TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 12, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~IIIIIIIIII~~~~~IIIIIIIIIII~I
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
i ~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~I~~)
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
12 I4AY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 19)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
oI1oUP I
Eeeluded Iron, aulemelle
dewnoredina and
deelerdFeellen
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 MAY 1971
CON TENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Hanoi Denounces Treatment of Protester3, Wishes Them Success . .
1
Soviet Press Comment Decries "Reprisals" Against Protesters . . .
4
Peking Denounces "Bloody Suppression" of U.S. Demonstrators . . .
5
Le Duan in Peking En Route Home After Six-Week Ste.y in USSR . . .
6
Offer on POW's Shunned at Paris, Attacked by Hanoi Radio . . .
8
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Protests U.S. Strikes at DRV . . . . .
9
Victories, "Hardships" Discussed on Dien Bien Phu Anniversary . .
10
Comment on Fighting, "Uprisings" in Central South V-1etnam . . . .
11
Communists Continue to Claim ARVN Forces Routed in Cambodia . . .
12
Pathet Lao Publicizes "New Proposal" for Laos Settlement . . . .
13
PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Relations Formed with San Marino; Talks Begin with Turkey . . .
15
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
Zhukov Views Offensive Weapon Dej;loyment Freeze as Inadequate . .
19
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
U.S. Effort to Adapt to "Realities" of Some Value--Arbatov . . .
21
Moscow Accuses U.S. in Sea Collision in Korea Strait . . . .
22
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Cites Cairo Press as See4ng No Change in U.S. Policy . . .
21,
ROMANIA
Ceausescu Reaffirms Intent to Pin-sue Independent Course . . . .
26
JAPAN CP
JCP Rebuts "Slanderous" CCP Attack, Issues Countercharges . . . .
30
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PEOPLE'S DAILY Notes Fifth Anniversary of Mao Directive . . . .
32
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
12 MAY 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 3 - 9 MAY 1971
Moscow (3235 items)
VE Day
May Day
Indochina
[U.S. Demonstrations
CPSU Congress
GDR Liberation
Anniversary
French Foreign Minister
in USSR
Czechoslovak Liberation
Anniversary
GDR SED Plenum
Middle East
Peking (1561 items
Domest.c Issues (22%) 32%
[5-~.h Anniversary (--) 5%]
Mao's "7 May"
Directive
Indochina
[U.S. Demonstrations
[1st Anniversary
Sihanouk's Government
Palestine Week
FRC-San Marino Consular
Relations
U.S. Statement on Taiwan
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Pelting domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(39%)
27%
(15%)
7%]
(--)
9%]
(--)
13%
(--)
4%
(--)
4%
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INDOCHINA
Continuing Vietnamese communist propaganda on the U.S. antiwar
demonstrations sustains the theme that the "repression" of the
protesters bears witness to the Administration's growilg weakness
and isolation. Claims of success for the demonstrations are
most extravagant from LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY, which says the
militants "paralyzed all activities of the government."
Moscow's propaganda on the protests moves to the level of
authoritative central press comment, with articles by Yuriy
Zhukov in PRAVDA and Matveyev in IZVESTIYA decrying countermeasures
typical, in Zhukov's words, of a police state.
Peking, also focusing on iolice %nd military moves against the
protesters, continues to a,/oid personal abuse of the President in
international propaganda. But in domestic media it now lays the
blame for "repressive" actions squarely at the President's door.
Chou En-lai and VWP First Secretary Le Duan alluded to U.S. as
well as world-,*ide opposition to the war in speeches on 11 May
during Le Duan's Peking stopover en route :home from his lengthy
stay in the USSR. Moscow reported Le Duan's departure from the
USSR on the 9th after talks with Brezhnev.
The Vietnamese communist delegates at the Paris talks again took
issue with President Nixon's insistence that there cannot be a
total U.S. troop withdrawal until all U.S. prisoners are released.
The propaganda on the session, however, continues to obscure U.S.
and GVN proposals for the immediate release of sick and wounded
prisoners and the transfer of some POW's to a neutral country.
Hanoi radio on 12 May cited Stockholm reports to refute "the
Americans' nonsensical allegation" that Sweden had agreed that
prisoners could be interned there and that Swedish ships could
be used to transport them.
Hanoi's claims of a strategically significant victory over Operation
Lam Son 719 in southern Laos are repeated in Vietnamese communist
comment marking the 7 May anniversary of the fall of Dien Bien Phu
and in other propaganda seeking to demonstrate the failure of
Vietnamization and pacification. Attention to fighting in South
Vietnam centers on action in central Trung Bo; a 4 May QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN article claims that the allied deployment in that area has
become "passive and confused" and that Vietnamization has suffered
"serious setbacks."
HANOI DENOUNCES TREAThIENT OF PROTESTERS. WISHES THEM SUCCESS
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against the protesters as actions of an embattled Administration
under increasing pressure from an aroused public opinion. At
the same time, messages and statements of support publicized in
Hanoi and Front media wish success to the American antiwar
efforts and demand the release of those under arrest.
REPORTAGE Current ;propaganda takes the form chiefly of news
& CO TENT reports on the scope of the demonstrations and the
countermeasures. The only available commentaries--
one from Hanoi radio on 9 May and another carried by LPA on the
6th, broadcast in a fuller version by Liberation Radio on the
8th--echo earl+.er propaganda in acclaiming the demonstrations
and denouncing the treatment of the participants. The
Administration's reaction, says the Hanoi commentary, only
exposes its "further weakened and isolated posture."
Several VNA items report the spread of demonstrations to other
cities but continue to focus on activities in Washington, briefly
reporting such events as the marches to the Saigon embassy on
the 6th and to Congress on the 5th. Some of the items, charging
repressive treatment of the demonstrators, point to similar
charges by Representatives Dellums and Abzug.
The Hanoi radio commentary says that despite "the massive repression
and mass arrests"--it alleges that 14,000, a "record figure", have
been arrested or detained--the demonstrators on 4, 5, and 6 May
continued "their militant activities, stalling traffic along many
streets in Washington." The LPA commentary is more categorical
in its claim of success for such actions. Reporting the
demonstrations in frcnt of Congress, the White House, the Pentagon,
and Selective Service headquarters, it says that "masses of
American people blocked major highways and paralyzed all activities"
of the government.
Predicting further isolation for the President if he pursues his
Indochina policy, the Hanoi commentary concludes that the
demonstrations have shown that "the American conscience is
vigorously awskened" and that the President "!-.as had to cope
with a vigorously shaken re4-rbase" in addition to defeats on
the battlefield. The Front commentary concludes that the recent
remonstrations and the mass arrests on 3 May attest to the
President's failure to "appease snd defuse the American people's
spring struggle." On the 1lth, depicting Rev. Carl McIntire's
"U.S. Administration-sponsored rally for a 'military victory"'
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as a "disastrous failure," Hanoi radio finds new proof that the
majority of Americans firmly oppose their government's policy.
SUPPORT OF DRV Premier Phan. Van Dong, according to VNA on
PROTESTERS 9 May, used the occasion of his "recent"
reception of American scientists visiting North
Vietnam to "warmly welcome" the spring offensive in the United
States and to "wish the antiwar movement . . . ever stronger
development and bigger success."* Other expressions of DRV
support include a statement by the Vietnam Lawyers Association,
publicized by VNA on the 7th, which calls the "brazen repressive
acts" of the Nixon Administration "an invasion of civil lib:rties
and gross violation of U.S. laws." It demands "the immediate
release of all apprehended militants."
On 6 May VNA reported a meeting the previous evening at which
Hanoi intellectuals protested the "repression" of the
demonstrators. And on 9 May it recounted a rally held on the
8th in Hanoi by "large numbers of representatives of intellectuals
and university students" to "warmly welcome" the spring offensive
and denounce the "barbarous" countermeasures. The rally adopted a
message to Dr. Spock and "his fellow peace militants" calling for
an end to the Administration's "policy of repression against the
American people" and demanding that it "set free all those who
were illegally arrested" and end the war.
From the South come a cable and a statement issued by the South
Vietnam People's Committee for Solidarity with the American People
dated 4 and 6 May, respectively. The cable, addressed to the
People's Coalition for Peace and Justice and broadcast by Liberation
Radio on the 5th, "angrily" indicts the Administration for having
"repressed the 3 May demonstrations" and arrested 7,000 people,
specifically including Dr. Spock, Rennie Davis, and xubie Hoffman.
The lengthier statement on "the Nixon Administration's repression
of the antiwar movement" charges in more graphic yprms that the
President has "frenziedly" flouted the American people's demands.
It says that on 3 May, "in compliance with Nixon's orders, tens
of thousands of policemen and troops, using clubs, bayonets,
tear gas, and even helicopters, barbarously repressed the
demonstrators in Washington, wounding hundreds of them." It, too,
* Dong on the occasion of the 15 October, Vietnam Moratorium Day
in 1969 had sent a message to the "American people," which
welcomed the fall offensive and wished it success.
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- u -
records the arrest of 7,000 people on the 3d and says that
"these terrorist acts" and the President's "odious, slanderous
accusations against the antiwar Americans could not dampen but
rather fueled the antiwar movement and have made upright and
impartial Americans realize more clearly their responsibility
to save the United States" from the war and "to take to the streets
and resolutely struggle for peace and justice until total victory
is achieved."
Registering the South Vietnamese people's "full support of the
American people's just struggle," the statement demands that the
U.S. Government "put an end to its terrorist acts and slanderous
accusations and immediately release the Americans that have been
illegally arrested and detained."
Vietnamese propaganda continues to depict support for the U.S.
demonstrations from people in Saigon. A Liberation Radio
broadcast to U.S. servicemen on the 5th publicized a purported
message from a POW to his Congressmen asking them to back the
antiwar movement.
SOVIET PRESS COMMENT DECRIES "REPR!SALS" AGAINST PROTESTERS
Wile Soviet news coverage sharpens a portrayal of Adm'6nistration-
sanctioned police brutality against the U.S. antiwar demonstrators,
central press comment by IZVESTIYA's Matveyev and PRAVDA's Yuriy
Zhukov lend an authoritative cast to Moscow's Ceaunciati-)n of the
official reaction. Moscow's more sharply critical comment is
accompanied by publicity for statements by the Soviet Peace
Committee, the Soviet War Veterans Committee, and Soviet "cultural
leaders" expressing indignation at the "repression" and
"victimization" of the demonstrators. The Peace Comrittee also
sent a telegram to the Coalition for Peace and Justice decrying
the "violence and terror."
Administration responsibility for the police "reprisals" and use
of "concentration camps" is underscor-:d, for example, in reports
saying that Attorney General Mitchell directed the operations and
that President Nixon "approved" of the police "arbitrariness."
Moscow reported on 8 May that White House spokesman Ziegler said
President Nixon was "satisfied" with the measures taken to
disperse the protesters and "highly assessed" the actions of the
police and military units. TASS comments that the President thus
intimated that he would resort to the "toughest repressions"
against antiwar protesters in the future.
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Zhukov's 6 May article in PRAVDA pictures police and "paratroopers"
battling their own people in the center of their capital. Accusing
the government of engaging in hypocritical talk about freedom and
democracy while it throws troops against its own citizens and
imprisons those who call for peace, Zhukov concludes that the
Administration's "pyrrhic victory" has exploded the American "myth
of freedom" and "illusion of democracy." Charging that the
"American militarists" have turned their country into a police
state, he reriarks that "what happened in My Lai yesterday can
happen tomorrow in the United States itself."
In the IZVESTIYA article, summarized by TASS on 10 May, Matveyev
says the demonstrations exposed the lack of realism in
Administration hopes that the American people would become
reconciled to the war and dramatized the "ever-moulting crisis"
besetting the country. In a similar vein, a panelist in the
9 May domestic service roundtable discussion said the
demonstrations showed the failure of all the President's
efforts over the past two years to inspire the confidence
of the American people and to pacify the antiwar movement.
Another panelist, assessing the practical impact the
demonstrations can nave on U.S. policy in Indochina, observed
that the President, would have to take into account what happened
to his predecessor when he tried to ignore public opinion.
Commentators stress congressional criticisms of the treatment
of the demonstrators. Zhukov in PRAVDA cites Representative
Dellums as censuring the tactics of the police and Senator
McGovern as ?^alling the recent events the direct result of
Administration inability to heed popular demands. TASS reports
critical statements by Representative Abzug, Senators Metcalf
and Kennedy, and others. As evidence of the impact of the
demonstrations on Congress, TASS points to the coming Senate
debate on the draft system, another "sharp political fight"
looming over the McGovern-Hatfield bill on refusing allocations
for pursuit of the war, and the work of Senators Cooper and
Church on a new bill on the withdrawal of troops from Indochina.
PEKING DENOIINCES "BLOODY SUPPRESSION" OF U,S, DEMONSTRATORS
Peking's continuing reportage on the final week of the "gigantic"
U.S. antiwar demonstrations has focused on the "large-scale
suppression" of the demonstrators by "many military and police
fo:?ces." Stressing that the demonstrators were of all ages and
CONF DENT
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from all walks of life, Peking took note of the participation
of servicemen, V9~cnaa veterans, and government employees.
Propaganda disseminated by NCNA's international service-continues
largely to abstain from personal abuse of President Nixon.
Comment carried in the domestic media, however, has sought to
lay blame for the treatment of the demonstrators directly at
the door of the President. A report carried in the NCNA domestic
service on 7 May called the President "the ringleader in this
large-scale suppression," noted that "he hid himself in the
western White Housd'and "directed this suppression" from there,
and charged that "with an ugly face" and "bloodstained hands"
he "talked nonsense" in claiming that the United States "'is
not and will not become a police state' and that his government
is 'opposed to any suppression.'" It termed the mass arrests
in Washington "an outrage against the people, seldom seen in
history," and called the President a "rascal" and "an evil god
of war." This report has been broadcast to Korean and
Vietnamese audiences in the Peking radio's international
service.
In a similar vein, an article carried in the "worker-peasant-
soldier battlefield" column, transmitted by the NCNA domestic
service on 6 May, contended that "the blood of the Kent State
martyrs was not wasted," that "Nixon's bloody suppression
cannot intimidate the heroic American students," and that "the
broad masses of American revolutionary students have clearly
seen the true face of the butcher Nixon from their lessons of
blood." Neither this article nor the 7 May report has been
transmitted in NCNA's English service.
LE DUAN IN PEKING EN ROUTE WOKE AFTER SIX-WEEK STAY IN USSR
NCNA announced the arrival of Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First
Secretary Le Duan in Peking on 10 May and talks with Chou En-lai
the next day, followed by a banquet at which Le Duan and.Chou
both spoke. Moscow media, reporting Le Duan's departure from the
Soviet Union "for home" on the 9th after talks with Brezhnev,
recalled that he had come to the Soviet Union for the 24th CPSU
Congress--he arrived on 27 March--but shed no new light on hia
activities in the weeks since the close of the congress.*
For a review of the travels of the other Indochinese delegates
since the congress, see the 5 May TRENDS, pages 9-10.
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TALKS WITH Le Duan met with Brezhnev on the day of his departure
BREZHNEV for talks on "important questions pertaining to the
international situation and to bilateral relations,"
according to TASS. Both leaders, the report said, reiterated their
desire to "further develop militant friendship, solidarity, and
all-round fraternal cooperation" between their parties. VNA's
10 May report of the meeting added that Brezhnev reaffirmed Soviet
support for the Vietamese, Lao, and Cambodian peoples' resistance
until "complete victory." Where TASS described the atmosphere of
the talks as one of "complete unanimity and cordiality," VNA
characterized it as one of "militant solidarity and fraternal
friendship."
Routine-level Moscow radio comment on the Brezhnev-Le Duan.meeting
stresses Soviet resolve to continue aiding the Vietnamese and
points to Vietnamese gratitude for Soviet help. A broadcast on
the meeting in Mandarin on 10 May remarked pointedly that Soviet
support "has never been limited to lip service" but stopped short
of directly attacking Peking's behavior. In other comment not
pegged to the visit, however, Moscow continues routinely to attack
the PRC for failing to join in united action to support the
Indochinese.
ACTIVITIES The 10 May NCNA report of Le Duan's arrival in
IN PEKING Peking mentions that he had come "from Moscow."
In announcing the DRV delegates' departure from
Peking en route to the CPSU congress on 27 March, NCNA had
similarly noted that they were leaving "for Moscow"--a reflection
of Peking's willingness to mute the Sino-Soviet rivalry in an
Indochina contPxt.*
Chou En-lai and Le Duan exchanged speeches at a banquet on the
11th following talks between a CC?' Politburo group led by Chou
and the members of the Le Duan delegation. The talks, NCNA said,
proceeded "in an atmosphere which fully manifested the fraternal
unity and militant friendship between the Chinese and Vietnamese
parties." At the banquet Chou extended congratulations to the
three peoples of Indochina "on their great victories" and
particularly on the "brilliant victory won on the battlefielu of
* See the 31 March TRENDS, pages 6-9, for a discussion of the
stop in Peking of the Indochinese delegates to the CPSU congress
and their attendance at a banquet there celebrating military
victories in Indochinsa.
cIA
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Highway 9"; he predicted that the three peoples "will soon win
new victories" over the United States. Calling the three peoples'
war a "Just war," Chou contended that the U.S. war was opposed by
the people of the whole world, "including the people of the
United States." In his speech in response Le Duan also alluded
to the U.S. antiwar demonstrations, claiming that "we have
defeated" U.S. imperialism "throughout the world and in the
heartland of the United States."
OFFER ON POW'S SHUNNED AT PARIS. ATTACKED BY HANOI RADIO
Vietnamese communist accounts of the 6 May session of the Paris
talks totally ignore the issue of internment of prisoners of
war in Sweden, revolving around reports that Sweden had expressed
willingness to let its territory be used for the internment of
POW's and its ships for their transport. The communist accounts
brush off the allied presentations* in standard fashion, stating
that the U.S. and GVN delegates "repeated their absurd allegations
made at the previous session aimed at prolonging and expanding the
war." The accounts register the communist delegates' continued
insistence that the United States must set a date for a U.S.-troop
withdrawal before the POW issue can be discussed. They also again
denounced President Nixon's linkage of a total U.S. withdrawal
to the release of all U.S. prisoners and to South Vietnam's
capability for self-defense.
Hanoi radio on 12 May, however, cited reports from Stockholm...
in claiming that the Swedish Foreign Ministry and newspapers
"have rejected the Americans' nonsensical allegation" that
Sweden had "proposed" that U.S. prisoners "be released in Sweden."
The broadcast also said the Swedish Foreign Ministry had informed
the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm that the Swedish Government
* GVN delegate Lam again sought a response to his offer to
repatriate 570 sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners and
to transfer 1,200 North Vietnamese prisoners who have been in
captivity for more than four years to a neutral country.
Ambassador Bruce, in supplemental remarks during the.give-and-take
portion of the session, cited Lam's proposals and took note of the
press reports that Sweden was willing to allow its ships and
territory to be used for the transport and interment of prisoners.
He mentioned President Nixon's "satisfaction" at these reports
and his hope that Hanoi would promptly negotiate an agreement
to take advantage of Sweden's humanitarian gesture. In later
additional remarks, the Ambassador repeated his call for the DRV
delegate to respond to Sweden's reported offer.
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"has never expressed its willingness to allow its ships to be
used in transporting to Sweden" prisoners taken during the
Vietnam fighting. The broadcast cited Swedish newspapers in
denouncing as "a political trick" President Nixon's remarks,
cited by press spokesman Ziegler at a news conference on 3 May,
expressing satisfaction at the reported Swedish offer. Sweden,
Hanoi quoted one Swedish paper as saying, has declined to take
part in "Nixon's political ;aaneuvers."
FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES AT DRV
Alleged U.S. activity in the DMZ from 3 to 10 May is denounced
in protests issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on-8
and 11 May, the latest in the continuing series of protests over
U.S. actions against North Vietnam. The protest of the 11th also
claims that U.S. jet fighters on 7 and 9 May "attacked with
explosive and noxious chemicals a number of localities in Quang
Binh and Ha Tinh provinces." (Hanoi radio claimed on the 12th
that one U.S. plane was downed on 7 May and another on the 10th
over Quang Binh Province, bringing Hanoi's total of downed U.S.
planes to 3,394.)
Both statements charge that U.S. planes, including B-52's, bombed
Huong Lap village--from 3 to 7 May land again from 8 'to 10 May.
Both also charge that U.S. artillery fired at villages "located in
the demilitarized zone on DRV territory." The statement of the
8th says that U.S. artillery shelled Vinh Quang, Vinh Giang, and
Vinh Son villages from "positions on the sea and south of the
demilitarized zone"; the statement of the 11th claims that Vinh
Son and Vinh Giang were hit, causing "losses in lives and property"
to the local population. The statements "sternly condemn" these
U.S. "acts of war" and demand a permanent end to all U.S. encroach-
ments on DRV sovereignty and security.
VNA on the 10th carried an atypical report spelling out damages
reportedly caused by U.S. strikes against the DMZ. Such charges
and claims of damages are normally made only in official protests
or war crimes communiques. Some of the dates cited and localities
reportedly hit correspond with those mentioned in the foreign
ministry spokesman's 11 May statement.
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VICTORIES., "HARDSHIPS" DISCUSSED ON DIEN BIEN PHU ANNIVERSARY
Hanoi marked the 7 May anniversary. of the fall of Dien Bien Phu
with the customary editorials in the party organ NHAN DAN and the
army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The NHAN DAN editorial.used the
experience of Dien Bien Phu to demonstrate that "the nearer we.
are to victory, the greater the effort we must make," and it
predicted more "difficulties and hardships." QUAN DOI NhAN DAN
claimed at the outset that victories of strategic significance.
have been won this year in northeastern Cambodia.and on the .
southern Laos-Highway 9 front; but .'.t observed, like.NHAN DAN,
that "many hard tests" lie ahead and added that "many
strategically significant battles" must be won in order to "crush
the Americans' aggressive will."
While it -s not uncommon for Vietnamese communist propaganda to
warn, as these editorials do, of future hardships and sacrifices,
Hanoi and Front media only occasionally acknowledge. that some in
their ranks are reluctant to face more hardships. Such-an
acknowledgement appeared recently in an article attributed to
Front commentator "Cuu Long," broadcast by the Liberation Radio
in daily installments from 27 through 30 April. Urging
increased ideological work, this article said that "a number
of people" fear difficulties and hardships and that "rightist,
passive thinking" must be overcome.*
Drawing lessons from the campaign against Lam Son 719 as well-as
from Dien Bien Phu, the 7 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial claimed
that both demonstrated that weaponry is an important factor and
that "to be able to fight big battles involving concentrated
forces, the main force assault units must be equipped-with a
certain degree of weapons and other technical equipment." It
went on to reiterate the stock dogma that the factor determining
victory is man and his "fighting spirit." According to the paper,
* Occasional past references of this kind to unacceptable attitudes
include, for example, an acknowledgment of the existence of "passive,
rightist" thinking in an article in the South Vietnamese communist
party organ TIEN PHONG, broadcast by the Front in January 1970.
(See the 12 February 1970 FBIS SURVEY, pages 10-12.) In the earlier
period, erroneous views emerging after the introduction of U.S.
forces into the war in 1965 were discussed in a February 1967 article
by Cuu Long, publicized in the Hanoi press and radio.
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the fighting this year has also demonstrated "the strength
inherent in the coordination of combat among various battlefields"
and that the Indochinese are able to "simultaneously open many
battlefronts and engage themselves in large-scale combat on many
battlefields."
COMMENT ON FIGHTING. "UPRISINGS" IN CENTRAL SOUTH VIETNAM
An article ir. the 4 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN reviews recent action
in central Trung ;Bo, including provi:zces from Quang Nam in the
north to Darlac and Khanh Hoa in the south. Acclaiming communist
attacks in the highlands, it credits them with foiling allied
clearing operations and forcing the ARVN to retreat to defensive
positions. Alleged ARVN weakness is linked to battle losses
during 1970 and to the Vietnamization program. The article
explains that the U.S. forces began to shift the combat burden
in the II Corps to the ARVN in late 1969 but that the South
Vietnamese troops are still dependent on the United States and
could not carry on when the Americans were "bogged down" in Laos
and Cambodia this year.
The siege of ARVN Fire Base 6--designated Hill 1,001 by the
communists--is highlighted by the army paper. It claims that the
overrunning of the fire base breached the allied defense line
northwest of Kontum, posing a "serious threat" to rear bases,
and that this "critical situation" compelled the allies to
commit the bulk of their forces in II Corps to the recapture
of the position. The allied rescue operation, according to
the article, was "rapidly thwarted." The paper credits the
communist forces in the area 'with repulsing four waves of allied
counterattacks and claims that "in the end" they "seized complete
control over the battlefield."
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article also lists numerous "uprisings" and
attacks on pacification in central Trung Bo and claims that "the
implementation of the pacification program has been stalled in the
highlands and in the coastal and delta areas." A Liberation Radio
commentary on 11 May lauds 1 and 2 May attacks in Quang Da (the
GVN's Quang Nam) on the GVN's "control and rural pacification
network" in the Dai Loc military subsector. The "victory" is
termed a blow to the pacification program in a key pacification
area in the central Trung Bo delta.
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There is further comment on the 25 April assault on the ARVN's
Lam Son officers' training center in Khanh float allegedly
"annihilating" more than 500 officers and officer candidates.
An 8 May Hanoi radio commentary, for example, praises attacks on
such training centers as "painful blcws to Nixon in his efforts
to consolidate and develop the puppet army according to his
Vietnamization scheme." It claims that the shortage of officers
in the ARVN is becoming very serious.
COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO CLAIM ARVN FORCES ROUTED IN CAMBODIA
Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to claim that ARVN
forces engaged in Operation Toan Thang 1/71 (Total Victory 1/71)
in northeast Cambodia have been severely defeated, and the Front
radio amplifies claims of the results of these alleged losses.*
A series of three articles on the alleged deterioration of the
ARVN, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 4, 5, and 6 May, cites
the "failure" of Saigon troops in Toan Thang as "incontestable
proof"--along with the "defeat" of Lam Son 719--of the ARVN's
ineffectiveness and low combat strength. Claiming that Saigon
lost more than half its forces in Toan Thang and finally had to
call off the operation, the 5 May article says the Cambodian
fighting has demonstrated that the ARVN cannot avoid "heavy
defeats," even when fighting under the most favorable conditions.
It concludes routinely that the fighting in Laos and Cambodia
has severely hurt the Vietnamization program.
Liberation Radio on 10 May broadcast a commentary attributed to
the PLAF organ QUAN GIAI PHONG which details alleged defeats
sustained in Cambodia by the ARVN's 3d Armored Brigade, noting
that the brigade was one of three set up only this year. Earlier
reports on the Cambodian fighting have mentioned engagements with
the 3d Brigade and have identified it as the spearhead of Toan
Thang. The 10 May commentary claims that 2,000 men of the 3d
Brigade have been killed, wounded, or captured and that 300 of
its tanks and armored cars have been destroyed. Five of the
brigade's six armored companies have been "annihilated or badly
mauled," according to the commentary.
* Communist claims of victories over Toan Thang 1171 since its
start on 4 February are documented in the 28 April TRENDS,
pages 9-11.
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The QUANG GIAI PHONG commentary claims that despite fairly strong
U.S. fire support, the 3d Brigade hesitated to advance swiftly
to its objectives and therefore became ineffec*ive and fniled to
surprise its adversary. When the brigade did engage in combat,
the commentary adds derisively, it established a record.for
rapidly fleeing in disorder, leaving behind equipment and
wounded troops. The commentary explains that the officers and
men of the 3d Brigade "lost confidence in the protection provided
by armored vehicles" and, when they were engaged in combat,
abandoned the vehicles and fled. The armored forces suffered
paini'ul defeats even when operating in open fields, according
to the commentary, and became easy targets for communist
artillery whenever they grouped together.
PATHET LAO PUBLICIZES "NEW PROPOSAL! FOR LAOS SETTLEMENT
A "new proposal" on a political solution of the Lto problem.is
publicized in 12 May VNA and Pathet Lao news agency reports of
a communique on a 26-27 April conference of the standing.
committees of the NLHS Central Committee a.ad the Patriotic.
Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee.* The proposal, which
contains two main points, appears to modify the Pathet Lao's
stand put forth in the 6 March 1970 five-point program--a
program consistently described by the NLH3 as the "basis" for a
settlement along with the 1962 Geneva agreements and "the present
actual situation" in the country. The demand for withdrawal of
U.S. troops is absent from the new proposal, which calls instead
for a ceas.-Eire.
The first point demands once again that the United States end
its "intervention and aggression" in Laos and, "as an immeai.e
step," completely and unconditionally end the bombing on the
"whole territory" of Laos. It does not, however, go on to demand,
as the five points do, that all U.S. advisers and military
* The proposal is presumably also included in a letter from
NLHS Chairman Prince Souphanouvong to Prince Sonvanna Phouma which
was brought by Souphanouvong's "special envoy" Tiao Souk Vongsak,
who returned to Vientiane on 8 May after an absence of more than
three months. He had returned to Sam Neua on 21 January for
"further instructions." Pathet Lao media have noted that.the
letter contains a "new initiative" but have yet to release its
contents.
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personnel be withdrawn. This hardline demand had most recently
been reiterated by Souphanouvong in a letter to Souvanna.Phouma
publicized on 28 March 1971, in which he called for the
withdrawal of "all U.S. troops and Saigon and Thai troops" and
said that "there cannot be the least basis for a settlement
of the Lao problem among the parties concerned" as long as
the troops remain. Souphanouvong had retreated in that letter
from more moderate proposals made in November and December 1970
that talks could take place between representatives of the two
princes in Fang Khay if the bombing and military activities
were halted only for a limited period of time in limited areas
of Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua Provinces.
The second main point of the current plan contains two parts,
proposing that "immediately" after'the bombing is stopped.
(1) "the armed forces in Laos" effect a cease-fire and stop.all
acts encroaching on the other side's zone, and (2) "the Lao.
parties concerned" discuss the formation of a provisional
coalition government and "other problems of mutual concern,"
including guarantees of the neutrality of Laos. The.five-point
program, after demanding an end to U.S. bombing and.a withdrawal
of U.S. troops, says that a provisional coalition government
should be established "during the period from the restoration
of peace to general elections for a national assembly."
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PRC FOREIGN AFFAIRS
RELATIONS FORMED WITH SAN MARINO; TALKS BEGIN WITH TURKEY
Peking has sought to sustain its diplomatic momentum with
the announcement on 7 May of a recognition agreement with
San Marino, followed the next day by a unique communique
disclosing that talks have begun on establishing diplomatic
relations with Turkey. The latter announcement, in the
form of an NCNA dispatch citing a "press communique"
without specifying a source or date, marks the first time
in its current diplomatic campaign that Peking has explicitly
reported the opening of negotiations on diplomatic
recognition. On the same day as the NCNA report, the
Ankara radio broadcast an announcement by the Turkish
Foreign Ministry information office that the two countries
had agreed to open talks on diplomatic relations after
having concluded exploratory contacts.
The unique announcement on the opening of talks, while having
the effect of putting further pressure on the two sides to
reach a successful conclusion, may have been intended by
Peking to promote a bandwagon trend among countries
considering negotiations with the PRC on diplomatic
recognition and fearful of being left behind. The
publicized talks with Turkey might remind other members
of NATO that two members of the alliance, Canada and
Italy, were among the first three countries to recognize
the PRC in the latter's current drive.
Peking may also hope that its signal is received in Iran,
a country which the Chinese have recently been cultivating.
Chou En-:Lai, speaking at a 30 April banquet welcoming the
second sister of the Shah of Iran to visit the PRC
recently, termed the visits "a friendly gesture of the
Iranian Government" that will promote friendship between
the two peoples and "friendly relations between the two
countries." The wife of the Iranian premier accompanied
the princess on this visit.
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SAN MARINO The protocol on establishment of relations at
RECOGNITION the consular level between the PRC and San
Marino followed the formula used in the PRC-
Kuwait recognition agreement in March: San Marino recognizes
the PRC Government as "the sole legal government of China,"
with no mention of Taiwan. In the protocol the PRC registers
respect for "the policy of neutrality" pursued by San Marino,
a point also made in the 9 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
hailing the recognition agreement. The editorial also
played up themes that have been prominent in Peking's
diplomatic campaign, endorsing the principles of peaceful
coexistence and opposing power politics by the "superpowers."
The editorial observed that in following these policies the
PRC has established diplomatic relations with many countries
and that its international relations are "developing and
broadening daily." There was no mention of the Taiwan
question.
The formula now used with San Marino and previously with
Kuwait represents the third variation of this crucial issue
in the current series of recognition agreements beginning
with the one with Canada last October. The Canadian formula,
followed subsequently in the cases of Italy and Chile,
offered a compromise in which the PRC recorded its
territorial claim to Taiwan while Canada recognized the
PRC Government as "the sole legal government of China"
and took note of its claim to Taiwan without endorsing
it. A week after the announcement of the agreement with
Canada, Peking released a communique on the establishment
of relations with Equatorial Guinea in which the latter
recognized the PRC Government as "the sole legal government
representing the entire Chinese people." This formula
embodies Peking's preferred terms,* as indicated by its
use in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial commenting on the
agreement with Canada and arguing against any "two-Chinas"
solution. Subsequent recognition agreements with three
more African countries adopted this formula, suggesting
that it is used where Peking is in a relatively strong
bargaining position and need not con_oromise.
* Taipei mirrors Peking's position regarding the scope of
representation of a Chinese government. In a statement on
10 May the ROC declared that it is "the sole legal government
representing all the Chinese people."
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The Kuwait formula appears to be the most flexible of the
three,' in effect leaving the Taiwan question even more open
than in the case of the Canadian formula. It may be, however,
that Peking has switched from the latter.formula not so much
for the purpose of gaining more latitude in negotiating with
other countries as out or sensitivity to the speculation
arouo,rd by a formula in which a country merely "takes note"
of the PRC's claim to Taiwan. Peking's comment focused on
the Taiwan question betrays in forceful terms its concern
lest the inter,.ational community should seek an accommodation
on this issue that would seriously prejudice its irredentist
objectives. In the absence of a recognition agreement
meeting its optimum terms, Peking may prefer to sidetrack
the Taiwan question rather than to use a formula that
suggests a willingness to compromise on a matter of such
concern. In following this strategy Peking might calculate
on strengthening its hand for dealing with the China
representation question by broadening its diplomatic
standing across as wide a front as possible, thereby
isolatiub Iaipci and undercutting its leverage for
resisting Peking's demands. It seems pertinent, in
this connection, that the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials
following the two agreements using the Kuwait formula
ignored the Taiwan and the UN representation issues while
focusing on points of mutual interest. These issues
figured in some form in all the other editorials on
recognition agreements.
The table on~the next page shows the*date on which-Peking
announced a recognition, agreement,.whether the, other country had
previously recognized the ROC, both the ROC and the PRC,
or neither, and the formula used in the agreement. Formula
I is that in which the other country recognizes the PRC
as "the sole legal government of China" and "takes note"
of its claim to Taiwan. Formula II is that in which the
other country recognizes the PRC as "the sole legal government
representing the entire Chinese people." Formula III is
that in which the other country recognizes the PRC as "the
sole legal government of China" but in which there is no
mention of Taiwan. It will be noted that previous recognition
of the ROC is not a criterion distinguishing the use of the
various formulas.
* Peking's flexibility was underscored in an inadvertent
manner in the agreement on diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.
In the communique the Chinese expressed support for the
government and people of "the Eon ire of Ethiopia in their
Approve rPl'~ Ac bB3 It
9
emp as is a e e ritrean iteration Front might see in
this a rather bitter irony.
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Canada
13 Oct 70
ROC
I
Equatorial Guinea
20 Oct 70
Neither
II
Italy
6 Nov 70
ROC
I
Ethiopia
1 Dec 70
Neither
II
Chile
5 Jan 71
ROC
I
Nigeria
10 Feb 71
Both
II
Kuwait
29 Mar 71
ROC
III
Cameroon
2 Apr 71
ROC
II
San Marino
7 May 71
Neither
III
FORMULAS USED IN REGENT RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
ZHUKOV VIEWS OFFENSIVE WEAPON DEPLOYMENT FREEZE AS INADEQUATE
An article by Yuri Zhukov in the 5 May PRAVDA conta1.ns Moscow
media's first--albeit brief--treatment in nearly three months
of substantive issues under discussion at the fourth round of
the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Vienna. In the
context of a warning about the "increasingly dangerous influence
of the U.S. military-industrial complex" allegedly seeking to
block any relaxation of tensions between the United States and
the USSR, Zhukov belatedly mentions Senator Jackson's 15 April
remarks again calling for a freeze on the deployment of offen-
sive nuclear weapons of both countries. The Senator's speech,
made in Washington before the American?Soci?ety of Newspaper
Editors, had not been reported before by Moscow media. Moscow
had also failed to report Senator Jackson's television inter-
view on 28 March and his speech on the Senate floor the
following day in which he surfaced the plan for a one-year
freeze on offensive nuclear weapon deployment.
Zhukov now says the Senator declared in his 15 April speech that
the overall balance of strategic arms "is inclining in Moscow's
favor." For this reason, he continues, the Senator proposed a
freeze on offensive weapons "only on the territory of the United
States and the USSR," ignoring altogether "the nuclear weapons
which the United States keeps on its bases around our country."
A 3 February article by V. Shestov in PRAVDA--triggering a spate
of Soviet comment critical of the U.S. negotiating position on
strategic arms limitation--had first broached the matter of
weapons at U.S. overseas bases in the context of SALT, calling
U.S. reticence to discuss the issue an attempt to gain "one-
sided advantages" in the talks.* But the base issue was not
treated in subsequent comment.
In addition to criticizing Senator Jackson, whom he labels "the
Senator for the military-industrial complex," Zhukov levels an
attack on Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University as a
member of "the new anti-Soviet campaign choir." Citing a recent
* For a discussion of the Shestov and related articles, see the
TRENDS of 24 February 1971, pages 33-35; 18 February 1971,
pages 29-30; and 10 February 1971, pages 22-21I.
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article by Brzezinski in NEWSWEEK, Zhukov says he expressed
the fear that the Soviet leaders, "particularly the Soviet
military, are perhaps deliberately making use of SALT in order
to achieve military 'superiority' over the United States."
In effect, Zhukov adds, Brzezinski is "almost prayerfully
tossing his government a little idea, even if it is in the
form of an 'unprovable fear.'"
Zhukov concluaes with the stock avowal that the USSR, for its
part, supports the talks "with the aim of achieving mutually
acceptable solutions." Recalling the CPSU Central Committee
report to the 24th CPSU Congress, presented by Brezhnev on
30 March, he reiterates the standard line that talks such as
those under way in Vienna can be productive if the security
interests of the two sides are taken into account and no one
seeks one-sided advantages.
Moscow o'.herwise devotes little current attention to SALT.
Soviet media have not reacted to the New York TIMES story of
29 April that the USSR has proposed at Vienna a five-year
treaty limiting U.S. and Soviet missile defenses to 100 inter-
ceptor missiles around the capitals of the two countries.
Available Soviet accounts of Secretary Laird's 21 April speech
',jefore the American Newspaper Publishers Association and his
27 April Pentagon press conference ignored his remarks on SALT.
They pointed up is warnings about a "Soviet threat" but did
not give details of his charges that the USSR is involved in
a new ICBM construction program and has resumed activity at
ABM sites around Moscow.
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U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS
U.S. EFFORT TO ADAPT TO "REALITIES" OF SOME VALUE--ARBATOV
Currently there is a fairly substantial volume of Soviet
press criticism of U.S. policy vis-a-vis the USSR. One such
article is discussed in the preceding section of this TRENDS,
the 5 May Zhukov article with its attack on the "military-
industrial complex." These critical articles stop short of
suggesting, however, that bilateral relations are endangered;
on the contrary, an article in the y May PRAVDA by the
Director of the Institute of U.S. Studies, Georgiy Arbatov,
hails the "Leninist principles of foreign policy" set out
at the CPSU Congress, including the call for normalizing
relations with the United States and for resolving disputed
questions by means of negotiations.
Among the critical commentaries is an article by Mayevskiy
in the 5 May PRAVDA, appea,.?ing on the same page with the
Zhukov article, which complains that the U.S. press is
engaged in a "prop-.ganda attack on the Soviet Union, . . .
intimidating the American reader with the 'Soviet threat,'
heating passions in the spirit of Shakespeare--not William
but Frank, the USIA Director who issued instructions on
launching an anti-Soviet campaign a long time ago." It
was Shakespeare, Mayevskiy says, who insisted that the
United States refuse to participate in this year's Moscow
Film Festival on the grounds that previous festibals had
shown films "exposing the U.S. military's bestialities."
Also on 5 May, a lengthy article in LITERARY GAZETTE
chronicles the alleged activities of the counselor for
cultural affairs at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, McKinney
Russell, aimed at recruiting a Soviet scientist. The
latter article seems directed as much at Soviet citizens,
warning of recruiting efforts of "friendly" Americans, as
at Washington for engaging in espionage.
ARBATOV The Arbatov article deals at length with the
ARTICLE attempts of "American imperialism" to face
up to the "new realities" which have evolved
over the past five years as a result of the change in
the balance of forces between the two socioeconomic
systems "in favor of socialism." Arbatov says that
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imperialism has not changed in nature and that U.S. imperialism
in particular has sought merely to change its "forms and
methods," to find "more cunning ways" to implement the same domestic and foreign policies. He deserves that U.S. policy
in Vietnam and the Middle East, and Washington's position on
the strategic arms race and U.S.-Soviet relations, have "in
essence become a means of assuaging the public and not a
practicable program for the normalization of relations and
of the international atmosphere."
Reminiscent of Foreign Minister Gronyko's 3 April CPSU
congress speech, Arbatov goes on to discuss the way;- to deal
with imperialist endeavors to adapt to the new situa`ion in
the world. He says that attempts at deception must be
unmasked, but he rejects the notion that the elemenl;s of
realism in imperialist policies "must be refuted on the
grounds that such attempts express a desire tD preserve
imperialism and to prevent new shocks and political
failures." In his words, the imperialists' adaptations
to reality are in fact "forced conr'essions made under
pressure from the forces of peace and progress and
objectively they may have const uences which meet the
interests of the peoples."
MOSCOW ACCUSES U.S. IN SEA COLLISION IN KOREA STRAIT
TASS on 11 May carried a summary of a Soviet Foreign Ministry
note protesting the "illegal actions" of a U.S. "t-:arship"
which collided with a "Soviet rescue vessel" in the Korea
Strait on 6 May. According uo the note, the actions of the
U.S. ship endangered the safety of navigation on the high
seas uid were at variance with the generally recognized
norms of international law. It demands that Washington
take steps to prevent such incidents in the future, and
it says the Soviet side reserves the right to demand
compensation for damages. In the only available followup
comment, an article in TRUD on the 12th, summarized by
TASS, says that the collision occurred when a U.S.
destroyer, in an attempt to photograph Soviet vessels,
approached too closely. According to TRUD, the Soviet
vessels involved in the incident were a transport
refrigerator ship which was towing a floating dock
and two accompanying "rescue ships."
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The last Soviet protest to the United States over a collision
at sea to be publicized by Moscow came on 13 May 1967, when
a government note complained that a U.S. destroyer taking
part in Joint U.S.-Japanese naval exercises in the Sea of
Japan had damaged a Soviet destroyer on 8 May. In language
more strident than the current protest, the 1967 note
described the action of the U.S. ship as "premeditated"
and "arrogant." While it demanded that the "guilty be
punished" and steps be taken to prevent further
"provocative actions," the 1967 note did not mention
compensation.
On 14 November 1970, Moscow protested to London about a
collision in the Mediterranean five days earlier between
the P:,.Ltish aircraft carrier Ark Royal and a Soviet
destroyer, resulting in the death of two Russian seamen.
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW CITES CAIRO PRESS AS SEEING NO CHANGE IN U,S, POLICY
Moscow draws heavily on Arab press comment in its propaganda
on Secretary Rogers' Middle East tour to convey the impression
that the trip was essentially unproductive, that the American
stand is unchanged, and that through continued political and
military support the United States still encourages Israel's
resistance to a peaceful settlement, rather than pressuring
it to implement the Security Council resolution. Cairo
comment, as quoted by Moscow, says the United States, is
seeking mainly to protect its interests--particularly oil--
in the area, points to a gap between actual U.S. policy
and American diplomatic assurances, and notes that there
are marked differences in the U.S. and UAR positions on a
settlement.
While contriving to present the tour. in negative terms,
Soviet commentators refrain from speculating on the results
of the trip. A panelist on the 9 May domestic service
commentators' roundtable observes that it is difficult "as
yet to assess the real results" of the mission, and a domestic
service commentator on the 11th remarks that foreign news
agencies continue to guess at the content of the Secretary's
report to the President. A foreign-language commentary the
same day attributes to "Western political observers" the
view that Mr. Rogers failed to dispel Arab skepticism
regarding U.S. policy, and an Arabic-language broadcast
that day declares that the visit strengthened the positions
of those who believe that the Arabs cannot expect any
charities from the United States. Like other comment,
this broadcast points to the "obvious partiality" in
the Secretary's trip to Sharm asl.-Shaykh and the Arab
part of Jerusalem, claiming that "even anti-Arab papers"
described this as recognition of Israeli claims to these
occupied Arab territories. A Yefremov domestic service
commentary on the 9th, referring to Rogers' "flight over
occupied Arab territories" to Sharm ash-Shaykh, assails
the "treachery of American diplomacy" in pretending to
question Israel's territorial claims, and rhetorically
asks who gave Washington the right to decide the destiny
of the Arab lands.
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12 MAY 197.1.
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There is again some suggestion of sensitivity to the idea of
U.S. mediation supplanting the mission of Dr. Jarring, a
Glukhov article in PRAVDA on the 12th, as reported by TABS,
claiming that the Arabs regard Washington's intention to
pose as mediator as "quite clumsy, to say the least." A
foreign-language commentary by Arkadyev on the 11th,
recalling that the Secretary said in Cairo that the United
States is resolved to continue supporting the Jarring
mission and strives for a lasting peace, argues that this
statement does not show the slightest change in U.S.
policy. Noting that Rogers said the U.S. stand remains
that outlined in President Nixon's foreign policy message
in February, Arkadyev--like TABS in a 5 May report--
describes the message as confirming a course designed
to insure Israeli military superiority "under the guise"
of preserving the military balance of farces.
The Secretary's activities in Cairo and Israel, his
stopover in Rome, and his report to the President on
his return are briefly reported by Moscow. Assistant
Secretary Sisco's return to Cairo for talks on the 9th
is also noted only briefly, Moscow reporting that he
acquainted the Egyptian leadership with the results
of Rogers' talks in Israel and going on to cite the
EGYPTIAN GAZETTE as saying that those talks contributed
nothing new to a settlement.
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ROMANIA
CEAUSESCU REAFFIRMS INTENT TO PURSUE INDEPENDENT COURSE
In a lengthy address on 7 May marking the 50th anniversary of the
Romanian Communist Party (RCP), party chief Ceausescu made an
unusually strong restatement of Romania's right to pursue its
independent course and of its resolve to remain neutral in the
Sino-Soviet dispute. The speech, broadcast by Radio Bucharest,
was notable for its emphasis on Romania's right to develop mili-
tary cooperation outside the framework of the Warsaw Pact and to
develop its own national forces. It was also noteworthy for its
emphasis on the impermissibility of interference in the internal
affairs of other parties as well as for an anusual warning against
party factionalism. In contrast to negative reaction from Moscow
and its hard-core allies to recent U.S.-Chinese contacts, Ceausescu
used the occasion to hail these developments as a "positive step"
in the interests of cooperation among states and peace.
Ceausescu's strong reaffirmation of Romania's own national course
and independent views came against the background of its expanding
relations with China, including military contacts, a Chinese grant of
a long-term credit, and the recent announcement that Chinese technical
personnel are to be sent to Rc,aania. Soviet displeasure over Romania's
contacts with the PRC were reflected in a 23 April article in the
Soviet weekly NEW TIMES, entitled "Peking's,Diplomatic Game," which
complained that the Chinese are trying to divide the socialist
community by using "a differentiated approach." In an allusion to
Romania, the article observed that the Chinese are "coaxing some and
granting them credits" while "abusing and blackmailing others."
Ceausescu's remarks also came against the backdrop of continuing
Romanian refusal to join all the other Warsaw Pact members who
rallied to Moscow's cause by answering Chinese polemics during the
recent CPSU congress. Another factor possibly involved in Ceausescu's
strong defense of his policies may be speculation that Romania served
as an intermediary between China and the United States. Moscow
pointedly took note--in a TASS dispatch published in PRAVDA on 1 May--
of a statement by Edgar Snow in a LIFE magazine article on recent'talks
with Mao that certain unnamed "go-betweens" had been conveying messages
from Washington to the PRC.
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ROMANIAN As he had done on other anniversary observances,
INDEPENDENCE Ceausescu began his speech by playing up the
RCP's role and minimizing the Soviet contribution
to Romania's liberation during World War II. Although he expressed
gratitude to "the glorious Soviet armies" for their sacrifices, he
went on to add that "our party was the organizer and soul of all
actions u:,Lertaken by the people and army; the patriotic forces and
army quickly liberated the capital and other centers in the country."
He added that "the Romanian Army, along with the Red Army, carried
on difficult struggles for the liberation of the fatherland, and
took part in the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia." The
point of Ceausescu's reading of history seems to be that Romania is
grateful for Soviet assistance but has earned the right to pursue
its own policy.
Ceausescu seemed particularly concerned to dispel any notion that
Romania is moving closer to the Soviet orbit--a view that figured in
speculation in the Western press following Bucharest's belated
decision to join the CEMA investment bank. On the question of
Romania's possible renunciation of its principles, he commented:
"How could we give up water and air? It would mean giving up life;
therefore we cannot give up these principles, because they constitute
our independent and free life."
In his remarks on party relations Ceausescu forcefully restated his
view that under present conditions "a center within the communist
movement is no longer either necessary or possible." Since condi-
tions in each country differ, he argued, each party "adopts a
differentiated political line, strategy, and position." He stressed
that should individual parties encounter difficulties, other parties
(read: the CPSU) have the duty "to avoid any interference in the
domestic affairs of the respective party, not to encourage dissension
under any circumstances." In effect reaffirming that the Romanians
will not join in polemics against China, Ceausescu noted that the
RCP was "wrong" to have participated in attacks on other "fraternal
parties" in the past.
As if to underline the correctness of Romania's policy toward China,
he noted a general tendency in the world to normalize relations
with the PRC. He unqualifiedly endorsed recent PRC-U.S. contacts
as a "positive" first step, a view that contrasts with the negative
comment issuing from Moscow and its or-L~hodox allies. He generalized
this view by saying that normalization of relations with the PRC,
"without whose participation the solution of the great problems of
international life cannot be conceived today, corresponds to the
cause of cooperation among states and to peace."
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12 MAY 1971
RELATIONS WITH Turning to relations within the Soviet bloc,
SOCIALIST STATES Ceausescu went on to repeat faatliar-assurances
of Romanian willingness to promote "coopera-
tion" within CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, but he pointedly defended
Bucharest's right to pursue economic and military relations outside
the bloc framework. He noted that in developing cooperation with
CEMA members "Romania keeps in mind that this organization embraces
only a part of the socialist countries," adding that Romania "will
continue to expand its cooperation with the other socialist coun-
tries." Arguing blandly that as the Warsaw Treaty statutes show,
the Pact has "a temporary nature," he added: "We must understand
that it is necessary to concern ourselves with the steady strer'th-
ening of our national army, to develop and strengthen cooperation and
the exchange of experience with the armies of all the socialist coun-
tries regardless of their belonging or not belonging'.to-this treaty,
because after the abolition of the NATO and Warsaw treaties as
well, national armies will continue to exist for a long time . . .
and we will develop and strengthen their capacity as long as we
do not achieve the liquidation of the armies of the world."
This line defends Romania's practice of "exchanging" military
experience with the maverick Yugoslavs, but Ceausescu may have
been primarily concerned to justify increased contacts with the
Chinese. Defense Minister Ionita visited China in July 1970,
and a Romanian military delegation "vacationed" there in October.
On the eve of the 24th CPSU Congress, Deputy Premier Radulescu
made his second Peking visit in less than five months, resulting
in an announcement that Chinese technical personnel are to be
sent to Romania. The second-ranking Chinese official in the
talks was Politburo member Chiu Hui-tso, PI." deputy chief of
staff in charge of logistics, who accompanied Chou En-lai on his
recent visit to Hanoi.
Immediately following his remarks on the need to strengthen the
Romanian Army, Ceausescu cited the need to improve security
organs, "to perfect their activity aimed at foiling the actions
of any hostile elements which dare plot against our system." He
also promised to strengthen the militia, "which may be called upon
to act against antisocial elements and defend public peace."
DANGER OF Noting that the Romanian party's unity had been
FACTIONALISM weakened by factionalism in the course of its his-
tory, Ceausescu added: "Based on this experience,
our party pays particular attention to the steady strengthening
of the unity of its ranks, deeming this to be one of the basic
conditions for fulfilling its mission . . . . Therefore, we do not
IAL
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allow and we will not allow any kind of action which zould weaken
unity and the fighting capacity of the party."
As if to underline the point that the party is united around
Ceausescu and his independent policies, Radio Bucharest reported
on the 6th that at the proposal of the party Central Committee,
the State Council established the new titles "Hero of the
Socialist Republic of Romania" and order of "Victory of Socialism"-
both of which were promptly conferred on Ceausescu. In proposing
the honors for Ceausescu before the Central Committee, Premier
Maurer hailed the party chief's "courage"' in conceiving and carry-
ing out his policies.
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12 MAY 1971
JAPAN CP
JCP REBUTS "SLANDEROUS" CCP ATTACK. ISSUES COUNTERCHARGES
An article in the 8 May issue of AKAHATA, organ of the Japan
Communist Party, has further widened the ideological gulf between
the JCP and the Chinese Communist Party.* AKAHATA sought to
rebut criticism of the JCP made in a joint RED FLAG-PEOPLE'S
DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial article published 18 March
to mark the centenary of the Paris Commune.
Peking's article had itressed she role of violence in seizing
and maintaining political power and criticized those "revisionists
and renegades" who hope to take the parliamentary road to power.
The article specifically pointed to the JC? as an example of
modern revisionism within the communist movement and condemned
the "Miyamoto revisionist clique," for opposing "violent
revolution" and taking the "parliamentary road."
Peking's joint article also singled out for specific condemnation
the JCP's attempt (announced by AKAHATA in March 1970) to provide
new official translations fc: key Marxist terms. The JCP's
wish to retranslate the term "violent revolution" because of its
current connotation of "brute force" or "lawless force" was
condemned as representative of the JCP's efforts to pacify the
Japanese people. The search for a new translation for the term
"dictatorship of the proletariat" was portrayed as an attempt
"to oppose the Japanese people making revolution" by falling
"back on semantics and juggling with words."
In response to these charges, the 8 May AKAHATA article lashes
out at "the Maoists' theory" that violent revolution is the only
way to achieve political power; such a theory, it says, has
nothing in common with Marxism- Lenin!.sm and constitutes "a
misuse of the experiences of the Paris Commune." Claiming that
Maoists approve of "nothing but violent revolution," AKAHATA
charges the CCP with ridiculing the entire election process
* JCP-CCP relations deteriorated rapidly in the early stages
of the cultural revolution. Chinese polemical attacks on the
"revisionist" leadership of the Japanese party began early in
1967 and were quickly followed by sharp AKAHATA counterattacks.
CONFIDENTIAL
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12 ! ?%Y 1971
"in which millions of people participate in Japan" and with
slandering the JCP by portraying it as a "parlimentary fanatic."
Noting that the CCP attack came at a time when elections are
being held within Japan, AKAHATA declares that "slander of
this kind is an unpardonable insult to the millions of Japanese
who are participating in the elections."
AKAHATA goes on to defend its right to seek new translations
for Marxist terms and rejects the CCP's charge that the endeavor
is an "etymological sham." The article argues that a new
translation for such terms as "proletarian dictatorship" must
be found to prevent reactionaries within Japan from misleading
the masses into thinking that "a brutal and dark tyranny" will
be established "once socialism is achieved." "No other party
has the right to poke its nose into this problem," which is
"completely an internal affair," AKAHATA affirms. It condemns
the "chauvinist arrogance" of the CCP for "pretending to be a
supreme Judge over the revolutionary movements of the world."
Not surprisingly, the JCP's vereion of the historical legacy of
the Paris Couuuune supports the parliamentary methods with which
the party has identified itself in recent years. AKAHATA argues
that the Paris Commune "denied neither the parliamentary system
nor its election system" as it "converted the parliament from a
debating society into an organization for action." The JCP,
AKAHATA asserts, will continue to follow the parliamentary road
and work to achieve political power through a united front of
popular forces participating in elections: "A democratic
coalition government is not yet a people's government, but it
is certainly a bridgehead for the people to form such a govern-
ruent. "
CONFIDENTIAL
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12 MAY 1971
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PEOPLE'S DAILY NOTES FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF MAO DIRECTIVE
The fifth anniversary of Mao's "7 May directive" was welc^med
by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial which warned that continued
ideological study by cadres is a requisite, notwithstanding
past successes toward the achievement of cultural revolution
goals. The directive, a basic document of the cultural revolu-
tion, was contained in a letter to Lin Piao, dated 7 May 1966;
it called for an end to overspecializatiot 4.n any single field
of activity and for the inclusion of politics in all occupations
and studies, with special reference to the PLA.
The only previous anniversary editorial on the directive
appeared on the occasion of the first anniversary in 1967.
This year's editorial, rather than signaling any change in
domestic priorities, probably reflects the usual Peking
practice of taking special note of quinquennial anniversaries.
Nonetheless, its publication at this time serves to provide
r.,n additional bit of evidence that the ideals which sparked
the cultural revolution retain some of their former potency.
The May 4th Movement did not rate an editorial this year, its
52d anniversary, but a number of items in national and
provincial media did note the importance of youth and the
progress being made in rebuilding the Young Communist
League (YCL) under party supervision. A 3 May Shensi radio
report on a Sian middle school was perhaps the most
informative of these, making it clear that the YCL is now
a highly elite organization with the Red Guards acting as
a much broader body fcr encouraging mass political
interest. While half of the students in the school are
Red Guards, only about one in 20 are YCL members; in fact,
the YCL has only one-third the membership it had prior
to the cultural revolution. The Shensi broadcast
observed that the party branch had recently tightened
controls over the youth organizations so that they co;ild
better fulfill their task of educating youths 12 to 17
years old in the meaning of revolution and class struggle.
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