek delegation.
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MIDDLE EAST
SOVIET MEDIA MARK TIME ON MIDEAST-ISSUE'. ARAB'DEVELOPMENTS
Soviet media have paid little attention to recent Middle East
developments affecting inter-Arab and Arab-Soviet relations
and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moscow's limited comment on
the Arab scene comes against the background c..: the. strained
Soviet-Sudanese relations in the wake of the Sudanese coup and
countercoup that-led to the executions of local communists, as'
well as the inter-Arab tensions generated by Jordan's moves
to control the fedayeen and the related Syrian rupture of
diplomatic ties with Jordan. On the Arab-Israeli front,
Moscow played Assistant Secretary Sisco's late July-early
August talks in Israel in low key, routinely predicting negative
results. Moscow may well be awaiting the fall session of the UN
General Assembly before mounting any appreciable new propaganda
efforts with respect to the Middle East problem.
MIDEAST Sisco's visit drew predictably disparaging Moscow
CONFLICT comment which again decried U.S. efforts to act as
peacemaker and insisted that U.S. arms deliveries
to Israel demonstrate Washington's "hypocrisy" in claiming to
play a disinterested role and its unwillingness to pressure the
Israelis. But while denouncing U.S. attempts to act as
"mediator," Moscow gives no clue as to any initiatives it might
be contemplating at the UNGA session. Only once in the past
several months has Moscow even broached the problems encountered
in the continuing Big Four talks in New York, which Primakov in
an early May Arabic-language interview had called the "main
effort" being made in connection with the Mideast problem. This
isolated complaint about the U.S. stance in the talks came in a
Kolesnichenko PRAVDA dispatch on 31 July which charged that U.S.
Ambassador Bush, "contrary to common sense," was insisting on
"discussions of 'peace guarantees'" in the Middle East which,
without Israeli withdrawal, would amount to continuation of the
occupation. Normally, TASS briefly reports the fact that a
four-power session was held; the most recent such item, on
27 July, noted that the next meeting was scheduled for 19 August.
The last Soviet propaganda complaint spelling out Washington's
"negative stand" in the talks was an.IZVESTIYA dispatch in
mid-March.
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Broadly, the Soviet position continues to be that the USSR is
ready to participate with the other permanent members of the
Security Council in creating "international guarantees" for a
Middle East political settlement. This idea, advanced at the
elite level by Brezhnev in his 30 March CPSU Congress report,*
was reiterated in Gromyko's 13 July letter to U Thant which
recapitulated a broad range of Soviet policy positions. Moscow
did not mention the Egyptian interpretation of Soviet readiness
to participate in an "international force," rather than
"international guarantees." The Cairo AL-AHRAM on 22 July,
reporting that Soviet Ambassador Vinosradov had' informed.UAR
Foreign Minister Riyad about the Gromyko letter, said that it
"expressed the Soviet Union's readiness to participate . . . in
an international force" to safeguard international security.
Earlier, AL-AHRAM editor Haykal in a 25 June article had
claimed that Riyad had been informed by Gromyko in December
1970 of the USSR's readiness to participate in an "international
force to guarantee" a Middle East settlement based on Security
Council Resolution 242. Soviet proposals on a Mideast settle-
ment have suggested the stationing of "UN troops" at various
points, but have not dealt with their composition.
RELATIONS WITH Moscow's protest campaign against the
SUDAN, SYRIA persecution of communists in Sudan wound
down on 10 August, and Soviet media have
since been silent on the status of USSR-Sudan relations and
events in Khartoum. There has been no suggestion that Moscow
either sought or accepted any Arab mediation. Soviet media
thus ignored the fact that a Syrian delegation, after an
unheralded 10-11 August visit to Moscow, went directly to
Khartoum for talks on the 11th and 12th. For its part, Sudan
has rejected mediation: Sudanese Chairman an-Numayri declared,
according to a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report on the 12th,
that the Syrians' discussions in Khartoum could not be regarded
as mediation between the Sudan and the USSR, and Sudanese
Defense Minister 'Abbas said on the 24th that the Soviet Union
must take the initiative to correct its mistake, for Sudan
"would never be a party" to mediation.
Soviet media gave virtually no publicity to the two-day
visit of the Syrian delegation, composed of Vice President
al-Ayyubi and Foreign Minister Khaddam, reporting neither its
* See the FBIS TRENDS of 31 March, page 23.
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arrival nor its departure. According to a MENA dispatch on the
12th attributed to "reliable sources in Khartoum," the Syrian
visit to Moscow took place after consult4tions between the
Soviet ambassador and his government following the ambassador's
several meetings with senior Syrian officials "at the beginning
of the week." TASS on the 11th both announced and summed up the
visit in a report--also carried by Damascus radio, which
described it as a "press statement"--noting that the Syrians
had talks "in an atmosphere of friendship and frankness" with
Mazurov, Ponomarev, and Kuznetsov on bilateral relations and
"the Middle East situation." A 12 August Arabic-language
commentary on the visit blandly described such contacts as a
"good tradition" in Syrian-Soviet x2.ations and went on to
underscore the mutual benefits accruing from the two countries'
economic cooperation. An Arabic-language report two days
later did obliquely link the Syrians with Soviet-Sudanese
relations in observing that Syrian President al-Asad in a
speech in southern Syria had "firmly rejected" the idea that
there had been "any Soviet intervention in recent events in
Sudan."
ARAB FEDERATION, Moscow has given meager publicity to the
JORDANIAN ISSUES 18-20 August meeting in Damascus of UAR
and Syrian Presidents as-Sadat and al-Asad
and Libyan Chairman al-Qadhdhafi. TASS merely noted that they
would discuss questions connected with the Federation of Arab
Republics (FAR) established last April as well as "other
problems."* TASS also reported the signing on the 20th of the
FAR draft constitution and a joint declaration, and later
briefly summed up the constitution, pointing out among other
things that the federation is open to other Arab states if
they agree with its principles and strive for Arab unity and
the establishment of an Arab socialist society. But there
has been no Soviet account of the substance of the declaration,
which repeated the "no's" of the 17 April Benghazi declaration
on establishment of the FAR: no conciliation and no negotiations
with the "Zionist enemy," no relinquishment of an inch of
occupied Arab territory, and no bargaining over the Palestinian
issue.**
* According to Cairo's AL-JUMHURIYAH on the 12th, the Syrian-
Soviet talks in Moscow would be on the agenda, and AL-AHRAM on the
15th said Jordanian relations with the fedayeen and with Syria
would be a topic of discussion.
** See the FBIS TRENDS of 21 April, pages 20-22, for a discussion
of Soviet propaganda treatment of earlier federation moves.
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Seemingly having in mind Jordanian relations with the fedayeen
and with Syria, a Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 20th, pegged
to the Damascus conference, made the customary charges of
imperialist attempts to disrupt Arab unity by exp^_erbatint
any misunderstanding which may arise" between Arab countries
and by endeavoring, in Jordan and Lebanon, to "separate the
fedayeen from the masses." Similarly, a Yermakov international
review in PRAVDA on the 22d included Jordanian operations
against the fedayeen as a factor in the "more acute" situation,
along with the standard "imperialist intrigues" and Israeli
policy. TASS had briefly noted clashes on the Jordanian-Syrian
border and Syria's 12 August rupture of diplomatic relations
with Jordan--explained by Damascus, TASS added, as due to the
Jordanian authorities' disregard of Arab efforts aimed at
mobilization of all forces against Israel.
Moscow failed to mention the arrival of a Soviet military
delegation in Syria on the heels of the break in Syrian-
Jordanian relations. According to Damascus radio on the 17th,
the Soviet delegation and a visiting UAR military delegation
joined President al-Asad in observing "the largest army exercises
since the establishment of the Syrian army," held in southern
Syria.
Moscow has taken note of Saudi-Egyptian efforts to settle the
Jox'd&ni*n-.fedayeen di'Opfite.' ?-hASS on the 12th 9&id that ' ?their ? draft
memorandum, handed to both sides, called for observing last
fall's Cairo and Amman agreements defining relations between
the sides. But Moscow has given no emphasis to as-Sadat's
21 August consultations in Jidda and Khartoum, TASS brushing
them off in a brief report on the 22d that the Egyptian
president had returned to Cairo from Saudi Arabia and Sudan
where he had "conducted talks with the leaders of those
countries."
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BOLIVIA
While Soviet media have typically devoted negligible attention
to the 19-22 August coup in Bolivia that ousted leftist President
Gen. Juan Jose Torres, Havana has been vocal from the outset
in expressing support for the Bolivian "people" against the
"counterrevolutionary" plotters. In an interview in Santiago,
Chile on the 21st, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa saw the
events in La Paz as "an American bat4-le, not exclusively
Bolivia's." Havana propaganda has pictured the coup in these
terms, charging that the Bolivian "reactionaries" had backing
from the United States, Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina and
quoting Chilean and Pexuvian spokesmen on the need to defend
their gains against "reaction" and "counterrevolution."
By the 24th, authoritative Cuban comment was drawing doctrinal
morals from the Bolivian experience, picturing it in the
context of a continent-wide struggle in which the balance
is being weighted increasingly on the side of revolution.
In militant passages carrying echoes of Cuban propaganda
in the early 1960's, an !ditorial in the party organ GRANMA
pronounced it the "duty" of all Latin American revolutionaries
to "help the Bolivian people regain their revolutionary
posture" and assured the Bolivians of Cuba's "material" as
well as moral support.
HAVANA VIEWS BOLIVIAN "SETBACK" AS PREDICTABLE BUT REVERSIBLE
The notion that any Latin American regime moving in a
revolutionary direction faces the constant threat of a coup
from the right has long been a staple of Cuban propaganda,
as part and parcel of the dictum that armed struggle is the
only sure route to revolutionary power. Against this
background, Havana now calls the Bolivian coup "expected"
and "inevitable" but views it as a temporary "setback" and
holds it up as an object lesson for revolutionaries throughout
the hemisphere. In line with Castro's portrayal of a growing
revolutionary trend in Latin America, a Havana radio talk on
23 August saw the three days of "bloody battle" in La Paz as
proof that it is becoming "increasingly difficult for the
fascist military to stage a bloodless coup." And GRANMA's
24 ,:gust editorial spelled out the doctrinal lesson: The
Bolivian people's experience has demonstrated "the possibilities
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of armed action, not only in the rural areas but also in the
cities, when all methods of struggle are combined intelligently
and firmly."
GRANMA depicted the revolutionary trend as inexorable and
bound to reassert itself with greater force. It praised
the Bolivian people for having "written a heroic page in
the book of Latin American history"--a new round in a
continuous revolutionary struggle of which Che Guevara's
abortive guerrilla venture had been the first major
battle, foredoomed as Guevara's guerrillas were by over-
whelming military odds against it.
GRANMA's explanation that the forces of the people were
defeated by their "overwhelming disadvantage in weaponry"
was developed after the fact, as a rationale for the failure
of a resistance movement Havana media had portrayed in
optimistic terms during the period of the coup. On 20 August,
for example, Havana spoke of a "battle for liberation" being
waged heroically by "the people," the peasants, students,
miners, workers of the Labor Central (COB), noncommissioned
military officers, and the La Paz Colorados regiment
commanded by Maj. Ruben Sanchez, described as "strongly
revoi'itionaxy" with "strong connections to the popular
sectors." Havana broadcasts publicized messages of
solidarity with the Bolivian "people" from Cuban mass
organizations as well as from Chilean political and labor
groups, and Foreign Minister Roa recalled in his interview
in Chile on the 21st that the Cuban Government had more
than once expressed "its strongest solidarity and support
for the revolutionary movement" in Bolivia.
Castro had been moving cautiously toward endorsement of the
Torres government in the months preceding the coup,
discerning on 26 July "a profound radicalization of the
Bclivian people" and "proper conditions for a revolution"
but making support for Torres conditional on his revolutionary
actions.* While the coup was in progress PRENSA LATINA quoted
* Castro's remarks on the revolutioru ry situation in Bolivia
are reviewed in the TRENDS of 21 April, pages 25-26, and
28 July, pages 27-29.
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the Chilean CP organ PURO CIIILE as remarking that a victory
of the "fascists," if It materialized, "would be the
consequence of vacillations," although in reporting a
Bolivian COB communique it left out the more direct charge
that the plotters were able to use part of the state':
resources because of "General Torres government's indecision
and swaying from right to left."
The perpetrators of the coup were identified as the "fascists"
of the Bolivian Socialist Falange and the National Revolu-
tionary Movement along with their "servants" within the
armed forces. Havana's initial reaction to the new regime,
headed by Col. Hugo Banzer Suarez, was to depict a curfew
and martial law decree as the first step in a "violent
repression" which the junta might "unleash at any moment."
On the 24th, the GRANMA editorial said a reign of "terror
and revenge" had begun, with "armed rightist commandos
attacking the headquarters of the leftist parties and the
offices of labor unions and progressive newspapers." GRANMA
said there had never before in Bolivia's history been a
regime "more illegitimate, more antipeople, more antinational,"
but saw grounds in its internal disunity and absence of
popular backing for the judgment that it cannot last.
REASSERTION OF CUBAN ROLE IN HEMISPHERE-WIDE CONFRONTATION
Charges that the coupists enjoyed "backing from abroad" were
present in Cuban propaganda from the outset. A broadcast on
the 19th cited a La Paz EL DIARIO report that the U.S.
embassy had alerted its staff to a possible coup "that
would occur at any moment," and PRENSA LATINA recalled
the reported alert on the 23d to conclude that there was
"no doubt about U.S. involvement." On the 21st PRENSA LATINA
alleged that 8,000 men trained in Argentina, Paraguay, and
Brazil were fighting the pro-regime forces in Bolivia.
Havana radio predicted the next day that there would be
"an intervention by the Brazilian and Paraguayan regimes
supported by the United States"; and subsequent comment
focused on Brazilian military aspirations to get rid of
the "too leftist" Torres and to separate the oil-rich
department of Santa Cruz from Bolivia "as a first step
toward its absorption by Brazil."
CONFIDENTIAL
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GRANMA's 211 August editorial drew the threads of this comment
together in ascribing the success of the "bloodbath" against
the Bolivian people to a "triple counterrevolutionary alliance"
consisting of internal reaction and the Brazilian and Paraguayan
"gorilla" regimes, masterminded by the United States. "Plotted
by the imperialists and executed by the CIA," GRANMA said, the
coup was part of an overall strategy designed to isolate Cuba,
Chile, and Peru and to "discourage peoples which, as in Uruguay,
are seriously threatening to sweep the representatives of
oligarchy and imperialism from power."
Thus underscoring Castro's portrayal of a burgeoning revolutionary
situation in which Cuba is no longer isolated, the editorial
played the theme of Cuban-Bolivian affinity rooted in Guevara's
guerrilla adventure and noted that some Bolivian labor leaders
who had been in Cuba for the 26 July observance were now
victims of the fighting. It held up a pledge of "Cuba's
solidarity, her firm moral and material support, resolute
and determined," for the Bolivian "struggle for liberation"
as exemplary for all revolutionaries confronting "fascism and
imperialism" in Latin America.
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KOREA
DPRK HOPES RED CROSS CONTACTS WILL PAVE WAY FOR UNIFICATION
Expressions of good will and professions of optimism about the
prospects for Korean unification mark North Korean coverage
of the 20 August Panmunjom meeting of relresentatives of the
North and South Korean Red Cross organizv.tions to exchange
documents containing their respective proposals on contacts
among families separated by the division of the country. The
meeting stemmed from an exchange earlier in the month in which
the North Korean society, on the 14th, had responded to a
12 August proposal by its South Korean counterpart that .a
"movement" to locate separated family members be initiated..
The North Koreans proposed that discussions also be held on
questions of free travel, mutual visits, and free correspondence
among separated family members, relatives,.and friends.' The
seven-point demand on U.S. withdrawal from South Korea, which
included the demand that the United States stop preventing
civilian travel across the military demarcation line, was first
put forward by the DPRK representative at the 29 July meeting
of the Military Armistice Ccmmission (MAC); it was repeated at
the 25 August MAC meeting, according to a Pyongyang domestic
service report that day.
KCNA's prompt account of the 20 August meeting was followed
up with reportage accompanied by comment in NODONG SINMUN the
next day. KCNA reported that the messengers at Panmunjom "met
each other with gladness, firmly shaking hands with warm
feelings and compatriotic love," and expressed the hope that
the meeting will "mark an important occasion" in demolishing
barriers between North and South and "pave the way" for
negotiations and ultimate unification of the country. NODONG
SINMUN's report, while also noting that the meeting took place
in "a warm atmosphere of compatriotic love," included some
criticism of the South Korean side. It claimed that the South
Korean journalists covering the Panmunjom meeting was forbidden
to appear until the very last moment because the "South Korean
rulers" feared their contact with North Korean correspondents.
* See the 18 August TRENDS, pages 27-32, for a discussion of
this exchange. Earlier North Korean proposals regarding North-
South contacts are discussed in the 11 August TRENDS, pages
16-19.
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25 AUGUST 1977.
It also took the occasion to criticize the "South Korean puppet
clique" for having previously rejected all the DPRK's "fair and
reasonable" proposals on North-South contacts. But the paper
went on to praise this initial contact as a "good and glad
thing," the first fruition of North Korea's "sincere efforts"
to bring about North-South contacts.
KCNA on 20 August carried a statement by the North Korean Red
Cross chairman praising the exchange and expressing the hope
that this first contact will help open the way toward peaceful
unification. On the 23d Pyongyang reported a statement by a
spokesman of the DPRK Red Cross announcing that it will send
messengers to Panmunjom on the 26th to receive the South Korean
reply to North Korea's 14 August proposal.
KOREANS IN JAPAN Pyongyang continues to publicize activities
of the DPRK-sponsored General Association
of Korean Residents in Japan in connection with the North-South
contacts. On 22 August KCNA carried a statement by the chairman
of the association supporting the Panmunjom meeting; KCNA
reported on the 20th that members of the ROK-sponsored Korean
Residents Union in Japan had also praised the meeting. On the
19th, KCNA reported a letter from the chairman of the DPRK-
sponsored organization to the head of the ROK-sponsored group
proposing meetings of Koreans in Japan to support the North-South
talks. It proposed meetings in Tokyo, Osaka, and other cities
under the joint auspices of the two organizations, formati'on'-
of a preparatory committee to plan these meetings, and the
initiation of "day-to-day contact" regarding these matters.
The DPRK-sponsored organization had previously involved itself
in the recent attention to the subject of North-South c,,.,tacts.
On 18 August KCNA had reported a statement by the association's
chairman offering to send representatives to a third-country
conference of overseas Koreans for reunification. The DPRK
Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland had
agreed to such a conference in an 11 August letter to Ko Pyong-chol,
president of the United Front for Korean Democracy in New York.
On the 14th KCNA had reported that the DPRK-sponsored organization
in Japan had proposed to its counterpart that they iointly
celebrate the Korean liberation anniversary and promote a struggle
for Korean unification.
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MOSCOW, PEKING Both Moscow and Peking briefly reported the
20 August Panmunjom meeting, but neither has
been heard to comment thus far. Press conferences in the two
capitals by the DPRK envoys to publicize the North Korean Red
Cross' 14 August letter were reported by Moscow and Peking
respectively. The DPRK charge d'affaires in Peking, according
to both NCNA and KCNA, reviewed the DPRK's stand on unification
and recalled, among otter things, Kim Il-song's 6 August
expression of readiness to contact all political parties in
South Korea, including the ruling Democratic Republican Party.
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NEW PARTY COMMITTEES ANNOUNCED FOR SZECINJAN AND TIBET
Following a three-month gap in the reporting of new provincial-
level party committees, NCNA on 24 August announced that party
committees have been established for Szechwan, China's most
populous province, and Tibet, a vast and thinly populated
autonomous region. As expected, the namelists for both
committees reveal yet another victory for the alliance of
military men and "rehabilitated" cadres which has dominated
the leadership of the previously formed provincial party
committees. Only Heilungkiang and Ningsia now remain without
new party structures.
SZECHWAN Chang Kuo-hua, a seasoned PLA commander and long-
time leader in Tibet before his cultural revolution
transfer to Szechwan, was named first secretary. Chang, who is
also chairman of the revolutionary committee and political
commissar of the Chengtu Military Region (MR), ended a 10-month
eclipse from public view on 10 August when he reappeared in
Chengtu, identified as a member of the provincial CCP core
group.
Chang's political survival has clearly been at the expense of
the leftist forces within the province. In mid-March 1968
Chang was criticized by Chiang Ching for ailcwing conservative
attacks on Liu Chieh-ting and Chang Hsi-ting, vice-chairmen
of the provincial revolutionary committee, who were aligned
with radical Red Guard forces within Szechwan. Significantly,
neither Liu nor Chang was named to the new committee; neither
has appeared publicly since May 1970.
Most of Chang's deputies on the new committee have served
under him in Szechwan throughout the cultural revolution.
Liang Hsing-chu, a vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee
and commander of the Chengtu MR, was named second secretary.
Li Ta-chang, who served as governor of Szechwan immediately
prior to the cultural revolution, has been a vice-chairman
of the revolutionary committee since its inception. Hsieh
Chia-hsiang is a deputy political commissar of the Chengtu
MR and a standing committee member of the revolutionary
committee. Tuan Chun-yi, a newcomer to the Szechwan power
structure, has presumably been rehabilitated fallowing his
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cultural revolution fall from his post as chief of the Fir.t
Ministry of Machine Building. His career has been primarily
that of a technical manager, and he may supply skills needed
in the Szechwan leadership. Hsieh Cheng-jung and Ho Yun-feng
hold military responsibilities within the province. Hsu Chih
is a long-time vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee,
perhaps also formerly a leading government cadre in Peking.
Reflecting the political troubles which have long plagued
Szechwan, NCNA praised "the people of the province" for
uniting with the PLA and warding off "the interference from
the 'left' and the 'right'" through "sharp class battles."
Szechwan's provincial radio, which had been limited to
relaying Radio Peking since 19 November 1969, resumed local
news originations on 3 August.
The new party committee, consisting of 106 full and 44
alternate members, is more numerous by far than that for
any other province; Shantung's the next largest, consists
of 115 members and alternates. A total of 1,477 delegates
attended the congress (only Shantung's was larger) in
Chengtu from 12 to 16 August.
TIBET The formation of the new Tibetan committee has
provided final confirmation of the political demise
of Revolutionary Committee Chairman Tseng Yung-ya, who has
not appeared publicly since National Day 1970 and was
apparently demoted because of his support of the radical
"Lhasa Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters" group during the
cultural revolution. Jen Jung, who supported the
conservative "Great Alliance Headquarters" during the
cultural revolution, was named first secretary. Jen, who
has been first political commissar in Tibet since October
1968, had been named acting chairman of the revolutionary
committee in a 12 June NCNA report on a local activist
congress.
Six secretaries were named. Chen Ming-yi, a vice-chairman,
was recently named PLA commander in Tibet. Kao Sheng-hsuan
and Feng Ko-ta are newcombers to the province. Kao was
identified last April as PLA deputy commander in Tibet; no
identification is available for Feng. In an apparent
effort to highlight the position of minorities in the PRC,
NCNA specifies that three of the secretaries are native
Tibetans: Yang Tung-sheng, Pa Sang and Tien Pao. All have
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been vice-chairmen of the revolutionary committee since its
formation. Tien Pao is also a political commissar and
probably the only one of the native Tibetans with any real
power.
The 56 full and i6 alternate members on the committee were
selected at a party congress held in Lhasa from 7 to 12 August.
Jen':3 remarks to the congress, in line with keynote addresses
given in other border provinces, stressed the need to strengthen
frontier defenses against "imperialism, social-imperialism and
Indian expansionism." Jen also took the opportunity to lash
out at "the counterrevolutionary crimes of the Dalai-Panchen
traitorous clique."
RED FLAG SIGNALS AN END TO DEARTH OF READING MATERIALS
Breaking anew with cultural revolution practice, an article
in RED FLAG No. 9 has called on writers and publishing
houses to produce "popular reading material" on a variety
of subjects. Implicitly acknowledging that recent years
have seen a surfeit of "popular political literature"--
writings by and about Mao--the article indicates that the
time has come to produce reading materials "on literature
and art, science and technology, history, geography,
international events, and so forth."
The easing of cultural revolution strictures in regard to
literature had been indicated earlier when several
provincial radio broadcasts observed that old books
could be utilized, albeit critically, in schools. Also,
Peking observers recently reported that a novel was being
sold in the city's bookstores for the first time since
the start of the cultural revolution.
The RED FLAG article pulls few punches in noting the problems
that will be encountered in reviving Chinese literature.
It even indicates that one reason for the current revival
is that if revolutionary books are not produced, particularly
of the popular types "urgently demanded," then "bad books will
poison the masses and youth." Opposition to creating new
materials is said to come from those who believe that creation
of popular literature should be low in priority as well as
from class enemies seeking to poison the minds of youth.
Also,"some comrades" obviously still fear that-harm will come
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from turning out new and original works: "They have held that
publishing reading material on knowledge is wrong, and they
have not dared to compile books in this respect." Such
muddled ideas are of course not at all in crnformity with
Mao's teachings, RED FLAG asserts.
It is suggested that the new works be produced by three-'.n-one
creative groups of cadres, worker-peasant-soldier writers,
and professional personnel. This sharing of responsibility
may be designed to ease the fears of intellectuals wary of
authoring original works. In the same vein, the article
admits that "at the outset some works may be imprudent or
even contain certain mistakes, but if their theme: are correct
we should render active assistance in making then better."
The article also observes, however, that there is no need to
worry even "if poisonous weeds appear" because the masses
"will change them into fertilizer"--possibly too vivid a
metaphor for the more timorous authors.
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