TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: August 4, 1971
• Content Type: TRANS

t q,1,1 N
. .
Approved F. ase.
1-*
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00940f46 2"?z
Confidential
11111011144
FOR
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
RENDS
in Communirt Propaganda
Confidential
4 AUGUST 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 31)
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNINCI
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of :its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorizcd person Is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from eulemelle
dewnpredloq u'd
decleitiketlen
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
CONTENTS
Topir.:s and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
NHAN DAN Attacks on U.S., Giap Remarks Show Pique at PRC .. .
?
.
1
Peking Seeks to Allay Anxieties mf Indochinese Allies
5
USSR Says Sino-U.S. Developments Help U.S. Avoid Reply to PRG
.
.
8
DRV, PRG Press for "Positive" U.S. Response to Peace Plan . .
.
.
10
Le Due Tho Visits Moscow, Faking En Route to Hanoi from Paris
.
.
12
DRV Statement Marks Lao Anniversary; PRC Supports NLHS Plan .
.
.
13
Hanoi Evaluates Military Developments in First Half of 1971 .
.
.
15
CHINA
Peking Propounds "Revolutionary Diplomatic Line" on Army Day
.
.
18
Editorial Seems to Downgrade Lin While Stressing CCP Control
.
.
23
Politburo Members Present at Reception Listed by Rank
24
SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
Bloc Leaders, Minus Ceausescu, Stress Unity at Crimea Meeting
.
.
26
CEMA Communiqve Reflects Price of "Unanimity" on Integration
.
.
28
Hardcore Allies Picturc CEMA as Instrument of Political Unity
.
.
29
Hungarian Premier Stresses Continuing Contacts with West . .
.
.
31
Romania Insiei:s CEMA Integration Will Not Affect Sovereignty
.
.
31
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
PRAVDA Anticipates PRC Rejection of Five-Power Conference Bid
.
.
34
SUDAN
Observer Article, TASS Statement Highlight Protest Campaign .
.
.
37
Communist Media Vary on Role of Sudan CP in 19 July Coup . .
.
?
41
GERMANY
GDR Details Offer to Senat; TASS Edits NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Item
.
45
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
?
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVILN MAJOR ATTENTION 26 JULY - 1 AUGUST 1971
Moscow (3153 items)
Peking (1332 items)
Sudanese Events
(--)
15%
Domestic Issuee
(33%)
33%
[TASS Statements
(--)
6%]
[PLA Anniversary
(--)
16%]
Indochina
(14%)
9%
Indochina
(30%)
15%
[Solidarity Month (8%)
6%]
[Geneva Agreements
(16%)
3%]
RSFSR Supreme Soviet
(--)
6%
Anniversary
Session
[Sihanouk in DPRK
(7%)
3%)
CEMA Session in
(--)
5%
Sierra Leone Finance
(0a%)
11%
Bucharest
Minister in PRC
Cuban National Day
(1%)
5%
DPRK Liberation
(--)
10%
China
(4%)
5%
Anniversary
Lunakhod I
(1%)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
countedP. 8 commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volUme of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
- 1 -
INDOCHINA
Expressions of Hanoi's concern over Sino-U.S. relations reached
a new level of authority on the occasion of the 44th anniversary
on 1 August of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).
Defense Minister Giap's congratulatory message to Lin Piao
was superficially correct, with the usual tribute to the Chinese
revolution and the "esteemed" Chairman Mao and expressions of
appreciation for Chinese aid. But there were elements in the
message, as well as in Giap's speech at the Chinese embassy
reception, which seemed clearly to reflect North Vietnamese
annoyance with China.
Hanoi also chose the 1 August anniversary to publish a lengthy
NHAN DAN Commentator article on the history of "aggressive U.S.
impericalism"; the article made Hanoi's first--albeit oblique--
reference to steps to improve Sino-U.S. relations when it
observed that "recently, the U.S. ruling circles have occasionally
spoken of reassessing the China danger." And it pointedly went
on to say that "the U.S. imperialists, however, can in no way
conceal their sinister designs and cruel schemes against the
Chinese revolution from the clearsighted vision of progressive
mankind."
Peking for the most part has ignored the polemical Hanoi comment,
but it has sought to reassure the Vietnamese, as well as its Laotian
and Cambodian allies, that support for them would not be diminished
by the recent PRC moves to improve relations with the United States.
Support for the PRG's 1 July peace proposal is reiterated on an
authoritative level in a 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article,
pegged to a message from Sihanouk to the Khmer people in which he
said Chou En-lai had reassured him that the Nixon visit would not
change PRC support for Indochina.
Moscow continues to complain that the United States is delaying a
reply to the PRG's seven-point proposal, with many commentators
saying President Nixon's planned trip to Peking aids U.S.
procrastination. They say the trip is aimed at diverting
attention from the war and at making it possible for the United
States to avoid a reply to the PRG proposal. Moscow's support
for the PRG proposal is expressed authoritatively in the
2 August communique on the meeting in the Crimea of the leaders
of "fraternal countries."
NHAN DAN ATTACKS ON U,S., GIAP REMARKS SHOW PIQUE AT PRC
After the barrage of propaganda between 19 and 25 July, evincing
DRV concern that the announcement of the President's planned
visit to Peking had served to deflect attention from the 1 July
Approved For Release 1999/09FIFIEV-kbP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 19995eitak,NciktRDP85TOOMRAM0040032-6
4 AUGUST 1971
- 2 -
PRG peace initiative, the media dispensed with polemical atta,k.
on the United States for almost a week. But on the occasion
of the 44th anniversary of Peking's PLA, on 1 August, Hanoi
again voiced its misgivings about Peking's flirtation with the
country engaged in "imperialist aggression" in Indochina.
Defense Minister Giap's annual congratulatory message to his
counterpart Lin Piao as well as his speech at an anniversary
reception conveyed some of the overtones of the earlier
propaganda, though in less direct fashion. At sharp variance
with the substance of Giap's messages on this occasion for the
past six years, almost half .)f the message this time was devoted
to a discussion of U.S. "aggression" in Indochina in terms
similar to the recent flurry of Hanoi comment assailing the
Nixon Doctrine. Thus, Giap said that the United States, along
with its "criminal war and preparations for new military
adventures," is "resorting to all perfidious moves in the
hope of getting out of its stalemate and improving its difficult
situation. The VIctnamese people and armed forces always
maintain a resolute stand and keep a wary eye on all the
schemes and maneuvers of the enemy . . . ."
Superficially, the message was correct and some of the passages
were verbatim repeats of the language of earlier years: There
was the usual praise for the Chinese revolution and the
"esteemed" Chairman Mao, hope for continuing fraternal fr5.entiship
and militant solidarity between the two peoples, End expressions
of gratitude for the great Chinese support and assistance to
the Vietnamese. But in another break with the language of the
six previous messages, Giap for the first time did not
characterize Chinese assistance as being in the spirit of
"proletarian internationalism." He was also more sparing ln
his use of adjectives this year, expressing "deep gratitude for
the great, precious support and assistance." Last year he had
cited the "wholehearted and firm support and great and effective
assistance full of proletarian internationalism."
A reference to proletarian internationalism did appear in this
year's message in another, seemingly pointed context. While
the message concluded exactly as last year's did, "May the
fraternal friendship and militant solidarity between the peoples
and armies last forever r, it included a reminder in another
passage that the Vietnamese "have always done their best to
consolidate and strengthen [Chinese-Vietnamese] friendship on
the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
3
At the same time, the message did not repeat last year's
assertion that the Vietnamese consider Chinese successes "strong
stimulus for their own revolutionary cause."
It also seems significant that Giap this year paid tribute to the
PRC's contribution to the worldwide struggle only in a historical
context. Thus, after describing the PLA's feats on the way to
the victorious Chinese revolution, he said that this victory
"ushered in the era of socialism in fraternal China while dealing
a very heavy blow at U.S.-led imperialism, greatly contributin&
to the world eo le's stru le for ?eace national inde endence,
democracy, and socialism." The underlined phrase appeared in
last year's message in a current rather than a historical context.
The 1970 message read:
Armed with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought,
with its andaunted fighting spirit and splendid
tradition of struggle, with the rapid progress of
modern military science and technology, the PLA is
now assuming the glorious task of defending the
socialist construction of the Chinese people,
greatly contributing to the cause of peace,
national independence, democrac and socialism
in the whole world.
This year's message used identical language to characterize the
PLA but described its "glorious task" only as "preserving the
gains of the Chinese people's revolution while taking an active
part in the building of socialism with greater and greater
success."
GIAP SPEECH NCNA carried the text of Giap's congratulatory
message, just as it had carried the text of the
21 Julz DRV Foreign Ministry statement marking the anniversary of
the 1954 agreements, with its charge that the United States has
"resorted to insidious tricks to sow division among the socialist
countries In an attempt to pressure the Vietnamese people into
accepting their conditions." However, Peking media have
ignored the polemical Hanoi oress comment, and in reporting Giap's
speech at the Chinese embassy reception on PLA day NCNA omitted
some of his remarks included in the VNA version. (A full text
of Giap's speech has not been carried by VNA or Hanoi radio.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
-4-
As reported by VNA, Giap in his speech cited recent communist
"victories of strategic significance" in Indochina as evidence
of small countries' ability to defeat even U.S. " imperialist
aggression," scored Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, and
said that the U.S. "imperialists" are "resorting to all cruel
and cunning schemes, military as well as political, in an
attempt to save themselves from their predicament." But NCNA's
renort deleted the reference to "cruel and cunning schemes."
NCNA duly reported Giap's reference to the "valuable support
and assistance" from China, but it ignored a later passage in
which he stressed Vietnamese self-reliance. As reported by VNA,
he said. "Relying mainly on our own efforts and enjoying the
sympathy, great support and assistance of the socialist countries
and the world's peoples, we Vietnamese people more than ever
before firmly believe in our invincible strength, are resolved
to defeat completely the U.S. aggressors . . . ."
*IAN DAN The lengthy MAN DAN Commentator article of 1 August,
COMMENTATOR broadcast in installments by Hanoi radio on the 1st
and 2d, uses the device of tracing the history of
U.S. "imperialism" since the Spanish-American War to direct new
jibes at Peking for its courting of the Nixon Administration. It
is after a reference to the Taiwan policy of the "Eisenhower-Nixon
clique" and the persistent policy of U.S. air intrusions and
"provoca,ions" against China that Commentator refers obliquely to
moves to improve Sino-U.S. relations: "Recently, the U.S. ruling
circles have occasionally spoken of reassessing the China danger.
However, the U.S. imperialists can in no way conceal their sinister
designs and cruel schemPs against the Chinese revolution from the
clearsighted vision of progressive mankind."
Echoing a major theme of the polemical Hanoi propaganda beginning
with the 19 July NHAN DAN editorial, Commentator then declares that
a major U.S. aim is to sow disunity among the socialist countries.
While in the earlier comment this aim was put in terms of the Nixon
Doctrine, Commentator says that "to divide and rule has been the
imperialists' traditional stratagem aimed at repressing and
annihilating the revolutionary forces." And he adds bluntly:
In recent years the United States has at certain times
created the impression that there were new changes in
its relations with one country or another . . . . But
the advanced forces leading the various revolutionary
movements in the world have come to realize more and
more clearly that the United States' old rigidity or new
flexibility are dictated by one motive and one basic
objective determined by the unchanged, aggressive nature
of U.S. imperialism.
Approved For Release 19901/IgN.T6iik-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
5
PEKING SEEKS TO ALLAY ANXIETIES OF INDOCHINESE ALLIES
Peking has sought to allay Vietnamese communist uneasiness at
U.S.-PRC moves to improve relations by sustaining its high-
level support for the 1 July PRG seven-point peace initiative
and the Indochinese "struggle" against the United States. Most
notable was a 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article
chastising the United States for its failure to respond to
the PRG seven-point proposal and seeking to take the wind out
of speculation on the convening of a new Geneva conference on
Indochina.
Although keyed to Sihanouk's 24th message to the Khmer nation,
dated 30 July--released by Pyongyang's KCNA on 31 July and
carried in virtually identical form by NCNA on 2 August--the
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article ignored the fact that
Sihanouk's message was devoted to President Nixon's projected
visit to Peking.* However, by quoting selectively from
Sihanouk's message, Commentator stressed his point that "the
problem of Indochina can be settled only by the Indochinese
peoples themselves" on the basis of a total and unconditilnal
withdrawal of all non-Indochinese forces, leaving the
Indochinese "to solve themselves the problems without outside
interference." Sihanouk had prefaced this declaration with
the contention that "the essential subjects of discussions"
between Nixon and Chou En-lai "will probably be confined to
problems directly connected with the United States and the
PRC, for example that of Taiwar, an integral part of China."
In fact, the essence of Sihanouk's message, and the point
which Peking sought to convey to its Indochinese compatriots,
was capsuled in his claim that Chou had "assured" him that
the Nixon visit "would in no way bring a change to the
attitude of the PRC" with respect to its support for the
RGNUC, the Vietnamese communists, and the Laotian Patriotic
Front.
Offering additional assurance, PEOPLE'S DAILY addressed itself
to an alleged rumor concerning the convening of a new Geneva
conference to seek an Indochina-wide settlement, declaring that
"any plot or intrigue of U.S. imperialism that runs counter to
the will and interests of the Indochinese peoples will never
succeed." Citing Sihanouk's revelation of such a plot,
* NCNA's transmission of the Sihanouk message was Peking
media's only mention of the Nixon visit since the original
announcement.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
- 6 -
Commentator charged that the United States, while refusing
"to respond" to the PRG seven-point proposal, has "instigated
its Phnom Penh lackeys to spread the word that a new Geneva
conference would be convened." Claiming that the 1954 Geneva
agreements "have long been thoroughly sabotaged by U.S.
imperialism," Commentator maintained that in the face of
defeat on the Indochina battlefield the United States "is
vainly trying to turn the tide and seek a way out by calling
a new Geneva conference." "This can never be done," PEOPLE'S
DAILY sed, quoting Sihanouk's assertion that "we three
Indochinese peoples are not in need of a new Geneva conference
at all."
Underlining its across-the-board support for the three
Indochinese peoples, Commentator stated that "the correct way"
to solve "the Indochina question" is compliance with the joint
declaration of the summit conference of the Indochinese
peoples, Sihanouk's five-point statement, the PRG's seven-
point proposal, the five-noint political solution of the Lao
Patriotic Front, and the new Lao initiative for a nationwide
cease-fire. Peking echoed its past demand--and "the common
demand of the people of the three Indochinese countries"--
that the United States withdraw "from the whole of Indochina
totally, unconditionally, and immediately." Sihanouk in his
message had called for "the unconditional, total, and rapid
withdrawal" of aggressive forces, but added "or at least the
precise fixation of the date-limit for this withdrawal."
Since Peking in this Commentator article was addressing
itself to the wider Indochina problem--and it was in this
broader context that the denunciation of the call for a
new Geneva conference was made--the demand for a total,
unconditional, and immediate U.S. withdrawal from all of
Indochina cannot be viewed as a hardening of Peking's line on
the more limited Vietnam issue as enunciated in the 4 July
and 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials. Those editorials,
endorsing the 1 July PRG seven-point proposal specifically
focused on point one which calls on the United States to
establish a terminal date in 1971 for troop withdrawal.
Commentator again declared Peking's support of the PRG's
seven-point proposal.
That 1 July PRG initiative has also received sustained
high-level endorsement from other Chinese quarters. In
his speech at the 31 July reception marking the 44th
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
7
anniversary of the PLA, Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng
stated Chinese "firm support" for, among other things, the
PRG's seven-point proposal.* Reporting a speech at a Hanoi
meeting marking the same occasion, NCNA on 1 August cited
the contention of the military attache of the PRC Embassy in
Hanoi that the seven-point proposal "has opened a correct way
for peaceful settlement of the Vietnam question." "But the
Nixon Administration quibbled about this proposal," the
attache added, while pushing Vietnamization and intensifying
military operations. Similarly, a joint Algerian-PRC
communique of 2 August recorded both sides' expression of
"firm support" for the Indochinese peoples and their "full
agreement" with the seven-point proposal, citing the essence
of the first two points. Although the PEOPLE'S DAILY/
LIBERATION ARMY DAILY/RED FLAG joint editorial marking the
PLA's 44th anniversary did not specifically mention the PRG's
initiative, it did express "resolute support" for the
Indochinese peoples and contend that U.S. forces and
"lackey troops" must "unconditionally withdraw from
Vietnam and the whole of Indochina, lock, stock, and barrel."
BACKGROUND ON ISSUE Peking customarily has carried the text
OF GENEVA CONFERENCE of past Sihanouk statement, some of
which have also included rejections
of the notion of an international conference on Indochina, but
it is not known to have previously commenteci on one of his
messages to the Khmer people." On its own authority, Peking
has occasionally reacted negatively to various calls for an
international conference on Indochina, characterizing such
suggestions as a "fraud" or "trick" to get the Indochinese
people to lay down their arm:. In its last previous reference
to the issue Peking reacted in this vein to President Nixon's
call for an Indochina conference included as point two in his
five-point proposal of 7 October 1970. An NCNA commentary on
11 October and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the
13th called the conference proposal a trick and a plot to
"strangle" the Indochinese people's strAggle. A flurry of
negative statements on the President's proposal by Sihanouk
* Li Hsien-nien is the only other elite-level PRC spokesman
reported by Chinese media to have expressed support for the
PRG proposal--at a welcoming banquet for a government delegation
from Sierra Leone on 25 July.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
- 8 -
and his government included a 10 October statement which raised
the question of Chinese participation in a conference. As in
his current statement, Sihanouk said that such a conference
would not succeed without Chinese participation and that the
Chinese would not attend a conference also attended by the
Lon No]. government.
Peking as well as Sihanouk reacted negatively to suggestions
for an interna-,ional conference in the wake of the March 1970
Cambodian coup--by the French cabinet on 1 April, and later
by the three-nation mission of the Djakarta conference--Japan,
Indonesia, and Malaysia. For example, Li Hsien-nien at a
6 June 1970 reception on the PRG anniversary dismissed
efforts of the three-nation mission by saying that the United
States was stepping up "political deception" by "plotting
international conferences under 7arious names."
USSR SAYS SINO-U.S? DEVELOPMENTS HELP U.S. AVOID REPLY TO PRG
Moscow's continued support for the PRG's peace plan is currently
highlighted by the 2 August communique on the meeting held by
the leaders of "fraternal countries"--Moscow's East European
allies, except Romania, plus Mongolia. The communique promises
continued "all-round support" of the Indochinese peoples and
says that the PRG's seven points "constitute a just foundation
for restoring peace and security in Southeast Asia."
Routine comment continues to complain that the United States
is procrastinating on a reply to the PRG's proposal, many
commentators referring to President Nixon's plarni-d trip to
Peking in this context. Commentators continue to question
how it can be a "peace trip," as described by the President,
since it comes at a time when aggression is continuing in
Indochina. Commentators recall that the President himself
said the trip was not connected to an end to the Indochina
war, and they charge that the trip is aimed at diverting
attention from the war and setting the stage for the 1972
election campaign. They say that the propaganda campaign
raised in the United States over the trip is making it
unnecessary for the President to reply to the PRG proposal,
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1.971
-9
and several commentators cite a New York TIMES article asserting
that the President's new policy toward China has sent the Paris
talks back toward a stalemate.*
Moscow criticizes Peking's Indochina policies in some Radio
Peace and Progress broadcasts in Mandarin. A 1 August
commentary again cites Hanoi's charge that President Nixon's
policy is aimed at dividing the socialist countrils and adds
that Washington is making use of Peking's long-standing
splittist policies and refusal to join in united action to
help the Indochinese people. A 3 August commentary, which
also charges that the United States is exploiting Peking's
anti-Soviet, splitting policies to escalate the war, says
that such escalation has been stepped up in the wake of
Kissinger's visit to Peking and the invitation to President
Nixon.
1* Moscow does not mention that the article, by Tad Szulc,
noted that some observers had concluded that Peking would be
unable to settle the Vietnam war except on Hanoi's terms in
view of Hanoi's expressed opposition to may "big power"
solution to the conflict.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 199@eng?N.,.EiRk-RDP85T09?7E5INER00040032-6
4 AUGUST 1971
- 10 -
DRV, PRG PRESS FOR "POSITIVE" UIS, RESPONSE TO PEACE PLAN
Vietnamese communist propaganda on the 1 July PRG proposal is
confined largely to continued pickups of world reaction hailing
it as a reasonable and correct basis for achieving peace in
Vietnaw. The only available comment since the 25 July NHAN DAN
Commentator article comes in a Liberation Radio broadcast of
31 July which scores the lack of U.S. response to the proposal
and U.S. efforts to clarify its various points. The radio
notes that Ambassador Bruce at the 22 July Paris session "again
asked for more clarification" of the "perfectly clear" point one
on troop withdrawal and prisoner release. It adds darisively
that h-uce "pretends to be deaf" and tries to avoid a serious
discussion by asking for more clarification.
The Vietnamese communist delegates at the 29 July Paris
session again criticized the United States for its "intensifica-
tion of aggression" and "negative" attitude toward the PRG
proposal. They again urged a "serious" response--particularly
to the two basic points on a U.S. troop withdrawal deadline and
an end to U.S. backing of the Thieu administration.
Both the LPA and VNA accounts reported that PRG Foreign Minister
Mme. Binh again assailed the United States for attempting to
evade negotiations by "rehashing its worn-out proposal for a
'cease-fire in place" which, she said, is aimed at legalizing
both U.S. occupation of South Vietnam and the "puppet
administration." (The accounts do not reflect the fact that
Mme. Binh's brief remarks on the U.S. call for a cease-fire were
prompted by Ambassador Bruce's statement at the 22 July session.
The Vietnamese communist post-session press briefings?which, as
usual, go unreportld in the media--indicate that both Mae. Binh
and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy in the rebuttal period recalled
that the cease-fire proposal had been previously rejected.)
The VNA account reports Xuan Thuy's charge that the
Administration's "continued refusal to set" a withdrawal date
in 1971 after the PRG's offer on prisoner release proves that
it has been using the prisoners to hide its real intention
of prolonging the war and continuing to impose the Thieu
regime on the South Vietnamese people. VNA does not report
that Thuy cited recent remarks by President Nixon and Secretary
of Defense Laird on continuing Vietnamization and aid as
evidence of U.S. intent to continue the war. Xuan Thuy at
the 22 July session and the Commentator article of the 25th
had deplored the Administration's "hypocrisy" on the POW issue.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FH1G TRENDO
Ii AUGUST 1971
Liberation Radio has continued to broadcast purported statements
by U.S. prisoners commenting on the, PRGIo proposal, and Hanoi
Joined in with a 2 August English-language broadcast of a
message from two U.S. nrisoners in the North. Addressed to
Congress "via Representative McCloskey and Senator McGovern,"
the message briefly notes point one of the PRG proposal and
urges that a date for troop withdrawal "be set by legislativa
act" to end the war so that Vietnam "will then be free to
settle its own internal affairs."
BRUCE STATEMENT Regarding Ambassador Bruce's statement at
the session on the 29ch, VNA charges that
he "kept evading a response to the seven-point peace plan set
forth" by Mine. Binh a month ago and that he "slandered the DRV
in a bid to justify the U.S. continued acts against the DRV* and
intensified acts of aggression against South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia." Thus VNA obscures his specific charge of heightened
DRY military activity in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), particularly
the building of a road through the western part of the DMZ joining
roads in North Vietnam with those in the South. VNA says
Ministers Thuy and Binh "laid bare the obstinate, negative, and
slanderous allegations of the United States." It dismisses
Ambassador Lam's prepared statement in one sentence: "For his
part, the representative of the Saigon puppet administration
only rehashed Nguyen Van Thieu's bellicose claims."
Vietnamesc communist media have not mentioned that the 29 July
session marked Ambassador Bruce's last appearance as head of
the U.S. delegation and that he will be succeeded by Ambassador
Porter on a date yet to be announced. (The communist spokesmen
at the post-session briefing, responding to questions about
Bruce's resignation, took tlie tack that the important thing is
the President's policy.)
* North Vietnam to date has not protested the acknowledged U.S.
activity against the North on 29 and 30 July, although Hanoi
did claim that an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane was downed
on 31 July over Quang Binh Province, bringing the DRV's tally
of downed U.S. aircraft to 3,396.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONPIDNNTlAri FB TO TRENDO
Ii AUOUUT 1971
LE DUC THO VISITS MOSCOW, PEKING EN ROUTE TO HANOI FROM PARIS
Le Due Tholo departure from Paris on 28 July--after a five-week
stay dating from 21 June--was reported promptly by Hanoi the
following day. WIA and Hanoi radio reported his arrival back
in Hanoi on 2 August, noting that he wau accompanied by Nguyen
Minh Vy, deputy head of the DRV delegation to the Paris talks.*
Also on the 2d, Hanoi mentioned hie stopovers in both Moscow
and Peking.
STOPOVER In Moscow from 28 to 30 July, Le Due Tho met with
IN MOSCOW Politburo member Klrilenko for "warm and cordial"
talks. According to both Moscow and Hanoi media,
they discussed the further strengthening of friendship and
cooperation between the two countries and the "development of
the situation" in Indochina. The Soviet side expressed support
for the PRG's seven-point peace proposal and promised to
continue to do "everything necessary" to help the Vietnamosa
people's cause. Le Due Tho emphasized Vietnamese determination
to fight until victory and expressed gratitude for tha USSR's
"constant assistance and support."
TASS had reported on 22 June that Le Due Tho met with both
Kirilenko and Katushev while in Moscow en route to Paris after
attending the East German party congress, but did not indicate
the substance of their talks. Hanoi media never mentioned Tho's
brief stopover in Moscow in June; VNA merely noted on 24 June
that Le Due Tho had left for Paris that day after attending
the East German congress, obscuring the fact that his departure
was from Moscow.
Le Due Tho had also stopped in Moscow on his last previous
trip to Paris, for the French Communist Party congress in
January 1970, but .there were no reports that he met any Soviet
leaders. On his isTay home in April that year he attended the
Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow. he mel; with Kosygin
and once with Mazurov during a number of his earlier trips in
1968 and 1969.
* A 2 August message in VNA's service channel from Paris to
Hanoi noted that Le Chan, Director of the VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY
in Paris will also leave for Hanoi on 10 August, arriving there
late in the month.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL 101310 THEM
h AUGUOT 1971
-13-
STOPOVER During his stopover in Peking from 3' July to
IN PEKING 2 August, Le Due Tho held talks with Chou En-lai
in what NCNA described an "a warm atmosphere" and
had "a cordial and friendly conversation" with Oamdech Penn
Nouth, prime minister of Sihanouk's RGNUC. The subjects covered
were not reported. Following the talks, Chou hooted a banquet
in Le Duc Tho' s honor on 1 August. The 31 July NCNA report of
his arrival in Peking stated that he was on his way home "from
Paris," with no mention of a stopover in Moscow. Both his
arrival and departure, on 2 August, were attended by a high-level
Chinese delegation headed by Li'Hsien-nien and including Kong
Pia?, Li Chiang, Fang I, Han Nien-lung, and Lu Wei-chao.
On his last visit to Peking, 9-11 June on route to the BED
congress, Le Duc Tho held talks with Huang Yung-sheng,
Politburo member and PLA chief of general staff, and was
honored at a banquet hosted by Huang. Those talks were reported
by NCNA on 10 June to have proceeded "in a mont cordial and
friendly atmosphere," a more effusive characterization than
that of the 1 August talks with Chou. Le Duc Tho was not
reportee to have met with Chou during his June stopovev, although
on 13 June, two days after his departure, Chou met with Vice
Premier Le Thanh Nghi, who was returning from the Mongolian
party congress.
DRV STATEMENT MARKS LAO ANNIVERSARY; PRC SUPPORTS NLHS PLAN
The customary DRV :oreign Ministry statement marking the ninth
anniversary of the signing of the Geneva agreements on Laos
(23 July) was not released until 1 August, three days later
than last year's. A PRG Foreign Ministry statement was relased
on 29 July.* Both statements reiterate support for the NLHS'
22 June proposal which called for a cease-fire throughout Laos
"including" a cessation of U.S. bombing, to be followed by talks
between the "parties concerned" in Laos. The DRV statement
echoes the earlier NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary, scoring
the United States and its Vientiane "stooges" for having
"rejected" the proposal and for mustering Vientiane "rightist,"
Vang Pao, and Thai troops to launch a big operation in the
Plain of Jars-Xieng Khouang region.
* See the 28 July TRENDS, pages 14-15, for a discussion of
initial propaganda on the anniversary.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 199%9014dircA6-RDP85T09,?NINAB00040032-6
4 AUGUST 1971
NCNA duly carried the full text of the DRV statement, but
Peking, consistent with its unal low-key treatment, hns not
commented on the anniversary. Peking did, however, voice its
first official endorsement of the NLRB' 22 June peace
initiative: Huang Yung-sheng, in a 31 July PLA anniversary
speech, praised the NLHS five-point program and its "new
proposal for a nationwide cease-fire." The 3 August PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article on Sihanouk's statement repeats
the formulation in the course of its reassurance of Chinese
support for all the Indochinese peoples. Peking had previously
limited itself to reportage of foreign comment on the initiative.
TASS briefly reported the Vietnamese statements on the Geneva
Agreements anniversary but otters no comment of its own.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONEMENWAL FBIO TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
-15-
HANOI EVALUATES MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN FIRST HALF OF 1971
A flurry of recent Hanoi commentaries, using the device of a
review of the Indochina fighting during the first nix months
of the year, reiteratesconclusions stated earlier on the basis
of "strategic victories" achieved during Operation Lam Son 719.
It is standard DRV practice to review military accomplishments
biannually, but there seems this time to be an unusual
concentration of authoritative propaganda similar to that in
mid-1970 in the wake of the incursion into Cambodia. The
current propaganda includes a 14 July QUAD DOI NHAN DAN
editorial, an article by "Chien Thang" (The Victor) published
in the 2 August issues of both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN,
and an article by "Truc Chien" (Combat Alert) published in
installments in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN at the end of July. In
addition, there is an unusual, if not unique, Hanoi radio
series of panel discussions on the war featuring editors from
the radio and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, broadcast in the domestic
service from 26 July through 3 August.
As earlier propaganda had done, the current comment indicates
that the communists regard 1971 and 1972 as crucial years in
defeating Vietnamization and turning the tide in their favor.
Some of the comment again presses the notion that main force
action is necessary to radically change the development of the
war, thus raising the possibility that communist offensive
action will be stepped up.
1971-72 TEST OF Alleged communist military achievements in
VIETNAMIZATION the first half of the year are hailed in
the Hanoi commentaries as the greatest
victories since the Tet offensive of early 1968. Just as the
Tet offensive has been portrayed as the blow which persuaded
the United States to change to a "defensive strategy" and stop
the bombing of the North, so military achievements this year
are said to be significant steps in forcing President Nixon to
abandon Vietnamization and the "prolongation" of the war.
The 14 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, for example, echoing
comment during the campaign against Operation Lam Son 719,*
* A 22 March QUAN DOT NHAN DAN article attributed to the military
commentator Chien Binh (Combatant) claimed that the allied "defeat"
in Laos was a blow at the Nixon Administration's will and, warning
of "catastrophes" in the future, said that the President "cannot
refuse to change his strategy." (See the 31 March TRENDS, page 4.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/W/19NIRDP85T008MOM9040032-6
It AUGUST 1971
- 16 -
claimed that "strategically significant victories" in the past
six months "constitute a strong blow at the Nixon clique's
aggressive will . . . , forcing it to re-examine its Vietnamization
policy."
Underlining the importance of 1971 and 1972, Hanoi propagandiss
maintain that the allies were forced to launch major operatiolP;
!AI Laos and Cambodia in hopes of stabilizing the situation in
South Vietnam prior to the GVN elections this year and the U.S.
presidential election next year. A participant in the series of
radio panel discussions typically remarked that 1971 was the
"key year" for U.S. strategic policies. He went on to note
the timing of the elections in South Vietnam and the United
States, commenting that President Nixon's plans to stabilize
the situation have failed and that the Americans have therefore
encountered "great political difficulties" as well as difficulties
on the battlefield.
Propaganda during Lam Son 719 in February and March this year also
repeatedly made the point that the ARVN offensives in Laos and
Cambodia were part of an allied effort to prevent major communist
attacks during the 1971-72 election years. In addition, an
article by Ha Van in the March-April issue of the Hanoi journal
TUYEN HUAN (Propaganda and Training) speculated that the prospects
for the coming 1971-72 dry season were "increasingly desperate"
for the allies in view of the timing of the U.S. presidential
election campaign and the disadvantageous change in the balance
of forces which will result from a continuing withdrawal of
U.S. troops.
THE ROLE OF Some of the current comment again stresses the
MAIN FORCES importance of main force unit action. The Chien
Thang article claimed that an "outstanding
feature" of the situation in the last six months was the fact
that "liberation main force units . . . annihilated the enemy's
big army corps while they were being deployed in large-scale
combat formations." He went on to note the impact of offensives
by main force units and their unique role in fighting "big
battles of annihilation" as well as in striking at the enemy's
strongest forces and "thereby definitely weakening him." The
offensive blows of main forces, according to Chien Thang,
"contribute toward upsetting and confusing enemy strategies,
rapidly changing the balance of forces and the situation on the
battlefield, and creating a radical development in the war."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/2p0:NFINDAFO5T00875ROBOB3MN4D1032-6
4 AUGUST 1971
-17-
In a similar vein, a panelist in the radio discussion on the
27th cryptically hailed the "victories" in Laos as "opening a
new era for fighting annihilating battles." On the 29th a
panelist emphasized that the "revolutionary forces" were "in
their best shape ever" and noted pointedly that, having defeated
an anew, if your forces remain in good shape you can "continue
to step up the offensive tempo and attack the enemy again when
the latter is panic-stricken and on the verge of collapse."
Both the 14 July WAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial and a panelist in
the final discussion program maintained that "victories" this
year have "opened prospects" for defeating the allies "militarily."
The claim that mi1itary victory can be achieved, implicitly
raising the possibility of stepped-up fighting to obtain that
end, had not often appeared in Hanoi propaganda in recent years
prior to Lam Son 719. A 2 April article by Chien Binh departed
from the usual Hanoi pattern of vaguely stating that victory was
certain, arguing instead that the communists were fully able to
defeat the allies "militarily."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 199n9EgAl?"-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
PHIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
-18-
CHINA
PEKING PROPOUNDS "REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC LINE" ON ARMY DAY
Peking has used the occasion of the 44th PLA anniversary to propound
its "revolutionary diplomatic line," in effect justifying the kinds
of demarche that have produced invitations to President Nixon and
Burma's Ne Win--both formerly reviled as "fascist" and anti-Chinese--
to visit the PRC. At the same time, Peking has sought to reaffirm
Its commitments to anti-U.S. forces and has called for U.S.
withdrawal from Taiwan and other areas in Asia. In the wake of the
PLA anniversary comment, containing Peking's most comprehensive
statement of foreign policy since the announcement on President
Nixon's visit, Peking on 4 August reacted sharply to Secretary
Rogers' statement on the China representation question in the United
Nations by accusing the United States of playing a "clumsy 'two
Chinas' trick."
Peking marked the PLA anniversary with the usual reception,
held on 31 July and addyeased by Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng,
and a 1 August joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and
LIBERATION ARMY DAILY. Peking's dual approach to revolution and
diplomacy was illustrated by the honored status of a leader of the
Burmese communist insurgents at the reception held on the same day
NCNA announced the invitation to Ne Win. In addition to the Burmese
communist, Ba Thein Tin, the guests of honor included the premier of
Sihanouk's government, Penn Nouth; Le Duc Tho, stopping over in
Peking en route home from the Paris talks; and diplomatic representatives
from Peking's allies plus the Palestine Liberation Organization
representative. As is customary for gatherings of this sort, NCNA
noted the presence of the head of the Soviet delegation to the border
talks.
DIPLOMATIC LINE As in other pronouncements during the period of
Peking's diplomatic drive beginning last fall,
comment on the PLA anniversary has celebrated the PRC's broadening
international relations. The joint editorial confers the highest
sanction on this development by describing the "great victories"
achieved by "Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line," a formulation
contrived to clothe Peking's pronounced shift toward diplomatic
approaches with Maoist revolutionary rhetoric. The editorial refers
to closer ties with unnamed communist countries and to growing
relations with third-world countries. It also takes note of the
intensive practice of peopll's diplomacy, singling out contacts with
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
-19-
the American people for special mention. According to the
editorial, the continuing expansion of the PRC's diplomatic
relations demonstrates that the U.S. policy of "blockading and
isolating China has failed completely."
There was no mention in anniversary comment of President Nixon's
forthcoming visit, a subject on which Peking has been silent since
it carried the original announcement.* But the editorial's
exposition of Peking's "revolutionary diplomatic line," taken
together with its portrayal of the United States "now declining
just as the star of the British Empire did," provides a
rationale for the demarche. Though there is no direct reference
to negotiations in expounding the diplomatic line, the editorial
contains an allusion to basic Maoist scripture on the subject in its
call in this context for study of "the historical experience of
our party in carrying out tit-for-tat struggles" against the enemy.
A recent source for such a study, the 1 July joint editorial article
on the CCP's 50th anniversary, quoted Mao as having explained that
"sometimes not going to negotiations was tit for tat, and sometimes
going to negotiations was also tit for tat." This passage, from
Mao's 1945 report "On the Chungking Negotiations," was cited in the
1 July article's discussion of Mao's trip to Chungking for negotiations
with Chiang Kai-shek.** The 1 August editorial, while treading
gingerly along the delicate subject of President Nixon's visit, has thus
subtly made use of a scriptural fragment and a significant formulation
in a highly charged context to signal a policy line implying a major
role for negotiations.
* Apart from the announcement, the only mention of the invitation
to the President in PRC media was contained in Sihanouk's 24th
message to the Khmer people, transmitted by NCNA on 2 August. A
3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article pegged to Sihanouk's
message carefully avoided any mention of the invitation. See the
Indochina section of this TRENDS.
** Mao'r 1945 report was invoked to justify negotiating with the
enemy in comment broadcast by the Kiangsu provincial radio shortly before
the opening o: the Sino-Soviet border talks in October 1969. This
line was not picked up in the central media and was not heard in other
provinical media.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
- 20 -
TAIWAN While preparing the ground for negotiations, Peking
has also staked out a tough position on the Taiwan
question. Expressing concern over efforts within the international
community to seek an accommodation on this. question falling
short of the PRC's demand., the editorial reiterates opposition to
versions of a two-Chinas solution, the Taiwan independence movement,
and the proposition that sovereignty over Taiwan remains unsettled.
Both the editorial and Huang Yung-sheng's speech renew the call for
withdrawal of U.S. military forces and installations from Taiwan
and the Straits, one of Peking's long-standing conditions (along
with an agreement on peaceful coexistence) for Sino-U.S.? detente.
The editorial and the speech are particularly notable for their
pitch to the people on Taiwan to hitch their wagon to the PBC as the
vehicle and focus of Chinese patriotism rather than to calculate on the
advantages of independence of mainland authority. As the editorial
puts it, "We are confident that our patriotic compatriots in Taiwan
will not allow any foreign forces of aggression to sever Taiwan from
the rest of the territory of China."
Last year on this occasion Peking limited itself to pro forma
expressions of resolve to "liberate" Taiwan and a generalized demand
for "U.S. imperialism" to "get out" of Taiwan. Huang last year
mentioned the army as well as the people as being determined to
liberate Taiwan; th4s year, perhaps less provocatively, he did not
mention the army, declaring simply, "We are determined to liberate
Taiwan." Both the editorial and Huang's speech this year contain
the assertion that this matter "is China's internal affair and
brooks no foreign interference," a standard line consistent with
Peking's position since the 1950's that the U.S. presence is a subject
for negotiations but that control over Taiwan is an internal
question.
On 4 August Peking responded to Secretary Rogers' statement two
days earlier that the United States will support the seating of
the PRC in the United Nations while opposing expulsion of the ROC.
A report carried by NCNA and the Peking radio treated the U.S. move
as an effort to implement a two-China's poliuy that "is absolutely
illegal and futile." The report expressed concern over indications
that the United States will seek to have the question of the ROC's
explusion handled as an important question requiring a two-thirds
majority. It did not mention the question of the Security Council
seat, though it twice referred to China's "seats" in the United Nations.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
-21-
Peking's prompt reaction to the Rogers statement suggests its
concern to koep up pressures on UN members to meet its demands
and to avert a two-Chinas arrangement. As in Peking's report
on the China representation vote last fall, the 4 August report
noted that the pro-PRC resolution won a majority vote "amid
thunderous applause," adding that this year's resolution has won
warm approval and support from more countries." The report
concluded with an expression of hope that "the justice-upholding
countries" will not permit obstruction of the PRC's entry. The
report failed, however, to specify what position the PRQ would
take should it be invited to join without the ROC 's expulsion.
The report pointedly took note of the Secretary's statement that
the decision taken "is fully in accord with President Nixon's
desire to normalize relations" with the PRC. According to Peking,
this "fully lays bare the counterrevolutionary double-dealing tricks
of U.S. imperialism which says one thing and does another." The
report did not, however, go on to draw implications from the decision
for Sino-U.S. relations. Moreover, the report's vague attribution
of plots and tricks to "U.S. imperialism" contrasts with Peking's
reaction to an earlier move which it interpreted as aimed at a two-
Chinas approach--State repartment spokesman Bray's 28 April remarks
terming sovereignty over Taiwan an unsettled question. A 4 March
NCNA report on Bray's remarks repeatedly mentioned the Nixon
Administration by name in daning its gestures to improve relations
and warning the Administration not to "cling to its hostility" toward
the Chinese.
PROLETARIAN The PLA anniversary editorial sought to balance
INTERNATIONALISM its exposition of Peking's diplomatic line with
assurances that the Chinese remain faithful to
their revolutionary commitments. Peking's foreign policy as outlined
in the editorial follows standard lines: relations with communist
countries on the baEis of proletarian internationalibm; support for
revolutionary struggles; and peaceful coexistence with countries having
different social systems. A week earlier, speaking at a banquet for a
visiting Sierra Leone delegation, Li Hsien-nien prefaced a statement of
support for the anti-U.S. forces in Indochina by hailing proletarian
internationalism as "the highest principle guiding China's foreign
policy."
A passage in the editorial pledging support for revolutionary and anti-
U.S. forces opens with the avowal that "whoever opposes imperialism
or makes revolution has our support." Complementing its demand for
U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan, the e0itorial also includes demands for
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09C2AiRefERP85T0087Wpg9040032-6
4 AUGUST 1971
-22-
withdrawal of American forces from Indochina, South Korea, and
Japan. In Huang's speech the list was extended to include the
Philippines and Thailand.
SOVIET UNION The editorial gets in the usual thrust at the
superpowers, naming the United States and the Soviet
Union, and it updates a notion from the early 1960's in charging
that the two superpowers ceek to extend their power into "the vast
intermediate zone." The editorial gives short shrift to "social
imperial:am," omitting to mention the Soviets by name in this
context while denouncing the doctrines of limited sovereignty and
the socialist community. Last year's editorial had made pointed
charges about Soviet troop deployments along the Chinese border
and portrayed a threat from the Soviets. The change in mood is
reflected in the difference in the titles of the anniversary
editorials, last year's "Heighten Vigilance, Defend the Motherland"
now giving way to a vacuous "Commemorate 1 Aug tat, Army Day."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/0905F.IMRDP85T00878R0002013040032-6
It AUGUST 1971
-23-
EDITORIAL SEEMS TO DOWNGRADE LIN WHILE STRESSING CCP CONTROL
The joint editorial seems to diminish somewhat the status of
Mao and Lin vis-a-vis the PLA, especially that of Lin as the
leader currently in control Of the PLA. Along with other
Army Day articles and speeches the editorial speaks of the
FLA as a force "founded and led" by Mao and "commanded" by
Lin; previously, since 1967, the general practice has been
to refer to the PLA as "personally founded and led" by Mao
and "directly commanded" by Lin. Also, the toasts proclaimed
by Huang Yung-sheng at the reception banquet refer to Mao
as "great leader" rather than "supreme commander" and drop
Lin's title of "deputy supreme commander."
In addition, the editorial depersonalizes the control of
the army by noting that the army places itself "under
the party's absolute leadership, going where the party,
directs," though it is still "acting as Chairman Mao teaches."
And the army "identifies its responsibility to the people with
its responsibility to the leading organs of the party."
Officially, Lin's direct control over the military seems to
be unchanged with Army Day messages still referring to him
as Minister of National Defense. The new format may merely
reflect a felt need to downplay Lin's military role somewhat
so as not to call into question the dictum, "the party
commands the gun," should he accede to the party chairmanship.
The editorial does seem to go further in this direction than
strictly necessarr, however. For the first time since the
cultural revolution began, tne Army Day editorial contains
no quotation from Lin which all should heed, not even his
injunction to study Mao. And in an unusual remark, bordering
on a warning to anyone trying to force a policy against the
army's collective will, the editorial observes that the army
"has maintained remarkable unity in its own ranks as well as
with those outside its ranks."
At the same time, in a marked departure from previous
practice, the editorial stresses that the PLA must be firmly
under party control. For the first time on Army Day since
1967, when radical leaders with power over the media used
separate editorials in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and
LIBERATION ARMY DAILY to urge closer control over the
military, the editorial this year noted Mao's statement
that "the party colmnaads the gun, and the gun must never
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09126101A-RDP85T00876R9Q010040032-6
4 AUGUST 1971
-24-
be allowed to command the party." The PLA is referred to as
d powerful weapon of the CCP and the Chinese people,"
invincible only because it is "boundlessly loyal to the party,
the people, the great leader Chairman Mao, and his proletarian
revolutionary line.?
The theme of party control over the army, which 4s intermittently
trought to notice in Chinese propaganda, had not ceen raised
i4 recent Army Day editorials. The re-emergence of the theme
in the editorial this year may reflect the fact of the formation
of provincial party organs to which local units should look for
party control. Since most party committees are headed by military
leaders,much of the possible opposition to a reassertion of party
corrol would probably be neutralized.
Probably, however, the reassertion of party authority is a reflection
of a more general campaign for ideological rectification aimed
at remnants of the 16 May group; although a "radical!' group, it
has been closely tied by Peking to elements in the army including
deposed acting chief of staff Yang Cheng-wu. The fallibility of
the army when not led by party leadership imbued with Mao's
thought was the major thesis of an NCNA article on 31 July which
reviewed the history of the PLA with emphasis on the line that
"whenever Chairman Mao's revolutionary line is interfered with,
the army suffers losses."
This ticle contains reminiscences by an old soldier recalling
deviations from both the left and the right which resulted in
disasters. It outlines Mao's specific actions for instituting
party control over the PLA, with party braLches and committees at
all levels, carrying the system up to "the whole army" which was
placed "under the unified leadership of the front committee of
the party." The article does not specify that the civilian party
apparatus exercised power over the military at any level below the
central apparatus, possibly an indication that the current campaign
for greater party cc_trol refers to the role of the party vis-a-vis
the army in strem;thening ideological controls rather than to the
assumption of control over the military by local civil party organs.
POLITBURO MEMBERS PRESENT AT RECEPTION LISTED BY RANK
Eleven full Politburo members, headed by Chou En-lid, attended the
Peking Army Day reception addressed by Huang Yung-sheng. Last
year the comparable reception was attended by the same 11 leaders,
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/Mkg*RP85T008715R00090p40032-6
h AMUR 1971
-25-
plus Standirg Committee members Chen Po-La and Kang Sheng, and
PRC Vice Chairman Tung P1-vu. Lin Piao has not appeared, at
the annual Army Day reception since before the start of the
cultural revolution.
On this occasion, for the first time pince the Ninth Party
Congress in 1969, the leaders present for a major holiday
turnout were listed according to Politburo rank rather than
stroke order (Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order). There
have previously been partial leadership turnouts in which the
names were listed in non-stroke order, but the nature of the
occasion -- government, cultural, or whatever -- obviated any
strictly hierarchical listing.
Now the Army Day rankings confirm that Mao's wife, Chiang Ching,
ranks above PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng. In 1970 there
had been some variation in their listings; earlier tht7 year, when
they both appeared, Chiang had always been listed first, but
these occasions were mostly of a cultural nature. Her senior
party position now seems to be confirmed by the fact that ghe is
listed, on Army Day, ahead of Huang.
Chu Te is the only Politburo member to be making his initial
appearance under non-stroke-order conditions. Although the aged
military leader probably retains little effective power, he does
hold on to a middle Politburr ranking, above several active
members.
Among secondary leaders attending the reception was Teng Hai-ching,
former head of the revolutionary committee in Inner Mongolia. He
is the first deposed provincial chief to surface in the official
media--and after he had made po public appearances since October 1969.
Teng was listed among other PLA leaders in a group that included
officers from the Peking Military Region, of which he was formerly
a deputy commander. He is ranked following all other full Central
Committee members in the group.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDHNTIAh 1' B1U TIMM
h MUT 071
- 6 -
SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS
BLOC LEADERS, MINUS CEAUSESCU, STRESS UNITY AT CRIMEA MEETING
Moscow's concern to present a united front with its allies in
the face of the developing Peking-Washington rapprochement and
the recent events in the Middle East is registered in the
communique on the 2 August meeting of "several" Soviet bloc
first secretaries "vacationing" in the Crimea after the CEMA
Council session of 27-29 July. The 2 August communique also
reflects mounting Soviet concern over Romania's continuing
resistance to coordination of its foreign policy with its
Warsaw Pact allies. Romania's Ceausescu was the conspicuous
sole absentee in the Crimea, in the wake of the CEMA session
in Bucharest where the Romanians apparently succeeded in
watering down the Soviet Union's plans for economic
"integration" as one facet of its drive to cement bloc unity.
The communique on the Crimea meeting emphasizes the "mounting
importance" of "cooperation" among the socialist countries
"on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and
socialist internationalism"--code words for loyalty to
Moscow. Arguing the need for communist unity in the context
of the class struggle, the document reaffirms the "correctness"
of the stand of the Moscow international party conference of
June 1969 on the continuing need to combat "rightwing and
leftwing opportunism" and to rally "all progressive and
national liberation forces in the anti-imperialist struggle."
The party chiefs, according to the communique, "touched on
topical questions of the development of the world communist
movement as well as foreign policy problems of mutual interest."
Following statements of Soviet positions on European problems,
Indochina, and the Middle East,* it says the meeting passed
in "a cordial, friendly atmosphere and was marked by complete
unanimity and mutual understanding on all the questions
considered." In addition to Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and
Shelest, the Soviet delegation included Katushev and
Ponomarev, CPSU secretaries in charge of ruling and nonruling
international party affairs, respectively.
* See also the Indochina and Sudan sections of this TRENDS.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CoNVIDNNTIAI, 1011111 TIMM
Ii WPM
FOLLOWUP In roltowup oommonL, Uovlot blots mod44 howe played
COMMENT the Lheme of the need for unity al it lime when the
"Impart:1110A" are trying to exploit differences In
the International communint movement. The prominence of the
Luau(' of relation(' with China in the Crimea deliberations wan
pointed up In a talk broadcast by Radio Prague in Czech and
Slovak to citizenn abroad on the 3d. Strensing the "political
nignificance" of the Crimea meeting in view of the "hectic
pace of political events" internationally, the commentator
remarked that "Washington is evolving v detailed concept of
how to exploit a new factor in international relations: the
activity of the People's Republic of China with regard to
the United States." It added that this policy "has the
evident intention to weaken the positions of the Soviet Union"
and the socialist countries' peace offensive.
ADN's report of a 4 August NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial on the
Crimea meeting begins and ends on a note of the urgency of
communist unity. It says "the meeting again proven that
unity and its further consolidation are the determining
factor in the community of socialist states," adding here
that the GDR is "a firm and unshakable part of this community."
After reviewing the subjects discussed at the meeting, it
stresses that "unity in the broadest sense is needed" to
solve these tasks.
A 4 August RUDE PRAVO editorial on the meeting, citing
"differences in views in the international communist movement,"
says "world imperialism . . . is attempting to misuse various
revisionistic trends, Trotskyism, and anarchistic tendencies"
to dilute socialism's world influence and weaken communist
unity. It adds that "events of recent weeks" indicate that
the imperialists are "attempting to misuse anti-Sovietism,
covering up their antisocialist aims with leftwing cliches,"
which it says demonstrate the need for struggle against
right and left opportunism to strengthen unity.
ROMANIAN The Bucharest SCINTEIA reported bricifly on 3 August
BEHAVIOR that the Crimea meeting was held, listing the
participants and noting that the East European
leaders were "now vacationing in the Soviet Union." On
the substance of the talks, it said only that the participants
"informed one an her on the progress of socialist and
communist construction in their countries and broached topical
questions on the international situation in the communist
movement."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
ow' DP:NT I Al1 1013111 THIN1J11
AUCHHIT 471
- 213 -
Also on 3 Augunt, the Romaniann lined the forum of the Geneva
dlinaTuumnit talks to reiterate their views on the need for
regional disarmament measuree in the Balkans and more broadly--
according to AOERPRES? account of remarks at the session by
Romanian Ambassador Ion Datchu--for withdrawal of foreign
troops to their own national boundaries, for concomitant
abolition or military blocs, and for all countries to "refrain
from any act generating tension." On the same day, TABS and
MTI announced the start of Warsaw Pact "tactical cooperation
maneuvers" code-named Opal 71 involving Soviet, Czechoslovak,
and Hungarian troopc under the direction of the Huncarian
Defense Ministry, presumably taking place chiefly on the
territory of Romania's northwest neighbor.
CEMA COMMUNIQUE REFLECTS PRICE OF "UNANIMITY" ON INTWATION
Released in the media of the CEMA member countries on 29 July,
the communique on the 25th CEMA Council session emerges as a
patchwork document reflecting the compromises necessary to
achieve "unanimity" on the 15-20 year "complex program" for
phased economic integration. Hungarian Premier Fock, in an
MTI interview after his return home, stated that the program
had not been "adopted smoothly" and that there were "serious
debates." The communique, phrased in such a way as to
accommodate the varying and conflicting views of the
implications and acceptable bounds of "integration," contains
ingredients that have enabled each of the participants to
express satisfaction in subsequent comment--and in the
process to bring the differences and crosscurrents into
sharper relief.
Treating the new program in broad general terms, in advance
of its publication in full in the press "in the ensuing
days," the communique is at pains to emphasize that the
program "has been endorsed unanimously." It underscores
in another passage the formal commitment secured from all
the participants: They "reasserted unanimously that their
countries are absolutely willing to undertake every
organizational, economic, and juridical measure that is
necessary to ensure an efficient fulfillment of the complex
program." It asserts that the 24th CEMA Council session in
Warsaw in May 1970 had also "unanimously" endorsed the
integration program in its earlier developmental stage,
although the 14 May 1970 communique had merely said that the
gathering "discussed" the CEMA Executive Committee's report
on the progress of work on the program.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
COWIDENTIAh THEN DO
AUOUOT 1971
-29-
Passages registering tIne price of "unanimity" emphanize that
economic cooperation under CEMA in between "equal and
novereign" socialist otaten and, along with "Docialist
internationalism," embodies "respect for ntate sovereignty,
independence and national interests, noninterference in the
internal affairs of the countries, fully equal rights and
free consent, mutual advantage and comradely recinrocal
assistance." This recitation of the litany of tenets
cherished by the Romanians is followed by a direct response
to one of their vocal objections: an assurance that Racialist
"integration" does not imply the creation of "supranational
bodies," specifically welcomed in Romania's post-session
comment expressing general satisfaction with the document.
The communique records without elaboration a formalization
of the coordination of national economic plans in the form
of a new CEMA "committee for cooperation in the domain of
planning." While Romania's post-session appraisal in SCINTEIA
emphasizes that the new program is based on free consent and
entails no infringement on national self-management, a PAP
interview with Polish Deputy Premier Jagielski on 30 July,
a RUDE PRAVO interview with Czechoslovak Premier Strougal
on the 31st, and a RUDE PRAVO commentary on 3 August all
make the point that "joint planning" of certain economic
processes will be a part of the integration program. Prior
to the Bucharest session, Radio Moscow on 22 July had
resurfaced the concept of future "international planning
organs" and a single "joint" economic plan as an eventual
outgrowth of the coordination of national plans.* And Radio
Sofia did its Soviet mentor one better in evoking on the
30th Lenin's grandiose vision of a future "world communist
economy" governed by "a previously coordinated plan."
HARDCORE ALLIES PICTURE CEMA AS INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL UNITY
The broad political context in which Moscow views CEMA
integration is indicated in the CEMA Council communique
in the statement, echoed in the communique on the Crimea
meeting, that the new program "will consolidate still more
the political unity and cohesion of the fraternal socialist
countries." And in post-session comment Czechoslovak,
Polish, East German, .:nd Bulgarian media have seconded
Moscow's portrayal of CEMA in the perspective of all-round
efforts to cement Soviet bloc unity and strength
* See the 28 July TRENDS, page 38.
Approved For Release 1999/09/259?8051i5T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONMDENTIAI, IMO TRU=
Ii AUGUUT 1971
-30-
PRAVDA'u 3 AuguoL editorial on the CEMA (minion said the
new program will not only increase production but will
"ntrengthen the defense potential of the socialist
community." GDR Premier Otoph declared in an East Berlin
radio interview on 29 July that the program will strengthen
the political unity and cohesion of the socialist community
in the struggle between the two major world systems. The
CSSR'a Strougal said in his 31 July RUDE PRAVO interview
that the program will have a positive effect "in the
broader political context" and contribute to "deepening
unified procedure in the other fields of activity" of the
parties and states.
Bulgarian Premier Todorov, replying to a toast by Ceausescu
at a luncheon after the close of the CERA session, pointed
to the new program's "great political and ideological" as
well as economic importance; and Radio Sofia on 30 July
said it "creates the prerequisites for the further
strengthening of our economic cooperation, for increasing
the might of the socialist community, or, in other words,
for strengthening the might of the progressive and
revolutionary forces which determine the development of
the world revolutionary process."
The speech at the CERA session by Polish Premier Jaroszewicz,
published first in summary form in TRYBUNA LUDU on 29 July
and then in full on 1 August, characterized the integration
program as strengthening "the ideological, political, and
defensive unity of the CEMA countries" and coupled transparent
admonitions to the Romanians on the importance of unity
with reminders of the effective support and help the CERA
countries receive from the Soviet Union. Stating that "the
Polish communists and patriots take the view that the Soviet
Union is the mainstay of the historic opportunity for
socialist construction and for success in the world,"
Jaroszewicz added pointedly that "this is how the communists
and patriots of all CEMA countries think and feel." He
declared that CERA countries and their parties should "oppose
in a principled way" all attempts to weaken unity. He went
on to stress that "the internationalist unity of the countries
of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact is one of the basic factors in the
struggle against revisionism, nationalism, and dOgmatism,"
adding that "any lack of comprehension regarding this duty
damages our joint interests."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONPINNTIAh MAIO THMNDO
h MONT 1971
-31-
HUNGARIAN PREMIER STRESSES CONTINUING CONTACTS WITH WEST
Where Moscow's other allies played up the concept of economic
integration as one inseparable facet of a comprehensive unity
centered in Moscow, Hungary kept its discussion of the CEMA
program largely in the economic context and betrayed special
concern to present the program as no deterrence to an
expansion of economic ties to the West.
This concern came through most clearly in MTI's interview
with Premier Fock on his return to Budapest on the 29th.
Fock said the new program "does not mean any change whatsoever"
In Hungarian relations with countries "not participating in
integration." He added that "we want to continue to trade
with all countries" on the basis of mutual advantage and that
the program "does not mean that we isolate ourselves," but
rather "encourages us to create stronger contacts, while
concentrating our forces, with countries which are outside
the integration." Fock's remarks on this score amplified the
statement in the Bucharest communique to the effect that
any country outside CEMA membership may take part totally
or partially" in carrying out the program and that the CEMA
countries would "continue expanding economic and technico-
scientific links with the developing countries and with the
developed capitalist states," on the basis of peaceful
coexistence, equal rights, and respect for sovereignty.
Fock also said the integration program "takes far-reaching
account of the principle of individual interest"--cases
in which "all CEMA countries do not participate" in certain
partial measures." He added that "the fact that one or
two countries d.Q not participate in a certain action cannot
be an obstacle to the cooperation of the other interested
countries."
ROMANIA INSISTS CEMA INTEGRATION WILL NOT AFFECT SOVEREIGNTY
Bucharest followed its customary pattern of treatment of
major bloc events in which it participates, publishing the
CEMA communique in all the Romanian dailies on 30 July and
following up with its own interpretation in an authoritative
article in SCINTEIA on 1 August. Reflecting apparent
satisfaction at the outcome of the session, the article,by
I. Fintinaru, hailed the new CEMA program as "a good start"
and assured the Romanian people and foreign friends that
the further movement toward bloc integration will not infringe
on Romanian sovereignty.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 FtfAl1kaitTP5T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FRIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
-32-
The SCINTEIA article, as reviewed by AGERPRES on 1 August,
made clear that it was only the spirit of compromise and
understanding at the CEMA meeting that enabled the Romanians
to endorse the program document. It cautioned that now "the
manner in which the concrete provisions are materialized
becomes essential." As if to drive home this point, it .
added: "The Romanian party and pe,..ide express their
conviction that the self-same constructive spirit, of mutual
understanding and cooperation, which allowed for the
unanimous endorsement of the program will become the
permanent feature of the practical activity carried on for
translating into life its provisions."
In passages calculated to reassure the Romanian people on
the sensitive issue of "integration," a term Bucharest media
have normally avoided, the article noted that integration
has been "the object of multiple concerns" and discussions
and explained the Romanian leadership's view "that socialist
integration must be approached as distinct from the aim
attached to it in capitalist relations [and by implication
also in the Soviet Union] and that it does not mean infringement
of national independence and sovereignty."
The article went on to explain that "by integration we mean a
diversification and expansion of the forms of rmoperation
which, by observing the sovereign decisions of each party
and government, should lead to faster development of their
productive forces. . . In this sense, the article added,
the complex CEMA program alluded to in the communique
"clearly specifies that socialist integration proceeds on
the basis of fully free consent and is not accompanied by the
creation of supranational bodies, does not affect the
questions of internal planning, of financial activity
and economic self-management." Further emphasizing the
voluntary nature of participation in CEMA projects,
SCINTEIA went on to recall that the original CERA
charter stipulated that relations among the member
countries would be based on "fully equal rights" and "free
consent."
Stating that the CEMA pr)gram would be in the economic
interests of all its me-.Jers, the article used circuitous
language apparently designed to counter the notion that it
would imply political integration: "The multilateral
cooperation between the socialist countries has not, and
cannot have, other objective and basic meaning than the
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
-33-
accelerated and economic growth, the material and apiritual
advancement of the society of each socialist country taken
separately . . ." In this context the article repeated
the stock Romanian argument that Bucharest lives up to its
international socialist obligations mainly by building
socialism in Romania.
In a passage apparently designed to reassure the Chinese
that Romania's endorsement of the CEMA program document
portends no change in Romania's neutralist postme in the
Sino-Soviet dispute, SCINTEIA reaffirmed that in addition
to expanding cooperation in CEMA, Romania will continue to
pursue cooperation with "all other socialist countries, to
act on all paths for making its own active contribution to
overcoming difficulties, to strengthen the unity of all
the socialist countries." The article also contained an
assurance that Romania "will act to expand cooperation
with all the countries of the world, irrespective of
social system."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
- 34 -
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
PRAVDA ANTICIPATES PRC REJECTION OF FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE BID
Soviet media have said nothing about an official Chinese response
to the Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear disarmament
conference, in the absence so far of any Peking publicity for
the PRC rejection which Western press report:- say was delivered
to the Soviet embassy on 30 July. But a PRAVDA review of world
reactions to the proposal on 30 July anticipated an unfavorable
Chinese response in noting Western press reports that Chou
En-lai had indicated a negative attitude toward the idea in
talks with U.S. newsmen--a belated allusion to the substance of
Chou's comments to the journalists on 21 June, shortly after
the Soviet proposal had been sent to Washington, Paris, London,
and Peking and the day before it was released in Soviet media.
Peking, which has yet to publicly acknowledge he existence of
the Soviet proposal, used the joint editorial marking the
Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) anniversary in PEOPLE'S
DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY on 1 August to accuse
the nuclear superpowers of hypocrisy in caliing for disarmament:
"Although U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism talk about
disarmament every day, they are actually engaged in arms
expansion all the time," and "while carrying on nuclear
blackmail, they are actively preparing to fight large-scale
conventionea war."
The Polisn news agency, PAP, in a Warsaw-datelined review on
1 August of the PLA anniversary observance in Peking, noted
that r;hinese comment was full of "anti-Soviet invective" and
in his context attributed to "Peking diplomatic circles"
the report that "the Chinese government turned down" the
Soviet bid fox a meeting of the five nuclear powers.
PRAVDA ON CHOU'S The 30 July PRAVDA article on world
JUNE COMMENTS reactions to the Soviet proposal, by
V. Demin, said the PRC "has stated that
it will examine the proposal" but added that according to
Western press reports "the PRC is not displaying interest"
in it. Demin said the reports to this effect were based on
"the talks between Chou En-lai and American journalists"
during which Chou "expressed reservations with regard to
convening a conference" of the five powers. TASS on
23 June had cited a New York TIMES report of Chou's comments
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
- 35 -
to the newsmen on the 21st, noting that he said he "would
discuss" the Soviet proposal; but TASS did not at that time
mention the TIMES' observation that Chou indicated reservations.
The day after the Demin article appeared in PRAVDA, a Moscow
broadcast in Mandarin said foreign press reports noted
"recently" that the PRC "does not show much interest in the
proposed conference of the five nuclear powers" and specified
that the reports were based on Chou's comments to the
newsmen on 21 June.
Demin's article contained a clear allusion to the PRC's own
call for a world summit conference on nuclear disarmament,
including both nuclear and non-nuclear countries, in reminding
the unnamed advocates of such a forum that the Soviet Union
"never has been and is not now against such a conference"
and in recalling that the idea had been endorsed at the 24th
CPSU Congress.*
PRAVDA ON REACTIONS Rounding up Western reactions to the
FROM WESTERN CAPITALS bid for a five-power conference, the
Demin article said France had "already
expressed its positive attitude." He cited a U.S. State
Department spokesman to the effect that the United States would
study the proposal and would consult with its allies, adding
that the United States had indicated at the Geneva disarmament
talks that "there exist a number of prol_lems which should be
discussed precisely by the nuclear powers themselves"--a
quotation from James Leonard, at the opening session of the
Geneva talks on 29 June, which Moscow has cited before. As
for the British, Dcmin said U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home
had noted that London was studying the proposal and that the
United Kingdom "will undoubtedly wish to be represented" at
a five-power conference.
Demin went on to respond to arguments against the Soviet plan,
including "pessimistic sentiments" and "lack of confidence"
in its chances for success. He rejected the "strange logic"
that the nuclear powers "are at different levels of development"
* See the TRENDS of 8 July 1971, page 22, for recent back-
ground on Peking propaganda pressing the long-standing PRC
proposal for a world conference to discuss the complete
prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, with
an agreement on non-use of the weapons to be reached as a
first step.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
-36-
and that this would preclude the possibility of agreement.
And he decried "groundless and irresponsible allegations"
that the Soviet proposal is "aimed at creating difficulties
for the other nuclear powers."
IMPACT ON SALT Discounting Western speculation that a
conference of nuclear powers "could
supposedly create an obstacle to progress at the strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT)," Demin stated categorically
that "a conference of the five cannot replace the bilateral
talks that are already being held between the USSR and the
United States" because "the questions on their agendas differ.'
While a five-power conference would discuss "a wide range of
measures 'or nuclear disarmament, affecting all the nuclear
powers," he said, "at the bilateral Soviet-American meetings
the narrower issue of limiting the systems of strategic
defensive and offensive weapons which the United States and
the Soviet Union now possess is being examined."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/RODSMIRDP85T008/7M(1919a0040032-6
4 AUGUST 1971
-37-
SUDAN
OBSERVER ARTICLE. TASS STATEMENT HIGHLIGHT PROTEST CAMPAIGN
Moscow's voluminous campaign protesting the "bloody terror" in
Sudan and the execution of three leading Sudanese Communist
Party (SCP) members gained momentum after the release of the
27 July TASS statement, with reports of protest meetings throughout
the Soviet Union and statements by Soviet public organizations.*
Concurrently, TASS continues to carry terse reports stating that
"reprisals continue" in Sudan, briefly noting further arrests and
prison sentences and ministerial changes. The first press comment
comes on the 30th in an "Observer" article published in both PRAVDA
and IZVESTIYA which objected to "imperialist" allegations that the
19 July coup was directed from Moscow, and first raised the question
of future Soviet-Sudanese relations. A second TASS statement, on
31 July, which revealed that the Soviet leaders had sent protests to
Sudanese Chairman an-Numayri on the 25th and 26th, complained of
"unfriendly acts" against Soviet representatives in Sudan, and went
beyond the Observer article in asking whether the Sudanese leadership
wished to maintain friendly relations or "push the matter to their
curtailment and possibly disruption."
There is as yet no monitored reaction from Soviet or Bulgarian media
to Khartoum's diplomatic moves: an-Numayri's 31 July ultimatum to
the Soviet ambassador to end Soviet attacks on his regime within
48 hours, as reported in an interview with an-Numayri in the
1 August London OBSERVER; Omdurman radio's 1 August announcement
that the Sudanese ambassador to the USSR and Bulgaria was being
withdrawn; and the 2 August Omdurman announcement that the
Bulgarian ambassador and the Soviet embassy counselor had been
declared personae non gratae.** According to a MIDDLE EAST NEWS
* Moscow's current propaganda campaign is reminiscent of its
campaign in early 1963 against persecution of communists in Iraq
which was highlighted by two CPSU Central Committee statements,
editorial comment in PRAVDA, and reports of protest meetings.
See the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS, 21 February
1963, pp. 11-15, 7 March 1963, pp. 14-16, and 21 March 1963, pp.15-16.
** Sofia radio on the 3d does report Khartoum's recall of some
Sudanese ambassadors from other posts, but not from Bulgaria. DPA
is the only source of a report from Khartoum on the 3d that a spokes-
man of the Soviet embassy said the USSR had protested the expulsion
of the Soviet counselor.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/F,N,FMITIRP85T00875R9JOyM0032-6
4 AUGUST 1971
-38-
AGENCY (MENA) report from Khartoum on the 3d, a Sudanese Foreign
Ministry official said the two were expelled because they were
in contact with the 19 July coup leaders. The official s'so
reportedly said that the recall of the Sudanese ambassador "does
not absolutely mean that we have requested or will request the
Soviet Union to withdraw its ambassador."
OBSERVER ARTICLE, The PRAVDA-IZVESTIYA Observer article takes
TASS STATEMENT several tacks in approaching the Sudanese
developments, suggesting concern that the
SCP will be "completely liquidated" and that "anticommunist
repression" may spread to other Arab countries, defending the
history and role of the SCP, reacting somewhat defensively to
"imperialist" allegations of Soviet collusion in the 19 July
abortive coup, proclaiming Moscow's credentials as a supporter
of the Arabs, and bringing up for the first time the question of
the effect of the Sudan events on bilateral relations.
Observer proclaims strict Soviet obse'vance of the policy of
noninterference in the internal affairs of Arab states. But
at the same time the article somewhat contradictorily states
that the Soviet people are not indifferent to the destinies of
the fighters against imperialism, and "no one should have any
illusions in this respect." And Observer, broaching the
question of state relations, finds it "strange, to say the least,"
that "certain Sudanese leaders" should declare that the
reprisals against communists will not influence the close
Soviet-Sudanese relations. These themes are replayed in followup
propaganda.
The second TASS statement on Sudan in five days underscores
throughout the views of "Soviet leading circles" while disclosing
representations to an-Numayri on 25 and 26 July appealing for an
end to harsh sentences on Sudanese "public leaders" and protesting
"unfriendly actions" against Soviet representatives in Sudan. The
Observer article had foreshadowed the revelation of the Soviet
leaders' appeals in noting "numerous calls of the Soviet leaders"
to the Sudanese authorities and, like the TASS statement,
complaining that these appeals went unheeded.
According to the TASS statement, Podgornyy's appeal against harsh
sentences, in a message on the 25th, was followed by a statement
by "the Soviet leaders" on the 26th conveyed through the Soviet
ambassador in Khartoum, which "emphatically" appealed to an-Numayri
not to resort to extreme measures and professed not to understand
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONW1DEN9'IAh VDIM TIMM
I AUGUMT 1971
- 39 -
the oentencing and execution "even of those who wore not directly
Involved" in the 19 July evento. TAM complaino that therm
appeals went unheeded; Sudaneoe trade union leader Ahmad
ash-Shaykh and SCP leaders Garang and Mahjub fell victim to the
"bloody reign of terror," it pays, adding that the CPO and
the Soviet people "angrily denounce" these "cruel measures."
(Podgornyy's appeal preceded Ahmad ash-Shaykh's execution by
one day; Garang and Mahjub were executed on the 27th and 28th.)
TASS conveys the impression that the second representation
dealt primarily with bilateral relations, noting that the Soviet
leaders' statement emphaoized that the USSR "does not intend" to
interfere in Sudanese internal affairs but that at the same time
it called attention to "certain actions" of Sudanese authorities
harming Soviet-Sudanese "good relations." They had in view, TASS
reveals, "unfriendly actions against Soviet representatives in
Sudan, damage to property, th:eats and acts of violence against
Soviet officials in Khartoum." In light of such "provocative
acts," TASS adds, the question naturally arises as to whether
the Sudanese leadership is willing to maintain friendly relations
or to push the matter to "their curtailment and possibly
disruption." Maintaining and developing Soviet-Sudanese relations
can only be accomplished if the leaderships of both countries
work to this end, TASS declares.
While Observer claims that imperialist circles, wishing the
anticommunist hysteria to take an anti-Soviet direction, assert
that the "so-called 'movement of 19 July' was allegedly directed
from Moscow," the TASS statement says that in Sudan "as beyond its
borders there are forces"--unspecified--who would like to shift
the responsibility "for some or other domestic events" onto the
Soviet Union.
OTHER MOSCOW Still another elite statement--the communique on
COMMENT the 2 August meeting in Crimea of Soviet party
and government leaders with party leaders from
East Europe (except Romania) and Mongolia--expressed "grave
alarm" in connection with the "ruthless terror" against the SCP
and other democratic organizations in Sudan. Typifying Soviet
and East European propaganda protests, the statement "strongly
condemned" the "lawlessness and arbitrariness" of the Sudanese
authorities which are'bxploited by the forces of imperialism
and reaction against the interests of the Sudanese people."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
(orII'iIN'l A I tt THIOM
h AU( II 19y1
Broadcast comment In Arabic has stressed thin theme, charging
imperialism and Israel with exploitinE the Sudan events to
split the Arab anti-imperialisL front and drive a wedge between
the Arabs and the Soviet Union. A broadcast in Arabic on the 3d
pegged to the Crimea meeting stresses the socialist countries'
past ald present support of the Arab cause, pointedly noting
that the Arabs realize what it means to have a dispute with the
USSR, for without the strong support of the socialist countries
against Israel "they would be compelled to resort to the
colonialists."
Minimal attention to Assistant Secretary Siscols current talks
in Israel brings up Sudan along the same lines: A Volskiy
domestic service commentary on the 3d, for example, charges
Washington and Tel Aviv with trying to split the Arab front as
well as impair Arab-Soviet relations. And he recalls the
statement in the CPSU-Arab Socialist Union (ASU) communique on
Ponomarev's 20-30 July visit to Egypt on the dangers of
anticommunism. This passage in the communique?clearly initiated
by the Soviets in light of the Sudanese developments--says that
anticommumism serves only the interests of imperialism and reaction,
and it claims that attempts to spread anticommunism are aimed at
splitting the ranks of the Arab fighters against Imperialism,
Zionism, and Israeli aggression.
REPORTS ON Soviet media have extensively publicized
ARAB REACTION world-wide protests, primarily from foreign
and East European and international front
organizations. But there is a noticeable dearth of reports on
Arab reaction, Moscow selectively publicizing criticism from
such predictable sources as the Arab CPs, Lebanese leftists, and
some Arab trade unions. Staying clear of the Iraqi-Sudanese
dispute in the wake of the 19 July events, Moscow apparently has
failed to mention Baghdad assaults on an-Numa:ri.
The only criticism heard to emanate from the UAR--a statement by
the executive council of the UAR General Federation of Workers,
expressing "shock" at the "bloody incidents" and arrests of
trade union leaders--was reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY
on 1 August and picked up by TASS the following day. (Cairo's
domestic service interrupted its normal programming on the 2d for
an announcement that "some foreign agencies" had reported a
decision issued by the workers federation, and that President
as-Sadat had ordered an immediate investigation. The announcement
added that the UAR fully supports the Sudanese 25 May revolution
and "rejects any form of interference in the domestic affairs of
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CoNPIDPNTIAh mini 'WNW
h MUM 19(L
fraternal nudan.") Moscow has naturally ignored favorable Libyan
and. 4gyptian comment, ouch as AL-AHHAMIn editorial on the 24th
greeting the Sudanese people's "victory" and the return of
an-Numayri, or Qadhdhafilo defense of the Khartoum executions
in hip 1 August press conference.
OTHER BLOC Soviet media have chastised Peking for its
REACTION "eloquent silence" on the "bloody terror" in Sudan,
TASS on the 30th noting that according to Omdurman
radio an-Numayri had addressed a message to Mao expressing the
conviction that Sudanese-PRC "excellent relations" would be
further consolidated. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in
Mandarin on 28 July and a Moscow broadcast to Czechoslovakia
on the 30th pointed out that the sole NCNA dispatch--on 26 July--
said not a word about the persecution of communists. In a speech
to the armed forces on 2 August, reported by Omdurman radio on
the 3d, an-Numayri expressed appreciation for messages from "the
friendly FRC, dear Korea," and other states.
The DPRK and Albania have apparently maintained silence on the
Sudanese events, while pointedly issuing denunciations of
Jordanian "provocations" against the Palestinian guerrillas--an
Albanian women's union statement on 28 July and a DPRK Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statement on 2 August. The other East
Europeans, Mongolia, and the DRV have all protested in various
fashions and at various levels. The Bulgarian and Romanian
party central committees issued declarations and the Hungarian
MTI carried an authorized statement. Bulgaria's Zhivkov, the
GDR's Ulbricht, and Mongolia's Sambuu sent messages to an-Numayri,
while a Tito envoy, Josip Djerdja, has had talks in Cairo and
Khartoum.
COMMUNIST MEDIA VARY ON ROLE OF SUDAN CP IN 19 JULY COUP
Communist media, when referring at all to the 19 July abortive coup,
have tended to deny SCP participation, North Vietnam alone mention-
ing SCP "active participation" and a Hungarian paper seemingly
implying at least some party sympathy. Moscow's few references
underline SCP nonin7olvement, TASS even obscuring an acknowledgment
by an SCP Politburo member that the party "supported" the movement.
Thus TASS on 2 August briefly reported Sudanese CP Politburo member
tzz ad-Din hli 'noires telling the French CP daily L'HUMANITE that
the Sudanese LT did not take part in the 19 July events. But it
did not include his additional remark, as published in L'HUMANITE
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/091:213m01A+ROP85T00875131100300)40032-6
4 AUGUST 1971
on the 2d, that the SCP supported the 19 July coup because its
leaders promised to restore democratic freedoms and allow
banned organizations to function, although the party, he said,
has always been opposed to the military coup method. The
seeretary of the Sudanese CI's "section in Czechoslovakia"?
interviewed on the Prague domestic service on 30 July--also
affirmed that the "revolutionary changes" of 19 July were
welcomed by all democratic forces in our country and abroad."
Asked about the party's prospects now, he said the SCP was
"well experienced in underground work" and he thought strong
enough to continue its activities.
A VNA report of a 30 July NHAN DAN editorial on the Sudan
"massacre" is notable for the statement that the 19 July coup
"was conducted with the active participation" of workers,
peasants, progressive army officers, and "members of the SCP."
Broadcast excerpts of the editorial in the domestic service and
in English- and French-language services failed to include this
statement, as did TASS' 30 July report on the editorial. The
Hungarian MAGYAR NEMZET, in an article reviewed by MTI on the
28th, also seemedto hint at SCP involvement in ambiguously
stating that the 19 July "putsch" was a consequence of an-Numayri's
policy, "for the group of leftist officers executed in the
meantime, the Sudanese Communist Party, and the mass organizations
did not want to watch passively what was happening."
Other communist references to the initial coup, however, have
disclaimed SCP involvement. A participant in the 1 August
Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable complained
that the Sudanese leaders accused the SCP of beng behind the
19 July "plotters, although the facts do not confirm this in the
least." And TASS on the 28th reported the Paris FIGARO as
commenting that it was doubtful that SCP Secretary General
Mahjub took personal part in planning the "purely military
coup." An East Berlin commentary on the same day cautiously
observed that the background and causes of the 19 July coup
were "still obscure," but the Polish ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI,
according to PAP on the 29th, stressed that the architects of the
abortive coup "were not communists at all." Similarly, French CP
leader Marchais claimed in a speech reported in L'HUMANITE on the
29th that SCP head Mahjub had shown that the SCP "had never
participated in any plot."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
L'UNITA, FRENCH CP The Italian Communist Party organ L'UNITA
ON HAYKAL, UAR PRESS promptly attacked Muhammad Haykal, editor
of Cairc's AL-AiiltAM, for his views on the
Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) expressed in a 30 July article.
Haykal's assertion that the SCP "committed a 'historical error' by
aiming at exclusive control of Sudan" is branded in a 31 July
article by Jacoviello as not only one of Haykal's "flagrant lies"
but a matter of infamy. Jacoviello maintained that the party's
history demonstrates exactly the opposite of Haykal's
"pseudotheoretical disquisitions," but failed to reproduce
his specific criticisms. He suggested that if Haykal wanted to
present the truth he should publish--as L'UNITA did in the same
issue--a February 1960 speech by SCP Secretary General Mahjub
illustrating SCP policy "on the question of coups."
At the same time, Jacoviello criticized HaykeL for refraining
from any reproach of "Sudan's Tshombe," Chairman an-Numayri,
but professed to understand his silence in that an-Numayri is
considered "a preclous ally" by "those in Egypt" who share
Haykal's orientation--seemingly a slur on President as-Sadat
himself. The article went on to dispute Haykal's statement
that as-Sadat "supposedly intervened" with an-Numayri to try
to sav:: the life of the late trade union lender Ahmad ash-Shaykh.
"We happen to know," Jacoviello said, that as-Sadat conveyed to
an-Numayri a mcssage by Podgornyy "without adding anything of
his own to that message."
Haykal noyd that some European CPs "slipped into the pitfall"
of supporting the 19 July movement and called this "unjustified
Ignorance." He anticipated an uproar over Ahmed ash-Shaykh's
execution, and commiserated. with the USSR on its unenviable
situation: "It cannot interfere and it cannot remain si.ent"
under pressure from trade union movements and the communict
parties, especially in Western Europe.
Another swipe at the Egyptians came from French CP leader Georges
Marchais in a speech at a PCF demonstration on Sudan, reported
in the 29 July PCF organ L'HUMANITE. Rejecting any complicity
with the Sudanese "executioners,"Marchais said the PCF had
denounced the "dishonorable attitude" of the Libyan leaders who
had encouraged an-Numayri and had even delivered some victims
into his hands. . And the PCF, he said, found it "unforgivable"
that "some Egyptian rapers" published "forged documents"
concerning the activities of Sudanese communists with a view
to providing arguments for their murderers. (Cairo's Al-Akhbar
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/261,9MRE85T00875R999NIAlii
4 AUGUST 1971
- Wt. -
on the 27th published Mahjub's "confession" to an-Numayri
before his trial.) Marchais added that on 27 July the PCP
made its views known to "the ASU aairman in Cairo"--as-Sadat--
and asked him "finally to act" to prevent new crimes in Sudan.
In his L'HUMANITE interview, SCP leader Mir claimed that
an-Numayri would have been unable to regain power without
"foreign intervention," which he cia3*. was decided during
a conference in Tripoli, Libya, atteLe-wd by unnamed Libyan
leaders, UAR War Minister Sadiq, and Sudanese Treasury Minister
Abd al-Halim. He charged that the Egyptian army radio was
used by Sudanese Defense Minister Hasan Abbas in the operation
to restore an-Numayri, and that Egyptian planes landed
Sud.knese troops which had been stationed at the Suez Canal.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
OONW1DENTIAh lolif0 THEM
h. AUGUST 1971
GERMANY
GDR DETAILS OFFER TO SENAT: TASS EDITS NEUES DEUTSCHLAND ITEM
Against the background of publicly acknowledged progress
in the four-power negotiations on Berlin and Western
press discussion of confidential documents from the
negotiations, East Berlin's SED party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
on 31 July publicizes details of the GDR proposals made
to the West Berlin Senat at the ongoing talks between
GDR State Secretary Kohrt and Senat Director Mueller.
The details of these proposals have not been discussed
previously by East German media on their own authority
except for a 13 March NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article that
outlined the proposals through the device of quoting a
West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL report.* The 31 July editorial
strongly criticizes the Springer and CDU/CSU press and
other west German mass media -- especially the 28 July
issue of the weekly QUICK -- for revealing confidential
details of the quadripartite talks on "West Berlin."
Affirming that it is the GDR's desire to normalize
relations "between West Berlin and the GDR," the editorial
repeats the standard GDR call for success in the talks
and noted that the GDR has submitted proposals to the
West Berlin Senat. It immediately goes on to note that
both sides "must show good will, and that includes
recognition of the reality that West Berlin is a city
with a specific political status and that it has never
belonged to the Federal Republic and never will." A
lengthy 1 August TASS summary of the editoria: includes
this comment.
Comparison of the details of the proposals as publicized
in the March article with those in the current editorial
indicates several changes. Where both articles noted
there could be up to six visits of one- or two-day
periods or once a year for up to 30 days for West Berliners
to travel to "the GDR and its capital Berlin," the editorial
adds that travelers will need a West Berlin identity
paper and a GDR entry and exit visa. The March article,
* See the FBIS TRENDC of 17 March 1971, page 36.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09A25nCiAtRDP85TOGAMPficting0040032-6
4 AUGUST 1971
in discussing the concessions due from West Berlin, cited
TAGESSPIEGEL to the effect that the Senat "would have to
accept" the most important GDR demands: "The Berlin Senat
would. have to act Jike the government of an independent state";
it would also "have to recognize the affiliation of East Berlin
with the GDR"; and it "should assume the obligation to prevent
political activities in West Berlin which have scandalized the
GDR for a long time." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND went on to note that
the West Berlin paper interpreted the last condition to signify
"the Federal presence" in West Berlin, an issue on which the
Big Four were then "conducting negotiations."
Without explicitly listing any "conditions" the Senat must meet,
the editorial now declares tnat the "West Berlin Senat would only
have to guarantee orderly arianngements for the visitors' traffic
and spare West Berlin unnecessary complications"--an apparent
allusion to Federal Government activities in West Berlir.
The TASS report on the editorial furnishes no details of the GDR
proporals to the Senat, but simply notes the editorial's claim
that the GDR had made a "generous offer." With similar
circumspection, TASS failed to summarize portions of the editorial
which explained that the GDR had offered a treaty on regulating
transit traffic between West Berlin and the FRG and which noted
that "sealing of carriers transporting civilian goods is being
considered"--a reference either to the FRG-GDR talks between
State Secretaries Bahr and Kohl or to the Big Four talks.
TASS also ignored the passage in the editorial pointing out that
the problems of "enclaves such as Steinstuecken could be solved by
a contractually arranged exchange of territory with the West Berlin
Senat"--another topic within the mandate of the four-power
negotiations.
RESPONSIBILITY (113 August NEUES DEUTSCHLAND again denounced certain
FOR LEAKS West German papers for publicizing out-of-context
and distorted documents from the confidential
negotiations. The article went on to charge that such documents could
not have been made public "without the knowledge and the direct or
indirect support of individual participants in the four-power
negotiations." TASS reported this charge in its summary of the
article.
The only original Moscow comment on publicEtion of the documents
in the West German press, in a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 AUGUST 1971
? Germany on 31 July, claimed that CDU/CSU and "neonazi"
supporters in FRG Government offices are responsible for
the leaks.
Available Soviet and GDR media reports have not taken
note of the detailed report in the 2 August New York TIMES
on the preaent state of the four-power negotiations.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040032-6