TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 27, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
Confidential
Illlllliluiu~~~~~~iiiillllllll~ II
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICEiII
~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~ II~~~
IR
NDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
27 JANUARY 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 4)
STATSPEC
T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
CON FIIDE' N'I'IAL.
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination th other U.S.
Government components.
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Eulud.d from oolomoIk
downgrod;ng and
dedonif coiion
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/ 55 ?1CRDP85T00875R000300040004-7
NI IAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
C 0 N T E N T S
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
DTV Statement, Front Message Score New U.S. Acts in Cambodia 1
"Victories" in Cambodia Hailed; Lon Nol Saigon Trip Assailed . . 3
Phnom Penh Proposal to Trade P,)W's for Newsmen Rejected . . . . . 5
Sihanoui,. Deplores U.S. Actions Against "Liberation Army" . . . . 5
PRC Attacks ".Escalation" in Foreign Ministry Statement, Comment . 6
Moscow Plays Up "Escalation," Notes U.S. Domestic Criticism . 8
Hanoi, Front Blame Nixon for Two-Year Dead-Lock at Paris Talks . . 9
Hanoi Sco:?es GVN Method of Release of Prisoners to DRV . . 11
DRV Politburo Member Truong Chinh Reappears in Public . . . . 13
Laos: Souphanouvong Envoy Leaves Vientiane for "Instructions"~ . 14
PRC FOREIGN AFI'AIRS
Peking Presses Line on OpDosition to Superpower Dominance
Evolution of Peking's Approach to Triangular Relationship
Regime Demands "Discipline," Conciliates Coastal Workers . .
19
Moscow Draws First Analogy Between Polish, Czechoslovak Events .
21
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PRAVDA Reports Statement that Brezhnev "Head" of Politburo . . .
23
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Anhwei Becomes Seventh Province to Form Party Committee . . . . .
25
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release I
999/W j5 j&AD~ T 8758000300040004-7
O LY FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOP ATTENTION 18 - 2.4 JANUARY 1971
Moscow (3371+ items)
Podgornyy in UAR for (18%) 11%
Aswan Dam Cummission
ing
Indochina (5%) 7%
Luna 17, Lunakhod. (5%) 5%
U.S. "Zionist" Anti- (3%) 4%
Soviet Activities
China (3%) 4%
Czechoslovak CP (3%) 4%
Document on 1968-
69 Events
Italian CP, 50th (0.1%) 2%
Anniversary
Commonwealth Con- (2%) 2%
ference in
Singapore
Peking (2820 items)
Tndochina (14%) 314%
[Cambodia (4%) 17%]
[Lao People's (1%) 6%]
Liberation
Anniversary
Domestic Issues (38%) 29%
[Anhwei Party (--) 2%]
Congress
[L'aoning Party (1%) 1%]
Congress
Latin American (0.03%) 8%
Territorial Waters
Equatorial Guinea (0.03%) 6%
Government Delega-
tion in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attertion in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Treads. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of ninor significance
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
INDOCHINA
Hanoi keeps high-level attention focused on the U.S. role in the
"war of aggression" in Cambodia with a government statement
released on 24 January, five days after a DP,V Foreign Ministry
statement on U.S. action throughout Indochina had claimed that
".massive operations" in Cambodia have been conducted "under
direct U.S. command." The statement observes that Secretary
Laird on the 20th "brazenly declared" that the United States
would continue to use its air and naval forces in Cambodia. It
claims that "intensification of U.S. aggression" is aimed, in
vain, at saving the Phnom Penh "henchmen" from complete collapse
and the Nixon Doctrine from failure.
The PRG has not issued a statement on Cambodia at the government
level, although it had followed the DRV lead when it issued its
20 Januar:r foreign ministry statement condemning U.S. action in
Cambodia and throughout Indochina. The most authoritative Front
comment on Cambodia is a message from NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu
Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat congratulating Sihanouk and
Penn Nouth on the recent "great victories" of the Cambodian
"patriotic armed forces" on Highway 4 and in Phnom Penh.
Cambodian developments also prompt a flurry of statements from
Sihanouk and his government and front protesting U.S. involvement
and hailing the exploits of the insurgents.
Peking offers high-level comment in a foreign ministry statement
on the 25th endorsing the earlier DRV and PRG foreign ministry
statements aid charging that the Nixon Admi..7stration "is
flagrantly clamoring that it will not be restricted in committing
acts of aggression in Indochina." In this connection, an NCNA
commentary on the 24th levels a vehement attack at Secretary
Laird's 20 January remarks on the use of U.S. air and naval power.
Moscow to date has issued no authoritative statement on the
increased use of air power in Indochina and the increased U.S.
support role in Cambodia. However, routine propaganda continues
to cite statements by Secretary Laird, including his press con-
ference remarks on the 20th, as evidence of U.S. "escalation";
and propagandists note that domestic opposition to the
Administration's Indochina policy is mounting.
DRV STATEMENT, FRONT MESSAGE SCORE NEW U.S. ACTS IN CAMBODIA
GOVERNMENT The 24 January DRV Government statement, like
STATEMENT earlier propaganda, links U.S. intensification
of the "aggression" with the "massive increase"
of American m;.litary aid to Phnom Penh and the subsequent
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 1999/O ziCFAdtDP85T008 ( 00040004-7
27 JANUARY 1971
trips of Secretary Laird to Saigon and Admiral Moorer to
Cambodia.*
The statement reiterates the charge in the DRV Foreign Ministry
statement of the 19th that allied military opeiati.ons on
Cambodian Highway 4 are "under U.S. command." It goes on to
score U.S. bombing in Cambodia and support for allied operations
there by the Seventh Fleet, and it describes as "brazen"
Secretary Laird's 20 January remarks on the continued use of
U.S. air and sea power in Cambodia. The statement says "it
is clear that the Nixon Administration has grossly trampled
underfoot the sacred national rights of the Khmer people,
the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva agreements on
Cambodia, and all elementary norms of. international law."
Echoing the foreig.i ministry statement of the 19th, it
denounces President Nixon's five-pcint :e ace initiative as a
"mere deception."
Hailing Cambcdian insurgent "victories," the government state-
ment claims that the achievements of the "Cambodian national
liberation armed forces" have, over the past months, landed
the Lon Nol regime "in an extremely critical situation." It
endorses the 18 January appeal from Sihanouk and his government
and front and the 20 January statement of RGNU and FUNK, and
it concludes that the Vietnamese "are determined to persist in
and ste}- up their struggle against U.S. aggression, for national
salvation, and to stand shoulder to snoulder with the fraternal
Khmer people so as to fight together and together leaa the just
cause of the two countries to complete victory."
NFLSV/PRG The most authoritative South Vietnamese communist
MESSAGE comment on Cambodia is a message from Front
Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh
Tan Phat congratulating Sihanouk and Penn Nouth on the recent
"great victories" of the Cambodian "patriotic armed forces."
Insurgent achievements on Highway !, and in Phnom Penh are
* DRV statements at the government level in recent months
have been confined to Cambodian developments. Thus, most
recently, a DRV Government statement issued on 15 October
condemned the Phnom Penh announcement on formation of the
Khmer Republic. The U.S. incursion, into Cambodia prompted a
government statement on 2 May, and a 25 March 1970 statement
condemned the coup which ousted Sihanouk.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25 :1313
85T00875R000300040004-7
C NTIAL FfIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
particularly praiseci, and the message asserts that these
"brilliant victories" are "due anslrers to the cunning schemes
and perfidious and barbarous tricks of the Nixon Administration,
which is intencifying and extending the war of aggression in
Cambodia . . . ." Like Hanoi, the Front and PRG leaders
endorse recent statements by Sihanouk and the FUNK and RGNU
and pledge to stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the Cambodian
and Lao peoples.
"VICTORIES" IN CAMBODIA HAILED; LON NOL SAIGON TRIP ASSAILED
MILITARY Vietnamese communist media have not acknowledged
ACTION the allied recapture of_Pich Nil Pass on 23. January
in the course of the allied clearing operation along
Highway 4. But commentaries do take note of reports of fighting
at the pass, stressing the number of casualties allegedly
inflicted on allied forces. And Hanoi-and Front commentaries
cite an 18 January AFP dispatch for the observation "even if the
Lon Nol forces reacii the summit of Pich Nil, the fighting in the
area will not be over." An article in the 22 January 0UAN DOI
NHAN DAN broadcast in excerpts by Hanoi on the same day. review-
ing action along Highway 4 since July 1970, says the government
troops are still being checked in their efforts to take Pich
Nil Pass. It observes that the insurgents occupied the pass
at a time when government forces were "deadlocked" on Highways
6 and 7 to the north and northeast of Phnom Penh.
Like other comment, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article links the
launching of the allied operation on Highway 4 with the visits
of Secretary Laird to Saigon and of Admiral Moorer to Phnom
Penh. It reiterates claims that the allied operation was
"violently counterattacked" and that some 1,500 allied troops
were put out of action in the engagements from 1 through 15
January. The article concludes that "by pinning down thousands
of enemy troops along Highways 6 and 7, by repeatedly harassing
the enemy on the Mekong River, by exerting control on Highway 1,
by cutting Kighway 5, and by vigo:oously fighting the enemy on
highway 4. the Cambodia.- armed forces and people are driving
the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen into a defensive position
and bitter defeats."
Citing Western news reports, Vietnamese communist media on the
22d hail that morning's communist attack on the Phnom Penh
airport, which "virtually destroyed"the air force, and on the
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09R?F:.I4QP85T0087O@QN40004-7
27 JANUARY 1971
23d took note of other insurgent attacks around the Cambodian
capital: the 22 January attack on a naval base east of Phnom
Penh and bombing of the South Vietnamese ambassador's
residence, and the 23 January bombing of a police station.
A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary and a Liberation Radio commentary
on the 23d declare that the airport attack was "well coordinated"
with attacks on Highway 4 and praise the "resourceful" and
"flexible" fighting methods of the Cambodian forces. Both
maintain that U.S. bombs and ammunition have proven useless,
and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN asserts that "the Americans and
Saigon puppets are unable to save the Lon Nol clique, which
is becoming increasingly isolated and weakened."
An article in NHAN DAN, summarized in a Hanoi domestic
broadcast on the 24th, claims that the airport attack was
carried out "with the assistance and protection of the people."
It notes that Cambodian Government. troops operating on Highway
4 are being withdrawn to return to protect the capital. The
attack on the airport continues to be acclaimed, with
commentaries in both NHAN PAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on
26 January.
LON NOL TRIP The NHAN DAN article on the 24th and other
comment note that the attack on the Phliom
Penh airport occurred soon after Lon Nol's return from his
trip to Saigon. Observing that "Lon Nol escaped death but
his aircraft was hit and exploded," NHAU DAN says "that was the
Khmer people's stern warning to this vicious traitor."
Other comment on Lon Nol's 20-21 January Saigon visit includes
a 20 January Liberation Radio commentary which calls it a
"crime-studded trip" to collude in the implementation of the
"U.S. plan to intensify and spread the war to all of Indochina
and to carry out the Nixon doctrine to use Indochinese to fight
Indochinese." Calling Lon Nol a "notorious murderer," it
says that the GVN leaders, by receiving him, are exposed as
"unscrupulous low-class individuals who have sold their souls
to the Americans." A Hanoi radio commentary on the 23d
describes the trip as "a new step in an alliance aimed at
coordinating U.S. war acts in Cambodia and South Vietnam."
It stresses reports of continuing differences between the
Phnom Penh and Saigon regimes, claiming that Lon Nol brought
with him a list of complaints about the actions of South
Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia and that the GVN presented
him with a demand for more than 20 million dollars in
expenditures for the South Vietnamese military operations in
Cambodia.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00876R000300040004-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
PHNOM PENH PROPOSAL TO TRADE POW'S FOR NEWSMEN REJECTED
A Phnom Penh proposal on 21 January that Vietnamese communist
prisoners of war be exchanged for foreign journalists missing
in Cambodia is attacked at length in a 23 January Hanoi domestic
broadcast and rejected in a 24+ January DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's protest against the Cambodian Government's
"persecution and arrest" of Vietnamese. (A similar PRG Foreign
Ministry spokesman's protest on the 23d made no mention of the
proposal.) The DRV spokesman endorses a 5 January RGNU
spokesman's statement which held that the Lon Nol government
must bear responsibility for journalists missing in Cambodia.
The 23 January broadcast dismisses the suggestion of an
exchange as a "psychological warfare trick" and charges that
Lon Nol "fabricated the tale of 'North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong POW's' in Cambodia" in order to accuse the Vietnamese
of being aggressors and to "conceal the crime. of Americans
who have frantically stepped up the war of aggression in
Cambodia." The radio claims that Lon Nol's regime is also
trying to "evade its responsibility to insure the safety of
foreign newsmen stationed in Cambodia." It adds that "this
trick of Lon Nol is also linked to the campaign on 'the POW
question' noisily raised by the Nixon Administration in the
recent past with a view to misleading and concealing the U.S.
imperialists' military adventures in Vietnam and in the whole
of Indochina."
The radio reiterates the stand of the RGNU statement in early
January which held that the RGNU, the FUNK, and the "liberation"
forces were relieved of all responsibility for "accidents that
might happen on the battlefields to newsmen allowed by the
Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique to enter Cambodia." Like the state-
ment, it adds that "real newsmen" have been treated well and
released, although they did not have RGNU permission to enter
"liberated areas."
SIHANOUK DEPLORES U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST "LIBERATION ARMY"
The military developmer_ts in Cambodia have elicited a series of
statements from Sihanouk and his government (RGNU) and front
(FUNK). Following an appeal on the 18th, there are statements
by Sihanouk and the FUNK/RGNU on 19 and 20 January, respectively,
protesting U.S. involvement in Cambodia and requesting that
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/091gi, iC18; RP85T00875 Q QAgRps40004-7
27 JANUARY 1971
worldwide pressure be brought on the Nixon Administration to
end its "aggression." Sihanouk's statement also calls for
nations to break relations and end cooperation with Phnom
Penh, to recognize the RGNU as the sole legitimate Cambodian
government, and to give "military and humanitarian" aid to
"the Khmer people" who are fighting "under the banner of the
FUNK."
In his statement, the text of which was carried by NCNA in
English on the 21st, Sihanouk charged that the United States
has never ceased its involvement in the "Cambodian civil
war" and has "defrauded the Khmer people.of the decisive
victory which their national liberation army was on the point
of winning irresistibly many times and on many occasions over
the forces of the fascist traitors in Phnom Penh." This
passage was omitted from an earlier NCNA Chinese-language
summary of the statement, which did include Sihanouk's
claim that the "new aggression" by the United States "is,
from the viewpoint of the genocide of the Khmer people and.
the neocolonization of the Khmer country, still more serious
than the aggression of 1 May 1970."
Sihanouk's 16th "message to the Khmer nation," issued on the
22d and carried by NCNA on the 23d, cites Western news
reports "o demonstrate the success of the insurgents in
recent fighting. Congratulations on insurgent "victories"
are expressed in a message from Sihanouk and Penn Nouth sent
on the 23d to RGNU Defense Minister Khieu Samphan.
PRC ATTACKS "ESCALATION" IN FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT, COMMENT
The 25 January PR' Foreign Ministry statement charges that "since
the dry season set in, the Nixon government has adopted a series
of grave steps to further expand its war of aggression in
Indochina." It cites recent develooments in Indochina to document
its claim that "U.S. imperialism is wildly attempting to launch
a new military adventure," and it warns that "the Chinese
Government and people are closely watching the development of this
scheme of the Nixon government." In listing evidence of expanded
"aggression," the statement claims that the United States "direct-
ed" South Vietnamese-Cambodian Government forces to attack
Cambodian insurgents and "dispatched.U.S. planes, warships, and
military 'advisers' to take a direct part in the war."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T008`75R000300040004-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
The statement promises routinely that China will be firm in its
backing for the three Indochinese peoples. It endorses the DRV
and PRG foreign ministry statements.of the 19th and 20th and
the statements from Sihanouk and from the FUNK and RGNU on the
19th and 20th--statements previously welcomed in a 22 January
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which scored the U.S. role
in Cambodia, including the alleged use of U.S. "ground 'advisers.
The article claimed that "now people can clearly see that Nixon
simply does not hope the war in Indochina to be 'over'; instead,
he is racking his brains to drag on and expand his war of
aggression."
Secretary Laird is sharply attacked in a 24 January NCNA
commentary by Ou Ping pegged to his 20 January press conference.
Observing that Laird "was put on the spot" by the reporters,
Ou Ping notes that they criticized the use of U.S. planes and
helicopters in Cambodia and said that U.S. actions went beyond
the scope of policies spelled out last year. Ou Ping then
recalls President Nixon's 30 June speech on the Cambodian action,
saying the President had "pretended to 'guarantee' that the
United States would no longer give 'air or logistical support
to the Lon Nol regime . "'
Ou Ping says that Laird was first embarrassed by the reporters
but then became angry and "bluntly replied 'as long as I.remain
in my present post, I must continue.to recommend the use of
air forces in Laos and Cambodia." Ou Ping Gays that this is
entirely consistent with Laird's defense of the massive air
strikes against the DRV two months ago and is merely the latest
demonstration that "imperialists" see "aggression" as their
duty. The commentator adds that one cannot expect "U.S.
imperialism" to act with reason and that the. only way to deal
with it is to "defeat it totally with crushing blows." Thos
Indochinese people, Ou Ping adds, "have never ha(l any illusion
about U.S. imperialism, nor will they pay any heed to the threats
of Laird and his ilk."
The contrast between Peking's calls for a military solution in
Indochina and Hanoi's efforts on the diplomatic front is
currently underlined! A 25 January NCNA account of a 23 January
NHAN DAN Commentator article on the past two years of the Paris
talks manages to make no mention of the talks themselves,
instead dwelling on evidence of U.S. "aggression" and Commentator's
attacks on the Vietnamization program.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
MOSCOW PLAYS UP "ESCALATION." NOTES U.S. DOMESTIC CRITICI'z^
Moscow comment continues to portray the United States as widen-
ing the Indochina conflict. TASS Observer Kharkov on the 21st,
reporting on Secretary Laird's press conference the day before,
said his "blunt" statement that "the present situation in
Cambodia is of critical importance for the success of the
Vietnamization program" means, "as the American press itself
noted," a "considerable enlargement of the framework of the
Nixon Doctrine, of which Vietnamization is the very core."
An Orekhov commentary in PRAVDA on the 23d singled out Laird's
claim that "the American military command has the right to
undertake anything it can for the protection of American
troops that remain in South Vietnam" and said this is the
"pretext" under which the United States has extended the war
into Laos and Cambodia.
On the 20th a Radio Moscow domestic broadcast belatedly
acknowledged reports of a raid by South Vietnamese paratroopers
in Cambodia on the 17th. Without mentioning that the reported
target of the raid was a camp where American prisoners were
believed to be held, the radio said the "new provocation" was
carried out by "a large unit of South Vietnamese paratroopers,
accompanied by so-called American advisers, who were dropped
on an area deep inside Cambodia." It is.now becoming evident,
the radio added, that "the notorious American advisers, in
great numbers, are conducting combat operations against the
patriots."
The matter of advisers was also brought up in a domestic news
item on the 26th. It quoted the New York TIMES as saying that
there are plans for U.S. representatives to check on the
effectiveness of the Cambodians' use of American arms and
equipment--"thus the matter in question is the dispatch to
Cambodia of American military advisers, which is in flagrant
contradiction with the decision of the U.S. Congress."
Also on the 26th, TASS said a Pentagon spokesman "admitted
that the United States is training Cambodian troops in South
Vietnam and Thailand." On the 23d, Radio Moscow had reported
U.S. construction of "a helicopter base" in Cambodia to
support Saigon and Phnom Penh forces.
Moscow promptly hailed the communist raid on Phnom Penh air-
port on the 22d, alleging that it "has further worsened the
position of the Phnom Penh authorities." A Radio Moscow
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/3p,- L % L ; pP85T00875R000300040004-7
FBIS TRENDS
27 JAWJARY 19'j 1
report the next day plryTed the same theme in noting that the
raid "dealt a colossal. blow to the pr'.stige of Lon Noll' and
added that Washington is "hastening to repair the damage."
Other Moscow reportage and comment plays U.S. domestic
opposition, particularly among members of Congress, to
Administration policy in Indochina. A TASS Washington dispatch
on the 23d reported that Washington's "escalation of the war
against Cambodia is being widely and sharply condemned in the
American press, with even conservative papers joining in indict-
ing the Adminl:;tration for violating the will of Congress and
its own promises to bring the war in Southeast Asia to an end."
In a similar vein, Re~_io Moscow commented on the 22d that the
new session of the U.S. Congress has "opened against the back-
ground of increasing American aggression in Indochina-"
President Nixon, it added, "has thrown a new challenge to
Congress, ignoring its decisions prohibiting a repetition of
armed intrusion into Cambodia." In the same context, Soviet
media have publicized criticism of Administration policy by
Senators Mansfield, Muskie, Church, McGovern, and Aiken.
PRAVDA ON A PRAVDA article c,n the 26th, reported by TASS,
PARIS TALKS attributes the "disappointing results" of the
Paris peace talks to Washington's "unwilling-
ness to heed sober advice." Noting that the United States has
consistently rejected proposals from the other side and has
been "widening its aggression to Cambodia.and Laos," the
article says the only way to break the present deadlock is
by "taking a realistic approach to the solution of the Vietnam
problem; this was stressed once again at the 100th meeting in
Paris by Xuan Thuy," who "urged the American side to begin
serious talks."
HANOI, FRONT BLAME NIXON FOR TWO-YEAR DEADLOCK AT PARIS TALKS
Both the DRV end PRG delegates at the 100th sessioii of the Paris
talks (,n 21 January reviewed the conference's work of the past
two years. The 100th session and the second anniversary of the
talks also occasion a lengthy 23 January NHAN DAN Commentator
article broadcast that day by Hanoi radio and reviewed by VNA.
Front comment includes a 21 January LPA Commentator article,
carried by LPA that day and broadcast by Liberation Radio on
the following day, and a Liberation Radio station commentary
on the 22d. The comment uniformly places the blame on the
Nixon Administration for all delays at Paris and urges an
early solution to the Vietnam problem on the basis of the PRG's
proposals.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release I 999/Q9liSi >j,rwl,LtDP85T008i7ABOQ),9040004-7
27 JANUARY 1971
The NHAN DAN Commentator article, like Xuan Thuy at the Paris
session, maintains that President Nixon has tried for two years
to create a position of strength on the battlefield and at the
negotiating table. Commentator says that during the past
100 sessions, the U.S. delegation "wasted time pleading for
Nixon's aggressive policy and colonialist plot that were
reflected in his warlike eight-point plan of 14 May and his
five-point proposal of 7 October 1970. The delegation has
resorted to deceitful maneuvers--such as the POW problem--to
fool public opinion." The article adds: "When Nixon had
to cope with public pressure, he stated that the conference
had made progress. When he wanted to undermine the conference,
he approved the resignation of the U.S. delegation's chief and
refused to appoint a successor for half a year."
Like the delegates at -Paris, the Corrnentator article and Front
comment score the U.S. positior -)n.a troop withdrawal and the
Vietnamese right to self -detern,ination and say that the PRG's
solution on these two fundamental issues "is correct, rational,
sensible, clear, and comprehensive." Commentator routinely
denounces the Nixon.Doctrine and. Vietnam ization as policies
aimed- at continuing aggression.
Both PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh and DRV delegateXuan Thuy
in i:h?,ir reviews of the history of the Paris sessions scored
the U.S. position on mm:tual troop withdrawal and self-
determination for the South Vietnamese, but VNA reported only
the details of Mme. Binh's remarks. The VNA and LPA
accounts both note that she spelle,' out the PRG's
proposals on these basic issues.
The VNA account also duly reports that Mme. Binh condemned
the Nixon Administration for intensifying the war in the
South and for "repeat''dly bombing and strafing North Vietnam,
escalating the war in Laos, and expanding the war to Cambodia."
VNA nntes.Xuan Thuy's remarks on U.S. bombings and shellings
of the DRV but, inexplicably, omits his remarks on escalation
in Cambodia.
VNA's account of the allied delegates' presentations brusquely
notes that "for his part, the U.S. negotiator did his best to
argue for the policy which the Nixon Administration has
carried out over the past two years--prolong and.. expand the
war of aggression, drive the Paris conference on Vietnam into
a deadlock, and threaten to sabotage it. Speaking. in his turn.,
the delegate of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration
exerted his energies to plead for his U.S. master."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09
W,: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
L1 I)I!IN'.I!l.A1, 11111",; '.I'RERI ;a
27 JANL1/1ItY 197:1.
HANOI SCORES GVN METHOD OF RELEASE CF PRISONERS TO DRV
Hanoi reacts to the planned 2I+ Ja_inuat y GVN release of a number
of disabled North Vietnamese prisoners with two "authorized"
VNA statements on the 23d. And the iwbhods of the release
are scored in a 25 January DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement. Consistent with past Hanoi practice, the statement
obfuscates the fact that North Vietnam had actually received
the prisoners, and scores the GVN for "deliberately refusing"
to comply with DRV provisions on the ivl.ease of 37 Vietamese
"illegally arrested in South Vietnam."
(Western retorts
following the release on the 24th said that three of the 40
prisoners to be released had decided not to return to the
DRV at the last moment.)
The foreign ministry spokesman's statement scored the GVN
for taking advantage of the prisoner release and for
"introducing into the demilitarized zone troops, weapons,
and war means including 25 M-113 armored personnel carriers
in order to conduct military acts." It "strongly protested
against and denounced . . . these brazen acts" by the "U.S.
puppets."
Complaints about the GVN's use of M-113 armored vehicles to
take the "arrested persons" to the Ben Hai River had been
aired in a radio commentary on the 24th, which was broadcast
at about the time of the actual release. As documentation
of the danger, the broadcast said that the allies had shelled
the southern part of the DMZ "from 1800 to 2330 Hanoi time"
on the 23d. It also assailed the International Red Cross
for allowing the procedure, saying that it had no right to
intervene and insisted on previous DRV stipulations.
The first indication that the DRV objected to the GVN's
method of release--which GVN Ambassador Lam had presented to
the DRV delegation in Paris at the 14 January Paris session--
come in a 23 January VNA "authorized" statement--first
released at 0430 GMT. The VNA statement recalls that a DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement had been released on
24 December following GVN Foreign Minister Lam's announcement
on the 22d of the planned release of a number of Vietnamese
prisoners as a humanitarian gesture for Tet. VNA repeats
the assertion of the spokesman that if any detained "patriots"
were released and desired to live in the North they would be
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999tO9i'25i.a,ICilA RRDP85T00817:5R000i300040004-7
IANtJAliv 19/ 1
40
r'ece l vecl and II.I;I; I I;tovl h,y 1,111' I11iV (;, vr'rrnnout, . 'I'hr~ VNI1 i;tn,t4'-
mc.(rrt then r.tsr;e-r'Led 1,111 0, it, vertu "n,;ILhor'rierl Lo nitrite II, clortr"'
that the) 1;r(Ue.711!, rc'lr'rc;;e r+,n(I rc'r'e'lrtlur1 of Lheue~
people mur;I; he c ctrl' i erI )(It, III I,he ;;rune way an the
relc,r.tc;c and recc'ltt,ton ~,,n 11 .Ii.tly 1.9'(0.* Itcrc l.l'LcrrI.l,y,
t1100C poolrle wr.1.1 be 1, r'rtnrlpor1,ed. by rx.1a rtn(I releated.
near the DRV Let rl.tor itt! water at, the mouth of the
Cua T11 rig It rver at 1000 flours ilanol Lime on 211 January
All. mull.Lary activlLleu within Lhe r''.Ierr:;e area
must be utopped. The Arrrcrlearra and. puppetn roust
provid on superpowers represents the latest phase in
its attempt -co come to terms with Soviet and U.S. power and
to acquire leverage in the triangular relationship. During
the period of isolationist withdrawal following Peking's
rejection of appeals for communist unity in the mid-1960's,
the Chinese portrayal of the international environment was
dominated by a picture of Soviet-U.S. "encirclement" and
containment of China. After the election of President Nixon
there were signs that Peking hoped to use the United States
as a counterpoise to the Soviets. At that time Peking called
for resumption of the Warsaw talks with representatives of the
incoming Administration, and its comment on the election and
inauguration was noncommittal on substantive Sino-U.S. issues
while warning Washington not to pursue Soviet-U.S. cooperation
at the expense of other interests. Peking canceled the Warsaw
session just prior to its scheduled date of 20 February 1969,
ostensibly in reaction to the U.S. acceptance of a Chinese
defectcr but possibly out of a judgment that the new Administra-
tion intended to follow a hard line on China while concentrating
on relations with Moscow. During the period of Sino-Soviet
border tension and clashes, Peking's comment reflected a sieg
mentality whicn viewed its two major rivals as engaged in joint
anti-Chinese efforts.
After the opening of the Sino-Soviet bordar talks on 20 October
1969 and an accompanying reduction in tension, Peking again showed
an apprecia-;,ion of uses to which the triangular relationship
could be put. This was reflected, for etc m1 e . ; n Gn~~R~RI Ye
reports transmitted by NCNA on 14 December 1,969__juxtapjasin
.an announcement oq__the__reGess.__o the__Sa o=. oviet__talks_t~_-permit ~l~
the top_ two Sov .e_ negQtiat.ors--t.o-ze-turn_-to-.Moscow that-day--and-
a report on a meeting __n_Wa.rsaw o:F,_U.S._._and-.PRC-representatives
thiee da1~s earlier. The latter meeting led to the resumption
of the regular-Warsaw---ta1ka__runn2,ng__paralle.l-_t.o-the-_P.eking
talks. The Chinese later postponed a session (scheduled for
20 May 1970) in reaction to the U.S. incursion into Cambodia,
but in doing so they carefully left the door open for future
meetings.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
The emergence of the line on superpowers in mid-1970 appeared
to be prompted by President Nixon's remarks on the Middle East
in his 1 July television interview in which he spoke of the
dangers of a collision of the superpowers in that area.
Speaking ac the Iraqi embassy on 16 July, Li Hsien-nien
assailed the notion of a balance of power in the Middle
East as an effort by the superpowers to contend for spheres
of influence there. Since then Peking has tailored this
theme to ca.ies of Soviet-U.S. "collusion and contention"
throughout the world.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
POLAND
REGIME DEMANDS "DISCIPLINE," CONCILIATES COASTAL WORKERS
The continuing crisis facing the Gierek regime is reflected in
an increasing incidence of warnings about "demagogy" and demands
for "discipline" in the central media. Strikes and work stop-
pages in the coastal cities triggered a visit there by the top
leaders on 24-25 January--as the shipyard workers had long
demanded.
Polish media have only briefly acknowledged the occurrence of a
strike by shipyard workers in Szczecin which, according to
Western news sources, broke out on the 22d, was joined by public
transport and other workers, and was settled by the visit of
First Secretary Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz to that city on
the 24th. The next day the Warsaw domestic service carried a
Szczecin-datelined report insisting that "there is absolutely
no tension in our city"; transport is functioning "without
delays, and work in the port loading ships is proceeding
according to plan." The report added that the top leaders'
visit to the shipyard was the leading topic of discussion
among the populace and that "satisfaction over the fact that
Szczecin has returned to completely normal life and work is
noticeable throughout the city."
The Warsaw domestic service on the 25th reported the meeting
involving the top leaders the day before at the Szczecin
Adolf Warski Shipyards, "where recently work has been
discontinued once again." Without revealing the exact
nature of the workers' demands, the report said Gierek "took
a stand regarding the problems put forward by the shipbuilders"
while the workers, "with particular emotion, expressed
confidence in Edward Gierek and in the process of renewal
which has been initiated." An end to the strike was claimed:
"Recognizing that support for the new leadership is best
expressed by deeds, the shipbuilders have resumed normal
work." Indicating that the conduct of ti.e public order
authorities during the December riots was a leading issue
at this meeting, the report said the meeting was also
attended by Defense Minister Jaruzelski and new Interior
Minister Frantiszek Szlachcic.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
Only the day before the Szczecin meeting, Szlachcic had replaced
former interior Minister Kazimierz Switala, recalled from the
posy for "health reasons." Switala had taken over the Interior
Ministry post from Moczar at the end of an earlier crisis period--
the March 1968 student riots. PAP on the 25th said Szlachcic was
also present at the top leaders, meeting with shipyard workers at
Gdansk the day after the Szczecin meeting.
PAP's report implied a more acrimonious meeting at the port of
Gdansk, where there have apparently been almost continuous
discussion meetings since the December riots, attended at
various times by sizeable portions of the Gdansk shipyard
working force. The report said the "hours-long direct talk"
between Gierek and Jaroszewicz and the Gdansk workers came
about because "at numerous recent meetings . . . the desire
had been expressed by the shipyard workers to meet with the
highest representatives of the party and the government for
a frank talk." The tense atmosphere of the Gdansk meeting
was further reflected in PAP's report that "the delegates
did not conceal their bitterness and great disapproval as
regards the situation that had such serious consequences,
that 1 a'i resulted in a crisis of confidence between the
leadership and the population--the tragic December events."
The report did not claim "emotional" support for the new
leaders, as at the Szczecin meeting, but said only that
Gierek and Jaroszewicz were "applauded" when they called
for "a production effort and creative activeness of all
wise and truly committed working people" and stressed the
importance of "mutual confidence."
DEMANDS FOR The progressive breakdown in work discipline
DISCIPLINE in the recent period is dramatized by a letter
from Premier Jaroszewicz to enterprise
managers, summarized at length by the War3aw domestic service
on the 23d, the day before the leaders' visit to Szczecin.
The letter charges that during "the last few weeks" enter-
prise directors and managers have, among other things,
"tolerated a relaxation of working discipline and violation
of valid regulations without undertaking decisive action
to insure the normal operation of enterprises." In a
significant qualifier to Gierek's promise to involve
workers in decision-making, Jaroszewicz warned that
"listening to the opinions" o the workers does "not
under any circumstances relieve the enterprise directors
and administration of the responsibility for decisions."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
The letter adds that management personnel should "in their
relations with the staff adopt a realistic attitude and
oppose any kind of demands which are unrealistic and
demagogic."
The stand taken in the Premier's letter was explicitly
backed up by an article in TRYBUNA LUDU on the 2tth. As
reviewed in the Warsaw domestic service, the article
demands "solid work" and "social discipline" and declares
that an atmosphere of "anarchy and demagogy, which some
would like to create," miJ.itates against the "constructive
action which we all need most." Claiming that "the
immense majority of the working class" agrees with this
stand, it stresses the need for "all citizens . to
be aware of this."
Continuing the concerted campaign, the same paper the next
day carried an article entitled "Responsibility and
Discipline." Demanding "conscious, general discipline,"
this article asserts that "all those who do not understand
it act against themselves and increase the burden carried
by the whole working society." Addressing itself to both
managers and workers, the article warns that "it is
inadmissible to make unrealistic promises, as well as to
put forth claims whose impracticality is obvious."
MOSCOW DRAWS FIRST ANALOGY BENEEN POLISH, CZECHOSLOVAK EVENTS
On the 22d, the day the Szczecin strike broke out, Radio Moscow
carried a talk by Korionov which for the first time in Soviet
comment drew an explicit parallel between the Polish disorders
and the Czechoslovak developments of 1968-69. The commentary
seemed contrived primarily to justify Moscow's self-appointed
role as watchdog ove:? the "socialist" character of countries
in its orbit, with audiences in the more independently oriented
communist states as well as critics in the noncomr1_unist world
in mind: Thus it was broadcast in Romanian, Serbocroatian,
Vietnamese, Korean, and the languages of several noncommunist
areas. It was not broadcast to Poland or to other members of
the Warsaw Five, and nothing liKe it has appeared in Soviet
domestic radio or press media to date.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
27 JANUARY 1971
The Polish events, Korionov said, "showed once again that the
internal and external enemies of socialism do all they can to
derive benefits from the difficulties which occur," and "they
attempt also to liquidate the people's socialist gains." He
continued: "During these events, as during the political
crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1969, it became
immediately clear that external and internal antisocialist
forces worked in a coordinated way." After citing Gierek's
assurances of solidarity with the USSR and the socialist
camp, the commentator declared that "the course of events
shows clearly how necessary it is to be uncompromising in
the struggle against the revisionist and nationalist danger
which actually opens the road to antisocialist and counter-
revolutionary forces."
Echoes of the Brezhnev doctrine came through sharply in
Korionov's comment that "it is becoming increasingly clear
that the ruling communist governments have a vast inter-
nationalist responsibility for preserving socialist gains,"
and "life shows that the joint actions of the socialist
countries" are of prime importance in the struggle against
imperialism and for peace.
TASS on the 25th had carried a cryptic report of the Polish
leaders' visits to Szczecin and Gdansk. Citing PAP, the
report said only that Gierek and Jaroszewicz "met
representatives of the personnel of shipbuilding enter-
prises" and that "the subject of the talk was pressing
political and economic problems of the country." Prior to
the Korionov commentary, Moscow's infrequent original
commentaries on the Polish developments since the December
riots had used restrained language in conveying Soviet
concern to keep the lid on popular pressures for reform
in that country. Thus, an Averchenko report in the
14 January PRAVDA, entitled "The Party and the People
Have One Goal," stressed the Polish rank-and-file party
members' steadfast adherence to orthodox Marxist-Leninist
principles and their loyalty to the alliance with the USSR.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release I
999/09/25arO.:8a-;RU1 5TOO875F Q93 WOO4-7
27 JANUARY 1971
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
PRAVDA REPORTS STATEMENT THAT BREZHNEV "HEAD" OF POLITBURO
For the first time since the question of the leadership of the
Politburo was raised at the 1966 party congress, some central
Soviet newspapers have carried a local leader's statement that
Brezhnev heads the top collective body. The formulation, "the
Politburo headed by General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev," was
used by Dagestan First Secretary M.-S.I. Umakhanov at the
19 January 50th Dagestan anniversary in Makhachkala and
reported in PRAVDA, SOVIET RUSSIA and RURAL LIFE on 20 January.
Caut!.on or disagreement, however., was suggested by the failure
of other central papers to publ.,sh the formulation in their
reports. It seemed a matter of course for SOCIALIST INDUSTRY
and RED STAR, which carried only a few parRgraphs on the
ceremony, to omit the formulation, but KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA,
TRUD, IZVESTIYA and MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA carried long versions
comparable to PRAVDA's, without the paragraph containing the
formulation. (A week earlier, on 12 January, RED STAR had
published an article by Vice Admiral I. Rudnev which asserted
that party organizations are headed by collectives--"bureaus
and connnittees"--rather than by individuals.)
At the 1966 congress a raykom secretary had stated that the
new Politburo would be headed by a General Secretary (PRAVDA,
3 April 1966), but this unique statement turned out to be
abortive. Since then, the formulation "Politburo headed by
Brezhnev" has been used four times, but only locally, in the
pro-Brezhnev areas of Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan. Kazakh
First Secretary Kunayev used it at an April 1969 Kazakh
Central Committee plenum (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 17 April
1969) and at the November 1969 Kazakh Congress of Kolkhozniks
(KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 18 November 1969). Armenian First
Secretary Kochinyan used it at the August 1970 Kazakh 50th
anniversary (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 29 August 1970). At the
October 1970 Azerbaydzhan 50th anniversary an honorary
presidium was elected consisting of the Politburo headed by
Brezhnev, according to the 3 October BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, but
the central press deleted the clause "headed by Brezhnev."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300040004-7
 Approved For Release I
999/ ~D1,q ft131385T008t7Aff QgQR0040004-7
27 JANUARY 1971
- 24 -
In addition to singling out Brezhnev, Umakhanov also appeared
to snub RSFSR Premier Voronov, who had come to Makhachkala to
present Dagestan with an Order of the October Revolution on
its anniversary. In Voronov's presence, Umakhanov thanked
the Central Committee and Politburo headed by Brezhnev for
their "constant fatherly attention and comprehensive help"
to Dagestan after the 14-15 May 1970 Dagestan earthquake.
He expressed no gratitude to the RSFSR government or to
Voronov, who was the only Soviet leader to visit Dagestan after
the earthquake (SOVIET RUSSIA, 21 May 1970).
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release I
999/09/2,5, >~,IAmRR1,85T00875F PQ;QAgig,94;Q004-7
JAN11AIRY I!)'(I
- -
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
ANHWEI BECOMES SEVENTH PROVINCE TO FORM PARTY COMMITTEE
On 23 January NCNA reported the cstubl.islimeni; of the Anhwei
Provincial CCP Committee, the seventh such prov:Lnc:Laa.-level
party conunittee to be set up within 7 weeks. Some ,30 percent
of China's population now comes under the new committees.
Adhering to the same rigid format used in announcing the
other provincial party committees, NCNA reported that a
provincial party congress attended ly 1,150 delegates met
in Hofei from 15 to 21 January and elected the 79 members
and 12 alternates to the new provincial cornmittee.* Although
figures on the size of the entire former party committee are
not available, the five-man group which heads the new
committee is smaller than the former 15-man secretariat.
Three military men, one veteran cadre, and one peasant
representative claimed the five secretarial positions on the
committee, formed, as in the case of the other provincial
committees, on the basis of the "three-in-one alliance" of
old, middle-aged, and young. All five are local leaders
with concurrent positions in Anhwei's civilian-military
power structure. Li Te-sheng, alternate Politburo member,
director of the PLA General Political Department, and chair-
man of the revolutionary committee, who was st.nt into Anhwei
in 1967 to restore order among factional Red Guard units as
commander of the Anhwei Military District, .as named first
secretary. He was also identified for the first time as
head of the provincial party nucleus group.
Presumably Li, because of his central duties in Peking, will
delegate considerable power and authority to Sung Pei-chang,
a local military figure and a vice chairman of the provincial
* The Anhwei announcement came only 8 days after the
provincial radio claimed new party committees for the "over-
whelming majority" of municipalities and counties in the
province. Similar claims were also made by the provincial
radios in Hunan and Kwangtung just before they set up their
party committees last month.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7
 Approved For Release 1999/092 : C.r~,-QP85T00875~Q
I I I 0,p~q4Q40004,
, -7
t,1,1 I''II
,IAl11JA11Y I,)'(I
t?f?vr,IIII, Initn.r y r nnnnl l,tr r , wl,,, wall ttrtntr?'I ur?,?t?r?L11.t?,y. 1.1 ?Irrt--,.1,111,
VIr?r allit II?nuto u1' 1,1 I,ruv1Iu?Ill. I rr'vuIll I IurIII, t',y I?,nntltILl,rr+ cauI It
I'ntmr r urrt?rt,11.r,y (III Lhr? ul,l Iutl?I,y rununll,Lrn, whit ttri.mr.l It
rlr Irtlt,y Itcoretn,r'y. Kllu IIIIIIg-ehIt'll , 11. tttu,I('I I,rurhtr?I,lIII hr?I,.r,rt,Io
10113101- 11,11,1 It c;r,IIIXII, I('arms I t Lcr, It I Lr rltriLr ntrmthrl' w 1 1,11 t?r rtl,unu I -
l,I I II,Irt1 r,II Ltre L,rovltlcrlit I r?evrt111t,Iun11.r?y cununItLrr, wrttt 11,111( 1
IIll c,rl It rlr?put.y uc'c:rc.Idtr?y, ILII WI-1.11 1,111,111f, t'
^l11.1L.tI?y le?tilar? 1.'ro111 K1rtrug,niu, rrecnLI,y I. t? Itnttl'eI'r?rdI I.o Anllwe1.
wher?c he boefure p1.,1 i t,.lcal comm i attar, (l' Hit! Anhwr 1. M I I I I,IWY
I)!ul,t?Ic I,.
WI.th the except Ion of llopeh'ii 1)rov1.nc1.it 1. c111el', I, I. II ueh- t'eng
all. l'ol.Ltlair?o memberrl who sr?'' ul.uo cha.1runen o.l' Lrrov.Lncila.l.
revolutionary committees have now been placed at the head
of rebuilt party committees in their respective provincial
bai:l.i.wickn. 'l'yre other provi.nccu with new committees but
without it Politburo chief--Mao's native province of Hunan,
Huang Yung-sheng' q stronghold of Kwangtung, and traditional
pacesetter Kiangoi--posuesued other obvious claims for early
selection.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300040004-7