TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300030051-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: November 18, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
Illlllll~~uiiiiiiii~llllllll ~ I II
FOREIGN II
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~ I II
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Confidential
18 NOVEMBER 1970
(VOL. XXI, No. 46)
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP I
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 NOVEMBER 1970
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
INDOCHINA
Reaction to Laird Statement on DRV Downing of U.S. Plane . . . . . 1
Manifesto of South Vietnamese "Popular Front for Peace" . . . . . . 6
Moscow Underscores Role of Arab Socialist Union in UAR . . . . . . 9
USSR Reticent on Syrian Ba'thist Leae,rship Crisis . . . . . . . . 13
CUBA SUBMARINE BASE
TASS Commentary Decries U.S. Press "Rumpus," Reiterates Denial . . 17
Havana Says U.S. Forced to Divulge "Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact" . . . 18
SALT
USSR Cautiously Optimistic in Limited Comment on Talks . . . . . . 19
CHILE
Moscow Welcomes Resumption of Diplomatic Relations with Cuba . . . 21
Cuba Hails Blow to Blockade, Evinces Interest in Ties with Peru . . 21
FRG-POLAND
Warsaw Hails Treaty, Praises Brandt's Political Courage . . . . . . 24
ROMANIA-POLAND
New Treaty Patterned on Soviet-Romanian Pact, with Variations . . . 26
Ceausescu, Gomulka Remarks Mirror Divergent Approaches . . . . . . 28
Communique Hailing Friendship Ends Yahya Khan Visit to PRC . . . . 30
Moscow Reports Yahya Khan's Arrival, Displays Sensitivity . . . . . 33
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1E NOVEMBER 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOF, ATTENTION 9 - 15 NOVEMBER 1970
Moscow (3875 items)
Peking (2946 items)
October Rev-lution
(39%)
11%
Pakistani President
(--)
26%
Anniversary
in PRC
Afro-Asian Solidarity
(--)
6%
Indochina
(16%)
25%
Conference in Tripoli
[Cambor?ian National
(1%)
15%]
Indochina
(3%)
5%
Day
De Gaulle's Death
(--)
5%
(Vietnam
(10%)
4%)
WFDY Meeting in
(4%)
5%
Domestic Issues
(26%)
17%
Budapest
Middle East
(2%)
7%
China
(4%)
4%
.e Gaulle's Death
(--)
7%
Gro,;:Zrko in Italy
(--)
4%
DPRK Party Congress
(3%)
4%
Middle East
(3%)
.:'%
C 0 R R E C T I 0 N TO THE TRENDS OF 4 NOVEMBER
PRC SUMMIT PROPOSAL, page 26. In paragraph two, tracing background
of the proposal, line eight should read: x x x would not be used.
The proposal was repeated, though without the "first step"
suggestion, in the communiques announcing the second and third
Cninese nuclear tests in May 1965 and May 1966. It recurred with
and without the formula in other elite Peking propaganda during
May and June 1966, and Chou En-tai repeated the 1964 formula in
his 28 July 1966 message x x x .
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INDOCHINA
Current Vietnamese communist propaganda focuses on Defense
Secretary Laird's 13 November comments following the downing
of a U.S. plane over the DRV that day. 7 'ird's enunciation
of the U.S. policy on reconnaissance over :orth Vietnam
prompts DRV and PRG foreign ministry spokeamen's statements
on the 14th and 16th, respectively, as well as a statement by
the spokesman for the DRV's Paris delegation. The statements,
as well as lower-level comment, deny that there was an under-
standing allowing U.S. reconnaissance flights over the DRV
after the 1968 halt in the.bombing of the North and assail
the U.S. policy of "protective reaction" when unarmed U.S.
planes are fired upon. Laird's remarks are also decried in
Moscow propaganda, including articles in IZVESTIYA and RED
STAR, and in a commentary by a correspondent of Peking's NCNA.
With the 92d session of the Paris talks postponed until
19 November because of de Gaulle's funeral on the 12th, there
is little 1ietnamese communist propaganda on political settle-
ment. Commentaries, chiefly from the Front, continue to
deprecate. President Nixon's 7 October peace proposal and to
uphold the PRG's eight-point elaboration of 17 September.
A 15 November NHAN DAN article claims that the U.S. elections
on the 3d demonstrated that the "absolute majority" of the
American people oppose the war and the President's policy
"of prolonging and expanding it."
The heads of both Vietnamese communist delegations at the
Paris talks, the DRV's Xuan Thuy and the PRG's Nguyen Thi
Binh, attended de Gaulle's funeral, Mme. Binh interrupting
an "official visit" to Bulgaria for the purpose. Her visit
to Sofia, which began on 9 November, was resiuned on the 13th.
The floods in South Vietnam's northern provinces continue
to draw attention, with publicity for communist relief
efforts and attacks on allied "crimes" in the area. Inter-
national expressions of sympathy for the flood-victims
include high-level messages from Romania and North Korea.
There is also a message from Chou En-lai and one from the
Chinese Red Cross announcing a donation of relief materials.
Moscow has acknowledged the floods only in routine-level
propaganda.
REACTION TO LAIRD STATEMENT ON DRV DOWNING OF U.S, PLANE
OFFICIAL DRV AND Both the North and South Vietnamese
PRG STATEMENTS communists reacted officially to
Secretary Laird's 13 November remarks,
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Affairs organizations at the Pentagon, in response to the downing
of an RF-4C over North Vietnam's Ha Tinh Province that day.
Uniformly, the comment--including the DRV and PRG foreign
ministry statements and the one by the DRV delegation spokes-
man in Paris--denies that there was an understanding in 1968
allowing U.S. reconnaissance flights over the DRV and
denounces Laird's statement that the United States stands
ready to take appropriate action in response to attacks on its
unarmed aircraft. The propaganda has not acknowledged
Laird's remarks that the cessation of strikes against the DRV
in November 1968 was premised on a North Vietnamese undertaking
to negotiate in good faith in Paris and his expression of
concern that the DRV has not negotiated in a substantive or
productive way.
Hanoi treated the downing of the RF-4C on the 13th routinely,
announcing on the same day that.an "enemy reconnaissance jet"
had been brought down, bringing to 3,364 Hanoi's total of
U.S. aircraft alle&edly downed over North Vietnam.* The DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, issued on the 14th in
reaction to Laird's remarks, rejects the Secretary's comment
that such actions by the DRV are incompatible with a-U.S.-DRV
understanding: The spokesman says the DRV Government has
"time and again" stated that the United States halted the
bombing unconditionally and that there is "absolutely no
'tacit agreement"' between the DRV and the United States.
The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman claims routinely that U.S.
reconnaissance flights are an "infringement" on DRV sovereignty
and a "brazen provocation" against the Vietnamese people, and
he affirms that the Vietnamese are "resolved to oppose and
duly punish. all U.S. encroachments." He charges that Laird's
statement "aims at smokescreening the war acts" of the United
States against the DRV and at "paving the way for the
continuation and multiplication of these war acts"; and he
says that the DRV Government demands an "immediate" end to
"the above mentioned acts."
Unlike the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's staterient, the
ones by the spokesman for the DRV Paris delegation and by the
PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman note that Laird mentioned
* A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 18th claims that
121 U.S. aircraft have been shot down over the DRV since
the bombing halt began in November 1968.
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military infiltration across the demilitarized zone and the
shelling of South Vietnamese. cities, along with attacks on
reconnaissance planes over the North, as actions which might
prompt a U.S. response in accordance with the 1968 under-
standing. But there is no communist acknowledgment of
Laird's reference to the shelling of Saigon with four enemy
rockets on 2 November. The only monitored Vietnamese
communist mention of that attack was in a 3 November Hanoi
domestic service broadcast, in dictation, which referred
briefly to an attack on Saigon with "big guns."
The consistency with which Hanoi insists that the U.S.
bombing halt was unconditional is pointed up in the
l4 November statement by the DRV delegation spokesman,
carried by VNA on the 15th, which recalls that this view
was affirmed in the DRV Government's 2 November 1968 state-
ment and declares that it has been reaffirmed "many a time"
by Xuan Thuy in Paris. The delegation spokesman charges that
Secretary Laird's comments "constitute new evidence that the
Nixon Administration has not given up its acts of provocation
against the DRV and lay bare its intention of undertaking new
adventures infringing upon the sovereignty and security of
the DRV."
The 16 November PRG spokesman's statement, publicized'on the'ljuh,
expresses. "full and unanimous" agreement with the DRV spokesman's
statement and says that "no threat can shake the iron-firm
determination of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people.
None of the Americans' adventurous military acts against the
DRV can avoid being appropriately punished" by the people in
both parts of Vietnam. nor save the United States from defeat.
RADIO 8 PRESS
CONr1ENTAR I ES
Like the official statements, lower-level
comment mentions the possibility of future
U.S. actions against the DRV. NHAN DAN
on the 15th, in a commentary broadcast by Hanoi radio, cites
AP in charging that Laird "brazenly threatened to have
aircraft bomb our antiaircraft defense positions." The paper
calls the Secretary's "threat" part of a "plot of the Nixon
Administration to prepare for intensification of military
activities against the northern part" of Vietnam.
A 17 November Hanoi radio commentary scores Laird's remarks
along with a State Department spokesman's statement that the
reconnaissance flights will continue. Their "prefabricated
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arguments can fool no one," the commentary says, and "can
only further expose their true faces as stubborn aggressors
and their plots of preparing public opinion in order to
intensify their acts of war against the DRV." An 18 November
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, also citing Laird's remarks and
the State Department spokesman's comments, claims that U.S.
news agencies and Saigon radio "even spread the news that
the United States might resume its bombing on storages in
North Vietnam." The army paper concludes that the United
States is "obviously feverishly preparing for new military
adventures in North Vietnam in an attempt to intimidate the
Vietnamese people and extricate themselves from their
position of failure and passiveness." The commentaries
uniformly express the determination of the North Vietnamese
to punish U.S. "violations of DRV sovereignty."
MOSCOW Reporting on the 14th that Secretary Laird
asserted U.S. readiness to take "retaliatory
measures" in connection with the downing of the American
reconnaissance plane the day before, TASS says Laird's
statement shows that "the U.S. military" is not only
arrogating to itself the right to violate DRV airspace but
also demands complete safety in the process. TASS calls
the reconnaissance flights a "gross violation" of the
United States' "commitments on the cessation of raids on
the DRV."* Commenting. in a similar vein, a 15 November
IZVESTIYA article adds that Laird is "threatening to renew
the bombing of DRV territory."
A RED STAR article by Aleksey Leontyev, summarized by TASS
on the 17th, denounces Laird's statement as "threats and
blackmail" and repeats the charge that the United States
is "violating the commitments" on cessation of the bombing.
Terming the American actions "unjustifiable" and supporting
the DRV's right to defend itself, Leontyev recalls the
* A 1 May USSR Government statement read by Kosygin, scoring
the U.S. military operation in Cambodia, included a denuncia-
tion of the bombings of the DRV in early May. It charged
that the United States had "grossly violated the commitments
undertaken in the agreement that served as a basis for the
four-sided talks in Paris" and added that through the war in.
Cambodia and the bombings, President Nixon "practically
cancelled out the decision of his predecessor, President
Johnson, on the cessation of the bombings." Comment on the
current episode does not mention the Paris calks.
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DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 14th that
"there is no 'tacit agreement' on this matter between the
DRV and the United States."
A foreign-language radio commentary by Soltan on the 16th
asks how the "provocations and threats" against the LRV
can be reconciled with President Nixon's statements about
peaceful settlement, though Soltan does not directly mention
the five points.
PEKING A commentary by NCNA correspondent Ou Ping, broad-
cast by Peking on 16 November, welcomes the down-
ing of the U.S. reconnaissance plane and scores Secretary
Laird's statement that the United States is ready to "take
appropriate action in response" and will "continue to take
those actions necessary to protect the lives of our men."
The commentary does not mention the Secretary's reference
to the understanding allowing reconnaissance flights,
but NCNA's 15 November summary of the DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement includes its rejection of the notion
that there is any "tacit agreement."
The NCNA correspondent claims that the Indochinese people
have "smashed" the U.S. "war blackmail" and "punctured its
'peace' fraud," adding that "it is nothing but a daydream
now for Laird to try to intimidate the Vietnamese people
and tie their hands in carrying on the wa:: . . . through
'appropriate action in response." Lecturing that the only
way to deal with U.S. "imperialism" is to "trounce it
severely and put it to death," Ou Ping concludes that "it
can be decidedly said that the day when Laird takes
'appropriate actions in response' is precisely the time
when U.S. imperialism suffers still more disastrous defeat
on the battlefield in Indochina."
The NCNA commentary says nothing about Chinese assistance
or backing for the DRV, and NCNA's summary of the DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statement omits is assertion that U.S.
air intrusions are a "challenge to justice- and peace-loving
opinion all over the world."
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MANIFESTO OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE "POPULAR FRONT FOR PEACE"
LPA on the 16th and VNA on the 17th summarized a 10-point
manifesto said to have been issued by the "Popular Front for
Peace" during a "formal appearance before the people" on
7 November at the Ngoc Phuong monastary, Gia Dinh Province.
According to the press agency reports, the manifesto calls
for the withdrawal of allied troops "as an inevitable pre-
condition to end the war," the restoration of peace "on the
basis of the national right to self-determination," and the
establishment of a government that "genuinely represents the
South Vietnamese people so as to end the war" and "meet the
aspirations of the people." The reports of the manifesto
do not bring.up the role of the communist side in a political
solution. Other points in the manifesto deal with. social and
economic questions and relations with "peace-loving" nations.
In another report on the 7 November meeting of the Popular
Front for Peace, LPA noted on the 17th that the meeting was
attended by two Americans--a journalist and a student--
representing the "American people's antiwar movement." The
Americans spoke at the meeting, LPA said, and were ''admitted
to the Popular Front for Peace and assigned the task of
getting in touch with the antiwar movement in the United
States and the world."
The manifesto of the Popular Front for Peace had been mentioned
before by Hanoi and Front media, but with only a general
indication of its contents. The adoption of the document was
reported promptly in an 8 November Liberation Radio news item
which noted that the Popular Front for Peace had issued a
manifesto on the previous day urging formation of a govern-
ment capable of satisfying the people's desires and the
withdrawal of all allied troops. On the 10th the radio
claimed that five Saigon. papers had been confiscated and.
another censored because they carried articles or reports
endorsing the Popular Front's 10-point manifesto. Other
Hanoi and. Front propaganda has cited the manifesto as an
example of growing expressions of opposition in South Vietnam
to the "Thieu-Ky-.Khiem clique."
BACKGROUND The Popular Front for Peace was founded on
11 October this year at a meeting in Saigon
which set up a "mobilization committee for a people's front
struggling for peace and the people's right to self-deter-
mination" and elected a presidium board and a provisional
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secretariat committee. A lengthy Liberation Radio report
on the 11 October meeting, broadcast on the 19th, identified
Dang Van Ky as chairman of the presidium and said he had
been a "deputy chairman of the 1965 peace movement."
Liberation. Radio listed more than 20 members of the presidium
and secretariat, including National Assembly deputies Phan
Xuan Huy and Kieu Mong Thu--both of whom spoke at the
meeting, according to the radio report. Liberation Radio
said that the founding meeting, attended by "more than 1,000
delegates," was sponsored by the Committee for the
Compatriots' Right to a Decent Life and the Women's
Committee for the Right to a Decent Life; the leaders
of these two. organizations are represented in both the
presidium and secretariat of the Popular Front for Peace.
Liberation Radio reported that the Popular Front committee
"made it known that it would broaden its composition and
that a number of notables, intellectuals, and laborers would
be elected and officially become members following a broad
campaign." The radio added that the committee will "contact"
other personalities and listed almost.30 such people,
including Gen. Duong Van Minh.
A statement adopted by the 11 October meeting, carried in
full by Liberation Radio, and speeches at the meeting,
excerpted by the radio, dealt mainly with criticism of U.S.-
backed economic policies of the Thieu regime. Like the
later manifesto, the statement called for the withdrawal of
allied troops as a prerequisite for peace. With respect to
the Saigon regime, it commented that "because South Vietnam's
leaders have proved incompetent in insuring a good life for
the compatriots and satisfying thei.-c desire for peace, the
Vietnamese people are themselves forced to settle their
life-or-death problem and decide their country's future."
Liberation Radio claimed that "many persons" at the meeting
repeated a. "strong statement" by. Mrs. Ngo Ba Thanh--chairman
of the Women's Committee for the Right to a Decent Life and
a member. of the presidium of the Popular Front for'Peace--
that "criticized President Nixon's five-point statement:
'Because U.S. troops cane here en masse, they must now withdraw
en masse. Only this will bring forth a- cease-fire and enable
the South Vietnamese people to exercise their right to
self-determination.'"
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Front media have also carried reports on a 1 November meeting
of the Popular Front for Peace. .Liberation Radio on the 13th
and LPA.on the 14th noted that Dang Van Ky, in a speech to
the meeting rejected "slanders" by the "Thieu clique" against
the leaders of "movements for peace and the right to live."
LPA said he charged that the "slanders" were a pretext for a
crackdown. c:, the movements, and Liberation Radio said he
xnaintained that "he and other members of the Front served as.
instruments for no one but instead served only the people."
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW UNDERSCORES ROLE OF ARAB SOCIALIST UNION IN UAR
In reporting the fifth session of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)
National Congress, hold in Cairo 12-13 September, Moscow has
played up the organization's role in the UAR's internal life. TASS
on the 12th promptly reported President as-Sadat's election as ASU
chairman,* and Moscow has widely publicized Brezhnev's telegram of
congratulations to as-Sadat, reported by TASS on the 13th. The
telegram credits the ASU with a "leading role" in the Egyptian
people's struggle against Israel and imperialism and with carrying
out the program of "revolutionary progressive development."
Brezhnev expresses the hope that CPSU-ASU "relations of friendship
and cooperation" will continue to develop successfully.
AS-SADAT SPEECH,, Summarizing as-Sadat's speech to the congress
CONGRESS DOCUMENTS on the 12th, TASS highlighted his remarks on
continuing Soviet support of the UAR. It
singled out his welcome of British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home's
interpretation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, and
it cited a number of his remarks critical of the United States. TASS
also noted as-Sadat's explanation of the projected Egyptian-Libyan-
Sudanese federation as a "nucleus" of three states whose state systems,
world outlooks, aims, and policies are uniform. The account did not
touch on the portion of as-Sadat-'s speech;. dealing.. with?iKosygin's
talks in Cairo after Nasir's funeral. It also failed to mention his
comments on the UNGA resolution, in which he stipulated two conditions
of UAR acceptance: that the UN Secretary General submit e. progress
report to the United Nations within two months, and that Cairo will
not again extend the cease-fire--at least, not "unless we and Jarring
reach a stage in the situation enabling us here to rethink our posi-
tion."**
* Reporting Premier Fawzi's 15 November resignation and designation
by as-Sadat to head a new cabinet, TASS on the 16th cited AL-AHRAM--a
paper "close to government circles"--as pointing out that various con-
siderations, including the need to elect the ASU chairman, had delayed
reorganization of the cabinet.
** An article by Kudryavtsev in NEW TIMES No. 42 (Russian edition,
23 October) had cited as-Sadat as telling senior Egyptian officers on
19 October that the UAR would agree to extension of the cease-fire
for another three months only if there were "serious and effective
contacts" and that if the UAR agreed to an extension "it will be
the last, for we shall not consent to any further prolongation."
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TASS' account of the ASU Central Committee's report to the congress
similarly highlighted its "stress on the importance" of Soviet
support and expression of gratitude for the "all-round aid." TASS
said the report "gives much space" to the UAR's relations with the
socialist countries, first of all the USSR. But TASS did not
detail the report's references to Soviet political, economic, and
military support, including the provision of military weapons and
equipment and the role of Soviet experts in training the UAR forces
on modern weapons, "particularly the means and equipment for
electronic war." Underscoring the theme of continuity of the
Egyptian political course emphasized in Moscow's propaganda subse-
quent to Nasir's death, TASS said the report stresses that the
latest evecits "convincingly show" no vacuum occurred after his
death.
Briefly noting as-Sadat's concluding remarks, TASS on the 14th
summed up the congress resolutions, singling out the pledge to
achieve "full liberation" of all occupied Arab territories and
the statement that Nasir's 30 March 1968 program will remain the
"guiding document" in strengthening and developing the UAR. It
noted the ASU's decision on strengthening Arab cooperation, its
determination to continue the anti-imperialist struggle, and its
appreciation of Soviet support, as well as the declaration that
all political and economic resources will be employed to achieve
the building of a socialist society. Among other points not men-
tioned by TASS, the resolutions also call for strengthening the
armed forces, assert full support for the Palestinian revolution,
urge strengthened relations with African and Islamic states, and
note Egyptian ties with Mediterranean countries, France iii parti-
cular.
MOSCOW Dealing with the ASU's role in a 2 November article,
CONVENT PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov asserted that the
real test of the ASU's authority and viability came
after Nasir's death, when "imperialist propaganda began blaring
about a 'vacuum' in the UAR." The ASU showed that it was capable
of assuming the leadership of the revolution, Glukhov declared, and
all the most important questions were solved by the ASU Supreme
Executive Committee and Central Committee. He said that transform-
ing the ASU into an "effective political vanguard organization" is
the key to solving the most important problems facing the UAR.
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Both Glukhov's article and an Arabic-language commentary on the
12th underlined the importance of the ASU in raising the level
of consciousness of the working people, Glukhov citing National
Assembly President Shuqayr to this effect as well as noting his
remarks on the importance of socialism for the Egyptian revolution.
Both Glukhov and the commentary in Arabic also approvingly cited
as-Sadat, in his National Assembly speech on the eve of the presi-
dential referendum, as saying the action program he suggested was
that of the ASU's "national action charter" and Nasir's 30 March
1968 program. According to Glukhov, as-Sadat thus gave "utmost
prominence" to continuation of Nasir's work.
The broadcast in Arabic pointed to the importance of the ASU con-
gress in light of the tasks entrusted by the UAR's political
leadership to this "mass political organization." Nasir's pro-
gram of industrialization, agrarian reform, improvement of the
workers' social and economic conditions, and development of close
cooperation with the USSR are principles for the ASU, whose part
in the country's life is "constantly increasing," it said. Call-
ing the ASU a "major force" and "great weight" in the life of the
country, the broadcast claimed that it has more than once demon-
strated its vitality and influence among the masses; and it noted
the decision "in the ASU session this year to proceed with the
peaceful initiative" for a cease-fire and resumption of the Jarring
mission.
BACKGROUND ON Along with occasional carping in the past about
ASU "VANGUARD" the ASU's failure to become an effective politi-
cal party, there have been sporadic Soviet refer-
ences to the need to create an "activist," "vanguard" grouping within
the organization--a party within a party, consisting of "progressive,"
leftist-oriented Egyptians--to guide the ASU in the proper socialist,
mass-political direction. George Mirskiy stated this need in an
article in NEW TIMES No. 48 of 1965 (Russian edition, 26 November)
when he declared that the ASU "cannot act as a politically conscious
vanguard" and added that "socialist development is inconceivable
without a party, without ideological work among the masses."
Mirskiy went on to comment approvingly on the appointment of the
then new premier Zakariya Muhyi ad-Din--of,vhom Moscow does not
approve now--as a sign that Nasir intended to concentrate on
reconstructing the ASU; he would be assisted, the article said,
by "such authoritative political leaders" as Ali Sabri and the
premier's cousin, Khalid Muhyi ad-Din, "both of whom are regarded
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as the most loft-oriented Free Officers leadera." Mirskiy con-
cluded by underscoring the "urgent need" for "the process of
creating within the ASU a vanguard party, the political core of
the Union" (the quoted phrase was printed in italics) and called
this the "central, key factor" in the reorganization scheme.
The same author, in an article in NEW TIMES No. 50 of 1968
(Russian edition, 18 December), commenting on 'the student unrest
in the UAR in November that year, pointed out that some leftist
students had dnmended implementation of the reforms promised in
Nasir's 30 March 1968 program. "All progressives," Mirskiy said,
saw in this program "a guarantee of the implementation of the
principles of socialism, the creation of a socialist vanguard
party, and of resolute struggle against the reactionary, bour-
geosified elements ensconced in the state machinery."
PRAVDA's P.rimakov, in an article on 7 May 1969, noted both subjec-
tive and objective obstacles to the ASU's "becoming a party" and
went on to comment that "the desire to form a party within the ABU
is becoming increasingly strong." This, Primakov said, is "one
of the most significant trends in the UAR's internal development
at this time."
A RED STAR article by G. Savin on 25 September the same year,
referring to Nasir's hopes of winning the broad masses over to
the ASU and recruiting them into the country's active political
and economic life, noted that
within the ASU organizations there is now in progress a
broad and profound process of creating a really mass
political organization which, as many activict+ of the
ASU say, will make it possible in time to lay the foun-
dation for a political party--a vanguard for all pro-
gressive forces participating in the building of a new
society.
In an article in KOMMUNIST No. 16 of 1969 (signed to press
3 November), Rumyantsev recalled the establishment ofr' the ASU
and went on to remark that the UAR had also set up an institute
of socialist problems and had abolished the ban on the dis-
semination of Marxist literature in the country, with the study
of Marxist-Leninist classics becoming "a structural part of the
party school programs." The situation of the Egyptian Marxists,
"who were previously persecuted, was normalized," he said, and
they were "given the opportunity to participate in the building
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of the ABU and to involve themselves in public and production life,"
Itu.myantrsev remarked at a later point that the "young national
democratic organizations, the ASU and the Bath Party, have not
yet become effective political parties with a socialist orientation."
In the March 1970 iSEue of the Russian-language journal PROSTER,
published in Alma-Ata, Yakov Belousev brought up the ASU in
recounting talks with Egyptian officials during a visit of Soviet
parliamentarians to thta UAR in January. He cited ASU organizational
affairs secretary Sha'rawi Jum'ah^ as saying that for supervision
of the large and hetero,genous mass of party members, not all of
whom are active,
it is necessary to have an ideological framework, a form
of political vanguard inside the ASU in the person of the
apparat and the activiet group of the party, and such an
apparat already exists. The political apparatus is assigned
the role of a vanguard political party of a socialist nature.
USSR RETICENT ON SYRIAN BA'THIST LEADERSHIP CRISIS
Following the pattern of its treatment of the last major Syrian
power struggle in February-March 1969,** Moscow has been reluctant
to acknowledge the current developments, reportedly stemming from
disagreements between the "civilian" and "military" wings of the
Syrian Bath Party over Syria's military intervention in the
Jordanian situation in September. There has still been no comment
on the situation, with Moscow confining itself to short TASS dis-
patches belatedly acknowledging the holding of the "emergency"
10th National--pan-Arab--Congress of the Bath Party and Defense
Minister al-Asad's 13 November takeover. Moscow had taken no
note of mid-October reports of the resignation--later withdrawn or
suspended--of al-Atasi, chief of state and premier and Bath
secretary general, from his government and party posts. Prague's
CTK had reported this development on 19 October, noting that the
resignation was reportedly dv.. to leadership controversies, and
* Sha'rawi Jum'sh,who is also interior minister, was identified
by Mirskiy in his December 1968 article as a "representative of
the left wing in the leadership." TASS on 16 January this year,
reporting the activities of the Soviet delegation led by Kunayev,
had mentioned that Jum'ah explained the creation, aims, and prin-
ciples of the ASU, but gave no details.
** For a discussion of Soviet propaganda on the 1969 crisis, see
the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA of 3 July 1969, pages 1-5.
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on the 25th it reported RUDE PRAVO as attributing to Westeril
news agencies claims of a split between the political and
military wings of the Syrian Bath. These "rumors," the paper
said, were received "skeptically" in Arab political circles,
although "they admit that these two wings may differ" in the
stress one places on ideological. and the other on military and
practical questions. RUDE PRAVO conceded that there were
"differences in evaluating" the Jordanian crisis, particularly
the participation of "Palestine Liberation Army units stationed
in Syria" to the fighting in Jordan. (Moscow in dealing with
the 1969 wrangle had similarly scoffed at Western news agency
"rumors" of an internal political crisis, eventually acknowledging
unspecified "complications" and "differences of opinion" among
the leadership.)
BATH Not until 5 November did PASS blandly report that
CONGRESS the Bath Congress had opened on 30 October and was
continuing its work. TASS said that delegates were
discussing party strategy with "due account for the international
situation and the need to strengthen the positions" of the party
to oppose imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary plans. They
stressed the importance of supporting the Palestinian resistance
movement, according to TASS, and also discussed "the role played
by the Syrian army in the country's life" and condemned "reactionary
quarters in the Arab world."
On the 9th TASS reported Bath National Command member Malik al-
Amin as telling a press conference that the delegates had approved
a report and were formulating decisions. The TASS account quoted
al-Amin, characterizing the report, as stating that "imperialism
had always intended to disrupt party ranks, to use rightwing ele-
ments" to distort the Ba'th's political line, and to undermine the
"mainstays of the revolutionary transformations" in Syria.
In a brief Paris-datelined report on the 13th, on the conclusion
of the congress, TASS reported that the participants mapped out
measures to further strengthen Syrian cooperation with the UAR
and other "progressive Arab forces," as well as socialist and
other friendly states. In the domestic field, TASS added, the
party plans social and economic reforms, an "extension of demo-
cracy in governing the state, and greater activity of public
organizations."
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1.8 NOVEMBEIt 3,970
TAKEOVER In Moscow's first direct reference to the Syrian
BY AL-ASAD dissensions, a 'PASS report from Cairo on the
15th, citing AL-JUMHURIYAI?I, said that "differences
on matters of foreign and domestic lolicy between a 'civilian'
grouping headed by party deputy secretary general Salah Jadid
and a 'milittry' grouping headed by Defense Minister Hafiz al-
Asad came to the fore" at the party congress. TABS attributed
to unspecified news agencies the report that al-Asad, using the
army and iiecurity forces, had. taken control of key points in
Damascus, including communications centers and the offices of
two official newspapers, AL--BA'TII and ATH-THAWRAH. Noting
reports that "civilian" leaders Jadid and Zu'ayyin had. been
arrested and that al-Atasi was under house arrest, TASS pointed
out that there were no official reports from Damascus yet on
leadership changes.
On the 16th, in a Beirut-datelined dispatch, TABS again cited
news agency reports that al-Asad continued in control, that
some arrested Bath Party members had been released, and that
al-Asad was cvtiferring with al?Atasi on the question of forming
a new cabinet. Mentioning reports of demonstrations and counter-
demonstrations by Jadid and al-Asad supporters, TASS cited AFP
to the effect that not many people took part.
A Moscow domestic service commentary by Ryzhikov on the 16th,
referring to talks on the new government in Cairo, "latest
events" in Syria, and the Israeli cabinet session, observed
that information ibout the three events "is not complete." He
brushed off the Damascus developments with the remark that "the
radio observes complete silence on these events," which are "in
no way explained by the only paper that appeared in the capital
today, AL-BA'TH." There is only the news of al-Atasi's release
from home confinement, he added.
STATEMENT BY BATH TASS 'briefly reported on the 17th, without
PROVISIONAL COMMAND comment, the statement of the Provisional
Regional Command" of the Syrian Bath
broadcast the previous day by Damascus radio. TASS noted that
the "interim leadership" said Syria will develop "in every way"
its relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.
It cited the statement as pledging Syria to develop relations with
"progressive Arab countries," above all the UAR, and as welcoming
the UAR-Libyan-Sudanese initiative toward establishing a federation.
But TASS failed to mention the stated aims, respectively, of working
toward unity with "progressive Arab states," particularly the UAR,
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and of striving for Syria to "assume its natural place" in the
steps 'toward union. The TASS account noted that in domestic
policy the interim leadership will strive for "deepening socialist
transformations" and "utmost" strengthening of the armed forces.
It pointed out that within three months a people's council will
be set up, including representatives of the Bath, the trade unions,
and the "progressive public," to draft a Syrian constitution and
that the interim leadership will discharge its functions pending
a Bath Regional--Syrian--Congress. TASS made no mention of the
leadership's aims with respect to backing the "Palestinian
revolution" and developing relations with states "which maintain
reasonable stands on our national issues, particularly the Pales-
tine issue."
A brief TASS item from Cairo on the 18th attributes to the MIDDLE
EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) the report that the "provisional leader-
ship" nominated Ahmad al-Khatib, chairman of the Syrian teachers'
trade union, as the new head of state, and asked al-Arad to form
a new government.
POLISH A commentary in Warsaw's GLOS PRACY, reviewed by-PAP
COR-ENT on the 17th, expressed the opinion that if al-Arad
succeeds in keeping the helm of state "this would
undoubtedly be one of the greatest political events" in the Middle
East since Nasir's death. The paper conceded that the current
situation in Syria may appear "somewhat peculiar," since it has
been the Bath civilian wing which has advocated "more radical"
views including the idea of armed struggle as an appropriate
means for regaining the occupied Arab territories. The military
group around al-Asad, GLOS PRACY said, has been more in favor of
a political solution of the Middle East conflict, closer to Cairo's
views. The paper found it unlikely that al-Asad would be able
to rule in such a "complicated country" as Syria without having
achieved a compromise with the Bath Party "majority," notably
its civilian wing.
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CUBA SUBMARINE BASE
TASS CONr1ENTARY DECRIES U ,S , PRESS "R1t1PUS." REITERATES DENIAL
Having kept the issue alive only in passing references for almost
a month, Moscow again devotes a commentary to the charges of
possible Soviet submarine base activity in Cienfuegos, Cuba in
reaction to what is described as a renewed "rumpus" by some U.S.
press organs over an alleged Soviet menace to the Western
Hemisphere. The commentary, by TASS' Igor Orlov on 17 November,
recalls the 13 October TASS statement's carefully worded denial
that the USSR was building "its" base in Cuba, the statement's
avowal that the USSR is doing nothing to ^ontravene the 1962
U.S.-Soviet "understanding," and its expos.tion of Moscow's
"well-known stand" on foreign military bases.* Orlov also
reasserts the right of Soviet "ships and naval vessels" to
call at foreign ports, including those of Cuba, "with the
permission of the governments concerned"--a point also made
in the TASS statement and in earlier Soviet comment.
Recalling that Soviet commentators last month had ascribed
Washington's raising of the issue to "electoral considerations
of the Republican Party" and to Congress' consideration of
military appropriations, Orlov imputes the "new fabrications"
to U.S. circles "who dislike the relaxation of tension, the
normalization of international relations," and who oppose
"improvement of Soviet-American relations." The commentary
is characteristically vague in identifying the charges to which
it responds, saying only that ill-intentioned U.S. circles are
ready "to grasp at any excuse and, in particular, to interpret
in a distorted light even the movements of some lonely barge."
Moscow media, like Havana's, have ignored the Defense Department's
10 November statement that a Soviet submarine tender and an
accompanying tug returned to Cienfuegos on the 9th. Both Moscow
and Havana had similarly ignored Defense Department statements
last month on the vessels' departure from Cienfuegos on 10 October
and arrival at the Cuban port of Mariel on the 15th. The
announcement by U.S. officials on 15 October that two Soviet
barges remained at Cienfuegos was likewise unmentioned.
For an analysis of the 13 October TASS statement, see the
TRENDS of 14 October 1970, pages 33-37.
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Passing references to the issue in Moscow media over the past
month have normally appeared in the context of discussions of
an alleged U.S. effort to revive the cold war. For example,
a 29 October PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov entitled "Has Not
Dulles Risen from the Dead?", complaining of an "intensificatiop
of anti-Soviet propaganda" in the United States, cited the
"fantastic fabrications" about a Soviet nuclear submarine
base in Cuba and added: "As is known, after a check it was
made clear that no military base was being built there."
Gromyko touched on the subject in his 21 October UN General
Assembly speech, after decrying U.S. "fabrications" concerning
violations of the Middle East cease-fire: "With no grounds
whatsoever," he said, "a propaganda campaign has been mounted
about some kind of invented Soviet arrangements in Cuba
allegedly jeopardizing the security of the United States."
He concluded that "this fabrication has fallen flat."
HAVANA SAYS U.S. FORCED TO DIVULGE "KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV PACT'
Havana media, silent on the submarine base issue for about a
month, also revived it in mid-November--in a domestic radio
talk on the 14th by Guido Garcia Inclan, the commentator who
in two broadcasts last month authored Havana's only comment on
the subject. He alleges now that the United States, appalled
with terror lest Russia establish submarine bases on our island's
southern coast," has been compelled to "disclose the Kennedy-
Khrushchev agreement in the light of which they have to be
very careful with Cuba, making certain that nobody lays a hand
on her."* In his last previous reference to the issue on
14 October, Garcia Inclan said Moscow had reminded the United
States of "the Kennedy-Khrushchev pact" (Moscow called it an
"understanding" and did not name Khrushchev) and made what
appeared to be a circuitous allusion to reciprocal commitments
in the 1962 arrangement, including a no-invasion pledge by the
United States.
* The TRENDS of l October 1970, pages 38-39, reviews Cuban
leaders' past statements on the question of a 1962 U.S.-Soviet
understanding. For a discussion of Garcia Inclan's comments
in October of this year, see the TRENDS of 21 October, page 23.
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SALT
USSR CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC IN LIMITED COMMENT ON TALKS
In keeping with treatment of the first two rounds of the strategic
arms limitation talks (SALT), Moscow media are devoting limited--
chiefly reportorial--attention to the current round in Helsinki.
TASS has provided brief, straightforward reports on the meetings
between the delegations at the U.S. and Soviet embassies, and.'its
reportage on proceedings at the UN General Assembly has picked
up general remarks by various representatives on the importance
of the negotiations.
Moscow's most noteworthy current comment is an article in the
weekly NEW TIMES (No. 46, dated 13 November) which is cautiously
optimistic on the possibility of an agreement. The article
notes the "businesslike atmosphere" in Helsinki and. observes
that past experience in disarmament negotiations "shows the
possibility of real progress" if there is a constructive
approach by the participants. Declaring that the USSR
attaches "great significance" to SALT, the article recalls
Gromyko's remarks last month before the UNGA in which he
voiced hope that the talks would lead to positive results.
At the same time, the article says the "prevailing international
situation" exerts a considerable influence on any talks, adding
that "U.S. imperialist circles have in a number of instances
created additional obstacles to the liquidation of dangerous
hotbeds of tension and for the resolution of acute problems
which are poisoning the relations between states."
Soviet comment continues to air routine complaints about U.S.
plans to move forward with new weapons systems, suggesting
that such plans complicate the talks. A typical commentary,
for Finnish listeners on 5 November, cited as one obstacle to
progress toward limiting strategic arms the attempt of the
"U.S. military-industrial complex" to make "new turns in the
spiral of the arms race." An article in the October issue
of the journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY by
G. Trofimenko (signed to the press on 13 October) had discussed
U.S. military and political strategy at some length, recalling
a speech by Secretary Laird in New York in April 1970 in which
he said the Administration had postponed "fundamental decisions"
on strategic weaponry in order to create a more favorable
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atmosphere for SALT. Trofimenko commented that certain decisions
had already been made, including the accelerated deployment of
the Safeguard ABM and the development of MIRV's.
COMMENT IN For Chinese audiences, Moscow has used the
MANDARIN purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress
to defend the USSR's participation in SALT--"an
activity within the realm of the general strategy of the inter-
national communist movement"--and to assail Peking for its
present silence and past criticism of SALT. A commentary on
14 November, calling attention to Peking's current silence,
said that the PRC last November had branded Soviet participation
in SALT "another step on the road of betraying the interests
of the anti-imperialist struggle" and termed such a charge
consistent with Peking's reaction to the partial nuclear test-
ban treaty. In fact, the commentator said, if SALT produces
an agreement it will have lessened the "imperialist nuclear
threat," thereby marking "a new step in one of the important
tasks of communists--the strengthening of peace."
Peking has not devoted a commentary to SALT since 4 November
1969, when an NCNA dispatch on the talks leveled charges similar
to the one recalled in the Soviet commentary. It has, however,
taken some passing swipes at the talks.
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CHILE
MOSCOW WELCOMES RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA
Soviet media have hailed President Allende's 12 November announce-
ment of the restoration of Chilean-Cuban relations as portending
the end of Cuba's isolation and as registering a trend among
Latin American states toward liberation from U.S. tutelage.
Latin American specialist Listov wrote in the 14 November PRAVDA
that Allende's move accords with the strivings of a number of
Latin American states to pursue foreign policies "without
dependence on the 'wishes' of Washington." He noted increasing
Latin American trade with Cuba in contravention of U.S. desires
and alleged. that there were increasing calls within the OAS
for restoration of Cuba's "lawful rights" in that organization..
"Realistic tendencies," he concluded, "are gaining the upper
hand."
Other Moscow comment plays up favorable Latin American reactions
to Allende's announcement. An Ecuadoran cabinet minister is
cited as saying his country, too, must mc.intain relations with
all Latin American. states, including Cuba, and Chilean Communist
Party Secretary General Luis Corvalan is quoted as calling
Allende's move "the start of a process that will put an end to
Cuba's isolation from other Latin American countries." A Radio
Moscow commentary for Latin American audiences on the 16th
coupled the. renewal of Cuban-Chilean ties with Peruvian Govern-
ment calls for a reassessment of the Cuban question as evidence
of "a breach of the imperialist-imposed blockade of Cuba."
The time has come, the commentator said, when "the policy of
isolating Cuba is becoming the policy of isolating the United
States from other countries in the Western hemisphere."
CUBA HAILS BLOW TO BLOCKADE, EVINCES INTEREST IN TIES WITH PERU
Havana's first comment on the reestablishment of Cuban-Chilean
relations, in the domestic service on the 13th, forecast that
other Latin-American governments will follow suit with "the
same courage and the same propriety" displayed by Allende.
Another commentary the same day described the renewal of ties
as of "utmost importance" not only to Chile and Cuba but to
"Latin America and the world." Above all, the commentator said,
it dealt."a hard blow to the U.S. policy of blockading and
isolating the Cuban revolution."
CONFIDENTIAL
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The renewal of ties was negotiated by Cuban minister without
portfolio Carlos. Rafael Rodriguez, who headed the Cuban delega-
tion to Allende's inauguration. While in Chile, Rodriguez
proffered some advice which appeared to betray Cuban concern
over the future course of the new Chilean government. At an
11 November press conference--reported in a dispatch from
PRENSA LATINA's correspondent to the Havana home office--he
remarked that Chile might well profit from some of Cuba's
"negative.experiences." Specifically, he warned against
permitting "anguish. or impatience over meeting the people's
needs" to result in. efforts "to accomplish more than the
technical, political, and economic resources allow at a
given moment." Suggesting. concern lest Allende be overly
tolerant of hs political enemies, Rodriguez noted that the
Cuban revolution "sinned in its early days not by excessive.
executions but by being too generous with certain elements
that had attached themselves to the revolution."
In an interview. on Chilean TV two days earlier, Rodriguez had
been asked about a. TIME magazine report that one of Allende Is
daughters had returned from Cuba with a letter from Fidel
Castro advising Allende not to break relations with Washington,
to maintain amicable. relations with the army, and to restrain
revolutionary rhetoric. Rodriguez temporized at first ("Look,
I do not. devote myself to violating correspondence"), then
declared that the letter was "nonexistent" ani that "Dr. Allende
neither asks for nor needs advice, nor is Comrade Fidel up to
giving advice to any leader like Dr. Allende, his personal
friend whom he admires and trusts."
At the press conference in Chile Rodriguez reiterated that
Cuba will. not return to the OAS and excoriated the organiza-
tion as "a corpse with some outgrowths 'still appearing."
But he went on to express understanding of Allende's-decision
to remain. within the. OAS "because. he believes Chile' can. fight
from within. for such international programs as those of
Popular Unity." Allende's statement on the reestablishment
of relations. with Cuba, carried in full in Havana media,
disputed the legality of the OAS sanctions against Cuba but
was careful to specify that Chile will respect its obligations
under international and regional treaties; PRENSA LATINA
also carried-the 15 November statement of a Chilean
representative with the Andean Pact to the effect that the
restoration. of Cuban-Chilean relations "will in no way alter
our participation" in the Pact.
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RELATIONS In a 1. August interview with Chilean newsmen in
WITH PERU Havana, asserting high interest in.relations with
Chile,* Castro remarked that-he was "not so
interested in-opening relations with Peru" because "imperialism!'.
might use. such a. development "as a pretext to attack-the present.
Peruvian Government." But there are signs that Havana entertains
hopes for a Peruvian initiative to resume relations.
En route home from Chile after Allende.'s,inauguration; Rodriguez
stopped. off at the Lima airport .on.12 November and made a.number
of flattering statements--carried by PRENSA LATINA--about
Peruvian. foreign and. domestic policies. Among other-things,.he.
lauded. remarks by the Peruvian foreign minister calling for a
dialogue between. Cuba and other Latin American. countries and
suggesting Cuba's. readmission to the.,OAS--manifestations,
Rodriguez said,.of.Peru's "independent policy." While insisting.
again that.Cuba does.not.want to return to the OAS; he professed
understanding. of. the. desires for member countries to use the
organization-as a.platform for airing. their views on Latin
American problems. He recalled Castro's-praise for President
Velasco's reform measures, massive Cuban blood. donations for
Peruvian earthquake victims, and Cuba's proposal of an-inter-
national aid fund for Peru in the. aftermath of the earthquake.
He had made many of.the same.points at Lima's airport on his
previous stopover en route. to Santiago.
Radio Havana. reported. on. 13 November that Peruvian President
Velasco, after commenting. on- the renewal of Cuban-Chilean
relations, said the OAS resolution excluding Cuba "cannot
remain an. eternal and unchangeable condemnation." A broadcast
on the 15th cited an article by-a Peruvian -newspaper*editor
as arguing that the issue of restoring relations with Cuba
did not necessarily have to be resolved within the OAS and as
alleging that the Peruvian president and his foreign minister
both believed it was "possible to revise the legal terms on
which Cuba was condemned."
* Discussed in the TRENDS of"19 August 1970, pages 38-41.
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FRG-POLAND
WARSAW HAILS TREATY. PRAISES BRANDT'S POLITICAL COURAGE
The treaty to normalize Polish-West German relations, concluded
on 14 November and initialed by Foreign Ministers Scheel and
Jedrychowski in Warsaw on the 18th, is hailed in Polish media
as a prod?,ict of Polish initiative and a tribute to the political
courage and realism of Chancellor Brandt. A TRYBUNA LUDU article
on the 15th says "diplomatic circles" expect the formal signing
to take place before the end of the year and notes that
Jedryehowski has invited Brandt to visit Warsaw, presumably
for the signing ceremony.
Polish commentators call the treaty an important step in the
improvement of bilateral ties and a vital factor in the
development of European security. Tracing it to the initiative
of PZPR First Secretary Gomulka in May 1969, they emphasize
that the "point of departure" was the necessity for the FRG
to confirm the "final nature" of the Oder-Neisse line as
Poland's western frontier--a consistent theme of Polish
comment since the negotiations for the treaty began in
February.*
Praise for Brandt's "realism" in agreeing to the treaty appears
in a commentary in the 15 November ZYCIE WARSZAWY, which
remarks that the coalition SPD-FDP 3overnment under Brandt
"has had the courage to revise Bonn's policy toward the
socialist states and, in keeping with the spirit of the
times, to seek a detente in relations with these countries."
PAP on the 16th quotes the army daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI-as
asserting that Brandt, "whose antifascist past is generally
known," has "soberly and realistically" appraised problems
relating to Bonn's Ostpolitik.
* The seventh and final round of talks began on 3 November.
For a review of comment on the sixth round, see the TRENDS of
14 October 1970, pages 42-43.
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3.8 NOVII,MT31!;H 19't O
At the same time, the propaganda 'takes cognizance as usual of
opposition forces in the I'RG allegedly bent on undercutting
Brandt's policies. Thus the 15 November TRYBUNA LUI)U article
cautions that "nationalistic forces" and "revanchist groups"
continue to oppose the normalization of relations with
Poland. Commentators point to the existence of such sentiment
in stressing the importance of developments in the post-treaty
period.
Soviet media have reported the conclusion of the agreement, so
far without comment. The only available East European comment
apart fr':m Warsaw's comes from Budapest, which has welcomed
the agreement in NEPSZABADSAG and NEPSZAVA articles on the
15th. Both papers laud Brandt's role while taking note of a
still vocal opposition. NEPSZAVA says that "a demagogic
incitement of the ch auvinist-militarist-revanchist chorus
can be expected primarily in the matter of the final and
irrevocable recognition of the Oder-Neisse border."
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 CON I"II)IRN'I'IAI, ~' ~~IIP
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NEW TREATY PATTERNED ON SOVIET-ROMANIAN PACT. WITH VARIATIONS
The Poiiuh-Itoman:Lan treaty uigned by Gomulka and Ceauoeoeu in
Bucharest on 12 November, available in full from A(IERPRES, in
general follows the pattern set in the Soviet-Romanian treaty
of 7 July,* which cleared the way for Romania to go ahead on
the renewal of treaties with other Soviet bloc countries.
The Polio h-Romanian pact, replacing the one of 26 January 1949,
was Initialed within a month of the conclusion of the Soviet-
Romanian treaty after a long delay occasioned by the Czechoslovak
events. On the model of the Soviet-Romanian treaty, the Polish-
Romanian document broadens the commitment to mutual defense and
avoids any allusion to the Brezhnev doctrine or any commitment
to economic "integration" under CEMA, of which Poland is a
foremost advocate. At the same time, variations between the
two treaties reflect Romania's independent approach in its
dealings with other members of the Soviet bloc, as well as an
effort to achieve more flexibility in bloc relations by
enshrining principles of autonomy in bilateral pacts.
MUTUAL Article 7, the mutual defense clause of the new
DEFENSE treaty, commits the signators to assist each other
militarily against armed attack "by any state or
group of states," as in the counterpart clause of the Soviet-
Romanian pact. It replaces the formula used in the January 1949
treaty, which delimited the commitment to repelling aggression
by "Germany or any state associated with it." While the old
formula is no longer appropriate in a period of rapprochement
with West Germany, the new one--divested completely of
geographical limitations--would presumably create some
uneasiness on the part of Moscow's allies in the present-day
context of potential Sino-Soviet confrontation. In the preamble,
where the Soviet-Romanian treaty pledges observance of the
"obligations envisaged in the 1955 Warsaw Treaty" and mentions
that the Warsaw Pact was created in response to "the NATO threat,"
the counterpart passage in the Polish-Romanian preamble adds a
phrase terming the Pact "an instrument for defending the security
of the countries in the treaty membership and peace in Europe."
* See the TRENDS of 8 and 15 July for a discussion of the
Soviet-Romanian pact.
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ROMANIA-POLAND
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t;t)NI'1.I4;NII\I., 1111111 '1'10NU1}
:IM NO)VEMl3II L970
'.I.'huu while Lhe mul:urtL dnf0nue c,111,1100 3.e1 you the geographical
boutrd,Lrl,ea of' the cormniLtriont OIpon-ended, the Romanians and
L'olou contr!.vo in their prer>Jnblo to reinforce the focus on
the European theater.
UN ROLE Article 5, the "coexiutence" clause, softens the
rtnti-imporialiot thrur3t of its counterpart in the
Soviet-Romanian pact and cited the United Nations' role in
peace-keeping operations, unmentioned in that context in the
pact with the Soviets. Article 5 of the Soviet-Romanian pact
pledges the eignatoro to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence
by taking measures against "encroachments by the aggressive
forces of imperialism and reaction"; the Polish-Romanian
counterpart article pledges that "in keeping with the aims
and principles of the UN Charter," the two parties will
"continue the endeavours for the defense of peace and
security and the peaceful solving of international differences . . . ."
MUTUAL The principles governing relations between Romania
RELATIONS and Poland are set out in Article 1, which states
that "cooperation" between the two states will be
based on "socialist internationalism, sovereignty, equal
rights, reciprocal advantage, mutual assistance and noninterference
in internal affairs." Article 2 pledges the "continuous development
of cooperation within CEMA, as well as with other socialist states."
Similar formulations appear in the Soviet-Romanian treaty.
But Article 8, the mutual "consultation" clause, is looser in
form than the one in the Soviet-Romanian treaty, providing only
that the two parties "will inform and consult" each other "on
the expansion of cooperation between the two states as well an
with major international questions concerning their interests."
The 1949 treaty between the two countries had called for
consultation on "all important international questions,"
whereas the new Soviet-Romanian pact provides that the two
signatories will "consult one another on all important
international problems affecting the interests of both
countries in order to place in accord the positions." This
in turn contrasts with the more disciplined treaty ties Moscow
has established with Czechoslovakia: The new Soviet-Czechoslovak
treaty stipulates that after consultations, the two parties
"shall act proceeding from their common position."
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CON I1'.CI),I0'1':I:Af., I+'II:I:rj 'I!1I1,ND0
18 NOVEMBER 1970
CEAUSESCU, GOMULKA REMARKS MIRROR DIVERGENT APPROACHES
In his address at a friendship rally following the signing >f
the treaty, broadcast live by Radio Bucharest, Ceausescu mado
a strong defense of his own national course and his policy of
pursuing good relations with "all" countries. "The will of
the people to live freely, to strengthen and consolidate
their national states, to develop independently their economic
and social life in accordance with their vital interests," he
emphasized, "asserts itself more strongly than even in our
days." Noting that the new treaty puts both countries on
record as resolved to "unswervingly pursue the policy of
peaceful coexistence," he added that "Romania consistently
strives to promote new relations between states based on
sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual
advantage." Life proves, he concluded, that cooperation,
the avoidance of armed clashes, and lastir g peace can be
insured "only on the basis of these principles inscribed
in the UN Charter."
In contrast, Gomulka stressed a need to promote further
cooperation within the framework of CEMA and argued that
national security is linked to close ties with the Soviet
bloc: "Insuring the rate of development and keeping in
step with the worldwide technical progress is unthinkable
without strengthening economic ties between the socialist
countries," he said. And progress in "economic integration
is based on a more effective contribution of-our countries
in the international division of labor and on efficient
competition with capitalism; we must not underestimate the
importance of the integrating processes taking place in the
capitalist world." Gomulka also took the occasion to recall
the "heroic" role of the Soviet army in helping to liberate
the socialist countries in World War II. He reminded the
Romanians that "the effective guarantee of their sovereignty
and security, as well as the instrument of their thoz _-i4h
development," resides in their own efforts and in "the unity
of the socialist states."
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CONFTI)1(IMTIAi, IO13I13 Tt EN.DS
18 NOVEMBER 1.970
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COMMUNIQUE The 13 November joint communique issued at the
ON VISIT close of the four-day Bucharest visit of the
Gomulka delegation, which also included Premier
Cyrankiewicz,* reports that the two sides signed a protocol
calling for "continued expansion of economic and technical-
scientific cooperation." The wide areas of d.itference between
the two party-state delegations, however, are reflected in
the communique's summary of the talks: "The two delegations
informed each other about the achievements and tasks in
building socialism in the two countries . . . and analyzed
the present state and possibilities for expanding bilateral
relations and exchanged views on international questions
and on problems of the international communist and workers
movement."
Presumably at Romania's behest, the communique echoes Ceausescu's
stress on observance of the principles of the UN Charter,
registering both sides' support for expanding relations "based
on the rules of international law . . . and intensified efforts
to promote peace and exclude the use of force or threats of
force from interstate relations."
* Cyrankiewicz and Romanian Premier Maurer signed the new
friendship treaty along with Gomulka and Ceausescu. Maurer,
still recuperating from an automobile accident, was not listed
as present at any of the ceremonies during the Polish visit.
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CON.FIDENTIAL:, FBIS PIZENDS
1.0 NOVEMBER 1?7O
PRC - PAKISTAPJ
CO+ UNIDUE WAILING FRIENDSHIP ENDS YAWYA KHAN VISIT TO PRC
Peking has used the occasion of Pakistan President Yahya Khan's
10-14 November visit to reaffirm the warmth of PRC-Pakistan
relations against the background of recent contacts between
Yahya Khan and the two superpowers. As stressed in the
14 November joint communique, the visitor was accorded "a
rousing welcome and a magnificent and enthusiastic reception"
by the Chinese. Both sides are recorded as being "highly
satisfied" with the results of talks between PRC Premier
Chou En-lai and Yahya Khan, which took place in "a very
sincere and friendly atmosphere." The visitor was also
received by Mao. During the visit a new agreement on
economic cooperation was signed.
The communique broaches contentious Indo-Pakistan issues and
calls attention to themes reflecting Peking's resurgent
diplomatic activity, notably the recently resurrected proposal
fora world summit conference on disarmament and support for
PRC membership in the United Nations. In stressing the value
of peaceful coexistence, the communique cites the settlement
of the boundary question between the two countries as
exemplifying "strict adherence" to the five principles of
peaceful coexistence. Presumably in deference to Pakistani
sensitivities, the communique mentions neither the Soviet
Union nor the United States.
Yahya Khan's visit to China, coming in the wake of a trip to
the Soviet Union in June and a meeting with President Nixon
in October, followed a series of exchanges of delegations
between the PRC and Pakistan this year. Kuo Mo-Jo and Fang Yi
(head of the Chinese aid agency) visited Pakistan in March
and April, respectively, and since then Peking has hosted
Pakistani economic and friendship delegations and has
entertained the commanders of the Pakistani air force and
navy and the army's medical director. In the current
communique Yahya Khan renewed the long-standing invitation
for Chou En-tai to visit Pakistan, and Chou "indicated that he
would visit Pakistan at the earliest possible opportunity."
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18 NOVEMBER 1970
CHINESE AID Noting that the two sides "expressed full
satisfaction at the deep, all-round development
of the friendly relations between China and Pakistan," the
communique registers Pakistan's acknowledgment of China's
"generous help" in the past and Chinese "willingness to render
to Pakistan further assistance within China's means and capacity
to help make the economy of Pakistan self-reliant." Although
NCNA's 14 November report on the signing of a PRC-Pakistan
"agreement on economic and technical cooperation" does not
disclose the terms of the aid, the Karachi press has described
it as including a long-term interest-free loan of 500 million
yuan for use during the first three years of Pakistan's fourth
five-year plan, with the possibility of additional loans after
a review of the situation at the end of the third year. That
there is a military aspect of the aid agreement seems indicated
by the participation in the talks of PLA Chief of Staff Huang
Yung-sheng, Deputy Chief Chiu Hui-tso, and the head of the
logistics equipment department.
INTERNATIONAL The Chinese seem to have hedged in their commitment
ISSUES to Pakistan's causes in its disputes with India.
While expressing support for the Kashmiri people
"in their just struggle for their right of self-determination"--a
stand included in PRC-Pakistan communiques since February 1964--
the Chinese took a noncommittal position on.other aspects of
the Indo-Pakistan disputes. Thus, according to the communique,
the Chinese side "noted with interest" and considered "worthy
of support of the people of various countries" the Pakistani
proposal on withdrawal of troops to enable the people of Kashmir
to exercise self-determination. The communique also notes that
Yahya Khan "apprised" the Chinese of "the dispute over the
distribution of the Ganges waters" and that the Chinese side
"appreciated Pakistan's stand for a peaceful solution" of this
question and "hoped for an early settlement." Chinese reserva-
tions on the troop withdrawal proposal may have been made with
an eye on the Sino-Indian territorial dispute, and on the Ganges
question Peking may have been seeking to keep its options open
rather being locked in on one side of the dispute. In managing
to have these issues included in the communique the Pakistanis
? achieved more than they did during Yahya Khan's visit to Moscow;
the communique on that visit failed to mention the Kashmir or
Ganges questions. The Soviet-Fakistan communique spoke in
generalities about Indo-Pakistani relations. The Sino-Pakistan
communique does not mention India.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 NOVEMBER 1970
On the UN membership question, a consistent theme-in PRC-Pakistan
communiques and in Chinese reportage on mutual visits, the
communique cites Pakistan's view that the PRC Government is
"the sole legal government of the Chinese people," that Taiwan
is "an inalienable part of the territory" of the PRC, and "that
the legitimate rights of the PRC in the United Nations should
be restore(, forthwith." The Chinese side "expressed thanks for
the friendly stand of Pakistan." The expulsion of the Nationalist
regime is left implicit in the communique. In banquet speeches
on the 11th Tung Pi-wu thanked Pakistan for "firmly opposing
the scheme of creating 'two Chinas,l" and Yahya Khan asserted
that Taiwan "is an integral part" of the PRC and that Pakistan
"categorically rejected the myth of two Chinas and all that is
attempted to be built around this myth."
The communique records both sides' "determination to work for
the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear
weapons." In addition, the Pakistan side takes note "with
positive interest" of Peking's proposal for a world summit
conference to discuss this objective. (This proposal was
mentioned in the 7 March 1965 communique on Ayub Khan's visit
to the PRC but was omitted from the 31 March 1966 communique
concluding Liu Shao-chi's visit to Pakistan.) The Chinese
proposal, first mentioned following the October 1964 PRC nuclear
test but not reiterated at the elite level since July 1966,
resurfaced in the 1 November 1970 joint statement of the China-
Japan Friendship Association and the visiting Japanese Socialist
Party delegation. However, the current communique,unlike the
1 November statement, does not go on to suggest that as a "first
step" the conference reach an agreement that nuclear weapons
would not be used.
Disagreement is reflected in the communique's statement that
the two sides had "an exchange of views" on Indochina, though
the Pakistanis joined their hosts in saying "the struggle of
the three peoples of Indo-China for national liberation was
just." A closer coincidence of views, based on a predictably
pro-Arab position, is recorded on the Middle East, with the
two sides calling for Israeli withdrawal from "all Arab
lands . . . seized by aggression."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
18 NOVEMBER 1970
CHINESE Voluminous Chinese propaganda surrounding the visit--
COVERAGE totalling over a quarter of Peking radio output during
that week, compared with 15 percent of total output
at the time of Ayub Khan's visit in March 1965--foreshadowed the
communique in lauding the warm bilateral relations, supporting
Kashmiri self-determination, and citing Pakistani backing for PRC
membership in the United Nations. In addition, an NCNA correspondent's
commentary on 10 November injected a sharp anti-Soviet note in
hailing Pakistan for rejecting last year the proposal of "a super-
power, flaunting the banner of 'regional economic cooperation,"'
for creation of "a pernicious 'system of collective security in
Asia' in a vain attempt to control the Asian countries, further
push its aggression and expansion in Asia, and oppose China."
Peking's efforts to play up the warm welcome, the grand receptions,
and the large crowds for Yahya Khan and bin. entourage., began
with an NCNA report of his arrival on the 10th and his welcome by
"several hundred thousand revolutionary people" who "gathered at
the airport and lined the streets" and "sang and danced and shouted
slogans." NCNA also carried roundups of Pakistani press comments
hailing the visit and praising the friendship between the two
neighbors.
MOSCOW REPORTS YAHYA KHAN'S ARRIVAL, DISPLAYS SENSITIVITY
In a highly unusual Peking-datelined report on Yahya Khan's arrival,
TASS on 10 November noted that he had come on "an official visit" and
had been met at the airport by Chou En-tai and Li Hsien-ni n. On the
same day a Mandarin broadcast over Moscow's purportedly unofficial
Radio Peace and Progress stressed that Soviet-Pakistan relations
are characterized by mutual understanding, friendship, and cooperation
and recalled that President Yahya Khan during his visit'to Moscow in
June had said Pakistan and the USSR hold the same views on many
international issues, citing particularly their close stands on
Vietnam and the Middle East. The high degree of economic cooperation,
the broadcast said, is illustrated by some 20 large joint industrial
enterprises which will be the backbone of Pakistan's national economy.
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