TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 31, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~ Illlllluu~~~~~~~~~-iilllllll~l
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~IIIIIIIIIIIIIU~IIlllllllllll~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
31 MARCH 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 13)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person Is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from eutemelit
downgrading and
d.eleaiGeetlen
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2 AL FBIS TRENDS
31 MARCH 1971
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Communists Assess "Victory" in Laos as Turning Point in War . . .
1
Peking Banquet, Mao Message Celebrate Indochina Victories . . . .
6
Brezhnev Ignores Laos Operation, Moscow Says Allies "Failed" . .
10
DRV, PRG Score U.S. "Acts of War," "Threats" Against North . . .
12
Luang Prabang Incident Noted, Lao Princes' Contacts Continue . .
14
Brezhnev Delivers Central Committee Report on First Day . . . .
16
East-West Relations: Stress on Soviet Role in World Peace . . .
18
Disarmament: Partial Measures Listed, Conferences Endorsed . .
20
European Issues: Renewed Call for Security Conference . . . . .
21
Middle East: USSR Role in International Guarantees for Area .
.
23
USSR-East Europe Relations: Integration. Coordination Stressed
24
Sino-Soviet Relations: PRC's Hostility Said to Impede Unity . .
26
SINO-BURPfESE RELATIONS
PRC Appoints Ambassador, Ignores BCP Insurgency Anniversary
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Provincial Party Committee Established in Kirin . . . . . . . . .
31
Formation of Party and Revolutionary Committees Compared . . . .
32
Ukraine and Azerbaydzhan Congresses Diverge on Brezhnev . . . . .
34
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 MARCH 1971
Moscow (2898 items)
Peking (1626 ite
)
ms
CPSU 24th Congress
(39%)
32%
Indochina
(29%)
52%
Indochina
(13%)
13%
[FUNK lst Anni-
(3%)
15%]
[Solidarity Week
(7%)
3%]
versary
Middle East
(3%)
3%
[Le Duan, Other
(--)
1"%1
China
(3%)
3%
Indochinese
Zionism & Soviet Jews
(1%)
2%
Delegations
Luna 17 & Lunakhod
(2%)
1%
Domestic Issues
(45%)
18%
Czechoslovak CP Theses,
(--)
1%
Paris Commune Centenary
(15%)
12%
50th Anniversary
Table Tennis World
(0.5%)
7%
Championship
Romanian Government
(3%)
5%
Delegation in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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INDOCHINA
M 4-6
Hanoi comment in the wake of the South Vietnamese withdrawal from
Laos claims that it was a decisive, "total" victory with strategic
as well as tactical implications. Propagandists claim that all
allied objectives in the operation were thwarted and that President
Nixon's Vietnamization policy has been dealt a "mortal blow."
Alleged allied losses in men and materiel are documented in a
24 March communique from the "Laotian People's Liberation Army"
which says that 15,400 troops were "put out of action."
Continued condemnation of the concentrated U.S. air strikes
against the DRV on 21-22 March includes a "special communique"
from the DRV War Crimes Commission, released on the 26th, which
stressed that "no threats, no war acts" can shake the Vietnamese
people's determination to fight and win. Vietnamese communist
media carried the statements by the ARV and PRG delegations in
Paris boycotting the 25 March session of the talks, but there has
been no acknowledgment of the U.S. and GVN retaliatory suggestion
that the 1 April session be postponed until the 8th.
Peking's jubilation over the "brilliant" victories in Indochina,
particularly the "rout" of allied forces in southern Laos, is
expressed in a congratulatory message and a "victory" banquet
during First Secretary Le Duan's stopover enroute to the CPSU
congress. Peking's willingness to mute Sino-Soviet differences
in an Indochina context was reflected in NCNA's report that the
Indochinese delegations had left for Moscow. NCNA's announcement
on Le Duan's arrival in Peking in May 1970 failed to acknowledge
that he was returning from the Lenin centennial celebrations in
Moscow.
Soviet support for a political settlement in Vietnam, based on
DRV and PRG proposals, was reaffirmed in Brezhncv's 30 March
report to the 24th CPSU Congress. He made no mention of the Laos
operation in referring to "continuing" U.S. aggression against
the peoples of Indochina, but routine Moscow propaganda pictures
the operation as having demonstrated the failure of the Vietnamiza-
tion policy.
COMMUNISTS ASSESS "VICTORY" IN LAOS AS TURNING POINT IN WAR
In the wake of the "decisive" battle on 20 March in the Ban Dong
area and the South Vietnamese withdrawal from Laos, Hanoi propa-
ganda assesses the communist "victory." A particularly detailed
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31 MARCH 1971
analysis appears in an articla on the 22d in the army paper
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN by military commentator "Chien Binh"
(Combatant).* Official statistics on the communist "victory"
are released in a communique of the Laotian People's
Liberation Army (LPLA) Supreme Command on the 24th and
welcomed with further authoritative Hanoi comment in a NHAN
DAN editorial on the 25th. Feats in Laos are also praised
in a message from DRV President Ton Duc Thang on the 25th.
Other comment includes an article by "Quyet Thang"**
(Determined to Win), broadcast on 28 March and published in
the March issue of the monthly QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine.
Uniformly, communist comment exultantly claims that the
communist campaign in Laos against Operation Lam Son 719
achieved total victory, completely thwarted allied objectives,
destroyed a major portion of allied troops and equipment, and
defeated basic U.S. tactics. In arguing that allied objectives
were not achieved, propagandists specify that the Laos opera-
tion, among other things, was aimed at cutting supply routes,
preventing major offensives by the South Vietnamese and
Cambodian insurgents, breaking down the "resistance" of the
three Indochinese peoples, demonstrating the feasability
of Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, and assuring the
reelections of President Thieu and President Nixon.
Hanoi press comment on the campaign holds that it was a
major turning point in the war marking the inevitable defeat
of Vietnamization and shifting the balance of forces on the
battlefield. This comment also suggests that the communists
actually sought the confrontation between main forces units
in Laos, in a departure from the tactics they had followed in
the past two years.
* Chien Binh earlier commented on the Laos incursion in the
26 February and 4 March issues of QUAN DOI NHPN DAN. See the
10 March TRENDS, pages 10-11.
** Quyet Thang is a military commentator whose articles have
frequently appeared in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine. However,
the last article known to have been attributed to him--on
allied strategy in South Vietnam--was published in the January
1971 HOC TAP.
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LPLA COMMUNIQUE The LPLA co.:.-unique on Operation Lam Son 719
ON ALLIED LOSSES claiming "total victory" in this "historic
campaign" was released at a press conference
in Hanoi on the 24th. Hanoi radio remained on the air throughout
that night and rebroadcast the communique along with battle
reports. And it was featured in special "two-color" issues of
the Hanoi press on the 25th. The communique says that the allies
lost "an important part" of their armed forces and war materials
including 15,400 troops put out of action, 200 of them Americans,
and 1,000 others captured,* ":any" of them officers. The
communists also claim to have destroyed or captured 496 aircraft
(mostly helicopters), destroyed or captured 586 military
vehicles (including 318 tanks and armored cars), destroyed or
captured 144 heavy artillery pieces, more than 5,000 weapons of
various kinds, a large quantity of important documents, and
military equipment.
Elaborating on the communique's statistics on allied losses,
the NHAN DAN editorial on the 25th stated that "more than four-
fifths" of the troops sent into Laos were "exterminated," nearly
all the military vehicles and artillery pieces lost, and most
of the brigade- or regiment-size units "annihilated or heavily
decimated." The editorial also claimed that the number of
helicopters destroyed in southern Laos was nearly equal to the
amount of aircraft mobilized when the operation first began and
surpassed half the total number of aircraft "mobilized when the
requirement was at its apex."
The matter of communist losses in the Laos campaign is predictably
ignored in the propaganda, but the Chien Binh article on the 22d
notes that one of the allied objectives was to "attract and
exterminate" the adversary's troops. Elaborating, a 29 March
Pathet Lao radio commentary charges that the allies "hoped to
deceive the invincible strategic forces of the Indochinese
countries into gathering on the Highway 9 battlefront so that
they could use their air forces to put them out of action."
* Continuing to exploit ARVN prisoners captured in Laos, the
communists on 28 March publicize a press conference-the previous
day, "near the Laos-Vietnam border," featuring ARVN prisoners,
including Col. Nguyen Van Tho, commander of Saigon's 3d Airborne
Brigade. Communist media had broadcast earlier statements
attributed to Tho and had ridiculed Saigon claims that he had
not been captured.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF "VICTORY," The Chien Binh article is
IMPACT ON VIETNAMIZATION ebullient in its claims that the
"defeat" of Operation Lam Son 719
marks a turning point in the war. It maintains that "it Is
obvious that Nixon has sustained a total defeat in a decisive
strategic battle" and declares that the allies have "entered a
new phase of decline." Chien Binh goes so far as to claim at
one point that the allied "defeat" in Laos is "a strong blow
to the Nixon clique's aggressive will." Later he adds that
there will be "great catastrophes" in the days ahead and, thus,
"no matter how stubborn Nixon may be, he cannot refuse to change
his strategy in Vietnam and Indochina."
Chien Binh declares bluntly that the fundamental allied tactics
vital to Vietnamization, went bankrupt in Laos, and that the
most seasoned South Vietamese units were routed. Deriding
President Nixon for losing forces which he had carefully built
up during his term in office, Chien Binh remarks: "Nixon has
picked up two years' worth of firewood and burned it in one
hour." He maintains that the Saigon army "will never be able
to get back on its feet after receiving this mortal blow."
Both the Chien Binh article and the article in the March QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN magazine by Quyet Thang go on, after stressing the
impact of the Laos operation on Vietnamization, to point out
that the South Vietnamese army will be further strained by the
inevitable withdrawal of more U.S. troops. Chien Binh remarks
that the U.S. Administration, following the defeat of the
Vietnamization program in Laos, is now haunted by the question
of what will happen when the South Vietnamese have to fight
alone.
Chien Binh's claims for the importance of the Laos campaign
are echoed in the 25 March NHAN DAN editorial which says that
the "victory" on Highway 9 is a "major milestone in the history
of the coordinated fight by the Indochinese peoples." In a
possible deliberate mocking of the languag.: of President Thieu's
8 February announcement of the campaign which noted it was
"limited in time and space," the paper adds that the "tremendous"
campaign has an importance which goes beyond the "operation's
limits in time and space." According to the editorial: "The
U.S. aggressors intended to launch a decisive battle and a test
of strength with the Indochinese revolutionary forces. Their
plan was accepted and they were overwhelmingly crushed in this
fierce test of strength."
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31 MARCH 1071
The editorial also claims that the Laos operation has demonstrated
that the Vietnamization of the war "is doomed to woeful defeat."
Chiding Nixon for not "learning from the defeats of his
predecessors," it lists his three "strategic errors" as the
Vietnamization "scheme" and Nixon Doctrine, the incursion into
Cambodia, and the "military adventure" on Highway 9. This
"new error," according to the editorial, "will lead the
aggressors to many unforeseen consequences."
COt+IUNIST ST!ATEGY Propaganda on the Laos campaign not
only predictably praises the communist
forces' leadership in "defeating" the allies but also suggests
that communists held the initiative and planned the confrontation
in Laos. Typical of other comment, the LPLA communique claims
that the communist "victory" was a victory for their political
and military line, "talented strategic and operational leadership,"
and "superior military art." Like earlier comment on the
20 March battle in the Ban Dong area, it holds that the allied
"defeat" came about according to careful plans. Chien Binh also
suggests this when he observes that "the U.S.-puppet officers
have come to realize that the troop movement toward Ban Dong
was not a success but a quick fall into the enemy trap." The
25 March NHAN DAN editorial claims that the "liberation" forces
"maintained their initiative from the start to the end." and
"carried out with great precision the strategic design" of block-
ing the allies at Ban Dong to prevent them from entering Tchepone
and then dealing then "decisive blows" in Ban Dong.
The suggestion that the communists trapped the allies into a
"defeat" in Laos lends new significance to a unique argument
for such major engagements voiced in Vietnamese propaganda last
December. An article by PRG Defense Minister and PLAF Commander
Tran Nam Trung differed from other propaganda in the previous
two years by stressing the importance of "big-unit" fighting in
people's war.* Tran Nam Trung appeared to be arguing for an
abandonment of conservative communist tactics and for a return
to more action by main force units. He maintained that the
stepping up of big-unit actions is "required in the development
of the all-people and comprehensive people's war in order to
* The Tran Nam Trung article was first carried by Front media
on 10 December and by Hanoi media on the 16th; it was discussed
in the 30 December 1970 TRENDS, pages S 1-3.
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smash the U.S. imperialists' stubborn plots and to crush their
aggressive will." Trung did not limit his attention only to
South Vietnam and even suggested the possibility of a military
move elsewhere when he stated that the "coordinated offensives"
in Indochina have "created new offensive forces, new territories
for offensives, and new abilities for large-scale offensives."
Trung's call for big-unit engagements was not repeated. in
subsequent Vietnamese communist propaganda, but there was
other evidence last year that Hanoi was seeking a new strategy
in the war and it is possible that the DRV leaders decided,
in accordance with Trung's argument, to accept a major
confrontation with the allies if circumstances were deemed
favorable.
PEKING BANQUET, MAO MESSAGE CELEBRATE INDOCHINA VICTORIES
Peking's confident assessment of military developments in
Indochina, particularly the "rout" of allied forces in southern
Laos, evolved this week into jubilant celebration of the
"brilliant victories" throughout Indochina. This mood of
jubilation and the complementary belief that victory in "the
campaign of Highway 9" is an event of "great strategic
importance to the overall situation" in Indochina were
expressed in speeches at a "grand victory banquet" in Pelting
on 26 March and by a message of congratulations on the 29th
from Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai to the communist leaders
in Indochina.
CHINESE MESSAGE In the message--addressed to the leaders
of the Laotian Patriotic Front, the National
United Front of Cambodia, the South Vietnam National Liberation
Front and the PRG, and the DRV--Mao, Lin, and Chou extend
"warmest congratulations" to the "three fraternal peoples of
Indochina" on their recent battlefield performance, taking
particular note of the "splendid battle of annihilation" in
the "campaign of Highway 9." Characterizing the victory as
one of "great strategic importance" which puts "the Nixon
Government in a more difficult position and makes things tougher
for it," the message contends that "the present situation in
Indochina is unprecedentedly fine" and that the three Indochinese
peoples "will certainly overcome all difficulties and win complete
victory" by persisting in people's war.
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VICTORY BANQUET Ebullient victory speeches by Chou En-lai,
Le Duan, the Laotian Patriotic Front's
Kaysone Phomvihan, the NFLSV's Nguyen Van Hieu, and Sihanouk
marked the banquet celebrating the "tidings of victory" that
are "pouring in from the front of resistance against U.S.
aggression in Indochina." With particular emphasis on the
"splendidly fought" battles along Highway 9, the banquet speakers
claimed that a turning point in the Indochinese struggle-had been
reached--Chou called it a victory of "great strategic importance"
creating a "new situation on the entire battlefront in
Indochina"--proving that people's war can defeat "so-called
air superiority" and that by coordinating closely with each
other the forces of the three peoples of Indochina can bring
about "a thorough defeat of the U.S. aggressors and all their
running dogs."
In his speech Chou elaborated on Peking's earlier predictions
that in the face of the Laotian reversal the United States
might resort to new measures such as intensified bombing of
North Vietnam. Noting the recent bombings and suggesting
that the Nixon Administration "is even preparing new military
adventures," Chou added a new warning that during the dry season
next winter and spring it "will embark on still greater war
adventures in a last desperate struggle for Nixon's campaign
for the next presidential elections." But, Chou contended,
the United States cannot save itself from its "doomed defeat"
regardless of the "military adventures" to which it resorts.
In his banquet speech, Le Duan did not raise the issue of new
U.S. military adventures or intensified bombing of the north.
The speakers stressed the united front of the three Indochinese
peoples and the coordination of the various liberation forces--
in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam--but placed particular emphasis
on the "strategic victory" of the "cap*ign,of Highv y 9,"
generally depicting the forced withdrawal of the Saigon forces
as a "rout" in order to avoid complete "annihilation." Kaysone
Phomvihan alleged that the Nixon Administration undertook the
Laotian operation "in order to save itself from its defeat,"
and Nguyen Van Hieu contended that the purpose of the invasion
was to "obstruct the mutual support and assistance between the
three Indochinese peoples, destroy the Laotian people's base
areas for resistance, embellish the South Vietnamese puppet
forces, and trumpet the so-called victory of the 'Nixon Doctrine.'"
The speakers all agreed that the "campaign of Highway 9" so lied
doom for the Nixon Doctrine and the Vietnamization policy.
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Although all contended that the Laotian incursion was a major
disaster for the United States, only Sihanouk went so far as to
call it "comparable to the unforgettable and highly historic
victory of Dien Bien Phu."
ASIAN UNITY In addition to celebrating military victories,
the banquet also served as an occasion for
welcoming the three Indochinese delegations en route to Moscow
for the CPSU congress. Though the DPRK was represented by no
one higher than its ambassador, Peking turned the occasion into
a show of Asian communist unity under its auspices, thereby
flaunting a theme which had emerged following last spring's
Indochina summit meeting and Chou's visit to Pyongyang. Chou
declared at the banquet that the peoples of Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia, Korea, and China have "a glorious tradition of unity
against imperialism" and are now "all confronted with the
aggression and threats by U.S. imperialism and its lackeys."
While demonstrating its enhanced role in Asian communist affairs
in the past year, Peking's treatment of the delegations' stopover
also reflected its willingness to mute the Sino-Soviet rivalry
in an Indochina context. NCNA's reports on the arrival and
departure of the delegations mention the presence of Soviet
Ambassador Tolstikov, and the report on their departure notes
that they left for Moscow. NCNA's announcement on the arrival
of Le Duan in Peking on 10 May 1970 did not acknowledge that he
was returning from Moscow, where he attended the Lenin centennial
celebrations, but there is a precedent for Peking's acknowledgment
that a Vietnamese delegation passing through the PRC also had
Moscow on its itinerary: NCNA on 21 October 1969 reported that
Phan Van Dong had arrived in Peking after visiting the Soviet
Union and the GDR. During his visit Dong, in a speech in Peking
duly reported by the Chinese, expressed good wishes for the
Sino-Soviet talks which had just opened.
OTHER PEKING A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 28 March, entitled
COWAENT "Warm Congratulations on the Spectacular Victory
on Highway 9," claimed that the results of the
southern Laos operation represented "not only a tactical but also
a strategic defeat" that "will surely affect the whole Indochinese
battlefield in an overall situation." The editorial supported
this contention on the ground that the ARVN has been greatly
weakened, thus helping to "accelerate the bankruptcy" of Vietnamization
and the Nixon doctrine.
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As in Chou's banquet speech, the editorial addresses itself to
U.S. presidential politics as a factor in future developments.
Claiming that the Highway 9 campaign has "aggravated the
political crisis" of the Nixon Administration, the editorial
notes that the President staked his political future cn the
southern Laos operation, hoping to win "an easy victory so
as to gai. political capital" for the next presidential election.
Quoting the President as admitting that he faced a credibility
gap, the editorial said this means more bitter opposition to
his policy from the American people and "new quarrels and-strife"
among U.S. olitical leaders. An NCNA commentary on the 25th
took particular note of the President's television interview on
the 22d, observing that he "once again resorted to the trick of
lying in a vain attempt to cover up defeats, disclaim his
criminal responsibility, and continue to deceive the American
people."
Another NCNA commentary, on 27 March, was somewhat more specific
in spelling out the Laotian operation's aim of disrupting
communist supply routes than was the 23 March PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article. Whereas the earlier article attributed
the incursion to a desire to "occupy southern Laos, cut off
the close ties among the peoples of the three Indochinese
countries, and avert their deft,,:; in Indochina," the commentary
on the 27th notes allied claims that they would occupy Tchepone,
a "strategic point in lower Laos," and asserts that "they even
tried to set up a blockade line in the panhandle of lower Laos
so as to sever the close contacts among the three Indochinese
peoples."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MARCH 1971
BREZI-IVEV IGNORES LAOS OPERATION. MOSCOW SAYS ALLIES "FAILED"
Brezhnev in his 30 March report to the 24th CPSU Congress
discussed Indochina only briefly and in general terms.
Thus, he did not mention the operation in Laos in scoring
U.S. spread of the war to all the Indochina countries and
its Vietnamization policy.* In standard terms, he asserted
that the Vietnamese resolve to become masters of their own
country cannot be broken by "direct military intervention,"
by "sabotaging negotiations," or by "wide employment of
mercenaries." He reiterated that the only way to solve
the Vietnam problem is on the basis of the DRV and PRG
proposals which the USSR "firmly supports." Brezhnev
reaffirmed Soviet "support" for the struggle of "people
of Vietnam and other countries of Indochina against the
imperialist interventionists," and to "fraternal support"
of the DRV in both the "armed struggle" and in "peaceful
work."
Moscow's postmortems on the Laos operation echo Vietnamese
communist propaganda in continuing to count it as a failure
of the Vietnamization policy. Foreign-language commentaries
by Aleksey Leontyev on 27 and 28 March, for example, say
that Vietnamization cannot "supersede negotiations, but
will only bring about new adventures similar to the one
attempted in Laos, which can only prolong the war and will
never settle any problem."
Much of the comment centers on the growing "crisis of
confidence" in the United States in the wake of
the Laotian "failure" and efforts by U.S. spokesmen,
including the President in his 22 March TV interview, to
present the operation as a victory for the GVN troops.
Some comment, including a 26 March PRAVDA article by
Strelnikov, asserts that Defense Secretary Laird, in
his remarks of the 24th to reporters after a hearing on
Capitol Hill, finally "publicly acknowledged that the
* Brezhnev has made no substantial statement on foreign
policy since November 1970, and it has been left to
Kosygin, 'i a 10 February speech, and the 25 February
Soviet Gcvernment statement to denounce the Laotian
incursion.
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interventionist troops 'have left Laos because of the extreme,
violent reaction of the enemy."' Strelnikov notes that the
"catastrophic failure" of the intervention "aroused a storm
of critical remarks and caustic commentaries" in the United
States aimed at the Pentagon and White House.
TASS on the 26th says that "those senators and congressmen
who repeatedly spoke against the senseless,-course of
aggression in Indochina received convincing proof that
their warnings and misgivings had been justified." Another
TASS item the same day, commenting in a similar vein, says
that official Washington claims that the GVN staged an
"orderly retreat" after accomplishing its mission are
"ridiculed by all except the most loyal of Pentagon
apologists." Concluding that the growing lack of confidence
in Administration utterances is yet another symptom of the
desire "shared by a clear majority of the American people
for a prompt liquidation of the slaughter in Southeast
Asia," TASS notes that this is manifested in the Democratic
Party Policy Council's approval of a resolution urging
Congress to cut off all funds for American operations in
Indochina after 31 December.
An IZVESTIYI article by Sagatelyan on the 28th is the only
known propaganda to repeat the warning in the 25 February
Soviet Government statement on the Laos operation that U.S.
actions in Indochina "cannot but affect Soviet-American
relations." The IZVESTIYA commentator quotes from a Jack
Anderson column in the Washington POST to demonstrate
military pressure on President Nixon to take such extreme
actions as bombing and mining Haiphong harbor, an action
which, Anderson noted, would create a threat to Soviet
ships.* IZVESTIYA quotes the London DAILY MIRROR as
saying that the President must not allow his generals to
convince him that one more "military adventure" will bring
a decisive success, and that the "defeat" in Laos shows
that the sooner the Americans withdraw the better. IZVESTIYA
concludes that undoubtedly the realism of the British
editorial was evoked by the Soviet Government statement's
warning of an adverse effect on Soviet-American relations.
* The issue of mining Haiphong harbor has of course rarely
been broached since the October 1968 bombing halt. However,
in April 1969 an &typical routine-level domestic service
commentary cited the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT as repo~?ting
that President Nixon's military advisers recommended the
resumption of the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.
CONFIDENTIAL
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31 MARCH 19 1'.1
Some other Moscow comment continues to charge that the
Americans want to "avenge" their defeats in Laos by bombing
the DRV, and there are low-level references to the
possibility of expanded aggression against the DRV.
A foreign- language commentary by Soltan on 25 March,
for example, reiterates that in Saigon and Washington
"one hears threats of open invasion of the territory"
of the DRV. Soltan warns that the Americans must not
assume that the Indochinese countries cannot stage any
serious resistance, going on to point to Soviet aid to
Vietnam. From 25 to 27 March Moscow media report low
level meetings held in various parts of the Soviet Union
protesting the 21-22 March air raids on the DRV and
expressing approval of the Soviet Government's policy of
aiding Vietnam.
DRV. PRG SCORE UPS1 "ACTS OF WAR." "THREATS" AGAINST NORTH
In the wake of the 21-22 March U.S. strikes against the DRV,
Hanoi and the Front continue to warn of U.S. "adventures"
against the DRV, albeit with less frequency than in recent
weeks. Vietnamese communist media have not carried Xuan
Thuy's remarks to this effect in a speech in Paris
commemorating the first anniversary of Sihanouk's Front.
But such warnings do appear in the 24 March DRV War Crimes
Commission "special communique"--publicized on the 26th--
which documents "the most recent war acts" against the
DRV, and in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 27th. The war
communique says that the North Vietnamese along with
their Indochinese allies "are ready to smash all
new military adventures" of the United States. The
editorial in a now-routine affirmation of heightened
vigilance says that "we are determined to destroy all
U.S.-puppet forces that dare to encroach upon the North
either from the air, the sea, or land." Xuan Thuy had
used a similar formulation in his speech. (In the wake
of the operation into Laos, Hanoi had stressed the
buildup of allied forces near the DMZ and increased
U.S. naval activity in the Tonkin Gulf, as well as air
"provocations" against the DRV.)
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Le Duan speaking at the 26 March banquet in Peking did not raise
the question of a threat to the DRV, although Chou En-lai speak-
ing on the same occasion did so. Le Duan after hailing the
"strategic victory" of the communist forces in Laos stopped with
the assertion that "no matter what schemes and maneuvers the
U.S. imperialists may resort to" the Vietnamese people are
determined to "strictly continue and to step up their struggle
against the U.S. aggression until total victory."
PROTEST OF Hanoi on 31 March issues its first DRV Foreign
DMZ STRIKES Ministry spokesman's statement--protesting U.S.
actions against the demilitarized zone and
Quang Binh Province--since the 22 March Foreign Ministry state-
ment scoring the concentrated 21-22 March U.S. strikes against
the DRV. The statement protests action on the 29th and 30th,
and the strikes on the 30th are apparently those which U.S.
spokesmen described as being in response to the DRV's moving of
artillery into the northern part of the DMZ. But, Hanoi, of
course, handles them as part of what it claims is continuous
bombing of the DMZ. Since the first of this year, Hanoi had
issued 19 foreign ministry spokesman's protests scoring U.S.
actions against North Vietnam of which 12 have accused the
United States of bombing and artillery action in the northern
part of the demilitarized zone, territory which Hanoi claims
belongs to the DRV.
The current protest, similar to the 12 others this year
cryptically charges that on the 29th and 30th,U.S. aircraft
"repeatedly dropped demolition and steel pellet bombs over Huong
Lap village and launched artillery attacks from positions south
of the demilitarized zone against many villages situated north
of the 17th parallel inside the DMZ." It emphasized that "these
villages belong to the territory of the DRV."
The protest also charged that on the 28th, U.S. planes "bombed
and strafed a certain number of localities of Quang Binh Province."
In routine fashion, the protest "strongly denounced and sternly
condemned the above acts of war" and demanded an immediate end
to all actions violating the DRV?'s sovereignty and security.
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LUANG PRABANG INCIDENT NOTED, LAO PRINCES' CONTACTS CONTINUE
The 21-22 March firing of rockets at Luang Prabang airfield by
the "armed forces and people of Luang Prabang Province" was
belatedly mentioned jii a brief Pathet Lao radio report on the
25th, subsequently also carried by VNA and LPA. Communist media
have offered no followup comment, and have also predictably
ignored another demarche on the incident by Khamphan Panya,
the Prime Minister's representative, with the British and Soviet
ambassadors. On 25 March the Vientiane domestic service reported
that Khamphan Panya had informed the ambassadors of a Souvanna
Phouma message to the two governments concerning the "serious
matter" of the attack on the airport and requesting that the
governments "take urgent measures as stated in the Geneva agree-
ments." Communist media had similarly failed to report Khamphan
Panya's earlier 22 March request that the two ambassadors notify
their governments of the extreme seriousness of the Luang Prabang
incident so the latter could take action in accordance with the
Geneva agreements.
0
A Hanoi domestic service commentary on 30 March did, however,
display sensitivity over an interview Souvanna Phouma gave to
AFP on the 25th in which he said that the only explanation for
the attack on the airport was a North Vietnamese desire "to
control Luang Prabang and possibly seize King Savang Vatthana."
The Hanoi commentary protested that Souvanna Phouma once again
"slandered North Vietnam as being an aggressor in Laos," and
"distorted the DRV Government's policy toward the Laotian King,"
but did not mention the Luang Prabang bombardment. It recalled
that the NLHS five-point statement "clearly pointed out that it
respects the royal throne," adding that the DRV has always
supported the "proper stand" of the NLHS.
CONTACTS In his AFP interview, Souvanna Phouma revealed
BETWEEN PRINCES that he had received a message from Souphanouvong
rejecting his previously unpublicized proposal
that the two princes meet in Luang Prabang without any preconditions,
an offer Souvanna said he made on 6 March. According to Souvanna
Phouma, Souphanouvong once again demanded cessation of "all
bombings" and withdrawal of all Thai and U.S. forces, but again
failed to mention the presence of DRV troops.
On 21 January, at a meeting with Souphanouvong's special envoy
Tiao Souk Vongsak, Souvanna Phouma had proposed that the long-
sought plenipotentiaries' meeting be held in Luang Prabang
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"because agreement could not be reached on the Khang Khay
site"--a site which Souvanna had proposed on 25 June. Souvanna
sent two subsequent messages to Souphanouvong--on 11 February
c., d 1 March--repeating his proposal that talks be held in Luang
rrabang.
On 28 March the Pathet Lao news agency reports that Souphanouvong
sent Souvanna Phouma a message in reply to the latter's two
messages of 11 February and 1 March. (This is presumably not
the same message discussed by Souvanna Phouma in his AFP inter-
view.) The message denounces Souvanna Phouma for "colluding"
with Saigon in the military operation in southern Laos and for
"ignoring" NLHS "concessions" regarding the plenipotentiaries'
meeting in Khang Khay, but it does not explicitly reject the
notion of a meeting in Luang Prabang. It repeats demands that
the United States "cease its bombing of Laotian territory" and
withdraw all U.S., Saigon, and Thai troops, asserting that while
the troops remain there can be no basis for a peaceful settlement
"wherever the meeting between Laotian parties may take place,
including Luang Prabang as you proposed."
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31 MARCH 1971
CPSU CONGRESS
BREZHNEV DELIVERS CENTRAL COWIMITTEE REPORT ON FIRST DAY
The congress convened on 30 March with Brezhnev delivering the
Central Committee report to a gathering which included representa-
tives of 101 foreign communist and noncommunist parties.
Preceding Brezhnev's report, Podgornyy welcomed the foreign
party delegations by name, including a roster of nonruling
communist parties about the same in number--though not in
composition--as that attending the last CPSU congress in 1966.
The Chinese and Albanians are absent, as was the case in 1966.
TANYUG on 26 March said the Chinese "were not even invited" to
the congress, but the same source on the 29th said the Chinese
and Albanian parties "have not replied" to invitations. These
parties refused bids to the 23d Congress in 1966. As in 1966,
Brezhnev did not note the absence of these two parties in his
remarks on CPSU relations with these and other ruling communist
parties.
JAPAN CP The Japan Communist Party, absent from the 1966
CPSU congress as well as from the Moscow inter-
national party conference in 1969, is represented at the
present congress by a three-member delegation headed by Tomio
Nishizawa, a member of the Presidium. On the eve of the
delegation's departure for Moscow, AKAHATA on the 27th carried
an interview with Miyanoto in which the JCP chairman based his
party's acceptance of the congress invitation on "the Soviet
side's essential assurances," in recent bilai;eral talks,
"against interference in our internal affairs and against
contacting anti-party elements." He prefaced this statement
with the remark that there are still differences between the
two parties "on a variety of problems such as, for instance,
the Czechoslovak issue and the Kuriles problem, which seem to
be in no way ready for immediate reconciliation."
OTHER ASIAN As in 1966, the Vietnamese Workers Party
REPRESENTATION is represented by First Secretary Le Duan,
who repeated his procedure of 5 years ago
by stopping in Peking before continuing on to Moscow. This
year, NCNA on 27 March reported that Le Duan "left here by air
for Moscow" that morning--in contrast to an NCNA report on
27 March 1966 which said the VWP leader had been on a "friendly"
visit in Peking but gave no indication that he had continued on
to Moscow.
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- 17 -
The North Korean party delegation, which had been headed in 1966
by the aging President and Central Committee Vice Chairman Choe
Yong-kon, is headed at the present CPSU congress by KWP Politburo
member and secre';ary Kim Ili:' As it did in 1966, the Korean
delegation evidently went di3.ectly to Moscow without visiting
Peking.
The NFLSV, represented at a higher level this year than in 1966,
is led by Nguyen Van Hieu, identified as a member of the Front
Presidium. The NFLSV delegation in 1966 was led by Mme. Nguyen
Thi Binh in her capacity at that time as Front Central Committee
member.
The Pathet Lao has sent a delegation to the CPSU congress for the
first time. The group is headed by a deputy chairman of the NLHS
Central Committee, Kaysone Phoumvihane, who has also previously
been identified with the clandestine Lao People - Party.
EUROPEAN RULING As at the last CPSU congress, Moscow's Warsaw
PARTIES, CUB4 Pact allies are represented by their party
first secretaries. These delegations also
include chiefs of state and premiers in all cases except Romania,
whose premier, Maurer, is absent--possibly because of his slow
recovery from injuries from an automobile accident last year.
The Yugoslav party delegation, headed in 3.966 by Rankovic--
subsequently purged--is headed this year by Todorovic, a member
of the Executive Bureau of the Presidential Council of the LCY.
The Cuban delegation headed by President Dorticos is higher
ranking than in 1966, when it was headed by party Secretary
Armando Hart.
NONRULING CP'S The sizeable array of first secretaries from
nonruling communist parties does not include
those from the French and Italian CP's, whose chief delegates
are deputy general secretaries Marchais and Berlinguer, respectively.
Opening the congress, Podgornyy said there were "101 delegations"
from "90 countries," but greeted by name only some 72 ruling and
nonruling communist parties and 22 "national democratic" parties,
with the remainder presumably included in his category of "other
parties." In addition to the Japan CP, communist parties named
as present at this congress, but not at the 1966 congress, are
those of the Dominican Republic, East Pakistan, Puerto Rico, Guyana,
the new West German Communist Party (DIe), and the Socialist Unity
Party of New Zealand--recognized by Moscow since the last CPSU
congress, in place of the pro-Peking New Zealand CP. Identified as
present in 1966, but not at the present congress, were the CP's of
Iceland, the Netherlands, Morocco, Basutoland, Nepal, and "the
Algerian communists." .
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS: STRESS ON SOVIET ROLE IN WORLD PEACE
Brezhnev in orthodox fashion contrasts the aggressive policy
of imperialism with the Soviet policy "of the active defense
of peace and the strengthening of international security."
In outlining the aims of Soviet foreign policy--which he
says were formulated at the 23d Congress in March-April
1966--he reaffirms Moscow's pursuit of a peaceful coexistence
policy, a pulicy of "rebuffing the aggressive imperialist
forces," and one striving to save mankind from e. new world
war. And he says that the world socialist system is making
"a tremendous contribution to solving the vitally important
task" of preventing a new world war. But he does not take
the occasion to restate the doctrine on the preventability
of a world war,* perhaps because of its close identification
with Khrushchev. At the 23d CPSU Congress, Brezhnev had
approached the question in more doctrinal terms, saying that
"it is our deep conviction that the conclusion of the
international communist movement that the aggressor car.
be curbed and another world war averted remains valid."
Implicit in Brezhnev's stress on maintaining world peace
is the need to settle outstanding disputes by negotiaticns,
but he again does not discuss this in doctrinal terms. Thus,
there is no echo of his explicit assertion in the congress
in 1966 that the Soviet Union advocates a settlement of
outstanding issues by negotiations.
U.S.-SOVIET In his attack on U.S. policy, Brezhnev says
RELATIONS that the "main crime of the.modern colonialists"
is the continuing "aggression" in Indochina.
And he is graphic in his description of the operations of the
"interventionists" there, noting that "tons of napalm" have
been used and that nearly 1.5 million Vietnamese have been
poisoned by chemical weapons. Brezhnev does not, however,
declare--as did the 25 February Soviet Government statement on
the Laos incursion--that operations iii Indochina could
adversely affect U.S.-Soviet relations.
* The thesis on preventability of war has been repeated only
infrequently in elite statements since 1966. The main.document
on the June 1969 international party conference had stated that
a new world war can be averted through a joint struggle of
peaceloving peoples; and the conference's "Appeal in the
Defense of Peace" had said that this joint struggle "can do
away with the fatal inevitability of a new world war."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MARCH 1971
Improved relations between the United States and the USSR,
Brezhnev says, are both. desirable and possible. But he
observes that "we cannot pass by the U.S. aggressive actions
in various parts of the world." He questions U.S. sincerity
"at the conference table." And he complains that the United
States has "hardened its position" on a number of international
issues, "including those which touch on the interests of the
Soviet Union"; that it has engaged in "frequent zigzags";
and that it has sought to resurrect "the myth of the Soviet
threat." Brezhnev declares that the USSR threatens no one
and has no territorial claims, concluding that "no one [should]
talk with us In the language of ultimatums and strength."
STRATEGIC ARMS In his remarks on disarmament--which he
LIMITATION TALKS says remains "one of the most important
international problems"--Brezhnev briefly
touches on the current strategic arms limitation talks. In
the first elite remarks on the talks since Kosygin's nn
11 February at the seabed treaty signing, Brezhnev observes
that their favorable outcome would help to curtail another
round in the arms race and would allow the diversion of
resources to more creative purposes. The USSR for its
part, he declares, is seeking to insure that they will
have positive results. But in the vein of the 3 February
Shestov article in PRAV'JA, he warns that no talks on
disarmament "can be productive unless the interests of
the security of the parties are considered equally and
no one seeks unilateral advantage."
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DISARMAMENT: PARTIAL MEASURES LISTED, CONFERENCES ENDORSED
In a notable departure from the format of his 1966 speech, Brezhnev
ticks off the "main concrete tasks" of the USSR and other peace-
loving states in their pursuit of peace--tasks which range from the
liquidation of "hotbeds of war" in Southeast Asia and the Middle
East, through insuring collective security in Europe and implement-
ing various disarmament measures, to international cooperation on
environmental problems.
In the course of listing various disarmament measures, Brezhnev
says that the USSR favors nuclear disarmament "by all states that
have nuclear weapons, and are for convening to this end a
conference of the five nuclear powers--the Soviet Union, the
United States, the PRC, France, and Britain." Moscow in 1965
had endorsed a French proposal along this line; most recently,
the 13 October 1970 Soviet-French communique following Pompidou's
visit to the USSR said that both sides "confirmed their com,non
conviction that the great powers having at their disposal nuclear
weapons should get together to discuss the questions of disarma-
ment in this field." Moscow's domestic service on the 30th
reports without comment that the British Government in a state-
ment has indicated that it will seriously study the Soviet proposal
for five-power talks; the broadcast adds that, according to
REUTER, the proposal has attracted the attention of the participants
at the Geneva disarmament talks.
Brezhnev follows his remarks on a five-power conference with the
observation that the USSR favors the convening of a worldwide
conference "to examine every aspect of the disarmament question."
The proposal for a world disarmament conference--surfaced at the
October 1964 Cairo Nonalined Conference--was endorsed by Gromyko
in his December 1964 UNGA address and was hailed with regularity
in Soviet propaganda through the end of 1965, when the General
Assembly unanimously approved it. Since then the proposal has
been broached only infrequently by Moscow, and not at all since
February 1967, when the UK-USSR joint communique on Kosygin's visit
to Britain noted that both sides were ready to attend such a
conference.
Brezhnev repeats the USSR's familiar call for treaties prohibit-
ing nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, the banning
of underground nuclear tests, the creation of nuclear-free zones
"in various parts of the world," and the liquidation of foreign
military bases. Additionally, he urges that measures be taken to
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reduce the likelihood of "accidental occurrence or premeditated
fabrication of military incidents and their development into
international crises and war." Brezhnev's list is the first
such comprehensive list to appear in Moscow propaganda since the
1 July 1968 Soviet memorandum on disarmament. The 1968 memoran-
dum did not include the proposal for a nuclear-free zone--which
does, however, appear with some regularity in both elite and
routine comment.
In listing disarmament measures Brezhnev also includes a reduc-
tion of armed forces and armaments "in areas where armed confron-
tation is especially dangerous, primarily in central Europe."
While a variation of this proposal was part of the comprehensive
partial disarmament program set forth in a December 1964 Soviet
Government memorandum, it subsequently has normally been discussed
in the context of European security (and it was not included in
the July 1968 disarmament memorandum). In a recent example, the
26 June 1970 memorandum )f the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers'
conference in Budapest observed that reduction of foreign armed
forces on the territory of European states would promote security
in Europe.
Brezhnev ressurects another partial disarmament measure that had
been mentioned in the December 1964 memorandum--reduction of
military expenditures, "primarily by major states." This mea-
sure was last mentioned at the elite level by Gromyko in his
27 June 1968 Supreme Soviet speech, when he complained that in
the past the Western powers have rejected this and other Soviet-
sponsored disarmament measures.
EUROPEAN ISSUES: RENEWED CALL FOR SECURITY CONFERENCE
In his rundown of the main tasks facing the peace-loving nations,
Brezhnev repeats the call for the convening of a conference on.
European security. Elsewhere in his address, he noted that the
"majority of European states" have come out in favor of the pro-
posal for a conference, and that preparations for it are moving
along. But he does not take the occasion to mention the
25 November 1970 Finnish proposal--to which Moscow had responded
favorably--that heads of missions or other representatives in
Helsinki hold consultations both with the Finnish Foreign
Ministry and at multila4,eral meetings on the organization of a
conference.
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31 MARCH 1971
Brezhnev reaffirms the readiness of the member states of the
Warsaw Pact simultaneously to liquidate that alliance and NATO
or, "as a first step, to liquidate the military organizations"
of the two groupings. This proposal, which dates back to 1966
when it was included in the Bucharest declaration on European
security, has been broached in elite Soviet propaganda only
infrequently in recent years. Most recently, the 17 June 1969
main document of the Moscow world communist conference had
called for simultaneous dissolution of the two blocs. But
the document said nothing about the liquidation of their mili-
tary organizations as a first step.
In reviewing the situation in Europe, Brezhnev hails the posi-
tive effect of Soviet-French relations, and he points to the
"substantial shift" in the USSR's relations with the FRG.
Regarding the ratification of the FRG's treaties with the
USSR and Poland, Brezhnev says that there is a "sharp demarca-
tion of political forces." He observes that "one must believe
that realistically-minded circles in Bonn and certain other
Western countries and capitals understand the simple truth:
Delay of ratification would give rise to a new crisis of confi-
dence in the whole FRG policy, and the political climate in
Europe would deteriorG.`-e, as would the prospects of lessening
international tension."
On Berlin, Brezhnev says that if the United States, France, and
the United Kingdom will respect, as the USSR does, "allied agree-
ments which determine the special status of West Berlin," and if
they respect "the sovereign rights of the GDR as an independent
socialist state, the talks which are now being conducted can be
successfully concluded to the mutual advantage of all interested
parties, including the population of West Berlin itself." Lte
phraseology differs somewhat from that which Brezhnev used in his
29 November 1970 speech in Yerevan, his last discussion of the
Berl-n problem. He said then that it was quite feasible to reach
an agreement regarding West Berlin, "the only thing needed" being
"for all sides concerned to display good will and to work out
decisions that would meet the wishes of the West Berlin population
and take into account the legitimate interests and sovereign rights
of the GDR." By now calling for the Big Three to respect both
"the special status of West Berlin" and "the sovereign rights of
the GDR as an independent socialist state," Brezhnev appears to be
laying down more stringent preconditions for a settlement.
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MIDDLE EAST; USSR ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL. GUARANTEES FOR AREA
Brezhnev's brief remarks on the situation in the Middle East -on-
tain the usual call for a political settlement, praise for the UAR
for accepting UN special representative Jarring's proposals, and
indictment of both Israel and the United States for allegedly
blocking settlement. Most notably, Brezhnev's remarks represent
the first elite affirmation of Soviet readiness "to take part with
other powers who are permament members of the Security Council in
creating international guarantees for a political settlement' in the
Middle East." Prior to Brezhnev's speech, there had been passing
references to the issue of international guarantees and an interna-
tional peacekeeping force, Moscow only indirectly suggesting
support by indicating, Egyptian acceptance and Israeli objections.
Brezhnev takes note of the fact that the UAR has "proposed to
undertake measures for the resumption in the nearest future of
navigation on the Suez Canal'..." A foreign-language commentary by
Glazunov on the 25th, reporting on UAR President Anwar as-Sadat's
recent interview on French television, had also broached the
matter of navigation through the canal. The commentary said that
as-Sadat has indicated that "the Suez Canal could be reopened to
foreign a ips if Israeli armed forces are partially withdrawn
from the ''inai Peninsula; the UAR considers this the first step"
toward imp-Lamentation of the 1967 Security Council resolution.
Brezhnev concludes that after a political settlement it would be
possible:'. to consider further steps aimed at reducing tension
in the region, "in particular, at turning the Mediterranean Sea
into a sea of peace and friendly cooperation."
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USSR-EAST EUROPE REUI'iONS: INTEGRATION, COORDINATION STRESSED
As part of Moscow's effort to preserve the facade of a unitod
community and to discourage outside efforts to penetrate its East
European sphere, Brezhnev underlined "the close and diverse
cooperation, friendship, and cordiality" that pervadeslbscow's rela-
tions with "the Warsaw Treaty countries--Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR,
Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia." In his more general
comments on socialist construction in the world movement
Brezhnev acknowledged the need for a "correct" combination of
"general regularities" and "national specifics"; but in regard
to relations with his East European allies, he made it clear
that national policies must evolve within the disciplined
framework of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. Thus, after
acknowledging that "the possibilities for the socialist
division of labor are not yet being fully used," he called
for economic integration of the bloc and laid particular
emphasis on the "coordinating foreign policy function" of
the Warsaw Pact. These are serious areas of disagreement
with the Romanians, who continue to oppose bloc integration
and to insist on maintaining an independent foreign policy
course.
Soviet displeasure with Romania, among others, seemed to be
reflected in a general passage by Brezhnev attacking
"negative phenomena" in the communist movement and calling
for a manifold struggle against "right and 'left-wing'
revisionism, and against nationalism." He added: "It is
precisely the nationalistic tendencies, especially those
which assume the form of anti-Sovietism, that bourgeois
ideologists and bourgeois propaganda have most willingly
relied upon in their fight against socialism and the
communist movement."
Briefly touching on relations with the maverick Albanians,
Brezhnev reiterated the line that the USSR is prepared to
"normalize" relations with Albania; but the avowal came
directly after his assault on Tirana's Peking ally for
following an anti-Soviet line in its propaganda and
policy. This expression of Soviet willingness to improve
relations with its ideological enemy is apparently designed
to portray Moscow as the innocent party in the dispute and
to put the onus on Tirana for disrupting communist unity.
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31 MALZCII 1.9'(?I,
Turning to relations with another ideological adversary,
Brezhnev vaguely noted that relations with Yugoslavia "have
continued to develop." He added that "the Soviet people
want to see socialism in Yugoslavia strengthened and her
ties with the socialist community grow stronger sentiment i
that the Yugoslavs might find presumptuous. Despite such
reservation: about Yugoslav socialism, however, Brezhnev
made it clear that he would like -to improve party and
state relations by calling for Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation
and developing contacts between the CPSU and the LCY.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Brezhnev updated the Soviet rationale for
POLAND the intervention in Czechoslovakia and
touched in general terms on the developments
in Poland since December. While his remarks on Czechoslovakia
are explicit and fairly extensive, his brief discussion of
Poland amoui:ts only to a grud.?;ing Soviet acknowledgment that
"difficulties" had arisen in that country. Brezhnev declared,
in obvious response to conjectures on this score, that Soviet
friendship with Poland "is unshakeable" and registered
Moscow's "deep satisfaction that the difficulties which
arose in fraternal Poland have been overcome." Without
referring directly to either the coastal riots or the
economic troubles which had sparked them, Brezhnev
approvingly noted the Polish party's current meap.4res to
strengthen its ties wi.th the workers and to "consolidate
the positions of socialism" in that country.
On the subject of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev provided an
explicit Soviet endorsement of the position taken by a
December 1970 UPCZ plenum document--belatedly released in
January 1971--that the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion
was in response to "appeals" by the Czechoslt. ?eks
themselves. Following a lengthy defensive explanation
that the "counterrevolutionary" threw endangered not
only Czechoslovakia but "the positions of socialism in
Europe as a whole," Brezhnev declared that "in view of
the appeals by party and state leaders, communists and
working people of Czechoslovakia" and the danger to socialist
gains in that country, "we and the fraternal socialist
countries. jointly took the decision to render internationalist
assistance to Czechoslovakia in defense of socialism." He
added that "we agree with the conclusion" drawn by the
CPCZ plenum document.
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31, MAUCH 1.97:1
WI thout uxipll e L t1y endorsing the loaderehip of Iluuak, present
aL the congress, llrezhnov declared: "We are sincerely glad
that the communists of Czechoul.ovakla have successfully
withstood the trials that fell to their lot." Brezhnev
may have indicated partial disagreement with the compromise
nupcrt of the C.PCZ document: Ile referred to the document
only au "Lessons of the Crisis Development" without Giving
the rest of the title--including "following the 13th
Congress" of the CPCZ in 1966. Husak had apparently been
allowed, in the document, to indict the Novotny era--not
dust the ,post-January 1968 Dubcek era--for the 1968 crisis,
in return for the document's statement that the August
lnvaaion had been carried out at the Czechoslovaks' own
request.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS! PRC'S HOSTILITY SAID TO IMPEDE UNITY
In the most critical Soviet elite comment on China since
leaders' election speeches last June, Brezhnev used the
congress as a forum to deplore persisting Chinese hostility
in the face of Soviet efforts aimed at normalizing relations.
He noted that "useful steps" had been taken at Soviet
initiative to normalize relations, citing the border talks,
the exchange of ambassadors, and the signing of a trade
agreement for the first time in several years. But while
professing Moscow's readiness to proceed further in this
direction, Brezhnev declared that the Soviets cannot ignore
Peking's anti.-Soviet line and denounced Peking's "slanderous
fabrications" concerning Soviet policy.
Against the background of Peking's recent ideological
broadside on the centenary of the Paris Commune, Brezhnev
made a play to the international communist gallery by
remarking -t,hat to sow dissension between-the PRC and the
Soviet Union is particularly harmful now. inasmuch as. it
coincides with an intensification.of.imperialist'aggression.
He claimed that the situation "more than ever-before"
demands unity and joint action rather than hostility
between China and the Soviet Union. Respecting the
Vietnamese communists' avursion to being caught in the
Sino-Soviet crossfire, Brezhnev did not mention Indochina
directly in this context.
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31 MIU CI:( 1971
- 27 -
Brezhnev's report provided a brief review of Moscow's China
policy in the post-Khrushehev period. He observed that Peking
had followed an ideological and political line incompatible
with Leninism and had demanded that the Soviets repudiate
the line of the 20th CPSU Congress and the party program. He
also took this occasion to refer to Peking's territorial
claims against the Soviet Union and to the 1969 border
clashes, a subject which the Soviet leaders have carefully
avoided since the opening of the Peking talks. Seeking to
show that Moscow had taken a balanced and responsible
approach to Sino-Soviet tensions, Brezhnev claimed that
the Soviets had rebuffed attempts to distort Marxism-Leninism
and to divide communist ranks while maintaining restraint
and "not yielding to provocations" in the interest of
normalizing relations. He gave no hint of the existence
of current tensions along the border.
As in his 28 August 1970 Alma-Ata speech, which had served
as the basic text for the Soviet line on China, Brezhnev
characterized the Peking talks as "going slowly." He added
an implicit criticism of the Chinese approach to the talks
by observing that not only one side must take a constructi?re
position if they are to be successful. Brezhnev repeated
the assurances in his Alma-Ata speech that the Soviets will
not forsake their national interests and will continue to
struggle for cohesion in the communist movement, and he
reiterated his appeal for not only normalization of state
relations but also the restoration of "good neighborliness
and friendship" between the PRC and the Soviet Union.
Curiously, in view of his censure of the Chinese for
impeding joint action, he omitted the remainder of his
appeal in Alma-Ata calling for unity of effort against
imperialism.
Taking another swipe at the Chinese, in a passage discussing
the international communist movement, Brezhnev noted that
during the period since the last CPSU congress Peking had
sought to form schismatic groups in an effort to develop
a counterweight to Moscow's wing of the world movement.
He lauded the June 1969 Moscow international communist
conference, at which Brezhnev led a bandwagon attack by
pro-Soviet loyalists against the Chinese, and he suggested
that conferences of this sort become a regular. -practice.
Characteristically, Brezhnev expressed concern over the
threat to Soviet hegemony posed by nationalist trends and
the attrr.ctions of an independent stand in the communist
movemez .
CONFIDENTIAL
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31 MARCH 1971
EAST EUROPE Prior to the congress Moscow had responded to
COMMENT Peking's ideological blast on the Paris Commune
centenary largely through the proxy of its
East European a]1ies, apart from an extensive flow of polemical
reaction in Radio Moscow's broadcasts to the Chinese. While
Romania remained silent, the other members of the Soviet bloc
came to the defense of their chief standard-bearer in comment
appearing in both East European and Soviet media. Most
notably, Polish party chief Gierek, in an article in the
29 March PRAVDA on the eve of the congress, picked up where
the fallen Gomulka had left off in professing fealty to
Moscow as the center of the communist movement. Serving
notice that the changes in the Polish leadership offered
no opportunities for driving a wedge ''en Warsaw and
Moscow, Gierek declared that solidar :: the CPSP?
continues to be the most accurate tet oyalty to
proletarian internationalism and that .,verahelming
majority of the fraternal parties, inc ing his own,
react to Chinese splitting actions by .gthening their
solidarity with the Soviets.
East European comment has spelled out the charge--hinted
at in Brezhnev's congress report--that Peking's attack
damaged the communist cause by taking place at a time
of intensified enemy action in Indochina. A NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND editorial, summarized in PRAVDA on 29 March,
severely condemned "the Mao Tse-tung group"--an offensive
formulation generally avoided by Moscow in its own name
in recent months--for directing its attack on Moscow
instead of joining with the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries at a time of military operations
in Laos. PRAVDA did, however, edit its overzealous ally
by omitting a passage in which NEUES DEUTSCHLAND recalled
that the Sino-Soviet border clashes in the spring of 1969
coincided with tensions arising from the FRG presidential
election in West Berlin.
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 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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- 29 -
SINO-BURMESE RELATIONS
PRC APPOINTS AMBASSADOR, IGNORES BCP INSURGENCY ANNIVERSARY
Peking's failure to take note of the 23d anniversary of the launch-
ing of the communist insurgency in Burma, coming in the wake of the
recent arrival in Rangoon of the newly appointed PRC ambassador to
Burma, Chen Chao-yuan, accords with other recent indications of
Peking's intent to improve state relations with the Ne Win govern-
ment. Since last September Peking has virtually ceased propaganda
support for the Burmese Communist Party (BCP); and since then its
sparse treatment of Burma has consisted primarily of brief NCNA
reports on state or diplomatic functions.
BCP ANNIVERSARY Peking media's omission of any comment on the
23d anniversary on March 28 of the launching
of the communist insurgency in Burma stands in contrast to Peking's
publicity for that anniversary in 1970, which, in turn, reflected
a notably milder attitude toward the Ne Win government than the
harsher attacks on the same occasion in 1969.* In 1970 Peking
marked the 22d anniversary with several NCNA articles detailing
battle actions of the BCP-led insurgents, tempering recollections
of "outstanding achievements" with warnings that the Burmese
revolutionaries "will encounter various difficulties" and must
"continue to display the spirit of waging hard and protracted
struggle and persevere in their armed struggle under the leader-
ship of the BCP,:" NCNA also disseminated reports of foreign
communist support to the Burmese insurgents--for instance, from
the Albanians and the communist parties of Thailand and Malaysia--
but avoided implying any aid for the BCP by the PRC itself and
omitted any direct expression of Chinese support for its armed
struggle.
STATE Although Rangoon appointed U Thein Maung as
RELATIONS Ambassador to the PRC in mid-October 1970 and NCNA
announced his arrival in Peking, presentation of
credentials, and meeting with Chou En-lai in late November and
early December, Peking did not reciprocate until recently. NCNA
on 21 March announced that Ambassador to Burma Chen Chao-yuan had
departed that day for his post.
* For a discussion of Peking's evolving attitude toward the Ne
Win government and its treatment of the 22d anniversary, see the
TRENDS of 1 April 1970, pp. 24-25.
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Reciprocal appointment of ambassadors capped a two-year evolution
in Peking media's treatment of the Ne Win government. Comment on
Burma during 1969--for instance that surrounding the 1969 anniver-
sary of the Burmese communist insurgency--employed hostile
personal attacks on Ne Win, such as "the Ne Win fascist regime"
and the "Ne Win clique." By late 1969 Peking had moderated its
formulations, referring to the "reactionary government," and
during 1970 this had been softened in Peking-originated comment
to "Burmese reactionaries," with no direct criticism of Ne Win
or his government.
Reflecting a further normalization of PRC-Burmese state relations,
NCNA on 4 October 1970 reported a greetings telegram from Ne Win
to Chou En-lai on the occasion of the PRC's 21st anniversary; and
a January 4 reception in Peking, given by the Burmese Ambassador
to the PRC and reported by NCNA, was attended by Kuo Mo-jo and
Pai Hsiang-kuo, the Minister of Foreign Trade.
SUPPORT FOR Concurrently with the normalizing of Burmese-
BCP INSURGENCY PRC state relations, Peking media have
virtually ceased giving any propaganda support
to the BCP's armed insurgency activities. Since the comment
surrounding the 28 March 1970 insurgency anniversary, Peking has
originated only three commentaries--one each in June, August, and
September--on the exploits of the BCP-led Burmese people's
revolutionary armed struggle. During this period Peking has
also reported BCP messages and statements on the occasions of the
Lenin centenary and the Chinese satellite launching in April 1970,
Mao's 20 May 1970 statement on Indochina, and the 3 March
satellite launching. In contrast to Peking's acknowledgment
of Ne Win's message on the PRC's national day last 1 October, it
did not mention any message of greetings from the BCP as it had
customarily done in previous years. NCNA did take note, however,
of the presence at Peking's national day celebrations of the
head of the BCP resident delegation in the PRC, Thakin Ba Thein
Tin. Thakin Ba Thein Tin has not been mentioned since that time
in monitored Peking media.
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31 MARCH 1971
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PROVINCIAL PARTY CO41ITTEE ESTABLISHED IN KIRIN
Adhering to the usual format, NCNA on 30 March announced the
formation of a party committee for Kirin Province. Within
the last 4 months, 15 of the PRC's 29 major administrative
divisions have reconstructed new provincial committees. As
in all previous examples, NCNA specifically noted that the
Kirin committee was elected in accordance with the formula
of "old, middle-aged, and young."
The Kirin committee was set up at a gathering of 921 party
delegates in Changchun from 18 to 24 Mexch. A six-man
leadership group--slightly weighted in favor of men with
military backgrounds. within the province--heads the
new committee of 74 full and 15 alternate members. The
top party spot went to Wang Huai-hsiang, chairman of the
provincial revolutionazy committee and since 1964 deputy
political commissar of the Kirin Military District (MD).
Kirin's four vice-chairmen were named secretaries. Ho
Yu-fa and Hsiao Tao-sheng are military men holding
concurrent positions as commander of the Kirin MD and
responsible person within the MD respectively. Veteran
cadres are represented on-the committee by Juan Po-sheng
and Cheng Chi-chiao, both former secretaries on the old
provincial coiitnittee. Chang Chao-jen, a newcomer to Kirin
identified only as a responsible person within the province
in June 1970, was also named a secretary.
Wang, making the usual speech on behalf of the party
nucleus group, stressed the need to improve party
leadership over economic work and step up overall
production within the province. As in the case of the
keynote addresses given by the first secretaries in
Liaoning, Kwangsi and Kansu--the other border provinces
with rebuilt party committees--Wang called for strengthening
Kirin as an "outpost" on China's Northeastern border.
Unlike the previous examples, however, he did not specifically
link this task to the need to prepare for war.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MARCH 1971
FORMATION OF PARTY AND REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES COMPARED
The attached table compares the formation of party committees
with that of revolutionary committees at the same mid-point,
when 15 of the 29 provincial-level units had managed to
follow through on the center's instructions. It will be
seen that five provinces, plus Peking and Shanghai, were
among the first 15 in both instances, in forming their
revolutionary committees as well as their party committees.
Of the six areas that were not among the first 15 in
either instance, four--Tibet, Sinkiang, Yunnan and Ningsid--
share the obvious excuse of remoteness and a dispersed
populace. The reasons for the dilatoriness of the other
two--Szechwan and Fukien--are of a different order.
The table shows graphically that the old CCP North Region,
which led the field in er,tablishing revolutionary committees,
has yielded primacy to the East in party reconstruction.
The remaining four CCP regions show nearly the same rate of
committee formation in both instances; there is a disparity
of only one, plus or minus, for each of these four.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MARCH 197].
STATUS AT MID-POINT
FORMATION OF PARTY AND REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES COMPARED
Provincial- Party Committees Revolutionary Committees
level Unit 30 Mar 71 _ 28 Feb 68
EAST Anhwei +
Chekiang +
Fukien
Kiangsi + +
Kiangsu +
Shanghai 4.
+
Shantung +
CENTRAL- Honan 4.
SOUTH Hunan +
Hupeh
Kwangsi +
Kwangtung
NORTH Hopeh
Inner Mongolia
Peking
Shansi
Tientsin
NORTH- Heilungkiang
EAST Kirin
Liaoning
NORTH- Kansu +
WEST Ningsia
Shensi 4.
Sinkiang
Tsinghai + 4.
SOUTH- Kweichow
WEST Szechwan
Tibet
Yunnan
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MARCH 1971
- 34 -
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
UKRAINE AND AZERBAYDZHAN CONGRESSES DIVERGE ON BREZJ-NEV
In the two final republican congresses, Azerbaydzhan and the
Ukraine followed prior patterns ir: their treatment of Brezhnev.
The Azerbaydzhanis praised him while the Ukrainians paid him
little deference. Few sensitive issues were raised at either
congress, but each, in contrast to the other republican
congresses, was marked by sniping at incumbent or previously
dismissed republic leaders.
The Ukraine, unlike Brezhnev's other former home bases of
Kazakhstan and Moldavia, has not gratuitously hailed Brezhnev
and did not do so at its congress. First Secretary Shelest
paid less deference to Brezhnev in his congress report than
any other republic First Secretary except Estonia's Kebin, who
had ignored him entirely. Shelest's only mention of Brezhnev
was a short, innocuous quotation of his on the role of the
party. Moreover, unlike other republic or regional leaders
(Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev, Uzbek First Secretary
Rashidov, Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, and Moscow
First Secretary Grishin) who had praised Brezhnev's 50th
anniversary and Lenin centennial reports, Shelest conspicuously
praised only the party "documents" on these anniversaries.
Shelest likewise cited only the translation of Lenin's works
into Ukrainian and ignored the Ukrainian translation of
Brezhnev's works which had been announced just the week
before.
Among other Ukrainian congress speakers, Brezhnev's old
colleague, Premier Shcherbi.tskiy, quoted him twice, and
President Lyashko and Kiev city first secretary A. P. Botvin
cited him once. The only unusual deference was shown by
the Ivano-Frankovsk obkom first secretary, V. F. Dobryk, who
expressed his oblast's "sincere and warm thanks to the CPSU
Central Committee, Soviet Government, Central Committee
Politburo, and personally Central Committee General
Secretary Leonid Ilich Brezhnev" for their concern for
and aid to the Ukraine (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 20 March).
Dobryk, former first secretary of Brezhnev's home town of
Dneprodzerzhinsk, probably had special reason to be grateful
to Brezhnev since he was the only provincial city first
secretary (besides Leningrad) to be elected as CPSU Central
Committee candidate member in 1966.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
31 MARCH 1971
The Azerbaydzhanis displayed their traditional deference to
Brezhnev. Although they did not elect an honorary presidium
consisting of the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev as they had
done in October 1970, First Secretary Aliyev in his concluding
? speech reiterated the controversial formulation (BAKINSKIY
RABOCHIY, 12 March).
OTHER ISSUES In contrast to most republic first secretaries,
who had avoided discussion of foreign affairs,
Shelest joined Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov in praising the
new treaty with West Germany. Zionism was attacked by Shelest,
Zakarpatsk obkom first secretary Yu. V. Ilnitskiy, and writer
Yu. K. Smolich, and ideological deviations were criticized by
Shelest, Dnepropetrovsk first secretary Vatchenko, Kiev first
secretary Tsybulko, Kharkov first secretary Vashchenko, and
Ivano-Frankovsk first secretary Dobryk. Vatchenko and
Vashchenko used these deviations to snipe at ideology
secretary Ovcharenko (see FBIS TRENDS for 17 March). The
economic reform received brief praise from President Lyashko
and Lvov first secretary Kutsevol, while the production
associations were encouraged by Shelest.
The Azerbaydzhan congress was largely preoccupied with the
1969-1970 purge of the republic leadership. Some speakers
urged further punishment for the ousted republic leaders,
and Academy of Science President G. B. Abdullayev, whose
organization had become the refuge for former first
secretary Akhundov, former premier Alikhanov, former
president Iskenderov, and former agriculture secretary
Kyazimov, complained about the difficulty of operating
the academy with such scientifically unqualified cadres
among its leadership (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 12 March).
In addition, most of the surviving pre-Aliyev leaders were
attacked and removed from office. Ideology secretary
D. G. Dzhafarov (attacked by name for "subjectivism") and
longtime industry secretary A. D. Amirov (apparently blamed
"
"
? for the
sharp drop
in oil production) were dropped from
the Secretariat at the end of the congress. Gosplan
chairman M. I. Allakhverdov, condemned for his "harmful,
unbusinesslike style of work," was dropped from the Central
Committee and presumably will soon be removed as Gosplan
chief. Second secretary S. V. Kozlov--who, as Russian
supervisor of the republic, is not so directly unc?.er
Aliyev's control--and A. I. Ibragimov--promoted to premier
in 1970--are now the only survivors of the pre-Aliyev
bureau.
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