TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 3, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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7
Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~
Confidential
3 FEBRUARY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 5)
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(')NF'II)ENTIA1,
This propaganda analysis report, is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast. and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
E.cluded from automatic
L do..ngroding and
dedenifcation
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C NFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
DRV Protests U.S. Air Role, Scores Rumored "Invasion" of Laos . . 1
PRG Foreign Ministry Condemns "Escalation" of Laos War . . . . . 4
Pathet Lao Assails "Aggression," Appeals to Geneva Co-Chairmen 5
Kosygin. TJ&SS Charge U.S. Escalation, Intrusion into Laos . . . . 8
DRV, Fro.1t Decry U.S. Statements on Involvement in Cambodia . . . 10
DRV Protests U.S. Bombing in Demilitarized Zone, Quang Binh . . . 11
Front Says Allies Violate Tet Truce, Scores U Minh Operations ? . 11
North Vietnamese Leaders Make Annual Tet Visits . . . . . . . 12
PRC Cites Swedish Press on Possible U.S. Use of A-Weapons 13
MIDDLE EAST
Kosygin Sees Resolution 242 as "Realistic" Way to Peace . . . . . 14
USSR Praises UAR's Efforts for Peace, Reticent on Cease-Fire . . 16
Syrians Have "Fruitful Exchange of Opinions" in Moscow . . . . . 18
GDR Denounces, USSR Questions FRG Activities in West Berlin . . . 20
Pattern Begins to merge in Bahr-Kohl Discussions . . . . . . . . 23
Moscow Scores "Lies" About Plan to Invade Poland . . . . . . . . . 25
Czechoslovakia, Hungary Lead Comment on Polish Events . . . . . . 26
Warsaw Media Publicize Katowice Paper's Attack on Gomulka . . . . 31
TAIWAN
NCNA Carries Accounts of Resistance to "U.S.-Chiang" Rule . . . . 33
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Chekiang Province Forms Party Committee, Eighth in Nation . . . . 35
Leadership Problems Persist Despite Party Committee Resurgence . 36
Regime Suspends Publication of Stalin-Era History . . . . . . . . 38
KOMMUNIST Article Urges Strong Leader for Collective . . . . . . 40
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Moscow (3788 items)
Peking (2731 items)
Czechoslovakia (4%)
9%
Domestic Issues
(29%)
45%
[Leaders in USSR (--)
6%]
Indochina
(34%)
22%
China
(4%)
5%
[PRC Foreign
Indochina
(7%)
6%
Ministry State-
Venus 7
(--)
5%
ment, 25 Jan.
Indian Independence
(--)
3%
UAR Delegation in
(--)
8%
Anniversary
PRC
Venezuelan CP (--)
3%
DPRK Airman in ROK
(--)
4%
Congress
Latin American
(8%)
3%
Angela Davis Case (1%)
U.S. "Zionist" Anti- (4%)
3%
2%
Territorial Waters
Soviet Activities
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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INDOCHINA
The third official Hanoi protest in three weeks over "escalation"
of the war in Indochina comes in a 1 February DRV Foreign Ministry
statement protesting "unrestricted" use of U.S. air power through-
out the area and observing that "since 30 January the United
States has begun a new, extremely barbarous bombing campaign
against southern Laos." Although the statement is pegged to
Secretary Rogers' press conference of the 29th, it does not
acknowledge that reporters pressed him regarding the possibility
of imminent South Vietnamese ground action in Lars.
Speculation about ground action is noted in Hanoi comment be{'ore
and after the DRV statement, however, and in a PRG Foreign
Ministry statement of 2 February. The PRG statement cites press
reports that the ARVN, with U.S. air support, "may soon launch
an attack against communist supply routes in southern Laos" and
says that "U.S. officials have not ruled out the possibility of
a military operation similar to the one launched by the Americans
in Cambodia last summer."
The Pathet Lao also currently releases a flurry of official
statements protesting "escalation" of action against Laos,
including two messages to the Geneva conference co-chairmen
appealing for measures to stop the "aggressors." Radio comment
on 3 February cites Western news agencies for the assertion that
the Nixon Administration "has not yet revealed" that it is "send-
ing Saigon puppet troops commanded by U.S. military advisers'' to
prepare for large-scale military action in the Laotian liberated
zone.
The first high-level Soviet reaction to the increased U.S.
support role in Cambodia and to the reports of South Vietnamese
ground action in Laos comes in speeches by Premier Kosygin on
occasions honoring a visiting Syrian delegation. On 1 February
Kosygin declared that "an outrageous invasion of the southern
provinces of Laos is under way." On the 2d, according to TASS,
he said that "news reports coming in today show that the South
Vietnamese puppets, on orders and with the support of their
American masters, b=read the military actions in southern Laos."
There has been no high-level Peking comment on Indochina since
the PRC Foreign Ministry statement of the 25th. Peking has taken
note of the rumored ground move into Laos, however, by publicizing
a 1 February NHAN DAN editorial.
DRV PROTESTS U,S1 AIR ROLE. SCORES RUMORED "INVASION" OF LAOS
While Hanoi radio and press comment beginning on 31 January began
citing Western press speculation on an imminent ARVN ground
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invasion of Laos, the DRV Foreign Ministry statement on 1 February
focuses instead on "unrestricted" use of U.S. air power throughout
Indochina. If the pattern on Cambodia is followed, however, Hanoi
in be expected to issue a separate official protest on action in
Laos.
The foreign ministry statement begins with the complaint that
Secretary Rogers said in his press conference on the 29th that
the United States was prepared to use its air power to the
fullest extent whether in South or North Vietnam, Laos, or
Cambodia to protect the lives of American soldiers in South
Vietnam. ThL statement says the United States is repeating
the "deceitful allegation" about protecting U.S. lives
"to prepare for new U.S. military adventures," and recalls
that this was the allegation used when it sent troops to Cambodia
and bombed "populated areas" in the DRV. I. goes on to reiterate
the standard line that if truly concerned about the lives of
Americans, the Nixon Administration would not have rejected the
PRG 17 September proposal,, which, it says, was designed to allow
U.S. withdrawal "with honor and real safety." In documenting
its charge of expanded air action, the statement leads off with
the assertion that "the United States has increased its aircraft
carriers in the Tonkin Gulf, and since 20 January has conducted
a new and very savage bombing drive in lower Laos."
On the 31st--almost exactly 24 hours before the foreign ministry
statement was released--a Hanoi radio commentary in the domestic
service first acknowledged Secretary Rogers' press conference
remarks, in Hanoi's words, "dealing with the possibility of using
U.S. air power to support the Saigon puppet troops in expanding
the war of aggression to Laotian territory." It also cites AP
as reporting on the 30th that "an armada of 400 U.S. combat
planes, including B-52's, had fiercely attacked an area in
* On 19 January there was a DRV Foreign Ministry statement
which protested "intensification" of aggression throughout
Indochina, leading off with Cambodia. This was followed by a
DRV Government statement on the 24th protesting the increased
and more active U.S. role in Cambodia. The last DRV Foreign
Ministry statement on Laos was that on 11 December which
protested B-52 and other a;r strikes and the introduction of
Cambodian and Thai forces, and charged that the United States
"is relentlessly preparing for Saigon troops to carry out joint
operations into Laos."
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southern Laos." Condemning intensified U.S. air strikes
against Laos, the dispat,h of Thai mercenaries, and "incursions"
by ARVN troops, the commentary says that the U.S. imperialists'
"new, extremely serious act of war" in Laos `'....unasks Rogers'
recent deceitful allegations that the United States does not
want to escalate the war and will not let itself become bogged
down in a land war in Cambodia or Laos."
The commentary predicts strong opposition from world and U.S.
public opinion to "the U.S, rulers' plot to send Saigon puppet
infantrymen to attack Laos," Just as there has been to "the
Nixon Administration's expansion of its strikes against the
DRY and to its military activities in Cambodia."
A NHAN DAN commentary carried by VNA and broadcast by Hanoi
radio earlier in the day on the 31st speaks more cryptically
of possible ground action in Laos; it says that "Rogers spoke
of the possibility of using the U.S. Air Force in support of
South Vietnamese puppet troops' operations in Laos, but he
said that the United States was unwilling to escalate the
war and let itself be involved in a ground war in Cambodia
or Laos." NHAN DAN precedes this with a passage that
indirectly broaches the Secretary's expressions of concern
regarding Vietnamese communist supplies being built up in
the panhandle area of Laos. According to VNA, NHAN DAN
reported Rogers as saying that "the United States would
use full-scale air power everywhere in Indochina when
necessary in order to check the enemy rebuilding of bases
and safe shelters to threaten U.S. forces in South Vietnam."
A NHAN DAN editorial on 1 February, as reviewed by VNA, -n
the course of detailing escalation in Laos cites Ri''TTER',
as reporting on the 30th that "a drive against communist
supply areas in southern Laos may soon be launched by South
Vietnamese ground forces backed by American air power" and
that "officers also refused to rule out the possibility of
an early expedition similar to the U.S. incursion against
communist oc,rder sanctuaries in Cambodia last summer."
Hanoi radio broadcasts a virtually identical version but in
the last sentence deletes the phrase "against communist
border sanctuaries." A Hanoi radio broadcast the day before
also in citing Western press reports referred to the
possibility of a military action in Laos "similar" to the
operation in the Cambodian border area last summer but said
nothing about "communist sanctuaries."
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DRV media on the 2d carry the statement by the spokesman of
the delegation at the Paris conference, issued on the 1st,
which echoed the foreign ministry statement in scoring stepped-
up bombing in Laos. However, the spokesman went beyond the
statement in citing press reports that "the Nixon Administration
may be making feverish preparations for a large-scale offensive
against lower Laos by Saigon puppet troops- transported and
supported by U.S. aircraft." A Hanoi broadcast to South Vietnam
on the 3d says it is clear that it is the U.S. "aggressors" who
have planned such a venture, "although to date the Nixon
Administration has said nothing about the sending of Saigon
puppet troops and U.S. troops to harass the liberated area in
lower Laos."
RGNU STATEMENT VNA on 3 February carried the text of a
statement on Indochina issued that day by a
spokesman of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) which also, unlike
the DRV Foreign Ministry statement, refers directly to the
possibility of an invasion of Laos. It charges that "the
Nixon Administration now is deploying important air and ground
forces of the United States and its puppets to laun:h new
large-scale attacks against lower Laos." Raising the spectre
of a threat to the DRV, the statement adds that "alongside its
continuing air raids, the Nixon Administration is preparing
for new criminal adventures against the DRV."
The RGNU statement echoes the DRV Foreign Ministry statement
in deploring Secretary Rogers' 29 January remark on the use
of U.S. air power anywhere in Indochina to protect American
forces in South Vietnam.
PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY CONDEMNS "ESCALATION" OF LAOS WAR
The DRV Foreign Ministry statement's failure to discuss
rumored ground action against Laos is pointed up also by the
2 February PRG Foreign Ministry statement, which cites recent
press speculation and goes so far as to say that "U.S.
officials have not ruled out the possibility of a military
operation similar to the one launched by the Americans in
Cambodia last summer." The PRG statement begins by denouncing
what it calls U.S. attempts to "escalate the special war in
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Laos" for the past several months--the bringing in of more Thai
regular units and conduct of unprecedented air strikes, including
the use of B-521s.*
The statement routinely charges that the Nixon Administration
hopes by new "military adventures" to extricate itself from its
"critical situation." The PRG Foreign Ministry expresses
support for the Pathet Lao statement of 1 February denouncing
U.S. "escalation," and it pledges loyalty to the unity call
in the joint statement of the Indochinese people's summit
conference last April.
On 30 January, the day before the release of the PRG Foreign
Ministry statement, Front propaganda had charged that the
United States was preparing to send South Vietnamese troops
into southern Laos. A Liberation Radio commentary, for example,
cited several Western news reports of evidence of an imminent
attack--including the heavy air strikes in Laos and northern
Quang Tri and the positioning of aircraft carriers in the
Gulf of Tonkin--aid added that "the situation became more
serious when REUTERS reported that the South Vietnamese infantry-
men . . . supported by the U.S. air force were likely to launch
an offensive in southern Laos." The radio charged that Saigon
troops "are now about to rush in to massacre the Laotian people"
and, scoring U.S. actions throughout Indochina, declared that
the United States' "new military adventures designed to expand
the war throughout Indochina" will be countered.
PATHET LAO ASSAILS "AGGRESSION." APPEALS TO GENEVA CO-CHAIRMEN
The Pathet Lao currently issues a series of official statements
capped by a 1 February message informing the two Geneva Conference
co-chairmen of "the present extremely urgent and dangerous
situation in Laos" and requesting that they take "effective
measures" to deal with it. The message reports that Secretary
Rogers' at his 29 January press conference did not rule out the
* A PRG Foreign Ministry statement on 1 November 1970 protested
intensified B-52 bombing in Laos, charging that this was linked
with "maneuvers to send Thai and Saigon puppet troops to invade
Laos." A 19 November DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement
on B-52 strikes did not mention such an invasion plan.
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possibility of using U.S. air power to back South Vietnamese
ground forces' activities in Laos, and it calls attention
to the alleged massing of "tens of thousands of U.S. troops
and Saigon puppet soldiers" along the South Vietnam-Laos
border "ready to enter and attack Laos." The message
goes on to charge that there is in preparation a "new
step of war escalation" with the "massive participation
of U.S. air forces, Saigon puppet troops, and elements of
the Thai army, not exluding part of the U.S. army."
This message is similar to a Central Committee "statement"
which VNA carried on 1 February, stating that it had been
"broadcast over Pathet Lao radio and monitored" in Hanoi.
The statement encompasses U.S. actions throughout Indochina
and calls upon "the peace-loving governments in the world
as well as the member-countries of the 1962 Geneva Conference
on Laos" to take "timely and energetic measures" against
the aggressors.
During the previous week the Pathet Lao had publicized a
Central Committee statement and a PLAF,supreme command
statement, as well as an earlier Central Committee message
to the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference. The Central
Committee statement, dated 25 January and broadcast by the
Pathet Lao radio on the 26th, condemned the United States
for intensifying the war throughout Indochina, but
particularly stressed U.S. escalation in Laos "at a time
when the Lao Patriotic Front is showing its good will and
exerting all-out efforts to prepare" for the plenipotentiaries'
meeting. It cited "nibbling attacks by puppet troops"
against the liberated zone, alleged that the United States
had "dispatched additional units of Thai regular forces to
Laos to undertake new military adventures," and charged the
United States with increasing its bombing of Lao territory,
using B-52's and. spreading toxic chemicals and "causing
considerable losses in lives and property to the civilian
population."
The PLAF supreme command statement, broadcast by the Pathet
Lao radio on 26 January, was a very similar indictment of
U.S. actions throughout Indochina, again focused on U.S.
support for Thai and South Vietnamese units carrying out
raids in southern Laos and on escalation of U.S. bombing of
Lao territory. The statement contended that the U.S.
escalation "extinguishes the possibility of a peaceful
settlement of the Laotian question."
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The Pathet Lao news agency on 29 January reported a Central
Committee message to the Geneva conference co-chairmen, which
it said was dated 24 January. Like the 1 February message to
the co-chairmen, this message focused on U.S. activities in
Laos, omitting the broader comment on Indochina which was
included in the virtually concurrent Central Committee statement.
SOUPHANOUVONG Pathet Lao radio on 3 February reported a
EMISSARY press conference held the day before by
Souphanouvong's special envoy Tiao Souk
Vongsak which dealt with Souvanna Phouma's 21 January proposal
that the long-sought plenipotentiaries' meeting be held in
Luang Prabang rather than Khang Khay.* Souk sa-.d that since
Khang Khay had been selected as the meeting site "and jointly
agreed upon, both sides should seek ways to ensure security
for the meeting." Expressing the view that Souvanna's
proposal "will obstruct rather than advance preparations
for the meeting," Souk recalled-"our most generous proposal
of 31 December 1970 on security for the Khang Khay meeting"
and charged that preparations for that meeting "are dead-
locked because of the destructive acts of the U.S. imperialists
and their rightist stooges." Souk added, however, that he
"remains Prince Souphanouvong's special envoy" and that he
is "ready to continue discussions with Prince Souvanna Phouma
successfully to push forward preparations for the Khang Khay
meeting." He told the journalists that "wren I am about to
leave for Vientiane again, I will surely notify reporters."
Souvanna's proposal had first been acknowledged on 29 January
by the Pathet Lao radio, which suggested that Souvanna was
pressured into the proposal by "the United States and its
henchmen" who "obviously want to annul the agreement to
choose Khang Khay as site of the meeting." It charged that
the proposal "is aimed at bringing pressure to bear" and
"to shift the blame" if the meeting fails to take place.
It further asserted that until the United States ceases its
pressure on Souvanna and its sabotage of the talks, "it is
impossible to convene any conference at any place, and even
if a meeting is held it cannot yield any positive result."
* Souvanna's 21 January proposal and Souk's return to Sam
Neua are discussed in the TRENDS of 27 January, page 14.
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A 1 February NLHS Central Committee communique on Souk's report
to Souphanouvong and the NLHS Central Committee on his
discussions with Souvanna did not comment on the substance
of those discussions but noted that Souphanouvong gave "new
advice" to Souk, who "will return to Vientiane again to
continue his duty on preparations for the Khang Khay meeting."
KOSYGIN, TASS CHARGE U.S. ESCALATION, INTRUSION INTO LAOS
The first alite Soviet comment on the increased U.S. support
role in Cambodia and the possibility of allied action in Laos
came in remarks by Premier Kosygin at a dinner and luncheon
honoring a visiting Syrian delegation. According to TASS,
Kosygin said on 1 February that "the Soviet Government could
not help giving serious attention to the further aggravation
of the situation in Indochina, where American imperialism
is expanding, with the help of its Saigon hirelings, the
military operations against Cambodia; where an outrageous
invasion of the southern provinces of Laos is under way and
where the gross violation of the sovereignty of the DRV is
continuing."
In contrast to this careful avoidance of any mention of a
U.S. role in an "invasion" of Laos, Kosygin declared in his
remarks the next day, also reported by TASS, that "new
reports coming in today show that the South Vietnamese puppets
on orders and with the support of their American masters
spread the military action in southern Laos." In an obvious
effort to marshal public opinion against any allied action
in Laos, Kosygin said that "the peaceful public of the whole
world protests angrily against this new American adventure."
On the 3d TASS issued a statement which begins by saying that
the Soviet Union "strongly denounces the armed intrusion of
the United States and Saigon puppets into Laos." But it
goes on to declare, in language more cautious than
Kosygin's: "reports say that a considerable number of
Saigon ground troops supported by U.S. armed forces invaded
Laos" and that U.S. B-52's have been making daily raids.
The statement adds thLt "new aggressive actions from the
United States will. cause further and serious complications
of the situation in Indochina" and that these actions
"Jeopardize the contacts that have been established betwe:n
the political forces of Laos with the aim of seeking a peace
settlement for that country."
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Lilco Kosygin, the statement calls in standard terms for a
political settlement of the Indochina conflict. It concludes
with a generalized expression of support for the struggle
of the Indochinese peoples and with an expression of
confidence that they will be able to repulse "the invader"
in that "part of the world."
Earlier Moscow propaganda included an article by Ilinskiy
on 2 February entitled "The Cynicism of the Aggressor,"
which charged that "large groups of military units of the
Saigon regime under the command of American officers"
have "penetrated" Laos. It added that "the U.S. Air Force
conducts over 700 flight-; daily against areas controlled
by the Laotian patriotic forces, and there are more than
12,000 U.S. 'advisers' already stationed in that country."
The "Soviet people," Ilinskiy added vaguely, "side with
the Just cause of the Laotian patriots and express the
conviction that Laos will be a truly independent and free,
peaceful and democratic, united and neutral state."
A commentary by Radio Moscow's Godunov broadcast to foreign
audiences on 1 February cited Western r,ds reports as
confirming that "Saigon forces with U.S. air support are
waging a vast aggression against Laos." Without mentioning
the Soviet role as a Geneva conference co-chairman, Godunov
sought to exploit the new "escalation" by noting that "the
United States signed the 1962 treaty on Laos which called
for respect for the country's sovereignty, independence,
and neutrality."
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DRV. FRONT DECRY U.S. STATEMENTS ON INVOLVEMENT IN CAMBODIA
Hanoi and Front comment on Cambodia takes note of statements on
the war by U.S. officials, citing remarks by Administration
spokesmen and others to demonstrate the expansion of "U.S.
aggression" there and quoting congressional criticism of
Administration policies. Comment highlights Secretary Roger's
29 January press conference statement that the United States
would use unlimited air power throughout Indochina, and also
cites Secretary Laird's testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on 27 January. The 31 January NHAN DAN
commentary, for example, scores Laird for declaring that
"U.S. involvement in Cambodia not only rimed at protecting
its troops in South Vietnam but at heliing the Phnom Penh
regime to resist 'communist aggression' and that Congress did
not ban" the use in Cambodia of U.S. personnel for equipment
delivery, search and rescue, and information and medical
activities. According to the VNA version, NHAN DAN comments
that "the Nixon clique has gone beyond its previous claims
of 'abolishing the sanctuary of the VC,' 'protecting American
lives in South Vietnam,' and 'insuring the American troops'
pull-out.,"
A 29 January Hanoi domestic broadcast noted that Chairman of
the Armed Services Committee Stennis on the 27th "impudently"
remarked that the United States might feel compelled to go
further in its involvement by introducing air controllers.
The NHAN DAN commentary on the 31st does not mention this
aspect of the Senator's remarks but responds to a reference
he made to DRV troops in Cambodia, declaring that his "open
slander against the DRV cannot smestr the Cambodian people's
struggle and undermine the solidarity between the Vietnamese
and Khmer people."
Both Hanoi and Front media pick up Western news reports of
U.S. military personnel in Cambodia. A Liberation Radio
commentary on the 31st, for example, charges that "despite
the fact that the U.S. Congress prohibits Nixon from sending
U.S. military advisers and troops to Cambodia, he has, in
fact, ignored the congressional ban and has surreptitiously
sent U.S. military advisers to Cambodia."
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- 11 -
DPV PROTESTS U1S. BOMBING IN DEMILITARIZED ZONE, QUANG BINH
A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 30 January,
released that day by DRV media, scores alleged U.S. air raids
on the northern part of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Quang
Binh Province. The protest charges that for five days, from
25 to 29 January, the United States "sent several types of
aircraft, including B-52's, to drop many demolition and steel-
pellet bombs onto Huong Lap village, north of the 17th parallel
in the DMZ." And it claims that on 27 January, U.S. aircraft
"indiscriminately bombed a number of localities in Quang Binh
Province."
The spokesman "severely condemned these acts of war" and
"resolutely demanded that the U.S. authorities cease forthwith
all encroachments" on the DRV's sovereignty and security.
SOUTH SUPPORT An LPA commentary on 1 February, which is
FOR NORTH carried by both LPA and Liberation Radio
that day, scores the United States for the
alleged bombings in late January. It routinely warns that
"no insolent threat by the U.S. imperialists against the
North will escape due punishment by the South Vietnamese people."
It repeats the familiar threat that every "war act" by the United
States against the North will be punished by the South Vietnamese
people and armed forces "five and ten times harder."
On 28 January Liberation Radio broadcasts the latter portion of
the 14 December 1970 NFLSV-PRG statement issued in response to
the appeal of the VWP-DRV Government on 10 December, without
identifying it. The rebroadcast potion affirms that "Vietnam
is one" and reiterates the resolve of the southern people to
fight until "complete victory." It says that the South
Vietnamese armed forces and people "are resolved not to tolerate
any U.S. military adventures against the DRV or any U.S. crimes
against the kith-and-kin northern compatriots."
FRONT SAYS ALLIES VIOLATE TET TRUCE, SCORES U MINH OPERATIONS
CEASE-FIRE Front media predictably charge that the allies
"VIOLATIONS" violated the communists' order for a four-day
(26-30 January) cease-fire over Tet, the lunar
new year; and VNA on the 2d cites LPA figures claiming a total
of 840 violations. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 30th
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listed alleged allied acts breaking the truce and commented that
"these acts are stunning slaps at the U.S.-puppets who have
repeatedly ballyhooed about the so-called 'good will for peace,'
'extended cease-fire,' 'in-place truce,' and so forth; no one
can believe their deceitful words." According to this and other
broadcasts, "many" Saigon troops refused to carry out orders and
demanded to return home over the holiday. Communist propaganda
prior to Tet had urged government troops to carry out such actions.
U MINH The 30 January commentary and other Liberation Radio
FIGHTING reports of alleged cease-fire violations describe as
"particularly serious" allied activity in the U Minh
area--the site since November of South Vietnamese operations to
clear the long-time communist stronghold in Kien Giang and An
Xuyen provinces. Allied operations in the U Minh area have been
followed in Hanoi and Front propaganda, with battle reports in
December and early January claiming that the communists success-
fully attacked the participating GVN units. A 27 December
Liberation Radio broadcast, for example, compared the operations
to attempted allied sweeps in the same area in 1968 and 1969
and claimed that the current plan to pacify the area had been
"initially defeated" and that the insurgents were "determined
to completely defeat the U.S.-puppet nibbling and pacification
operations." It alleged that the allied forces in the operation
had suffered some 2,000 casualties in 15 days.
NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS MAKE ANNUAL IET VISITS
A succession of VNA items from 28 to 31 January report the visits
of DRV leaders President Ton Due Thang, Le Dian, Vo Nguyen Giap,
Le Due The, Nguyen Duy Trinh and Hoang Van Doan to various units
of the People's Armed Forces, to factories and cooperatives, to
families of workers and cadres, and to South Vietnam's Special
Representation to the DRV. Other leaders making similar visits
included To Huu, Nguyen Van Tran, Do Muoi, and Song Hao. Visits
to various localities and army units on the occasion of Tet last
year were reported to have been made by President Ton Due Thang,
Le Duan, Truong Cninh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh and Le
Thanh Nghi. Although Truong Chinh apparently made no visits
'~uring Tet this year he did attend the annual Fatherland Front
Central Committee meeting--held on 26 January this year--as he
did last year.*
* See the TRENDS of 27 January 1971, page 13, and of 11 February
1970, pages 6 and 7.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 FEBRUARY 1971
PRC CITES SWEDISH PRESS ON POSSIBLE U.S. USE OF A-WEAPONS
In an unusual discussion of possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons
in Indochina, a Stock'-olm-datelined NCNA report on 29 January
quoted the Swedish paper IYTONBLADET as paying the day before
that the Nixon Administration "will prnlably use a new-type
atomic bomb of 'limited' power" for "a decisive battle" in
Indochina. The account cited "mcny indications" that
Washington is approaching the stage of decision, including
an article in the New York TIMES in November by C. L. Sulzberger
and similar reports in other papers serving as trial balloons
for the White House to test public opinion. It also cited
"the forced removal. of 3.5 million South Vietnamese from the
north to the south" as another indication that the United
States is preparing to use atomic weapons.*
Peking's standard reference to nuclear weapons in Indochina
is that the United States has used a wide range of tactics
and weapons short of nuclear arms, with no indication that
Washington intends to cross this threshold. The atypical
29 January NCNA report claimed that from 1966 to 1968 the
United States had discussed the question of using tactical
nuclear weapons in Vietnam but was deterred by "the vigorous
opposition" of international opinion. In addition to serving
Peking's general propaganda interest in exploiting opposition
to U.S. policy, the NCNA report, which has been broadcast to
foreign and domestic audiences, may have been designed to
promote adverse world opinion to any use of nuclear weapons
in Indochina. NCNA quoted the Swedish paper as saying that
"many well-informed U.S. scientists and politicians feel quite
uneasy abort, the matter" and that "some representatives of
these politicians" made contacts with political figures in
other Western countries "so as to arouse international
opinion to stop this crazy act."
* The first known communist reference to speculation about
the possible removal of large numbers of people from the
northern provinces in South Vietnam was in the 20 January
PRG Foreign Ministry statement. The "scheme" is currently
mentioned in the 1 February NHAN DAN editorial on U.S.
"escalation" in Indochina.
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MIDDLE EAST
Moscow in the past few weeks has given meager propaganda
attention to the Middle East situation. But Kosygin takes
the occasion of the Moscow visit of a Syrian party-government
delegation led by Prime Minister and Defense Minister Hafiz
al-Asad to underscore Soviet insistence on implementation of
Security Council Resolution 242. Calling this a "crucial
moment" in Middle East developments, Kosygin refer7- to the
Jarring talks and looks to Israel for "concrete, peaceful
actions." He makes no mention of the cease-fire expiration
on 5 February, which is virtually ignored in the propaganda.
Nor does Moscow express any opinion on the usefulness of a
Security Council meeting or Big Four initiatives to obtain
an extension of the cease-fire or otherwise assist Jarring
in his negotiations. Limited comment again plays up Cairo's
desire for a peaceful solution while pLrtraying Israel as
engaging in delaying tactics in the hope of prolonging its
occupation of the Arab territories.
KOSYGIN SEES RESOLUTION 242 AS "REALISTIC" WAY TO PEACE
Speaking at a 1 February dinner for the Syrian delegation,
Kosygin expresses Soviet conviction that the November 1967
Security Council resolution--never endorsed by Syria--is
the "most realistic road" to a solution of the Middle East
crisis. Without mentioning the resolution, he tells the
Syrians in a luncheon speech the following day that it is
necessary to "maintain realism" in appraising the situation,
as well as "vigilance toward the enemy." In his speech on
the 1st, he does not go on to cite portions of the resolution,
as he did in his 21 December speech during the visit of a UAR
delegation led by 'Ali Sabri. He merely adds that due
account must be taken of the lawful rights of "all" the
Middle Eastern states, including the Arab people of Palestine.
Nor does he explicitly call for Israeli withdrawal, although
he does routinely charge Israel with endeavoring to remain
in the occupied territories. To the peoples of the Middle
East, he says, such a policy bars prospects of "peaceful
development and cooperation." He later remarks that given a
desire for peace under conditions when "all the peoples of
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3 1111:1313UARY 19'(1
the Middle East" could live as "good neighbors," one should
be guided not by the ideas of "extremist politicians" but by
the vital interests of the peoples.*
Kosygin sees the Middle East crisis as involving "grave inter-
national complications," and says that a "crucial noment"
has been reached in Middle East developments. Israel, he
says, agreed to resume contacts with Jarring under pressure
of world public opinion, "as a result of the constructive
policy" of the UAR. In line with general propaganda
reticence, he makes no mention of the expiration of the cease-
fire on 5 February. He cautions that "further procrastinations,
attempts to bargain from positions of rude force," will not
lead to a solution. (In December he had specifically advised
the "Israeli extremists" to be under no illusion that through
bargaining they would be able to get a price for their consent
to a peaceful settlement.) He puts the next step up to
Israel: Everyone, he says, is now looking to Israel for
"concrete peaceful actions."
Again pledging "all-round" support to the Arab cause, Kosygin
says the USSR is developing cooperation with friendly Arab
states, giving them "all necessary support," and assures the
Syrians that this applies "in full measure" to Syr4an-Soviet
relations. Concluding with a pro forma appeal for Arab unity,
he welcomes the efforts of the UAR, Syria, Sudan, and Libya--
the "Tripoli Charter" states--to strengthen -their united
actions in the struggle against imperialism, which he claims
is counting on Arab disunity and is trying to delay "elimina-
tion of the consequences of the aggression." He nowhere
directly mentions the United States, referring only to Israel's
reliance on the "forces of imperialism and reaction"; in
December he had alluded to Israel's "patrons."
* The "good neighbor" concept has appeared infrequently in
the propaganda: The first appearance seems to have been a
Kudryavtsev article in IZVESTIYA last August which recalled the
language of Resolution 242 on frontiers and added that frontiers
would become safe and recognized under conditions of "peace,
cooperation, and good neighborliness." The 3 December state-
ment of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee said
that without Israeli withdrawal it was impossible to imagine
the peoples of the Middle East living like good neighbors.
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I01,;1110II11(Y 1141
USSR PRAISES UAR S EFFORTS FOR PLATT I I L'r I CLN-r ON CL A(i L--F I I L
Moueow Lrl Chit, I)ILul, Lh'( wuek.u 111LLJ Ie id, I1,11 I)rOI)",gn.u(l", orr the
MLdd.L( Ii;rrul, to it mLn.lunnn.* 'l/I)LI',/I-ii- thf! 11,j)jW()11P11, IL 14111C.1.1111,
orr Llru 'Ph JLLnrrary clour(UL.k. rwr?v lcu (-cmnnr'rrl,11Lo r?u' rorur,Il,l.LhJ
noted. that ucgot 1r' L ionrr were antler way t;hrorrgh Jrr,r' HI rrg rcucl
the nt.eletr had ctei'l.ned Lhel.r j3on.I.t.Lorur, but he rlc c:J Inerrl to
anticipate Lhe reuu.l.Lrr of Ju.rring'r_r e Cor'l;u.
TASS hau reported the IJAlt and Jordanian mc,nroran(1unur to Jrrrrang,
made public by the reopec Live gove.r. nmerULL, uummar l.z lug the UAR
memorandum conveyed to Jarring on .1.5 .Jarrurrry rend gi.v lug a brief
account of the Jordanian statement delivered to h.hn on the
18th. On the 27th a TASt dispatch from New York noted that
isrc:.el had conveyed to Jarring Ito reply to the "1.aLouL
proposals" by the UAR and Jordan, and. that this "rounds out
the first stage" of the contacts. Pointing out that Israel's
reply was made orally, TASS said this evoked a cautious
response from "local observers," who suppose the Israeli
Government has not given up its tactics of "deliberat
procrastinations."
On 2 February TASS carried a short report of the UAR memorandum
presented to Jarring on the lst, noting that it again outlines
the UAR's "firm position" on a pea'e settlement proceeding
from its readiness to fulfill all provisions of Resolution 242.
On the same day, a brief TASS account of U Thant Is report to
the Security Council on Jarring's activities said he appealed
for a continued cease-Fire and asked the parties to continue
their contacts. The report ir.:icates, TASS said, that the
course of the contacts give grou..i: "for 'cautious optimism.'"
It added that U Thant urk,ed the parties to pursue their
discussions in a construc-Live manner and co:)perate with Jarring
with a view to carrying out Resolution 21;2, and to withhold
fire, exercise military restraint, and maintain the quiet.
A statement by the UAR's UN representative az-Zayyat is reported
by TASS on the 3d as having said U Thant's appeal to refrain
from firing is one of the elements "which will be taken into
consideration." At the same time, TASS said, az-Zayyat
* Comment on the Middle East in the week ending 31 January
accounted for only 0.7% of total comment, the lowest figure
since mid-June 1969.
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C(rNll'IllNN'I'IA1, b'lll(1 'I'IlPIN1)11
i I0h;IMIIAIt'( 1 9'(I.
vml)ha,u.FY,ct(I I,hctl, lwri,oc' :n I.twc:mil)tt lido w.ltlt rn.L I..l.l.tixy occt.tl)lLL.lon
!tnd ril,ruuut+(l l,hc rollporur I1r1 L.LLY of Llw f10ctI1.1L' Counc:I.a., :I.tu
l,n+rnutnr?ui, nruntlxWu, Will n.l.J. (IN membot'u 1.'(,r.' ltr.i.n(.;.i.ng abottl; peace
I.u 1;lu Ml(ld:l(!
PRI-'SS Mo~ucc:ow'tt :I.Imll('d comment on the UAU'u :1.5 January
COMMf:NI' mernorrtnclram 1.ar.tclu Ctdro'u "extremely coniLructive
you .tJ.on" and. if; "pcrtc(l'ul aup.l.raLLonn,"
1Corycrvln clccla,r I.ng In Lhc 29 January I:ZVi 13'l'.I:YA, according to
that the memor-andurn'tt denuaniis for an end to the
"I:arctca.:1, aggreuslon" and for withdr-awaa. beyond the 5 June 1967
frontier?u are "abuolutely just." And Vc_tuilycv, in the
29 January PPAVDA, ant,,ertod that from the very first contacts
with Jarring Cairo has demonstrated Its good will and sincere
efforts for a political. solution. The UAR memorandum, he said,
adhercu strictly to Revolution 2112. Summing up the UAR's six
points for a settlement, Vauilyev said the prc.posals, put
forward in "a cairn and positive spirit," open the way to
'stablishment of a just and lasting peace permitting every
state in the area to live in security.
Both Koryavin and Vasilyev complain of Israel's attitude, the
former holding Israel's "obstructionist policy" responsible
for hampering settlement of the crisis while the latter
complains that Israel, trying to prolong its occupation while
addressing threats to the Arab countries, is endeavoring to
dictate its conditions from a position of strength. Criticizing
the United States as well as Israel, an Arabic-language commentary
on the 26th assailed Washington for its "active participation wi+h
Tel Aviv in maneuvers" about Jarring's mission. Trying to justify
Israel's stand, it declared, the United States "tacitly approves"
Israel's attempts to tie its participation in the Jarring contacts
with "groundless conditions and demands." The State Department,
it added, made it clear the United States supports the Israeli
position with regard to i- .thdrawal and not the dem~tnd of
Resolution 242.
ROGERS Reporting Secretary Rogers' 29 January press conference,
REMARK" TASS on the 30th singled out his expression of hope that
the cease-fire agreement would be extended as a result
of the activities of Jarring and U Thant, and his remark that the
United States "was 'working quietly behind the scenes.'" TASS
juxtaposed the observation that Israeli Finance Minister Sapir
recently asked for a new U.S. loan of $500 million, and commented
that satisfaction of this request at the present time and further
deliveries of American arms could only encourage Tel Aviv to
sabotage a peaceful settlement.
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3 F E:Br UAR Y 1971
'PASS on 23 January had reported UAR Foreign Minister Riyad as
saying, in reply to a message from Secretary Rogers, that the
UAR so far saw no progresu in the Jarring mission. TASS cited
the Cairo AL-AIIRAM to the effect that the Secretary had
pointed out in his message that extension of the cease-fire
agreement would substantially contribute to the Jarring mission,
and chat Washington preferred not to raise the Middle East
problem in the Security Coun.il.
SYRIANS HAVE "FRUITFUL EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS" IN MOSCOW
TASS on 29 January announced that "in accordance with an agree-
ment reached earlier," a Syrian party-government delegation
would visit Moscow early in February; the delegation, led by
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Hafiz al-Asad, member
of the Bath Provisional Regional Command, arrived in Moscow
on 1 February. This is the first high-level visit since
al-Asad's takeover of power in mid-November last year.
Al-Asad had been a member of the last such official Syrian
delegation to Moscow, led by the then chief of state
al-Atasi. This visit, originally scheduled for May 1969
and then postponed--reportedly by the Soviet side--took
place in early Juli, that year.*
Moscow reports on the two days of talks--the delegation left
on 3 February--characterize the atmosphere as one of "friend-
ship and frankness," TASS reporting on the 1st that a
"fruitful exchange of opinions" on bilateral relations and
international problems took place that day. In addition to
Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin, TASS reported that the
Soviet side included Ponomarev, Baybakov, Gromyko, Grechko,
and Patolichev. The Syrian delegation included the ministers
of foreign affairs, agriculture, economy and external trade,
petroleum, and Euphrates dam. Damascus radio on the 1st
added that "several technicians and civilian and military
experts" accompanied the delegation.
In his speech on 1 February Kosygin said the negotiations which
had begun confirm the "proximity of views on key questions" of
the international situation and point to possibilities of further
* See the FBIS TRENDS of 3 July 19 9, pages 1-6.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 FEBRUARY 1971
developing Syrian-Soviet cooperation. The USSR, he said,
values this cooperation not only as regards bilateral
relations but also as a factor in helping consolidate peace
in the Middle East. And he added that questions connected
with this situation "naturally" would hold an important
place in the negotiations. Affirming the "cordial relations"
between the USSR and Syria, Kosygin rejected "imperialist
propaganda" claims that these relations are the result of
"temporary protective conditions" or are based on
"commercial interests" in the Middle East. They are founded,
he maintained, on common interests in the anti-imperialist
struggle.
CPSU-BA'TH Speaking at a luncheon given by the Syrians
RELATIONS on 2 February, Kosygin said, according to
TASS, that the Soviet Union "attaches great
importance" to friendly CPSU-Syrian Bath contacts, which
help strengthen friendly relations between the Soviet and
Syrian peoples and play an "important role" in supporting
the struggle for national independence, peace, and social
progress. The same day TASS reported that al-Asad was
received by Brezhnev for a conversation "in a warm and heart-
felt atmosphere" during which they discussed some international
issues as well as questions concerning CPSU-Ba'th contacts.
Treatment of communiques on past CPSU-Syrian Bath talks has
pointed up Soviet-Syrian differences: Thus the communique
on talks in Moscow in January 1967 was inexplicably delayed
until 11 February, and that on talks in Damascus in July-
August 1968 was significantly published by PRAVDA only in
summary form, omitting such passages--in the Damascus
version--as an expression of Soviet support for the Arab
right to "use every means available" in the struggle to end
Israeli occupation. Lower-level party contacts have continued,
with little publicity from Damascus and apparently even less
from Moscow. For example, according to brief reports from
Damascus, Bath delegations visited Moscow in December 1969
and February 1970, and CPSU delegations were in Syria in
March and April last year.
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3 FEBRUARY 1971
- 20 -
GERMANY AND BERLIN
GDR DENOUNCES, USSR QUESTIONS FRG ACTIVITIES TN NEST BERLIN
The late-January visits and meetings of FRG officials and poli-
tical leaders in West Berlin, particularly the 2'-30 January
meeting of FDP parliamentary leaders, prompted strong denuncia-
tions in GDR official statements and followup propaganda, while
Moscow used routine propaganda channels to impugn Bonn's policy
toward West Berlin. The propaganda served as accompaniment to
the GDR authorities' five-day slowdown of civilian traffic on
the autobahns linking the Federal Republic with West Berlin--
longer in duration than the slowdowns occasioned by the CDU/CSU
parliamentary meeting in the city in November (four days) and
the SPD parliamentary n:euting in December (three days). As
usual, the propaganda did not specifically acknowledge the slow-
downs.
GDR media on 24 January publicized the customary foreign ministry
spokesman's statement protesting the impending FDP meeting and
denouncing FRG activities in West Berlin generally. To date
Soviet media have not been heard to mention the protest made by
the Soviet embassy to the three Western embassies in West Berlin
on the 27th, though it was cited obliquely in an East Berlin radio
commentary on 1 February.
GDR PROTEST, The GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement
COMMENTARIES of 24 January reacted both to the projected FDP
parliamentary leaders' meeting, with the partici-
pation of FRG Federal Ministers Genscher and Ertl, and to the
concurrent visits to West Berlin of President Heinemann and
Chancellor Brandt "in their official capacities." The statement
complained, in the vein of prior protests against FRG meetings in
the city, that Bonn's actions "violate the status of West Berlin,
which does not belong to the FRG," and serve only to "create new
fuel for conflict in the heart of Europe" and to "hamper the
efforts to bring about detente." Reported by ADN on the 24th and
published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the next day, the statement further
labeled these actions "interference" running counter to international
law and conflicting with the FRG's "off?~ia.1 assurances" that it
wants to help achieve "settlements regarding West Berlin." The
spokesman made his statement two days before the scheduled fourth
meeting between GDR and FRG State Secretaries Bahr and Kohl in
East Berlin.
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3 FEBRUARY 1971
The spokesman concluded routinely that it is in the interests
of the Federal Government and "not least" of the people of West
Berlin to "respect the status of West Berlin and to terminate
the unlawful political demonstration in that city." This stand-
ard line recurs in commentaries pegged directly to the FRG
activities in West Berlin, to the CSU congress in Duesseldorf,
and to Brandt's 28 January State of the Nation address. NEUES
DEUTSCHLAND also picked up TASS and Soviet central press criti-
cisms of the FRG activities.
PROPAGANDA TASS' 25 January report of the GDR Foreign
FROM ")')SCOW Ministry spokesman's protest, based on ADN's
report, appeared in the 27 January PRAVDA
alongside a brief dispatch from the paper's special correspon-
dent in West Berlin, Khodakovskiy, noting that Heinemann was
to leave for West Berlin on the 27th and commenting that this
was "only the beginning" of FRG actions "aimed at undermining
the status of West Berlin and at obstructing the attainment
of an agreement on problems of West Berlin." The report of
the protest and the dispatch appeared under the single headline
"Illegal Actions."
Also on the 25th, TASS summarized an ADN report of that date on
a meeting between Ulbricht and West German Communist Party (DKP)
Chairman Bachmann noting, among other things, the two party
leaders' denunciations of FRG activity in West Berlin. But TASS
left out a passage which said the two sides "condemned" Bonn's
"attempts to misuse West Berlin as the spearhead against the GDR
and the socialist camp"--a formula that does not fit with Moscow's
current approach, centered on criticism of elements in the FRG
bent on blocking a West Berlin settlement and achieving European
detente.
On the 27th, Radio Moscow told German listeners that the PRG's
projected "illegal actions" cons--tuted an attempt to change the
status of West Berlin. Observing that the "escalation of political
activity" by Bonn "in a city which does not belong to the Bonn
state and is not subject to its administration" is continuing, the
commentary added--in an apparent allusion to the traffic slowdown
which had started that day--that Western politicians "seem not to
know that pressure creates counterpressure." It went on to ask
rhetorically if the FDP and SPD leaderships were now espousing the
CDU policy of an "imperial neurosis"--a policy of "illusionists
ignoring realities." While reiterating Soviet approval of past
steps taken under Brandt's "peace policy," the commentator com-
plained that Bonn "intentionally refuses" to ratify the Moscow
CONFIDENTIAL
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3 FEBRUARY 1971
and Warsaw treaties, which also r ins that Bonn's "peace policy . . .
will net be implemented." And the growing FRG "illegal political
activity in West Berlin" and "lack of realism" on the part of West
German politicians regarding a Berlin settlement "must inevitably
impede and disturb the achievement of an agreement on the West
Berlin problems."
While Soviet media have not puolicized the USSR Embassy protest
to the Big Three embassies on the 27th, which placed the onus for
"undesirable results" of the FDP meeting on its organizers but
did not mention the Heinemann or Brandt visits, routine Soviet
comment has cited Heinemann's and Brandt's visits as well as the
FDP meeting as "illegal political activity" which "cannot facili-
tate" a West Berlin settlement. The most authoritative Soviet
comment comes from PRAVDA's foreign political observer Viktor
Mayevskiy in an article on 31 January, which denounces Bonn's
"incessant attempts . . . to undermine the status of West Berlin,
to hinder the reaching of an agreement on West Berlin problems."
An apparent allusion to the Soviet official protest appeared in
an East Berlin radio commentary on 1 February. The radio's
Moscow correspondent Seibold noted that the Soviet Union had made
its views on West Berlin known via its central press, TASS, and
"official channels," b.'t did not elaborate on the latter. Seibold
went on instead to recall the formulation in Brezhnev's November
Yerevan speech--used again by Kosygin in his year-end ASAHI inter-
view--to the effect that the "Berlin problem, while difficult to
solve, can be solved given the good will of all concerned" and if
the interests of the West Berliners and the "legitimate interests
and sovereign rights" of the GDR are accommodated. It is on this
basis that the Soviet Union is negotiating with the three Western
powers, the GDR correspondent said, and the "difficult" talks
should not be "further complicated" now by "extra obstacles"--
that is, Bonn's "massive, organized" and "deliberate" interference
in West Berlin.
BRANDT SPEECH, Brandt's State of the Nation address to the
CDU CONGRESS Bundestag on 28 January elicited typically
abusive denunciations from East Berlin and
relatively low-keyed comment from Moscow. Noting that the three
main subjects of Brandt's speech were the Ostpolitik, FRG-GDR
relations, and the talks on West Berlin, TASS on the 29th
remarked without further comment that Brandt had made ratifica-
tion of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties "conditional" on the
"positive results" of the four-power talks on West Berlin. TASS
added that Brandt thoroughly discussed FRG-GDR relations but that
he made no reference to recognition of the GDR under international
law.
CONFIDENTIAL
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3 FEBRUARY 1971
,1ovlet I)rc,I t grtrtdaa reacted more harshly to the CDU/CSU speech of
reply, delivered by Bundestag Opposition leader Barzel, and to
speeches in the ensuing two-day debate on 28-29 January. TASS
d.isccrncd an "atter,ptt to interfere" in the GDR's internal affairs
in Barzel's statement that there must be "progress inside Germany"
before the Moscow treaty can be ratified. Such "attempts" had
"previously proved bankrupt many times," TASS remarked. In a
similar vein, Moscow comment on the 25-27 January CDU congress in
Duesseldorf charged that the CDU leadership "intends to continue
to follow the blind alley course initiated by Adenauer" in the
interests of the "revanchist circles of West German capital"
(Mayevskiy in PRAVDA on the 31st).
At the same time Moscow has continued to note the presence in the
CDU of forces which now "realize the need" for a "realistic policy"
in Europe. Soviet media had given considerable publicity to the
13-20 January visit of Gerhard Schroeder, chairman of the Bundestag
Foreign Affairs Committee and deputy chairman of the CDU, invited
to the USSR by Chairman of the Council of Union Shitikov. TASS
and the central press reported Schroeder's talks with leading
Soviet officials, including Gromyko and Kosygin, on "urgent pro-
blems in relations between the USSR and the FRG."
Moscow carried a fairly brief, straightforward report of Ulbricht's
28 January speech to the 15th SED Central Committee plenum on poli-
tical preparations for the party's forthcoming eighth congress. In
the speech, delivered the same day as Brandt's State of the Nation
address, the East German leader did not mention the Bahr-Kohl talks,
the four-power talks, or Berlin but took the occasion to again
strongly denounce any kind of special "intra-German relations" and
to demand that Bonn abandon its "dreams of 'intra-German relations',
with their aura of tutelage." Ulbricht reiterated the GDR's policy
of "relations of peaceful coexistence, of contractually agrees
normal diplomatic relations on the basis of international law."
East German commentaries, sharply critical of Brandt's speech as
constituting "interference" in GDR internal affairs, insisted that
the "German socialist state" is irrevocably delimited and entirely
separate from the "imperialist" FRG.
PATTERN BEGINS TO EMERGE IN BAHR-KOHL DISCUSSIONS
The current series of discussions between State Secretaries Bahr
of the FRG and Kohl of the GDR show signs of setting into a pattern
regarding venue and frequency. The first two meetings on 27 November
and 23 December, 26 days apart, were held in East Berlin. The third
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3 Dpi i iiAIIY
meeting, 23 days later on 15 January, was held in Bonn. The
communique on that meeting for the first time announced a pre-
arranged date and time for the next one, 26 January in Berlin--
a development noted by Brandt in his State of the Nation address
as a healthy indicator that the Bahr-Kohl discussions have ":Lost
their initial quasi-sensational coloring."
The communique on the fourth meeting on 26 January followed
suit in announcing a time and place for the fifth one--4 February
in Bonn, sustaining the pattern of alternating sites. On
2 February, East and West German media announced that the date
had been pushed ahead to the 3d. The communique on the 3 February
meeting, postdating the traffic slowdowns on the autobahns, says
Bahr and Kohl will meet next in Berlin on 17 February.
GDR media continue to avoid detailing the substance of the talks.
ADN has consistently limited itself to the same three- or four-
line announcements DPA identifies as "communiques," but without
so designating them. It has at no time carried any elaboration,
in contrast to DPA',s more extensive reporting, and it has ignored
all the comments on the talks by the FRG official spokesmen at
press briefings.
While ignoring Western speculation that at the 26 January meeting
Bahr and Kohl would for the first time expand their agenda beyond
the Berlin problem to postal connections, ADN announced on the eve
of the meeting that "telecommunications between the GDR and the
independent political entity of West Berlin" would be expanded
on 31 January by the addition of a number of direct telephone
lines "between the GDR and West Berlin." The wording of the
announcement seemed calculated to stress th-it the agreement was
between the GDR and West Berlin--not West German--officials.
SED Politburo member Axen referred to the Bahr-Kohl talks in
his Politburo report to the SED Central Committee plenum on
28 January, carried in full in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 29th,
as a product of GDR initiative. Axen recalled that on
29 October 1970 the East German Government had proposed to the
FRG that the two states enter into negotiations "in due and proper
form on concluding a treaty regulating the mutual transit of
persons and goods of the GDR and the FRG." He pointed out that
such a treaty, valid under international law, would "promote
successful progress" of the four-power talks on West Berlin.
Axen used the word "Vertrag" (treaty) where Ulbricht had used
the apparently less formal term "Abkommen" (agreement) in the
same context in his New Year's address. Axen concluded his
remarks on the Bahr-Kohl talks by stating that Ulbricht had
outlined the GDR position on them "clearly and unmistakably."
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( N101D11IN'I'IA1, Vlil;1 'I'ItNNNI
'i 101,;11R1I1 i '' 19'(1.
POLAND
MOSCOW SCORES /LIES` ABOUT PLAN TO INVMDE POLAND
Western press speculation about a ponc,11)le i oviet invasion
of Poland draws a vehement Soviet [)ropaganda reaction
reflecting Moscow's evident touchiness on the subject.
Under the title "Breeders of :Gies," an article by Mikhailov
in the 30 January PRAVDA singles out a UPI report "about
Russia's alleged intention to invade Poland" as "another
foul maneuver," a "flagrant lie" propagated by the
"capitalist" and "ya_J.low" press in the United States,
then "passed across the Atlantic" and spread further by
the: West European press. The article acknowledges what
ms.y well be at the crux of Moscow's vehement reaction in
noting that the "fabrication" was also picked up and
disseminated by Radio Free Europe, "broadcasting to
Poland and other socialist countries."
The article claims that in fact, according to "reports
from 2oland," the difficulties of last December "are now
being successfully overcome" and that the Polish working
people "have acknowledged with gratitude" the manifestations
of solidarity by the Soviet Union and other socialise
countries. Mikhailov cites the visit of First Secretary
Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz to Moscow on 5 January as
evidence of deepening Polish-Soviet cooperation. He
declares that the efforts of "imperialist subversive
centers" to exploit the "temporary" Polish difficulties
have failed and expresses the conviction that the "flagrant
lies" about a pr'jected invasion "will not deceive world
public opinion."
Mikhailov's article has been summarized at some length by
TASS for recipients abroad rut has not so far been broadcast
to foreign or domestic :radio -tudiences. Chinese charges had
elicited Moscov's only prior comment on the question of
possible Soviet militarir intervention in Poland--the
31 December PRAVDA editorial article which derided Peking's
claim that the Su i.ets had moved troops to the Polish border
during the mid-December disturbances. The editorial
article, which countercharged Peking with "impudent
interference" in Poland's internal affairs, was summarised
widely by Radio Moscow for audiences including the Poles.
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0) N I 0 I I ) N N I I ' I A 1 , i i I:1 'I'Iti11Nl):1
i I f:liIflJARY I.9'(
WARSAW, I'RA(;UL: PICKUP',`) 'i'Itc Warsaw clotncrtt LI c rucl I o utamrnttri zed
OF MI KI IAI I.OV' S AR'f I CL.h Ml.khrtl. 1.ov':1 rtr?L.LC Le on " 0 11.tnt.urry but
ettr?el.'t.tl.l.y :tul~l~rc uucd. 1.Lu p:r?Inciptt:L
LurLul,, I,rcruc ul;l.nl{ i L b.l.ttndly rtn "It corium.! uLttr'y devoted to the
:, l,rutl, Lt~rt ill ['o 1ILl1d" wh Lear entr)hrtu i zed I;ov.l c' L no I. Lclt.tr?a.ty WI Lh
Lhcr l'c>:I c;, ill &:,vcrcutnirrjr their "temlrir~tr?y" (Ii I'l'icu.LLI eu. Wars aw a
:rununnr',y circ.eci MLkluti.lov'u ttrtncrL.ion thttL ". i.rriper:i.al.iut :Llett"
ttru.l "un1.'ottt,dci1 Lr:venL Lone" would, not deceive world opinion,
but It d1(1 not i ndi cafe the nubcrt,ance of the "lLeu ." ''he
uwrnnutr;y nuwhure wentf.oned that the article apeci1.'ically
denlctl We. il,errr slu'cuitttion about It poo's.Lbie Invasion.
By contrast, a report on the 30th in the Prague domestic
service lr.igliltl;hted the most polemical features of the
PRAVDA articie, noting at the outset that it described a
UPI report "that the Soviet Union iB pro pared to invade
L'oland as a new dirty maneuver and an impertinent lie, "
CZECHOSLO AKIA, HUNGARY LEAD IN COMMENT ON POLISH EVENTS
Whale Moscow's comment on the Polish scene continues to be
sporadic, Czechoslovakia has originated extensive comment
drawing heavily on the rew Polish leaders' own statements,
most recently on the impermissibility of irresponsible
breaches of discipline. Hungary, second to Czechoslova'-ia
in the volume of its propaganda attention to the Polish
events, has sought to minimize potential dangers to "socialist"
interests in the Polish situation. In what seems a replay of
Budapest's approach at the time )f the 1968 events in
Czechoslovakia, current Hungarian comment--in a period of
restiveness among the Polish workers which has generated
new tensions between the new leadership and the Soviets--
is at pains to picture a calm situation held well under
control by the regime.
Bucharest, cautiously reticent, has originated no comment on
Poland since 27 December when a SCINTEIA article emphasized
a return to normalcy there; as the signs of unrest and
assertiveness among the Polish workers mounted in January,
Bucharest's infrequent news reports largely steered clear
of the internal situation. Sofia, on the other hand, has
carried reports in late January suggesting a deteriorating
situation and has referred for the first time to basic
"problems." But Bulgaria has originated no comment at all.
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CONI0.I:DJEN'I'I:A1, 11:31S '19ENDS
3 FEBRUARY 1.9 71
Gparuo comment and reportage from East Germany has attacked RFE,
insisted that Polish-GDR relations would remain intact, and
approvingly cited a member of the new Polish regime on the
need to deal resolutely with "antisocialist" forces seeking
to exploit the situation.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA The Czechoslovak press, in voluminous comment
and reportage on the Polish scene, has
emphasized the close ties between the workers and the new
leaders, the value of self-criticism, the importance of
socialist unity, and in the most recent period the Polish
regime's o' ii warnings about attempts to create disorders
throlu h "demagogic demands."
An "editorial" in P'atislava PRAVDA of 30 December signed by
Warsaw correspondent Hulman quoted an admor.:'_tion by Gierek
against "rash conce],;:s in economic policy" and cited the
new First Secretary',,, remarks on the "self-criticism",,af
his leadership regardir.a; -'past mistakes." The same paper
on 16 January further manifested approval of the new
regime's course in carrying an excerpt 'from the previous
day's issue of the Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU on the need for
consultation with the working class and for observing
principles of democracy and collective leadership.
A report by Warsaw correspondent Hulman in the 21 January
RUDE PRAVO, while reporting the measures taken by Polish
trade unions to correct past "errors and shortcomings,"
added that "TRYBUNA LUDU and GLOS PRACY point out, however,
that in some places one can also hear d;.shar monious and
destructive voices" making "demagogic demaiids" which
"weaken discipline." The same emphasis marked a Warsa',r
dispatch in the 29 January Bratislava PRAVDA entitled "The
Solution of Contemporary Problems in Poland in an Atmosphere
of Prudence." The dispatch stressed that during their
24-25 January visit to the coastal cities, Gierek and
Jaroszewicz not only promised a freer flow of information
and other reforms but "also demanded that the people
learn to bear responsibility."
* See the TRENDS of 23 December 1970, pages 18-20, for a
roundup of earlier East European reactions.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 FEBRUARY 1971
In the sphere of foreign policy, Czechoslovak media have given
heavy publicity to assurances by Gierek and Jaroszewicz that
Poland's ties with the USSR and other CEMA and Warsaw Pact
countries remain unchanged and to the two leaders' talks
with Brezhnev and Kosygin in Moscow on 5 January. An article
by iviarek in the 14 January issue of the Bratislava youth
daily SMENA stressed the need for more such meetings to
provide leaders of the socialist countries with more
information on the "changes" that took place at the
20 December PZPR plenum.
HUNGARY
Budapest is the only n,
of Moscow's East European
allies so iar to exI
y, on its own authority,
blame the
former party leadershi
the December Polish
events.
Thus an articJ? in the
ary NEPSZABADSAG,
entitled
"The Old Year in Foreign
..itics," contained a
brief passage on Poland which att ed the December
disturbances "partly" to the old J rship. Two days
earlier, MAGYAR NEMZET had quoted - t,.tement by the French
CP's Marchais, appearing in L'HUMANITE, to the effect that
"omissions have been committed by the old leadership."
MAGYAR NEMZET observed that the new leadership is
preoccupied with economic problems, and the NEPSZABADSAG
article drew a rcass1r ing picture of the international
impact of the Polish events: They "do not influence the
fundamental trends of development of the socialist
community and the development of international relations."
Budapest comment has also sought to play down dangers inherent
in the Polisn events by ascribing a dominant role to
irresponsible--but unrepresentative--juvenile delinquents
in the coastal riots. The 7 January NEPSZABADSAG article,
pressing this line, emphasized the relative youth of a
majority of the coastal shipyard workers as an explanation
of why the disturbances broke out in that region. The
4 January issue of the government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP
quoted the Warsaw weekly POLITYK'1 to the effecr, that
during the riots "not a single act or pronouncement was
aimed at our socialist system or our international allies."
Currently less frequent, Hunsarian comment seems at pains
to play down the continued restiveness on the part of
Polish workers. A Melykuti article in the 21 January
Budapest trade union daily NEPSZAVA pointed to the public
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CUNI0.l:i 'N'I'; Al
3 11'I-;I-I(HA1tY I()'(I
approval of the C:ierok regime and declared that the ten[3ene[IJ
and nervousness evident before the new regime took over "was
primarily caused by the disruption of relations between the
previous party leadership and the masses."
ROMANIA Monitored Bucharest media have carried only one
original comment on the Polish developments--an
article by Caplescu in the 27 December SCINTEIA emphasizing
that the "normal" tempo of activity was being resumed.
Although the Bucharest press and radio reported the new
leaders' 23 December speeches to the Sejm and carried short
items on the communiques on the Polish leaders' visits to
the fraternal countries in January, the Romanian reports
included no mention of workers' demands for reforms or of
the theme of unity among the socialist countries. The
dominant feature of the reports was an emphasis on the
Polish people's support for the new leaders and their
programs.
Bucharest reports on Polish events during the latter part
of January have largely steered clear of the internal
situation, reporting such international developments as
the signing of a five-year Polish-Romanian trade agreement
and West German CDU leader Barzel's visit to Warsaw. One
of the rare Bucharest reports on the internal Polish scene
since mid-January was a 10-line item in the 17 January
SCINTEIA which reported the replacement of Loga-Sowinski
by Wladyslaw Kruczek as head of Polish trade unions.
BULGARIA Sofia media, originating no comment on the
Polish events, have carried almost daily
reports generally calculated to stress the continuity
of Leninist norms under the new leaders. Only in the
latter part of January did Sofia report Polish leaders'
statements critical of the former Gomulka regime--along
with reports indicating that the situation might be
getting out of rand.
RABOTNICHESKO DELO of 25 December, reporting Gierek's
and Jaroszewicz's speeches to the Polish Sejm two days
earlier, highlighted their assertions that there would
be no deviation from socialism, that Poland would remain
a firm member of CEMA; and that it would follow an unaltered
foreign policy. In the wake of the Polish leaders' visits
to Moscow and East Berlin in the first half of January,
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0O1\1I01I)1';N1I'IAI, I0i III 'I'I(I';NI):;
i h0I,;I11(IIAI(Y 11)'(1
Lhu u(Lmc I)11,}H ? (.11tt Iod n. 'I'I(YJ1IINA 1,111)I1 Oil I LOr.I n.L--rL.Luc) I)t'U L(Icrull;
In Llle UOt'ln, (IO1iO1,1r. Ltet'vlce--v.lc~wlrllf l:h(! vi1iiLt1 ILI c(nrl.'1.rnuL-
I,Ion (_)t' I'oI.rl.nd'lr i'Ir.'m 1.LLIIiLrI with Lhc I.'r?t.Lter(1(LL coutttrIe(t,
I)eLrL.L,.1.tlitr.l.y 1,1)e 11;Jt;1(.
On 2l ,111.111,111ry, L(AIiO'I'N:1:C III;t;ICO DI-;1,O carried it .r?cl)ort which for
the 1.'.iru L Lime In Bulgarian media Lnd l.catod. that "problems"
had played it role In the coastal rloLn. I(ecounL.ing it '0 u:Lt
by 13tLlti^ workers' representatives to G:Lerek and Jaroszewicz
in Warsaw, +h:l.s report noted that after Glerek had explained
the causes of the. December events, the delegates discussed
"the problems whioll concern the workers and the public of
the coastal cities." On the 24th, the .:,tune paper reported
a letter from Premier Jaroszewicz to enterprise managers in
effect complaining that the liberalized situation in the
country was getting out of control. The paper said the
letter stressed the need for "personal responsibility,"
which "has not been correctly applied in the past," and
pointed out that the 20 December PZPR plenum had created
conditions "favoring the overcoming of irregularities
and weaknesses."
EAST GERMANY An uneasy reticence has marked the reaction
to the Polish events in GDR media, after
an initial--18 and 19 December--outburst against the alleged
provocative role of RFE and VOA. East Berlin media have
since confined their coverage largely to quotations of
Polish press comment and to reports of such major
developments as the Polish leaders' visits to Moscow
and East Berlin in early January. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
on 6 January summarized an article in the Warsaw
military paper ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI which scored anew the
alleged role of RFE during the December riots. The
same issue of the paper reported the approval of both
sides of the results of the Polish leaders' talks the
previous day in Moscow. An article in the 14 January
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, entitled "New Stage in GDR-Polish
Relations," welcomed the results of the Polish leaders'
visit to the GDR capital, remarking that "our opponents
watched in vain for a negative rift in GDR-Polish
relations."
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0)N10II)IIA'I'IA1, 11'11111 'I'I(1-1N1)Ii
i 11h;1111I IAi(Y 11)'(1
Lucu I,Itou, I'll(- Only c)rllr,lrut.l uc)mmc-nl. mr)ttLLorc cl I'rrnn (;Ulf uortrcou
hn.u [w(.,; it, I''rnatlcu (l I t11)rt.Luh I'rv)nt Wartlttw, 1)r?o:clcall l; by Ucutucl- Laic ucnctc t
()It ')I Jn.rturtr',Y, 1411 1.011 It ll~it.I. I r.rlr Lccl IL tl L(Lenu,n l; by I.'VI'It I'ol [ I;burs
uI(n):,r? 1;zyclin.lc Lo tlu c.tl.'l'ecl; thal; "rt (rI.Licrtl. lL1`Il.L1ytI:hI 0.1., the
c.rrr?urrt comnri.Ltcxl hel'c):re Lhe I)ucetrtl)or? events (toes not. mean that
their caut.)utr tic In Lhc et.tucneo of the uoc i.al:.nt or. der. ,"
but rather that; "v1.o7.a1Li.on of the correct pr:Lnc:[pleo of' thiu
order" wall reuponultrle. The din patch approvingly cited Szydlak's
further otaLernenL that "the anLinoc:[a1.Lrrt forced trying to benefit
from the conuequenceo of the deformation must be countered with
determinaL:Lorr. "
WARSAW MEDIA PUBLICIZE KATOWICE PAPER'S ATTACK ON GOMULKA
Warsaw media have underscored the importance of an article in
the 29 January issue of the Katowice daily TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA
which, In advance of the impending eighth PZPR plenum, goes
to the greatest lengths so far in attacking Wladyslaw Gomulka
in all but name. Although the article has not been reprinted
in the main party daily TRYBUNA LUDU, the Warsaw domestic
service on the 29th prominently reported in the daily press
review that it was reprinted in that day's SLOWO POWSZECHNE,
influential daily of the Catholic PAX organization. And PAP
on the 29th carried a lengthy summary of the TRYBUNA ROBOTNJCZA
article.
The author, Chief Editor Szczepanski of the daily organ of
the Katowice voivodship party organization, formerly headed
by First Secretary Gierek, explicitly assails "the autocratic
methods of the former First Secretary." More generally, the
article repeatedly attacks "the former party leadership."
While stopping short of naming Gomulka, it attacks by name
two of Gomulka's closest associates--leading ideologist
Kliszko and Jaszczuk, wno delivered the plenum report
announcing the disastrous price increases--both of whom
lost their Politburo posts on 20 December.
While denying that there are plans for "repressions" or
"watch-hunts," the article appears to presage an intensified
attack on Gomulka at the upcoming PZPR plenum: As summarized
by PAP, it declares that "the main reason" for the December
crisis was "th- departure of the former leadership from
Leninist norms" in running the party and the country, and
ii, says this thesis "will certainly be developed and
thoroughly justified in the resolutions of the eighth plenum."
CONFIDENTIAL
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r'()Nl,'II)l N'IIIAI, I''ItI:S 'I'Ifh;NI);I
i I)'Ili41f11/IItY .1 )'(.l.
On Ole ;?'(11h I'AI' eu,r.?r?led It t)r:L('l.', though clcLIL:Lau.u(1, report on the
c:Ltrr~.n1. t)LrLLca o1.' c;onu.la.luL'rr hcu:LLlr. implying that he hun been
In the hot; fti.t LI. u:Lnca 19 L)eccrnher, Lhe report urL:Ld "neuralgic
[41, 1110 . . . tII.LVC' gained In .[ntenuity," that "n:I.ght disturbances
[)er.3.LuL," rLnd that "the I):reuent state of health requires further
treatment . "
G.Lerek had set the tone for the heretofore restrained criticism
of the former First Secretary: 'thus in his plenum speech on
taking office on 20 December,, he referred only to "badly
thought-out conceptions in economic policy," and in his
speech before the SeJm on 23 December he did not go beyond
a remark that economic problems "cannot be solved in a
bureaucratic manner."
In addition to its unprecedented attack on Gomulka, the TRYBUNA
ROBOTNICZA article contains an unprecedented eulogy of Gierek.
In leading up to its attack on "the autocratic methods of the
former First Secretary," the article recalls that Gierek
"courageously" resisted Gomulka's methods even prior to the
leadership change. Polish society, it says,
knows and remembers that Edward Gierek, having in view
the real needs of the working people and the necessary
conditions of harmonious development of the whole country,
systematically held a courageous party dJ cussion with
members of the former leading group, that he always
tried to present in the forum of the former party
leadership necessary decisions resulting from the most
important needs of the economy and society.
Since the leadership change, Szczepanski continues, "the
reintroduction of Leninist methods of party life has
started from the top level," and "statutory functions,
powers, and duties have been restored to the Secretariat
of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Central
Committee itself." In the requisite criticism and self-
criticism at all party levels, he declares, "we have a
basic trump card, that is, the confidence and support
Edward Gierek enjoys among all party members and the
working class." He adds: "We must enrich and strengthen
this confidence and support for Edward Gierek."
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D, I {I. t ~
:S 10111iItIJAI{Y
TAIWAN
NCNA CARRIES ACCOUNTS OF RESISTANCE TO "U,S,-CHIANG" RULE
NCNA's international service on 25, 26, an 0 31 January carried
reports on resistance in Taiwan against the "U.S.-Chiang" rule
and :intensifying security measures to defend this "precarious"
rule. NCNA'u 25 January report told of repeated attacks on U.S.
personnel and installations and of opposition to U.S. and Japanese
economic penetration. The report on the 26th portrayed "fascist
terror and persecution of 'T'aiwan compatriots" at a time when
Chiang's regime is faced with its worst crisis since fleeing to
Taiwan. On the 31st NCNA summarized a North Korean commentary
denouncing the United States for its "protracted occupation" of
Taiwan, praising "the Taiwan people's struggle," and predicting
that the "700 million Chinese people will surely liberate Taiwan."
Though these themes are not unusual in broadcasts to Taiwan over
the PLA's Fukien Front radio, NCNA has only infrequently carried
reports of this nature. The last previous such report by NCNA
appeared on 29 June 1970 as part of the considerable propaganda
marking the 20th anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan.
That report dealt with instances of popular resistance to the
Chiang regime and the U.S. presence. There had been an earlier
spate of NCNA reports along these lines about a year ago: On
20 January 1970 NCNA carried an account of popular discontent
among the is-Landers in the same transmission that reported on
the session of the Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw that day; t'ro sub-
sequent reports depicted miseries suffered by Taiwan miners and
peasants, and NCNA on 5 February described worsening economic
conditions in Taiwan.
A clue to the timing of the reports in January mid February 1970
may have been contained in the 5 February item's reference to the
approaching spring festival, which began on 6 February last year.
The current reports may have been timed for the same occasion,
beginning this year on 27 January. As is customary in connection
with major holidays, NCNA announced on 25 January that the Fukien
Front units had been ordered to suspend their alternate-day shell-
ing of the offshore islands "as an expression of solicitude" on
the lunar new year.
A sustained international dissemination of this kind of propaganda
would presumably be intended to underscore Peking's claim to Taiwan
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iIBIS TRENDS
3 FEBRUARY 1971
-34-
at a time when the China recognition and representation ques-
tions have again become matters of moment. Repetition of
themes contained in the recent NCNA reports would serve this
end in seeking to show that the Taiwan people themselves are
victims of current arrangements. A particularly topical note
was struck in the 25 January report's warning against a grow-
ing Japanese economic presence. Peking has evinced particular
concern over Japan's future role in resolving the Taiwan ques-
tion and, more generally, over sentiment in the world community
inclined toward a "one China, one Taiwan" solution.
The latter concern has been expressed in Peking's comment on
the establishment of diplomatic relations with five countries
in recent months; in three of these cases (Canada, Italy, and
Chile), Peking accepted the compromise formula permitting the
other side merely to "take note" of Peking's claim to Taiwan
without endorsing it. Unlike Peking's comment in the cases of
Canada and Italy, however, its comment following the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations with Chile--announced on 5 January--
ignored the Taiwan question while expressing gratitude to Chile
for having voted for the EEC's representation in the United
Nations.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
3 FEBRUARY 1971
- 35 -
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CHEKIANG PROVINCE FORMS PARTY COMMITTEE, EIGHTH IN NATION
Announcing the eighth provincial party committee within 8 weeks,
NCNA on 30 January reported the formation of a new committee
for Chekiang Province. The NCNA announcement, coming 9 days
after the Chekiang provincial radio on 21 January ebulliently
reviewed party building progress throughout the province,
reported that a congress held in Hangchow from 20 to 28 January
elected 67 members and 22 alternates to the new committee.
As in the case of the other provincial committees, the Chekiang
committee was formed on the basis of the "three-in-one alliance"
of old, middle-aged, and young. It will be headed by six
secretaries, smaller than the former 16-man secretariat. Figures
on the total size of the previous committee are unavailable.
Following the pattern set in the other rebuilt provincial party
committees, the Chekiang committee will be led by men already
entrenched within the provincial power hierarchy. New party
labels went to: Nan Ping, chairman of the provincial
revolutionary committee and acting political commissar of
the Chekiang Military District (MD), who was named first
secretary and also identified for the first time as head of
the party nucleus group. Chen Li-yun, first vice chairman
and veteran military figure with responsibilities on the
Chekiang MD, was named secretary as was Hsiung Ying-tang, vice
chairman and the acting commander of the Chekiang MD.
Veteran cadres are represented on the new committee by Lai
Ko-ko, vice chairman and former secretary general on the old
party committee, who was named deputy secretary. Hsieh Cheng-hao,
vice chairman and a naval officer, was also named a deputy
secretary, as was Chai Chi-kun, chairman of the Ningpo Special
District revolutionary committee in Chekiang and the only
subprovincial powerholder on the new committee.
This latest announcement indirectly highlights once again the
political health of Politburo members Hsu Shih-yu and Chang
Chun-chiao--both recently named first secretaries on new party
comm.ittaes set up in their respective provincial bailiwicks.
Hsu and Chang have managed to make the Nanking Military
Region (MR), which they head, the first MR to rebuild all the
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3 FEBRUARY 1971
. 36 -
provincial-level party units within its jurisdiction. And
this notwithstanding the fact that the Nanking MR has more
such units to deal with than any other MR except Peking.
OTHER COMMITTEES Commenting for the first time on the fact
IN THE OFFING that "a number of provinces" have recently
elected new provincial party committees,
a 30 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, the first on a domestic
issue since 30 October, called the new committees significant
advances for "strengthening the centralized leadership of the
party." Confidently declaring that "other provinces,
municipalities and autonomous regions are in active preparation,"
the editorial went on to caution party members at all levels
against arrogance and rashness in working to greet the 50th
anniversary of the CCP "with new victories."
LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE PARTY C(MITTEE RESURGENCE
Recent provincial newspaper articles make i': clear that the forma-
tion of party committees in many areas does not mean the end of
ideological struggle. A KWANGSI DAILY editorial broadcast on
27 January noted that serious questions regarding cadre behavior
"are cropping up in the new leading groups." A TACHUNG DAILY
editorial broadcast on the 24th stated that in the key area of
educational reform "a struggle is still being waged in some
areas and among some units."
In the realm of PLA-civilian .adre relations also, problems
continue to emerge. Kunming radio on 27 January pointed out
that some PLA personnel had "overcriticized the shortcomings
of the civilian cadres" without, helping them politically.
A Hupeh article on the 26th called some of the PLA cadres in
civilian posts "arrogant and unwilling to learn from the local
cadres."
While these articles point to tensions over current political
developments, they offer little in the way of specifying tl.e
issues now causing turmoil. One of the few items to point out
a sp?zific policy now under discussion was a 21 January FUKIEN
DAILY editorial dealing with cadre decisions for the coming
year. In r section on agriculture, the editorial reemphasized
the need for even greater efforts in grain production, but
acknowledged opposition to this scheme of priorities--which
has now been pressed for several years running with presumed
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LO A~ 1 1 i~
3 FEBRUARY 1971
deleterious effect on other crops. Coming close to an outright
admission that other crops did suffer last year, the editorial
attacked the idea that "last year too much work was done on
grain production, causing an adverse effect on the sideline
production." But it did not deny that such production was down.
Both the FUKIEN DAILY editorial cited above and a HONAN DAILY
editorial broadcast on the 25th stress that the overriding
consideration in local decision-making must be the will of the
center. The Honeni editorial bluntly pouts out that inevitai.ly
"once a task is proposed, there is bound to be a struggle."
Cadres must be prepared when this occur;; to grasp new trends;
they must not assume that because they "were right at one stage
they are always right" (which sounds like a slap at "revolutionaries"
who jumped correctly in 1967, but who must now learn that discipline
has been restored). Echoing a slogan from the cultural revolution,
the editorial warns that instructions must be followed whether or
not they are understood; but in line with current efforts at
cadre education it adds that cadres must '.'strive to understand
[orders] fully in the course of carrying them out."
While the Honan editorial points at "class enemies" who are
"applying still more sinister and tricky. methods" as the cause
of many current problems, the Fukien editorial less conspiratorially
attributes most problems to a lack of organizational discipline.
Some cadres are said to have passively fallen behind, fearing
dangers so much that they "dare not do anything new," not even
emulating models "which other people have already done." But
even those who actively evade central desires are apparently
not to be automatically expelled from the ranks of "the people"
in Fukien. Spreading "fabricated rumors" and "taking the evil
road" are characterized as "grave mistakes," yet they are said
to "manifest nothing but a lack of organizational discipline."
The FuJ.ien editorial treads more sensitive ground with an
unusua:_ly effusive paean of praise to Lin Piao. Besides giving
Lin iris customary status as Mao's best pupil, the editorial
makes. the more unusual claim that Lin.is.capable of his own
philosophical, thoughts and "has in a deepgoing manner elaborated
Mao Tsetung Thought in all fields, including ideological,
political, philosophical, and military fields."
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("ONFI1.)r:N1111:A1., 10131S '.I'1t N1) 3
3 1,'i i'u.JARY 1971
- 38 -
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
REGIME SUSPENDS PUBLICATION OF STALIN-ERA HISTORY
The Soviet leadership appears again to be confronted urgently with
the "Stalin problem." As the most recent sign of this confronta-
tion, a major work in the multivolume official party history has
failed to appear on schedule. The work in question--Book 2,
Volume It of "The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union"--deals with the most sordid period of Stalin's reign
(1929-37), the era of the collectivization of agriculture, the
assassination of Kirov, and the launching of the great terror.
In view of the scope of the historical study, the delay in
publication would appear to be related to unresolved differences
in the leadership over the Stalin issue.
It is also possible, however, that the delay represents a
calculated effort to withhold authoritative assessment of
Stalin until the dust settles in the political arena. In
that case, the 24th CPSU Congress, scheduled to convene on
30 March, could conceivably serve as the forum for a major
reassessment of Stalin, as has been rumored in the Western
press in recent months. The thrust of any such reassessment
may be gauged by the more favorable image of Stalin that has
emerged in the propaganda in recent years.
OFFICIAL SILENCE Although there has been no official
announcement of any interruption in
the publication schedule of the multivolume party history,
the record clearly indicates such an interruption has occurred.
The first three volumes in the series appeared at regular
intervals during 1965-67, but Book 1, Volume 4 (covering the
1921-29 period) did not appear until last spring. Its
publication was announced in PRAVDA on 13 May; it was
subsequently advertised in various party journals; and it
was favorably reviewed in PRAVDA on 25 July. (As in the
earlier works in the series, which were addressed to the
less critical years of Stalin's career, the new work
contained numerous factual, though largely uncritical,
references to Stalin.)
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0MW11)1,:NT I / 1, W111I1 ' w,:Nlr:;
i 10Iti111iI I/My 11)'(1
IX l,hc cUrtt? I Lc;t? I,rrb I. c!rtl, 1 nn I{cthr rl~r I c Irn,rl I,n,:rr nnHH,, I'll,- c.runiutu I orr
lrl.c.tcc (;c, the I'Ir;rl, ,rn,it ul' Vulnuu? 11 nlrr,llirl liri,vr 1tl,l,r,rr,lrrl nc, Irtl,r,r-
l;ltrtu the celucl c,l.' I rtrr 1, ?yertr. Ilc,wrvtn , I,Irr i c Irrtir I,nc rr nr, r; i I;rr of
the worst rtncl no nu;n l 1 orr or 1.11 I n I,he; I,ri,r?l,y I,re;;;r ? I rtes Lr rr,rl r,tr
P6 Jrtrruta-y !. HAVI>A annourtcctcl l,hc I,ub I [cn,l; Lan ul' nnoLher vc, I tuna
in Lhc ;:;crLcu--lic:,ult I., Volunu.! 5 (coverIfl( I;hc! .I()38-)15 1u-r?Ic(l).
The friLc oL' Lltc B110,131-rig, hi-,; Lor?icrrl. wot?It h; r. c nrLn l ;rc?crrL of l,lrrr,l;
experienced by Volume 110 of "The I,rtr.?Fre `.lov.i.et Encyc'1ol)r.x1I
in the ltltrujhchev era. Volume 110, wlt:Lclr conLahled the
authoritative biography of 1'1t;a:L.i.n, 1t[)1)ertrecl I n ettri.y :L')58
after a delay of over 11.1 month:., during which rd.]. the cuh-
sequent alphabetical volumes in the encyclopedia had appeared
in print. The delay was undoubtedly caused by diffcrence;;,In
the leadership over the Stalin issue, which were temporarily
resolved by the purge of the so-called antiparty group in
mid-1957?
CAUTION ON The persistance of such differences may be
STALIN inferred by the circumspect handling of the
Stalin issue by Khrushchev's successors.
Instead of undertaking a forthright reappraisal that might
provoke public uutcries at home and abroad, the post-Khrushchev
regime, out of concern over the consolidation of its authority,
decided to sanction an indirect approach aimed more at extolling
the "heroic" past than at rehabilitating Stalin. In the
process, however, Stalin has been an important--if not the
principal--beneficiary of this campaign.
The detailed and sensational criticisms of Stalin voiced at
the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961 and recorded in the second
edition of the on-,-volume party history in 1962 have gradually
given way to the muted and stereotyped formulations of the
June 1956 CPSU Central Committee decree on the "personality
cult." At the same time, the outpouring -f military memoirs
and literary and historical works on the war during the past
few years has served to obliterate the strictures of the
Khrushchev era and restore a large measure of Stalin's
reputation as a war leader.
Stalin's credentials as a political leader, however, remain
in question. And the element of uncertainty on this matter,
which in one way or another touches on other vital aspects
of Soviet state and society, is not likely to be lessened by
the recent decision to suspend judgment on the most sordid
period of Stalin's reign.
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i'(rlVl" ll0I11,111AI, I11h1:1 'I'I(I-:IVU:i
t I411:ItI(IIAI(Y 11)'(1
K(iMMl1N I :;T AI t I I CLL.: 1JR(iI=:; `STRONG 11A )l
R FOR COLLECTIVE
Th(? nur rl 1'r;r? a ;rl,rori(~ Iertricr Iii I'll'' Irr;;I,I I,rtt,I nrrr of p(,wr.r In
rtrl ul!d by A. I', r;il,lu In t,hr~ l1 rid, L;itirt(' of I(()MMIINI 'I' J.'or J.)'(L.
'111(, n.pi? rtr?rtnu, I,I1n.r'I,Iclrt, rnnt.I I,11?r1 "'I'll(! Aul,horll,y (J' It
I,r n, I r ," cu l nr? I rl,,;, w l l,h other c l'I'ort,;: l'o 1.11] In! hr(!yhlloV In
u l , r t l , r r r . ( -rnu;; 1 , r ' r ' u r ! r t 1 , l?Y , the puh l LcrtL ion i n lflAVI)A oil ,'.O Jrtr-uitry
of n, I ocn l Lr n.rl, r ';i r1011 L~~urtL Lon of It [Ill as Iton.d of the
I'oI l Lburo.
Ar'L I clew tluLL are pro-co]. l ve L i.v i. L?y continue to he publiulted
r.tlno, however, and there are Indications that some party
ot?t,tu1Izuti.(,rtr) conLInue to r?C;.ilut the attempts to exalt
Brezhnev. Unlike other republican papers, the Georgian
ctrtd Relot?ucti.i nn newspapers deleted froth the 7ASS report
(published In i HAVDA) Lite reference to Brezhrtev as head of
the PO L.rthuro.
In his KOMMUNIST article Pershin affirms that "no matter
what; sphere of public life we consider, any organization
is unthinkable without authority, without a dominating will,
embodied either in one person or in a collective organ." In
this respect he contradicts the view of Vice Admiral I. Rudnev,
chief of the political administration of the Black Sea Fleet,
in RED STAR on 12 January: "Collegiality in working out party
policy and in adopting decisions in the CPSU is assured by the
fact that it is not individual persons or one-man leaders which
stand at the head of party organizations, but collective
organs--bureaus and committees." Another admiral, P. Ushakov,
writing in a January issue of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES
(No. 1), also reasserted the principle of collectivity, arguing
that no leader "no matter how capable" can replace the
collective. A January PARTY LIFE (No. 2) article by
S. Smirnov on Leninist principles and norms likewise urged
"further development of intra-party democracy" and "strengthen-
ing of the principle of collective leadership," and called for
"undeviating observance" of principles and norms of party life.
Pershin's article tends to subordinate the principle of
collectivity to the need for a strong leader:
Relying on the masses and collegiality in discussing
basic problems in no way reduces the role of the
administrative functions of the leader, his one-man
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( ( ) I V l I I ; I i ; J ' I AI, 1010;1 'I'IiI;NI~ ;
IOI l IltIAIIY 1.')'(1.
reulu,r,n I h L.I. L Ly ri.ucl une-mri.u till rnatr,emerrt--w.l. hoot Lhere
Would hc, no I,rc ci;u.ru::. u; or c!:f.I.'Letenc!,y of' leade:r.?alr.r.p.
I,err.i.rr, wh i Lr do l.'c ru.l.].ntr collect Lvi ty and co:Ll.eg:J.aa.].ty
In adniIrri.rttrn.l;iorr, more tlrrru once crl;;o warned against
:xLrernec;, Lr.rrrr.J.rrg eollcgia:L ort*ruur Into talk shops.
Accordi.nt* to Pe.r:_rlra.u, Lenin asserted that "final decisions
belong to one leader--'to one comrade, known for his :firmness,
dec.hd.vene:.;o, boldness, ability to conduct practical work and
enjoying the moat confidence.' In all cases without exception
democracy in leadersh:J.lp and collegiality must be combined with
the authority of an administrator, with the personal responsibility
of a leader." Pershin also quotes Lenin on the need for
"unquestioned obedience to the will of one person, a Soviet
leader, during work." He does, however, caution that if a
leader "acts against the interests of the collective, does not
meet the demands of life and does not consider real conditions,"
the party corrects him and, if necessary, can even replace him.
BACKGROUND The role of the leader vis-a-vis the collective
has been the subject of continuing debate in
recent years. After a concentrated surge of pro-collectivity
articles in January-February 1969 (the last of which--
G. I. Shitarev's in QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, No. 3--
recalled that the October 1964 plenum had acted "against
attempts to replace collective decisions with one-man
actions"), sporadic attempts have been made to boost the
role of the individual leader. In April 1969--the month
in which Kunayev first used the formulation "Politburo
headed by Brezhnev"--V. Churnichev wrote in POLITICAL SELF-
EDUCATION that collectivity "includes the recognition of
the role and responsibility of a leader" and requires
rejection of "anarchic views negating the role of leaders
and organizers of the masses." He went on: "To the same
degree that collectivity is needed, stressed Vladimir
Ilich, one-man management is needed so that there will not
be irresponsibility in work." This view was repeated by
Col. M. Timofeyechev in an October COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED
FORCES (No. 20, 1969).
Yu. G. Tui.rishchev carried the argument still further in
the December 1969 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY. Using the
term "vozhd" (chief) instead of "rukovoditel" (leader),
he upheld the need for strong "chiefs of the party, the
most experienced and farsir;hted of its leaders." He
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(;(.)NI'1I)I1;N'I'.f.11I 1'731:0 'I HNNI);3
13 1' l' I3HIJANY :L9'(:I.
uouf;11L to di..l'fcrenta.alte such r.tuthori.t,y l'rorn t:e cult of personality
by decLara.ng that under the :Latter the leader acquired "a
supernatural role" which belittled the role of the party and
the masses (o,s under Stalin).
The articles In this vein were implicitly challenged by other,".
In the June 1969 QUES'.I.'IONS OF CPSU HISTORY I. I. Ivanov w^ote
that "while rioting the important role of outstanding persons
an(L leaders, the party resolutely fights glorification of
particular leaders.' Georgian Second Secretary P. A. Rodionov--
whose treatises on collectivity appear more frequently than
those by any other author--asserted in PRAVDA in 2 Au,;ust 1969
that "no one belittles nor can belittle the role of a first
secretary. But he can successfully carry out this responsible
role only by relying on the collective . . . ." V. P. Nikolayeva
in the September 1969 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, seemingly with
Kunayev's April statement in mind, wrote: "It is well known
that Lenin categorically objected to exaggerations of the role
of his person and opposed attributing nonexistent offices to
him"--for example, by crossing out the title "chairman of the
Politburo." Nevertheless, Kunayev again called Brezhnev head
of the Politburo in November 1969.
In early 1970 Rodionov again adopted a more reserved position
in the debate. Writing in the April QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY,
he duly rioted that collectivity did not negate the role of
leaders, but his definition of the limits of authority was
more restrictive. In his view, a cult involved "superstitious
admiration of a particular outstanding person and belittling
the role of the masses," while legitimate authority was "based
on recognizing the decisive role of the masses, collectivity
in work, the community of interests of leaders and followers,
and correct, deep understanding of these interests." Rodionov
stressed a secretary's subordination to the collective and
further noted that collectivity was improved in Lenin's day
by expanding the size of the Politburo.
The discussion has appeared to taper off since early 1970,
but occasional articles with controversial ideas have
continued to appear. Krasnodar First Secretary G. S. Zolotukhin
in the August QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY argued that collectivity
requires management by the leader of the collective organ and
that one-man decisions are not incompatible with democracy.
Central Committee cadre section instructor N. Zolotarev in a
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CON I'fUI+,N'I'.1:/1I 'I'ItI NI);i
3 I''I,;IiHIJAi Y P)'(1,
September 1)'(0 ICOMMUNTS'I' (No. .13) retailed Lenin'n domand Lhrut
whenever possible "toll octiv:Lty should be reduced to the
shortest diucusrsion of only the most :Important qucwtionu In
the smallest collegiurn, and the practical management of an
institution, enterprise, matter or task should be entrurrted
to one comrade . . . ."
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% Confidential
FOREIGN ~
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
I~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~
,~) d C-/U-~
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
10 FEBRUARY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 6)
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