TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 7, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
Illlui~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~iii-IIIIII
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
11111 iIIIIIIIIIII 111111111111111111111
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
7 APRIL 1971
('10L. XXII, NO. 14)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
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CONFIDENTIAL FAIS TRENDS
7 APRIL 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
DRV Article Presses Strategic Implications of Laos Operation . . 1
PLAF Tallies "Victories" Over Laos Operation in Quang Tri . . . . it
Routine Criticism of "Aggression" in Indochina at CPSU Congress . 6
Pathet Lao Delegate at CPSU Congress Thanks Moscow for Aid . . . 7
Conviction of Calley for Son My Massacre Called "Cover-Up" . . . 9
Soviet Policy of Peace Endorsed by Gromyko, Kosygin . . . . . . 12
Brezhnev Gets Uneven Foreign CP Support on Unity Issues . . . . . 14
Independent-Minded Parties Stress Noninterference, Diversity . . 17
Efforts to Build Up Brezhnev's Stature Apparent . . . . . . . . . 22
PAKISTAN
Podgornyy Decries Bloodshed, Peking Obscures Disorders . . . . . 24
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
New Party Committees Announced for Hupeh and Fukien . . . . . . . 28
Peking Names Chi Peng-fei Acting Foreign Minister . . . . . . . . 31
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
7 APRIL 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 MARCH - 4 APRIL 1971
Moscow (2577 items)
Peking (1855 items
CPSU .4th Congress
(32%)
82%
Indochina
(52%)
32%
(Brezhnev's
Report
(--)
31%]
[PRC Message on
Laos Operation
(--)
6%]
Hungarian Liberation
(0.1%)
2%
Domestic Issues
(18%)
25%
Anniversary
Table Tennis World
(7%)
13%
Indochina
(13%)
2%
Tournament
East Pakistan
Rebellion
(0.1%)
2%
Mauritanian Foreign
Minister in PRC
(--)
7%
Middle East
(3%)
1%
Establishment of PRC-
(--)
6%
China
(3%)
1%
Cameroon Relations
Establishment of PRC-
(--)
5%
Kuwait Relations
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item--radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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INDOCHINA
Hanoi propagandists continue to claim that Operation Lam Son 719
in Laos was a strategic failure for the allies and a vital blow
to President Nixon's Vietnemization program. And the army paper
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 2 April carries the second analysis of the
operaticr within two weeks under the byline Chien Binh (Combatant).
The latest article seeinc to press for communist offensive action
even more directly than the article on 22 I-larch: Chien Binh says
that "big annihilating campaigns" are vital for victory and
maintains that the Lacs campaign demonstrated that the allies
cannot successfully counter large-scale communist attacks.
Hanoi's continuing propaganda campaign on the communist "victories"
gets new impetus with the 6 April release of a communique detailing
defeats of the allied elements engaged in Lam Son 719 along the
IQze Sanh front in South Vietnam. As in the case of the communique
released two weeks ago on action in Laos, Hanoi radio broadcast a
special program and the press has highlighted the communique with
laudatory comment.
0
In the wake of the 26 March "grand victory banquet" in Peking, PRC
media have continued to hail the "crushing defeat" suffered by the
U.S.-supported ARVN forces in the Laos operation. Peking has also
continued to probe the implications of the operation for the
American political scene, liberally citing Western news repor1-?. to
demonstrate that President Nixon's "credibility gap" has been
widened by his effort to portray "defeat as victory."
Le Duan, address:.ng the 24th CPSU congress on 31 March, briefly
noted the "glorious victories" by the "liberation" armies of
Vietnam and Laos in the "Highway 9 theatre" as well. as in Cambodia.
Gromyko discussed Indochina only briefly in his speech at the
congress on the 3d and, like Brezhnev in his report on the 30th,
did no-: mention any such specific issues as the Laos operation.
But routine Moscow comment continues to discuss the allied "failure"
in the operation, and a domestic service broadcast on the 4th
observed that the President was preparing for his 7 April TV speech
on Indochina by studying a report on a. lied miscalculations in the
operation,
DRV ARTICLE PRESSES STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF LAOS OPERATION
CHIEN BINH The 2 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article by Chien Binh
ARTICLE provides a concise summation of the jubilant
communist evaluation of the campaign in Laos against
the allied Operation Lam Son 719. Echoing claims he made in earlier
CONFIDENTIAL
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articles,* Chien Binh maintains that the communists' "defeat"
of the Laos operation has strategic significance and has
undermined Vietnamization because of the loss of elite ARVN
troops and the failure of tactics relying on the use of aircraft,
tanks, and artillery. In a notable departure from Hanoi's
propaganda line of recent years, Chien Binh says flatly that
the communists are fully able to defeat the allies "militarily."**
d
In his 22 March article, Chien Binh had observed merely that the
South Vietnamese army would be further strained by the continuing
withdrawal of U.S. troops. Now, in his article on the 2d, he
indicates that a significant change has already taken place:
"After the withdrawal of 200,000 U.S. troops, the balance of
power on the battlefield has undergone an important change."
He adds at this point that "the test of Vietnamization has
entered its fiercest phase." Chien Binh maintains that the
test of strength which took place in Laos was inevitable and
would have occurred sooner or later in one place or another;
and he says sarcastically that "Nixon cannot act otherwise,
because he cannot wrap the Saigon puppet army in cellophane and
keep it forever in Saigon."
Chien Binh seems to use the Laos campaign to press the argument
for big unit action--an argument advanced in a unique article
last December by PRG Defense Minister and PLAF Commander Tran
Nam Trung.*** Chien Binh stresses the "great importance" of
"big campaigns of annihilation" such as the one in southern
Laos. He asserts that "only by annihilating the enemy's
military forces by big chunks can we gradually knock out the
enemy, gradually crush his will, and gradually change the war
situation in order to advance toward completely militarily
defeating him." He maintains that the results of the fighting
along Highway 9 reflect the relative strengths of the two sides
* Chien Binh commented earlier on the Laos incursion in the
26 February and 14 and 22 March issues of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. See
the 10 March TRENDS, pages 10-11, and 31 March TRENDS, pages 2-5.
** Hanoi propagandists typically speak in sloganistic terms that
"we shall surely win, the U.S. imperialists will surely be
defeated," leaving ambiguous how the victory is to be achieved.
*** See the 30 December TRENDS, page S 1-31"'Rnd-the 31 March
TRENDS, pages 5-6.
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in the Indochina conflict and demonstrate that the allied
forces "cannot col.e S.ith the adversary's large-scab' blows
of annihilation."
Chien Binh addresses himself indirectly to the suitabilit;; of
South Vietnam as a theater for large-scale confrontations in
his discussion of the effects of the topography of southern Laos
on the fighting there. He points out that there are areas in
South Vietnam which approximate the cc:nditions of the-areas
where heavy fighting has occurred in both Laos and Cambodia:
"South Vietnam, like the southern Laos area, does not lack
hills and mountains and, like the Kratie-Kompong Chem area in
Cambodia, does not lack lowlands." Seeming to stress his
recognition of the efficacy of various kinds of warfare, he
not only notes that guerrilla fighting is appropriate to some
areas but adds that "it is not true that there must be large-
scale combat in all areas."
Chien Binh does not characterize the spate of attacks on allied
positions in South Vietnam in the wake of the Laos campaign,
but he claims that the fighting this spring shows that the
"resistance" forces "can simultaneously swing many blows on
many battlefields in southern Laos, Cambodia, northern Laos,
the high plateaus, the central Trung Bo coastal areas, and
the Nam Bo delta." He maintains that the allies have been "on
the defensive everywhere" and that they are limited in their
ability to reinforce even an important front.
FIGHTING IN Hanoi media have greeted recent communist
SOUTH VIETNAM attacks in Kontum and Quang Nam as "outstand-
ing annihilation battles" that demonstrate
their "firm initiative" on the battlefield. This evaluation
appears, for example, in a 2 April NHAN DAN commentary which
acclaims the 27 March attack on the U.S. base Mary Ann in
Quang Nam, the 29-30 March assault on Duc Duc district capital.
in the same province, and the overrunning of ARVN firebase 6
in Kontum (designated Hill 1001 by the communists) on 31 March,
as well as other actions in South Vietnam. The paper comments
that the attacks countered "Nixon's scheme to prolong the
aggressive war and to reduce the U.S. troop casualties under the
Vietnamization plan."
Offering details on the three major attacks, the NHAN DAN
article and other commentaries claim that the attack on the
Mary Ann base "completely annihilated" a battalion of the
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196th Brigade of the America]. Division. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on
the 6th reports that the attack was launched by Quang Nam
regional troops and claims that they returned to their position
"without suffering any casualties." The communists allege
that a combined ARVN infantry-artillery battalion was wiped
out and many U.S. advisers and ARVN troops captured in the
attack on firebase 6. Nearly 300 allied troops are said to
have been put out of action when Due Due was attacked and
"controller?."
PLAF TALLIES "VICTORIES" OVER LAOS OPERATION IN QIL4NG TRI
A PRG press conference in Hanoi on the 6th made public a
4 April communique of the PLAF command on the Khe Sanh front
which tabulates alleged allied losses in Quang Tri along
Highway 9 from 30 January to 31 March. Giving special
attention to the communique, as it did to a similar 24 March
communique from the Laotian "liberation" forces command,
Hanoi publicized it in special radio broadcasts on the Quang
Tri fighting on the night of the 6th and featured it, along
with editorial comment, in two-color issues of the press.
on the 7th. Ridiculing the dispatch of allied forces to
Highway 9 and the incursion into Laos as a "foolish strategic
scheme," the communique repeats communist claims that Laotian
and South Vietnamese forces along Highway 9 "dealt crushing
blows of great strategic significance" to the allied troops.
All told, according to the communique, the forces in South
Vietnam put out of action nearly 7,000 allied troops,
including 4,054 G1'd; destroyed 863 military vehicles,
including 236 tanks and armcred cars; and shot down or
destroyed 234 aircraft on the ground. In addition, they are
said to have wrec'"ed 72 cannon and big mortars, sunk or set
afire 42 warships and combat launches, destroyed 41 big
logistic storages and materiel dumps, and set fire to
millions of liters of gasoline and thousands of tons of
weapons, ammw.iition, food, and military equipment.
The communique repeats the claim that Quang Tri forces overran.
a position of the ARVN 39th Ranger Battalion on Hill 500--a
hill located in Laos according to allied maps, but placed
inside South Vietnam by maps on the fighting published in the
Hanoi press. Indirectly acknowledging the contradiction in
locating the hill, the communique notes that the attack took
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place at a time when the prongs of the allied incursion were
intercepted and besieged in Laos and that it "contributed to
the smashing of the enemy's northern prong."*
The 7 April NI-IAN DAN editorial spells out the communist claims,
saying the communique's figures indicate that the fighters
annihilated approximately one-third of the allied forces on
the Khe Sanh front and destroyed more than two-thirds of the
allies' military vehicles and one-third of their artillery
pieces. Comparing the recent fighting around Khe Sanh to
the siege of the Khe Sanh base in 1968, the editorial vows
that "this generation and generations to come will always
remember our compatriots and fighters who fought valiantly
and resourcefully, surmounted all difficulties and hardships,
twice accepted the U.S. aggressors' challenge, and on both
occasions triumphed gloriously, scoring victories of
strategic importance."
THIEU PRESS Hanoi media view President Thieu's 31 March
CONFERENCE press conference in Dong Ha as a maneuver to
save face and bolster morale in the wake of
the ARVN's "defeat" Ln Laos. An article in the 2 April QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN ridiculed Thieu's "braggings" and his announce-
ment "with fanfare" that South Vietnamese commandos had been
"lifted to some places near the Laos-South Vietnam border."
Acknowledging more details of Thieu's announcement, a Hanoi
domestic service broadcast on the 2d said Thieu "created the
false story thE.t the puppet troops had just attacked a
communist headquarters in southern Laos." Reflecting reports
that the commando raid was timed at communist base area 611,
the broadcast declareC that the allies "are trying to fool
public opinion, pretending that they were not defeated in
Laos and are sending hundreds of commandos to attack Hill 611
in Laos." It made no reference to Thieu's statement, at the
same press conference, that South Vietnamese forces are
capable of launching attacks against the DRV without U.S.
support.
* Comment on the attack on Fill 500 is reviewed in the
24 February TRENDS, pages 4-5.
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-6-
ROUTINE CRITICISM OF "AGGRESSION" IN INDOCHINA AT CPSU CONGRESS
DRV, N(''_SV Addressing the CPSU congress on 31 March, First
SPEAKERS Secretary Le Duan delivered a generally standard
attack on U.S. "aggression" in Indochina. Both
he and NFLSV delegate Nguyen Van Hieu, speaking on the 2d, said
that the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine have
received serious setbacks most recently during the allied
invasion of Laos and in the operation,4 along Highway 9. Both
also reaffirmed the communist stand that a proper basis for a
polit4'al settlement is provided by the 10-point NFLSV/PRG
proposal and the eight-point elaboration. Consistent with the
usual North Vietnamese even-handedness regarding its two big
allies, Le Duan cited China as well as the Soviet Union in
expressing gratitude for aid from the socialist countries.
In castigating the United States for continued "escalation" of
the war, both Le Duan and Hieu denounced U.S. "threats" against
the DRV* and preparations for "new military adventures" there.
They had not mentioned the alleged danger of action against the
DRV at the 26 March "victory" banquet in Peking, an omission
the more notable in that Chvu En-lai did so in remarks on the
same occasion.
SOVIET Indochina was discussed only briefly and in general
SPEAKERS terms by Grechko on the 2d and Gromyko on the 3d.
Both cited the war as an example of the perfidy
and aggressiveness of U.S. foreign policy in general and,
following the lead of Brezhnev's 30 March report, neither
,discussed the Laos operation specifically. Gromyko denounced
the United States for propagating the "falsehood" that it would
like to withdraw its troops from Vietnam while simultaneously
committing aggression there and in Cambodia and Laos as well.
* The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 6 April issued another
in the continuing :pries of statements on U.S. air strikes,
this one protesting strikes from 31 March to I April on
villages in the DMZ. On 1 April the media carried statements
by the DRV and PRG spokesmen in Paris recalling that they had
called off the session of the Paris talks or 25 March in
protest over the concentrated air strikes on the 21-22 and that
the United States, with "no justification," had cancelled the
1 April session.
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He did not discuss a political settlement, but in another
section of his speech he cited Indochina as an example when
he contrasted the honesty and peaceableness of Soviet foreign
policy with efforts by the United States to mask its own
"aggression." He said the United States had "adopted" the
Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962, which were designed to
serve peace in Indochina, but was not "embarrassed" by this
when it decided to unleash aggression there.
Grechko said that the "American imperialists," who have never
stopped preparing for aggression, are using Vietnam as a
"testing ground" for their strategy. He briefly called
attention to the USSR's "selfless aid" to the Vietnamese as
an example of the Soviet Union's devotion to its international
duty.
Kosygin mentioned Indochina only in passing in his report on the
five-year plan, pointing to the need to strengthen the USSR's
armed forces in the face of a complex international situation
4.n which imperialism resorts to "military adventures and
direct aggression," exemplified by the "disgraceful, dirty,
bandit war in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos."
PATHET LAO DELEGATE AT CPSU CONGRESS THANKS MOSCOW FOR AID
The speech at the CPSU congress by NLHS delegate Kaysone Phomvihan
on the 3d was notable for an expression of thanks to the Soviets
for their "tremendous and invaluable aid and support" to the
Laotian people's struggle against the "U.S. imperialists." This
speech was publicized in Moscow media as well as by the Pathet
Lao and was published in PRAVDA on 4 April. The reports of the
speech were followed on the 7th by a Moscow domestic service
report that at a meeting in the Lao "liberated areas" held to
celebrate recent "military victories," participants spoke of
the "Laotian patriots"' gratitude for Soviet "aid and support."
Moscow elite propaganda has generally been less direct than
this regarding aid to the Pathet Lao, but such explicit references
have appeared in routine comment originated by Moscow as well as
in Pathet Lao statements publicized by Soviet media. The
25 February 1971 Soviet Government statement on the Laos operation
promised continued aid to the "patriots of Indochina," thus
implicitly including the Pathet Lao. Brezhnev had conveyed
a similar implication in his 12 June 1970 election speech when
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he followed an expression of support for the "Just principles
and demands advanced by the patriotic forces of the peoples
of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos" with the pledge that "we shall
render all the necessary assistance to those who are fighting
for their freedom and independence."
At the routine propaganda level, more explicit references to
aid appeared, for example, in connection with the 15th anniversary.
of the NLHS on 6 January 1971 and the 25th anniversary of Laotian
independence on 12 October 1970: There were promises on those
occasions of continued Soviet "assistance" or "help" to the
"Laotian patriots." Statements publicized in Moscow media in
which NLHS leaders expressed gratitude for Soviet "assistance"
included remarks by NLHS Chairman Souphanouvong in an interview
in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 27 November 1970 and by NLHS Secretary
General Phoumi Vongvichit in a PRAVDA interview on 12 May 1970.
"VANGUARD PARTY" While Kaysone Phoumvihan is attending the
CPSU congress in his capacity as vice
chairman of the NLHS Central Committee, the role of the clandestine
Lao communist party was hinted at in a passage in his speech in
which he noted that the Lao people's struggle is being carried
on "under the correct leadership of the vanguard party." He
has been identified as secretary general of the clandestine
"Lao People's Party." On the occasion of the 25th anniversary
of Laos independence on 12 October, he authored an article--
carried by the Pathet Lao news agency on 5 October--on the history
of a "genuine revolutionary party" in Laos.*
* See the TRENDS of 7 October 1970, pages 11-12.
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CONVICTION OF CALLEY FOR SON MY MASSACRE CALLED "COVER-UP"
DRV AND PRG The first monitored reaction in Vietnamese
communist media to Lieutenant Calley's con-
viction:'.and sentencing to life imprisonment for his role in
the March 1968 Son My "massacre" came early on 3 April when
Hanoi radio broadcast an item from the army paper QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN and Liberation Radio carried a commentary. The
DRV and PRG spokesmen in Paris at a 2 April press conference
had denounced what t'_cy called President Nixon's decision "to
temporarily set free" Lieutenant Calley, but these statements
were not carried in communist media until the 3d.
Comment uniformly says that the trial was held to cover up
crimes committed by the U.E. "aggressors" for years in Vietnam
and that public opinion is demanding that Calley's superiors
also be punished. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article and one in
the party paper NHAN DAN on the 4th say the United States
tried to cover up the Son My "massacre," the latter recalling
that the Central Trung Bo Liberation Front committee "had
immediately protested" the 1968 "massacre." NHAN DAN adds
that the United States still refused to admit that the massacre
took place even when the case wab brought to light by the New
York TIMES in November 1969.*
Consiste-it with the line that U.S. public opinion has become
increasingly appalled at U.S. "crimes" in South Vietnam,** the
comment blurs the fact that a strong current of opinion be-
lieves Calley should not be punished at all. NHAN DAN says the
U.S. public is indignant "not because the sertence was too harsh
or too lenient but because the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam
had piled up such horrible crimes." Both papers cite press
assessments that Calley is only a "scapegoat" convicted to
relieve higher-ranking officials of responsibility; they also
quote Senator Fulbright--in a 1 April TV interview--to the
effect -U'-hat to shift responsibility onto a lieutenant is
* For a discussion of communist propaganda at that time, see
the TRENDS of 19 November 1969, page 12, and 26 November 1969,
pages 11-12.
** On 5 April VNA carries one of the regular communiques by the
DRV War Crimes Commission scoring "crimes" during March, includ-
ing alleged killings of civilians in the course of the "pacifica-
tion" program in South Vietnam and as a result of U.S. bombings
of villages in the North.
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7 APRIL 1971
"debatable" and that the investigation should be carried up
to the level of the commander-in-chief.
MOSCOW Unlike the Vietnamese communists, Moscow
promptly reported the conviction and sentencing
of Calley. A domestic service broadcast on the 30th said
that the majority came out unscathed while Calley became
the "scapegoat." According to TASS on the 31st, PRAVDA's
New York correspondent Kolesnichenko said that the hastozy
of the trial is one of Pentagon efforts to first suppress
the crime and then see that most of those involved escape
justice. The PRAVDA correspondent acknowledged the various
currents of U.S. opinion when hF said that during the trial
"the gap between the democratic n.nd reactionary parts of
America became wider," with the "authorities" trying to
present Calley as a "lone maniac" and "reactionary circles"
wishing to make him "almost a hero," while indignation at
U.S. "crimes" in Vietnam is mounting throughout the country.
Reporting the sentence of life imprisonment, TABS on
1 April said that the Pentagon put Calley on trial "under
pressure by the indignant public" but that "the main
initiators of this bloodbath escaped punishment."
The next day TABS cited Fulbright's statement that such
"representatives of principal political authorities
and the supreme military command as, for example,
former commander-in-chief of the U.S. forces in South
Vietnam General Westmoreland, should be held accountable."
On the 3d TABS reported Westmoreland's denial that he
was responsible, commenting that he thus tried to "shift
responsibility" to the lieutenants and sergeants.
The President's actions in the case--the transfer of
Calley back to his quarters and the announcement that he
would give the final review--were noted without comment
by TABS on the 4th.
On 7 April TABS reported that Captain Daniel, prosecuting
attorney at the Calley trial, sent a message to President
Nixon protesting his "direct interference in the
administrati(.it of justice" and expressing shock that
the Presiden- had "ordered the Son My hangman to be
released from prison." TABS added that "many Americans"
see politics behind the decision of the President, "whose
sharp loss of prestige makes him flirt with the more
reactionary forces."
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7 APRIL 1977.
PEKING Peking's only mention of the Calley verdict thus
far came on 5 April in an NCNA commentary calling
the trial a "farce" designed to "defend the 'commander' at
the expense of the 'pawns." The commentary notes that
complex appeal procedures will now go into effect and that
it may take several years to obtain a final conviction. NCNA
calls attention to the fact that President Nixon ordered
that Calley be "released from Army custody and remain in his
quarters." Remarking on the President's "deep sympathy" for
Calley, it asserts that Son My was not an isolated incident
and that "the number-one criminal of all these violent acts
is none other than the supreme commander of the U.S. forces,
U.S. imperialist chieftain Nixon." In this connection, NCNA
briefly notes Fulbright's view that the responsibility for
Calley's crimes should be "traced to the supreme commander
(Nixon)."
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CPSU CONGRESS
SOVIET POLICY OF PEACE ENDORSED BY GROWKO. KOSYGIN
In his 3 April rundown of foreign policy issues before the
CPSU congress, Foreign Minister Gromyko followed the broad
outlines of Brezhnev's 30 March Central Committee report
in stressing the Soviet policy of coexistence and avoidance
of war. Gronnyko made explicit what Brezhnev had only
implied when he reaffirmed that the USSR supports the
resolution of all outstanding international problems "by
peaceful means, by means of negotiations."
In his 6 April report on the Soviet economy, Kosygin touched
briefly on foreign affairs, following the lead of Brezhnev
and Gromyko in pledging the USSR to a policy of peaceful
coexistence and in indicting the United States for its
"bandit" war in Indochina and its support for Israel.
But unlike the other two spokesmen, he takes the occasion
to reassert the thesis that the USSR does "not regard war
as inevitable."
In the defense of the "Leninist" peaceful coexistence policy
and the concluding of agreements with capitalist states,
Gromyko's remarks seem implicitly aimed at the Chinese and
other radical critics, both on the right and the left. Thus
he asserted that it is "equally alien to us to shrink back
in the face of the imperialists' threats or to be attracted
by ultra.cevolutionary phrases." Both postures, Gromyk:o
says, reflect an underestimation of the strength of the
socialist countries and the progressive forces of the world.
In Gromyko's words, true Marxism-Leninism is shown neither
by failing "to keep one's nerve under control when clashing
with imperialism" or by "ostentatious placard ultrarevolu-
tionariness." Gronlyrko almo observed that the USSR's policy
of peaceful coexistence does not extend to the ideological
sphere.
Gromyko contrasts the honesty and openness of Soviet foreign
policy with U.S. policy based allegedly on "falsehood,"
citing as %h- prime example of the latter U.S. expressions
of readiness tj withdraw troops from Vietnam while
simultaneously committing "aggression" there and in Laos
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and Cambodia. He characterizes the Indochina conflict as
"the most dangerous military conflict since World War II and
': most bloody." And he routinely takes the United States
to task for its support of Israel and for its role--along
with other Western powers--in maintaining tension in Europe.
At the same time, Gromyko observes, as did Brezhnev, that
better relations with the United States are both desirable
and possible, and he implores Washington to weigh "in all
seriousness" everything that Brezhnev said in his speech
of the 30th. He urges that the United States back its
professed desire for talks with practical deeds, and
complains that it has not always shown a readiness to
do this. The USSR for its part, he observes, favors
"serious talks," those in which the participants "do not
try to trip each other up but really try to find
agreement." In this connection, he charges that the
United States has engaged in "zigzags" in the current
talks on Berlin, on the talks on convening a conference
on European security, "on questions of the Middle East,
and on controlling the strategic arms race."
Notably absent from the speech--which appears in PRAVDA
on the 4th--are references to the potpourri of
disarmament measures which Brezhnev had mentioned in his
remarks. Routine propagande. since the 30th has, however,
mentioned them in passing, including the call for a
conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear
disarmament. In one instance, at least, propaganda has
credited France with the initiative for such a conference.
A Paris-datelined TASS dispatch in PRAVDA on the 2d,
reporting French reaction to Brezhnev's remarks on the
proposal, said that circles in Paris are recalling that
France has supported such a proposal "over the course
of 10 years."
Gromyko sustains the USSR'sr rejection of the notion--
pressed by the United States and FRG, among others--
that a European security conference cannot be convened
before the Berlin problem is resolved. According to him,
the ratification of the FRG's treaties with the USSR
and Poland, the settlement of the FRG's relations with
the other socialist states, the successful conclusion
of the Berlin talks, and the holding of a conference
"have to be implemented in parallel, without waiting
for the end of pro,.:edings in one direction before
passing on to another."
CONFIDENTIAL
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Kosygin also mentions a European security conference, noting
that its convening would help to increase confidence on the
continent and would open the way for broad economic and
scientific-technological cooperation. Additionally, he
says, it would create conditions for solving such problems
as the building of large power-transmission lines and the
establishment on this basis oe a single European power grid.
BREZI4NEV GETS UNEVEN FOREIGN CP SUPPORT ON UNITY ISSUES
Speaking at the windup of the CPSU congress' discussion of
his 30 March report, Brezhnev on 5 April ritualistically
expressed gratification over the delegates' unanimous
approval of the Central Committee's policies and went on
to register the CPSU's aspirations for interna'1,onal
communist unity in words nlmost identical to his windup
speech at the 1966 congress: The conclave, he said, was
proceeding "in an atmosphere of passionate, Bolshevist
international solidarity with all the socialist countries,
the communists of the whole world, all the fighters against
imperialism."
The speeches by foreign party guests at the congress,
generally available in TASS summaries followed by Radio
Moscow broadcasts of texts in the languages of the
countries concerned, registered a general effort to
submerge the pivotal issues underlying dissensions in
the international movement. Thus Brezhnev's 30 March
attack on Peking--echoed almost to a man by the Soviet
republic speakers--drew only scattered support from
spokesmen for parties outside the Soviet bloc, in
contrast to the chorus of anti-Chinese attacks by delegates
at the June 1969 Moscow international communist conference.
And the foreign guests, except for Husak himself, almost
uniformly avoided the still rankling issue of the
intervention in Czechoslovakia.
Despite the evident effort to mute divisive subjects,
undercurrents of continuing dissension in the movement
were present in the speeches of the independent-minded
party spokesmen in particular. The vigorous defense
of the intervention in Czechoslovakia by Brezhnev and
Husak did not appear to set well with past critics of
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the Warsaw Five's action. The Italian CP organ L'UNITA
repr,-ed that some of the delegates, including the Italian,
fai.L_.i to applaud Husak's address out of displeasure over
his defense of the intervention. And French CP delegate
Marchais, in an interview with L'HUMANITE, expressed
displeasure over Husak's speech--an obvious embarrassment
to the nonruling European parties. Ceausescu's strong
emphasis on the impermissibility of interference in the
affairs of other parties and his lecture on the need to
resolve disputes through talks, not polemics, registered
Lae Romanians' reaction both to the treatment of the
Czechoslovak issue by Brezhnev and Husak and to the Soviet
leader's attack on Peking.
CHINA Support for Brezhnev's attack on Peking was
notably absent from the speech of the SED's
Walter Ulbricht, who had vigorously backed Moscow on
the issue at the 1969 conference. Outside the congress,
however, Ulbricht's heir apparent, Erich Honecker,
attacked "the group around Mao Tse-tung and its furious
anti-Sovietism" in a speech in Magnitogorsk reported by
ADN on the 4th. And an attack on "the Mao Tse-tung group,"
a formulation generally avoided by Moscow in its own
name in recent months, appeared in a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
editorial on the congress summarized by PRAVDA on 29 March.
The party chiefs of Moscow's other Warsaw Pact allies,
with the predictable exception of Ceausescu, repeated
the positions taken by their parties at the 1969 conference
in openly taking the Chinese to task in their congress
speeches. The Polish party's new First Secretary, Gierek,
given the honor of being the second foreign party speaker
after the DRV's Le Duan, followed up his 29 March PRAVDA
article in registering strong support for Moscow, declaring
that "the attitude toward the CPSU, toward the country of
the Soviets, constitutes the best proof of action in favor
of the unity of the socialist and anti-imperialist forces."
Assailing "those who do not understand this truth" and "from
anti-Soviet positions are bringing splits" into the
movement, Gierek stated that "the present policy of the
leaders of the COP aimed against the unity of the
socialist states, and especially its attacks on the CPSU9
cannot undermine the solidarity of the fraternal parties
with the Soviet communists" but "can only lead to
progressive isolation" of those following this course.
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As the first foreign party speaker at the 1 April session, Husak
"condemned the malicious, slanderous campaign and the destructive
aims of the leadership of the CCP against Czechoslovakia, against
other socialist countries, and primarily against the Soviet
Union," according to the apparent text broadcast by Radio Moscow
in Czech cnd Slovak on 1 April. At the same session, Hungary's
Kadar assailed "the disruptive activity of the Chinese leaders"
and stressed that his party had "firmly condemned" this activity,
"as is generally known, from the beginning."
The most slavish followers of the CPSU line, Bulgaria's Zhivkov
and Mongolia's Tsedenbal, delivered strong attacks on the Chinese
at the 1 and 2 April sessions, respectively. While TASS' report
of the 2 April proceedings reported Tsedenbal only as attacking
"the splitting activity of the Chinese leaders," the text carried
in PRAVDA on the 3d quoted him also as stigmatizing "the Chinese
apostates from Marxism-Leninism"--stronger words than any Brezhnev
had used on the subject at the congress.
Where some 50 foreign parties had joined the chorus of anti-China
attacks at the 1969 international communist conference, however,
only a minority of spokesmen for uonruling parties joined the
leaders of the Soviet-lining ruling parties in directly assailing
Peking this time. Numerous others who had spoken out on the
issue in 1969 joined the independent-minded Romanians, Cubans,
Yugoslavs, and Italian communists in staying silent on the issue
now. The parties whose spokesmen again, as in 1969, attacked
Peking included the Indian, Danish, Portuguese, and U.S., as
well as severpt pro-Soviet Latin American CP's.
Radio Moscow's broadcasts in Mandarin have pressed home the con-
gress attacks on the Chinese. One on the 2d carried excerpts
from Tsedenbal's congress speech, including the reference to the
Chineca as apostates. Another on the next day, a commentary by
Latyshev entitled "The Isolation of the Chinese Leaders on the
International Stage," noted among other things that "the anti-
Soviet activity of the Chinese leaders was also widely condemned"
by the CP's of "various" countries among the "more than 100"
foreign delegations. A broadcast on the 4th quoted a Soviet worker
delegate to the congress to the effect that "by making no mention
if our congress, the Chinese propaganda machine has slandered our
party and people
CZECHOSLOVAKIA With the exception of Husak, who obediently
"thanked" the Soviets for responding to the
Czechoslovak's "appeal" for the August 1968 intervention, most
foreign party speakers confined themselves to general support for
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Brezhnev's denunciation of "rightwing opportunism"--the orthodox
tag applied to the 1968 Prague liberalization--without direct
reference to Czechoslovakia. Although an article in the 3 April
Bratislava PRAVDA, reported by CTK, commented that the congress
speeches of Gierek, Ulbricht, Kadar, Ceausescu, and Zhivkov "all
paid. great attention to the Czechoslovak events of 1968 and 1969,"
available texts of the speeches indicate that none of them men-
tioned these events directly.
Of the nonruling party spokesmen whose statements are available,
only Argentina's Ghioldi explicitly supported the Soviet action
in Czechoslovakia. According to TASS on the 3d, he recalled at
that day's session that "imperialist reaction, with the aid of
revisionists, renegades, and bourgeois elements, made an attempt
to sever Czechoslovakia from the world socialist system," but
"the community of the socialist states, led by the Sovi ' Union,
has proved beyond any doubt its strength and inviolabilii;y."*
These remarks were included in a version of the speech broadcast
on the 4th by Radio Moscow in Spanish to Cuba, with the added
comment that by the 1968 intervention the world socialist system,
led by the Soviet Union, had proven "that it possesses everything
necessary to repel aggression."
INDEPENDENT-MINDED PARTIES STRESS NONINTERFERENCE, DIVERSITY
CEAUSESCU Without mentioning either China or Czechoslovakia
directly, Romania's Ceausescu made it clear in his
1 April address to the congress that Bucharest's view of the
1968 events and its resolve to stay neutral in the Sino-Soviet
dispute remain unchanged. His notably pointed emphasis on the
independence of parties and the necessity of avoiding interfer-
ence in their internal affairs may also have been responsive in
part to Brezhnev's call for CEMA integration and his stress on
the Warsaw Pact's role in "coordinating" foreign policy.
Ceausescu's firm defense of Romania's own national course also
came against the background of the recently concluded visit
to Peking--the second in five months--by a Romanian delegation
led by Deputy Premier Radulescu, which served in effect to balance
off Ceausescu's attendance at the CPSU congress. The Peking visit
resulted in an announcement that Chinese technical personnel are
to be sent to Romania.
* At the un 1969 Moscow party conference, the invasion of
Czechoslovakia the preceding August had been explicitly defended by
the.CP's of El Salvador, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Costa Rica,
Luxembourg, and Guyana--and explicitly criticized by those of
Australia, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Belgium,
and Great Britain.
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Ceausescu began his remarks, as reported by Radio Bucharest,
by referring to Moscow's "remarkable accomplishments" as "a
very important contribution to strengthening the world
socialist system." But he indicated Romania's order of
priorities by devoting the major portion of his relatively
brief speech to an outline of Romania's own accomplishments,
adding wryly in this context: "In all our activity we are
guided by the well-known Marxist-Leninist thesis according
to which the main duty of the governing communist party is
to build the new social system."
After paying brief tribute to the importance of Romanian-
Soviet relations, Ceausescu went on to indirectly challenge
the Soviet view of party relations and of how to handle
disputes among parties. Noting that "differences" among
parties exist on ways to build socialism and on some
international questions, he in effect lectured those
who had censured the Chinese at the congress that
differences are not properly resolved by such polemical
attacks: "The way to resolve differences is by having
discussion from party to party, from leadership to
leadership in a spirit of mutual faith and esteem."
In an apparent allusion to such Soviet actions as the
invasion of Czechoslovakia, he added: "Our party
speaks out against any interference in the internal
affairs of other parties, for this leads to the weakening
of their unity and fighting capacity against the c._.ass
enemy."
Ceausesc-, promised once again that Romania will continue
to foster good relations with "all" communist parties
"in the spirit of mutual trust and esteem and recognition
of every party's right independently to elaborate its
political line in keeping with the concrete conditions
prevailing in its country." He added: "We will also
expand our relations with other socialist, progressive,
and anti-imperialist forces."
In the wake of Brezhnev's call for CEMA integration,
Ceausescu limited himself to expressing Romanian
willingness for further "cooperation" in that body,
stipulating that CEMA cooperation "must lead to the
development of each socialist country and to the
strengthening of their independence as free and
sovereign states." He pointedly failed to mention the
Warsaw Pact.
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The TASS account of Ceausescu's remarks predictably focused
on his brief comments on Soviet achievements and Soviet-
Romanian relations; it omitted his reci-uation of Romanian
accomplishments and did not reflect his comments on CEMA
and on the way to handle interparty differences.
TODOROVIC In speech to the congress on 2 April as
repor-Ued by Radio Belgrade, Yugoslav Executive
Bureau member Tcdorovic played the independence and
noninterference themes in less emphatic fashion than
Ceausescu, expressing satisfaction with the favorable
development of Yugoslav-Soviet relations "en the basis
of the principles of equality, mutual respect, and
noninterference, which represent the best guarantees for
the successful development of relations between peoples
and states."
The Yugoslav representative also used the occasion to
reaffirm Belgrade's opposition to any leading center
in the world movement and to appeal for diversity in
the movement's ranks: "The equr.lity of paths and wealth
of forms are the expression of tie breadth and intensity
of the modern socialist transformation of the world.
Differences which stem from this reality are the source
of the creative force and of the consolidation of
socialism under conditions of a democratic exchange
of views and cooperation among equal and sovereign
movements and countries."
In remarks that may have been responsive to Brezhnev's
statement that "the Soviet people want to see socialism
in Yugoslavia strengthened," Todorovic defended
Yugoslavia's self-management course ana assured his
listeners that planned constitutional changes--and
resultant further decentralization--are designed to
"strengthen" the Yugoslav community and are under
the disciplined control of the Yugoslav League of
Communists.
BERLINGUER Italian Communist Party (PCI) deputy leader
Enrique Berlinguer, addressing the CPSU
congress on 1 April, transparently reasserted the Italian
party's dissent from the Soviet concept of internationalism
that was used to justify the intervention in Czechoslovakia,
as well as its objections to Moscow's present views on
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communist unity. Berlinguer stated that "our international
solidarity" does not and cannot mean "our full identification
with the choices which each socialist country, and more
generally each communist and workers party, has made and
is making on its own responsibility." And "our internationalism,"
he said, is based on "recognition of the full independence
of each country and each party and leaves the way open, as
has alreely happened, to moments and circumstances of
dissension. and divergence, without in any way, as a result
of thi.s, weakening solidarity and duty in the struggle for
the great aims which unite us."
As if to document an approach combining unity with diversity,
Berlinguer promised that his party will continue the fight
against any "manifestations of anti-Sovietism"--an apparent
allusion to the PCI's ouster of the dissident IL MANIFESTO
group--and will continue to study the experiences of other
parties, while developing its own specific contribution
deriving from its own experiences ani ideas.
An unattributed statement in the PCI organ L'UNITA on 3 April,
explaining why the PCI delegation failed to applaud Husak's
address to the congress, linked Berlinguer's statement on
internationalism to the PCI's opposition to the intervention
in Czechoslovakia. The paper commented that the concept of
sovereignty expounded by Ausak in defense of the 1968 action
"confirmed and even menticned further developments along
the same unacceptable line." It added: "Our line, confirmed
by Berlinguer," is shared by other parties, and "this is why
Husak's speech has aroused reactions among various delegations
at the CPSU congress, including the Italian one--delegations
which did not in fact applaud the concepts expressed in that
speech."
MARCHAIS In an orthodox address to the congress on
31 March, French Communist Party (PCF) Deputy
Secretary General Georges Marchais expressed the PCF's
general support for the independence and sovereignty
of all parties, then seemed to cancel this out by
adding: "but at the same time, we believe that proletarian
internationalism, the joint action of all the communist
parties on a Marxist-Leninist basis, is a sacred duty and
indeed the prerequisite of our struggle"--a statement, that
smacks of the Brezhnev doctrine.
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For evident domestic political purposes, Marchais sought
to mitigate the impact of such a pro-Soviet line for his
domestic constituency in an interview with a L'HUMANITE
correspondent the next day, published in the paper on the
3d. He explained that he had failed to "recall the
well-known and unchanged attitude" of the PCF toward
the August 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia because
the PCF delegates were "guests" in the Soviet Union and
wished to avoid polemics in the interests of communist
unity. Marchais also displayed sensitivity to the
"regrettable" fact that Husak "saw fit to devote the
main part of his address" to a presentation of the
CPCZ's views on the issue--a presentation "which
implied criticism of our own attitude." The CPCZ's
concept of sovereignty, he added, "seems to us alien
to the principles of the 1969 Moscow conference."
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EFFORTS TO BUILD UP BREZHNEVIS STATURE APPARENT
In speeches on the first day of discussion following delivery
of his report, Brezhnev received considerable personal
attention, quite in contrast to the 1966 congress. The
effort to set Brezhnev apart from the collective and to
attribute to him a personal leadership role--an effort
evident at a handful of the pro-Brezhnev republican congresses
in February and March, those of Kazakhstan, Azerbaydzhan,
Moldavia, and Kirgizia--is clearly continuing at the Cz'SU Congress.
No speaker, however, has yet used the controversial formulation,
the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev.
More significant than the flattery on the part of obvious
Brezhnev supporters such as Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev
and Gorkiy First Secretary Maslennikov is the unusual praise
expressed by Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, Leningrad
First Secretary Romanov, and Georgian First Secretary
Mzhavanadze, who have been reticent in the past. Ukrainian
First Secretary Shelest, however, followed his past practice
of avoiding praise of Brezhnev.
Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev, pacesetter for those who seek
to laud Brezhnev, hailed his report as an important contri-
bution to Marxism-Leninism and declared that it is "necessary
to stress especially comrade L.I. Brezhnev's ability to unite
the collective and direct the efforts of the whole Central
Committee for fruitful work . . ." (PRAVDA, 1 April). Uzbek
First Secretary Rashidov, who was the most flattering to
Brezhnev at the 1966 congress, spoke of the party information
system as the "enormous accomplishment of the Politburo, the
Central Committee Secretariat, and L.I. Brezhnev personally";
he al .) credited Brez}-iev with overseeing the working out of
initial measures to aid Tashkent after its earthquake (PRAVDA,
2 April). Gorkiy First Secretary Maslennikov, a follower
of Brezhnev's protege Katushev, praised the Central Committee,
the Politburo, and General Secretary Brezhnev for courage and
vigilance against antisocialist forces and for doing every-
thing necessary to strengthen the unity of socialist countries
(PRAVDA, 1 April). Krasnodar First Secretary Zolotukhin
praised the Central C.).mittee, the Politburo, and General
Secretary Brezhnev for leading the party and country "with
great mastery and in a Leninist ;ray," and he hailed the land
improvement program adopted by the Central Committee "on the
initiative of comrade L.I. Brezhnev" (PRAVDA, 2 April).
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Apparently influenced by the pro-Brezhnev atmosphere, Masherov,
Romanov, and Mzhavanadze showed new willingness to give Brezhnev
praise and persona: credit. Masherov stated that the "huge
efforts" in agriculture undertaken by the Politburo and "comrade
L.Z. Brezhnev personally" have already brought good results
(PRAVDA, 1 April). Romanov praised Brezhnev's reports on the
50th anniversary of the revolution and on Lenin's anniversary
as an "important contribution" to theory and noted approvingly
the constant readiness of the Central Committee, the Politburo,
and General Secretary Brezhnev "personally" to give counsel
and aid to Leningrad (PRAVDA, 1 April). While Mzhavanadze did
not go so far as to give Brezhnev "personal" credit for any-
thing, he did praise Brezhnev's report as "brilliant" (PRAVDA,
2 April).
In contrast, Shelest avoided praising Brezhnev's report.
Additionally, Moscow Fir~+ Secretary Grishin--who often has led
in praising Brezhnev--was relatively reticent on this occasion.
COLLECTIVITY The subject of '.,ollectivity was raised by Brezhnev
DISCUSSED himself in his report and also by his supporters
Kunayev and Ra;3hidov (who asserted that the
Politburo's work was characterized by collectivity), as well as
by Mzhavanadze. Brezhnev, while warning against leaders abusing
their power, argued the need to combine collective leadership
with "personal responsibility" and cited Lenin to the effect
that responsibility for a specific task must be placed on a
specific person. Mzhavanadze also noted the need to combine
collectivity with personal responsibility and acknowledged that
the Politburo's work, Central Committee plenums, and statements
in Brezhnev's report indicate "that now, in connection with new,
more complicated tasks, the role and responsibility of a leader
is immeasurably growing." This--Mzhavanadze continued--is
precisely why a responsible leader "must always and in every-
thing" be an example in observing discipline and "listen attentively
to criticism, not ignore it but draw the necessary conclusions
therefrom" (PRAVDA, 2 April).
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PAKISTAN
PODGORNYY DECRIES BLOODSHED; PEKING OBSCURES DISORDERS
After Soviet media had for a month carefully straddled the fence
on the Pakistan domestic crisis, counterposing West Pakistan
reports of "normalcy" to Western news agency reports of fighting
and deaths, Moscow took an official position in a 3 April message
from President Podgornyy to President Yahya Khan expressing the
Soviet people's concern at the "continuation of repressive mea-
sures and bloodshed" in East Pakistan and appealing to Yahya for
"a peaceful political settlement." On the same day, Peking came
out with its first, belated acknowledgment of the existence of a
troubled situation in Pakistan, citing a Yahya speech mentioning
"secessionist elements" who had attacked the country's "integrity"
but nowhere specifying that there had been bloodshed cr even
disorders.
Gino-Soviet politicking in the troubled waters of Indian-Pakistani
relations seemed an element in the reactions from both Moscow and
Peking. Soviet media have publicized warm Indian approval of the
Podgornyy message. The thrust of Peking's sole report is that
Indian interference and "subversion" are to blame for exacerbating
the Pakistan crisis.
PODGORNYY Podgornyy's message to Yahya, carried by TASS on the
MESSAGE 3d and broadcast widely in foreign beams, registered
concern over "the numerous casualties, sufferings,
and privations" being caused in East Pakistan by the use of armed
force, with caveats contrived to ward off any charges that the
Soviet Union was meddling in Pakistan's internal affairs. Podgornyy
said his words were coming from "true friends" and were "guided by
the generally recognized humanitarian principles recorded in the
universal declaration of human rights," by concern for the welfare
of "the friendly people of Pakistan," ^nd by a belief that a "peace-
ful political settlement" %iould meet the interests "of the entire
people of Pakistan" and of "preserving peace in the area." He
expressed the Soviet Union's "great alarm" at the breakdown of the
Dacca talks between Yahya and East Pakistan leader Mujibur Rahman and
at the use of "repressive measures and bloodshed" by Yahya's military
administration; and he called for "urgent measures" to stop the
bloodshed and repression and to return to methods of a peaceful
political settlement.
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7 APH:LL 197:L
The message carefully skirted acknowledgment of the underlying
issue of East Pakistani secessionist aspirations and retained.
elements of balance--and future options, depending on events--
in the Soviet position. Thus the call for a political settle-
ment in the interests of "the entire Pakistani people"was
? balanced by recognition, in a passage deploring the "arrests
and persecution" of Mujibur Rahman and other East Pakistan
politicians, that they had received "convincing support from
the overwhelming majority of the population of East Pakistan
in the recent general elections."
The break in Moscow's stance of aloofness was foreshadowed by
a TRUD article, broadcast in English to South Asia and in
Bengali, the day before the message was released. Relying
heavily on "alarming" Western news reports of "bloody clashes"
in East Pakistan, TRUD asserted tha'; the Soviet public was
"worried by the cruel measures bein; taken against the East
Pakistani population." Anticipating the approach taken in the
message, it noted that Mujibur's "influential" Awami League had
received 167 of the 314 seats in the assembly and contended
that "force and repression will not help solve the problems
facing the country," which can only be settled "by political
means. I
Podgornyy's message appears to have been publicized in part with.
an eye toward the Indian position on the East Pakistan situation.
Moscow's domestic service reported on the 5th that the message
h~id been "greeted in India with great approval" and that the
Indian central press had stressed that the Soviet Union "ft the
only big power which has called for a cessation of the fratricidal
conflict." Monitt'red Muscow tuediR. have not reported any
Pakistani reaction to the Podgornyy message.
EARLIER COVERAGE Following Yahya K'han's 1 March speech announc-
IN MOSCOW MEDIA ing postponement of the convocation of the
newly elected National Assembly, originally
slated for 3 March, Soviet media limited their coverage of the
ensuing Pakistan domestic crisis to brief, scattered factual
reports on such developments as the strike initiated by the Awami
League and the Mujibur-Yahya talks in Dacca. Soviet comment on
the 23 March anniversary of Pakistan's independence contained no
substantive discussion of the crisis; one TASS commentary on the
22d merely noted that talks were being held in Dacca "on the
future constitutional system of the country."
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7 APHI.L 197].
2G
After the breakdown of the Dacca talks and the outbreak of war-
fare in East Pakistan on 26 March, Moscow duly reported Yahya's
speech reasserting military conLrol over East Pakistan, prohibiting
biting all political activities, and accusing Mujibur of treason.
Subsequently Moscow cited "conflicting reports" of the situation,
balancing official West Pakistan reports of "normalcy" and "full
control" in East Pakistan with Western news agency reports of
"fierce fighting" and bloody repression of East Pakistanis by
the West Pakistan military forces.
PEKING Peking media have not acknowledged the existence of
civil war in East Pakistan, and Chou En-lai's 22 March
message to Yahya on Pakistan National Day made no allusion to any
untoward situatior, in Pal?:istan. Peking's first and to date only
mention of East Pakistani events was in a 3 April NCNA report,
based on both Pakistani and Indian as well as Western sources, of
three Pakistan Government notes to the Indian Government on
alleged Indian interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. r+CNA
quoted passages from Yahya's 26 March speech referring to the
"grave situation" in the country, to the "very serious turn" of
recent events in East Pakistan, and to "anti-Pakistan and seces-
sionist elements" who have "attacked the solidarity and integrity
of this country."
NCNA used selected quotations from Western and Indian news
agency reports of Indian comment to depict active Indian inter-
ference in East Pakistan. For example, it cited a 31 March PTI
report that Indira Gandhi had tabled a resolution in Parliament
stating that India "cannot remain indifferent" to the East
Pakistani situation and calling on governments of the world to
take steps--as NCNA put it--"to interfere in the internal affairs
of Pakistan." NCNA noted that the Indian iovernment "is also
reported to be encouraging Indian nationals to intrude into
Pakistan territory for subversive purposes."
In thus limiting its reaction to an account focused on alleged
Indian interference, Peking has expressed support for the
Pakistan Government in the international community while
refraining from comment on the internal conflict. The NCNA
report took note of reported Indian efforts to enlist support
from the United States and the St:riet Union and within the
United Nations in behalf of common steps regarding the East
Pakistan situation. By attacking outside interference, Peking
has updated its line of support for Pakistan in the context
of South Asian affairs.
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7APRIL 197.1.
- 27 -
Apart from quoting Yahya'e reference to secessionist elements,
PRC media have not identified the contending parties or issues
in the internal dispute. There was no Chinese report on the
postponeme'.t of the National Assembly or on any of the events
leading up to the outbreak of the civil war.
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CONFIDAN'1'IAL FBIS TRENDS
7 APRIL 19'(1
- 28 -
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
NEW PARTY COMMITTEES ANNOUNCED FOR HUPEH AND FUKIEN
Quickening the pace, NCNA reported the formation of a new party
committee for Hupeh on 31 March and one for Fukien on 6 April.
Six such announcements were made during March compared with
two in February, four in January, and four last December.
Seventeen of the PRC's 29 major administrative units now
claim new provincial committees.
With the formation of new committees for and Fukien, the
Wuhan Military Region (MR) and the Foocho come the third
and fourth military regions to set up commit for all.
provincial units within their jurisdiction le Nanking LvIR
led by Politburo members Hsu Shih-yu and Ci. hun-chiao,
reached this stage in January, followed by Canton MR,
Huang Yung-sheng's old stronghold, in late February.
HUPEH The Hupeh committee was formed at a party congress
COMMITTEE meeting in Wuhan from 23 to 28 March. Officers
from the Wuhan MR dominate the seven-man leader-
ship group which heads the new committee of 80 full and 23
alternate members.
The top two positions on the committee went to military men
who moved into the Hupeh power :structure after the Wuhan
Incident of July 1967. Tseng Ssu-yu, the new first secretary,
moved from Y's chief of staff post in the Shenyang MR to
replace Chen Tsai-tao in July 1967 as commander of the
Wuhan MR, a position he continues to hold. Tseng is also
chairman of the revolutionary committee. Liu Feng, named
second secretary on the new committee, hcs been based in
Hupeh since 1958. Identified only as an air force officer
for several years, Liu was promoted to his concurrent post
of first political commissar of the Wuhan MR just after
the Wuhan Incident. Liu is also a vice-chairman of the
revolutionary committee.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
7 APRIL .1971.
- 29 -
Of the five men named as secretaries, all but one have a formal
connection with the military power structure in Hupeh. Chang
Ti-hsueh is also first political commissar of the I Iupeh Military
District and holds a concurrent vice-chairmanship. Prior to
the cultural revolution, Chang was the provincial governor and
acting first secretary of the old provincial party committee.
Kung Ching-teh is also deputy commander of the Wuhan MR while
both Pan Chen-wu and Chang Yu-Ima are deputy political commissars
within the MR. Chiang Yi, a former secretary on the previous
party committee and a standing committee member on the
provincial revolutionary committee, is the only new secretary
without a concurrent link to the military apparatus in Hupeh.
Tseng's keynote address to the congress gave more attention
than usual to thc' "armymen" in the province whom he portrayed
as responsible for the "excellent situation in revolution
and pr,iduction" within Hupeh. While members of the PLA
were applauded for success in carrying out their civilian
tasks, "leading cadres ac all levels," were asked to
increase their study of Mao's Thought in order to strengthen
the centralized leadership of the party.
A joint HUPEH DAILY-YANGTZE DAILY editorial, broadcast by
Wuhan radio on 1 April, welcomed the new committee but
cautioned that we "must not think that everything will be
all right once the CCP committee has been set up." The
party's leadership should be strengthened, the editorial
argued, by paying increased attention to the "building of
leading groups" and by "unfolding a self-education movement"
aimed at arrogance and complacency among party members.
FUKIEN The Fukien committee was selected at a party
COMMITTEE congress attended by 977 delegates meeting in
Foochow from 30 March to 3 April. A seven-
man leadership group, composed of four military iron and
three civilians, heads the new committee consisting of 75
full and 18 alternate members.
The top spot on the committee went to Han Hsien-chu, chairman
of the revolutionary committee and commander of the Foochow
MR, who was named first secretary. Chou Chih-ping, a full
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7 APRIL 1971
Central Committee member and a former vice-minister of
metallurgy identified as a responsible person within Fukien
military units in April 1970, was named second secretary.*
Five secretaries were named. Chu Shao-ching is a responsible
person with the Fukien PLA units. Ni Nan-shan, making his
first Fukien public appearance, has apparently been
transferred from Kiangsi where he was listed as a responsible
person with local PLA units. Three vice-chairmen, Huang
Ya-kuang, Cho Hsiung, and Tan Chi-lung, were named as
secretaries. Huang was affiliated with the People's Bank of
China until the early '60's, after which he returned to his
native Fukien. Cho is a newcomer to Fukien, first appearing
in February 1970. Tan, also new to Fukien, first appeared
in the province in October 1970 and was later identified as
a vice-chairman. Prior to the cultural revolution, Tan was
the first secretary of the Shantung committee. He failed to
appear publicly during the cultural revolution but emerged
at the Ninth Party Congress as an alternate member of the
Central Committee.
Han made the usual address to the congress, routinely calling
for greater unity and avoidance of interference from either
"right" or "left" in carrying out future tasks. Echoing
themes also contained in the keynote speeches of first
secretaries in the other border provinces with new committees,
Hen called for strengthening militia work within Fukien--
"the Southeastern gate"--in order to prepare for war and
"contribute to the liberation of Taiwan province."
PROGRESS A party committee for Shantung appears in the
ELSEWHERE offing. On 1 April Tsinan radio claimed
success in rebuilding "most" of the basic-level
party units and establishing party committees for "nearly
half" of the counties and municipalities within the province.
Similar sweeping claims were made earlier this year by
sevoral provinces Just before their new committees were
announced.
* Four of the last five provincial-level party committees
to be announced have named a second as well as a first
secretary. In the case of the first 12 such committees to
be established, only two--Shanghai and Liaoning--utilized
this bureaucratic device.
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7 APItTL 1977.
Shantung, the only East China province that has not yet formed
its party committee, was a revolutionary vanguard during the
cultural revolution under its chief Wang Hsiao-yu. Wang's
relationship with some PLA leaders was unsatisfactory, however,
and shortly after being elected to the Ninth Central Committee
he dropped from public view. His last public appearance was
on 1 October National Day in 1969, and even that appearance
came after an abr,ence of several months following early May
post-congress appearances in Peking. In the interim no acting
chairman has been named for Shantung.
The recent reemergence of Hsieh Fu-chih as Peking chief indicates
that Wang cannot be counted out. Should he reappear as first
secretary it would not necessarily indicate a radical
resurgence over the PLA, however. For whatever reason,
whether from weakness or strength, Peking seems to attach
considerable importance to retaining revolutionary committee
chairmen as provincial party chiefs and has done so in all
17 instances to date.
The formation of new lower-level committees continues through-
out China. Most notable of those formed during the past week
is the Urumchi Municipal CCP Committee; Sinkiang Chairman
Lung Shu-chin was identified as leader of the regional core
group when he addressed the municipal congress. Sinkiang
clearly leads Inner Mongolia and Tibet as the most likely
autonomous region to next form a party committee; Kwangsi
formed its committee in February.
PEKING NAMES CHI PENG-FEI ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER
NCNA's identification of Chi Peng-fei as PRC acting foreign
minister in its report on the 1 April signing of a PRC-
Mauritanian economic agreement is the first confirmation in
Peking media that Chi holds that title. Moscow had called Chi
the acting Foreign minister in its 23 March report on a meet-
ing between Chou En-tai and Soviet representatives in Peking.
There is a precedent for Peking's identification of an acting
minister during the ongoing rebuilding of the State Council:
Lin Hai-yun as acting minister of foreign trade, in 1970.
However, Lin was not destined to acquire full title to the
position. Late last year, Peking reported that Pai Hsiang-kuo
had become foreign trade minister.
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