TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 10, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~ ~IIIIIIIII~~~~~~~IIIIIIIII
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
10 FEBRUARY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 6)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Euludcd from automatic
do.npradinp and
dcdauif eotfon
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONF'IDEN'TIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 FEBRUARY 1971
C O N T E N T S
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
DRV Government, PRG Issue Protests on Allied "Invasion" of Laos . 1
Pathet Lao Continues Series of Protests Over Attacks on Laos . . 4
PRC Foreign Ministry Statements Score Laos Operations . . . . . . 7
Moscuw Comment, Kosygin Deplore "Escalation" in Indochina . . 10
DRV Scores U.S. Strikes in DMZ, Quang Binh, Lists "War Crimes" . 14
Reports of Paris Talks Play Down Comment on Laos, POW Issue . . . 15
Hanoi, Peking Belatedly Report Sihanouk Visit to DRV . . . . . . 17
Moscow Welcomes UAR Cease-Fire Extension, Suez Proposal . . . . . 18
PRAVDA Complains of U.S. Attitude in Big Four Talks . . . . . . . 20
SALT
PRAVDA Raises Substantive SALT Issue; IZVESTIYA Attacks Smith . 22
SPACE FLIGHTS
Soviets Stress Apollo Difficulties, Hail Luna and Venus Missions. 25
USSR-CUBA
Moscow, Havana Announce Soviet ships to Visit Cuban Ports . . . .
27
GERMANY AND BERLIN
GDR Protests CDU Meeting in Berlin, Criticizes SPD Meeting . . .
30
Soviet Comment Ignores SPD Meeting, Denounces CDU Gathering . . .
32
Stoph Offers Proposals to West Berlin on Relations with GDR . . .
34
Moscow Gives Polish Party Plenum Extensive Publicity . . . . . .
36
Warsaw Reports Continued Tough Stance by Coastal Workers . . . .
38
ALBANIA-YUGOSLAVIA
Tirana, Belgrade Announce Decision to Exchange Ambassadors . . .
39
(Continued)
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 FEBRUARY 1971
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Voronov's Top Deputy in RSFSR Laaderahip Is Removed . . . . 41
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Problems of "7 May Schools" Discussed in the Propaganda . . 43
Hainan Island Establishes Its New Party Committee . . . . . 46
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: PRC DISCUSSES POSSIBLE U.S. USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 1
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FB I S TRENDS
10 FEBRUARY 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 1 - 7 FEBRUARY 1971
Moscow (3529 items)
Peking (3247 items)
Indochina
(6%)
17%
Indochina
(22%)
47%
[TABS State-
ment
(--)
6%]
[PRC Foreign
Ministry Statement
(--)
5%]
Syrian Party-
(0.1%)
6%
Domestic Issues
(45%)
20%
Government Dele-
Ceylon National Day
(--)
4%
gation in USSR
DPRK Army Day
(--)
4%
China
(5%)
5%
Mao Statement on Japan,
(--)
4%
Luna 17 & Lunakhod
(2%)
3%
7th Anniversary
Venus 7
(5%)
1%
Latin American
(3%)
3%
SALT
(--)
1%
Territorial Waters
Middle East
(0.7%)
1%
Commonwealth Conference
(2%)
3%
Angela Davis Case
(3%)
1%
in Singapore
Uganda Coup
(--)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FPlS TRENDS
10 FEBRUARY 1971
INDOCHINA
High-level Vietnamese communist reaction to the 8 Februr.ry move-
ment of U.S.-supported ARVN troops into Laos comes on the 10th
in DRV and PRG government statements which say that ouch "maneuvers"
as having President Thieu issue a statement cannot hide the fact
that it is the Americans who have invaded Laos. The DRV statement
asserts that further proof of U.S. "hypocrisy" regarding r,
political settlement is shown by the fact that the Nixon Administra-
tion within the past 10 months has expanded the war to two
countrie s--Cambodia and Laos. The statements echo a DRV foreign
ministry statement and a PRG government statement on the 5th in warning
the massing of U.S. troops near the 17th parallel may presage new
actions against the DRV.
The DRV Government statement says vaguely that "the Vientiane
administration, through arguments that turn black into white,"
has tried to justify the Saigon and U.S. encroachments on Laos.
But like other propaganda, it maintains the usual silence regarding
the DRV troop presence and obscures the fact that the allied opera-
tion is aimed at Vietnamese communist bases and supply routes in Laos.
Peking first officially protested the buildup of allied forces on the
Laotian border in a 4 February foreign ministry statement. Another
foreign ministry statement on the 8th scored allied ground attacks
and called the "large-scale invasion" of Laos a provocation against
China--a formula also used in the past in connection with U.S.
"escalation" against Cambodia and the DRV. The first explicit
Peking reaction to the move into Laos on the 8th appeared late on
the 9th in an NCNA dispatch which only briefly alluded to Thieu's
announcement while stressing U.S. responsibility for the move.
While high-level Soviet condemnation of rumored allied moves
against Laos had come in remarks by Kosygin on 1 and 2 February
and i:: the TASS statement on the 3d, there has to date been no
formal Soviet protest over the ARVN move. However, on the 10th
Moscow radio reports that during a meeting with DRV Politburo
member Le Thanh Nghi--concluding a tour to negotiate aid agree-
ments--Kosygin voiced "resolute condemnation" of the intrusion
of U.S. and South Vietnamese troops into Laos as well as the
"outrages" in Cambodia and "constant violations" of DRV
sovereignty.
DRV GCVER!l1ENT, PRG ISSUE PROTESTS ON ALLIED 11INVASION " OF LAOS
While routine Hanoi and Front propaganda within a matter of hours
acknowledged President Thieu's 8 February announcement of the
movement of South Vietnamese troops into Laos, the official
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 FEBRUARY 1971
protests in the form of government statements were not relearned
until the 10th--the day after an NLHS Central Committee statement
was issued. Both the DRV and PRG government statements duly
endorse the NLHS statement condemning the aggression against Laos.
Both Vietnamese communist statements ridicule President Nixon's
"trick" of having Thieu make the announcement; both say that this
cannot hide the U.S. role and that the United States is violating
the 1962 Geneva agreements. The PRG refers very briefly to the
Vientiane government in "severely condemning the pro-American
Vientiane administration for aiding the American aggressors and
their henchmen." The DRV statement goes further with an implicit
acknowledgment of the Laotian Government statement which regretted
the incursion but placed primary responsibility on the DRV for
its aggression against Laos. Thus the DRV statement says vaguely:
"The Vientiane administration, through arguments that turn black
into white, has striven to justify the Americans and Saigon
puppet administration's encroachment on Laotian sovereignty . . . ."
Both government statements see the move against Laos as further
evidence of U.S. intent to pursue a military course. Observing
that within 10 months the Nixon Administration has expanded the
war to two countries, Cambodia and Laos, the DRV statement
says this proves that the Administration does not want peace
and shows "the deceitful nature of the so-called five-point peace
plan and all other initiatives." Like other propaganda, the
statements reaffirm Indochinese solidarity and predict that "all
strata" of the Laotian people will enter the struggle. Regarding
any "new military adventure" against North Vietnam, the DRV
statement "sternly warns" that the Vietnamese people, "with high
vigilance," will certainly defeat any such adventure.
INITIAL REACTION TO The first Vietnamese communist acknowledg-
THIEU ANNOUNCEMENT ment of President Thieu's announcement
on the 8th came in a Liberation Radio
broadcast at 1300 GMT, some 10 hours after Thieu's statement
was broadcast by Saigon radio. The radio commentary, echoing
earlier propaganda on rumored allied moves, declared cryptically
that "before the indignation of public opinion, Nixon did not
dare to directly order the attack against the Laotian liberated
area but ordered Thieu to do it on the morning of 8 February."
The commentary said that the "U.S. imperialists' frenzied act"
can "in no way save the dangerous situation of the Vientiane
reactionary clique," and it claimed that "the U.S. aggressors
and their henchmen in Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane in the past
year and early days of 1.971" have suffered "pitiful setbacks."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 FEBRUARY 1971
Another Liberation Radio commentary an hour later said everyone
knows it is the United States that is responsible for the large-
scale aggression, which is a "brazen" violation of the 1962 Geneva
agreement. The commentary, of course, said nothing specifically
about the nature and locus of the operation in remarking that
"Nixon and the lackey clique have been making round-about and
deceitful allegations on the nature, purpose, and duration of
the military operations and the level of U.S. participation."
An LPA commentary on the 9th ridiculed the statements by the U.S.
command I.n Saigon that no U.S. ground combat forces are involved
in the Laos operation, saying "it is clear that this large-scale
operation was schemed and staged and is being commanded by the
United States with the direct participation of 9,000 U.S. troops
of the 101st Airborne, Americal, and 5th Mechanized Infantry
divisions. Like earlier comment, it scored the Vientiane
administration, charging that "in the face of the serious U.S.
acts of aggression against the Lao people, the Vientiane
authorities, dancing to their U.S. master's tune, at first
pretended to know nothing about the attack or, southern Laos and
even tried to plead for it."
The first DRV reaction came in a commentary broadcast by Hanoi
radio within the hour after the second Liberation Radio
commentary. In addition to noting Thieu's announcement of "the
aggressive attack in Laos called Lam Son 719," it cited the
MACV statement that the United States will provide any
necessary air power--combat or logistical, aircraft or
helicopters--to support the Saigon ground troops and air force.
The broadcast added that after more than a week-long news
embargo designed to ward off censure by public opinion, "Nixon
resorted to the trick of having Thieu make the order public."
It recalled that the Cambodian incursion was carried out under
the "pretext" of destroying "conuaunist" sanctuaries, and it
said similar allegations are being made now.
Like the Front, Hanoi condemned the invasion as "trampling" on
the sovereignty, independence, and neutrality of Laos and
as a "new extremely serious violation of the 1962 Geneva agreements."
Notably, however, the Hanoi broadcast went on to directly
criticize Souvanna Phouma, saying that though aware beforehand,
he "pretended to ignore and did not seek to prevent the action."
It added that on the contrary, "he employed vile arguments to
accuse the Vietnamese people of staging aggression against Laos."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 FEBRUAF Y 1971
EARLIER DRV, PRG Hanoi's first official protest over the
PROTEST STATEMENTS rumored ground action against Laos came in
a DRV Foreign Ministry statement n the 5th,
echoing and endorsing an NLHS Central Committee stateme )f the
4th. (The 1 February DRV Foreign Ministry statement h~, discussed
only air power escalation in Indochina.) The Front gov rnment
also endorsed the NLHS protest in a statement dated the 5th and
carried by Front media on the 6th. Both the DRV and PRG state-
ments use language similar to the Pathet Lao's in condemning the
buildup of a large force of U.S. and Saigon troops. But while
the DRV statement refers merely to carrying out "the plan of
aggression against Laos on a larger scale," the PRG's claims
that "large-scale aggressive attacks have been conducted
against Laos."
The DRV statement differs from that of the PRG in its references
to "extremist reactionaries" in the Vientiane administration as
well as army, and in its claim that the U.S. "act of aggressicn"
against Laos is "wrecking" the meeting between the representatives
of the two princes in Laos and the NLHS' efforts to settle the
Laotian problem peacefully.
Both the DRV and PRG statements are notable for their interjection
of the notion that the concentration of larger forces in the
area near the 17th parallel indicates that the United States is
planning--in the words of VNA--"new military adventures against
the DRV." Both statements also condemn the new ARVN operation
in Cambodia.
PADIET LAO CONTINUES SERIES OF PROTESTS OVER ATTACKS ON LAOS
The first official communist protest following President Thieu's
announcement on the 8th was the NLHS Central Committee statement--
dated the 8th but broadcast on the 9th. It claims that the
operation, involving "nearly 50 battalions," came in the wake
of the United States and South Vietnam "having moved elements
of their forces into Laotian territory since 1 February."* The
* :-rfor to Thieu's 8 February announcement there were a series
of protests of allied actions, including the one from the NLHS
Central Committee on the 4th which charged that large South
Vietnamese and U.S. forces were conducting operations against
Laos-"in coordination with the Vientiane puppet army."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1.0 FEBRUARY 1971
statement condemns this "extremely serious escalation" of the
war and describes Thieu's "claims about the space and time
limits as well as the objectives of the operation" as "deceitful."
It bluntly labels as "false" assertions "that no U.S. ground
troops are taking part in this operation."
The statement calls on the Lao people to "punish" the invaders
and defeat the operation, and it calls on other governments
and people to "take strong and effec tf.ve acts" against the
"aggressors" and to demand that they put an end to the "brutal
aggressive operation." According to the Pathet Lao news agency
version, it also accuses the "Vientiane administration" of
"pretending to protest" against the allied invasion while in
fact "shielding this aggressive operation." This appears to be
an allusion to the Laotian Government communique broadcast by
Vientiane radio at 0530 GMT on the 8th--some two hours after
Thieu's announcement. The communique requested the immediate
withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laotian territory and asked
the nations. responsible for implementation of the Geneva
agreements on Laos to take appropriate measures to assure
compliance with the agreements. Expressing regret that "foreign
troops-of countries which signed the agreements" had decided
"of their own accord to select Laotian territory as their battle-
field," the communique placed "primary responsibility" for the
current fighting on the DRV and its past and continuing violations
of the agreements, but warned that "other foreign troops can in
no way use this as an excuse to violate the borders of the
kingdom of Laos."
An "urgent message" from Scuphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma, also
dated the 8th but not broadcast by the Pathet Lao radio until the
10th, scores the "new massive military invasion of Laos" by U.S.
and South Vietnamese forces, "coordinating" with "Vientiane
troops." Souphanouvong calls it "deplorable" that "Your Excellency
also makes gestures and commits acts which the U.S. imperialists
and lackeys might use to cover their war of aggression and fool
public opinion both at home and abroad." He appeals to Souvanna
to "take necessary measures to. compel the warmongering U.S.
imperialists and ultrarightist clique to immediately cease such
barbarous acts of aggression."
In an earlier message to Souvanna., dated 2 February and broadcast
on the.4th, Souphanouvong had called upon him to avoid being
used by-the "U.S. imperialists and lackeys" and claimed that the
United States and Laotian rightists had "obstructed and delayed"
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the plenipotentiaries' meeting and were seeking "to destroy any
NLHS attempt to peacefully settle the Laotian problem."
The allied operations in Laos are also denounced in a statement
by the Patriotic Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee, dated the
9th and broadcast the next day, whi2h expresses support for
earlier NLHS statements and protests that allied actions undermine
NLHS efforts to achieve a peaceful solution of the Laotian
problem. An earlier statement from the committee, dated h February
and broadcast on the 6th, had similarly charged that allied
operations were sabotaging NLHS attempts to bring about a
meeting between plenipotentiaries of the two Laotian princes to
reach a peaceful settlement.
An NLHS Central Committee "appeal," dated the 7th and broadcast.
by Pathet Lao media two days later,.called on the Lao people to
unite and to "develop the powerful people's war" to drive out the
"aggressors." It decried the "open armed invasion" as an
"insolent. challenge" to the. Lao people, and it warned--uniquely--
that Laotian. territory is "not a battlefield favorable to the
development of their modern armed forces." The appeal called
upon signatories of the Geneva agreement on Laos to "condemn
and protest" the invasion and to compel the aggressors "to stop
the war escalation in Laos and immediately and totally withdraw."
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PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENTS SCORE LAOS OPERATIONS
FOREIGN MINISTRY A i'RC Foreign Ministry statement on 8 February
STATEMENT ON 8TH endorses the NLHS Central Committee statement
of the 4th and echoes Its condemnation of the
"large-scale invasion of Laos." The foreign ministry statement,
carried some 17 hours after the broadcast of Thieu's announcement
of the allied operation, makes no mention of Thieu's official
announcement but charges that the Nixon Administration has now
ended efforts to "cover up its criminal scheme" and has "flagrantly
invaded Laos." It asserts that the United States and its
"lackeys in Saigon and Bangkok have dispatched armed forces in
the tens of thousands to launch large-scale attacks on the
southern areas of Laos from the air and on the ground."
It calls the "invasion" a "provocation" against the Chinese and
other peoples--a formulation applied to U.S. actions in
Indochina in the 13 December Chinese party-government statement
supporting the 10 December DRV party-government appeal. The
4 May 1970 PRC Government statement assailing the U.S. incursion
into Cambodia and the bombing of the DRV had similarly
characterized these actions as provocations against the Chinese
people.
Observing that "Laos is a close neighbor of China," the foreign
ministry statement promises in standard terms to make "all-out
efforts in giving support and assistance to the peoples of Laos,
Vietnam, and Cambodia." The last previous official PRC state-
ment on Laos, a foreign ministry statement on 26 March 1970,
also noted that Laos is Chitia's close neighbor but contained a
warning that "the Chinese people absolutely will not sit idly
by while U.S. imperialism acts wantonly in Laos"--a threat
which had not been raised in Peking's elite pronouncemei s for
some years and which has not been repeated since.*
The Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on the 8th does not
mention the DRV Foreign Ministry and PRG statements of the 5th..
but, like them, it scores the new South Vietnamese operation
in Cambodia and raises the possibility of a threat to the DRV,
* See the 1 April 1970 TRENDS, pages 16-17, for a discussion of
the 26 March 1970 PRC Foreign Ministry statement protesting
intensified bombing of Laos and the introduction of "Thai
accomplice troops."
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10 FEBRUARY 1971
AFFAIRS articles in September 1969 and October 1968 Belyayev
had supported Cairo's proposition that passage of Israeli
ships through the canal should be dependent on settlement of
the refugee question. (According to U.S. press reports--but
not Cairo radio's 9 February account--an Egyptian official
spokesman reaffirmed this position, declaring that passage of
Israel'. 'ships through the canal is included in the Security
Council resolution but the refugee problem must be solved first.)
PRAVDA WIPLAINS OF U,S, ATTITUDE IN BIG FOUR TALKS
Moscow thus far has not acknowledged the 5 February State
Department announcement that the United States has informed the
USSR, Britain, and France of its readiness to open preliminary
discussion on Big Four guarantees of a Middle East peace settle-
ment at the four-power session on 12 February. While the Soviet
proposals on a settlement--last set forth in the 15 October
PRAVDA by Primakov--call for Big Four or Security Council
guarantees, this aspect has been given little attention in
routine propaganda. TASS on 1 February did report Averell
Harriman as saying, in a speech in Florida, that his recent
trip to Moscow convinced him "that the Soviet Union 'stands
ready to join in effective four-power guarantees"' for a peaceful
settlement.
PRAVDA on 10 February does, however, offer an unusual discussion
of the Big Four role and berate the United States for its
position in the four-power consultation, apparently without
mentioning the U.S. proposal. TASS generally reports briefly
on Big Four sessions, but only infrequently in the past several
months has Moscow touched on a four-power role in a settlement:
Kudryavteev in August, for example, called on the four to promote
a settlement and said Jarring's mission should be given a
"practical program of action," and Gromyko in his 21 October
UNGA address, after referring to the Jarring mission, said the
four powers must contribute to a settlement.
liov PRAVDA's New York correspondent Kolesnichenko, as reported
by TASS on the 10th, says that "UN informed circles" point out
that the United States refuses to discuss "substantial questions"
of a political settlement in the Big Four sessions. Noting that
the American press says the United States is making efforts
through "so-called 'quiet diplomacy'" to eliminate the crisis,
Kolesnichenko charges that Washington is actually blocking the
work of t;ie Big Four and would like to doom the consultations
to failure. In view of the cease-fire extension and the "new
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10 FEBRUARY 1971
emerging situation," giving the United States a "real possi-
bility" to display quiet diplomacy, Kolesnichenko says it
should be expected that the Americans would not, oppose
"adoption of coordinated decisions" aimed at securing the
earliest political settlement. He particularly complains
that at the four-power meeting on 4 February the U.S.
representative opposed the opinion of the other three, and
turned down Soviet and French proposals, on a coordinated
statement stressing the need for full implementation of
Resolution 242 and particularly the need for Israeli withdrawal.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 FEBRUARY 1971
charging that the United States is "wildly plotting to launch
a sudden attack on T' i Vietnam." The statement maintains
that "such rabid act:. ua the part of the Nixon Government can
only arouse the Laotian people and the other peoples of
Indochina to even more resolute resistance and hasten its
thorough defeat."
FOREIGN MINISTRY Peking's first official denunciation of the
STATEMENT ON 4TH concentration of allied troops or. the Laotian
border came in a PRC Foreign Ministry state-
ment on the 4th which lc:ri off with an attack on Secretary Rogers'
29 January press conference remarks: It cited the Secretary
as saying that there would be no limit on U.S. air operations
in Indochina and that the United States would nct foreclose any
possibility of other action. The statement went on to charge
that "in the past few days" U.S. and South Vietnamese forces
have been concentrated on the Laotian border, Thai troops
"directed by the United States" have acted in coordination, and
"in order to cover the invasion of Laos" by South Vietnamese
and Thai forces the U.S. air force has been carrying out
concentrated bombing on the southern areas of Laos. The state-
ment maintained that public opposition caused the Administration
to black out news but that the "premeditated" nature of the new
"military adventure" is well known and can be demonstrated by the
existence of a "secret agreement" between Saigon and the "Laotian
rightist troops" on the entry of South Vietnamese troops into Laos.
The 4 February statement endorsed statements by the NLHS Central
Committee spokesman on allied incursions and the DRV Foreign
Ministry on U.S. air strikes escalation, both on 1 February, and
by the PRG Foreign Ministry and a spokesman for Sihanouk's
government (RGNU) on operations in Laos, on the 2d and 3d,
respectively. It predicted that "U.S. imperialism" will "suffer
even more severe punishment" by the Indochinese people and
reaffirmed that it is China's duty to give all=out support and
assistance, adding that the Chinese people "absolutely will not
allow U.S. imperialism to do whatever it pleases in Indochina."
REACTION TO Peking's first explicit reaction to the incursion
INCURSION into Laos came in an NCNA dispatch on the 9th
charging that the United States on the day
before had dispatched "large numbers of U.S. and South Vietnamese
puppet troops to invade the liberated zone in southern Laos on a
large scale." The dispatch laid the responsibility for the move
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10 FEBRUARY 1971
on the United States, citing State Department spokesman McCloskey
as having "admitted" that President Nixon made the basic decision.
A subsequent NCNA report, dated the 10th, mentioned that the
United States and "the Thicu-Ky clique" had announced the incursion,
but Peking has otherwise ignored Thicu's announcement in favor of
concentrating on the U.S. role in "masterminding" the action.
The NCNA report on the 10th, enumerating the "-fallacies" in the
8 February State Department statement, suppressed several key
points in the statement. While responding to the points that
no American combat troops will enter Laos, that the operation
will be a limited one, that it is designed to protect American
lives, that it '.s consistent with international law, and that
the United States has consistently sought to end the Indochina
conflict through negotiations, NCNA's account failed to mention
the statement's refera.ice to sanctuaries and supply routes a~,
the target of the action, and it ignored all references to the
Geneva accords and machinery. NCNA interpreted the statement's
reiteration of President Nixon's five-point proposal of last
October as reflecting an intention to "make the three Indochinese
peoples surrender in face of the military pressure" of the United
States. NCNA all but ignored the statement's assertion that the
operation is fully consistent with international law, a claim
dismissed as "not worth a word of refutation."
PRC media's only mention of the Geneva conference machinery
appeared in an NCNA dispatch on the 9th quoting a statement by
the spokesman of the DRV delegation at the Paris talks
denouncing the British Government for having declared its support
of the incursion into Laos.* The dispatch quoted the DRV statement
as taking note of Britain's cochairmanship of the 1962 Geneva
conference and blaming the Conservative government for cooperating
with the United States in undermining the 1962 agreements. In
Peking's own reaction to the British Government's statement
supporting the operation in Laos, an NCNA report on the 9th
avoided any mention of the Geneva conference. It did, however,
acknowledge the charge made in the statement that North
Vietnamese troops were in Laos. In contrast to the attack oil
Britain, NCNA on the 9th favorably quoted French President Pompidou
* While Peking only occasionally mentions the Paris talks, there
is a recent precedent for its publicizing statements by the
communist delegations at the talks: On 26 November Peking
publicized the delegations' statements announcing the postponement
of the session of the Paris talks scheduled for that week.
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CONFIDEMIAL FBIS TRLNDJ
10 FI!I3RUARY 1971
on Laos, including his remark that "there will be no settlement
and no peace in Southeast Asia without cessation of all foreign
intervention."
In the moat authoritative Chinese comment uinnc the 8 February
foreign ministry statement, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article
on the 10th repeated the foreign ministry's charges regarding
allied operations in Laos and Cambodia as well ".~ the warning
about a surprise attack on North Vietnam. Fxpressing confidence
that the people of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia are "strong
enough" to defeat the allies, Commentator renewed the standard
pledge that the Chinese provide a "powerful backing" and
"all-out support" for the Indochinese people in their struggle.
MOSCOW COMMENT. KOSYGIN DEPLORE "ESCALATION" IN INDOCHINA
Soviet media have stepped up their proptganda attacks on U.S.
Indochina policy following Koa;'gin's 2 February call for world
public opinion to condemn allied activity i.n Laos and the
3 February TASS statement's denunciation of the "armed
intrusion" into Laos. Moscow publicizes voluminous reports
of protest meetings in the USSR and abroad and culls state-
ments critical of the allied action from the foreign press.
In continuing at the same time to call for a negotiated settle-
ment and expressing general support for the Indochinese peoples,
the comment hews closely to the language of the TASS statement.
Against the background of the TASS statement and Kosygin's
earlier charge on 1 February that "an outrageous invasion of
Laos is underway," Moscow media obscured the date of the 8 February
South Vietnamese crossover into Laos. Soviet media's first
reaction to the GVN announcement came in a TASS Washington dispatch
at 0832 GMT on the 8th which said U.S. military authorities
"confirmed reports of the invasion of Laos by American-Saigon
troops" but gave no date.
A subsequent, longer TASS dispatch from New York took note of
Thieu's statement. It reported that the United States "officially
admitted the fact of armed incursion into the territory of neutral
Laos" and added that "their mouthpiece, puppet Saigon 'president'
Thieu, declared that South Vietnamese troops supported by the
U.S. Air Force had invaded the territory of Laos." TASS did not
elaborate on the substance of Thieu's statement. It did, however,
note "Saigon" reports that the operation was "designed for a period
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1.0 F1:UItUARY 19'(1
of from 1.0 days to one month." It went on to denounce "the
criminal aggression of the United Staten In Indochina," which
It said hats "entered tt new dangeroun stage," and to warn
vaguely that "the U.S. Administration hau auuumed heavy
reuponsibillty to world and American public opinion for Its
aftermath."
An editorial in PHAVDA on the 8th, as reported by Radio Moncow
and TAGS, charged the United Staten with escalating the war
"on all front[; of Indochina." It cited an evidence reports
that the U.S. air raidu on South Vietnam, Ctunbodia, and Laos
"are now on it settle without equal at any time In the
Indochina war." At the stone time, it added, "tens of
thousands of soldiers in the army of Washington's Saigon hirelings
have, with American air and naval support, been moved into
Cambodia and. Laos." PRAVDA also noted that "in the northern
part of South Vietnam nearly 30,000 American and Saigon troops
have begun the biggest punitive operation in the pant 10 months
on the borders with the DIN and with Laos."
To judge from American press reports, the PRAVDA editorial said,
"the Pentagon is planning a further e caltttion of its criminal
war." Without elaborating on these "plans," it. went on to
charge that "new U.S. aggressive actions, in Indochina tire a
brazen violation of the U.N. Charter, tin affront to International
law, and a breach of the 19511 and 1962 Geneva agreements."
After calling in ntandtrrSI terms for a political settlement in
Indochina, PHAVDA concluded with a quotation from the 3 February
TASu statement: "The Vietnamese, Laotiants, and Cambodians have
the unflagging and determined support of the Soviet Union and
other socialist counteicn."
Other Moscow comment has taken Brita!n and the United States
to task for their attitudes toward the Geneva accords. A TASS
commentary by Kharkov on the 8th assailed London for supporting
the allied action in Laos. Without mentioning Moscow's own
role In the Geneva accords, Kharkov said that "the British
Government, being a cochairman of the Geneva conference on
Laos, cannot but know that the American-Saigon aggression
against the Laotian people is a most, flagrant violation of the
1962 accords." It added that "instead of pressing for an
implicit fulfillment of these agreements which guaranteed Laos
neutrality, independence, and territorial integrity, London
assumes the unse-mly mission of an apologist of America's
sanguinary banditry."
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CONFI1)ErvI'IA1, 1131E 'I'It1;:ND3
10 FEBRUARY 1971
An r,rtlcle by Mnyevtskiy in PRAVDA on the 10th, an reported by
TAGS, charged that the "invasion or Laos by U..S. military and
i;aigon puppets In it nhruneI.etr; Lrampl.Ing underfoot of
International law; it is nn outrage ttgainct the principles of
the UN Charter and the Geneva agreements oignt.1 by the United
;; tatect." The ";state Department trtatemcnL on Dion," Mayevrkiy
added, in "noth..ng r_.lnc but an effort, to juntii'y brigandage"
and mines the quenLton: "What tire utgnaturca under
International documents really worth7"
KOSYGIN'S ME=ETING According to Ettdlo Moncow, Premier
WITH LE THANH NGHI Kocygin "received" PI01 Politburo member
and Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi on
10 February -nd had "n cordial and comradely talk" with ':rim.
The radio added that Le Thanh Nghi "spoke of the aggravation
of the situation In Indochina, emphasizing the dangerous
nature of the actions u ti.". imperialism directed at
broadening the aggression in Lars and Cambodia anu at organizing
new provocations against the DRV."
In language more restrained than his remarks on Laos on 1 and 2
February, Konygin, the radio said, "condemned the intrusion
of AA:ericnn-Saigon troops into Laos, their outrages in Cambodia,
and the constant violation of DRV territory." The radio's
account cited no direct response by Konygin to Lc Thar,h Nghi's
charge that the United States is organizing "new provocations"
against the DRV. The Soviet Premier putted that the govern-
ment of the USSI? "resolutely condemns the aggrcusive actions
of the United Staten in Indochina," the broadcast said, and
"once again confirmed the determination of the Soviet Union to
afford all-aided support to the DRV in repelling imperialist
aggression and in building socialism." As usual, there was no
elaboration on the form this "all-aided support" would take.
TASS reported the day before that Le Thanh Nghi, "who stopped
over In ,'?:osccw," met with Deputy Premier Novikov on the 9th
for a "friendly talk." On the came day, it added, the two
deputy premiers signed an agreement on "the Soviet Union's
additional technical assistance to the DRV."
During a January-February tour of Soviet bloc countries, the DRS'
official was reported by bloc media to have signed agreements
with Hungary, Poland, and East Germany. The last monitored
report of Le Thanh Nghi's whereabouts prior to the 9 Febrssry
TASS report on Mn presence in Moscow was a 4 February Radio
Sofia item saying that he had "left" the country following a
"vacation." The report did not indicate his destination.
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CONIC II)l;r;'i'Lni, Flit:; '1'1ir;tIU;1
to ii:i ii11ANY 19'(1
TASS ON P(tC
STATLMLNT
On r) F'hruttry IWIL rrhoncxd the HiC Foreign
Mintutry t; t.atetncnt, t;ttppor 1,1ng Lhr_ 1110.1lcL !,Ito
t;tatenicnt crf thr, ht.h, including the i;htneue
1'1''(I Jf' (.0 give "curry ifonu lb 1c' rtun i uttut''e and support" to the
Incloch mere pcoir Ica , But, did not, rnent.ion the Cn [nose
chrtrgcu that, Lhc 11nIL''d 'It,rtt,r'ti In ''plot,Ling Lo l.nunch it sudden
att'ri.'k on t,hr_ DIN" and that t,hr Lttcrt ttu; hicurolon lo "it grave
provocit ion not only ngaint;t Lhc, three peoples; of* Indochina
but agalrtnt, the Chincue pnol;le and the people of the whole world
rt;: well.." Moscow hnn report.cd Chincr,e nLnLcin^nt,o on Vietnam in
the prw I : 'CID, ; 1.n Eng I I uh and Nun,; I an rr.porled thr! l3 December
ChInr:tr ritatcmr,nt. on the 10 December DIN ,Joint party-government
appeal.
Mot;c,ow' n publicity for the PH C u tatcrncnL accord;) with the Soviet
proprrgtuida appeal for the Chlne~;c to join In the "ant. i.-imperialiut"
movement,. But while. thus seeking to denont;trace Soviet concern
for unity in IL:. propttgandrt for general conatunption, Moscow hats
continued in its brondctuntu to the PiiC to rLccusc the Chineuc of
t;,tbotrip, frig united action and pinyirg into the hands of the ilnitr'd
:talc: on Indochina. A 9 February brow [cast to the Chinese
charged, for exrunplc, that while t.hc tmttied States is eucalrtting
the war in c.:`)at area and "cannons are thundering and bombs are
dropping, ncrtr the I'ItC frontier," the Chinese leadership is
limiting 1t; rct.ponuc to "verbal" assault., on imperiuli sm and
Is committed to a policy of "doing nothing in particular" in
Indochina. China's "commitment to nonintervention in Vietnam,"
the broadcast added, ha:; encouraged "U.S. militarists to think
that they will not be punished for their currently escalating
rtggrc:.sion in Indochina."
rdo: cow ha:. ignored State Department press spokesman McClo.3kcy'c
8 February remark:; that the action in Laos would pose no threat
to th ? Soviet "nion or the PliC and that it remains U.S. policy
to improve relat ion:; with both countries.
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CONFIDENTIAL F1310 '1'HI NDf
10 FT:I3RUAIiY 1971
DRV SCORES U.S. STRIKES IN DMZ, QUANG BINH, LISTS "WAR CRIMES"
A aeries of DF(V Foreign Ministry upokcuman'u statements issued
on 5, 6, and 9 I?ebrua.ry "sternly condemn" alleged U. 3. bombings
against the demilitari:cd zone (DMZ) and Quang Binh Province,
an usual terming them "acts of war."
The protest on the 5th "sternly denounced" what it called "fresh
bombings of ttrcars in the northern part of the DMZ." It claimed
that on 31 January and 1 and .3 February, the United States
"again sent many aircraft, Including 13-52's, to drop many
demolition and steel pellet bombs or. Huong Lap village" and that
"at the Diane time, U.S. artillery from south of the DMZ fired
on Vlnh Son v:.llage," both of which "lie north of the 17th
parallel in the DMZ belonging to DRV territory."
The same ttirgets--Iluong Lap and Vinh Son villages--are listed
In the protect of the 6th, while that of the 9th protests
alleged bombings against only Huong Lap. Both protests echo
the spokesman on the 5th in charging that B-52'u and artillery
were used against the targets--on the 4th, according to the
statement of the 6th, and successively from 5-7 February,
according to the one on the 9th.
The foreign ministry spokesman on 6 February makes the additional
charge that on 4 February U.S. planes "fired rockets at an area
in Quang Dinh Province" and says the Vietamese armed forces and
people are "determined to appropriately punish" all U.S. encroach-
ments and "war acts" against the DRV--a warning perhaps directed
rt the admitted U.S. action above the DMZ.?
WAR CRIMES VNA on 9 February releases a DRV War Crimes
COMMUNIQUE Commission communique on alleged U.S. war crimes
in both North and South Vietnam during January,
calling them evidence of U.S. preparations for "new military
ac,venturea to intensify and expand the war to the whole of
Indochina." In addition to routine charges of U.S. crimes in
South Vietnam, the communique says that "using South Vietnam
0 The U.S. Command announced in Saigon on 5 February that a
U.S. F-105 fighter-bomber on the 4th fired two Shrike missiles
at a North Vietnamese antiaircraft installation about 30 miiee
north of the DMZ. The strikes were described ae "protective
reaction."
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10 FEI)ItUAHY 1971
an it springboard," the United Stat.eu "threw tens of thousands
of puppet troops" In coordination with U.S. forces against;
Ctunbodia and Dion In late Jtututtry and early February.
In the context of crimes agalant North Vietnam, the communique
c itcn as fu.trt}'er documentation of the U.S. atLitudc Secretary
Hogern' 29 January remark that the United States "would use
its air power without restriction at any place In Indochina."
Charging that the Nixon Administration continued to "encroach
on the DHV'u sovereignty and security," the communique asserts
that the United States also "went on with its bellicose and
saucy threats" against the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian
peoples. It routinely enumerates U.S. reconnaissance actions
over the North its well as alleged air strikes in the DMZ and
northern provinces as ^rimeu against the DRV.
The VIM and LPA accounts of the communist delegates' statements
at the 10lst session of the Paris talks on 1 February--drastically
truncated in comparison to the actual texts--obscure their
detailed discussion of the developing Laos situation and of the
"escalation" in Cambodia. This treatment is in keeping with the
frequently abbreviated reports of the delegates' statements,
and thus would not appear to be of undue significance. The
statements themselves were in line with Vietnamese communist
propaganda on Laos at the time of the session.
Thus the VNA and LPA accounts of the session suggest that PRG
delegate brae. Nguyen. Thi Binh concentrated on scoring the
President's Vietnamization program and on vilifying the GVN
for helping to carry it out. Neither account notes her
detailed presentation of charges against the United States
in Cambodia and 1-os.
Similarly, the VNA account ignores DRV delegate Xuan Thuy's
specific charges against the United States with respect to
Cambodia and Laos. It does report that Thuy, "after recalling
the latest. U.S. acts aimed at prolonging and expanding thr, war
in Cambodia and loos," charged that the Nixon doctrine--tu
which Thuy devoted half his statement--"has now been laid bare
as one aimed at making aggression with new methods, using Asians
to fight Asians, under U.S. command, with U.S. material supplies,
air and naval support, not excluding the support of U.S. ground
forces."
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CONFIDE NTIAL F131S 'L'NI'ND3
10 11?I3UUABY 1971
The UUNA account does note that In their additional remarks,
Mme. Binh and Xuan Thuy "laid bare the tortuous contentions
of the United Stateo runt Ito puppets and sternly condemned tho
la'.tcr'u aggression In Laorr and war expansion and intensification
throughout Indochina."
The VNA account notes the buildup of allied forces in the
northern part of South Vietnam in charging that U.S. Ambassador
Bruce "tried to distort the grave situation caused by the
United States In Laos In an attempt to cover up the concentration
of tens of thousands of U.S. and Saigon troops along the
Victnamesc-Lao border in preparation for an aggression against
Laoo."
VNA also carefully records the fact that both communist
delegates in standard terms called for the Nixon Administration
to engage seriously in the Paris talks.
POW SSSUE VNA says that at the session the "delegate of the
Thicu-Ky-Khicm clique merely repeated old
contentions about the so-called 'cease-fire' and 'prisoners of
war' questions." Thus it given no indication that GVN delegate
Lam put on the Paris record the proposal by GVN Foreign Minister
Lam that the GVN ai:j. North Vietnam inwiediately release all sick
and wounded prisoners of war, including American airmen held
in the North. The proposal was made on 26 January at a press
conference following the 24 January GVN release of 37 disabled
North Vietnamese prisoners.* (The VNA account of the 94th
session on 10 December similarly had given no indication of the
nature of the allied proposal for the immediate release of all
North Vietnamese prisoners held in the South in exchange for
GVN, U.S., and other allied prisoners.)
The VNA account made no reference at all to the fact that
Ambassador Bruce also raised the POW issue, challenging the
communists to fulfill their obligations to sick and wounded
prisoners or face continued condemnation.
See the TRENDS of 27 January, pe:ges 11-12.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONF'IDF NT.AL FBI0 TflF;NDS
10 FEBRUARY 1971
HANOI. PEKING BELATEDLY REPORT SIHIANOUK VISIT TO DRV
Hanoi on 9 February provide the first public confirmation of a
two-week Sihanouk visit to North Vietnam.* VNA announced that
he arrived in Hanoi or. 26 January for a "friendly visit" at the
invitation of DRV President Ton Due Tang. According to VNA,
Sihanouk was welcomed by Tang, Le Dunn, Truong Chinh, Pham Van
Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and other DRV leaders. Another VI4A report
noted that Sihanouk held "many talks and exchanges of viewpoints"
with President Tang and "other state leaders." The exchanges
were held, according to VNA, in an "atmosphere full of militant
solidarity, fraternal friendship, and complete mutual confidence"
and the two older "achieved a unanimity of views on all problems
raised."
An NCNA report datelined 9 February announced Sihanouk's return
to the Chinese capital that day. Among the Chinese leaders
greeting him at the airport were Chou En-lai, Chief of Staff
Huang Yung-oheng, Vice Premier Li Hnien-nien, and Deputy Chief
of Staff Wu Fa-hsicn.
? Sihanouk's last visit to the DRV, from 25 May to 8 June 1970,
was discussed in the 10 June 1970 TRENDS, pages 7 and 8.
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CONFIDENTIAL 101310 TRENDS
10 FEBRUARY 3971
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW WELCOMES UAR CEASE-FIRE EXTENSION, SUEZ PROPOSAL
In a low volume of comment on UAR President an-Sadatla
4 February speech to the National Assembly, Moscow welcomes
Cairo's "peaceful initiative" in extending the cease-fire for
another 30 days, until 7 March, and in proposing a "partial"
?:thdrawal of Israeli forces from the east bank of the Suez
Canal and UAR preparations to reopen the canal for inter-
national navigation. Noting favorable European reaction and
"pessimistic" U.S. press comment, Moscow says the world has
the right to expect a favorable reply from Israel, and it again
complains that Tel Aviv refuses to discuss the essential
questions of withdrawal and recognition of Palestinian rights.
Prime Minister Golder Meir'u remarks in a recent NBC interview
are construed as a rejection of the Suez proposal, Israel
refusing "to undertake even a partial troop withdrawal" from
the canal. In terse acknowledgment of Mrs. Meir's 9 February
speech to the Knesset, TASS that day says Israel has declined
the UAR "peace initiative" and reports only--citing UPI--that
Mrs. Meir said the UAR proposal is unacceptable to Israel.
CEASE-FIRE The brief `PASS account of as-Sadat's speech
EXTENSION noted that the UAR decided to "refrain from
resumption of fire" for another 30 days in
response to appeals by U Thant and the world public; it did
not mention his request that U Thant make a progress report
to the Security Council before the expiration of this period.
PRAVDA'a Belyayev, participating in the 7 February domestic
service commentators' roundtable, said the agreement on
extension was explained by as-Sadat as a response to approaches
by U Thant "and other member countries of the Security Council."
Panelist Kud.ryavtsev, underlining the difference between a
cease-fire and peace, commented that there is great danger in
the "very indefiniteness" of the situation. Pointing up the
propaganda theme that Middle East tension impedes the Arabs'
peaceful development, and in effect linking this to the Suez
proposal, he added that "such an indeterminate state of affairs
paralyzes the possibility of settling a number of vital
questions" for the Arab countries, such as the problem of
rebuilding Egyptian towns on the canal.
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10 FEBRUARY 1971
PROPOSAL Commentators hail as-S adat's proposal for a
ON SUEZ "partial" Israeli withdrawal--not further
clarified--and preparations to reopen the canal
as a "new real opportunity" for achieving a political settle-
ment and a "concrete and realistic initiative."* Where
as-Sadat called such a withdrawal a "first stage of a timetable
that will be prepared later" to implement other provisions of
Security Council Resolution 242, TASS' account of the speech on
the 4th said only that the UAR would regard this as a first step
toward implementation of the resolution. Moscow's only recent
reference to a timetable appeared in a 4 February domestic
service commentary by Ryzhikov which cited Israeli leaders as
saying they are ready to fight rather than to fulfill Resolution
242, "or at least to set forth a timetable for the withdrawal
of Israeli troops" from all occupied territories.
Soviet propagandists employ the standard line that only the
oil companies and large shipowners benefit from the canal's
closure, while many European and Asian countries have sustained
losses. In a domestic service commentary on the 8th, Kudryavtsev
called reopening of the canal "one of the mc,3t urgent problems"
of international navigation and trade cr.;rununications and said it
would help improve the political atmoE,phere in the Middle East
as well as answer the interests of many European and Asian
countries. Perhaps presaging as-Sadat's Suez proposal, ASU
Secretary General an-Nur had been reported by TASS on the 3d
as declaring in a Cairo television program that the interests
of the Common Market countries and Britain were closely related
to the normal functioning of the Suez Canal, which in turn "is
linked with the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli
aggression." (The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report of an-Nur's
interview failed to include these remarks on Suez.)
Moscow has not touched on the question of Israeli use of the
Suez Canal, referring only to restoration of "normal inter-
national" navigation. However, PRAVDA's Belyayev, in the
commentators' roundtable on the 7th, observed that the Arab
capitals are talking of the need for a just solution of the
Palestinian refugee problem and of "freedom of navigation in
the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal." This remark also
provides the only current propaganda suggestion of a linkage
between the refugee and navigation issues; in INTERNATIONAL
* Moscow never acknowledged Western and Israeli press reports
over the last few months of various suggestions, attributed to
Israeli Defense Minister Dayan, regarding demilitarization or
mutual thinning out of troops on both sides of the canal.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS T LENDS
10 FEBRUARY 1972,
AFFAIRS articles in September 1969 and October 1968 Belyayev
had supported Cairo's proposition that passage of Israeli
ships through the canal should be dependent on settlement of
the refugee question. (According to U.S. press reports--but
not Cairo radio's 9 February account--an Egyptian official
spokesman reaffirmed this position, declaring that passage of
Israel!.. ships through the canal is included in the Security
Council resolution but the refugee problem must be solved first.)
PRAVDA COMPLAINS OF U,S1 ATTITUDE IN BIG FOUR TALKS
Moscow thus far has not acknowledged the 5 February State
Department announcement that the United States has informed the
USSR, Britain, and France of its readiness to open preliminary
discussion on Big Four guarantees of a Middle East peace settle-
ment at the four-power session on 12 February. While the Soviet
proposals on a settlement--last set forth in the 15 October
PRAVDA by Primakov- -call for Big Four or Security Council
guarantees, this aspect has been given little attention in
routine propaganda. TASS on 1 February did report Averell
Harriman as saying, in a speech in Florida, that his recent
trip to Moscow convinced him "that the Soviet Union 'stands
ready to join in effective four-power guarantees"' for a peaceful
settlement.
PRAVDA on 10 February does, however, offer an unusual discussion
of the Big Four role and berate the United States for its
position in the four-power consultation, apparently without
mentioning the U.S. proposal. TASS generally reports briefly
on Big Four sessions, but only infrequently in the past several
months has Moscow touched on a four-power role in a settlement:
Kudryavtsev in August, for example, called on the four to promote
a settlement and said Jarring's mission should be given a
"practical program of action," and Gromyko in his 21 October
UNGA address, after referring to the Jarring mission, said the
four powers must contribute to a settlement.
Now 1RAVDA's New York correspondent Kolesnichenko, as reported
by TA:;S on the 10th, says that "UN informed circles" point out
that the United States refuses to discuss "substantial questions"
of a political settlement in the Big Four sessions. Noting that
the American press says the United States is making efforts
through "so-called 'quiet diplomacy'" to eliminate the crisis,
Kolesnichenko charges that Washington is actually blocking the
work of the Big Four and would like to doom the consultations
to failure. In view of the cease-fire extension and the "new
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 FEBRUARY 1971.
emerging situation," giving the United States a "real possi-
bility" to display quiet diplomacy, Kolesnichenko says it
should be expected that the Americans would not oppose
"adoption of coordinated decisions" aimed at securing the
earliest political settlement. He particularly complains
that at the four-power meeting on 4 February the U.S.
representative opposed the opinion of the other three, and
turned down Soviet and French proposals, on a coordinated
statement stressing the need for full implementation of
Resolution 242 and particularly the need for Israeli withdrawal..
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C0NFIDEMT'IAL FBIS 'T'RENDS
10 FEBRUARY 1971
PRAVDA RAISES SUBSTANTIVE SALT ISSUE; IZVESTIYA ATTACKS SMITH
A 3 February article in P?iAVDA by V. Shestov departed from
Moscow's past propaganda practice by discussing, and so identifying,
a substantive question at issue In the Strategic Arms Limitation
'T'alks (SALT). The article denounced the position--ascribed to
"the U.S. press" and said to reflect the interests of "the
American militarists"--that the negotiations "should not affect"
U.S. forward bases. Three days later, a dispatch in IZVESTIYA
by the paper's Washington correspondent broke another Soviet
propaganda practice by criticizing U.S. delegation head Gerard
Smith. The brief dispatch, directly responsive to U.S. press
reports of Smith's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on 3 February, broached another contentious issue in
remarking on Smith's reportedly "negetive" approach to the
"practical" idea of confining an agreement to the limitation
of ABM systems.
PRAVDA Signed by V. Shestov, the author of past Soviet
ARTICLE comment on disarmament and military strategic issues,*
the PRAVDA article directed its fire at "forces . . .
firmly entrenched on the banks of the Potomac" who are interested
in "casting aspersions" on SALT and "fanning distrust toward the
position of the Soviet Union." In this context Shestov complained
that the U.S. press "is practically breaking its back trying to
prove that the negotiations allegedly should not affect the
American nuclear means that have been brought near the Soviet
borders and the borders of other socialist countries"--an effort
reflecting the desir%: of "American militarists" to gain "one-
sided advantages" it the talks. Soviet media had not reported
Defense Minister Grechko's remark a week earlier during a visit
to Finland, cited in the Western press. that SALT had been unpro-
duct~ve because the negotiations "were not based on a desire for
equal rights."
* An article by Shestov in the June 1969 issue of INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS contained Soviet media's first substantive discussion of
U.S. development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles
(MIRV) and the implications for U.S.-Soviet relations. See the
FBIS SURVEY of 19 June 1969, pages 1-2.
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CON 1,11I)E'N'!'IAL, 1'131::;
10 F'1s13NUARY .19'(1.
Elaborating on the charge that t,h.! United SttLteu wan ueekintf,
one-sided advantagcu, Uhentov cited In pitrtlcvl.n.r the Irrcreuue
In military expenditures for further depioyrncrrt, of the Safeguard
ABM system, the accelerated equipping of ICBM' o with "multiple
warhead MIRV charges," the rnodernizing of U.S. military bases
worldwide, and the utrezgthening of the U.S. navy. Arguing that
"a mutually acceptable agreement on the limitation or offensive
strategic armament can be reached only on the basis of observing
the principle of security for both sides and ruling out one-sided
military advantages," he declared that the U.S. "line of intensi-
fying military preparations" is "incompatible with a constructive
approach to SALT,"*
Concluding with a recollection of Kosygin's year-end statement to
ASAHI on Soviet interest in achieving a "reasonable agreement in
the sphere of limiting strategic armaments," Shestov returned -uo
the equal-security theme: "Realistic measures aimed at limiting
armament and aimed at disarmament , . . can be implemented only by
observing the conditions of equal security for all countries," he
said, and the proponents of such it "sober approach" could count on
the unswerving efforts of the Soviet Union.
IZVESTIYA The IZVESTIYA dispatch of 6 February by the paper's
ON SMITH Washington correc;pondent, Yuriy Barsukov, cited U.S.
press reports as saying Ambassador Smith sought in
his closed-door testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the 3d to "prove why the United States should not
conclude; as a separate initial measure, an agreement on limitation
of defensive types of strategic armaments." Calling this a "strange"
stand, Barsukov said that, tnere was in fact "much interest" in such
an agreement among U.S. political. and scientific circles and that
the Senators who heard Smith's testimony were "puzzled at his
'extremely negative' approach to such a practical step."
Barsukov remarked on the "rather peculiar situation" in which
chief negotiator Smith, the person "authorized to carry out talks"
and "to search ways toward agreement on limitation of defensive
and offensive strategic armaments,'' should be attempting to
* The last major Soviet press comment on SALT, a PRAVDA Observer
u.rticle on 7 March 1970, had sharply attacked Secretary Laird for
urging the buildup of strategic arms systems, including Safeguard,
but did not charge in so many words that Laird's stand was incon-
sistent t:J.th efforts to reach an agreement at SALT. Observer sim-
ply asked whether "fueces" that did not want an agreement on
strategic arms limitation were not influencing Laird's position
and added that this question was being asked increasingly in the
U.S. press.
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C'0111`1 1431'1'IA1, l ltl;; 'I'1li?:1IDtt
10 I- I?:IU UAil Y I'x71
"dl I1r:Ur1(le fltor'll from t' r1 oull coda 1 (1l'r'tlt, i cm" of t- }irupiifi }
which would Cu) ,j1111t. t,hrlt,.
0111B COf*CN'r Other, rnorr rout } nr :;ov i rt prupngn.nda 111111
C,111Uwcrd 111, un nomr grtlcrnI thrmrrl thr
I'ItAVDA article but him not. brought up thr forward baths Irnur
again or echoed Ilaruukuv'n orit tcrtl rrmr:rkr, on Amtt-nnador
Smith .
A foreign-l.cutput-F,r t.&:Ik over }hullo MuncUw on 6 Frbrwlry po}ntr(:
to "attempts of U.S. diplomacy to gain c,trr-sided ltdvrurtagen"
and remarked that t.hir, could not '' fact 11 tats the success" or
SALT, but u tatcd that the Soviet, de tegat. Lori was gu } dr 1 by a
desire to reach 1111 agreement. and that. "the fact, that the tn1kn
are In progreurl is itself it positive phenottierson."
Some comment on President Nixon's proposed budget him brought
up SALT. '1'huu a 29 January TAS:; report, null the 1'rer,iderlt'n
budget message "makes It clear that the United States Intends
to act, as before, from 'positions of strength' In nettiinF
major international ir.acr," and that "after stating the U.S.
desire to continue" SALT, the President "streuned at the ruune
time that the United States' main tusk is to strengthen the
rocket-nuclear forces." The message, 'L'ASS ridded without ela-
boration, put "a strong emphasis" on "the development of new
types of weaprr'ns. "
In the 7 February :lomcatic service commentators' rourultablc
program, IZVESTIYA observer Matvcycv remarked that it was
"pertinent to ask what effect" the proposed budget would have
on the strategic urnw limitation talks. He went on to recall
Brezhnev's statement in Kharkov on 111 April 1970 that "to any
attempts by anyone to gain military superiority over the Soviet
Union, we will reply with whatever increase of military might
is necessary to guarantee our defense. We cannot do otherwise."
Matveyev did not pursue the question of the Impact on SALT.
TASS on 28 January transmitted in English a report of a New
York DAILY WORLD article on alleged Defense Department efforts
to expand from a four-site to a 12-site missile defense system--
the "larger goal," the paper was quoted as saying, being prepara-
tion of "an anti-Soviet missile offensive for the destruction of
socialism." The TASS Russian service did not carry this item,
however, and it has not appeared in monitored Soviet radio
broadcasts.
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SPACE F L I C H T S
lpi:t 'i~?1:~t',
1 rJ 1.1.11''t'A1''f 1971
SOViLT ; STTtI S S APOLLO DIFFICULTIES, HAIL LLRLA Nil) VI1NUS MISSIONS
)/int. rnynrgf.r ' t' tlir '1 ?1 imnry '~ 1'nl,iligry rl iFht, c?r Al'' 11,) 11,
lln