TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: December 9, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

t:ttN '
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
~IIIIIIIIII~~~~~~IIIIIII~
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~Illllllllllll~~llllllilllll~l
Confidential
i n Communist Propaganda
Confidential
9 DECEMBER 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. Z4 ;
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively oii material carried In communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
Eteludad hem aulanlal{t
da."j,adinp and
dadeniftatien
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : fdl$p@ T&0875R00030f@M0?45
9 DECEMBER 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
Hanoi Rebuts U.S. Claims of Right to Strike at North Vietnam . . 1
Hanoi Glosses Over Substance of 3 December Paris Session . . . . 4
DRV Propaganda Continues Calls for Vigilance, Combat Readiness . 5
Warsaw Pact Statement, Moscow Comment Score Attacks on DRV . . . 7
Peking Assails U.S. Warnings About Retaliation Against DRV . . . 8
Hanoi, Front Praise Military Gains of "Cambodian Patriots" . . . 9
Laos: NLHS Shortens Proposed Time Period for Bombing Halt . . . . 9
POLAND-FRG
Publicity for Treaty Signing Notes Berlin Linkage Issue . . . . . 11
NATO MEETING
Moscow Sees Military Decisions as Counter to European Detente . . 14
EUROPEAN SECURITY
Warsav Pact Statement Underscores Soviet Bloc Unity . . . . . . . 17
MIDDLE EAST
Warsaw Pact Presses Political Settlement in Middle East . . . ? ? 19
USSR Blames Israel for Delay in Resuming Jarring Talks . . . . . 20
UAR-U.S. Exchange Over "Spy Flights" Noted by Moscow . . . . . . 22
Moscow Silent on Cairo Reports of UAR-Soviet Talks . . . . . . . 22
Husayn's U.S. Visit, Jordan Clashes Prompt Little Comment . . . . 23
PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS
Peking Renews Demand for U.S. Withdrawal from Taiwan . . . . . . 26
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Continued Praise for Brezhnev at Armenian Anniversary . . . . . . 28
Overseers of Moscow Culture Transferred to New Posts . . . . . . 30
CONFIDENTIAL (continued)
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
CONTENTS (continued)
Special District Party Committee Established in Liaoning . . .
33
Civilian Political Commissar N
amed to Tsinghai PLA Unit . . .
34
Meeting in Canton Marks Reopen
ing of Universities . . . . . .
. 35
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: ANNUAL it
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES . . . . .
v ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WITH
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. S-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :87U51R081At130054-3IS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1976
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 30 NOVEMBER - 6 DECEMBER 1970
Moscow (3376 items)
Peking (2700 items)
Warsa.i Political
(--)
14%
Domestic Issues
(13%)
27%
Consultative Committee
Japan
(1%)
14%
Meeting in Berlin
[Mishima Suicide
(1%)
9%]
Armenian SSR 50th
(7%)
12%
Indochina
(25%)
11%
Anniversary
[Air Raids on
(i7%)
5%]
[Brezhnev Speech,
(3%)
9%]
North Vietnam
29 Nov.
Albanian Liberation
(8%)
10%
Indochina
(11%)
8%
Anniversary
[Air Raids on North
(9%)
2%]
Guinea Invasion
(21%)
10%
Vietnam
Relations With Ethiopia
(--)
7%
Constitution Day
(--)
5%
Mauritania National Day
(5%)
3%
China
(5%)
4%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-F ?YP1 D $$17 R0003000309jj j TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
INDOCHINA
Hanoi continues its barrage of propaganda assailing the United
States for carrying out last month's air strikes against the
DRV and insisting that the November 1968 bombing halt was
unconditional--that the United States has no "so-called right
of protective reaction." U.S. statements that the Americans
may fire first if a plane is being targeted by DRV radar-prompted
a protest statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on
5 December, along with suppor-Ling radio and press comment.
There are passing, ambiguous references to the 21 November U.S.
attempt tc rescue prisoners in the DRV, with both Hanoi and
the Front suggesting that there was in fact no such attempt
but that Administration spokesmen fabricated the prisoner-rescue
story to counter opposition in the United States and throughout
the world to the U.S. strikes against the DRV.
The United States is also charged with duplicity in connection
with the idea of an extended holiday cease-fire. A Hanoi radio
commentary on the 9th notes that Secretary Rogers "informed
Senator Jackson" that the Administration is considering a
proposal for a cease-fire from Christmas through Tet at the
end of January. Hanoi dismisses this as U.S. propaganda
consistent with the President's "so-called" cease-fire proposal
of 7 October; it says that a "reasonable" decision was that
of the PRG, which called--on 30 November--for cease-fires of
three days for Christmas and the New Year and four days of Tet.
Condemnations of the U.S. strikes against the DRV in Soviet
media include the denunciation in the Warsaw Pact statement
which TASS carried on 3 December. The statement and routine-
level Moscow comment echo Hanoi in insisting that the 1968
bombing halt was unconditional. Soviet commentators again charge
that the strikes are part of a U.S. policy of escalating the war
and torpedoing the Paris talks.
Peking's continuing comment in the aftermath of the air strikes
against North Vietnam includes a 7 December PEOPLE'S DAILY
Commentator article endorsing the DRV Foreign Ministry spokes-
man's statement of the 5th. Commentator claims that the "insane"
and "outrageous" U.S. warnings of retaliation against North
Vietnam are aimed at paving the way for "expanding the war of
aggression" at any time.
HANOI REBUTS U.S. CLAIMS OF RIGHT TO STRIKE AT NORTH VIETNAM
Continued condemnations of U.tSh.ntai+rhastrriikees~against the DRV are
Approved Muncoon%h ional~an'30thaaphtheerre was no uund"erstaan-tgg erebyaU.S.
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBL? 1970
reconnaissance flights would continue unchallenged and the DRV
would refrain from such actions as shelling of cities in the
South and moving troops across the DM"J. There are repetitions
of earlier attacks on the United States for now extending the
"so-called" undertaking and for arguing that it could strike
at the DRV with impunity if the lives of Americans were
threatened in flights over Laos or in some other such circum-
stance.
Hanoi reacts with particular vehemence to-Pentagon spokesman.
Friedheim's assertion on 3 December that the United States may
fire first if its reconnaissance planes are targeted by DRV
radar. On the 5th a statement was issued by the'DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman, along with a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial
and a Hanoi radio commentary on the same day and a NHAN DAN
editorial on the 6th. Hanoi "severely condemns the insolent
U.S. allegation" and asserts that all acts of encroachment on
the DRV's sovereignty and security will be duly punished by
"the Vietnamese people." In the words of the foreign ministry
spokesman, nothing can shake the "iron resolve" of the
Vietnamese people to fight. until total victory. The QUAN DOI
KHAN DAN editorial insists on the DRV's right to track and
down U.S. reconnaissance planes and to set anti-aircraft
batteries and assemble troops anywhere in the country. It
charges that the Administration's "arguments are aimed at
giving the Americans an excuse to strike" the DRV "at any
time, against any objective, at any place and through all
military methods."
PRISONER RESCUE Several of the current commentaries make
passing reference to U.S. statements about
the attempt to rescue prisoners held in the DRV, but Hanoi
still describes these statements as "fabrications" and does
not admit that such an operation took place. The foreign
ministry spokesman's statement refers to U.S. "fallacies"
including assertions that attacks on the DRV were aimed at
"treeing pilots detained in North Vietnam." The QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN editorial on the 5th, ignoring the mission of
21 November, says merely that "recently" Defense Secretary
Laird again advanced "the a>?gument about 'rescuing U.S.
prisoners of war,' brazenly aaying that 'the United States
will make every effort, including the possibility of taking
military action, in the future"' and that "the United States
does not rule out any actions."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RpU , 1 a 0003000300MA
9 DECEMBER 1970
The 5 December Hanoi radio commentary says that to conceal the
"war crimes" of the 21st and to deceive public opinion and
"excite the narrow-minded nationalist feelings of a number of
Americans" the Nixon.Administration went beyond earlier
allegations about "protective reaction" and an "understanding":
it put out a smokescreen by producing the pretext of rescuing
U.S. prisoners of war. The broadcast also cites the
"bellicose statements" made on 1 December by Secretary Laird
and by Ambassador Bruce at his Paris press conference "to
the effect that the United States will make every effort to
free American prisoners of war in North Vietnam, including
possible future military action." The NHAN DAN editorial on
the 6th also refers to the remarks by Laird and Bruce. It
echoes other propaganda in saying that "the Nixon clique
covers up its scheme to carry ou. air raids" against the DRV
"with the deceitful argument about rescuing U.S. prisoners
of war . "
An article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 7th--
entitled "War Maniacs Unmasking Themselves"--pictures U.S.
spokesmen, particularly Laird, as being under fire from U.S.
public opinion concerning "the lack of logic" in Administration
statements. The article says that the President and Laird
"uttered very contradictory; statements" .about-.the.'-air
strikes and that roundabout arguments have stimulated a
"credibility crisis."
Liberation Radio commentaries on 3 and 6 December, denouncing
U.S. strikes at the North, also note expressions of U.S.
intent to take "every measure" to rescue American prisoners.
The broadcast on the 3d says, atypically: "We want to tell
the U.S. war maniacs that all their reckless and cunning
schemes will not be able to rescue the U.S. air raiders
who are being detained in both North and South Vietnein, but
will on the contrary cause more serious consequences and
danger to those U.S. air raiders, as U.S. and world public
opinion has clearly pointed out." The commentary goes on to
say more routinely, like Hanoi, that the best way to rescue
U.S. "air raiders" is to negotiate seriously on the basis
of the PRG proposal, particularly the.provision-in the
eight-point elaboration of 17 September regarding discussion
of the release of all military prisoners.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
HANOI GLOSSES OVER SUBSTANCE OF 3 DECEMBER PARIS SESSION
The cryptic VNA account gives little indication-of the nature of
the exchanges at the 93d session of the Paris talks on
3 December. Thus, there is no acknowledgment that DRV delegate
Xuan Thuy recalled that the session had not been held as
scheduled on 25 November as a protest over U.S. "acts of war"
against the DRV. Nor does VNA acknowledge that he mentioned,
and ridiculed, the operaticn north of the 19th parallel "to
rescue U.S. pilots-detained in a camp 20 miles from Hanoi."
VNA also ignores his remarks criticizing Secretary Laird for
saying, on 1 December, that the United States might use
military action, not excluding the use of commandos, to
launch rescue operations against prison camps in North Vietnam.
The VNA account gives similarly brief treatment to PRG delegate
Mme. Binh's statement at the session, but LPA carried a more
substantial summary and Liberation Radio broadcast her formal
statement textually. Unlike Thuy, she did not broach the U.S.
prisoner-resr'ue mission directi.y. Howe`,er, after observing
that top Administration leaders "have an gaatly threatened"
to repeat their "acts of war" against the DRV, she'said--
cryptically and without elaboration--that "Ky went to the
length of volunteering as a commando of the United States."
She also repeated past charges about Saigon's mistreatment
of prisoners and went on to say that the United States "has
resorted to the POW issue in order to deceive and exacerbate
public opinion, thereby trying to cover up its crimes and
adventurist acts of war."
The substence of the allied statements is totally obscured,
with VNA saying only that. both "tried to justify the world-
condemned U.S. war moves" on 21-22 November. Consistent
with standard practice, Hanoi media have said nothing about
the give-and-take portion of the session-or the briefings
afterward; hence there is no acknowledgment that Ambassador
Bruce proposed, as a first step regarding treatment of
prisoners, that each side permit a.committee of the
International Red Cross, or some other. impartial observer,
to visit all prisoner camps in North and South Vietnam.
In reporting Xuan Thuy's statement, VNA highlights his "strong
rejection" of the U.S. justification- for the bombing of North
Vietnam, as well as his reaffirmation that the 1968 U.S. halt
in the bombing and "all other acts of war" against the DRV
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
was "total and unconditional and that there was no 'understanding'
whatsoever." As at the 92d session on 19 November, he stressed
that he could reaffirm this "speaking as the DRV representative"
at the 1968 bilateral Paris talks. VNA reports Thuy's rejection of
a Defense. Department statement to the effect that U.S.
"protective reaction" rights extend.to saving the lives not
only of American pilots carrying out reconnaissance flights over
North Vietnam but also of pilots bombing Laos and "even saving
the lives of U.S. troops in South Vietnam." VNA also records
his assertion that the best way to save lives is to eni the war,
along with his warning that if the United States is really
concerned about defending the lives of American pilots it
must-respect the sovereignty and the security of the DRV.
The VNA account reports, briefly, that Thuy also scored U.S.
"escalation" in Cambodia and Laos and pledged strengthened
Indochinese solidarity against this "aggression." It does not,
however, record his assertion that.U.S. escalation throughout
Indochina "further proves".that President Nixon's 7 October
five-point proposal is "utterly fallacious"; and it fails to
note that he spelled out the basic points in the PRG's
eight-point "elaboration" of 17 September--on a U.S. agreement
to withdraw by 30 June 1971 and a renunciation of the Thieu
regime and establishment of a provisional coalition government.
DRV PROPAGANDA CONTINUES CALLS FOR VIGILANCE, COMBAT READINESS
Hanoi sustains its attention to vigilance and combat-readiness*
with editorials in NHAN DAN on the 4th, 6th, and 8th as well
as other press and radio comment. The NHAN DAN editorial on the
8th seems to direct its exhortations at the DRV population-at-
large rather than at the self-defense militia or basic units,
as earlier propaganda did. It describes the entire North as
"now seething with a new combat mettle," and it urges the
launching "under the new situation" of a mass movement "to
engage in revolutionary activities and resolutely fight and
defeat the U.S. aggressors." With the United States "preparing
for new military adventures," it says, "the fighters and people"
throughout the DRV must further heighten their "readiness to
fight and fight well." It adds that "under any circumstances,
at any time, and whatever the form and scale of enemy attacks,
or whatever force they may involve, we.are determined to fight
* See the TRENDS of 2 December, pages 4-7, and 25 November,
pages 3-4, for background on earlier DRV calls for vigilance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09: CIA-> ff8WAk000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
with complete initiative . . . as one man . . . unremittingly.
vigorously, and victorously." Other comment similarly calls for
combat spirit and preparedness.
The NHAN DAN editorial echoes previous propaganda exhortations to
continue accelerating production while improving combat tasks.
It repeats the statement that each area must have its own
combat plans; and like the NHAN DAN editorial of the 6th, it notes
the necessity of "maintaining security and order, demolishing in
time the propaganda arguments and sabotaging actions of the
reactionaries, protecting the people's life and property,
protecting the organs, cadres, documents, and public property."
Other comment .,:hoes earlier propaganda in pointing out the
necessity of carrying out patrol and guard activities and
preparing combat plans. The k December NHAN DAN ,yitorial
stresses improvement of self-defense forces, while several
Hanoi radio items highlight current. activities regarding defense
in various provinces.. There are also more claims that shelters
and trenches are being repaired.
The concern of higher authorities is again manifested in a
Hanoi radio broadcast of the 4th on Hai Hung Province. The
broadcast notes that the provincial administrative committee
recently issued an instruction on satisfactorily carrying out
the air defense task and achieving combat readiness in order
to cope with"the new combat situation." Implementing this
instruction, it says, "the provincial unit command has helped
the district unit commands check combat plans and improve
them . . . and has also sent officers to help villages grasp
the tactics of countering enemy attacks and ranger activities
and to help guerrillas and militiamen train themselves in
accordance with their combat plans."
The village militia and guerrilla unit which downed the U.S.
reconnaissance plane on 13 November is singled out as an example
in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on 9 December. As broadcast by
Hanoi radio that day, the article highlights and c':scribes the
village's vigilance and concentrated efforts on military training
over the past two years. It points out how a village iii Ha Tinh
Province has maintained leadership. over production and its militia
and guerrilla unit, emphasizing combat tasks and combat readiness.
It claims that "in the, past two years, although there was no fight-
ing, the village continued to apply the 'alert unit' system" and
carefully followed U.S. reconnaissance patterns in consideration of
the "geographical impcrtance" of the village. "Thanks to these
careful preparations," it asserts, the village militiamen, guerrillas,
and people cooperated with army units in downing the U.S. reconnaissance
plane on 13 November "with the first burst of gunfire."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
WARSAW PACT STATEMENT. MOSCOW COMMENT SCORE ATTACKS ON DRV
Continuing Soviet condemnation of last month's U.S. air strikes
against the DRV includes publicity for the statement on Indochina
issued by the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee,*
carried by TASS on 3 December, which says that by its "massive
attacks" the United States has "violated its commitment" on an
unconditional end to the bombing which made the Paris talks
possible. The statement does not echo routine-level Soviet
propaganda charges that the bombings are aimed at "disrupting"
the Paris talks; it does criticize President Nixon's five-point
peace plan, saying the plan "turned out to be only a cover for
continuing and expanding aggression." The statement promises
"support" for the Indochinese people in their struggle against
armed American intervention and for a political settlement,
specifying the "constructive" FRG proposals.
Routine-level denunciation of the U.S. bombing of the DRV
includes a 5 December domestic service commentary by Aleksey
Leontyev which says the Vietnam problem can be solved "only
by negotiations," a military solution being "impossible." The
Republican leaders who recognized this truth "a short time
ago," says Leontyev, now refuse to reach an agreement with
the Vietnamese and accept their proposals, instead resorting
to bombs. Leontyev calls the raids the result of "a preconceived
and prepared turning point" in the Administration's Vietnam
policy in the direction of escalating aggression and "torpedoing"
the Paris talks.
U.S. RIGHT On 3 December Moscow media briefly reported that
TO REACT the Pentagon press spokesman said American planes
have the right to attack DRV anti-aircraft
installations if they feel themselves to be in danger. On the
6th TASS promptly reported the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement denouncing the Pentagon statement. Moscow comments
that this means the United States has arrogated to itself the
right to "strike at will" against DRV territory.
* The Pact's Political Consultative Committee had issued a
statement on Vietnam in July 1966. A statement on Vietnam issued
in December 1969 by a Moscow meeting of party and state leaders
of "fraternal countries" was not linked with the Warsaw Pact in
Soviet propaganda, although the seven countries listed as attending
constitute the Pact's membership and other bloc propaganda did
tie the meeting with the Pact.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : ClP75R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
COPTFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
Commentat'rs recall that Secretary Laird _nade a similar statement
to the effect that the United States, in exercising its right of
self-defense, intends to attack DRV anti-aircraft installations.
A domestic service commentary on 4 December says Laird added that
this also applies to planes which bomb Laos--that is, that they
are allowed to strike DRV anti-aircraft installations near the
Laotian border. Stating that Laird has obviously given the Srecn
light for "widescale renewal" of the air war, the commentary says
it was "not accidental" that he said in a press conference that
"he does not preclude future actions similar to the troop landing
in the DRV on 21 November." A 7 December TASS comn.antary, Q.lso
denouncing Laird's "threats" against the DRV, cites the New York
TIMES as reporting that the United States threatened strikes
against the DRV also if "anti-aircraft guns are discovered close
to its southern frontiers with Laos and if there is a concentration
of troops on the territory of the DRV which Washington regards as
dangerous."
PEKING ASSAILS U.S. WARNINGS ABOUT RETALIATION AGAINST DRV
Peking media continue to publicize Vietnamese statements on the
U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. The 5 December statement
by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman is endorsed in a 7 December
PEOPLE'S DAILY commentator article which denounces as "insane and
outrageous" U.S. warnings of retaliation- and the policy. 6f
preemptive attacks when U.S. planes are targeted by DRV radar.
Commentator makes no mention of the issue of a U.S.-DRV under-
standing on the bombing halt, but he ridicules the notion that
there are any "rules" restricting Vietnamese action against U.S.
planes. He questions whether such rules would not allow the
United States to fly over any country for reconnaissance or raids
and whether they would undermine state sovereignty throughout the
world.
The U.S. attacks on the DRV were also scored in a 14 December NCNA
correspondent's commentary which charged that "it is customary
for Nixon to talk of 'peace' while dropping bombs" and that the
President has "frequently resorted to counterrevolutionary dual
tactics" one after the other. It noted that the recent bombing
of the North came on the heels of the 7 October U.S. peace
initiative. Claiming that the United States is failing while
the people of Indochina are winning, NCNA concluded that "the
people of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos will neither be taken
in by U.S. imperialism's 'peace' fraud, not be intimidated by
its bombs."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : .fflqj75R0003000P?@?4t~E
9 NOVEMBER 1970
HANOI. FRONT PRAISE MILITARY GAINS OF "CAMBODIAN PATRIOTS"
A 5 December VNA report on attacks by the "Cambodian national
liberation armed forces" in November claims that "clashes"
took place "inside and around" Phnom Penh and that a "series
of attacks" was mounted in "most" of the provinces. Among
specific actions cited are attacks on government troops at
the Pich Nil Pass on Highway 4 and on the ammunition factory
and power station in Kirirom--taken by the communists on
22 November. A 3 December Liberation Radio commentary
entitled "Heavy Blows at the Puppet Lon Nol Troops on Route 4"
deals with the exploits of the Cambodian "liberation forces"
in the Kirirom Highlands frum 25 to 27 November and asserts
that their position is "developing favorably" in all battle-
fields.
A 1 December Liberation Radio commentary took note of the
fighting at the town of Puok, in Siem Reap Province, and
claimed that the action demonstrated that the insurgents
have not only encircled Phnom Penh but have also developed
their strength and exerted strong pressure on the north-
western area. The 1 December explosion at the U.S. Embassy
in Phnom Penh was reported in a Hanoi broadcast on the 2d,
citing western news reports. The blast was credited to
"Cambodian patriotic combatants." A 9 December Hanoi
domestic service commentary on 6-7 December battles 50
kilometers northeast of Phnom Penh cites AP as saying the
Lon Nol regime has decided to allow the communists to occupy
more land, thereby renouncing a "scheme to regain important.
areas in the heartland of Cambodia." The commentary further
attributes to AP the statement that "if the communists continue
to cut off main highways, Cambodia will die."
LAOS: NLHS SIORTENS PROPOSED TIME PERIOD FOR BOMBING HALT
At a 1 December meeting with Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prince
Souphanouvong's "special envoy" Tiao Souk Vongsak shortened
the time period proposed by the NLHS for a limited bombing
halt to make possible a meeting of the two princes'
plenipotentiaries in Khang Khay. According to a 3 December
NLHS "statement" on the meeting, carried by Pathet Lao
radio on the 5th, Souk relayed Souphanouvong's proposal
that the bombing in Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua provinces
be halted for 10 days prior to the meeting, during the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
meeting, and 7 days after it ends. The 26 1lovember NLHS
"communique" on the meeting between Souvanna and Souk on
the 214th had reported that the NLHS proposed a bombing
cessation in these two provinces for 15 days before the
meeting,* during the meeting, and 10 days after it.
The current statement says Souk stressed that there must be
a cessation of "bombing and strafing by the U.S. Air Force
as well as all activities of the Vientiane puppet forces and
all pro-U.S. forces" in the two provinces. He rejected a
proposal by Souvanna for a "15-kilometer radius safety
area" around Khang Khay.
The statement once again criticizes Souvanna for clinging
to "his old unreasonable stance, insisting on the so-called
'with0.rawal of North Vietnamese troops from Laos,'" thereby
showing that he "still allows himself to be pressured by the
Americans and the ultrarightist reactionaries" who want to
delay the meeting. (The communique of 26 November had
similarly absolved Souvanna of direct personal responsibility
for such obstructionism,. remarking that his "insincere and
vague attitude" obviously "results from pressure and is
aimed at serving U.S. imperialism's dark objectives.")
Souvanna's position, says the statement, "reciprocates the
current large-scale attacks and operations of the Vientiane
clique and Americans" in the Xieng Khouang/Plain of Jars
area. It notes, however, that discussions will continue.
A 2 December telegram from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma,
reported by the Pathet Lao radio on the -tth, also complains
about attacks in the Xieng Khouang area by "U.S.-supported
bogus forces" and the U.S. Air Force which have created
"obstacles" to the Khang Khay meeting. Saying he knows that
Souvanna "is also facing some difficulties," Souphanouvong
professes to see nothing surprising in Souvanna's "rejection"
of the proposals regarding security for the Khang Khay meeting.
He asks Souvanna to "force the warmongers" to cease their .
operations in the Xieng Khouang area and expresses hope that
Souvanna will "be able to evade all difficulties created by
the U.S. imperialists and lackeys" so that the plenipotentiaries'
meeting can be held as soon as possible.
* The TRENDS of 2 December, page 15, incorrectly reported that.a
Pathet Lao radio report of the communique said it called -for a
halt 10 days before the meeting. A recheck of the broadcast
confirms that the figure was 15 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
POLAND-FRG
PUBLICITY FOR TREATY SIGNING NOTES BERLIN LINKAGE ISSUE
Polish media, extensively publicizing the visit of the delegatiol.
led by Chancellor Willy Brandt to Warsaw for the signing of the
FRG-Polish treaty, have heaped lavish praise on Brandt personally
and carried all his public statements in Poland in full--including
his reference to the Berlin issue as part of a package with the
Polish-FRG and Soviet-FRG treaties. Polish spokesmen broached this
issue only obliquely. The communique issued on 8 December, at the
conclusion of the three-day ceremonies, describes the talks between
the Polish and West German leaders as "useful and fruitful," held
in a "businesslike atmosphere" in which both sides presented their
views "with full candor."
In the vein of the communique, Polish comment and statements by
Polish leaders during the visit emphasized the importance of the
treaty not only for the two states but for detente in Europe
generally. The communique calls it an "essential contribution"
to European detente. Additionally, Polish propaganda has reiterated
Gomulka's statement--made at a 3 December Zabrze Miners Day rally
the day after the Warsaw Pact Berlin meeting--that the treaty
"finally ends the problem of frontiers." During the ceremonies
Gomulka also called the agreed declaration on Poland's western
frontiers "the most important statement" in the treaty. Polish
commentaries, generally terming the treaty a "first step" or
foundation for the normalization of Polish-FRG relations, are
replete with praise for Brandt's "positive attitude." Ample
coverage of the West German delegation's activities includes
publicity for Brandt's gesture in kneeling before the memorial
to the victims of the Warsaw ghetto.
RATIFICATION, The Polish statements and comment, balancing
BERLIN ISSUES their praise for the Brandt-led forces in the
FRG with the usual censure of CDU/CSU forces
bent on "hampering" ratification of the treaty, stop short of
coming directly to grips with the issue of linking ratification
with settlement of the Berlin problem. Thus Cyrankiewicz, in
a formal toast at a luncheon for Brandt after the sif:ning on
7 December, noted that both sides had agreed to the e:;tablishment
of diplomatic relations "immediatley after the treaty comes into
force"--the language of the communique--and went on to express
the wish that ra.tification of both this treaty and the one with
the USSR will occur "without complications and hindrances."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDE'ITIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
PAP reported FRG Federal Press and Information Office deputy
head von Wechmar as explaining, at a 7 December Warsaw press
conference, that the point when the treaty "comes into force"
means the moment of ratification. PAP also noted that von Wechmar
said ratification by the FRG "will not take more than one month."
PAP's texts of Brandt's statements, however, include his remark--
in his toast replying to Cyrankiewicz on 7 December--that Bonn's
treaties with Moscow and Warsaw as well as an impending one with
Prague, plus desirable "treaty-binding regulations" on FRG-GDR
relations, would be
incomplete if there was no agreement on the improvement
of the situation in Berlin and around it because--I could
tell much on this subject from my own experience--tension
is still arising over Berlin. So I treat separate treaties
and agreements, concluded separately, as one whole in which
each of them holds an indispensable and unalterable place.
A reassuring comment was attributed by PAP to Bonn press spokesman
Ahlers at a 6 December press conference. Ahlers, PAP reported,
did not exclude the possibility of the treaties "entering into
force before the solution of the problem of West Berlin."
According to PAP, he said "the connection that exists between
the question of ratification of the treaties [with the USSR
and Poland] by the Bundestag and the Berlin problem does not
constitute a 'junktim' [linkage] from the legal point of view.
The federal government has full freedom of action in this
field, irrespective of the conditions" raised by the CDU/CSU.
At a late evening press conference on the 7th, also reported
by PAP, Ahiers said that Brandt, Cyrankiewicz, and Gomulka
had discussed a wide range of problemu, including Berlin
and East-West German relations. The Polish report quoted
Ahlers as saying the discussion s,.,anned "a broad exchange
of views in which not decisions bit better understanding
of the stands of the two sides mattered."
Cyrankiewicz, responding to questions at a press conference
held shortly before Brandt's departure from Warsaw on 8 December,
as reported by PAP, stated that the FRG and Polish governments
are in "constant contact" regarding a date for the ratification
of the treaty.. PAP reported him as remarking that "there is no
need to make a race" over whether the Warsaw treaty is ratified
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
earlier than the Moscow treaty. Cyrankiewicz noted, however,
that the Moscow treaty had been signed "earlier and concerned
a broader scope of matters." Regarding the Berlin problem,
he observed that Poland is not one of the four powers holding
talks on Berlin. He "emphasized," according to PAP, that the
Soviet Union is "in favor of detente" on the issue of Berlin,
adding that "we would be satisfied" if "other powers, too,
show similar intentions--obviously while respecting the
sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic and taking its
rights into account."
THE QUESTION OF The problem of the ethnic Germans still
"ETHNIC GERMANS" living in Poland is not explicitly
mei.ti oned in the communique on Brandt's
visit. It notes merely that the normalization process
initiated by the signing of the treaty "should, in the opinion
of the two sides, pave the way to the overcoming of problems
that still remain in the field of interstate and human
relations." PAP reported that Ahlers, in his press conference
on 6 December, noted that "humanitarian problems were tackled
during a general exchange of views," explaining that many of
these problems were solved during the recent talks by Red Cross
representatives of the two countries. Polish propaganda through-
out the period of the treaty negotiations had characterized the
problem of the ethnic Germans as a Polish "internal" question.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
- 14 -
NATO MEETING
MOSCOW SEES MILITARY DECISIONS AS COUNTER TO EUROPEAN DETENTE
Soviet press and radio comment on the 3-4 December NATO Council
meeting in Brussels characteristically plays on the disunity theme
and sees in the gathering a backward step "to the time of the cold
war." Moscow deplores the "secondary attention" given to the
problem of reducing tension in Europe, and in this vein it
contrasts the NATO session--allegedly dominated by "hawks"--with
the 2 December meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative
Committee in East Berlin. A 3 December domestic service commentary
said that while NATO is discussing plans for "aggression" and
putting forward "all kinds of conditions" for the convening of a
conference on European security, the Warsaw Pact conf-rence "called
for good neighborliness and cooperation and noted that suffj.cient
conditions already exist for holding all-European negotiations."
TASS dispatches on the 3d and 4th concluded that East Berlin and
Brussels serve today as "symbols of two fundamentally different
ways, two different approaches to international problems."
MILITARY In documenting the charge that the NATO gathering
DECISIONS was aimed against the trend toward detente in
Europe, Moscow focuses on the military decisions--
both at the full Council session and at the preliminary meetings,
on 1 and 2 December, of the 10-nation "Eurogroup" and the Defense
Planning Committee. The propaganda gives wide play to Secretary
Laird's pledge, restated by President Nixon in his- message read to
the Council on 3 December, that the present administration would
not reduce the number of U.S. troops in Europe. The pledge,
according to a radio commentary in foreign languages on
2 December, followed "a drummed-up campaign involving claims
of a forthcoming withdrawal of American troops" which in
effect was a "threat" to "pressure"Washington's allies for
additional military allocations. TASS on the 5th, reporting
that the pledge has come under fire in Congress, noted that
Senator Mansfield at a press conference the previous day
indicated he would press for amendments to legislation
providing for cuts in the numerical strength of U.S. forces
in Europe.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
The 4 December TASS report on the wind-up of the Council session
said the Eurogroup's decision to provide an additional one billion
dollars for military spending over the next five years came as a
result of "Pentagon pressure." TASS had taken note on the 3d of
Laird's praise for the decision. A PRAVDA article that day said
the decision was not taken without "sharp disagreements," citing
the Belgian press for a report that both Belgium and Britain
"stipulated the right to pay their contribution" in part by
building up their own national forces. An article in RED STAR
on the 3d saw the U.K. reservations on the Eurogroup decision
as little more than an effort to carry out "imperialist plans,
which envisage a partial 'return to East of Suez' and the
strengthening of contacts with the racist regimes in the South
of Africa."
Available Soviet propaganda has not yet treated in detail the
document "Allied Defense for the Seventies," approved by the
Defense Planning Committee. A TASS report on 4 December
ignored its substance, concluding that both it and the
communique on the Council session "are based in effect on the
premise that the division of Europe and the world into hostile
blocs will continue, while the arms race will be stepped up."
A TASS dispatch the previous day noted that the document says
NATO "should maintain a sufficient level of conventional armed
forces and nuclear might while retaining a strong collective
military structure." A "much more modest place" was given to
problems relating to the reduction of tensions in Europe, the
dispatch said, adding without comment that the document
advanced "the old NATO proposal for a 'mutually balanced
reduction of armed forces.'"
Similarly, Moscow propaganda has given little more than passing
attention to press reports that the United States has resurfaced
the proposal for laying a belt of nuclear mines in West Germany
along the East-West borders. A TASS commentary on 2 December
said that "some sober-minded people" have opposed such "provocative"
plans. But the very fact that the plans exist, TASS observed, is
"added eloquent proof of the intention of 'hawks' from across the
ocean to prevent a further easing of tension and to torpedo the
idea" of convening a European security conference. A foreign-
language radio talk on the 2d, attacking the U.S. posture on
disarmament issues, declared that the nuclear mines plan "shows
that the enemies of peace intend to avail themselves of every
opportunity to increase international tension, and to thwart
agreements on liquidating the nuclear peril."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
- 16 -
EUROPEAN While focusing on the military aspects of the Council
SECURITY session, Moscow propagandists take note of the fact
that some "sensible statements" were made--by French
Foreign Minister Schumann, among others--on the matter of a
European security conference. They acknowledge that the communique
expressed satisfaction, over the F'RG-Soviet and FRG-Polish treaties
and the inception of talksj between East and West Germany. Despite
all this, a 5 December TASS report said, the NATO Council concluded
that there was not enough progress in bilateral contacts to make
possible a switch to multilateral contacts with the socialist
countries.
Moscow has registered clear displeasure over the Council session's
linkage of a European security conference to progress on other
issues, notably the four-power talks on Berlin. Thus the 4 December
TASS report on the communique said the NATO "allegation" that a
conference is impossible without solving problems connected with
West Berlin is tantamount to "putting up artificial obstacles" to
an easing of the situation in Europe. A domestic service commentary
on the 5th asserted that "the NATO ringleaders tried to get as far
away as possible from the very pressing issue" of convening an
all-European conference by linking it with talks on Berlin,
strategic arms limitation, and the further development of
relations between the FRG and GDR. An article in the 30 November
PRAVDA had also deplored the efforts of those who would link the
convening of a conference with progress in the Berlin talks and
the strategic arms limitation talks now underway in Helsinki.
Additionally, Soviet propaganda has rejected attempts to tie the
European security conference proposal to progress in the Middle
East. A 3 December RED STAR article, for example, called the
attempts to make the convening of a European security conference
dependent on the Middle East situation "insidious."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL
- 17 -
EUROPEAN SECURITY
FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
WARSAW PACT STATEMENT UNDERSCORES SOVIET BLOC UNITY
Against the background of speculation about a rift between the
GDR and the TJSSR over issues related to Berlin, the statement
on European security adopted at the 2 December meeting of the
Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee* seems most
noteworthy for its attempt to project the image of a united
bloc solidly backing East Germany. After noting the importance
of the conclusion of the Soviet-FRG treaty and the initialing
of the accord between the FRG and Poland, the document says the
participants in the Pact meeting "unanimously expressed
solidarity with the peace-loving policy" of the GDR. Declaring
that peace in Europe cannot be built without East German
participation, it calls for the establishment of "equal
relations" between the GDR and other states, including the
FRG, "based on generally accepted norms of international law."
And it urges admission of the GDR to the United Nations and
other international organizations.
The statement breaks no new ground on substantive issues. It
routinely reaffirms Soviet bloc interest in a conference on
European security and states that there are no reasons "to
advance any preliminary terms" for convening such a conference--
an apparent allusion to West German and NATO linkage of the
conference proposal to settlement of the Berlin problem.
Without detailing the agenda or the participants in the
proposed conference, the statement says that both matters
have been resolved and goes on to welcome the recent Finnish
proposal on the holding of preparatory meetings in Helsinki.
As reviewed by Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen at a
25 November press conference, the proposal stipulates that
these meetings would be between heads of mission "or other
representatives." The Warsaw Pact states, according to the
statement, are ready to take part in such meetings. A TASS
report on 3 December said the Soviet ambassador in Helsinki
had informed the Finnish Government of the USSR's agreement
to preliminary consultations.
* The statement is one of four adopted at the meeting and
released the following day. The other three are on Indochina,
the Middle East, and Guinea.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
- 18 -
On the Berlin question, the statement expresses hope that the
four-power talks will produce "the attainment of a mutually
acceptable agreement meeting the interests of detente in the
center of Europe, as well as the requirements of the population
of West Berlin and the lawful interests and sovereign rights
of the GDR." Brezhnev, in.his 29 November speech in Yerevan,
had also specified that the wishes of the West Berlin population
and the interests of the GDR must be met. He had also expressed
the view that an improvement of the situation with regard to
West Berlin "is quite feasible"--a judgment not made in the
Warsaw Pact statement.
The statement appears to register support for the pending talks
between the FRG and Czechoslovakia in asserting that the
participants in the Pact meeting fully support Prague's "just
demand" that the FRG recognize the Munich agreement "as invalid
from the outset, with all the resulting consequences." A move
by West Germany to dissociate itself from the "diktat," the
statement says, would facilitate an improvement of the situation
in Europe and development of the FRG's relations with the
socialist countries.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
MIDDLE EAST
WARSAW PACT PRESSES POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST
The basic theme of the need for a political settlement of the
Israeli-Arab dispute is reiterated in the statement adopted by
the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee on 2 December
at its meeting in Berlin, and released on the 3d.* The
relatively mild statement points vaguely to the "depth and
scope of the dangers" in connection with the obstacles to a
political settlement raised by Israel and "international
reaction." It goes on to outline the opposite courses
advocated by the two sides--a theme touched on in some routine
Soviet propaganda.
With regard to the first course, the statement runs through the
standard Soviet litany for a Middle East peace: a political
settlement guaranteeing every people of the Middle East,
including Israel, an independent, safe. national existence and
"secure borders"; Israeli withdrawal from all occupied
territories; fulfillment of all provisions of the November
1967 Security Council resolution; and, as an "immediate
practical step," the holding of talks between the conflicting
sides through Jarring. Reminiscent of Brezhnev's 28 August
Alma-Ata speech in pointing to the benefits of a peaceful
solution, the statement says a political settlement would
make it.possible for the peoples of the Middle East to
direct their resources and energy to the satisfaction of
their pressing requirements; in urging Israeli withdrawal,
the statement maintains that without this there can be no
peace, and it is impossible to imagine the peoples of the
area living like good neighbors.
* Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war five statements on the Middle
E%st.have been issued by Moscow in conjunction with various
combinations of the East European countries, but not by the
Warsaw Pact. Yugoslavia attended the four 1967 meetings, held
at various levels, but apparently was not invited to the November
1969 meeting. Romania, the only one of the East Europeans to
maintain relations with Israel after.the war, was also absent
from the 1969 meeting; it attended three of the four 1967 meetings,
but failed to sign the statement issued after the first of these.
The current Warsaw Pact meeting also issued a statement on Guinea
in addition to those on the Middle East, Indochina, and European
security--the third. being a standard Pact topic.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
The other course, aimed at retention and annexation of the
captured Arab territories, preservation of tensions, and
overthrow of the "progressive Arab regimes," is espoused by
Israel. and its patrons, says the statement, which holds
international imperialism, first of all American imperialism,
responsible for the continued tension.
In the concl:xding paragraphs the statement presses the long-
standing Soviet propaganda urgings for Arab unity, expressing
confidence that the Arabs will further strengthen their
cohesion. And it repeats Moscow's advice to the Egyptians to
sustain Nasir's policies, expressing "profound satisfaction"
that the UA,3's leaders' statements reflect their intention
to follow his course and to work for a political settlement..
The participants pledge their readiness to further support
the "Just strugglc: of the Arab peoples, including the Arab.
people of Palestir:e," against the "imperialist policy of
aggression" in the Middle East. Unlike the last statement
on the Middle East issued by Moscow and some of its -East .
European allies, released on 26 November 1969, the present
statement makes no reference either.to bloc assistance to
the Arab. states or to Western "imperialist" assistance to
Israel.
USSR BLAMES ISRAEL FOR DELAY IN RESUMING JARRING TALKS
Moscow's low volume of propaganda attention to the Middle
East in the past few weeks has focused chiefly on Israel's
delay in returning to the contacts under Jarring, and cr
U.S. "encouragement" of Israel's "aggressive, expansionist"
designs by seeking a $500 million appropriation for more
military equipment for Israel. Brezhnev's general remarks
on the Middle East in his 29 November speech in Yerevan did
not touch on the Jarring talks. He observed that it was
"difficult to predict with precision" how events would
develop, but professed to see "favorable conditions" for a
settlement in light of Israel's increasing "international
isolation."
Propagandists charge that Israel's tactics of procrastination
over the Jarring talks are aimed at retaining the occupied
Arab lands. Moscow claims that Israel plans to agree to
resumption of the Jarring mission precisely at the moment
when Jarring is to submit his report to the Security Council
in early January, and will then further delay resumption of
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FB1S TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
the contacts until time for renewal of the cease-fire agreement
in early February. While comment has noted that Dayan spoke
favorably of resuming the Jarring mission and did not set any
conditions, Moscow has at the same time cited Western news
agency and-Israeli press reports of various conditions drawn
up by Tel Aviv for discussion with Washington. These
conditions. are said to include requests for long-term
military assistance after 1971, and for U.S. assurances that
it would use its veto in the Security Council to block
resolutions unacce^table to Israel and would "waive the
so-called Rogers plan" and not propose borders for Israel.
The propaganda asserts that Dayan's forthcoming visit to the
United States has nothing to do with a peaceful settlement,
but only with discussing Israel's conditions for resumption of the
talks.
A Belyayev article in the 2 December PRAVDA, cautiously
optimistic that "all possibilities exist" for immediate resumption
of the Jarring contacts, notes that President Nixon spoke in
favor of negotiations in his November message to Congress and
that Dayan had also spoken favorably of resuming the contacts
with-Jarring. On the other hand, he claims that the President's
message.to Congress took into consideration Israel's conditions
for resumption of the negotiations, and charges that Washington's
prime concern is for Israel to resume the contacts from a
position of strength.
Reporting that Mrs. Meir's recent letter to President Nixon
"insisted" cr. the expansion of Washington's diplomatic and
military aid, Moscow observed, in connection with the President's
reply, that his attitude to the request "is not in doubt" and
confirms that Tel Aviv is being encouraged to :esist a political
settlement.
CAIRO ON Moscow has offered no opinion of its own on the
CEASE-FIRE desirability of another cease-fire extension in
reporting remarks by UAR officials on the subject..
TASS on 27 November reported Egyptian Foreign Minister Riyad
as stating that.the UAR will not agree to another extension of
the cease-fire agreement if it is not sure that Israel's
contacts with Jarring are maintained without any covert aims
and are in good faith. And on 1 December TASS reported
President as-Sadat as telling UAR armed forces units, in a
visit to the Suez front the day before, that the UAR will agree
to prolongation of the cease-fire agreement only if an "accurate
calendar plan is set" for Israeli withdrawal.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/O9L1p T00875R0003000392H-,RENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
UAR-U.S. EXCHANGE OVER "SPY FLIGHTS" NOTED BY MOSCOW
TASS has briefly taken note of the UAR-U.S. exchange over the
issue of U.S. reconnaissance flights over the Suez Canal zone.
Reporting that t;ie UAR Government had issued a protest against
American U-2 reconnaissance flights "over Egyptian positions,"
TASS on 23 November cited AL-AHRAM as claiming that day that
Egyptian observation posts had repeatedly recorded flights by
U-2 "spy planes" made "in direct proximity" to the front line
to collect espionage information. AL-AHRAM added, according to
TASS, that the planes come from the direction of the Israeli-
occupied Sinai Peninsula, and that all intelligence information
collected during the flights "undoubtedly comes to the knowledge
of our enemy." TASS recalled that the UAR called the U.S.
Government's attention in October to the fact that U-2 recon-
naissance flights are a violation of the terms of the cease-fire
agreement.
UAR dissatisfaction with the U.S. response--delivered on the 25th--
to its protest was noted in a TASS item on the 27th which reported
AL-AHRAM as rejecting U.S. attempts to justify the flights. And on
5 December TASS reported that the UAR Foreign Ministry handed the
U.S. representative in Cairo a memorandum declaring that U-2 planes
were continuing flights "over the Sinai Peninsula," and that such
flights "ovei._Egyptian territory'_? serve the aims of Israel.
TASS on 3 December had picked up AL-AHRAM's*charge that day that
the Americans continue getting reconnaissance data on the Egyptian
troops from space satellites, despite official U.S. assurances
that it discontinued the U-2 flights. TASS added that AL-AHRAM,
referring to the "acknowledgment of the New York TIMES," pointed
out that the satellites transmit photographs of the positions of
Egyptian troops to one of the U.S. receiving stations in West
Germany, from where they are immediately relayed to the United
States.
MOSCOW SILENT ON CAIRO REPORTS OF LIAR-SOVIET TALKS
TASS on 4 December noted as-Sadat's decision, as reported by the
Cairo AL-AHRAM that day, to launch a broad diplomatic campaign to
explain to friendly governments and the international public the
UAR's stand on settlement of the crisis before the current cease-
fire agreement expires. The campaign, the dispatch added, is to
show that the UAR exerts every effort to restore a just and last-
ing peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242. While
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CAWRIt 016875R000300030055B!S TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
TASS noted only that high-ranking delegations would visit
countries of Eastern and Western Europe, Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, the AL-ADAM account, as reported by the MIDDLE
EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA), listed some of the countries to be
visited and delegation heads, including 'Ali Sabri to Moscow
on a visit "scheduled previously." MENA on the 7th r- orted
that 'Ali Sabri's delegation, including Deputy Premier 'Aziz
Sidgi, Foreign Minister Riyad, and War Minister Fawzi, would
leave for Moscow 17 December for talks on "cooperation in
various fields." There has apparently been no Soviet acknow-
ledgment as yet either of this visit or of that of a CPSU
Central Committee delegation led by Ponomarev which, according
to an 8 December MENA report, will arrive in Cairo on the 10th
for a 10-day visit at the invitation of the Arab Socialist
Union.
HUSAYN'S U.S. VISIT, JORDAN CLASHES PROMPT LITTLE COMMENT
Moscow has given little attention to Husayn's current tour,
ignoring his visit to Saudi Arabia and briefly reporting his
2-3 December visit to Cairo and departure for talks in London.
On the 8th TASS reports his arrival in Washington on an
"unofficial" visit but with a program of meetings with high
U.S. officials. The dispatch cites "well-informed political
circles" as assuming that one of Husayn's main tasks is to
convince Washington of the necessity of encouraging Israel to
resume contacts with Jarring. It is also believed, TASS adds,
that he will raise the question of an increase in U.S. military
and economic assistance. Recalling that at the time of the
recent crisis the United States supplied Jordan with several
tanks and a squadron of modernized F-104 aircraft, TASS notes
that the President has asked Congress to appropriate $30 million
for aid to Jordan, believed to be "purely symbolic" aid, and that
Congress is "in no hurry" to approve this assistance. Reporting
Husayn's meeting with President Nixon, TASS on the 9th cites
White House press secretary Ziegler as saying that the two
reviewed the Middle East situation, problems of resumption of
contacts under Jarring, and questions of military and economic
aid to Jordan.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/OitoI0lPDHM $ T00875R00030004Q9 -4REND3
9 DECEMBER 1970
SEPARATE A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 5 December claimed
TALKS that, on the occasion of Ilusayn's visit to the
United Stateb, "imperialists and their Israeli agents"
were again circulating rumors that Jordan was prepared to agree
to separate talks with Israel. The broadcast claimed that the
aims of such "fabrications" were to isolate Jordan from the Arab
struggle and try to cause a confrontation between Jordan and other
Arab countries. This presumably refers to remarks by Israeli
Minister Galili on 25 November that Israel was ready immediately
for talks with Jordan and Lebanon under Jarring's auspices. TASS
on 28 November had reported the Lebanese Foreign Minister as refutj.ng
Galili's statement. Moscow had also taken note of a TIME magazine
article on recent talks between .Husayn and Israeli leaders: A Moscow
domestic service report on 16 November declared that the Jordanian
Government had "exposed these fabrications" and that Israeli Deputy
Prime Minister Allon had told journalists the TIME report was
without foundation.
JORDAN Tlie new clashes in Jordan were briefly reported by TASS
CLASHES in a Cairo-datelined dispatch on the 7th which followed
past practice in reporting statements by both the
fedayeen and the government. On the 8th, TASS cited MENA for a
report that the two sides had reached agreement on "elimination of
tension" and "measures aimed at preventing incidents."
A Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 8th attributes the halting of
the recent clashes to firm measures taken by the Higher Arab
Followup Committee stemming from the Cairo conference of Arab
leaders, headed by Nasir, which had aided settlement of the
September fighting. It again praises the "great positive impor-
tance" of the Arab leaders' joint efforts in returning the
situation to normal. Claiming that the "obstacles and difficulties"
encountered in the process of settlement were not "self-created,"
the broadcast says they must be viewed in the context of the
general Middle East situation, and goes on to denounce the "path
of aggression" pursued by the Israeli "extremists" and their U.S.
supporters. Accusing the "Arabs' enemies" of seeking to liquidate
the Palestine resistance movement, the commentary asserts~.that
the movement has "secured a high reputation" in the international
arena as well as in the Arab world, and points to the UN Special
Political Committee's resolution on the rights of Palestinians to
self-determination as evidence.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :c -96048/kb0875R0003000300 Ci TH N1)U
9 DECEMBER 19'(0
- 25 -
Reporting adoption by the TIN General Assembly of draft resolutions
submitted by the Special Political Committee on the activities of
the UN Relief and Works Agency, TASS on the 9th says several
Western powers objected to the resolution which stressed the
right of the people of Palestine to self-determination, an "impera-
tive condition" for the establshment of peace. TASS notes that
the United States sided with Israel and was among the delegations
voting against the resolution, but says nothing about the Soviet
vote.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CON 1111) I!IN'I'IA I,
- 2 6 -
P R C F O R E I G N R E L A T I ONS
1111I0 'I'l1T,INU0
9 D1 CD;M13EI 1.970
PEKING RENEWS DEMAND FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM TAIWAN
While Peking in recent months has largely avoided comment on Sino-
U.S. issues, it has been intent on reasserting its claim to
Taiwan and counteracting any Impression that it has softened its
position at a time of resurgent diplomatic and. political activity.
The PRC's recent recognition agreements with four countries, along
with the favorable vote on tha resolution for its being seated in
the United Nations; have occasioned reassertions of Peking's
position on Taiwan that betray concern over a tendency in the
world community to seek an accommodation on this issue falling
short of Peking's full demands. In this --ontext Peking has
renewed its demand for U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan and has
reserved for itself the right to determine the island's future.
Peking's comment on the UNGA vote on the China representation
question--'in the form of an NCNA report on 22 November-
interpreted U.S. delegate Phillips' speech in the debate as
indicating that the United States had "changed its tone for
the sole purpose" of pursuing a "two Chinas" or "one China,
one Taiwan" plan. "This is what the Chinese people can never
permit," Peking emphasized. NCNA took note of Phillips' remark
that the United States is interested in having the PRC play a
constructive role in the family of nations but added that he
emphasized U.S. opposition to UN expulsion of the Chiang
Kai-shek regime.
In the previous month, at the time of the PRC-Canadian
agreement to establish diplomatic relations on the basis of
a compromise on the Taiwan question, Peking had similarly taken
note of "some superficial changes" made by the United States
on this issue. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 15 October,
pointing out with satisfaction that the two-Chinas approach
had been increasingly spurned, directed attention to what it
derided as "the new gimmick" of "one China, one Taiwan"
advanced by the United States as a result of failure of the
previous approach. It was natural that Peking should exhibit
concern over the new approach in view of the compromise in
which Canada recognized the PRC only as "the sole legal
government of China" while remaining noncommittal on Peking's
claim to Taiwan.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-hb% 5R0003000 #11$01~"MIBEB END13
1970
Poking chose the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic
relations with Ethiopia- based on the PRC's preferred terms of
being recognized as "the sole legal government representing the
entire Chinese people"--to repeat its explicit demand for
U.S..withdrawal from Taiwan as well as its routine expression
of determination to "liberate" the island. After expressing
gratitude to Ethiopia for its pro-Peking stand in the United
Nau.ions, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 3 December declared
that the U.S..policy of "hostility toward the Chinese people
has met with ignominious-failure" and that more and more
countries are for friendship with. the PRC. 'lit is exactly in
these circumstances," the editorial claimed, that the United.
States is intensifying its efforts to "perpetuate its forcible
occupation" of Taiwan.
The demand for U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan had most recently
been asserted on an authoritative level in Huang.Yung-sheng's
27 June speech on the 20th anniversary of the U.S. "occupation"
of Taiwan. Defining the Taiwan question as "the crucial issue"
in Sino-U.S. relations, Huang declared that a relaxation of
relations is "out of the question" unless the United States
withdraws from Taiwan. An NCNA commentary on the same occasion
made much. of the continuing U.S. commitment to the Chiang
regime in documenting allegedly hostile actions by the United
States despite President Nixon's call for improved relations
with.the mainland.
While taking note of the U.S. factor in the Taiwan equation,
Peking has also shown concern over the Japanese role and has
taken sharp exception to Tokyo's position on the issue. Thus,
a 27 NovemberNCNA report on Prime Minister Sate's policy
speech two days earlier complained that the Japanese wish
to have a part in determining Taiwan's future ana to prevent
Peking.from realizing its irredentist goal. According to.
NCNA,. Japan. is trying. to make use of the concern of the super-
powers to advocate a renunciation of force in dealing with
the Taiwan question. Once again it was in a Japanese
context that Peking addressed itself--as it rarely does--to
the question of the means it might use to incorporate the
island.. What method the Chinese will use, NCNA asserted,
"is their. own affair and no foreign country has the right
to interfere." Since the Nixon-Sato communique a year ago,
Peking has-displayed particular concern over-prospects of
a growing Japanese role in Asia as a stabilizing force that
would inhibit the realization of Peking's vital objectives.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CON 1.IDi ['I'I.'IAI, IBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
-28-
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
CONTINUED PRAISE FOR BRE;'HNEV AT ARMENIAN ANNIVERSARY
Brezhnev received conPi.derable personal attention and warm praise
at the Armenian 50th Lnnivereary celebration on 29 November, as
at the Kazakh and Azerbaydzhan anniversary ceremonies earlier,
in August and October. The previous pattern of attitudes toward
Brezhnev on the part of regional leaders was largely sustained.
This time, however, Brezhnev received somewhat warmer treatment
from leaders of the northwest--Belorussia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, and Leningrad--who had formerly tended to slight or
ignore him.*
Armenian First Secretary A. Ye. Kochinyan almost matched in
length and effusiveness the praise lavished on Brezhnev by his
proteges, Kazakh First Secretary D, A. Kunayev and Azerbaydzhan
First Secretary G. A. Aliyev, at their respective republic
ceremonies. Kcchinyan, however, failed to call Brezhnev head
of the Central Committee, as Kunayev and Aliyev had at their
ceremonies, and failed to repeat his own assertion at the Kazakh
celebration that Brezhnev headed the Politburo. Nor did the
Armenians nominate an honorary presidium consisting of the
Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev, as had the Azerbaydzhanis.
Kochinyan 's introduction of Brezhnev also omitted any reference
to Brezhnev's World War II role. Aliyev had spoken of Brezhnev's
participation in the "heroic defense of the Caucasus" (PRAVDA,
3 October). Kochinyan spoke instead of the "big role of Comrade
Grechko in the heroic defense of the Caucasus" (PRAVDA, 30 November),
although both Brezhnev and Grechko had served in the 18th Army
in the North Caucasus. Kochinyan showed unusual deference toward
Grechko, calling him a "prominent military and state leader" and
stressing his "enormous contribution to strengthening the military
might of the Soviet army." In contrast, Aliyev had addressed
Grechko only as "a glorious military leader and hero of the Great
Fatherland War," while Kunayev addressed him only as "one of the
glorious military leaders" (PRAVDA, 29 August).
* TRENDS issues of 10 September, 7 October, and 1 October 1970
discussed the treatment of Brezhnev at previous 50th anniversary
ceremonies.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
- 29 -
As before, Moscow First Secretary V. V. Grishin, Azerbaydzhan
First Secretary G. A. Aliyev, Moldavian First Secretary I. I. Bodyul,
and Kirgiz First Secretary T. U. Usubaliyev were highly complimentary
to Brezhnev. Uzbek First Secretary Sh. R. Rashidov reiterated his
earlier praise (Brezhnev's "brilliant and moving speech"), and
Kazakh First Secretary D. A. Kunayev was mildly complimentary
(Brezhnev's "deeply comprehensive" speech).
RSFSR Premier M. A. Yasnov, who had termed Brezhnev's speech at
Alma Ata "brilliant," called Brezhnev's Yerevan speech "comprehensive."
Turkmen First Secretary M. G. Gapurov and Tadzhik First Secretary
D. R. Rasulov, unusually laudatory at Baku, were more restrained
this time. Gapurov mentioned Brezhnev but with no praise. While
Rasulov praised Brezhnev's "moving and comprehensive" speech, he
stressed the role of the collective by attributing Soviet successes
to the "wisdom of the policy of our party and the huge organizational
will and ability of the Leninist Central Committee and its Politburo
to lead the masses" (KOMMUNIST, 30 November).
The previous pattern of restraint was again maintained by Estonian
First Secretary I. G. Kebin, Georgian First Secretary V. P.
Mzhavanadze, and Ukrainian First Secretary P. Ye. Shelest.
However, Kebin--in contrast to the previous four occasions--at
least mentioned Brezhnev's speech this time, albeit with no
praise. Mzhavanadze only noted that Brezhnev had presented the
anniversary award to Armenia, while Shelest was the only speaker
to ignore Brezhnev entirely in his speech.
NORTHWEST LEADERS The main variation from the previous pattern
was the praise of Brezhnev by leaders of the
northwest. Belorussian First Secretary P. M. Masherov spoke of
Brezhnev's "brilliant speech, as always full of great warmth and
rich, deep content." Although he had characterized the speeches
of both Brezhnev and Shelest as "brilliant and comprehensive"
at the December 1967 Ukrainian anniversary, he failed to praise
Brezhnev's speech at the December 1968 Belorussian anniversary.
The Belorussian representatives at the Kazakh and Azerbaydzhan
ceremonies had ignored Brezhnev's speeches.
Latvian First Secretary A. E. Voss not only praised Brezhnev's
"brilliant and moving" speech but devoted five paragraphs of his
23-paragraph speech to Brezhnev. At the December 1967 Ukrainian
and December 19G8 Belorussian ceremonies he had called Brezhnev's
speeches "brilliant," but he had ignored Brezhnev's speech in
Kazakhstan (he did not attend the Azerbaydzhan ceremony).
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
Lithuanian Premier I. A. Manyushis labelled Brezhnev's speech
"brilliant." The last anniversary at which a Lithuanian leader
praised Brezhnev's speech was at the December 1967 Ukrainian
ceremony, when first secretary A. Yu. Snechkus used the term
"brilliant" also. New Leningrad First Secretary G. V. Romanov--
who had accompanied Brezhnev and Grishin on their recent trip to
Hungary--departed from the pattern of his predecessors by praising
Brezhnev's speech as "brilliant and profound."
OVERSEERS OF MOSCOW CULTURE TRANSFERRED TO NEW POSTS
Two more Moscow city cultural officials have been transferred to
other posts. According to SOVIET CULTURE, on 26 November,
N. T. Sizov, who was deputy chairman of the Moscow city exec"itive
committee, has been named general director of the Moscow film
studio end deputy chairman of the USSR Cinema Committee;
B. Ye. Rodionov, who was chief of the Moscow city culture
administration and Sizov's direct subordinate, has been
appointed deputy chairman of the RSFSR Publishing Committee.
These moves represent a further shakeup in the Moscow city
organization's cultural leadership. Yu. N. Verchenko was
removed from his post as city party committee culture section
head earlier this fall; he was elected organizational secretary
of the USSR Writers Union on 4 November. S. S. Gruzinov was
removed from his post as rayon first secretary (where he had
a special role in city cultural affairs) when he was appointed
ambassador to Algeria last May. Moscow city committee ideology
secretary A. P. Shaposhnikova thus remains the only survivor
among the leaders of Moscow cultural policy in recent years.
The reasons for the shakeup are unclear. Gruzinov and Sizov
(as well as Shaposhnikova) were appointees of former Moscow city
first secretary Yegorychev in 1965, while Verchenko rose in the
Komsomol central apparatus under Shelepin's protege Pavlov; Sizov
also worked in the central Komsomol apparatus under Shelepin. These
associations may have impaired their credentials in the eyes
of present Moscow First Secretary V. V. Grishin, who has
advertised his allegiance to Brezhnev by frequent personal
flattery.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
The policy implications of these transfers are also unclear; the
new appointees remain unknown, and the transferred officials have
represented divergent trends in cultural affairs. While Verchenko
and Sizov are clearly hardliners, Gruzinov and Rodionov have
sometimes sided with unorthodox theater directors (for example,
director A. Efios--see the 26 March and 16 April 1968 SOVIET
RUSSIA).
Rodionov had managed to keep his post as supervisor of the
troublesome Moscow theaters for over ten years. His administration
was often criticized for permissiveness by such hardliners as
Sverdlovsk raykom first secretary B. V. Pokarzhevskiy (MOSKOVSKAYA
PRAVDA, 23 February 1968, SOVIET CULTURE, 24 February 1968, and
SOVIET RUSSIA, 22 October 1968), V. Selivanov (SOVIET RUSSIA,
26 March 1968), the SOVIET RUSSIA editors (SOVIET RUSSIA,
16 April 1968), and by his chief Sizov (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA,
13 July 1966 and 9 April 1970). In August, Shaposhnikova
specifically criticized Rodionov's administration for "giving
in" to theater directors and "not always giving skilled party
evaluation to ideologically harmful works" (KOMi1UNIST, No. 12).
Moscow First Secretary Grishin, at'an 11 November city committee
plenum, also attacked "ideologically immature" works and "new
readings" of the classics in Moscow theaters (PRAVDA, 13 November),
EX-MVD CHIEF NOW Sizov's credentials as a hardliner are
MOSFILM DIRECTOR abundantly clear from his career in the
MVD, his links to Shelepin and reactionary
author V. A. Kochetov, and his de.ense cf Stalin-era officials.
Sizov rose through the Moscow Komsomol crganize?'ion in the
early 1940's--as did Shelepin. As editor o: - central Komsomol
organ and head of a Komsomol Central Committee section in the
late 1940's and as Moscow oblast Komsomol first secretary 1950-
1954, he had occasion for frequent contact with Shelepin, who
was successively Komsomol Central'. Committee cadre secretary
(1943-1949), second secretary (1949-1952) and first secretary
(1952-1958). Later Sizov became an official of the radio
broadcasting administration and in August 1962 became chief
of the Moscow city MVD (Shelepin presumably supervised the MVD
as Central Committee secretary at that time and his protege
V. S. Tikunov was RSFSR MVD chief). In March 1965 he was
promoted to Moscow city executive committee deputy chairman
and soon dropped his police post.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
Sizov has simultaneously pursued a literary career, mainly in the
reactionary journal OKTYABR. His first novelette, "Troubled
Hearts," concerned the work of Komsomol leaders and apparently
was drawn from his personal experiences (Boris Privalov noted
in a 26 June 1964 LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA review that Sizov "has
considerable experience in Komsomol and party work"). The most
important of his works in OKTYABR was his early?196.4--novel-'"The
Difficult Years," which emulated OKTYABR editor Kochetov's own
controversial novel, "The Obkom Secretary," in refuting the idea
that all Stalin-era officials were bad and in presenting a relatively
sympathetic--for the Khrushchev era--picture of Stalin.
Sizov's novelette "Arbat and Selenga" in the October 1965 OKTYABR
was ridiculed in NOVY MIR (No. 4, 1966). It was criticized as a
prime example of OKTYABR's poor quality in a speech at an RSFSR
Writers Union plenum (A. Nikulkov in the 29 April 1966 LITERARY
RUSSIA). Now Sizov is general director of Mosfilm and presumably
in a position to authorize the filming of more Stalinist hack works
such as Kochetov's novel "Angle of Fall," produced by the Leningrad
film studio and premiered earlier this year.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL
- 33 -
PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS
FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
SPECIAL DISTRICT PARTY :A +1ITTEE ESTABLISHED IN LIAONING
Although it had previously claimed only two rebuilt county party
committees, Liaoning Province has become the first to announce
re-establishment of a special district party committee. This
is the first report in public media on a new party committee at
the special district or higher level since the Ninth Party
Congress.
The report on the new party committee came from the Liaoning
provincial radio on 3 December, and it has not yet been picked
up by central media.* The report claimed that rebuilding of
the Chaoyang special district's party committee started in
October 1968, with the army representative of the party core
group of the Chaoyang revolutionary committee "taking the lead
in making a frontal attack on complacency among leading cadres."
Party consolidation work continued until 95 percent of the
party units had completed their ideological rebuilding and
52 percent of the basic-level units had actually established
new party committees. Then, "in accordance with the stipulation
of the new party constittution," the committee was set up
"recently" following an election by 770 delegates attending a
party congress within the special district.
The district congress was addressee by two vice chairmen of
the Liaoning Provincial Revolutionary Committee, Yang Chi and
Liu Sheng-tien, who are identified for the first time as
members of the provincial party core group. Previously only
Li Po-chiu, also a vice chairman of the provincial revolutionary
committee, had been identified as a member of the party core
group. Both Yang and Li also hold high-ranking positions
within the Shenyang Military Region.
* An NCNA domestic service item on 5 December reported that
"party organizations and revolutionary committees at all levels
in Liaoning Province" are leading a mass movement to learn from
Tachai. A specific reference to Chaoyang special district refers
only to the revolutionary committee there; a specific reference
to Penchi county mentions the county party committee and the
county revolutionary committee.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
- 34 -
Notwithstanding Liaoning's claimed success, Hunan Province
appears the most advanced in terms c.f overall rebuilding at
the lower levels. A 4 December Changsha broadcast claimed
for the first time that a "great majority" of basic-level
party branches and a "majority" of counties have set up
new party committees. The broadcast reported that party
members in Hunan are resolved "on the basis of the successes
already achieved" to speed the remaining party-building tasks
and greet the promised fourth National People's Congress with
"new victories."
CIVILIAN POLITICAL COMMISSAR NAMED TO TSINGHAI PLA UNIT
An article broadcast over the Tsinghai provincial radio on
27 November by the political commissar of a PLA unit indicates
that PLA commissars are still being recruited from civilian
life. The author of the article, also secretary of the unit's
party committee, said he was reluctant to take the assignment
last year but as a party member accepted it "obediently."
He had "no experience at all in serving PLA units, in doing
political work for them, or in being a 'squad leader'," having
previously been a college professor. Believing, however, that
"only after one follows the leadership of higher authorities
can one gain a correct orientation," he decided that the
superior party organ knew best.
While the use of civilians as political commissars has been
frequent in the past history of the PLA, during the period of
army supremacy in the cultural revolution the few indicated
appointments of this nature were on a high provincial level.
Nonmilitary provincial chiefs were occasionally named political
commissars, as were provincial party secretaries prior to
the cultural revolution. The party in the army has in general
seemed to be a discrete entity during the struggles of the past
few years, perhaps even a rival to the civilian structure. The
Tsinghai example indicates that the PLA party organizations do
indeed retain some civilian coloration, particularly in light
of the fact that the commissar in question is secretary of at
least a division-sized unit composed of "several thousand
commanders and fighters."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
Ej
MEETING IN CANTON MARKS REOPENING OF UNIVERSITIES
"A grand school-opening ceremony" in Canton to mark the reopening
of nine provincial colleges and universities was reported by the
Kwangtung radio on 2 December. Anhwei and Chekiang provinces had
previously announced formally the reopening of their provincial
institutes of higher education. Scattered media reports have
indicated some individual reopenings elsewhere.
The Canton announcement, unlike those for Anhwei and Chekiang,
failed to provide any hard information on how the new higher
education system will operate in Kwangtung, but it did indicate
measures apparently aimed at insuring the political reliability
of the new worker-peasant-soldier students. Membership in the
Young Communist League or the CCP itself appears to be close to
a requirement for enrollment. The Canton report said that "80
percent" of the new students are either party or league members.
Wang Shou-tao, vice chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolu-
tionary Committee, cautioned the new students that "although
your environment has been changed, your work style of hard
struggle must not be changed." In an apparent effort to
maintain their work style, several "expedition teams" of worker-
peasant-soldier students "took several days to walk to the
schools" in Canton, the broadcast declared, and immediately
upon arrival began "weeding, irrigating vegetables, repairing
roads and cleaning up generally."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ? CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
- S-1 -
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
ANNUAL DRV ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The annual DRV economic mission abroad, this year headed by
Vice Premier Nguyen Con, returned to Hanoi on 25 November
after a month- and-a.-half tour during which economic agreements
were concluded with the PRC, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,
and North Korea. After leaving the DPRK on 23 November, the
delegation stopped over until the 25th in Peking, where it met
with Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien; Li had signed
the PRC-DRV aid agreement in October. At the same time,
agreements with Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania were signed in
Hanoi during the past month.* The DRV side at the Hanoi talks
was headed by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, who from 1965 to 1969
had regularly led traveling economic aid delegations. No
agreements with Poland, East Germany, or Hungary have been
announced to date.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA The DRV delegation visited Prague from
2 to 12 November, and Nguyen Con was
received by Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal. In
reporting that the DRV-Czechoslovak agreement was signed on
the 6th, Hanoi specified that it included military as well as
economic aid; but the Prague CTK's report made no mention of
military aid, saying the agreement was for "economic and
technical assistance" for 1971. CTK added that Czechoslovakia
would provide the DRV with "engineering and consumer goods."
This is consistent with differing Hanoi and Prague reports on
the signing of the agreements in 1968 and 1969. In 1968,
however, CTK did quote Czechoslovak Vice Premier Frantisek
Hamouz as mentioning military aid in speaking of the
negotiations with the DRV. Neither side mentioned military
aid in reporting the 1967 agreement, but the 1966 agreement--
signed in Hanoi that year--was described by both sides as
including military aid.
* The agreements with the PRC and the USSR are discussed,
respectively, in the TRENDS of 7 October 1970, page 8, and of
28 October, pages 4-5. The DRV-Albanian agreement is also
covered on page 5 of the latter issue. Additional PRC-DRV
protocols are discussed in the 4 November TRENDS, pages 10-11.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
9 DECEMBER 1970
The nature of some Czechoslovak assistance was suggested in a
5 November CTK report on the departure of another DRV delegation
led by alternate member of the North Vietnamese party Central
Committee Dinh Duc Thien.* The report said that Thien, in
meetings with Czechoslovak ministers, had discussed "the further
extension of training of Vietnamese for the requirements of
Vietnamese industry, possibilities for construction of a machine
tool research institute in the DRV with the assistance and
participation of Czechoslovak specialis-i,s, the construction
of an apprentice center in the DRV with Czechoslovak assistance,
and the use of Czechoslovak scientific and technical films for
training Vietnamese experts."
Both VNA and CTK reported that a protocol on goods exchange for
1971 was also signed on 6 November. But only CTK noted that
under this agreement Czechoslovakia will export to the DRV
machinery, rolled materials, pharmaceutical products, malt,
and various fabrics and will import from the DRV tea, jute,
ready-made clothes, woolen knitted garments, and products of
domestic industry." .
NORTH KOREA The Nguyen Con delegation arrived in Pyongyang
on 17 November, and on the 19th the two countries
signed an agreement on the DPRK's "free economic and military
aid" to the DRV and another one on mutual delivery of commodities
and payments for 1971. There is no further explanation of the
contents of either agreement in propaganda media. Reports on
last year's agreement with North Korea did not specify military
aid, although it had been mentioned in reports on the agreements
concluded in the previous two years.
The Nguyen Con delegation was received by Kim Il-song on the 22d
and left for home via Peking on the 23d.
* Dinh Duc Thien was identified by Prague as minister of
mechanical engineering and metallurgy. Available Hanoi
propaganda has not confirmed this position, but NCNA identified
him similarly in reporting his delegation's stay in Peking from
28 November to 5 December. This DRV ministry was formed in a
major governmental reorganization announced by Hanoi on
9 December 1969; see the TRENDS of 10 December 1969, pages 13-14.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : PATq ,,,#,15Tr0875R00030Q,?1J-P0''4I NI)ii
1) IINCHN1i i:li 1.9,(()
BULGARIA A 131.1.1garI an Government Cconom.i.c de:Legat.l.or- arrived
in Hanoi on 6 November, .Led by .Poncho Kuhad Lnsk' L,
Politburo member, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers,
and minister of conut;ruc.tion a.nd. architooLure. The delegation
was met by DRV Vice Premier be 'I.'hanh Nghi, who headed the DIiV
,sconomie delegation whi rah began talks with the Bulgarians the
next day.
On 12 November, according to VNA, representatives of the two
countries signed an agreement on non-refundable economic aid
and long-term loans, an agreement on military, aid for 1971,
and an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. A
protocol on scientific and technical cooperal?ion and an
agreement on goods exchange and payments were also signed.
Bulgarian press reports on the signing of the aid agreements
made no mention of military assistance. Sofia media similarly
failed to acknowledge the military aid agreement last year,
although such agreements had been noted in the media in
previous years.
Kubadinski was received by First Secretary Le Duan and Premier
Pham Van Dong on the 12th, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap
received Col. Gen. Georgi Momekov, a member of the delegation.
VNA's report of the group'-. departure on the 15th noted that
the Bulgarians had toured Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, and Ninh Binh
provinces and the city of Haiphong during their stay.
ROMANIA On 15 November, as the Bulgarians departed, a
Romanian Government economic delegation arrived
in Hanoi, led by Gheorghe Radulescu, a member of the Romanian
party Presidium and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers.
Again Le Thanh Nghi met the delegation and led the DRV side
in the ensuing talks.
Hanoi media on the 19th and Bucharest on the 20th reported the
signing on the 19th of an agreement on non-refundable military
aid and an agreement on goods exchange and payments for 1971.*
* A Romanian domestic broadcast on 23 October reported that
an agreement with the DRV on goods exchange for 1971-1975 and
a commercial protocol for 1971 were signed in Bucharest that
day. Hanoi media are not known to have reported these agreements.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3
CONP'II)IM"I.I..Ar, F13TS TRENDS
9 1)ECEMBER 19'70
VNA also noted that: a convention on loans for 1971 was signed,
while the Bucharest correspondent in Hanoi, according to
AGERPRLS, referred more generally l;o an economic agreement.
Last year Hanoi reported only that agreements on economic and
military aid were signed with Romania, while AGERPRES listed
an economic agreement, an accord on non-refundable military
assistance, a trade agreement, and an accord on postponement of
the refund of sums resulting from previously extended credits.
Examples of past Romanian assistance to the DRV were cited in
an AGERPRES report on the activities of the Romanian delegation.
A dispatch on the 19th noted that during a visit by the delegation
to Thanh Hoa the regional party first secretary cited support
given the province by Romania: "the activity of Romanian doctors
in that province, the support given by Romania to mechanize the
road laying work, and th' fact that youths from Thanh Hoa are
studying in Romania." The Romanians also visited the city of
Haiphong and Quang Ninh Province, according to the VNA report
on their 20 November departure. The delegation was received by
Le Duan and Pham Van Dong on the 19th.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030054-3