TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040022-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: May 26, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
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ENDS
00040022-7
Confidential
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
26 MAY 1971
( VOL . XXII , NO. 21)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Ent!mind hem aufainedle
downgrading end
dedeseiRtellen
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FBIS TRENDS
26 MAY 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
Ho's Birth Anniversary Marked by Pledges to Continue Struggle . 1
Hanoi Protests U.S. Strikes, Repeats Calls for Vigilance . . . 4
NLHS Proposal: Official DRV, PRG Support; Praise from Mos..:ow . 5
PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS
Major Campaign Marks Anniversary of Mao's 20 May Statement . . 8
MIDDLE EAST
Podgornyy Visit Highlights Comment on Strong Ties With Cairo . 12
Propaganda Treatment of UAR Events Continues Restrained . . . . 15
TASS Account of as-Sadat Speech Glosses Over Domestic Affairs . 17
TRUDEAU IN USSP
Moscow Registers Sensitivity to Impact on Relations with U.S. . 19
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
Moscow Plays U.S.-Soviet Announcement in Low Key 21
FORCES IN EUROPE
USSR Claims Support for Brezhnev Proposal, Impugns U.S. Stand . 23
Few Departures from Soviet Line in East European Comment . . 24
ROMANIA
Ceausescu To Visit Asian Communist Capitals in June
26
Bucharest Gives Chilean Foreign Minister Warm Welcome 26
CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS
Husak Thanks Soviets, Allies for 1968 Intervention
Warsaw Five Send Top Leaders, Romania Lesser Figure
Soviet Comment Envisions Further "Normalization"
29
31
32
(Continued)
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FBIS TRENDS
26 MAY 1971
C ONTENTS (Continued)
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Honorary Politburo Nominations to Republic Soviets Analyzed . . 34
Brezhnev Treated Without Effusion at Georgian Fete . . . . . . 36
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CCP Provincial Committees Set Up for Hopei., Inner Mongolia . . 38
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1 -
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 17 - 23 MAY 1971
FBIS TRENDS
26 MAY 1971
Moscow (2872 items)
Peking (1447 items)
Indochina
(8%)
8%
Indochina
(27%)
41%
Zionism & Soviet Jews
(5%)
5%
[1st Anniversary
(--)
27%)
Mars 2 Launching
(--)
4%
Mao Tse-tung
GDR Party-Government
(--)
4%
Statement
Delegation in USSR
[Le Duan in FRC
(11%)
2%)
Trudeau in USSR
(--)
4%
[Ho's Birthday
(--)
2%)
Middle East
(4%)
3%
Domestic Issues
(43%)
32%
Georgian Jubilee
(11%)
3%
DPRK TU Delegation
(0.2%)
6%
[Brezhnev Speech
(6%)
2%)
in PRC
China
(2%)
2%
Italian Economic Delega-
tion in PRC
(--)
4%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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26 MAY 1971
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INDOCHINA
The 81st anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth on 19 May provides the
occasion for Hanoi and the Front to reiterate thr.ar determination
to adhere to Ho's last will and testament and "resolutely fight
the U.S. aggressors until complete victory." A commemorative
address by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh contained standard
propaganda fare: Trinh lauded recent victories throughout
Indochina, warned of new U.S. "adventures" against the DRV, and
denounced the United States for failing to accept the communist
proposals for a settlement.
Attention to the fighting in South Vietnam includes Hanoi comment
pegged to a communique, broadcast on 21 May, claiming that from
1 December 1970 to 10 April nearly 7,500 ARVN troops were put out
of action in the operation in the U Minh jungle. Vietnamese and
Cambodian communist media on the 25th for the first time took
note of the ARVN operation launched into Cambodia on 11 May,
claiming that by the 17th nearly 1400 South Vietnamese had been put
out of action in Svay Rieng and Prey Veng provinces.
The "new" 12 May Pathet Lao peace initiative calling for a bombing
halt and a cease-fire received official support from the Vietnamese
communists in DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements on the 20th
and 21st, respectively. A VNA statement on the 24th dismissed as
"slander" Souvanna Phouma's letters to the Geneva conference
cochairmen and to the ICC on "the so-called aggressive actu of
North Vietnamese troops." VNA did not, of course, acknowledge
that Souvanna Phouma was complaining about attacks on Pak Song on
the Bolovens Plateau and on Muong Dong Hene in Savannakhet
Province. Hanoi media have publicized Pathet Lao reports on the
communist advances in southern Laos, but there has been no DRV
comment.
Moscow propagandists routinely reiterate that the Vietnamization
policy is failing and that the United States must set a troop-
withdrawal deadline in order to proceed to a settlement. Moscow
continues to charge that Peking's friendly gestures toward the
United States encourage the expansion of U.S. aggression in
Indochina. And the anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's 20 May 1970
statement on the U.S. incursion into Cambodia prompts further Soviet
claims that the PRC supports the Indochinese in words only.*
HO'S BIRTH ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY PLEDGES TO CONTINUE STRUGGLE
The anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth was marked this year as in
1970 by a Hanoi meeting on 18 May, jointly sponsored by the VWP
* Peking comment on Indochina in connection with the anniversary of
Mao's statement is discussed in the PRC Foreign Affairs section of
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FBIS TRENDS
26 MAY 1971
Central Committee, the National Assembly Standing Committee,
the Council of Ministers, and the Vietnam Fatherland Front
Central Committee. President Ton Duc Thang opened the
meeting and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy
Trinh gave the main address, the text of which was carried
by Hanoi radio on the 20th. From 16 through 18 May Hanoi had
broadcast installments of Premier Pham Van Dong's address
delivered at last year's Hanoi meeting commemorating the
80th anniversary of Ho's birth.* And VNA on the 19th
reported that "all the Hanoi dailies" carried editorials
marking the anniversary.
Except for Pham Hung,** the only Politburo member not reported
atter ling the Hanoi meeting was Le Duc Tho. However, Tho 'S
prest.nce in Hanoi had been noted as recently as 16 May, when
VNA :ir.ted him among those who met Le Duan uron his return
from Visit to Peking and his sojourn in the USSR after
attending the CPSU congress. Trinh's speech focused most
attention on the construction of socialism in the DRV, but it
also included standard discourse on U.S. "aggression"
throughout Indochina. Among other things, Trinh repeated
the characterization of the Laos incursion as resulting in
"great strategic victories" for the communists; and he
said that the Laos action, along with "important" communist
victories in Cambodia, had left the allies more confused and
divided. He pointed to growing opposition to the war in the
United States but said the Nixon Alministration "still balked"
at accepting the NFLSV's proposals: The United States refuses
to set a deadline for total withdrawal and persists in
"maintaining" the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration. Pro forma
criticism was also leveled at the United States for its "daily"
strikes at the North and its "hatching cf new military
ventures against the DRV."
Trinh followed these denunciations by recalling Ho's warning
that the war may drag on and "the people may have to face new
sacrifices of life and property," but "whatever happens we
must keep firm our resolve to fight the U.S. aggressors until
total victory." He also noted that the 19th plenum of the
Party Central Committee--announced last February--pointed out
that "the foremost task of our entire party, army, and people
at this moment" is to fight the "aggressors."
See the TRENDS of 20 May 1970, pages 13-15.
** Pham Hung has not been teported present in Hanoi since
September 1967.
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26 MAY 1971
SOLIDARITY OF
SOCIALIST CAMP
in the war
passage he
flour party
protecting
3
Trinh thanked the socialist countries and
flour friends worldwide" who have "whole-
heartedly supported and assisted" the DRV
and in socialist construction. And in another
said that Pthoroughly imbued" with Ho's instructions,
and people have always striven to contribute toward
international solidarity and the internal solidarity
of the socialist camp and toward actively restoring the
solidarity bloc of fraternal parties." The WAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial of the 19th also observes that Ho "untiringly
struggled for international unity," which he regarded as "an
indispensable factor for insuring the victory of the Vietnamese
revolution and the international revolution."
Pham Van Dong in his speech marking the anniversary last year
had quoted the passage in Ho's last will and testament on his
pain at the discord among the fraternal parties. And at the
31 August 1970 Hanoi meeting marking the 25th anniversary of
the DRV's founding on 2 September, Pham Van Dong said that
acting on Ho's "sacred" testament, "we have done all in our
power to contribute to the restoration and consolidation of
the solidarity of the socialist camp and the international
communist and workers' movement . . . ." It is standard for
Hanoi propaganda to pledge to work for the solidarity of the
"socialist camp," and this pledge was recently reiterated
authoritatively in the communique.of the VWP Central Committee
19th plenum, publicized on 1 February 1971.
THE FRONT Ho's birth anniversary was.also marked by a joint
PRG-NFLSV-Alliance meeting on the 18th in "a
liberated area" in the South. As at last year's meeting, the
main address was given by PRG President Huynh Tan That, .and
PLAF Deputy Commander Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh also spoke. Phat
that the anniversary was being marked in a "very spirited
atmosphere when the revolutionary.liberation war of the three
Indochinese peoples is gaining very.great successes . . . ."
He reviewed "puppet" losses during the Laos incursion, and he
said that the result and "gaps" on au battlefields had
weakened pacification efforts. Phat prefaced a call to
persevere in the struggle with the declaration that "no matter
how the enemy may distort the truth, President Ho continues to
be our sacred national image and the personification of our
national unity . . . ."
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FBIS TRENDS
26 MAY 1971
Other attention to the anniversary included a special edition
of GIAI PHONG, organ of the NFLSV Central Committee, and an
anniversary message from NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and
President Huynh Tan Phat to President Ton Due Thang, Le Duan,
Truong Chinh and Pham Van Dong. Quoting Ho's saying that
"nothing is more precious than independence and freedom, and
so long as there is an aggressor in our country we will have
to fight on to expel him from .the country," the message
expressed the determination of the South Vietnamese armed
forces and people, "closely united behind the NFLSV and PRG,"
to "constantly raise high their absolute revolutionary
fighting spirit, to achieve at all costs the sacred testa-
ment of President Ho . . . ."
HANOI PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES. REPEATS CALLS FOR VIGILANCE
The latest in the continuing series of statements from the
DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman came on 19 May with a protest
against alleged U.S. action on the 17th.* The statement says
that Tuong Lap village was bombed by U.S. aircraft, including
B-52's, and that Vinh Son village was shelled by U.S.
artillery based south of tilt; demilitarized zone. (VNA English,
in an apparent mistranslation, rendered this passage "based
in the southern part" of the DMZ.) The protest claims that
also on the 17th, U.S. fighters attacked the Le Ninh state
farm in Quang Binh Province and on the following day attacked
Ky Phuong village in Ky Anh district, Ha Tinh Province.
These attacks, it says "caused losses in lives and property."
The spokesman routinely condemned the U.S. "criminal war acts"
and demanded an end to all acts of encroachment on DRV
sovereignty and security.
VIGILANCE In addition to Nguyen Duy Trinh's reference on
the 18th to "new military adventures" against the
DRV, this theme recurs sporadically in other propaganda. An
11 May QUM' DOI NHAN DAN editorial on increasing the combat
strength of the local armed forces says it is necessary to
* Hanoi has not acknowledged action-on 23 May when, according
to the U.S. Command, fighter bombers and B-52's crossed the
southern border of the DMZ to bomb suspected DRV rocket launch-
ing sites. The U.S. Command also reported that on the night
of the 22d a U.S. F-105 fired a Shrike missile at an enemy WI
site 12 miles north of the DMZ.
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26 MAY 1971
-5
carry out this task in order to "readily smash all new military
schemes" of the United States agaiast the northern part of our
country. An 18 May NHAN DAN editorial as broadcast by Hanoi
radio, on strengthening the militia and self-defense forces,
claims that the United States "is plotting to make use of its
air and ranger forces to bomb, strafe, and carry out surprise
attacks by ground units against the northern part of our country.
That is why our people and armed forces should be ready to
fight and to annihilate the enemy."
A discussion of how to combat "the enemy's heliborne attacks"
appeared in a column on practical military matters serialized
in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN from 21 to 24 April. In a possible
allusion to the November Son Tay prisoner-rescue raid, the
paper said that use of helicopters "to drop rangers and stage
raids in the hinterland of North Vietnam is one of the craftiest
and most reckless schemes of the American; and their lackeys"--a
scheme aimed at destroying important military, political, and
economic targets, "kidnapping cadres, seizing weapons, freeing
pilot pirates, and sowing confusion among our people . . . ."
NLHS PROPOSAL: OFFICIAL DRV, PRG SUPPORT; PRAISE FROM MOSCOW
VIETNAMESE Hanoi and Front propaganda support for the 12 May
STATEMENTS pcace initiative of the .NLHS is raised to an
official level with DRV and PRG.Foreign Ministry
statements on 21 and 22 May.* The statements repeat the line
that the Lao issue has thus far not been settled because the
Nixon Administration continues a policy of aggression and
intervention in Laos, has "rejected".the five-point proposal,**
and has sought to prevent the Laotians from contacting each
other to solve the Lao problem peacefully. They add that the
Lao armed forces and people have "duly punished" the U.S. and
"puppet" military adventures and are now showing their good
* Peking has not endorsed the NLHS proposal on its own
authority, but NCNA has publicized the DRV and PEC, statements,
as well as statements by Sihanouk's government and by a DPRK
Foreign Ministry spokesman.
** The NLHS' five-point peace plan of 6 March 1970 had been
supported by DRV and PRG Government statements on 9 and 11 March.
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FBIS TRENDS
26 NAY 1971
will by making the present proposal. If the United States
continues the aggressive war in Laos, the statements warn,
the Vietnamese people will strengthen their solidarity with
the Lao and Cambodian peoples and fight together until "total
victory."
The Vietnam Fatherland Front also sent a message to the NLHS,
reported by VNA on 26 May, which hails the new proposals and
praises the Lao people's "great victories." It expresses
"indignation" over continued intensification and expansion of
U.S. aggression in Laos which it says is "torpedoing" the 1962
Geneva agremeents and preventing the Lao parties concerned
from meeting.
A 24 May VNA statement denounces Souvanna Phouma's 18 and
19 May letters to the Geneva conference cochairmen and to
the chairman of the ICC/Laos "on the so-called 'aggressive
acts of North Vietnamese troops on Lao territory." VNA
does not, of course, acknowledge that Souvanna Phouma was
complaining about attacks on Pak Song on the Bolovens Plateau
and on Muong Dong Hene in Savannakhet Province. VNA does
not mention the latest NLHS proposal when it says routinely
that Souvanna Phouma has Angaged in "brazen slander" to
mislead U.S. and world opinion, which is demanding that the
Nixon Administration put an end to intervention and aggression
in Laos, ending the bombing of the whole terril.,ory of Laos
as "an immediate step," so that the Laotians can settle their
affairs themselves.
PATHET LAO A 20 May NLHS Central.Committee spokesman's
COMMENT statement, carried by Radio Pethet Lao on the
25th, denounces continued U.S. aggression in
Laos and charges without elaboration that the United States
and the Vientiane administration are "slandering the NLHS
and the DRV" to counter public opinion which supports the new
NLHS peace proposal and opposes U.S. aggression.
A Pathet Lao Radio commentary of 24 May scores Souvanna Phouma
for avoiding acceptance of the new proposal "under pressure
from the U.S. imperialists and reactionary ultrarightist clique."
It complains that Souvanna Phouma leveled "charges.against the
Lao patriotic forces and the DRV" and "distorted the true
situation in the country" in his letter to the Geneva.cochairmen,
and that in a 20 May AFP interview he parroted "arguments of
his U.S. imperialist masters" and refused to put pressure on
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26 MAY 1971
7
the United States to stop bombing Lao territory. The commentary
? adds that the Sananikone "clique," the "reactionary ultrarightist
clique which controls Prince Souvanna Phouma," also opposes the
NLHS proposal. It concludes that the attitudes of Souvanna
? Phouma and the Sananikones show that they do not want to see an
end to the U.S. war in Laos and that they are spreading
"slanderous propaganda" to cover up U.S. aggression.
SOVIET Moscow supports the MRS proposal in routine-level
SUPPORT press and radio comment, including propaganda on a
week of solidarity with Laos which began on 17 May,
the seventh anniversary of the inception of U.S. bombing of
Laos. (A 22 May IZVESTIYA article says the solidarity week
was called for by the ninth session of the Council of the
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, held in Tripoli
last November.) The commentaries condemn the United States
for expanding the wax in Laos and for trying to prevent a
settlement, saying that peace contacts over the past year have
failed because of "sabotage" by "U.S. militaiist circles and
Laotian rea:tionaries."
Some commentators, including Shchedrov in a 22 May PRAVDA
article, accuse the United States of "rejecting" or maintaining
silence on the new proposal while plotting a "new invasion" of
Laos. But a 20 May domestic service commentary by Professor
Mikhail S. Kapitsa is somewhat less negative. It says the
proposal "could serve as a stimulus for gPtting the whole
problem of a settlement in Laos moving again and restoring
peace and a coalition government in that country," and it
concludes that "it is now up to the Vientiane authorities and
the Administration of the United States."
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PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MAJOR CAMPAIGN MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF MAO'S MAY STATEMENT
Peking has marked the first anniversary of Mao's 20 May anti-U.S.
statement with a major propaganda campaign, highlighted by a
joint editorial calling the statement a "brilliant_document of
historic significance" that "has become a program for the anti-
imperialist struggle" by the Chinese together with revolutionary
people throughout the world. Against the background of recent
moves to improve relations with countries which have been the
targets of Chinese enmity, Peking has used the anniversary as an
occasion to reaffirm its commitment to revolutionary causes and.
to give ample airing to Maoist ideology on the international
scene.
In view of Peking's practice of using milestone occasions for
reaffirming fundamentalist doctrines and commitments, the
anniversary propaganda does not seem to signal a reversal of
recent Chinese efforts to broaden international contacts and
to enhance the PRC's diplomatic and political leverage.
Though Peking has taken the occasion to play up "the revolu-
tionary mass movement" in the United States and communist-led
insurgencies in Southeast Asia, it has steered clear of
bilateral issues bedeviling Sino-U.S. relations and has
avoided attacking the SoutheaJt Asian noncommunist leaders.
Peking has also taken care, while viewing developments in the
past year as confirming the tenets contained in Mao's
statement, to avoid direct claims that Maoist ideology is
the guiding force behind these developments.
The propaganda campaign on the anniversary suggests Peking's
judgment of a need to reassure its clients and allies that it
is not abandoning their cause and to preserve its revolutionary
assets. In addition to the joint editorial, carried in
PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, the
anniversary material has included articles by workers,
peasants, and soldiers in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 20 May and a
stream of reports on the state of the revolution in various
areas of the world. Accounts of this sort have been issued
by Peking around the turn of the year in the past, but this
year Peking has timed them for the anniversary of Mao's
20 May statement. Also on the 20th, Peking issued the 14942d
"serious warning" to the United States, the first since
22 April (Lenin's birthday).
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INDOCHINA Mao's statement, issued on the day on which a
session of the resumed_Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw
had been scheduled to take place, was prompted by the U.S.
incursion into Cambodia and the formation of Sihanouk's
government in exile. (Peking's 19 May 1970 announcement of
the postponement of the Warsaw meeting cited "the increasingly
grave situation" caused by the Cambodian operation.) Indochina
has been prominent in the arniversary propaganda, as exemplified
in the joint editorial's asso.rtion that at present Indochina is
"the main battlefield in tha world people's struggle against
U.S. imperialism." The editorial's claim that Washington's
strategic plans in Indochina "have failed completely" is
spelled out in detail in a 20 May NCNA account of how the.
Indochinese have proven the "brilliant thesis" in Mao's
statement that "the people of a cmall country can certainly
defeat aggression by a big country."
The NCNA account, noting that President Nixon has been
"steadily expanding" the war in Indochina behind "the smoke-
screens of his empty talk of 'peace' and 'troop withdrawal,"
displays the mood of buoyant confidence that has marked
Peking's assessment of the military situation in Indochina.
In the past year, according to NCNA, the three Indochinese
peoples have formed "a solid anti-U.S. united front" which
has enabled them to win "victories of enormous strategic
significance." Indicating that Peking's prescription is for
more of the same in Indochina, the account concludes by
quoting from Mao's statement calling on the Indochinese-...
peoples to strengthen their unity and to persevere in "a
protracted people's war."
An effort to reassure the Indochinese and other anti-U.S. forces
of Peking's backing seems reflected in a passage in the joint
editorial insisting on "high vigilance" and warning that the
United States will "make desperate struggles and even embark
on a hazardous adventure." Pointing out that the danger of
a new world war still exists, the editorial offers a notably
pointed warning against letting down one's guard: "It is
dangerous if we see only the raging revolutionary flames but
not the enemy who is sharpening his knife, and think that .in.
view of the excellent situation we can lay our heads on our
pillows and just drop off to sleep."
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Mao's statement included the dictumduly cited in the.joint
editorial as "a most important" thesis--that .the danger of a
new world war still exists but that "revolution is the main
trend in .the world today." Mao's statement signaled_a_shift
from the previous omphasis on the war preparations campaign
arising out of the Sino-Soviet border confrontation to a
focus on anti-U.S. struggle. stressing the efficacy of local
protractedwarfare. The warning inserted in the anniversary
editorial seems designed .to counterbalance any excessive .
expectations.that may have arisen from.Peking's recent.
favorable readings of international developments.
SOUTHEAST ASIA Peking has used the anniversary, with.its.
keynote of world revolution, as an occasion
to balance recent moves toward improving relations with
noncommunist neighboring states with a reminder of the
existence of armed .insurgencies.led by client parties. A
19 May NCNA account .of revolutionary armed struggle in South-.
east Asia listed communist-led. movements in Burma, Thailand,
Malaysia,* the Philippines,. Indonesia, and North Kalimantan.
The account did not, however,.engage.in_direct attacks on any
of the leaders of these countries,..thus.striking the balance__
Peking has sought to maintain between propaganda support. for
its client parties and efforts_to.open.the door for better
relations with governments in the area.
In the manner of the authoritative ideological statement_marking
the Paris Commune centenary in March, the NCNA.account-discusses
the communist movements in Southeast Asia in terms exemplifYing
Maoist strategy while at the same.time crediting the local
parties with integrating "the universal. truth of Marxism- --.
Leninism with .the concrete practice of revolution in their own
countries." Peking has been leaving, it to the local parties
to acknowledge directly their debt to Mao's thought.
UNITED STATES
editorial's claim
U.S. imperialism"
The shift to an anti-U.S. focus signaled by
Mao's statement is celebrated in the _joint
that the "international united front against
has "expanded enormously" in the past year.
* The account refere to "Malaya" in discussing the.insurgamcy
in north Malaysia, and to "Malaysie_in. a-passage .on the-Norta
Kalimantan situation. Peking.has.implicitly acknowledged the
legitimacy of the federation by using. its official .name
connection with the recent visit of a trade delegation from Malaysia.
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26 MAY 1971
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The editorial calls on the people.of.the-world to further-expand
this united front to "isolate. aid strike at the chief. enemy,"
the United States. An has been the casein the .past .year, the
Soviet Union is only a secondary. target as one of the two
IIsuperpowersII and is not mentioned by name in the annivelsary
propaganda.
The joint editorial and_supporting_NCNA.accounts picture "violent
revolutionary .storms"_shaking the United .States and.-providing
"powerful support" for the Indochinese struggle. As.in.Pekines
coverage of recent ?demonstrations, however, President Nixon is
spared the sort of virulent cersonal.vilification.that.has .
marked Chinese comment in the past. Mao' tatement referred
to "Nixon's fascist etrocities".in-conneeion with the -shootings
of students lest .May. This passage-was.lunted in a.20 May NCNA
report on American antiwar .and other protest :movements.. The
joint editorial depersonalizes the charge .of fascism by. referring
to "U.S. imperialism's . . . fascist rule over the American
people."
While commenting on the -Nixon Administration's domestic affairs,.
its policies in Indochina, and various other aspects of.U.S.
foreign relations, Peking's propaganda on the anniversary has
ignored substantive bilateral issues in Sino-U.S. relations.
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MIDDLE EAST
FBIS TRENDS
26 MAY 1971
Moscow continues to give only sparse coverage to develop-
ments in Egypt in the wake of President as-Sadat's purge
of leaders in the government and the Arab Socialist Union
(ASU). But Soviet concern seemed underlined in the 23 May
announcement of the "unofficial friendly" visit by a Soviet
delegation headed by Presidium Chairman Podgornyy and
including Ponomarev. The announcement has been accompanied
by a spate of Soviet propaganda effusively praising Soviet-
UAR relations and publicizing as-Sadat statements and Cairo
press comment to depict deep Egyptian gratitude for Soviet
aid, support, and friendship. Reminiscent of comment
following Nasir's death last fall, Moscow recalls that
Nasir viewed Soviet-Arab friendship as a permanent factor
in the struggle for peace and expressed boundless gratitude
to the Soviet Union.
With the propaganda focus on Arab-Soviet relations, there
is little comment on the current status of the Arab-Israeli
dispute following Secretary Rogers' visit to the Middle
East. But Belyayev, in the domestic service commentators'
roundtable on the 23d, did complain that the Jarring'mission
has practically been torpedoed and that the Big Four
consultations have to all intents and purposes become
sporadic--all the fault of the United States. He outlined
what he called a "certain American variant" of a Middle
East settlement which would "isolate" the Suez Canal ques.,
tion from the settlement problem. Arab public opinion, he
claimed, is actively nosing this idea, insisting that the
Suez reopening be part an overall settlement which would
provide for "liberation" of all Arab territories and for
accommodation of the Palestinian Arabs' just demands.
Speaking at an 18 May lunchem for Canadian Prime Minister
Trudeau, Kosygin expressed support for programs for
political settlement put forward by Indochinese patriots
and--in unusual phraseology-by "Middle East," not Arab,
states. Hil subsequent remark that such programs open up
"realistic" ways toward restoring peace in these regions
was in line with routine propaganda praise for Cairo's
constructive and realistic peace initiatives. An article
by Ovchinnikov in the 23 May PRAVDA quotes without attribu-
tion Kosygin's additional remark that the aggressor must
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26 MAY 1971
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quit foreign territories and that the peoples' right to
independent development and to organization of their own
domestic affairs must be respected. PRAVDA explains that
this applies equally to Indochina and to the Middle East,
where "the United States is currently using all available
means to exert pressure directly or indirectly on the Arab
countries" and attempting to "speculate on the role of
self-styled 'mediator" while in fact obstructing a settle-
ment.
PODGORNYY VISIT HIGHLIGHTS COMMENT ON STRONG TIES WITH CAIRO
Identical announcements from Moscow and Cairo radios on 23 May
of Podgornyy's visit to Cairo "in the next few days" at.as-Sadat's
invitation were followed on the 24th by a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY
(MENA) report that the Soviet delegation would arrive on the 25th
for talks on "the latest developments in the Middle East crisis."
Podgornyy would be accompanied, MENA said, by Ponomarev, Gromyko,
Deputy Defense Minister Pavlovskiy, and several aides and advisers.*
Reports of the vieit were circulated in advance by correspondents
of Arab media in dispatches from Cairo to their home offices: A
report on the 22d to AN-NAHAR in Beirut said that Soviet Ambassador
Vinogradov, meeting with as-Sadat on the 21st, raised the question
of a visit soon of a Soviet delegation, probably led by Podgornyy.
And dispatches to Syrian media on the 23d, prior to the official
announcement, reported that Podgornyy's visit, to start on the
25th, was expected to last three days.
According to the 25 May AL-AHRAM, as reported by MENA, the sides
will make a comprehensive review of the results of contacts and
consultations held recently on the Middle East crisis, discussing the
situation from military and political aspects, and will also cover
Soviet-Egyptian military, political, and economic cooperation.
AL4tHRAM added that the Soviet delegation's visit will not be
restricted to any timetable. The paper also reported that Gromyko
and the UAR ambassador in Moscow met on the evening of the 24th
to discuss some of the issues to be raised in the Cairo talks.
Moscow radio on the 24th merely cited the Cairo press as saying the
* Podgornyy was in Egypt as recently as 13-19 January, heading a
delegation attending commissioning ceremonies for the Aswan hydro-
power complex. Ponomarev had led a CPSU delegation to Egypt
10-20 December, just prior to the Moscow visit of a UAR party-
government delegation led by 'Ali Sabri.
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26 MAY 1971
present Middle East situation as well as further Soviet-Egyptian
cooperation will be discussed.
A "preparatory meeting," as AL-ABRAM described it, was held by
as-Sadat and Podgornyy on the 25th in what TASS called a "friend-
ly, comradely atmosphere." Formal talks began on the 26th.
SKACHKOV Another Soviet delegation, led by Semyon Skachkov,
DELEGATION chairman of the S.viet State Committee for Exter-
nal Economic Relations, arrived in Cairo on
20 May to attend the launching of the first ship at the Alexandria
shipyards, according to TASS. MENA reported that the delegation
would hold economic talks during its four-day visit. TASS only
briefly reported Skachkov's remarks at the Alexandria ceremony on
the 23d, but MENA cited him as pledging continued Soviet aseistance
to Egypt in its struggle to liberate the occupied territory. He
pointedly expressed Soviet confidence in Arab victory in the .
struggle against "the Israeli aggressors and against U.S. imperial-.
ism" as well as confidence in the people's "adherence to their
freedom along the course" set by Nair. Judging by MENA'e account,
Skachkov made no reference to as-Sadat's most recent speech to the
People's Assembly on 20 May but praised his May Day speech for
stressing the USSR's friendship and firm stand alongside the UAR.
MENA on the 24th reported a meeting between Skachkov and. Deputy
Premier and Industry Minister Aziz Sidqi to discuss "continuation
of implementation of projects" agreed on during Sidqi's March .
visit to Moscow to sign an economic and technical cooperation
agreement. There appears to have been no indication in-materiel
on that visit of any planned Skachkov trip, although AL4tHRAM On
17 March had cited Sidqi as saying that Novikov would cote to
Cairo in ,TIme to sign another long-term agreement.
MOSCOW ON Soviet media portray the Egyptian press am giving
CAIRO PRESS a warm and cordial welcome to Podgornyy *ale ,
emphasizing the "sincere and strong" UAR-eSoviet
relations and expressing gratitude, respect, and.friendship.;Or'.
the Soviet Union. Moscow says the Cairo paperedevoteattention
to the USSR's part in developing the country's eConoMy and also
speak highly of the Soviet Union's "principled stand" on the
Middle East conflict. AL-AMMAR is cited as saying that Egyptian.-
Soviet relations asaume various forms and aspects "in accordance
with the demands of every stage" but that their basis remains
unchanged.
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AL-ABRAM is repeatedly quoted as declaring that the permanent
and firm UAR-Soviet relations will remain unaltered in spite
of efforts "in certain Western quarters" to drive a wedge
between the two states. In the most explicit reference thus
far to Western press reports of the pro-Soviet leanings of the
dismissed Egyptian officials, TA9S on the 25th attributed to
AL-AKHBAR the observation that "allegations of the Western press
that 'supporters of the West won over supporters of the Soviet
Union in the UAR' are nothing but an absurdity."
BROADCASTS TO Prior to the announcement of Podgornyy's
MIDDLE EAST visit, Moscow broadcasts in Arabic were
already replete with assurances of Soviet
friendship and support, depicting the Arab countries as con-
vinced that friendship and cooperation with the USSR are a
"vital necessity" for them. A broadcast on the 17th claimed
that Arab papers "stress the idea" in Brezhnev's 14 May Tbilisi
speech that the Soviet Union is and will continue to be the
"sincere and loyal friend" of the Arab peoples--a remark that
Brezhnev in fact did not make in that speech.
A commentary in Arabic on the 21st provided the first rebuttal,
against the unspoken background of the events in Cairo, of
Western and Zionist "clamor over the so-called Soviet influence
on the Arab countries." It insisted that in offering great
political backing and material assistance to the Arabs the
Soviet Union does not set any prior conditions that might affect,
even remotely, the national sovereignty" of the UAR. This line
has been reiterated in other broadcasts to the MIddle East: A
commentary in Persian on the 25th stressed.. that the Soviet Union
is not seeking to obtain unilaterally any advantages for itself
in the Middle East or any other part of the world since it har-
bors no covetous designs. And Turkish listeners were told on
the same day that the USSR has given extensive political, military,
and economic aid to the UAR without imposing conditions "and
without intervening in its internal affairs." Podgornyy's visit,
the commentary added, will undoubtedly help strengthen "peaceful
and progressive forces" in the Middle East.
PROPAGANDA IREKIMENT OF UAR EVENTS CONTINUES RESTRAINED
Moscow continues to report sparingly and selectively on develop-
ments in Cairo, ignoring announcements of further arrests and
new appointments and references to investigations. TASS reports
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FBIS TRENDS
26 MAY 1971
have underlined the role of the president, noting in an account
of the first new cabinet meeting that governmental and ASU
changes have been carried out "in keeping with decrees" issued
by the president and mentioning that the ASU interim committee,
meeting to discuss measures for reorganization, "was guided by
the directions" of as-Sadat. On the 25th TABS reported that
"in conformity with a decision" by President as-Sadat,.Aziz Sidqi
will be acting ASU secretary general until the ASU's general
national congress, scheduled to open 23 July.
Journalists were told, PASS said, that as-Sadat at the cabinet
meeting "touched on several questions of the country's internal
situation" and again stressed that the country's foreign policy
rests on no concessions regarding territory. or regarding
Palestinian rights. TASS has also briefly reported the presi-
dent's decree on reorganization of all ASU organs on the basis
of elections and his message empowering the People's Assembly
to draft a permanent constitution of the Egyptian Arab Republic.
PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov, reporting on the UAR draft
budget on the 23d, concluded that "progressive forces" in the
UAR regard cuoperation with the Soviet Union as a guarantee of
further successes on the road of progress.
POLISH While available East European propaganda has.been
COMMENT reticent with regard to the events in Cairo, one
forthright assessment of the developments did
appear in the Polish weekly POLITYKA, reviewed by PAP. on
21 May. The paper observed that as-Sadat's present policy
suits the aspirations, generally speaking, of all those who
want to end the war with the help of the Americans or anybody
else. Without explaining the current status of Jum'ah and
'Ali Sabri, POLITYKA said it is not known what, forces they
still have at their disposal; the article added that with AST?'
influence still strong among the town population and students,
"it cannot be precluded that counter..ction might be launched."
Listing the aspirations of various segments of Egyptian society,
POLITYKA concluded that as-Sadat has no easy. problem.
practically everybody would like something else, and it pre-
dicted that, like Nasir, he would try to keep a balance which
would satisfy each social group. One thing is certain, it
said: The country has entered a period of "sharp internal
struggle" which could have a great impact on its 'political
and social system.
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TASS ACCOUNT OF AS-SADAT SPEECH GLOSSES OVER DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
FOREIGN TASS devotes most of its account of President
POLICY as-Sadat's 20 May speech to the National Assembly--
now People's Assembly--to his remarks on the Middle
East conflict, predictably highlighting his statement that the
UAR would never have made progress if it were not for aid and
support "from our honest and sincere friend," the Soviet Union.
Where as-Sadat reviewed the positions of the Big Four, TASS
focuses on his remarks regarding the United States, noting in
passing that he "went on to speak about the recent visit to
Cairo by Secretary Rogers" and then quoting him as saying that
Washington supplies the "Israeli aggressors" with everything
from bread to Phantoms. TASS reports Egypt's reply to the
United States on the reopening of the Suez Canal as outlined by
as-Sadat, citing him as saying that Cairo has asked the United
States to define its pouition and that if the U.S. Government
really wants peace, pressure must he put on Israel if the cause
of peace demands it.
DOMESTIC The TASS account brushes off the second half of
AFFAIRS the speech, on domestic affairs, with the obser-
vation that as-Sadat "indicated that he would not
dwell on the events of last week, when several ministers and
top officials of the ASU resigned." TASS does note that much
of the speech concerned the drafting of a permanent constitution
which as-Sadat said must lay stress on Arabism and defend the
gains of socialism, and must envisage broader representation of.
peasants and workers in all government bodies. The account does
not, of course, refer to his statement that "currents are now
sweeping this world under the guise of science and dragging
peoples to fearful materialism in which all values and morals
are lost; we cannot live without values and morals because this
would be tantamount to not believing in our religion,"
ASU TASS does report that in concluding his address
AFFAIRS as-Sadat said the ASU would be reorganized from top
to bottom, with the People's Assembly performing
the functions of the ASU Central Committee until its new member-
ship is elected. Moscow has naturally failed to make any mention
of the ASU "secret organization" referred to by as-Sadat in both
his 14 and 20 May speeches and reported in Cairo media as the
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FBIS TRENDS
26 MAY 1971
focal point of the "plotters." MENA on the 23d revealed that
Jum'ah,"who was running the ASU secret organization," order-
ed the destruction of the organization's files.
It may be recalled that Moscow for some years has referred
sporadically to the need to create a "vanguard" grouping
within the ASU composed of "progressive" Egyptians to guide
the organization in the proper socialist, mass-oriented
direction. An article in the March 1970 issue of the Russian-
language journal PROSPER, published in Alma-Ata, had.cited
Jum'ah as saying it was necessary to have "an ideological
framework, a form of political vanguard inside the ASU in
the person of the apparat and activist group of the party,"
and that "the political apparatus is assigned the role of
a vanguard political party of a socialist nature."**
As opposed to Moscow's reticence on the status of Egyptian
leftists, the British CP organ MORNING STAR addresses itself
directly to the situation of the Egyptian communists in the
course of a 21 May article listing "dangerous moves" against
Middle East communist parties. In Egypt, the paper says,
"communists are not at present being persecuted, bdt they
have no legal right to form a communist party." It recalls
that the former communist organizations dissolved themselves
and that after release from prison, the "former communists"
were allowed to play a part in building the new Egypt, but
only as individuals.
* LE MONDE's Eric Rouleau in a 15 May article said that Jum'ah
made a secret trip to the USSR--in early February, according to
a Lebanese press account of the incident--and that as-Sadat took
this initiative "very badly," the more so since the Soviet lead-
ers had complained to Jum'ah that as-Sadat took diplomatic
initiatives without consulting them, contrary to a gentleman's
agreement concluded with Nasir.
** See the FBIS TRENDS of 18 November 1970. pages 11-13.
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TRUDEAU IN USSR
FBIS TRENDS
26 MAY 1971
MOSCL4 REGISTERS SENSITIVITY TO IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH MI
Soviet publicity for Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's 12-day
visit to the Soviet Union, which began on 17 May, reflects
evident sensitivity on the question of how developing Soviet-
Canadian relations may affect the USSR's relations with third
countries, primarily the United States. Kosygin's speech on
the 19th, the day the Soviet-Canadian protocol was signed,
and subsequent Soviet commentaries have underscored the
shared concern of hosts and guest expressed in the protocol,
which provides for bilateral consultations at least once a
year on "important international problems of mutual interest
as well as questions of bilateral relations." These
consultations, the document stipulates, have "no bearing on
the earlier commitments of the sides in regard to third
countries and are not aimed against any one of them."
Speaking at a Canadian Embassy luncheon on the 19th, Kosygin
declared that Soviet-Canadian cooperation in areas of mutual
interest can be extended as a result of the "businesslike
and friendly" talks, then hastened to add that this coopera-
tion "is not directed at anyone." It not only meets "the
national interests of both sides," he said, but "simultaneously
helps ease international tension and preserve peace." TABS
gave prominence to this passage in reporting Kosygin's remarks.
In a similar vein, in a Moscow radio talk broadcast widely
beginning on the 20th, commentator Belobrov declared that the
"important steps" taken by Canada and the USSR in the sphere
of bilateral relations will not only promote the welfare of
the two peoples but will "also help improve relations among
all countries." This, Belobrov emphasized, is "a very
important consideration." Other Soviet comment has made
substantially the same point, though less sharply--for example,
in likening the USSR's relations with Canada to relations with
France in the interests of mutual advantage and the cause of
peace.
Soviet media's accounts of the Canadian Prime Minister's
20 May press conference registered Moscow's sensitivity on
the score of how the results of the visit could affect
relations with the United States. A TASS account on the 20th
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FBIS TREWS
26 MAY 1971
and a TASS-attributed report appearing in the central press the
next day entirely omitted Trudeau's several remarks on the
subject. According to Western news agencies, Trudeau said his
visit had been prompted in part by a judgment that it will be
increasing4 important for Canada to diversify its contacts
with "significant world powers" because of the "overpowering
presence" of the United States. This judgment, he said, is
reflected in a "growing consciousness among Canadians of a
danger to our national identity." Pointing to Canada's
independence in foreign policy, he reportedly commented that
the Soviet-Canadian protocol on mutual consultations does not
imperil Canada's relationship with the United States through
membership in NATO and NORAD, and he found an analogy to
Canada's approach to the Soviet Union in Bonn's Ostpolitik
and the U.S. negotiations with the Soviets in SALT. He
also denied that he was acting as an intermediary for the
United States in Moscow.
The Soviet accounts of the press conference reported only
Trudeau's explanations of certain aspects of the newly
signed protocol, his reference to Kosygin's acceptance of
an invitation to visit Canada, his remarks on his discussion
with Brezhnev and Kosygin of the Soviet proposal on
reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe,
and his expression of interest in developing and exploring
the Arctic regions. TASS quoted him to the effect that
Canada and the Soviet Union "see eye to eye" on the last
point.
While Moscow would nave been expected to defer to Trudeaut.-.
concern for the U.S.-Canadian relationship, it might also
have been expected to capitalize on the visit in some measure
to promote the stereotyped propaganda picture of Western
disunity and alienation of the United.States' allies. But
the thrust of Moscow's comment has been precisely to offset
any view of Soviet courting of Canada as an exercise in
traditional Soviet politicking designed to isolate the
United States or to maneuver in the context of the Sino-
Soviet-U.S. triangular relationship. Viewed alongside other
recent Soviet moves, notably in.SALT and.in connection with
possible negotiations on force reductions in Central Europe,
the treatment of the visit emerges rather as an effort to
.enhance an image of Soviet readiness to negotiate .across a
broad front--bilaterally and.mult:laterally--with "business-
like" objectives in view.
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26 MAY 1971
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STRATP3 IC ARMS LIMITATION
MOSCOW PLAYS MI-SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT IN LOW KEY
Moscow's domestic service at 1600 GMT on 2( May carried as the
third item in its newscast the text of the ;joint U.S.-Soviet
announcement t,nat the two countries have agreed to concentrate
their efforts this year at the strategic arms limitation talks
(SALT) on an accord limiting the deployment of antimissile
defense systems and to work toward "certain measures" limiting
strategic offenz.ive arms. TASS subsequently trensmitted the
announcement, and PRAVDA carried it on an inside page on the
21st.
Initially, in releasing the announcement, Soviet media did
not mention that President Nixon read it in Washington. The
next day, however, a TASS roundup of favorable foreign
reaction noted that the President "in his radio and TV
speech" called the agreement "a very important event." The
same TASS item--which appeared in PRAVDA on the 22d--reported
that U Thant said the agreement "can prove to be an important
step forward in the complex and prolongEd talks" ad that
numerous U.S. Senators had reacted favorably.
On the 23d, participants in the domestic service commentators'
roundtable show reviewed the joint announcement and described
foreign reaction as "overwhelmingly" positive. Commentator
Belyayev linked the results at SALT with Brezhnev's 14 May
initiative on force levels in Europe, saying that these
developments show the beneficial nature of the USSR's
suruggle for peace and against war. Beyond this obse vation,
Moscow has not originated any comment.
EAST EUROPE All of Moscow's East European allies have
reported the announcement, and comment is
available from all but Sofia and Bucharest. Warsaw domestic
service commentaries on the 20th noted the relative speed
with which an agreement was reached, and a TRYBUNA LUDU
article reviewed by PAP on the 22d challenged Washington to
match its words Iiith deeds. PAP also quoted GLOS PRACY for
the observation that "the fairly optimistic initial views"
on SALT were not unfounded, with the "impasse" on the talks
now broken. A 25 May TRYBUNA LUDU article reviewed by PAP
observed that missile-equipped submarines, nuclear-armed
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26 MAY 1971
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bombers, and MIRV's are not to be discussed in the present
stage of negotiations, adding that.in this connection "some
experts point out that even in the event of a possible
conclusion of initial agreements, the arms race and the
perfecting of armaments will go on."
Prague's CTK on 21 May, noting that the House Armed Services
Committee has approved funds for further development of the
Safeguard ABM system, complained.that-this action is "in
contrast to the recent Soviet-American announcement on
progress" at SALT. A Budapest broadcast to Westerh Europe
on the 21st viewed the U.S. acquiesence in the announcement
as an effort to quiet domestic opposition. In the words of
the commentary, the domestic opposition to the Nixon Adminis-
tration is exerting such pressure that the President, "to
strengthen his position, definitely needs to show progress
in a question of decisive importance." SiMilarly, an East
Berlin domestic service commentary on 21 May said that the
United States accepted the "Soviet initiative" only because
"it had become aware of the changed power ratio in the
nuclear field and because of increased public presSure."
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FORCES IN EUROPE
40022-7
USSR CLAIMS SUPPORT FOR BREZHNEV PROPOSAL, IMPUGNS U.S. STAND
Moscow continues to claim widespread favorable reaction to the
Brezhnev proposal of 14 May to "start negotiations" on the
reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. A
domestic service commentary on the 21st, for example, said
that "the world public is devoting a great deal of attention"
to the proposal and that "not a single newspaper" has opposed
it. The commentary also noted Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's
remarks at a Moscow.press conference the previous day that
Canada "will carefully weigh what can be done" to implement the
proposal. A participant in the 23 May domestic service
commentators' roundtable show cited AFP for the report that the
foreign ministers of 10 West European countries,meeting.in
Paris on 18 May to discuss Common Market.questions, "expressed
satisfaction with Brezhnev's initiative .and characterized
it as a gesture of good will." The panelist went.on to cite
Senator Mansfield as believing that the United States,
instead of merely studying this "significant" proposal, "should
react to.it.in a positive manner and set a concrete date for
a start of the talks."
Soviet commentators have taken note of West German Chancellor
Brandt's initial reaction to the Brezhnev proposal. Among others,
a Grigoryev article in PRAVDA on the 23d said Brandt has declared
that the proposal "merits great attention." FRG resistance to
the proposal, according to Grigoryev, "is to be observed, as
always," in the ranks of the CDU/CSU and among the Bonn generals.
Soviet media have not so far been heard to mention FRG spokesman
Ahlers' 21 May statement that Bonn believes talks on.force
reductions "could not be independent of the negotiations over
Berlin."
Consistent with Moscow's failure to acknowledge that Ambassador
Beam had met with Gromyko on.17 May to explore.the Brezhnev
proposal, low-level propaganda has pictured the United States
as reluctant to engage in serious.talks. Thus a 20.May TASS
report concluded that Administration pressure to.block Senate
passage of the Mansfield resolution calling for a 50-percent
reduction in U.S. troop strength in.EUrope "cannot but call
into question the sincerity of statements of American .leaders
concerning their interest in a reciprocal reduction of armed
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forces in Europe," A domestic service report on 23 May declared
that the United States "not only does not wish to reduce its
troops in Europe, but is also bringing pressure to bear on its
NATO partners with a view to forcing them to increase military
preparations within the framework of the bloc." And a foreign-
language commentary by Glazunov on the 24th questioned the
sincerity of U.S. interest in talks when Secretary Laird has
indicated he will raise the issue of NATO's military capa-
bilities at the Ministerial Council session in Lisbon on 3-4 June.
Reporting the opening on 25 May of a two-day meeting.of.NATO's
Nuclear Planning Grour (NPG) in Mittehwald, West Germany, a
Moscow domestic servi6e.talk asserted that .the alliance is "not
only not rejecting the wild .plans kr making use of weapons of mass
destruction in Eurole, but is.interding .uo give an even more
dangerous.character.to these.plans." The broadcast called
such plans particularly "absurd" when the European public "has
given broad approval to the important initiative" of the USSR.
PEW DEPARTURES FROM SOVIET LINE IN EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT
All of Moscow's East European allies have essentially followed
the USSR's lead in treating the Brezhnev proposal. With the.
notable exception of Romania, they have stressed widespread
favorable responses and in varying degrees.have cast doubt on
U.S. sincerity. Bucharest, which reported the proposal in a
straightforward manner, has so far offered no comment but has
continued to press its own call for withdrawal of troops from
foreign territories.
Unlike Moscow, some East European sources hsl-e acknowledged the
17 May meeting between Ambassador Beam and Foreign Minister
Gromyko to discuss the proposal. A Bratislava radio commentary
on the 17th, for example, said .Bam has been instructed "to
start soundings" on the Saviet initiative. And Budapest's
NEPSZAVA on the 19th said that the United States has not
openly rejected Brezhnev's proposal, instead resorting to the
"diplomatic step" of having Beam request a meeting with Gromyko.
Pointing to Senator Mansfield's support for the proposal, some
East European comment has gone beyond Moscow's in noting that
he has suggested that talks could begin as early as June.
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 20th, for example, said Mansfield has
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urged the President to accept the proposal "and to begin talks
as early as June." Prague's ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY said on the 17th
that Mansfield has indicated the talks could start "at the
beginning of June."
At least one East European commentary has brought up the question
of an asymmetrical reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe,
a long-standing NATO proposal which Moscow has opposed. An
article in the Bratislava PRAVDA on the 18th said this "maneuver"
is based on the claim that U.S. forces would have to withdraw
across the Atlantic, whereas Soviet troops would remain closer
to Europe because of geography. Such a "trick" involving a
disproportionately large Soviet troop reduction would in fact
strengthen the position of both NATO and the United States,
the paper argued.
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ROMAN IA
CEAUSESCU TO VISIT ASIAN CONMUNIST CAPITALS IN JUNE
The Romanian press on 20 May frontpaged an announcement that
President Ceausescu will lead a party and government delegation
to Peking, Pyongyang, and Hanoi in June. As if to avoid giving
unduly provocative prominence to the Peking leg of the tour,
the announcement contained three paragraphs of equal length
on the projected visits, each noting Ceausescu's acceptance
of an invitation from the respective cJpital. The order of
the paragraphs--the PRC first, North Korea second, and North
Vietnam last--may indicate the order of the itinerary.
No specific dates were cited; the announcement said Ceausescu
will go to China "early in June," to North Korea "in the first
half" of June, and to North Vietnam "soon." It mentioned no
other visits or stopovers, but Ulan Bator's MONTSAME news
agency reported on the 24th that a delegation lad by Ceausescu
will "arrive in the MPR in the second 10-day period of Juno."
The vagueness about the timing may indicate that some details
have yet to be arranged or that Ceausescu wants to maintain
as much flexibility in his itinerary as possible.
The groundwork for the tour was evidently laid by Deputy
Premier Radulescu, who visited Peking and Hanoi In November
1970 and made a trip to Peking in March of this nazi Apart
from the bilateral aspects of the visits, the inclusion of
both the DPRK and the DRV on the itinerary--both neutrals
In the Sino-Soviet dispute--will enable Bucharest to underline
its policy of good relations with "all" the socialist
countries, to mute any appearance of capitalizing on Sino-
Soviet rivalry, and to enhance its image as honest broker
in the cause of unity.
So far, Soviet media have not mentioned the announcement of
the tour.
BUCHAREST GIVES CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER WARM WELCOME
Romanian media gave prominent play to Chilean Foreign Minister.
Almeydes 20,23 May visit to Bucharest, which resulted in the
signing of new agreements on trL.Le, industrial cooperation,
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and technological aid to Chile. Almeyda is currently on a
tour of the Soviet bloc seeking closer cooperation with the
socialist countries. According to AGERPRES, the Chilean
minister was received on the 21st by President Ceausescu
and Premier Maurer; he later had talks with his Romanian
counterpart, Manescu, as well as with Foreign Trade Minister
Burtica and Minister of Mining, Oil, and Geology Almasan.
Also on the ?1st, Ceausescu gave a dinner in Almeyda's honor
and stressed the common goals of the two countrieo in seeking
"national independence and cooperation among all states."
In response, Almeyda was effusive.in his thanks for Romania's
"generous receptivity" tm 'hile's problems and expressed
confidence th....t the twt tries are on "an ample and
promising road toward . -*hening their relationship on
the basis of mutual adT .
The communique on the v carried.by AGERPRES, registers
similar warm sentiments : yting that the talks were
"conducive to full under E 4ding" and.expresses the two
sides' "determination to develop relations on all levels--
political, ewnomic, technical-scientific, and cultural--
based on full equal rights and mutual esteem, trust, and
advantage." It adds that "concrete projects of industrial
cooperati-n" were agreed upon and that the two sides are
working out the details "by which Romania can grant Chile
loans for some of these projects as well as for the purchase
of Romanian equipment and machinery." The two parties
defined "concrete domains" in which Romania will grant Chile
technical assistance that will contribute to Chilean develop-
ment on a mutually advantageous basis, the communique says,
noting that cooperation in the mining.and copper industries
will continue. The results of the talks are in keeping with
Almeyda's definition of the purpose of his Soviet bloc tour,
as quoted in an AGERPRES account of a press conference for
Romanian and foreign correspondents.on the 22d: He hoped,
he said, "to define the domains of cooperation in the common
interest."
On more general topics, the joint document upholds each
country's sovereign right to. dispose of its natural.resources
and emphasizes a need to eliminate discriminatory practices
from economic relations between states. It also calls.for
the PRC's.admission to the United Nations and points to the
importance.of the establishment of diplomatic relations between
Santiago and Peking.
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The communique makes no mention of either the Soviet Union or
the United States. It does, however, condemn "the aggression
in Southeast Asia" and call for the withdrawal of "aggressor
troops." And AGERPRES, reporting the 22 May press conference,
quoted one passage in which the Chilean foreign minister took
a direct swipe at the United States. Answering a question on
the political situation in Latin America, according to
AGERPRES, Almeyda said that "the principle of noninterference
in the internal affairs of other states is gaining ground
while the interventionist policy.as practiced by the United
States against Cuba and the Dominican Republic has fallen
into disrepute." He reportedly.added that "an external
military intervention in Chile is.impossible, but economic
and financial pressures might occur."
BACKGROUND Against the backdrop of continuing efforts to
lessen its dependence on the Soviet Union for
its raw materials and to resist Soviet pressures for CEMA
integration, .Romania has been cultivating good relations with
Chile since the reestablishment of.full diplomatic relations
in June 1965. Vice Premier Radulescu visited Chile in 1968.
In the past few years the two countries have been cooperating
in the mining industry, and last September they concluded an
agreement to create a joint stock company for constructing
two copper refining plants. According to the agreement, one
plant would be built in each country and each would have a
51- to 49-percent holding in the company on its own territory.
Romania moved to capitalize on possibilities of further
improving its ties with Chile aftce Allende's advent to
power, sending Radulescu and Deputy Foreign Minister
Macovescu to Santiago for the inaugural ceremonies in November.
An article in the party daily SCINTEIA on 12 April, hailing
the victory of Allende's Popular Unity coalition in the 4 April
municipal elections, pointed to "the significance of this success
f5r Chile's economy and for the nationalization of Chile's basic
resources.
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CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS
HUSAK THANKS SOVIETS. ALLIES FOR 1968 INTERVENTION
In his most abjc:, puL.,:ic gesture to date, Gustav Husak used
the occasion of his rejort to the opening session of the 14th
Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress on 25 May to thank
Brezhnev by nrnA and the other visiting Warsaw Five leaders
collectively for invading the country in August 1968. At
the same time, the CPCZ leader characteristically discoursed
at length on the culpability shared by Novotny's pre-1968
leadership for the problems that developed after Dubcek's
takeover as First Secretary--an aspect of the Czechoslovak
situation that has consistently been played down in Soviet
propaganda.
The congress was opened with a brief, general speech by
President Svoboda, and the honor of welcoming the visiting
party delegations by name and conducting the procedural
voting.fell to CPCZ Presidium member and secretary Vasil
Bilak. The ultraconservative Bilak, who had preceded Husak
as Slovak CP first secretary in the preinvasion period and
was the target of liberal attacks for allegedly colluding
in the invasion, was singled out for lavish praise by both
Husak and Slovak CP First Secretary Lenart at the congress
of that party on 13-15 May 1971.
Heretofore, Husak has shown notably less zest for the
subject of the invasion than the ultraconservatives of Bilak's
stripe. He did not publicly endorse the intervention as a
positive phenomenon until his speech on a visit to Moscow in
October 1969--six months after his election as CPCZ First
Secretary. He did not express public gratitude for the
Invasion until after the release in January 1971 of the
CPCZ plenum document "Lessons From the Crisis-Ridden Develop-
ment in Party and Society After the [1966] 13th CPCZ
Congress," which he had presented at a CPCZ plenum in
December 1970. That document said officially for the first
time that the invasion was in response to "requests" from the
Czechoslovaks. At the 24th CPSU Congress on 1 April, Husak
briefly voiced "sincere thanks" to the CPSU and the Soviet
Government and people "for having understood" the Czechoslovak
communists' "appeals for help."
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EBISIRENDS
26 MAY 1971
Now, after hailing the inte:eentleea e having, among ther
things, "saved the 111!es of thoussnds.of.people," ausak
again expreesed. "stneere thanks" te the. CSU and the. Soviet
Government and people, aIcl.irig thanks new ee "you perannally,
Comrade Brezhnev and the other soeialist Lriends frem the
fraternal parties whose first seererardes are present. today.
He went on. to spel1. oue au length the line of the "Lessons"
document that "in a difficult siieeltien" the Warsaw Five
leaders "understoed the feats ef the Czechoslovak.communists
for the cause of soeialisme.the.requeet by many party and
state functienaries, by many eemmunists.andeeolleetives of
working pc-pie for assistance." That assance, he said.,
saved the country from "civi war and counter:evolution" and
"defended the achievements of seeialism."
In leading up te his remarks on the invasion, Husak.briefly.
disposed of the sensitive subjeet of the anti-Soviet "extra-
ordinary 111th .congress of the CPCZ" herid_ta secret at.
Vyseeany the day ftee the 2..AlAgasT 1968 invasioa--a subject
which had been dealt wi.th at length. at the Slovak CP congress
earlier this month te east Hosakie rele in the pot.-invasion
period in a favorable light. New, in attacking "Alexander .
Dubcek. and his followers," Husak seld their policies "ended
up in the bankruptcy which resulted in the hostile platform.
of the well-kncwn antipaety Vysoeany meeting," He charged..
that an attempt was made that e:ngressto "createeuader
the name of rLe CPCZ a oolnterre7oeutionary staff" to break
off ties with Meseow and fts flie and. elminate socialist
achievements in the CSSR,
At the same time, Hueak presented the January 1968 leadefeship.
change, as he tad doae befere, as a.geed idea gone wrong..
He charged that tl-ie demands of rhe 1966 .CPCZ eengeess.to
correct "certain unhealthy trends_in.our domestic political.
life" were not heedei by. Ncveehy, whese "frequent administrative
interventicns and -insensitive attitude nowarel solving the
naticnal question" (Czeehs ene.Sloveks) led to "bureaucratic
centraLtsm" and "formalism in int.eaparty life." The "decisive
measures" needed to correct the situation, he added, "included
the departure of Antonin Novctny as .first secretary," but
the new leadership healed by Dubeek failed to combat "the
growing rightist opportunism and antiseA74al1st trends" .
manifested partiularly in the communications media.
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FBIS TRENDS
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A lengthy TAGS summary of Husak's.speech on the 25th followed.
the lines of past Soviet treatment of his speeches by ignoring.
his remarks on the pro-January 1968 period,.focusing.instead
on the Dubeek.era and the achievements under Husak's.stewardship
since April 1969 in "normalizing" the situation. TAGS reports
in detail Husak's personal thanks.to,Brezhnev and the other
visiting East European leaders for the invasion and also singles
out his attack on "the Chinese leadership," leveledin_connection
with praise for the results of the 1969 Moscow international
party conference.
The initial TABS report of Brezhnev's speech. to the Prague
congress on the 26th puts the CPSU leader on record as "fully
sharing" the appraisal of the 1968-69 events set forth in. the
"Lessons" document and the CPCZ Central Committee report.
delivered by Husak the day before. Citing "the high prestige
now enjoyed in the world communist movement by the CPCZ and its
leaders--comrades Gustav Husak, Ludvik Svoboda, and other
unbending fighters for the. causo. of socialism," Brezhnev
declared that "no one will be able to sever Czechoslovakia
from the socialist camp."
WARSAW FIVE SEND TOP LEADERS, ROMANIA LESSER FIGURE
The Warsaw Five demonstrated.their.solidarity in the 19.68.
intervention, and. endorsement of Husak's leadership by all
sending their party first secretaries to the Czechoslovak -
congress, where only the CPSU and SED.were represented at..
tWtlevel at the 13th CPCZ Congress in 1966. The Polish,
Hungarian, and Bulgarian parties were represented only by
Politburo-level figures--Ochab, Nemes, and Velchev,
respectively--in 1966.
Romania and Yugoslavia underscored their disapproval_of the
Czechoslovak "normalization" by.lowering the level of their
representation from that of 1966. Romania sent Popescu, a
member of the RCP Executive Committee but not of the elite
Permanent Presidium. Yugoslavia sent Gazi, a member of the
45-member LCY Presidium, equivalent to only a Central Committee
member. In 1966, Bucharest sent Permanent Presidium.member
Birladeanu (since purged), and Belgrade sent LCY Executive
Committee member and Premier Stambolic.
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FBIS TRENDS
26 MAY 1971
While the French CP is again represented, as in 1966, by a
Politburo-level figure, Guyot, the Italian CP further
demonstrated its.hostility.to_the Czechoslovak events by
lowering its representation, from Politburo. to Central
Committee level. The Cuban.party and.the-NFLSV raised the
level of their delegates this. time from. Central Committee.
to Politburo members--Blas. Roca and Nguyen Van Hieu,
respectively. The North Vietnamese.and.North Korean parties
sent Politburo-level figures as in 1966--Le Thanh Nghi and
So Chol, respectively.
The Japanese_CP, which was.representeciat the 24th.CPSU
Congress, further indicated its rapprochement of sorts with
Moscow by sending.Central.ComnitteeAuember_Tosoda to the
Czechoslovak congress. Only.a.few.of-the nonrulihg
communist party delegations.are.reported.as being led by
their first secretaries--those of San.Marino, Luxembourg,
the West Gertan.DKP, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Lebanon,
Jordan, Iraq, South Africa, Brazil, and Panama.
SOVIET COMMENT ENVISIONS FURTHER "NORMALIZATION"
Comment in Moscow media on the. eve of.. the Czechoslovak party
congress credited Husak with having achieved a degree of .
normalization" and expressed confidence that he would
intensify the.process. The.day before the congress opening,.
a Volgi_ mmentary in the Moscow domestic service noted
that after Husak's leadership was elected in April 1969,
"the communists- , . managed.to.normalize the situation.
in the social life of the country," consolidated the economy,
and "reestablished relations. of mutual. trust and cooperation
with the CPSU." It said the congress, "completing a
complicated and difficult period.", in the.CPCZ's life,
would "analyze the past stage," make an "all-round examination
of the present level of development of the socialist society,"
and work out "a real program for the further successful
development of the CSSR."
An article in PRAVDA on.22.May.by Chief Editor Valenta.of
the CPCZ journal ZIVOT STRANY recalled that "party training
in 1969," after Huaak's takeover,."did_not embrace the_whole
party and was still far from bearing.nature_of.an_integral
system for the study of Marxism-Leninism," although it did
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26 MAY 1971
"facilitate the overthrow of non-Marxist positions and promoted
political differentiation." Valenta noted further that the
"Lessons" document presented by. Husak to the December 1970
CPCZ plenum had stressed that "the rightists, who have not
reconciled themselves to their. defeat, henceforth also .represent
the main political danger." This. fact, the article added,
"presupposes well-thought-out offensive political and
ideological work by the party for a lengthy period." Also in
keeping with its sober tone, the. article remarked that
"Czechoslovakia has paid_dearly in the recent past for
disregarding Lenin's warning" on the weakening of socialist
ideology.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
HONORARY POLITBURO NOMINATIONS TO REPUBLIC SOVIETS ANALYZED
In late April and early May, the republican newspapers reported
on nominc5.tions for deputies to the supreme soviets of the union
republics, to be elected 13 June. All Politburo members except
the five who hold regional posts--Grishin, Voronov, Shelest,
Kunayev, and Shcherbitskiy--were given honorary nominations in
most of the republics. Many of the press reports of such
nominations included standardized epithets of praise such as
"prominent state figure" and "true son of the party"; the
application of these epithets varied considerably in different
republics, suggesting preferences for individual leaders.
The pattern of preference, both in regard to epithets and
number of nominations, tended to remain the same as for the
April-May 1970 nominations in the union republics for the
USSR Supreme Soviet, with no significant change in Brezhnev's
favor. In fact, Armenia is the sole republic reporting praise
only of Brezhnev this year; Kirgizia and Azerbaydzhan, which
last year reported praise only of Brezhnev, this year provide
epithets for Podgornyy and Kosygin as well.
Georgia and Tadzhikistan seem to slight Brezhnev. The
Georgian press accounts of local nominations report less
praise for Brezhnev than for Podgornyy and Kbaygin.
Podgornyy is called an "important party and state figure"
and "skilled, energetic leader," while Kosygin is termed
a "prominent state and party figure." The most complimentary
thing said about Brezhnev is that he is a "brilliant example
of serving the cause of Lenin, the Communist Party, and the
interests of the people." (Gec-gian First Secretary
M6havanadze is himself portrayed as a "glorious son" of
the people). In 1970 also, Brezhnev had been slighted in
Georgia. While all three leaders had been named "true
Leninists" (as was Mzhavanadze), Kosygin had also been
termed an "important political and state figure,"
Podgornyy a "prominent state figure," and Brezhnev a
"brilliant example."
Tadzhikistan rates both Brezhnev and Kosygin as "prominent
figures of the Communist Party and Soviet state" and
Podgornyy and Shelepin as "true sons" of the party, while
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others recPive no epithets. In 1970 the Tadzhiks had appeared
to rate Shelepin even higher, calling him a "true son of :the
party and people, a prominent state figure," while Brezhnev
was termed a "true son of the Communist Party and Soviet
people" and Podgornyy a "true son of the party and people."
Podgornyy appears to be downgraded in Kazakhstan and Lithuania.
The Kazakh reports reserve the titles of "true Leninist" and
"outstanding figure" for Brezhnev and consistently attach
lengthier, higher ranking epithets to Kosygin than to Podgornyy.
While Podgornyy is given credit only for being a state figure,
Kosygin is occasionally labeled a state and political figure.
Podgornyy's highest tribute ("prominent state figure") is no
higher than that applied to Polyanskiy ("prominent state and
party figure") or Pelshe ("prominent party figure"). Kirilenko,
Suslov, Kunayev, and Kulakov are each categorized as "one of
the prominent figures" of the party. The lineup in 1970
was similar: Brezhnev was the only "outstanding" leader,
while Kosygin and Podgornyy were "prominent state figures"
(with Kosygin receiving slightly more extensive descriptions).
Suslov was a "true Leninist," Voronov "a prominent figure of
the party and Soviet state," and Pelshe and Kuuayev "oue of
the prominent" party and state leaders.
Lithuania rates Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Kirilenko as "outstanding"
political and state figures and Podgornyy only as a "prominent
political and state figure." It did not report epithets in 1970.
As it did in 1970, Belorussia appears to discriminate against
Kosygin, who is praised less often than Podgornyy and credited
only with being a state leader. Brezhnev is called an
"outstanding party and state figure" four times; Podgornyy
is labeled an "outstanding party and state figure" twice and
a "prominent party and state figure" three times; Kosygin is
called an "outstanding state figure" once and a "talented
-state figure" once. Suslov, Polyansk!y, and Mazurov are
labeled "prominent" figures, while Kirilenko is called a
"true sor of the party." In 1970 Brezhnev had been a
"prominent figure of the international Communist movement"
and "true Leninist," Podgornyy a "prominent figure," Suslov
a "brilliant example," and Mazurov a "principled leader." The
highest compliment Kosygin had rated was as an "example" in
serving the cause.
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Latvia appears to place Podgornyy and Kosygin, ab best, on a par
with Suslov and native son Pelshe. Brezhnev is repeatedly
labeled an "outstanding" figure and a "true Leninist," Suslov
a "prominent political and state figure" and "true Leninist,"
and Pelshe a "prominent party figure" and "staunch Leninist";
Podgornyy and Kosygin are called "prominent political and
state figures." Brezhnev had also been the only "outstanding"
figure in 1970, while Pelshe was a "true Leninist" and "prominent
figure" of the party and state, Kosygin a "prominent Soviet state
figure," Kirilenko a "true Leninist," and Podgornyy only a
"brilliant example."
Reports on nominations from the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Moldavia,
and Turkmenia contain no epithets for the Politburo members.
'BREZHNEV TREATED WITHOUT 'EFFUSION AT GEORGIAN FETE
At Georgia's 50th anniversary ceremony on 14 May, Brezhnev was
treated with proper respect but not as effusively as at the
August Kazakh anniversary, the October Azerbaydzhan anniversary,
or the November Armenian anniversary. Georgian First Secretary
Mzhavanadze--who has displayed coolness in the past - -introduced
Brezhnev with far less enthusiasm than the Kazakh, Azerbaydzhan,
and Armenian first secretaries had at their ceremonies. Instead
of labeling Brezhnev an outstanding figure of the party, state,
and international Communist movement, and heaa of the Central
Committee, Mzhavanadze simply introduced him as "our good friend,
our dear comrade, our militant party leader" (PRAVDA and ZARYA
VOSTOKA, 15 May). He mentioned Brezhnev without praise a few
times in his own speech, and at the end of Brezhnev's speech
Mzhavanadze thanked him for his "very brilliant, deep, and
comprehensive speech." Unlike the Azerbaydzhanis, the Georgians
did not elect a presidium consisting of the Politburo "headed
by" Brezhnev.
The speeches by representatives of Moscow, Leningrad, and the
other republics tended roughly to follow past patterns in
their treatment of Brezhnev. The least enthusiastic about
Bre7%nev were Estonian First Secretary Kebin (the only one who
did not even mention Brezhnev), RSFSR First Deputy Premier
Shkolnikov and Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan (both of
whom mentioned Brezhnev's 24th congress report but without
comment), and Lithuanian First Secretary Snechkus (who
described Brezhnev's Tbilisi speech only as "penetrating").
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Slightly warmer were Turkmen First Secretary Gapurov, who
labeled Brezhnev's speech "deeply comprehensive," and Ukrainian
First Secretary Shelest, who called it "remarkable." Half of
the 16 regional speakers (the first secretaries of Moscow,
Leningrad, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaydzhan,
and Latvia, as well ao Tadzhik President Kholov) used the term
"brilliant" plus other adjectives for Brezhnev's Tbilisi
speech or his 24th congress report. The most flattering to
Brezhnev were the first secretaries of Uzbekistan, Azerbaydzhan,
and Kirgizia, who described Brezhnev's 24th congress report as
an important theoretical document of creative Marxism-Leninism,
and the Moldavian first secretary, who spoke of Brezhnev as the
"leader of the Communist Party and state."
MENTION Apparently the Stalin issue could not be completely
OF STALIN avoided in the dictator's Georgian homeland.
Mzhavanadze mentioned Stalin's name twice, but
without comment. Brezhnev steered a middle course, citing Stalin
as one of Georgia's "prominent revolutionaries" but also
mentioning the struggle against "the cult of personality"
(PRAVDA and ZARYA VOSTOKA, 15 May). In the live Tbilisi broadcast
of his speech, Brezhnev put Stalin at the head of the list of
historical Georgian figures, and the mention of Stalin's name
was greeted with prolonged applause; in the PRAVDA and ZARYA.
VOSTOKA versions of Brezhnev's speech, Stalin's name came fifth,
and it was followed by the same "applause" indicator as each of
the other names.
The only other speaker to mention Stalin was Azerbaydzhan First
Secretary Aliyev, who declared that "we are proud of the fact
that in the ranks of the glorious revolutionary army of Baku
workers" there grew up as "Marxists-Leninists and organizers
and political leaders of the masses the remarkable sons of the
Georgian people Joseph Stalin, Alesha Dzhaparidze," and so forth.
Aliyev had also invoked the name of Stalin--as one of the
"pupils and comrades-in-arms" of Lenin--in his report at his
own republic's anniversary (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 3 October 1970).
Armenia's Kochinyan in his Tbilisi speech also named several
"outstanding sons" of the Georgian and Armenian peoples, but
he did not mention Stalin.
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P R C INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CCP PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES SET UP FOR HOPEI. INNER MONGOLIA
Further indiaeions of top-level leade.rship difficnitien are
seen in the makeup of the new party committees for Inner
Mongolia and Hopei, announced on 22 and 24 May respectively.
Li Hauch-feng, alternate Politburo member and chairman of
the Hopei Revolutionary Committee, was not named to the new
party structure in his provincial bailiwick. All the other
Politburo members with provincial ties have been appointed.
secretary at least--in most instances, first secretary--
in their provincial bailiwicks.
Teng Hai-thing, the long-absent chairman_of the Inner Mongolia
Revolutionary Committee, was similarly excluded from the.
of leaders of.the new regional .paity.committee. In the ease
of five.of the last six provincial-level party committees
established, the revolutionary committee chairman not .been
named to the secretariat; in regard-to each of the first 17
party committees established, the revolutionary committee
chairman became the first party secretary.
HOPE! The top spot on the Hopei. committee went to .Liu
Tzu-hou, previously the number two man in the
province. Liu, a full Central. Committee member, is also
the original first vice-chairman of the provincial revolu-
tionary committee. Cheng San-sheng, a newcomer to the
province recently transferred from Inner. Mongolia wheza
he held responsibilities on the revolutionary committ(
was named second secretary. Three military men were named
secretaries. Ma Hui is commander of the Hopei Military
District (MD) and holds a concurrent vice-chairmanship.
Liu Hai-ching has held military responsibilities within
the province since 1968. Ma Chieh, making his first
appearance in Hopei, has been transferred from Shansi Where
he was a vice-chairman of the Taiyuan municipal revolu-
tionary committee. Before moving, to Shansi in 1970, Ma
was an official within the Elangsule. _The two deputy
secretaries--Lu Yu,..lan and Ma Li--have both held vice-
chairmanships on the provincial revolutionary committee
since 1970.
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Highlighting the Inner Mongolian namelist is Chao Tzu..yanea..
surprise reappearance as a oecretarvon_the newoommittee.
Prior to the cultural_revolution, Chao was first zecretary
on the old Kwangtung party committee and also served .as a
secretary on the former Central-South Bureau headed by purged
Tao Chu. Chao's disappearance from public, view in 1966 vus
followed by Red Guard attacks portraying him as a loyal
lackey of Tao and charging him with mistakes in carrying out
various rural work programs.
Chao is the second Tao Chu vide to tind.a leadership spot on
a rebuilt provincial party committee.. Chang Pinghua,.former
first secretary on Hunan's party committee during Tao' reign
in the Central-South Bureau, recently surfaced as a secretary
on the new Shansi committee.
The Inner Mongolian committee, composed of 77 full and 15.
alternate members, was formed at the close of a raxty L:ongress
attended by 680 delegates meeting in Huhehot from 13 to .13 May.
Speaking to .the congress on behalf of the party core group. of. .
the region, YU sounded themes also contained in the keynote .
addresses at party congresses.in other border provinces. .
Noting that Inner Mongolia.is.on,the "northern frontier_of
our country" and .an "outpost of national_defense,'!.Yu declared
that all tasks should be accomplished "in light of preparedness
against war."
TIBET COMMITTEE Lhasa radio on 21 May indicated that a
IMMINENT? regional party committee would be set up .
soon. The broadcast, reporting on. the..
opening of a regional activists congress, said it:is being.
held amid "the upsurge of greeting the first Tibet party
congress."
Increasing the likelihood tha;l.he has.been.counted out or
the regional power structure, .Tseng Yung-ya, chairman of.
the Tibet revolutionary committee, failed to.attend.the
opening session of the activists congress.. Tseng has not..
appeared publicly since October 1970. Jen Jung, a vice-
chairman and first political comnissar of the regional FLA
units, headed the list of regional officials who turned out..
for the opening ceremony and delivered the major address.
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The Hopei. committee, consisting.of .79 full and 20 alternate
members, was formed at a congress attended by 1,209 party
representatives meeting in Shihchiachuang from .17 to 20.
Reflecting current PRC propaganda themes, Liu's keynote -address
to the congress called for reading Maes works moreseriously
in order to be able to distinguish "theoretically and in
practice" the difference "between genuine and sham Marxism."
Li Hsueh-feng, not named to the new secretariat, has not
appeared publicly since last October.when he led local rallies
celebrating National Day. Long a top CCP organizational
specialist, he helped in organizing previous National People's
Congresses, and .it is possible he has been detached to .aid in
preparations for the forthcoming NPC. His failure to reappear
in Peking, however, mats it more. likely that his disappearance
is connected with top leadership dissensions over the missing
Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng.
INNER MONGOLIA Radio behavior, suggests dissension may.
persist in Inner.Mongolia despite the
establishment of the regional party committee. The regional
radio is continuing its solid relay of Radio Pekingt.as.it.haa.
done since 5 January 1970. In. contrast, Kweichow radio recently
resumed broadcasting locally.originated material_on 18 May,
the day. following announcement.of_its new party commit:4e.
During the culturalrevolutioni provincial radios resuided-local
broadcasts prior to, or within 2 or 3 days after, revolutionary
committees were announced.
Of the five-man leadership group that heads the new committee,
four are new to Inner Mongolia. Recently identified as an
official within the Peking Military Region..(!.), which
includes Inner Mongolia, Yu Tai-chung has emerged on top as
first secretary of the new, committee; he held military
responsibilities within the Kiangsu MD, before his move to
Peking. Wu Tao, named a secretary, is the only holdover from
the cultural revolution power structure: a vice-chairman since
the revolutionary committee was formed in November 1967, he is
first political commissar of the MD. HaaHsin, a newcomer to
the province, not previously identified, was also named .a.
secretary as was the newly arrived Teng Tsun-lun, a former
vice-minister for the allocation of materials.
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